An Examination of the Roles, Missions, and Funding Process for CJCS Exercises

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This research paper examines the funding process for joint exercise training--looking at the historical evolution, impact of Goldwater-Nichols, and the most recent changes in roles, missions and functions. It highlights several problems that surfaced over the years and recommends solutions for those that haven't already been resolved.
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Joint exercise training becomes more important in a resource constrained environment. Alignment of resources and responsibilities improves effectiveness.
I believe that:

- There are disconnects between roles, missions, responsibilities, and resources for joint exercise training.
- The disconnects impact readiness, effective use of resources and some of them have a history of failed attempts to correct.
- There are differences between service regulations regarding funding procedures for joint exercises that could impact readiness.

In an era of downsizing, constrained resources, nation and democracy building, challenged by regional volatility and instability, uncertainty—in many ways greater than that of the Cold War years, and changes in the CINCs roles, missions and functions pose some interesting challenges for the future. Domestic and international realities make it extremely important that DoD and the taxpayers get the best return on the defense dollars invested. The world has changed and the major threat is not the Soviet Union. However, major threats still exist.
In the 1993 Annual Report to the President and Congress, Defense Secretary Cheney stated:

"The world is still a dangerous place. In addition to a major regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, we have seen renewed ethnic, religious and national violence in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. It is true that the United States no longer faces the threat of a global war beginning in Europe, a conflict that might have resulted in a nuclear confrontation between superpowers. But we do face serious regional contingencies--threats that may be triggered by any number of events, are difficult to identify in advance, and could be made more dangerous by the spread of high technology weapons. As a result, the challenge for the next few years are likely to be complex and difficult." (1)

The threat has a regional focus and our training scenarios will be based primarily on CONUS trained forces capable of responding to regional, domestic and military crises.

The executive summary of the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) implementation plan states:

"As permanent U.S. forward presence is reduced, geographic combatant commanders will be more dependent on CONUS based forces for satisfying regional commitments. These forces must be highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, and fully capable of operating as a joint team on arrival. Missions will range from highly sophisticated combat operations to humanitarian assistance. Ad hoc force selection and preparation will not suffice. A more rigorous approach is required."

As DoD restructures the training programs for the realities of today we will be challenged by Congressional reductions to
appropriations for peace dividends and increased efficiencies.

The restructuring of training exercises for today's realities is ongoing--there is a new CINC who has the responsibility for all CONUS based training of forces that will apportion to other combatant commanders as needed.

An aggressive, realistic and cost effective joint training program is the center piece of today's DoD capabilities.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this paper is to take a systematic look at the historical changes in roles, missions and functions, recent changes relating to joint exercise training, resource problems that can impact readiness, and offer concluding thoughts and recommendation. The research answers the following questions:

1. Did the Reorganization Act of 1986 create resource disconnects in the joint exercise process?
2. Should the funding process change because of a change in responsibilities, roles and missions?
3. Are there conceptual differences on joint exercise training between the services and the CINC?
4. Is there an impact on readiness resulting from funding allocation and changes in CINC roles and missions?
5. Can USACOM improve readiness and resource utilization as
the joint integrator for training the forces?

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Assumptions

1. The joint exercise funding process evolved over time and changes occurred as roles, missions, functions, and laws changed.

2. The services still have their missions to organize, train and equip forces for the CINCs. However, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) is the joint force integrator of air, land and maritime training for the CINCs and provides guidance to the services.

3. Joint training is operationally and cost effective and we get the best return available on resources invested.

4. USACOM as a combatant commander with COCOM will modify the joint training process to increase training and resource effectiveness.

Limitations

1. Data could not be gathered solely from laws, regulations and published guidance.

2. The research comes from interviews with members of the various services, JCS action officers, OSD and CINC USACOM staff members.

