Support to Domestic Civil Authorities in Civil Disturbance Operations: Intelligence Requirements and Doctrine

A Monograph by

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Using histories, after action reports, interviews, and doctrinal manuals this study examines intelligence requirements for support to domestic civil authorities in civil disturbance operations and evaluates the adequacy of tactical intelligence doctrine for such operations. The U.S. Army is frequently called upon to conduct civil disturbance operations to assist civil authorities in restoring order to riot-torn cities. The Army’s experiences in the 1960s riots and the 1992 Los Angeles riot show that despite many similarities the urban environment has changed and presents new challenges for a military force deployed in civil disturbance operations. Specifically, increased violence by well-armed gangs presents a significant threat to a conventionally trained force and necessitates an effective intelligence effort. Effective intelligence support, a task force in a civil disturbance environment requires adequate maps, databases of key urban facilities, knowledge of gang organization and tactics, and liaison with civil agencies. Current intelligence doctrine, principally Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, is broad, flexible, and adequate for application in civil disturbance operations.
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ABSTRACT

SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS: INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND DOCTRINE
by Major Steven W. Peterson, USA, 58 pages.

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The U.S. Army is sometimes called upon to conduct civil disturbance operations to assist civil authorities in restoring order to riot-torn cities. The Army's experiences in the 1960s riots and the 1992 Los Angeles riot show that despite many similarities the urban environment has changed from the 1960s to today and presents new challenges for a military force deployed in civil disturbance operations. Specifically, increased violence by well-armed gangs presents a significant threat to a conventionally trained force and necessitates an effective intelligence effort.

Effective intelligence support of a task force in a civil disturbance environment requires adequate maps, databases of key urban facilities, knowledge of gang organization and tactics, and liaison with civil agencies. Current intelligence doctrine, principally Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, is broad, flexible, and adequate for application in civil disturbances operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In April and May 1992, Army National Guard, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine forces provided support to domestic civil authorities in Los Angeles restoring order to a city wracked by the most costly urban rioting in American history. Although the use of military forces in 1992 Los Angeles was in some ways similar to the riot control deployments of the 1960s, changes in the American urban environment presented new challenges for the force.

The population of today's cities is much more segmented and considerably more violent than that of 1960s America. Today's urban gangs often possess military style weaponry and advanced communications devices and thus represent a considerable potential threat to a military force conducting civil disturbance operations. Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) found itself in a city with over 100,000 gang members and a culture of violence.

Unlike the 1965 Watts riots, the 1992 Los Angeles riots were not limited to a single area. Disturbances broke out almost simultaneously throughout the city and covered a large geographic area thus complicating military operations. The 1992 riots show that providing civil disturbance support to domestic civil authorities is a contingency for which U.S. Army corps and division commanders must be prepared. Intelligence is an
important part of that preparedness. Accordingly, this paper identifies intelligence requirements for civil disturbance operations and examines whether or not, U.S. Army tactical intelligence doctrine is adequate to meet the commander's needs in such operations.

Research Methodology

First, this study examines the experiences of the Army National Guard, Active Army, and other military forces in the urban riots of the 1960s and in 1992 Los Angeles in order to identify the intelligence requirements of civil disturbance operations. National Guard, Army, and Marine Corps after action reports are the principal sources of intelligence lessons learned used in this study. Army research papers and study group results, civilian research works, government riot commission reports, and the Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Operations Plan (GARDEN PLOT) are also used.

Working from these sources, this paper reviews lessons learned in the 1960s and 1992 riots and answers the following questions in order to determine the intelligence requirements of civil disturbance operations: What are the principle threats to the security of the force? What legal restrictions are there on intelligence collection in an American urban environment? What intelligence collection resources are best suited to the urban environment and threat? What kind of threat, terrain, and statistical
databases are required and are they readily available? What intelligence liaison with civil authorities is required and how should it be established and conducted? What analytical skills are required in civil disturbance operations? What are the reporting and dissemination requirements for situation development and tracking?

Second, this study evaluates the adequacy of the Army's tactical intelligence doctrine in meeting the requirements of civil disturbance operations. Working from Army field manuals, the U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept, and professional journal articles, this paper evaluates tactical intelligence doctrine in the context of the domestic civil disturbance environment.

As part of this evaluation, the discussion addresses the following questions: What intelligence doctrine applies to civil disturbance operations? Does Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield support the requirements of civil disturbance operations. Does it provide effective intelligence products to the commander?

In answering these questions, this paper evaluates tactical intelligence doctrine against three criteria: timeliness, completeness, and appropriateness of the intelligence products provided to the commander. A product is considered timely if it is provided to the commander so he can make a knowledgeable decision in time to effect the "battle." A product is
con-dered complete, if it answers the commander’s critical questions and
does not leave intelligence gaps which contribute to mission failure. A
product is considered appropriate if it is in a form suited to planning or
conducting operations in a domestic civil disturbance environment.

Finally, this study concludes by recommending changes to intelligence
doctrine to improve support for civil disturbance operations and identifies
areas for further research.

II. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL
AUTHORITIES IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS

The U.S. Army In Civil Disturbances

Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes
(principally Chapter 15, Title 10 US Code, Sections 331 and 334) provide for
the use of the federal military to aid civil authorities in the following
instances: at request of the state, to enforce federal law, to protect the
civil rights of citizens, to protect federal property and functions, and in
cases of compelling emergency. Toward that end, the Army is designated
as the Department of Defense (DOD) “executive agent for federal military
operations in response to civil disturbances.” As such, it publishes the DOD
Operations Plan for civil disturbances (GARDEN PLOT) and defines the
specific role of the Army as “to assist civil authorities in restoring law and
order when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard.⁵

Throughout the history of the United States, the National Guard and Army have repeatedly been called upon to support domestic civil authorities in suppressing urban rioting. From the early days of the republic to the riots of 1992 Los Angeles, the government has often turned to the military to restore order when civil authorities were overwhelmed.⁶ For example, from World War II to 1969 the National Guard served in civil disturbance operations 143 times (11 federalized) involving 180,000 troops in 37 states.⁷

The 1960s were a particularly turbulent period necessitating the use of troops in hundreds of incidents. The deployment of 13,400 California National Guard troops to quell the Watts riots in 1965 was typical of the government response to rioting throughout the period.⁸ In 1967 alone, there were 164 disturbances in 128 cities requiring the commitment of troops in support of civil authorities across the country.⁹ For example, in Newark, the state used 4,000 Guardsmen to put down rioting and in Detroit, the government deployed nearly 15,000 National Guard and active Army troops to restore order.¹⁰

In 1968, more rioting occurred throughout the country. During the single month of April, 27,000 people were arrested, 3,500 injured, and 43 killed during 237 riots in 206 cities.¹¹ By the end of the decade federal
troops had been used in Detroit, Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. and the Army had prepared contingency plans for the deployment of 280,000 troops in the event of simultaneous rioting in 25 major cities.  

