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The Admiral Charles M. Cooke
Naval Long Range Strategists and Planners Conference - March 1994

by
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THE ADMIRAL CHARLES M. COOKE NAVAL LONG RANGE STRATEGISTS AND PLANNERS CONFERENCE - MARCH 1994

It gave us great satisfaction at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies to host the conference which brought together a wide range of naval strategists and planners. Over forty commands were represented, giving clear evidence of the degree of interest in both the long range planning of the naval services and the conference's theme of Naval Expeditionary Warfare.

We hope that the three days spent in Newport made a constructive contribution to the discussion on Naval Expeditionary Warfare issues by providing a forum for the different perceptions of the participants to be freely exchanged.

This report is deliberately brief and it is hoped that no offense is caused by the exclusion of a particular individual's concerns. However, we hope it serves as a reminder of some of the debate and fashions a foundation for continued discussion on these critical concerns.

Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Director, Strategic Research
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PURPOSE. The Admiral Charles M. Cooke Naval Long Range Strategists and Planners Conference provides a forum where Navy and Marine Corps strategists and long range planners from JCS/OSD and Navy/USMC headquarters staffs meet with counterparts on the unified, specified, fleet and component staffs to identify and analyze areas and issues of common interests, to share maritime security concerns and insights, and to ensure commonality of effective purpose.

INTRODUCTION. This year's Admiral Charles M. Cooke Naval Long Range Strategists and Planners Conference, the fifth in a series of annual conferences cosponsored by the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School, sought to test and define the concept of expeditionary warfare in terms of national policy, command specific capabilities, and within the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) litmus.

Prior to focussing on what came out of the Conference, this paper provides a brief synopsis of the strategic thinking which led to the identification of Naval Expeditionary Warfare (NEW) as a discrete mission, defines the characteristic of NEW, and summarizes some of the realities within which our thinking and capabilities of NEW will mature.

CONTEXT. The purpose of the 1992 Navy-Marine Corps White Paper "...From the Sea" was to define a combined Navy and Marine Corps vision to help guide policy development, program planning, and force structure decisions in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In the decade prior to "...From the Sea", the strategic thinking of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps was guided by The Maritime Strategy. This governing concept was focused primarily on contributions of the Navy and Marine Corps in defeating the Soviet Union in a global war. Mainly that strategy focused on "blue water" -- that is, mid-ocean -- aspects of the naval war; the littorals (shore or coastal areas) were viewed as adjuncts to be seized and utilized as necessary in order to improve prospects for achieving sea control.

Once control of the seas was established, the Maritime Strategy called for "carrying the fight to the enemy". This would ostensibly be done by applying a broad range of power projection capabilities to "make a strategic difference in the course and outcome of the war". This concept -- Phase IV in the Maritime Strategy -- came to be known as "strategic leverage". How that aspect of the Maritime Strategy was to be executed was never, in fact, fully developed.
Following victory in the Cold War and the concomitant collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no challenge to U.S. Navy/Marine Corps supremacy on the high seas. The preconditions for using naval power to exert leverage against the shore in support of national objectives have been established. The term developed for doing so is "Naval Expeditionary Warfare".

Given the geostrategic location of the United States, expeditionary warfare mostly -- albeit not always -- involves movement of expeditionary forces across oceans to reach the objective area. Hence when that force is comprised of Navy and/or Marine Corps forces, it is a Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF). If it includes forces of other Services (Army, Air Force, Coast Guard), it would be a Joint Expeditionary Force.

**CHARACTERISTICS.** "...From the Sea" posited the following four features of Naval Expeditionary Forces:

-- Swift to respond;
-- Structured to build power from the sea;
-- Able to sustain support; and
-- Unrestricted in their movement into the scene of action.

"...From the Sea" also identified four key operational capabilities to execute successfully the new operational vision:

-- Command, Control, and Surveillance;
-- Battlespace Dominance;
-- Power Projection; and
-- Force Sustainment.