3. CINC USACOM was recently activated and operating
procedures are evolving.

**METHODODOLOGY**

This research examines the processes and impacts of policy and funding changes relating to JCS exercises. It assesses the impacts by researching the literature, laws, regulations and manuals, Congressional, OSD, JCS and service guidance. In addition to the examination of published materials, interviews were conducted with working staff and organizational leaders involved in planning, programing, budgeting and funding joint exercises.

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

The services have a long tradition of participating in various CJCS exercises to prepare for joint warfighting, peacekeeping, peacemaking, natural emergencies, and drug intervention. In the past, they've programed their participation on an annual schedule to support the combatant commanders or respond to Joint staff requirements. However, there have been several policy changes impacting the CJCS exercise training program financially and operationally. They are the Reorganization Act of 1986 and the DoD actions on Roles, Missions and Functions. The process for financing defense programs evolved over time
and efforts to control the process were not evident until the
late sixties. In the earlier years, the resource allocation
process divided the budget among the services. This was a
process that gave the service chiefs enormous flexibility.
Individuals responsible for executing the combatant roles
"the CINCs" lacked involvement in the financial
process. (2)

From the early sixties until 1986, there were several policy
changes aimed at improving the resource allocation process.
The major ones are as follows:

- Zero Base Budgeting (1976)--implemented by President
  Carter to aid OSD in adjusting the service budgets. (3)
- Defense Resources Board (1979)--established by SecDef
  Harold Brown to improve resource management. (4)
- Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
  revamped (1981)--Regan Administration initiative.
- Expanded resource allocation process (1984)--implemented
  by the DepSecDef to include CINC participation.

Although the above initiatives improved the resource
allocation process, the problem that causes the disconnect
remains unchanged--Title 10 gave the funding for joint
exercises to the services and not the responsible CINC.
The warfighters eventually entered the exercise programming
process through the DRB, by providing an Integrated Priority
List (IPL) to the service for Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) formulation and through closer coordination with the
JCS in the coordination process. (5)
These changes continued to improve the joint training resource allocation process over time. However, there still remained the disconnects of no single integrator for training the forces, and the services were funded for organizing, training and equipping them. The CINCs were the combatant commanders who exercised control in their geographical regions of the world. The Reorganization Act of 1986 made changes in responsibilities that significantly altered the process.

IMPACTS OF THE 1986 ACT

The Reorganization Act of 1986 directed changes to the DoD command structure unlike any previous policy changes. A brief look at changes to the command structure sets the stage for examining the relationship between command responsibility and the resource allocation process. Two of the most significant changes were: the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the roles of the CINCs. The roles of the JCS have changed throughout history -- a short chronology follows:

- World War II -- The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff were executive agents for the area and theater commanders. (6)
- National Security Act of 1947 -- Viewed the JCS as planners and advisers. (7)
- Key West Agreement of 1948 -- allowed the JCS to serve as executive agents for Unified Commanders -- established
direct communications with combatant commanders. (8)
- National Security Act Amendment of 1953--reversed the
  executive agent responsibilities. (9)
- Reorganization Act of 1986--clearly states that the Joint
  Chiefs of Staff have "no executive authority to command
  combatant forces." (10)

It's apparent that change has been the only constant in the
responsibilities of the Joint Chief's over time.
The roles of the Joint Chiefs ranged from directive authority
over combatant commanders to one of no combatant
authority--there was no change that gave them authority over
the resources that supported the forces trained for the CINCs
use.
The responsibilities of the Service to administer the
resources for joint training remains unchanged.
The services are responsible for organizing, training,
equipping, and administering the funding to support the forces
under their jurisdiction for joint exercise training.
However they have no combatant authority. Their forces are
apportioned to the combatant commanders when required for the
fulfillment of assigned missions.
In addition to reorganizing the roles and responsibilities of
the JCS, The Reorganization Act of 1986 made changes to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the combatant
commanders--the major resource issue was: (11)
- CINCs gained access to provide inputs to the services
  programming and budgeting systems for exercises.
The Reorganization Act of 1986 also gave the combatant commanders other authorities that relate to joint training: (12)

- Authority to direct subordinate commands and forces as necessary to perform their missions.
- Prescribed chains of command.
- Authority to organize commands and forces as necessary to perform missions.
- Authority to employ forces as necessary for mission achievement.
- Assigned subordinate command functions.
- Authority to coordinate and approve equipment, internal organization, training and resources.