As costly as many of the 1960s disturbances were, they pale in comparison to the destructiveness of the 1992 Los Angeles riot. During six days of unrest, rioters caused $717 million in damages with 42 people killed, 2,383 injured, and over 5,000 arrested. The government restored order only after deploying some 23,000 protection forces, including over 13,000 National Guard and federal soldiers. The level of violence had increased dramatically from the 1960s to 1992. The increase was a result of changes in the urban environment that were reflected in the nature of the rioting.

**Changed Urban Environment - Increased Threat**

Today's urban environment is one of tension and violence. Cities are plagued by "the problems of the inner city--gangs, crime, crack cocaine, poverty and homelessness, and racial and ethnic tension." These tensions are far worse today than they were in the 1960s and manifest themselves in increased violence. In 1991, the United States Senate Judiciary committee observed that the United States is "the most violent and self-destructive nation on earth" and noted that while the population had grown by 41 percent since 1960, violent crime increased 516 percent in the
same period making the United States the world leader in murder, rape, and robbery rates.\textsuperscript{17}

A look at Los Angeles gunshot statistics reinforces understanding of the danger of today's inner city. In 1991, 8,600 people were shot in Los Angeles with 1,554 murdered by gunfire.\textsuperscript{18} This represented a tripling in the rate of firearm homicides from 6.8 per 100,000 in 1970 to 17.5 in 1991.\textsuperscript{19} Most of the deaths occurred at the hands of gang members, the numbers of which increased in Los Angeles from 40,000 in 450 gangs in 1984 to 100,000 in 900 gangs in 1992.\textsuperscript{20}

The effects of gangs showed in the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Although no large scale attacks on troops occurred, gang members did ambush police and firemen and engage in continuous harassment of Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA) soldiers. The gangs accounted for the majority of the riot's deaths and the wholesale theft of firearms throughout the city. Unlike Watts in 1965 when none of the riot's deaths were attributable to rioters, more than three quarters of the 1992 deaths were.\textsuperscript{21}

The Webster Commission concluded that although the riots did not appear to be the result of coordinated gang activity, gangs did specifically target gun stores and pawn shops to steal more than 4,300 firearms.\textsuperscript{22} In several cases, they warned storekeepers to leave the premises, secured the
area from other looters, and systematically removed all weapons and ammunition. As the Webster Report notes:

One pawn store alone in Southwest Area lost 970 firearms the first night. Gang members reportedly posted armed guards to keep out general looters while they used a highway tow truck to first winch out security bars and then tow the store's gun safe off down the middle of Jefferson Boulevard. Another store in the 77th Street Area lost 1150 firearms, over 600 of them automatics or semi-automatics, on the first night. A third store in Hollywood Area lost 950 rifles. This small armory remains at large in the community as an added danger for police to confront.23

Such a coordinated and well executed effort made it clear that urban gangs were a significant threat to the troops of JTF-Los Angeles and Major General Marvin L. Couvalt, the task force commander, adjusted his operations in cognizance of that threat.24

In addition to the increased gang threat, there were other differences and some similarities in the 1960s and 1992 deployments. In 1965, the Watts riot started gradually and was confined mostly to a single neighborhood; whereas, the 1992 riot erupted almost simultaneously across the city and eventually stretched over 32 miles covering 100 to 150 square miles of urban terrain.”25 Consequently, the task force did not conduct as many traditional shoulder-to-shoulder crowd control operations as Army units did in the 1960s. Instead, it conducted site security operations, escort missions, mounted and dismounted patrols, and fielded a number of rapid reaction forces. Although dispersed over a much larger area in 1992 Los
Angeles, these missions were similar to those of forces deployed in Newark and Detroit in 1967 and Baltimore, Chicago and Washington, D.C. in 1968.

Recognizing the differences (gang threat, widely dispersed operations) and similarities (urban warfare vice traditional riot control) of the Army’s 1960s and 1992 civil disturbance operations, the study now examines the intelligence lessons learned in these deployments. By analyzing past experiences in the context of today’s urban environment, it is possible to develop a better understanding of today’s civil disturbance intelligence requirements.

**Intelligence Lessons Learned in Civil Disturbance Deployments**

A review of after action reports covering National Guard and Army deployments in Watts (11-18 August 1965), Washington (19-23 October 1967 and 5-16 April 1968), Detroit (24 July - 2 August 1967), Baltimore (7-13 April 1968), Chicago (4-13 April 1968), and Los Angeles (29 April - 29 May 1992) revealed remarkable consistency in the intelligence lessons learned in these deployments. Because of this consistency, much insight into intelligence requirements in contemporary civil disturbance operations can be gained by examining the lessons learned in 1960s and 1992 deployments. Consider first the evolution of the threat faced by a military force during civil disturbance operations.
Commanders of the 1960s deployments identified snipers and small, mobile groups of agitators engaged in hit and run tactics as the principal threats to their forces. These threats, identified in numerous after action reports, were well summarized in an article in the September 1967, National Guardsmen:

In Newark and Detroit, a completely new and vastly more complex situation confronted the forces of law and order. Snipers blazed away from hidden vantage points, then melted into the crowds to become indistinguishable from ordinary citizens. Mass arson over wide areas was the most common weapon. Criminal elements conducted a highly mobile operation, striking at unprotected targets, then roaring away, to strike again where opportunity offered. Ordinary citizens by the thousands--men, women, and children--succumbed to the general hysteria and smashed into stores to loot and burn.

Organized resistance also sometimes posed a threat to troops deployed during the 1960s riots. For example, in the April 1968 Baltimore riots, police monitored citizens band radios and discovered the use of codes and sophisticated radio procedures by groups tracking troop deployments, evidently for use in planning responses. Today, the threat from organized resistance is embodied in large, heavily armed urban gangs. In fact, the JTF in 1992 Los Angeles saw gangs as the most significant threat to the force.

Well armed with military weaponry and possessing modern communications equipment, hierarchical organizations, and rudimentary intelligence gathering networks, the gangs could easily have mounted
coordinated attacks on the force. The fact that they did not do so does not negate their threat. Some observers believe that they purposely "went to ground" during the troop deployments in order to speed the troops' withdrawal in order to get back to normal business. Such a strategy would be consistent with the characterization of American urban gangs as preservationist insurgencies--determined to maintain the status quo. Since the deployment was relatively short, gang interests were not significantly threatened, so they did not actively oppose it. However, had the deployment lasted long enough to interfere with gang power and interests they might have taken direct, coordinated action against the force. Therefore, Major General Couvalt's cognizance of the gang threat in structuring his operations was a prudent worst case planning assumption.

