This paper discusses the nature of war and warfare. It contends that unclear policy objectives and a lack of strategy contributed to strategic defeats in Vietnam and Somalia despite tactical successes. This was in part the result of a tendency to confuse war and warfare. This confusion is a natural result of prevailing theories of war which tend to blur the distinction between war and warfare. In response, this paper postulates a new theory of war that clarifies the distinction between war and warfare. It views war as a matter of decision making and discusses it as a function of a group’s will and capability relative to its interests in the context of the enemy. The theory defines capability as a function of five sources of power: military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic and discusses the complex, situation dependent relationship between will and capability. Finally, the paper postulates a methodology of campaign design based on the proposed theory and concludes by discussing its practical use for the United States Army.
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Title of Monograph: The Nature of War and Campaign Design

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Army faces an ill-defined future of shrinking resources and a changing world. In their book, *War and Anti-War*, Alvin and Heidi Toffler argue that the world is entering the "Third Wave" in which information and information war are the keys to future conflict.¹ The Army’s senior leadership appears to embrace this view and is searching for a new paradigm by which to transform the Army and prosecute future conflicts. New technologies are shrinking the decision cycle and making it possible to control forces and conduct precision strikes in ways previously unimagined. The Army staff is striving to respond by harnessing these technologies for the force of the future.² However, concentrating on rapidly changing technologies alone will not prepare the Army for future missions.

The Army needs a method of understanding how to choose the appropriate course in conditions ranging from operations other than war, to regional conflicts, to large scale Third Wave warfare. The answer may lie in a better understanding of conflict, in a better theory of war. The theories of Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu and others tend to view war and warfare as essentially synonymous when they are, in fact, subtly different. The purpose of this monograph is to explore a new theory of war and its practicality in shaping campaign design for the United States Army.
Structure

In Part II, the paper defines war and warfare and discusses how the subtle distinction between these terms is significant to policy makers and military leaders in setting national policy and employing military force. It briefly introduces two perspectives on the failure of national policy and the use of force in Vietnam and how recent events in Somalia point to a continuing need for a better framework from which to determine policy objectives and translate them into military action when required.

In Part III, the paper discusses the distinction between war and warfare and postulates a theory of war based upon the nature of human conflict — the one constant in war throughout history. In putting forth this theory, the paper explores the role of capability and will in war and their complex interrelationship. Five postulates are presented summarizing the theory and forming the basis for the campaign design methodology outlined in Part IV.

Part V presents brief conclusions concerning the practical usefulness of the theory and campaign design methodology presented in the paper. Finally, an appendix offers ten cases describing the relationship of will and capability in war and an historical example of each.
II. WAR AND WARFARE

War and warfare should not be thought of as synonymous. There is a subtle, yet significant distinction. Although there are many accepted definitions of these terms, consider the following statements as a useful starting point for discussion: War is a state of conflict in which a party uses instruments of power in direct opposition to another's interests or to protect or advance one's own interests in opposition to another. Warfare, is the way in which instruments of power are applied in war. There is danger in losing sight of this subtle distinction. Nevertheless, it is easy to do so, especially when military force is applied in the context of vague, shifting, or unclear national policy objectives. The following discussion uses the American experience in Vietnam and recent events in Somalia to demonstrate this point.

There are many explanations for the defeat of American policy in Vietnam. Here, we consider two vastly different perspectives which both demonstrate that success in warfare does not necessarily lead to success in war. First, we will introduce Andrew F. Krepinivich's contention that the Army never understood the nature of the war and hence adopted a strategy of attrition. Second, we will discuss Dave R. Palmer's argument that the Army understood the war, but had no choice but to pursue an attrition strategy in the face of flawed policy constraints imposed by the national command authority.

Andrew F. Krepinivich, Jr. in his book The Army and Vietnam describes in great detail the Army's reluctance to shift from a conventional
warfare focus to the counterinsurgency operations that he contends the nature
of the war called for. He argues that the Army was bound by its culture,
doctrine and force structure to use conventional warfare in Vietnam despite the
situation there. In his words,

the Army applied the doctrine and force structure it had developed
for conventional contingencies in Europe and Korea. . . . Deeply
imbedded in the service's psyche, conventional operations held sway
over the Army . . . The sheer weight of American materiel and
resources seemed sufficient to the military leadership to wear down
the North Vietnamese and their VC allies; thus, strategy was not
necessary. All that was needed was efficient application of
firepower. It had worked against the Japanese and the Germans in
World War II and against the Chinese in Korea. It would be tried
again in Vietnam. 4

According to Krepinivich, the Army in Vietnam allowed the American dedication
to firepower and attrition to govern its approach. In his view, the Army sought
to draw the enemy into battle in order to inflict maximum casualties and pursue
the attrition and annihilation warfare the Army was comfortable with.

Dave R. Palmer, in his book Summons of the Trumpet: U.S. -
Vietnam in Perspective, differs from Krepinivich. He acknowledges the
insurgency but throughout his work demonstrates that the war was in fact
principally one of aggression by North Vietnam against the South. Like
Krepinivich, Palmer concludes that the Army undertook attrition warfare in the
absence of a coherent national strategy:

One should carefully note that while American field commanders
openly admitted that they were waging a war of attrition, they
winced at calling it a strategy of attrition. Attrition is not a
strategy. It is, in fact, irrefutable proof of the absence of a strategy. A commander who resorts to attrition admits his failure to conceive of an alternative. He rejects warfare as an art and accepts it on the most non-professional terms imaginable. He uses blood in lieu of brains. To be sure, political considerations left military commanders no choice other than attrition warfare . . .