**DEVELOPMENTS.** In the 18 months since "...From the Sea" was released, all the Military Services have undergone a drastic reduction in forces. For example, the "600 Ship Navy" which existed at the end of the Cold War in 1988 has been reduced by 40% in size (325-346 ships), 36% in Total Obligational Authority, and 32% in personnel.

Study and review groups abound, working in parallel on various dimensions of the problem of providing a strategic foundation for future decision-making. Among the major efforts, and the lead agency for each, are:
In addition, there are many study efforts (e.g. Sealift, Mine Countermeasures, Special Operations, etc.) in progress, all of which seek to apply extant operational capabilities towards improving our expeditionary warfare potential.

The problem is that all of these study efforts trail the reality that budget considerations are forcing decisions about force structures to be made whether or not we have developed a shared strategic vision, operational concepts, and analytical assessment tools upon which those force structure decisions should be made.

Several efforts have been initiated to come to terms with what "Expeditionary Warfare" entails. The CNO has established N85 as Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the Navy Staff. In November 1993 a Naval Expeditionary Warfare Conference was held at Norfolk, Virginia.

And in March 1994, the Naval War College/Naval Postgraduate School's Admiral Cooke Naval Strategy Conference took naval expeditionary warfare as its focusing theme. The balance of this paper addresses issues and insights about Naval Expeditionary Warfare that emerged in the course of the three-day conference.

**ASSUMPTIONS.** Planners inherently use assumptions upon which to base their planning. There seem to be several key assumptions -- some implicit -- which underlie current U.S. military planning. These either have been stated publicly, or emerged during the course of the Cooke Conference. They would seem to include the following:

-- Sea control is assured on the major oceans of the world.
-- The world is undergoing the most significant change since the end of World War II, from the bi-lateral superpower conflict framework of the Cold War to a less certain future. In that future, diverse regional crises, in which the interactions of the superpowers will be less structured than in the last half-century, are likely to be more common.

-- Strategy guidance, when it comes, will largely reflect a linear continuation of the national security paradigm which existed during the Cold War (e.g. threats will be mostly -- albeit not always -- from nation-states and will be military or paramilitary in nature).

-- Joint operations are an incontrovertible dimension of future American military operations.

-- "Forward presence" will be a valid mission for force structure arguments in the future.

-- At some level not too far below current Fiscal Year budget authority, the freefall descent of the DOD budget will be arrested (and may even turn around by 1997).

-- Because of these assumptions, a consolidated naval warfare area is receiving increased attention: Naval Expeditionary Warfare.

Whether this is in fact a correct and complete list of assumptions underlying Naval Expeditionary Warfare would seem to be a first order of business for addressing any warfare mission area, NEW included.

**DEFINITION.** There is not yet a widely-agreed definition of what Naval Expeditionary Warfare is. So another first-order issue for Naval Expeditionary Warfare is for the community to agree on a concise definition. With that in hand, the Navy and Marine Corps will more effectively be able to get down to the essential business of working through the operational-level issues.

Notionally, Expeditionary Warfare involves the movement of a task-organized military force over some distance towards a specific objective, with the end result of accomplishing an assigned military mission against that objective.\(^1\) It is irrelevant

\(^1\) Others would add qualifiers like "usually on short notice", "in response to crises", "conducted with forces tailored with specific capabilities", and add that it connotes promptness of response, self-sustainability, and in all likelihood forward- or self-deploying forces, although these are by no means widely agreed at this point.
whether the movement is challenged by any adversary. There may be other qualifiers that the naval community wishes to ascribe to NEW.

N85 defined Naval Expeditionary Warfare thusly:

Military operations, mounted (usually on short notice) in response to crises or potential crises, and conducted with forces tailored with capabilities to achieve a limited and clearly defined objective or a specified range of objectives. The term conveys a sense of promptness of response and effectiveness of response; hence, it is best carried out in its initial stages by forces that are forward deployed or self-deploying, and which can sustain themselves in the objective area until a robust logistic support system can be established.