Since deployment experiences suggest organized resistance from criminal elements and gangs is a potential threat in the American urban environment, certain intelligence requirements can be assumed to apply. Specifically, the intentions, composition, disposition, and strength of these elements are or may become priority intelligence requirements for the force commander. In the context of the urban environment, this may take the form of identifying gang interests, organizations, "turf", distinctive clothing, markings, and codes (sign language and graffiti).
Determining gang intentions is also critical. The military commander must know which targets the gangs may be expected to hit in the area of operations. He must understand what actions by the force may precipitate gang attacks and must know the effects of on-going inter-gang conflicts or alliances on the security of the force. By identifying these factors, the intelligence staff can help the commander plan effective operations while preserving force security. This requires a coordinated intelligence collection effort—tailored to civil disturbance operations. However, significant legal restrictions prevent a task force commander from conducting direct intelligence collection in the American urban environment.

Army abuses of intelligence collection in support of preparedness for civil unrest in the 1960s resulted in significant legal and policy restrictions on domestic intelligence collection by Army personnel.\(^{35}\) As a consequence, a commander's ability to employ collection assets in support of civil disturbance operations is quite limited. Specifically, the Army may not collect or maintain intelligence on U.S. persons, except in unusual circumstances specified by Army Regulations 381-10 (Intelligence Activities) and 380-13 (Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations).\(^{36}\) This prevents a commander from gathering intelligence about gang members and activities to support planning prior to commitment in a civil disturbance operation. Although
some exceptions may be granted after deployment, collection by Army personnel is strictly limited to force protection. As a result, the Army must rely on liaison with law enforcement personnel for most intelligence collection. These legal restrictions on Army domestic intelligence collection are well-founded and unlikely to change; therefore, the commander must understand what intelligence data is required in civil disturbances and how it may be legally obtained through liaison with civil authorities.

Civil disturbance deployments in the 1960s and in 1992 Los Angeles showed that human intelligence collection is the best source of information for planning and conducting civil disturbance operations. Local officials, primarily police and fire personnel, were the best source of such intelligence. To capitalize on this, every after action report recommended collocating intelligence liaison teams at police and fire headquarters, emergency operations centers, and with other federal agencies.

In acknowledging the superiority of human intelligence (HUMINT) in the urban environment, the reports also repeatedly emphasized that the local populace was an excellent source of information and that every effort must be made to debrief soldiers deployed throughout the city. Unfortunately, reporting was generally inadequate in each of the deployments.
To overcome reporting problems, soldiers must be trained in what to look for and report in the course of civil disturbance operations. This requires a coordinated effort on the part of intelligence staffs to develop and issue reporting guidelines early in the deployment and revise them periodically as required. Forces deployed in Los Angeles developed special report formats tailored to the environment. These specified the reporting of the following information: location, weapons (number, size, type), clothing (headgear, footwear, color, type), confrontations (people, race, sex, age, remarks), shots fired (single or automatic), vehicles (licence, make, model, color, occupants), and communications (verbal, pamphlets, radio, TV, newspaper).  

Although HUMINT is perhaps the most effective means of collection in the civil disturbance environment, signals intelligence, photo intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance have in the past also been useful. Since changes in the urban environment do not appear to have decreased their usefulness, it is worthwhile to consider how these methods have been used in the past in order to understand how they might be effectively employed in the future.  

In Baltimore in 1968, radio intercept proved useful in monitoring dissident activities. Because of restrictions on military intelligence activities targeting U.S. citizens, such monitoring in today's environment
must be done by civilian agencies. Realizing this, the military commander should actively seek this support from appropriate agencies. The intelligence staff may, however, monitor operational nets of law enforcement agencies and fire departments. This proves an excellent source of situation tracking intelligence. Accordingly, a police scanner or radio compatible with civilian law enforcement frequencies is an invaluable collection asset during civil disturbance operations.

In most of the deployments, aerial photography was also used to monitor the rioting. For example, in Detroit in 1967, the Michigan Air National Guard flew dozens of reconnaissance missions producing 10,819 prints from some 3,553 feet of film. Similarly, helicopter reconnaissance by key leaders proved critical in determining effective troop deployments, positioning, and movement routes. Because reliable maps were often not available and the situation was continuously changing due to rioter action, helicopter reconnaissance was critical in helping the commander to see the battlefield. Ground reconnaissance was also effective in many deployments; however, rioter action and the dispersed nature of modern riots may often make it infeasible.

Although the force may coordinate signals intelligence and aerial and ground reconnaissance with civil authorities once deployed, in General Couvall’s words "when you get the call, you are already late."
Therefore, intelligence staffs must understand what planning data is required to support civil disturbance operations and ensure liaison activities with civilian law enforcement agencies are structured to obtain it.

The Department of Justice is the Army’s principle source of civil disturbance planning data. Unfortunately, experience shows that the types of information available may not meet Army requirements and will probably not be available prior to deployment. This increases the importance of liaison with local law enforcement agencies upon deployment. To ensure a smooth transition from non-involvement in the domestic environment to active support of civil authorities, commanders with civil disturbance contingencies should institute planning liaison with law enforcement organizations and educate intelligence staffs in crowd behavior and gang characteristics.

This would provide the background knowledge necessary to conduct meaningful intelligence analysis of mob actions and gang activities once deployed. However, legal restrictions, competing mission priorities, and limited resources may make it impossible for active force commanders and their staffs to conduct pre-deployment planning and liaison with civil authorities. One possible solution would be to use the National Guard to fulfill these functions. For example, it may be practical for the National Guard, in coordination with local authorities, to develop appropriate planning
packages identifying what information civil authorities should maintain to
provide to a military force once deployed.\textsuperscript{47} This is an appropriate task
for the Guard since it is normally located in the target area and often has
personnel who are law enforcement officials in civilian life (thus facilitating
liaison activities). Since the Guard is normally deployed before the active
force, its intelligence data and liaison structures could be incorporated by
the active force upon commitment. In this way, the intelligence effort
could be focused to meet the commander's needs in a timely manner.

Planning packages that the Guard might develop in conjunction with
civil authorities, should include terrain and demographic data. Unlike legal
prohibitions on gathering intelligence on domestic persons and groups, there
are no such restrictions for terrain data or general demographic
information.

Maps are the simplest form of terrain information. Unfortunately,
every civil disturbance operation reviewed for this study was handicapped by
problems with maps. They were either not available in useful scales or
sufficient numbers, were not up to date, or did not correspond to maps in
use by civil authorities.\textsuperscript{48} This complicated operational planning and made
operational reporting and liaison with other agencies impossible. However,
such maps are not routinely in the Defense Mapping Agency or US Geologic
Survey system therefore forces must rely on civilian sources to procure
Accordingly, maps should be included in planning packages coordinated with civil authorities prior to deployments.