The Act clearly defined the roles of the CJCS and the CINCs. It discusses the issue of resources in the fulfillment of responsibilities. However, the responsibility for ensuring that the combatant commanders have the resources to perform their missions rest with the SecDef in coordination with the CJCS--but the services still maintained the financial resources. (13)

Both the combatant commanders and the services have responsibilities for training the forces but only the services have the resources and only the CINCs have command authority. The CINCs needed the financial resources to execute their responsibilities. There are obvious disconnects between the CINCs responsibilities and resources.
The leading question relates to how can the disconnect between responsibility and resources be fixed? Further, does the disconnects have a negative impact or if fixed would it enhance readiness? Let's look at some of the recent changes and their impacts.

**CHANGES IN CINCs ROLES AND MISSIONS**

The law requires the CJCS to recommend changes in the Armed Forces Roles, Missions, and Functions as necessary. (14) In the CJCS Roles, Missions and Functions Report to the Congress in 1993, the Chairman recommended the establishment of a joint headquarters for U.S. based forces. The rationale for this recommendation related to the fact that there is no single CONUS integrator for training joint forces. (15) The CINCs have assigned areas of responsibilities (AORs) and trains forces within their AORs.

Although the law, various publications and regulations affix responsibilities for joint exercises within the services, the directive (Command Authority) remains with the CINCs. Prior to 1 October 1993, there had been two attempts to make a CONUS CINC responsible for training CONUS based forces—the U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was the first attempt—it activated in 1961. The mission of STRICOM was to establish joint doctrine and train forces for the CINCs. The mission collided with the service responsibilities under Title X and the objective failed. The services still
maintained their responsibilities to organize, train and equip forces for the CINCs. The command was replaced by the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) in 1971 and assumed the STRICOM missions. REDCOM experienced the same problems as its predecessor. Over time it assumed the responsibilities of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and became the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)--a combatant command. The CENTCOM mission became forward deployment, not joint training. The aim of this command was to contain Soviet aggression. (16) Again, the effort to make a CONUS based CINC responsible for joint training failed. On 1 October 1993, a new command activated with the mission of being the integrator of CONUS based joint training--USACOM. In the Congressional testimony that recommended establishment of USACOM the CJCS stated "today our strategy has changed, and we've reached a level of joint maturity that makes it possible to address again the need for a unified command over designated CONUS based forces."

USACOM assumed the responsibilities for identifying, training and preparing the forces that were previously the responsibilities of the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Navy's Atlantic Fleet Command (LANTFLT), Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC) and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT). The principal purposes of USACOM are: (17)

- Joint Training.
- Joint readiness of our response forces.

Other training related functions assigned to USACOM are: (18)
- Training forces for combined United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions.
- Improving joint tactics, techniques and procedures.
- Recommending and testing joint doctrine.

The new plan for a joint CONUS integrator for training was born. The combatant commanders retained their responsibilities for regional training of their forces. The major change that related to the impact on the CINCs is "value added training."

The most recent change in the CINCs roles and missions that established USACOM is different from previous attempts to make a CINC responsible for CONUS based joint training. USACOM was established with a command structure that gave the CINC an apportionment of forces and command authority over the forces—the service components responsible for training forces to work jointly aligned under CINC USACOM. (19) This is a change from the command structure of the two prior CINCs who had responsibility for joint training of CONUS forces. From an authority and command responsibility perspective, the changes appear to be sound.