**ISSUES.** At first glance, expeditionary warfare would seem to be little more than what U.S. naval forces have traditionally and historically done and done well, i.e. travel across the oceans to emplace and support military forces on foreign shores in the furtherance of national strategic objectives. But there are problems with translating the concept from the "vision" that the CNO and CMC set forth in 1992, to an operational capability applicable to the world of the mid-1990s and beyond.

Primarily these issues fall into three categories:

- **Executional** issues, which are near-term, address how in specific terms the naval service should organize for and develop doctrine for expeditionary warfare;

- **Structural** issues oriented toward force structure for -- and thus dollar investment in -- expeditionary warfare over the course of the POM; and

- **Conceptual** issues which are long-term and strategic, encompassing how naval expeditionary warfare concepts might evolve in the context of the uncertain world of the future and the application of emerging technologies.

**A. Executional Issues.**

(1) **Interpretation.** There are differing interpretations of what "expeditionary warfare" implies operationally. To some it is simply amphibious warfare, doctrinally conducted much as it was in World War II only using modern military capabilities. To others it involves applying different operational art forms (such as the Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" -- OMFTS) to the transfer of military power from sea to shore. In a third view it could be any type of military power (cruise or ballistic missiles, bullets, bombs, etc. as well as Marines or other reinforcements or supplies) shipped or launched from ships at sea against the shore in a hostile or potentially hostile environment. While to still others
expeditionary warfare spans the entire spectrum from embarkation state-side to application and sustainment of force against a foreign objective. Determining the essential elements of Naval Expeditionary Warfare will help limit the scope of how the mission is interpreted.

(2) Organization. What a Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) actually might be, who would command it, and how the command relationships of a given Naval Expeditionary Force would work will be a key issue to resolve. In part this depends upon resolving the interpretation problems noted above. Compounding this will be issues such as:

a. How "joint" (as opposed to "Blue" or "Blue-Green") the composition of a Naval Expeditionary Force will be (that its Command and Control will at least be joint seemed indisputable);

b. Whether different CINCs will have different views on how to organize and employ Expeditionary Forces;

c. How USACOM's concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packages (AJFPs) would be constructed relative to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (the USMC, for example, is concerned about maintaining the operational integrity of the MAGTF);

d. Whether the Fleet Commanders will accept a common vision of what Naval Expeditionary Warfare is, and how to resolve the many issues associated with NEW;

e. Whether forces of other nations will be involved, and if so, how they would be integrated into Command Relations;

f. How U.S. command relations are shaped when forces of Supporting CINCs such as SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and SPACECOM are involved; and

g. How to reconcile the more offensive sense of the NEF with the primarily defensive concept which underlies the Combined Warfare Commander (CWC) concept under which Naval Battle Groups have been organized for two decades.

(3) Information. Flow of needed intelligence from sensor to commander to shooter in a Joint, complex, rapidly changing operational environment was identified as a key functional concern. In fact the issue is broader than just military intelligence, since it arguably includes cover and deception, Psy-war ops, information protection, counter-intelligence, and so on - in short, "information warfare" integrated with evolving concepts of expeditionary warfare.
(4) **Tactical.** Several potential operational "show-stopper" issues were identified. Among these were mines, tactical ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, communications, and access to space systems.

a. **Mines** - Dearth of Mine Countermeasures (MCM) assets, non-co-location of those assets with other Fleet units for purposes of conducting coordinated training, lack of night-time Air MCM capability, slowness of response of MCM assets to theater, slowness of the MCM process itself relative to need to insert forces quickly into a crisis area, and above all the need for a benign environment were cited as problems to be addressed.

b. **Tactical ballistic missiles (TBM)** - It was asserted that because of the inherent mobility of naval ships there is, for the near-term at least, low concern about the conventional ballistic missile threat. However, in the more restricted maneuvering environment where expeditionary warfare must take place, TBMs are more problematic. And in the mid- and long-term, TBMs are likely to become an increasing concern for naval forces. ROE, timely delivery/receipt of weapons release authority, debris limitation (i.e. where in the missile flight path the intercept takes place), and interoperability were the major problems posed to expeditionary warfare by the conventional TBM threat.