Other types of terrain databases are also currently not readily available to the military commander. For example, there is a need for the commander to rapidly identify the locations of critical communications nodes, public utilities, state, federal, and local offices, banks, gun stores, pawn shops, and liquor stores (since these are key targets of rioters). However, lists of these facilities are not maintained by any one agency leaving the intelligence staff of a deploying unit to hunt them down after deployment or search the phone book to compile them in the absence of any other source of information. Again, this problem could be overcome by including this information in planning packages developed and maintained by civil authorities in conjunction with the National Guard.

Similarly, the Army commander has a need for demographic and statistical information about his area of operations. In today’s ethnically diverse urban environment, ethnic tensions may play a large role in the rioting. Knowing where ethnic groups are located thus becomes critical in assessing the threat and planning troop deployments. The commander also needs statistical information concerning a city’s normal levels of arson and violence. Having such information prevents military forces from overreacting to incident reports within normal levels. The local police and
fire departments maintain such data; however, the military commander will generally not be provided it until he deploys. Unlike the other information requirements discussed above, these statistical databases are not necessarily needed until the force has deployed, but must be available when operations begin. Therefore, liaisons to police and fire departments must make this a priority information requirement at the outset of the deployment.

The preceding discussion makes it clear that legal restrictions and scarce resources require that the commander deployed in civil disturbance operations rely principally on civilian organizations for intelligence data and collection. Therefore, establishing liaison with civilian agencies is a key aspect of Army doctrine for civil disturbance operations and is named as an absolutely critical function in every after action report reviewed for this study. In every case, commanders recommended collocating various command posts with police headquarters and operations centers and suggested the positioning of liaison officers at all key agencies.

Major General Couvalt particularly emphasized the importance of liaisons in the 1992 Los Angeles deployment and recommended specific planning to meet extensive liaison requirements in future deployments. He described liaison teams as requiring senior officers, ideally two majors with
a cellular phone working 12 hour shifts. He repeatedly emphasized the importance of having an adequate number of liaison teams stating:

Stretch your imagination for the number of LNO's [liaison officers] you think you'll need. Multiply it times two and you'll still call for more. 53

The following agencies should have liaison officers: city, county, and state governments, law enforcement and security agencies; the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, Customs Service, Border Patrol, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, US Marshals Service, Secret Service, Department of Energy, Federal Emergency Management Agency, all components of the National Guard, sister services, fire departments, emergency search and rescue services, public utilities, parks and recreation departments, social services departments, city engineers, city attorneys, local government public relations officials, civil air patrol, civil defense organizations, key community groups, and independent relief agencies among others. 54

Although many of these agencies appear to have no intelligence function, it is important to recognize that they may still provide critical intelligence information. Since the force will have limited intelligence personnel, agencies with intelligence functions (e.g. local, state, and federal law enforcement entities) should have priority in receiving them. The liaison officers assigned to other agencies should be provided a list of priority intelligence requirements and instructed to report pertinent
information to the intelligence staff as soon as possible. Of course, getting the right information to the intelligence staff is only part of the problem. The staff must possess the analytical skills necessary to process it.

In civil disturbance operations, intelligence analysts will work with information which is unlike that of conventional operations and will require an understanding of indicators and patterns unique to the urban environment. They will need methods for tracking dispersed incidents and performing pattern analysis to project future threats. The analytical skills necessary will be very much like those required in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping or peacemaking; therefore, training for such tasks will have benefits beyond just civil disturbance preparedness.

Many of the intelligence processing skills necessary in the civil disturbance environment are merely variations of those of a conventional environment. For example, intelligence staffs must be able to articulate intelligence collection and reporting requirements and task appropriate assets in accordance with a detailed collection plan. They must be able to identify gaps in available information and take positive action to fill them. This includes providing subordinate units reporting guidelines tailored to the civil disturbance environment and conducting debriefings of deployed elements.
Analysts must have a knowledge of "enemy order of battle" which in the urban environment may take the form of understanding crowd behavior and gangs (organization, composition and group hierarchy, weapons, distinctive characteristics). They must understand "threat doctrine" -- the tactics and techniques of gang actions, methods of communication, attitudes and interests. Analysts must be able to perform terrain analysis-- identify gang "turf," key terrain (critical potential targets of gang action), and routes into and out of target areas.

The intelligence staff must be able to perform situation tracking tasks such as posting maps, monitoring reporting, and maintaining message reference files. They must maintain historical files of gang activity in order to perform pattern analysis and predict future activity. They must be able to work with the commander and other staff to ensure mission planning considers probable gang and rioter actions and reactions. Above all they must ensure proper dissemination of intelligence products to the force in the field.

In civil disturbances, like any operation, information must be reported as rapidly as possible, analyzed, and disseminated as intelligence in a timely manner. The intelligence reporting structure must support the effective flow of information throughout the organization. After action reports indicate that communications links and reporting guidance are the keys to
making this happen in the urban environment. Liaisons to other agencies must be aware of the commander's priority intelligence requirements and have the means of passing information directly to the intelligence staff. Similarly, the intelligence staff must be able to communicate changes in requirements or critical intelligence information to other agencies through their liaisons. Deployed elements must understand what information is to be collected and reported and must have the communications means for passing it up the chain of command. Similarly, the intelligence staff must have a timely means of disseminating critical information to those requiring it.

Dissemination of intelligence may occur in several forms—update briefings to commanders and staffs, periodic written or broadcast intelligence summaries, or direct dissemination of time critical information to deployed elements. As in reporting, the key to effective dissemination is adequate communications and an effective chain of command. Obviously, intelligence reporting and dissemination requirements in a civil disturbance environment do not differ markedly from those in any operation.

**Summary of Civil Disturbance Intelligence Requirements**

Past civil disturbance deployments have produced remarkably consistent intelligence lessons learned. Drawing upon these lessons learned, the discussion thus far has shown that intelligence requirements in a civil
disturbance environment are in large part simply variations of traditional requirements. Commander’s engaged in civil disturbance operations must have an appreciation of the threat, in this case, primarily an understanding of urban gangs and rioter actions. They must be able to articulate priority intelligence requirements and work with civilian agencies to legally collect required information. In the urban environment, human intelligence will be the primary source of information; although signals and photo intelligence, and aerial and ground reconnaissance may also play a role.

Intelligence liaison teams should be exchanged with law enforcement activities to assist in analyzing information in light of military requirements and ensuring a timely exchange of intelligence data and situation reporting. The intelligence processing skills required by the intelligence staff in civil disturbance operations are similar to those of conventional operations—knowledge of threat order of battle and doctrine (gang characteristics), terrain information (characteristics of the area of operations and critical targets for protection), situation tracking skills (posting maps, monitoring reporting, and maintaining reference files), and pattern analysis of gang and rioter activity to predict future events.