However, this arrangement created disconnects between responsibilities and the allocation of resources—the impacts of this action is examined later. The CINCs have the responsibility and authority to ensure the military departments and the services are providing the joint training he deems necessary to perform his missions. (20) They can now devote their efforts to training in the AORs in
preparation for their assigned missions.
The USACOM implementation plan indicates that the regional CINC s no longer have the added responsibility of ensuring that follow-on forces arrive in the AORs trained to perform their missions—USACOM has that responsibility. (21) I contend that what we have now is a three way split of responsibilities for training the forces supplied to the warfighters—what I see is not only a resource issue associated with training but also a span of control issue. The Combatant CINC s train in their AORs, USACOM and the services trains forces in the CONUS for transfer to the warfighters. A potential challenge with this arrangement rests with the fact that Title X hasn't changed. The problem comes from the providers of forces to the CINC s—the services.

SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibilities of the services are defined in United States Code. Title X of the U.S. Code assigns the responsibilities to the service secretaries for organizing, training and equipping forces. (22) Further, the common functions of the services are defined by the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) Publication. This publication defines the related joint training and associated resource allocation responsibilities of the services as follows:
- "To recruit, organize, train and equip interoperable forces for assignment to unified and specified commands." (23)

- "To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the president; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping and training the forces of their departments, including those assigned to unified and specified commands." (24)

- "providing for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of CINC operational requirements." (25)

We see a disconnect between the responsibilities of the services and those of the CINCs—the training funds are with the services and the combatant authority for employing the trained forces rest with the CINC. What are the impacts on readiness?

**JOINT TRAINING AND READINESS IMPACTS**

We've seen that the responsibilities for conducting joint training stretches from the CJCS to the services as defined by the Reorganization Act of 1986. There is a joint training process that ensures the CINCs have the trained forces available to perform the assigned missions—this is accomplished by conducting training exercises.

There are two categories of exercises--CJCS and CINC
sponsored. (26) These exercises are planned annually by the CINCs and integrated by the CJCS. The annual joint training plans include exercises scheduled to be accomplished by the services, CINCs and the CJCS. The FY94 exercise plan includes some 180 exercises. However, the exact number that will be accomplished is unknown because they are ongoing. (27) When we back track and look at the effectiveness of previous exercises, we find that they've been somewhat effective. However, some areas were identified for improvements by a 1979 GAO study on the Effectiveness of Joint Training and Readiness Impacts.

The 1979 Joint Exercise Training Effectiveness Review identified some weaknesses in program formulation, realism, lack of centralized management and budget justification. However, the report went on to state that "JCS exercises contribute significantly to the training and readiness of U.S. military forces--they are a means of providing both interservice training and combined training with allied forces. They also provide excellent opportunities to test the plans and doctrine U.S. Forces will employ in the event of war." (28)

My research indicates that some of the weaknesses identified in the 1979 GAO report were fixed over the years.

One of the evaluation tools derived from the 1979 report is
the Joint Universal Lessons Learned (JULL) System. This system provides universal lessons learned from joint exercises and is used as a planning and correction aid. A recent Report on the Importance of the CINC Exercise Programs stated that "the relative smoothness of Desert Shield proves the value of the USCENTCOM exercise programs over the past decade--it demonstrated that training pays." (29)

In the 1993 House of Representatives Subcommittee On Appropriations Hearings the CINC's commented to the facts that readiness in the future will depend heavily on realistic joint training. Since this report CINC USACOM echoed the sentiments of the other CINC's and has been designated the responsible commander for training the forces of the future. It's clear that the responsibilities, authority and a definite plan for improving CJCS exercises are in place. However, there are some potential challenges and further policy changes still required. The new world order presented joint training challenges that require improvements for the CINC's to execute their responsibilities. Accordingly, a Joint Training Master Plan now exists--the master plan states:

"The specific challenge is to meet the near-term needs of the combatant commanders in executing the National Military Strategy while at the same time establishing a long-term program to ensure the high readiness of our future forces. The desired end state is the improved readiness of joint forces, a training strategy better aligned with the National Military Strategy, improved interoperability, and a more stable process for optimizing the application of scarce Service resources (dollars, forces and time)." (30)
The new training plan is based on a train-to-task process. The CINCs are now able to plan their training profiles using a Universal Joint Task List that provides common instead of unique training requirements. Following the requirements identification process, the combatants can develop training priorities based on capabilities to produce specific training outcomes. (31) The new training process is evolving and over time should improve readiness and answer the question often asked by Congress--how does readiness change when funding decreases or increases by specified amounts? While we await the answers on the true readiness impacts, there are some things that still warrant attention in the resource allocation area.

RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS CHALLENGES

The resource allocation process for joint exercises is clearly defined in law. However, financial execution is a mixed process and is not as clean as defined by the legislators. USACOM as the responsible CINC has command authority over the service components. However, he has no funds distributed to him in support of CJCS or CINC directed exercises. The funds are currently split between the services and the JCS for exercises.
The Joint Staff centrally controls approximately $400 million in FY94 funds for the following CJCS exercise expenses: (32)

- Airlift
- Sealift
- Port Handling
- Inland Transportation

In addition to the centrally funded JCS account, some of the services have funds for incremental costs above their normal training programs. These incremental funds are accounted for separately by the Army and Air Force. They fund requirements such as:

- Contract Quarters
- Temporary Duty Travel
- Civilian Overtime
- Rentals
- Equipment Reconstitution

The Navy doesn't distribute funds specifically for CJCS exercises. They make distributions to the Fleet Commanders who further distribute to the Type Commanders for aviation, surface and submarines. There are no CJCS exercise lines in the Navy's budget submissions and no subsequent tracking of spending in support of CJCS exercises--the costs are folded into the overall Navy operating expenses. (33) CJCS exercise training is being accomplished and there were no show-stopper lessons learned found during this research. However, there are no indications that the responsible CINC has much control over the funds that support the training

18
programs he's responsible for. All the funding is controlled by the Joint Staff and the services. The problem here centers on the fact that CINC ACOM has the responsibility and authority while the law provides the funds that support the CINCs mission to the services. When I contrast the establishing of USACOM to the recently established USSOCOM from a resource perspective, I find no major difference. They are both supporting combatant CINCs but CINC SOCOM has financial resources. He is apportioned all of the funds appropriated for force program II. CINC USACOM has no specifically appropriated force program. There appears to be some potential disconnects in the funding and budgeting areas in relation to responsibilities. One may ask the question of how is CINC USACOM different from the other CINCs? The difference is, ACOM has the responsibility for training forces that apportion to all the other CINCs. The only other CINCs that have similar responsibilities are USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM--both of them have designated resources to do their missions. I don't recommend such a funding arrangement to make the CINCs look alike, but it seems to be the practical and most effective application of authority, responsibility, and utilization of resources. The services have the responsibilities for budgeting and defending the funding requirements while the command authority rest with the CINC.
If the CINC directs changes to the component commanders' training programs and there are incremental costs, who will finance the incremental costs? I think it would be a tough issue to get the funding from either the JCS central pot or the services. In addition to disconnects between CINC funding and responsibilities, some confusion was recently observed during an exercise regarding who pays for certain aspects of joint exercises.

Observations from Exercise Fuertes Caminos, North-93, conducted by USSOUTHCOM in August 1993 noted that there were: (34)

- Conflicts regarding who pays for what.
- Some post-exercise expenses were not budgeted.
- A problem with who pays for pre-exercise training of task force members--Army regulations offered no provisions for charging pre-exercise training of individuals to CJCS exercise funds.

Observations like those mentioned above are areas that the USACOM staff in coordination with the components may implement procedures to eliminate future recurrences that could impact readiness. USACOM is considering proposals that could:

- Restructure some service component exercises to CINC directed exercises. (35)
- Make some CJCS funds available to the CINC in support of CINC directed exercises. (36)

Although some proposals are being considered that may give
USACOM more control, I found no indications of near term changes to standardize joint exercise funding procedures between the services.