c. **Nuclear weapons** - The possibility that TBMs might be armed with nuclear weapons would vastly compound the TBM problems noted above.

d. **Communications overload/vulnerabilities** - Expeditionary warfare in particular is heavily dependent on space-borne communications (reportedly also, Fleet units are in the process of removing HF -- the only other long-haul communications systems available -- which also pose a problem for us in operating with Allies who remain HF-system dependent). Problems were noted with complete dependency on space communications included jammability (particularly to our own EW/Radio Frequency Interference), volume-saturation (especially FLTSATCOM and Defense Satellite Communications System), and risks of single-point failure, particularly with 10 major tactical systems all based on the UHF TACSAT.

e. **Increasing access to U.S. space capabilities** - Due to recent policy decisions, space systems such as Global Positioning System (precise navigation), Multi-Spectral Imagery (mission-tailored map-making), and spy-in-the-sky high-resolution photography technology are or soon will be available to our adversaries, even in wartime. How this potentially affects the availability and flow of information in warfare in the future has yet to be examined.

There was a tendency among participants at the Cooke Conference to see each of these problems as potentially insurmountable. But if expeditionary warfare is to be
effective, the question is not what difficulties there will be in executing it, but how to overcome those difficulties. For example, the new Marine Corps operational concept "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" inherently contains a dilemma: either maneuver is a way to overcome or circumvent such tactical problems as those listed above -- such as mines -- or mines are a problem; if the latter, there really is no such thing as "maneuver warfare from the sea".

(5) **Support.** Shortfalls in sealift, big-deck amphibious ships, total Amphibious Ready Groups, and sustainability for extended operations ashore were identified. How severely these constrain operations, and how to correct the shortfalls or provide other work-arounds -- particularly in an era of still-declining budgets -- are issues for resolution.

(6) **Doctrine.** There was a discernible gap between "...From the Sea" and extant naval doctrine. Navy Doctrine Command has only recently been stood up, and is in the process of preparing general doctrinal guidance for naval operations. For the Navy to embrace and explain expeditionary warfare, particularly in the context of the joint operation environment, written doctrine would seem to be essential. The question was asked, however, whether closely structured doctrine for expeditionary warfare might constrain a Navy which traditionally has operated based on highly decentralized and individual decision-making.

(7) **Training.** Assuming that some amount of doctrine will be essential to help the Navy interface with the Marine Corps and in the Joint environment, the next issue will be how to organize, implement, standardize, and monitor the training in and exercising of NEF doctrine.

**B. Structural Issues.**

(1) **Composition.** Is a Naval Expeditionary Force a new name for an extant task organization, or will it require new groupings of forces based on specific tasks and objectives? The USMC seems inclined towards the former, wanting to preserve the integrity both of structure and command of the MAGTF, while USACOM seems more disposed towards organizing and training force capabilities to task irrespective of pre-existing Service organizations. (SOCOM, for example, described what it saw as its relevancy to naval expeditionary warfare, a concept rather vehemently opposed by some USMC representatives present at the Cooke Conference). It was unclear whether for the Navy organizing for expeditionary warfare would simply involve use of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) - Commander, Landing Force (CLF) structure, or imply something more comprehensively developed (e.g.- to include Cvs; cruise missile shooters; or air-defense, MCM, ASW units, etc.).