Finally, as in any operation, the timely reporting of information and the dissemination of intelligence products to commanders, staffs, and deployed elements is critical. Accordingly, the intelligence staff must
ensure liaison teams and personnel at all levels understand the commander's priority intelligence requirements and have tailored reporting guidelines to follow. Similarly, communications systems must be in place which allow timely information exchange up and down the chain at all levels.

With the above intelligence requirements in mind, the study now turns to an examination of tactical intelligence doctrine in order to assess its adequacy in meeting the commander's needs in a civil disturbance operation.

III. ADEQUACY OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS

Sources of Intelligence Doctrine for Civil Disturbance Operations

There is no specific Army intelligence doctrine tailored to civil disturbance operations. Instead, there are doctrinal intelligence manuals for intelligence analysis, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, intelligence and electronic warfare operations, and a variety of other topics.

The 1960s and 1992 civil disturbance deployments were conducted by corps or division staffs (often operating as JTF headquarters). Accordingly, this study limited its focus to selected aspects of tactical intelligence doctrine—those that a corps or division G2 staff would be most likely to apply in a civil disturbance operation. Specifically, the research supporting this paper included a review of the U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept,
In order to determine what intelligence doctrine was most likely to apply to civil disturbance operations, the discussion which follows is limited to an examination of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) doctrine based on the current (February 1993) draft of FM 34-130, IPB. Although IPB is only one of six intelligence functions outlined in U.S. Army doctrine it "provides the foundation for the successful accomplishment of the remaining five IEW [Intelligence and Electronic Warfare] functions." In fact, each of the other functions is performed in the context of IPB products. Therefore, an analysis of IPB is a logical and sufficient means of determining the adequacy of the Army's tactical intelligence doctrine in civil disturbance operations.

**Evaluation Criteria**

In examining the Army's tactical intelligence doctrine, this paper considers whether Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield supports the requirements of civil disturbance operations and provides effective intelligence products to the commander. The following three criteria determine effectiveness: timeliness, completeness, and appropriateness of
the intelligence products provided to the commander. Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, intelligence doctrine is considered effective if its products are timely (provided when needed), complete (meet commander's priority intelligence requirements), and appropriate (are in a form useful in planning and executing civil disturbance operations in the American urban environment).

**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is the doctrinal centerpiece of the intelligence process and plays a central role in staff planning of military operations. FM 34-130 describes the IPB methodology. In its most recent draft (February 1993) it includes guidelines for applying IPB to a variety of operations other than war, but does not include specific recommendations for domestic civil disturbances. This does not mean that IPB is not intended for use in such cases. On the contrary, the manual states

The doctrine of IPB is sound and can be applied universally to all situations at all levels. The tactics, techniques and procedures of applying IPB may vary according to the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) situation.58

Clearly, the doctrine is intended for application in any military situation. This includes civil disturbance operations which are not specifically addressed. Therefore, analysts must be expected to take what the manual
does present and extrapolate its applicability to the domestic urban environment. The following discussion assumes that perspective.

FM 34-130 describes four steps composing the IPB process: define the battlefield environment, evaluate the battlefield's effects on courses of action (COAs), evaluate the threat, and determine threat courses of action. The manual describes each of these steps in detail and uses several illustrative scenarios to show how they might be applied in various operations; but, does not address civil disturbance operations. It is therefore, important to consider each step in the context of the intelligence requirements of civil disturbance operations in order to determine the extent to which they apply.

**Step I: Define the Battlefield Environment**

According to FM 34-130,

Step I sets the parameters in time, the boundaries in space, and those characteristics of the battlefield environment that may be significant in accomplishing the command's mission.

This step also identifies gaps in available intelligence and guides the collection effort accordingly.

Setting the parameters in time and boundaries in space is further defined as specifying the area of operations and area of interest for the mission. The manual defines area of operations as "the geographical area where the commander is assigned the responsibility and authority to conduct
military operations.\textsuperscript{61} This definition applies in civil disturbance operations just as it does in any military operation.

Area of interest is defined as "that area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the command's operation."\textsuperscript{62} If it were limited to threat capability relative to time and geographic considerations (as in some older versions of IPB doctrine), the concept of area of interest would be too narrow for the circumstances of civil disturbance operations. However, the current draft FM 34-130 expands the concept of area of interest to include "characteristics of the environment which might influence courses of action or [the] commander's decisions."\textsuperscript{63}

These characteristics are described as including such things as population demographics, political and socio-economic factors, transportation and telecommunications infrastructures, and legal restrictions on the employment of forces. These factors are significant to the commander conducting civil disturbance operations; thus, the manual's concept of area of interest is broad enough for application in such an environment.

The manual also provides other guidance useful to intelligence personnel defining the battlefield environment for a civil disturbance. It points out that the commander and staff must understand political, social, economic, legal, and religious aspects of the situation as well as
relationships between the government, military, and the people. An intelligence staff which follows the doctrine's broad view of battlefield characteristics and applies techniques outlined in the manual should be able to produce products tailored to a civil disturbance environment as the basis for the remaining steps of the IPB process.

**Step II: Evaluate the Battlefield's Effects upon COA's**

In this step the commanders' intelligence staff:

fully explores what the environment encourages and discourages in the way of friendly and threat COA [Course of Action] by an analysis of the battlefield environment that may effect operations.

Much of the manual's discussion of this step of IPB concentrates on an evaluation of terrain in terms of traditional military factors (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach). If the doctrine limited itself to a discussion of the effects of terrain and weather in conventional operations, it would be inadequate for civil disturbance operations. However, the draft FM 34-130 goes far beyond that and discusses how these factors may be interpreted in the context of a variety of scenarios and circumstances. It also points out that politics, the civilian press, the population, and other factors must be considered.

The manual is very creative in giving examples of the types of products which are produced in this phase. For example, the manual contains a number of illustrative scenarios showing intelligence personnel
how to apply IPB to various environments. Many of the methods described in these scenarios are directly applicable to civil disturbance operations. For example, population status overlays which show areas inhabited by different groups are essential to operations in today's ethnically diverse urban environment. Similarly, the manual suggests that overlays of critical sites be prepared in some situations. In a civil disturbance these might detail the locations of gun stores, pawn shops, liquor stores, government buildings, and public utilities, for example.

Other overlays are prepared to depict militarily significant aspects of the terrain such as potential helicopter landing zones, assembly areas, or holding areas for masses of personnel -- all of which are important in civil disturbance operations. The manual also makes provision for including a study of less tangible environmental factors during this step of IPB. These include "the symptoms, causes, and aggravations of the conflict in terms of the population and economics." Understanding these factors is critical to understanding the civil disturbance environment and is evidence of the broad applicability of the doctrinal guidance for this step of IPB.