Funding for joint exercises in a constrained resource environment will continue to be scrutinized by the Congress in budget justifications and funding deliberations. The potential actions mentioned above, a new CINC responsible for integrating joint training, a Joint Training Master Plan, and the Universal Joint Task List should enhance readiness. It should be enhanced because the latest changes are aimed at financing joint training that achieves the desired outcome and funds the correct mix of forces trained for specific missions.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was to objectively examining resource allocation disconnects in the CJCS exercise process in relation to changes in roles, missions and laws and assess the impacts on readiness.

I believe the research accomplished the objectives. I found that the Reorganization Act of 1986 completely restructured the system. However, no changes were noted in the funding process.

A CINC gained the responsibility for being the joint integrator for CJCS exercises and the funds to support the program stayed with the Joint Staff and the services.
Additionally, the services retained complete authority for organizing, training, equipping, and funding under Title X of the U.S. Code.

The most recent change in the roles and missions that activated USACOM has been tried before. In 1961 and 1971 attempts were made to assign a CINC the responsibility for training joint CONUS forces. The concept collided with the responsibilities of the service chief's both times. Title X was not changed in the earlier attempts nor was it changed with the 1993 activation of USACOM. However, the latest change differs from the prior attempts because it gives the CINC command authority--directive authority over the service components. Additionally, the CINC has some new training tools--the Joint Training Master Plan, and a Joint Uniform Task List that will put commonality in the process and provide for a train-to-task environment. I believe this revised process and the transfer of the joint training mission to USACOM will improve readiness and the utilization of resources. What the CINC doesn't have yet are the financial resources to exercise his authority--I believe it's time to align the CINC USACOM financial structure to that of USSOCOM--give ACOM the funds for joint exercises and let him manage. This is one of the areas I recommend for further study--If adopted I believe it would enhance readiness and the budget justification process.

There is clear evidence that Congressional oversight of DoD roles, missions and functions will continue in the future.
Public Law 103-160 (National Defense Authorization Act) support my contention--it established a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. The commission has the following duties:

(1) "Review the efficacy and appropriateness for the post Cold War era of the current allocations among the Armed Forces of roles, missions and functions";

(2) "Evaluate and report on alternative allocations of those roles, missions and functions; and

(3) "Make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions and functions. (37) DoD funding and its relationship to readiness is an area under continuous scrutiny. Readiness effectiveness is hard to quantify.

I found no concrete formulas in my research that says if you fund a specific amount of dollars for a particular joint exercise--the readiness impact will increase or decrease by a quantifiable amount. Everyone would like to have a mathematical model that would make readiness quantification simple. There were no indications that suggests we will have such capability in the near future. These findings don't concern me considerably--I believe that readiness is training for the flexibility to be able to respond effectively when called upon to do a mission. Overall, I'm convinced that joint exercises provide effective readiness training. However, today's National Military Strategy requires training that differs significantly from the Cold War years. I
believe the new joint training process will help to alleviate some of the future Congressional concerns for the training impacts on readiness. However the resource allocation process needs to be changed to better align resources with responsibility. I believe this is a potential area for the commission to examine--the ultimate change required in this area may mean a change to Title X. I trust that my conclusions are confirmed in peace time budget deliberations and training evaluations and not in the heat of battle. However, if the latter happens before the former, I believe we will see that joint training equates to readiness and ready forces deters aggression and win wars.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend the following areas be studied further for possible changes:

- CINC's lack of funding flexibility to alter CJCS training program.
- Full accounting for joint exercise expenditures.
- Standardized accounting for joint exercises.
- Standard financial regulations for all service components to use in budgeting, funding, and accounting for joint exercises.
- Roles, Mission, and Functions Commission review funding
disconnect between service responsibilities under Title X and CINC USACOM's responsibility for training the forces in his new role as a single integrator for training. I believe these changes would enhance readiness and provide DoD, the Joint Staff, and the responsible CINC the necessary data for evaluating cost effectiveness in relation to readiness and enhance the capabilities for responding to Congress and various auditors.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., P. 3.


7. Ibid.

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