(2) **Span.** One major issue pertains to how broad the scope of operational concepts implied in "...From the Sea" is. Specifically, is the USMC's new operational
maneuver concept for use of its amphibious capabilities ("Operational Maneuver From the Sea") the sole -- or centerpiece -- maritime operational concept which "...From the Sea" implies? Or is there a broader set of naval or joint operational concepts which emanate "...from the sea", such as ballistic or cruise missile, or CV-air warfare, or special forms of warfare (SPECOPS, MCM, etc.), or other operational concepts not necessarily unique to naval warfare which nevertheless are conducted "...from the sea"? In other words, one key issue is: Is Naval Expeditionary Warfare limited to ship-to-shore movement of forces, or does the term connote more than that? Would it, for example, be Naval Expeditionary Warfare if Marines are not placed ashore at all (e.g.-a minefield is laid or a missile battery is destroyed by naval gunfire or missiles)? Must there be some threshold established in terms of numbers of units or soldiers/ sailors involved for a particular operation to qualify as Naval Expeditionary Warfare? Is a CVBG essential for most or all forms of NEW, in particular those involving emplacing Marines ashore? For how long does it include the necessary sustainment of forces emplaced upon -- or of attacks made against -- the shore? If it begins as an amphibious operation, does the Naval Expeditionary operation end when U.S. Army units relieve or augment the Marines, or is it still NEW as long as the operation is commanded by a Naval officer or continues to involve Navy ships?

(3) Scope. Does Naval Expeditionary Warfare include operations at all levels of war, or does it pertain entirely or mostly to one part of the spectrum? And what are the sorts of "triggering events" which would precipitate use of force under the concept of Naval Expeditionary Warfare?

(4) Balanced Fleet. The Naval Service has long-argued that in an ever-changing world, where ships can have a life-expectancy of anywhere from two to five decades, it makes good sense not to invest too heavily in any one aspect of the Fleet, but rather to develop a "balanced fleet" comprised of a mix of capabilities comprised of air-power, missile-power, self-defense, amphibious lift, etc. A strong emphasis on one particular aspect of the Fleet now, based on current world conditions in the immediate but still uncertain aftermath of the Cold War, could produce a Navy inappropriate for threats and tasks a decade or two hence. At a minimum, therefore, two issues arise:

(a) Whether there should be a more rigorous effort to understand the political/military operating environment beyond the current horizon before wholly re-structuring the Navy towards a specific type of task; and

(b) The extent to which the Navy should maintain ("warm base") its doctrines, training, and industrial capabilities to meet a blue-water naval threat.

(5) Relationship to Forward Presence. There may be an inherent tension, or conflict, between, on the one hand, the Navy's long-standing mission to "show the flag" -- now sanctioned by OSD as a valid mission for force structure considerations as "Forward Naval Presence" -- and, on the other hand, the Marine Corps insistence on
combat-loading so that it can be "first to fight". At first glance the two would seem to be inextricably linked in the emerging concept of NEW. But Cooke Conference discussions suggested it may be unclear whether the two notions are mutually supportive or paradoxical. For example, in most discussions there was general agreement that the term naval presence included, at a minimum, "forward", "self-sustaining", and "shaped for combat", so that "timely crisis response" would be available on-hand. But the wide range of tasks ascribed to naval presence forces, and the numbers required to meet the global commitments implied in the OPNAV study "Forward Naval Presence: A Strategy of Engagement, Partnership, and Prevention" seemed inconsistent with declining force levels and OPTEMPO goals. Some specific issues thus include:

(a) How to quantify naval force level requirements for the mission of Forward Naval Presence;

(b) Whether "timely crisis response" is a valid justification for forward naval presence, and just how timely (as well as how enduring) "timely response" must be to make this a valid and useful foundation for force structure arguments;

(c) Defining precisely such terms as "combat ready", "shaped for combat", and "timely response" for use force by policy-makers and budget decision-makers;

(d) Providing measurable evidence for the concept that Forward Naval Presence contributes to "reassurance of allies" and "deterrence of crises", perhaps by endeavoring to understand with more certainty how other countries (allies and potential adversaries) do or would perceive U.S. Naval Expeditionary Warfare in general, and the arrival of various force packages of USN/USMC/Joint/Coalition teams in particular;