**Step III: Evaluate the Threat**

When one thinks of threat evaluation in the context of conventional war scenarios, one thinks of doctrinal templates arraying forces on the ground within the constraints of terrain. In the narrow context of this
interpretation, doctrine for threat evaluation would not be very applicable in civil disturbances. Some of the elements deployed in Los Angeles adopted this narrow view based on the version of FM 34-130 in use at that time and concluded that products of this step were not applicable in a civil disturbance. The current draft FM 34-130 corrects this misperception and shows clearly the broad range of techniques and products which IPB produces to support commanders deployed in a variety of situations.

The current draft describes specifically how intelligence analysts should evaluate available information on threat characteristics and develop threat models tailored to the specific environment. An analyst following this doctrine’s guidance would be led to develop models of crowd action and riot development as well as models of gang behavior for use in civil disturbance operations.

The doctrine directs that analysts identify gaps in intelligence holdings and take steps to fill them as the first task of this step of IPB. This applies in civil disturbance operations as in any operation (although legal constraint make the collection process somewhat different). To process incoming information, the doctrine introduces a variety of analytical tools (intelligence journals and workbooks, time event charts, situation maps or coordinate registers, activities and associations matrices, link diagrams, radio diagrams, etc.) and describes their adaptation across the full spectrum
of military operations. In this way, the manual equips the intelligence staff with a broad perspective on this step of IPB. The doctrine's examples of how to develop and graphically portray threat models in operations other than war provide an analyst a good basis for adapting threat evaluation techniques to the civil disturbance environment.

**Step IV: Determine Threat Courses of Action**

In this step of IPB, the intelligence analyst uses the products of the other three steps to predict the threat's possible courses of action. A key aspect of this step is not only to predict what events might occur, but to identify activities which indicate those that are about to occur. Much of the doctrine's discussion assumes that threat action is the product of planning and direction by decision makers. This does not apply directly to civil disturbances in which mobs riot as the result of crowd psychology rather than at the direction of established leaders. However, it does apply with respect to gangs and their potential for action during civil disturbances. Therefore, just as in the other steps of IPB, the intelligence analyst must adapt doctrine to the situation. The draft FM 34-130 provides a rational approach for doing so.

The manual suggests starting with the threat models developed during the previous step and then considering a variety of factors including the desired end state of various groups, likely objectives for attack, current
threat dispositions, and threat perceptions of friendly forces. The manual shows how such considerations may be applied in a variety of operations. By reviewing the manual's illustrative scenarios and guidelines for operations other than war (particularly for peace keeping and peace enforcement), an intelligence analyst may develop the insight necessary to apply this step of IPB in a civil disturbance situation.

For example, the analyst might see that mobs have a pattern of attacking businesses owned by a particular ethnic group. Understanding the implied end state (the destruction of such businesses) the analyst might plot their locations with respect to the sites of current rioting and predict which areas might be the next to be hit. Similarly, knowing that gangs target gun stores the intelligence analyst might consult local authorities to determine the locations of such sites as a means of recommending security operations to the commander.

Thus, IPB doctrine can be used in civil disturbance operations to produce situation templates predicting the progress of rioting or likely targets for gang attack. Similarly, event matrices or templates are possible; albeit in a different form than conventional ones. The purpose of an event template is to identify indicators that when collected will confirm or deny certain courses of action. In civil disturbances there are indicators which can be observed and therefore doctrinal event templating techniques
can be used to effectively manage collection requirements. For example, collection might entail the police watching key neighborhoods for crowd formation or critical intersections to monitor the progress of mob movement. It might involve posting guards at critical gang targets (e.g., gun stores and pawn shops) and watching for the presence of gang members performing reconnaissance. Similarly, observation posts might be established in conjunction with the police to watch areas in which gangs meet in order to determine increased levels of activity.

Clearly, the doctrine describing the four steps of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is sufficiently broad and flexible enough to be applied to civil disturbance operations. However, if IPB is to be effective it must meet the commander’s intelligence requirements in a timely manner. The following brief examination of the timeliness, completeness, and appropriateness of IPB products in civil disturbances shows that it does so.

**Effectiveness of IPB in Civil Disturbance Operations**

As discussed earlier in this paper, a commander conducting civil disturbance operations has a number of intelligence requirements. In short, he needs detailed knowledge of the terrain, a clear understanding of the threat, a plan to collect information to fill critical gaps in a timely manner, and an accurate picture of the current and projected situation.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) doctrine is effective in civil disturbance operations if it provides products that are timely, complete, and appropriate in meeting these needs.

Obviously, the first and second steps of the IPB process (defining the battlefield environment and evaluating its effects on courses of action) provide for the collection and portrayal of terrain data in sufficient detail to meet the commander's requirements. If doctrinal guidelines are followed, the products produced during the first and second steps of IPB will be both complete and appropriate to the requirements of civil disturbance operations. All critical information will be depicted or identified for collection and products will be in a form tailored to the civil disturbance environment. The doctrine provides that the process must be completed within the time available to meet the commander's needs. In Los Angeles, elements of the 40th Infantry Division applied the IPB process and demonstrated that it can in fact be performed within the time constraints of a civil disturbance operation.

Identifying gaps in critical information and undertaking actions to fill them is also a key element of IPB. During the second step of the process, the intelligence staff develops priority intelligence requirements and a collection plan to answer them. In a civil disturbance, these functions will often be accomplished through liaison with other agencies and the reporting
of deployed elements. Accordingly, during this step the intelligence staff identifies liaison requirements and issues reporting guidelines tailored to civil disturbance operations to subordinate elements.

Doctrinal guidelines allow the preparation of collection plans which are complete and appropriate for civil disturbance operations. Experience during the 1992 Los Angeles riots show that when proper liaison is established with other agencies necessary information can be legally obtained and disseminated in a timely manner. 76

The third and fourth steps of the process (evaluating the threat and determining courses of action) provide products necessary to track the current situation and predict future events. Doctrine outlines a number of methods for performing situation development (e.g. intelligence journals and workbooks, time event charts, situation maps or coordinate registers, activities and associations matrices, link diagrams, radio diagrams, etc.) and portraying predicted future events. Use of situation and event templates and matrices adapted to the civil disturbance environment provides the intelligence staff the doctrinal tools necessary to keep the commander abreast of the situation as it develops. Once again, experience in Los Angeles shows that these methods can be effective in civil disturbance operations. 77 Elements of Joint Task Force Los Angeles used situation
maps and intelligence summaries to track crowd and gang actions and report intelligence throughout the organization in a timely manner.

In short, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is an effective intelligence methodology for supporting the commander engaged in civil disturbance operations. When adapted to the situation, IPB products are complete (in that they identify and provide for the collection of all critical intelligence), are appropriate (in that they can be tailored to the needs of civil disturbance operations), and timely (in that they are flexible enough to be applied in the compressed time frames associated with civil disturbances).

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no U.S. Army tactical intelligence doctrine for civil disturbance operations. However, intelligence requirements identified from the Army's 1960s and 1992 civil disturbance operations can be met using Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The current draft of FM 34-130, IPB, provides the intelligence analyst with a broad view of the process. Although it does not specifically address civil disturbance operations, its illustrative scenarios and descriptions of the application of IPB in operations other than war provide a sufficient basis for extrapolating its use in civil disturbance operations. Nevertheless, IPB doctrine could be
improved by adding a section outlining guidelines for civil disturbance operations, just as there currently are sections covering peace enforcement, peace keeping, and similar operations other than war. This would eliminate ambiguity and make it easier for intelligence staffs to adapt the IPB process to the unique requirements of civil disturbance operations.

Civil disturbance operations are a challenging potential mission for Army corps or division commanders and staffs within the United States. Preparedness for such operations is challenging given legal restrictions, competing mission priorities, and scarce resources. Accordingly, there are several areas which merit further research. For example, it should be determined whether or not the National Guard should be responsible for working with civilian authorities to prepare planning packages for civil disturbance contingencies. If so, it then becomes necessary to identify what information should be included in such packages. Similarly, there is a need to determine the exact liaison relationships with civil authorities prior to and following deployment of forces to civil disturbance operations. There is also a requirement to study civil disturbance force composition to determine training requirements and identify what types of units are best suited to operations in the American urban environment. These are just some areas which require further research.
Civil disturbances are a sensitive mission in which mistakes can lead directly to the loss of American lives. Therefore, support to domestic civil authorities in civil disturbance operations is a mission which Army planners cannot afford to ignore.
ENDNOTES

1Dr. Tom Marks makes a convincing argument in support of this point in his article "Northern Ireland and Urban America," a paper to be published in an upcoming issue of Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (London: Frank Cass). The Webster Report reaches similar conclusions in discussing the causes of the 1992 Los Angeles riot (William H. Webster and Hubert Williams, The City in Crisis: A Report by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: Board of Police Commissioners, 1992)).


4Field Manual 100-19, 7-12.

5Ibid.


9Eight of these were "major riots" (lasting more than two days marked by multiple fires, extensive looting, sniping, quelled with troops) and
thirty-three were "serious riots" (one to two days of violence, sporadic looting and fires, quelled by police). Ibid, 113.

10 Ibid, 516.


13 Los Angeles was one of nine significant disturbances which followed the acquittal of four police officers in the beating of a black motorist, Rodney King. Significant disturbances also occurred in Las Vegas, San Diego, New York, Seattle, San Francisco, Tampa, Birmingham and Atlanta ("Violence in Other Cities," Los Angeles Times, 2 May 1992, A7). Troops were used to restore order in both Los Angeles and Las Vegas (John Hurst and Maura Dolan, "Violence in Las Vegas Claims Two Lives." Los Angeles Times, 2 May 1992, A4). Damage and arrest figures are from "Understanding the Riots Part 3: Witness to Rage," Los Angeles Times, 13 May 1992, T9 and William H. Webster and Hubert Williams, The City in Crisis: A Report by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: Board of Police Commissioners, 1992), Appendix 8, respectively.

14 These forces consisted of 9,975 National Guard, 3,313 federal troops (1,544 Marines, 1,769 Army), 2,000 firefighters, 5,000 Los Angeles police officers, 120 paramedics, 2,323 California Highway Patrol, 1,000 sheriffs deputies, and about 1000 federal officers of the FBI, US Marshal, Border Patrol, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("The Protection Forces," Los Angeles Times, 10 May 1992, A31).

15 William H. Webster and Hubert Williams, The City in Crisis: A Report by the Special Advisor to the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: Board of Police Commissioners, 1992), 42.
16 A detailed discussion of the changes in the urban environment from the 1960s to today is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader interested in an exhaustive discussion of this subject should refer to Steven W. Peterson, *Civil Disturbances in the American Urban Environment: An Evaluation of U.S. Army Doctrine* (Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992), Chapters 3 and 4. This thesis dealt with Army doctrine for civil disturbances as embodied in FM 19-15 and did not address intelligence doctrine, hence the purpose of this monograph.


21 Peterson, 52.

22 Webster and Williams, 23, 24.

23 Ibid, 124.


25 Peterson, 114 and Couvalt briefing to Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference.

26 This study's research also included a variety of Department of the Army summary reports covering virtually every major civil disturbance deployment of the 1960s. This review included the *Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Study Group Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 April 1971)-- a particularly exhaustive study drawing upon the lessons learned of the 1960s to predict the Army's civil disturbance mission through 1975. None of these reports differed in their intelligence
findings from the formal after action reports mentioned here. The lessons identified in these reports are confirmed in Army research papers, professional journals, civilian works and doctrinal manuals and provide an excellent basis for developing the intelligence requirements of civil disturbance operations given the modern urban environment.

27Comments in General Throckmorton's report on Detroit were typical in this regard: "... the resistance was similar to the final stages of World War II where troops were moving through the cities where the people were for the most part friendly, but there were still small groups or individuals carrying out sniping and looting activity." After Action Report, Task Force Detroit, 24 July - 2 August 1967 (Headquarters Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, 1967), 18.


29"During the Baltimore operation it was disclosed through County Police radio monitoring, that dissident elements had in fact established a radio net on citizen bands 11 and 14. The net included a base station and several mobile units. Units were utilizing a code system for street designations and were being called on one band and automatically answering on the other. Mobile units were providing the net with locations and troop strengths. These stations refused to identify themselves when request for station identity was issued." After Action Report, Task Force Baltimore 7-13 April 1968 (Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 7 May 1968), II-m-3.

30Couvalt briefing to Senior Leaders Warfighter Conference.

31Ibid.

32Brigadier General Michael Canavan, U. S. Army, member of JTF Los Angeles staff made this point (Interview by author, August 1992, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). Major General Couvalt made a similar point and emphasized that crime rates actually fell to unusual lows during the JTF's deployment (Couvalt briefing to Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference).

34 Brigadier General Canavan, who as a colonel served on the JTF Los Angeles staff, speculated that this might be the case (Canavan interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas August 1992). His speculation seems well founded when considered in light of Robert Vernon's book, L. A. Justice: Lessons from the Firestorm (Colorado Springs: Focus on the Family Publishing). Robert Vernon, a former Los Angeles deputy chief of police, discusses several instances of gang activity which suggest coordinated action by the gangs against police and firemen during the riots.