(e) Determining how different forms of presence ("continuous presence", "continuous coverage", "periodic presence" and "episodic presence") equate in different parts of the globe, and whether in fact these other forms of "forward naval presence" such as regular periodic exercises (e.g.-UNITAS and RIMPAC) equate to full-period presence in the minds of other countries;

(f) Estimating the minimal "critical mass" -- which translates into real combat capability -- required in any grouping of naval assets deployed to perform the Forward Naval Presence mission;

(g) Determining analytically the degree to which substitutions, gaps, "tethers" etc. are acceptable within the above force structure arguments;
(h) Evaluating the importance of other key variables such as Host Nation Support, lift capacity, duration of the emergency, post-crisis stay-behind requirements, and other ongoing crises/national taskings; and

(i) Maintaining forward commitments in the face of budget and force level reductions.

(6) Value of Naval Expeditionary Warfare to National Command Authority (NCA). Ultimately the Naval Service will need a simple, concise, clear, and broadly-accepted definition of the value-added that Naval Expeditionary Warfare adds to our national security capabilities, ideally explainable in terms of specific national security objectives which can be served, so that NCA and Congress will be willing to invest future budgets in it. We may also have to be ready to explain what NEW might not do for the NCA, so that we do not fail to meet unrealistic expectations in the event.

C. Conceptual Issues.

(1) Need to Develop a Range of Planning Cases. At present there is only the "2 MRC" standard against which to resolve the many doctrinal, organizational, and structural questions pertaining to Naval Expeditionary Warfare. It may be that the MRC cases are unique, and that they would provide planning parameters for Naval Expeditionary Warfare which would be inappropriate for a larger, smaller, or operationally different case. Therefore, despite the OSD/JCS mandate to use only the 2-MRCs as scenarios for force planning, it is important that a spectrum of potential planning cases be developed in which Naval Expeditionary Warfare might be appropriate, so that the nuances of different situations (adversary, environmental conditions, triggers, etc.) can be explored in order to find the optimal solutions to the issues raised, rather than the singular best solution for only a single case.

(2) Uncertain Planning Future. There is at present no published National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy upon which to base force planning calculations. While it is likely that these will be forthcoming in the next several months, it is unlikely that these will provide any real long-term insight about the future world in which Naval capabilities (and doctrines) developed today will serve. The issue is that to some extent the naval services risk developing future capabilities and doctrinal concepts in a vacuum.

(3) Risk Assessment Yardstick. It was asserted that in the National Military Strategy still under development that there was an acceptance of increased "risk" from "low" to "medium". However, it was unclear what either level of risk implied in terms of casualties, damage, losses, or impact on public perceptions, or how any quantitative assessment of risk might impact military operations or planning. Particularly in the era of instant CNN coverage, in which public reactions seem more
critical than ever in determining optional courses of action\(^2\), risk assessment would seem to be one assumption that requires especially careful consideration.

**(4) Evolution of Maritime Strategy.** "...From the Sea" is an operational vision which keys off a changed threat assessment (regionalized and localized to the littoral, vice global and open-oceanic). While it is yet too early to develop an entirely new U.S. Naval Strategy, it may not be too early to start work to identify and quantify some of the planning features upon which the next generation of maritime strategy of the United States will necessarily be based. Inputs to the next generation maritime strategy include, but are not limited to:

a. Threat countries (including newly emerging or growing nations or groups of nations, even though to date they may have exhibited no direct threat to the United States or its interests) and their corresponding abilities to counter our naval operations along their littoral areas\(^3\);

b. Non-national military threats, such as pirates, drug traffickers, and international crime syndicates which might use the seas in the future in ways which pose problems for the U.S. Navy, or against which the Navy/Marine Corps might be expected to respond;

c. Conflict areas at sea, based on oil SLOCs and at-sea locations of energy resources, and the nature of the conflicts they are likely to generate;

d. Technologies which may become available to those who would seek to inhibit the United States or its allies from free and unencumbered use of the high seas;

e. How other nations/groups might exploit U.S. technologies or capabilities in order to operate more effectively against us.