37 U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 April 1971), C-2, II-2-72, II-2-73; and FM 100-19, 7-12, 7-13.

38 Almost every after action report reviewed for this study emphasized the importance of human intelligence collection and recommended greater effort in this area. For example, the Task Force Baltimore after action report was typical—emphasizing the need for additional HUMINT teams to move about and report with more "Negro" agents (page II-d-1). The report also states "Additional intelligence personnel [were] required during the initial phase of civil disturbances . . . the number of intelligence personnel deployed on civil disturbance operations [should] be increased." (After Action Report of Task Force Baltimore 7-13 April 1968, (Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 7 May 1968), p. II-d-2.

39 Typical comments are as follows: "As soon as their use is authorized, military intelligence personnel should be placed in police precinct headquarters to work closely with police intelligence units." (U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Study Group Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1 April 1971),
C-26) and "Police officials at precinct level are a fruitful source of tactical intelligence. Therefore, in future maintain regular contact by telephone and visit with precinct captains." (After Action Report, Task Force Goblet Glass, Headquarters, District of Columbia National Guard, period 5-16 April 1968 (Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1968), 22).

The importance of the local populace as a source of information is mentioned in most of the reports. Comments in After Action Report, Task Force Detroit, 24 July - 2 August 1967 (Headquarters Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, 1967), D-8 and in After Action Report of Task Force Baltimore 7-13 April 1968 (Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 7 May 1968), D-9 are typical on this subject.

The California National Guard's 40th Infantry Division developed a tailored spot report which specified the reporting of this information. William V. Wenger and Fredric W. Young, "The Los Angeles Riots and Tactical Intelligence," Military Intelligence, October-December 1992, 33.

Aerial observation and photo intelligence were used to good effect during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Although signals intelligence did not play a significant role, the sophisticated nature of gang communications suggests that gang opposition in future deployments might make the use of signals intercept important. Of course, legal restrictions dictate that this collection be left to civilian agencies to pursue. The military may only lend its expertise in the form of advise and analytical support and may not under current law and policy conduct direct collection operations.


"Helicopters can be used effectively for aerial surveillance and prompt reporting of trouble spots, activity of looters, and fires, gathering of crowds, and in directing mobile patrols in the area of concern." (Lessons Learned, Civil Disturbances 4-16 April 1968 (Headquarters, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 27 May 1968), C-4).

Couvalt briefing to Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference.

This has been the case since the early 1970s and is still provided for in civil disturbance operations plans. (U.S. Department of the Army,
Toward the end of the 1960s the use of such planning packets had become widespread and were judged to be of "invaluable assistance to task force commanders and other agencies assigned missions of restoring order" (Lessons Learned, Civil Disturbances 4-16 April 1968 (Headquarters, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 27 May 1968), F-3).


FM 100-19, 4-11.

Lessons Learned, Civil Disturbances 4-16 April 1968 (Headquarters, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 27 May 1968), C-2.

The telephone book is mentioned as a source of logistical information in After Action Report, Task Force Detroit, 24 July - 2 August 1967 (Headquarters Third U.S. Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, 1967), G-10; however, it is also an excellent source of intelligence.

Several after action reports identified a need for such data. For example comments see after action reports of Task Force Baltimore, (p. II-d-1), Task Force Washington (p. 10), Task Force Chicago (p. 15), and "Operations Report -- Lessons Learned, Civil Disturbances, April 1968" (Headquarters Department of the Army: 3 October 1968), p. 4.

Couvalt briefing to Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference.

FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 5-1and FM 100-19, 7-12 through 7-14. Obviously, it may not be feasible to establish liaison with all of these agencies individually. Civil authorities usually establish an emergency operations center to coordinate the activities of these agencies in civil disturbances. By providing a military liaison team to such a center, the military commander may enable coordination with these agencies as required without exceeding the liaison manpower available to him.
Admittedly, the selection of what doctrine is most likely to influence a G2 staff in a civil disturbance is somewhat subjective. The doctrinal sources selected for this study were chosen on the basis of the author's personal experience during nearly 12 years as an Army military intelligence officer with experiences ranging from battalion S2 to deputy chief of a combined field army all source intelligence center.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Branch Concept articulates the future evolution of Army military intelligence and corresponding effects on doctrine. This doctrine expands the number of doctrinal intelligence functions from four to six. Three of these functions (Indications and Warning, Target Development, Battle Damage Assessment) have little applicability in civil disturbance operations. Indications and Warning is not discussed in this study since legal restrictions on domestic intelligence collection by the military will cause the Army to rely almost exclusively on liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to fulfill this function. Target Development and Acquisition, defined as "[providing] targets and targeting data for attack, by fire, maneuver, and electromagnetic means" is also not discussed. Since the military's mission in civil disturbances is limited to "support of domestic civil authorities", any "attack" of targets in such operations will most likely be carried out by civilian law enforcement agencies and not military forces. Similarly, intelligence doctrine for Battle Damage Assessment is also not examined here. Although one might argue that this function can extend to determining the effectiveness of any military operation, it is primarily associated with evaluating the effects of target attack—which, as pointed out above, is unlikely to apply in domestic civil disturbance operations. The remaining three (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), Force Protection, and Situation Development) apply to civil disturbance operations. Force Protection (assessment of friendly vulnerabilities and risk to the force) and Situation Development (tracking and projecting the situation) are directly applicable in civil disturbance operations; therefore, discussion of these functions would be moot. For these reasons, this paper limits its examination of tactical intelligence doctrine to the functions of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (US Army Intelligence Branch Concept, Coordinating Draft, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 27 April 1992).

FM 34-130, 1-5.
64 Ibid, 7-5. The manual lists these factors in the context of a non-combatant evacuation; however, they are directly applicable to civil disturbances as well.

66 Ibid. Examples of how to perform this step in a wide variety of circumstances are discussed at length in Chapter 4, "Applications of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield," pages 4-1 through 4-100, and Chapter 7, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield throughout the Scope of Military Operations," pages 7-1 through 7-7-21.

67 Ibid, 4-89. Population overlays are discussed as part of illustrative scenario four, a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), but have obvious applicability in a civil disturbance environment where inter-group violence is likely.

58 Ibid.

69 Ibid, 7-12.

70 Wenger and Young, 29, 30.

71 Ibid. Analytical tools are listed on page 3-54 and described as part of the illustrative scenarios of Chapter 4, pages 4-1 through 4-100.

74 Ibid, 2-7, 4-59. The doctrine makes it clear that IPB is completed as the first step in the command estimate process and must be adapted to
meet the time available. As an example, the interested reader is referred to the timeline which is part of illustrative scenario three on page 4-59.

75 Wenger and Young, 29–34.

76 Couvat briefing to Senior Leaders' Warfighter Conference.

77 In fact, lessons learned reports submitted by JTF Los Angeles noted the importance of providing intelligence analysts to help police organizations apply these methods as well (e.g. Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) Report, "Subject: Importance of an Intelligence Analyst on Liaison Teams Assigned to Law Enforcement Agencies," 1-4 May 1992).
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