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\(^2\) One participant recalled the perceived/expected impact of global television coverage in reaction to continuing the campaign along the "Highway of Death" in helping to determine the end of Desert Storm combat operations.

\(^3\) One Cooke Conference participant noted that it might be time to recreate the "Rainbow" planning system which guided American naval planning in the inter-World War years. The Rainbow planning system was a series of plans (and wargames) developed against a full-spectrum of possible future enemies, regardless of the status of then-current national alliances and diplomatic relations.
Innovative Organizational Concepts. The point was made at the Cooke Conference that a very senior USN Admiral not long ago noted that at a budget level of $60 Billion, the Navy would have to fundamentally and structurally re-assess the entire way in which it does its business. The budget is now at $55 Billion, and possibly still dwindling. The issue therefore is whether it is now time to re-assess the entire way the USN/USMC do business, to include operating doctrines, force structure assessments, and concept development.

Innovative Technologies. Newly emergent technologies have at least the potential to revolutionize the ways in which expeditionary warfare might be conducted. Once we have addressed some of the more immediate questions about the span, organization, and methods of Naval Expeditionary Warfare, we can better apply developing technologies to potential weapons systems, and invest in R&D towards developing new technologies for the future.

Innovative Operational Concepts. Traditional approaches to Naval Expeditionary Warfare such as amphibious warfare techniques and maneuver warfare may suffice operationally in the near-term. But if Naval Expeditionary Warfare is to be hailed as a new way of doing future naval business, we will have to address wholly new and innovative ways of conducting the business of expeditionary warfare.

Summary

The Navy and Marine Corps have embraced a new conceptual operational area, called Naval Expeditionary Warfare, based on the 1992 White Paper "...From the Sea". It is fundamentally predicated on the fact that there is not, in the foreseeable future, any blue water threat to U.S. Navy dominance over the oceans of the world. Therefore, the argument goes, the Navy and Marine Corps can now focus its planning and optimize its force posture for expeditionary operations against the littoral areas which lie across the seas.

Details of "Naval Expeditionary Warfare" are still being thought through. These fall roughly into three categories of issues: executional, structural, and conceptual.

Executional issues pertain to near-term considerations - roughly over the next 1-5 years - such as developing specific operational doctrine, working through command relationships, and solving tactical problems such as mines and ballistic missile threats. The major problem is that while "expeditionary warfare" sounds at first like a concept that all military planners understand, the fact is that many seem to have different ideas of what is meant, and how expeditionary warfare is to be conducted. The objective of working through this set of issues will be to develop operational planning criteria, including threat reduction techniques, upon which to develop doctrine and conduct operational training.
Structural issues relate to POM considerations. They extend through and potentially beyond the next decade. Included are problems such as setting the conceptual/planning boundaries of "expeditionary warfare" (i.e.- ship-to-shore landing of Marines, or much more), how expeditionary warfare fits analytically with other post-Cold War mission areas such as "Forward Naval Presence", and how to explain the value-added of expeditionary warfare to busy (and frugal) policy-makers and budgeteers. The major problem with this category of issues is that there simply is not enough money to do all that must be done, and the question of how to set priorities is a vexing one. The objective of working through this set of issues will be to develop objective force structure criteria for making hard choices about numbers and types of systems in which to invest for the future.

Conceptual issues have a longer term horizon, extending well out past what we can now perceive, perhaps as much as 50 years, when forces authorized for construction today may still be operating. The major problem is that although the Cold War ended almost half a decade ago, there still is no fixed set of parameters for planning. Included under conceptual issues are problems such as what the world will look like then, which countries may by then be adversaries or rivals, what the nature of competition is likely to be, and how innovative strategies, concepts, and technologies might better prepare us for that uncertain future. The objective of working through this set of issues will be to develop long-term strategic planning criteria -- that is, a vision of the long-term future -- within which to develop strategies, plans, and operational concepts, and upon which to base R&D and technology development and application decisions.