Palmer argues that the military commanders in Vietnam did the best that was humanly possible in the face of a bankrupt strategy of graduated response imposed by Washington and a national policy which allowed the enemy a number of safe havens just outside the borders of South Vietnam. According to his arguments, attrition warfare was the only choice available to the Army:

Denied the capability of chopping at the roots of aggression, General Westmoreland was compelled to attempt killing the tree by plucking leaves faster than new ones could sprout. With Allied ground forces restricted to the borders of South Vietnam, the only feasible strategy was to try to kill North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers faster than they could be replaced. In Westmoreland's own words, written in August 1966, the conflict in South Vietnam had evolved into "a protracted war of attrition."

One of the problems with attrition warfare serving as a substitute for clear national strategy is that it became difficult to measure the progress of the war in Vietnam. Palmer explains how this resulted in the use of body counts as a principal measure of effectiveness. In particular, he notes that this led to the inappropriate substitution of an indicator of success for the objective of operations:

Having decided to engage in a killing contest, an army thereafter scores its points in terms of cadavers. . . . Other standards used to measure progress in past wars -- ground taken, miles advanced,
cities liberated -- were manifestly irrelevant in a war of attrition. "Body count" became a morbid fixture of military jargon. The news media tabulated the number of Americans killed each week and compared it with South Vietnamese losses to see if they were bleeding equally. Then the combined figures were contrasted with reported Viet Cong and NVA deaths to ascertain the weekly kill ratio. Since the Allies had no strategic plan on which to anchor their perspective, it is hardly surprising that in all too many instances the body count, the indicator, came to be considered the actual goal of military operations.  

Although Palmer levels this criticism, his work makes a convincing case that the Army's attrition warfare lead to the near total tactical defeat of the North Vietnamese; yet, was unable to prevent strategic failure. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in his discussion of the 1968 Tet Offensive. In his words: "The Tet offensive was the most disastrous defeat North Vietnam suffered in the long war. Paradoxically, it was also the North's most resounding victory during the years of American military presence." Tet was the beginning of the end as US resolve was broken. The election of the Nixon administration led to a long process of Vietnamization and negotiation culminating in US withdrawal and "peace with honor." On 30 April 1975, North Vietnamese troops triumphantly entered Saigon and it was clear to the world that American efforts in Vietnam had failed.

Whether one accepts Krepinevich's arguments blaming the Army for an inability to adapt its methods to counterinsurgency or Palmer's blaming the administration for foreclosing better warfare options and forcing the military to attrition, two facts are clear. First, the Army pursued attrition warfare and
succeeded tactically. Second, tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. Despite tactical success and a variety of programs aimed at pacification and winning the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese, in the end Vietnam fell to the Communists.\textsuperscript{12}

In short, the US was tactically successful but failed strategically in Vietnam. Stanley Karnow quotes Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., author of \textit{On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War}, as telling a North Vietnamese colonel after the war "you never defeated us on the battlefield" to which the colonel replied "that may be so but it is also irrelevant."\textsuperscript{13} The irrelevance of tactical success is the risk a nation runs when it conducts warfare without an effective policy for war -- when it fails to see a distinction between war and warfare.

In contrast, the North Vietnamese appear to have understood the distinction. They appear to have known that making war depended not only on the military capability but also on the will to fight of all the belligerents.\textsuperscript{14} They understood that they could never defeat the American's capability, so they targeted American will. The Americans sought battle to kill the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, the Communists sought battle to kill Americans.\textsuperscript{15} The difference was in the purpose for the killing and the degree to which each side's political will could tolerate losses. The Americans were working toward attrition, annihilation, and exhaustion of the Communist's military capability.
The North Vietnamese were out to exhaust American national will. The Americans used tactical engagements for tactical reasons, the Vietnamese used tactical engagements toward a strategic aim. In his book, *PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam*, Douglas Pike makes a strong argument that the North Vietnamese did not confuse tactical warfare with the nature of the war and hence pursued an effective strategy — *dau tranh*.

According to Pike, the Vietnamese strategy of *dau tranh* (translated struggle or struggle movement) involved two elements: political *dau tranh* (including action among the people, action among the military/civil servants, and action among the enemy) and armed *dau tranh* (independent/guerilla fighting and coordinated fighting). Neither the political nor armed elements could be successful alone. Within this strategy, the North Vietnamese adapted their methods to a changing situation with an emphasis on the interdependence of the two forms. In *Dau tranh* they understood that the battlefield was more than tactical warfare. It recognized that there was a struggle to control perception and hence will — and that the battle for will was two-fold. First, it targeted the will of the Americans to continue the war:

[Dau tranh] turns the weight of the enemy’s philosophical system against him. It works best, therefore, against a democracy and least well against totalitarians or fanatics. It agrees with the enemy that victory will go to the just because justice must triumph, but it does not paint the enemy as unjust with a brush that smears all the enemy camp. . . . Normal wartime polarization is denied. Over and over, it is asserted to the opposite camp, particularly to the vast civilian population at home,
"We are not your enemy. The enemy is the unjust person who wishes to pursue an unjust war and surely you are not among those. We stand not for victory but for justice." Thus, the strategy does not seek to monopolize virtue but to share it. 

Second, the Communists worked on the will of the American, French, and Vietnamese people to support them. Dau tranh recognized that:

The battle was to be organizational or quasi-political; the battleground the minds and loyalties of the Vietnamese; the weapons, words and ideas.

Unlike the American Army, the North Vietnamese military was not hampered by policy constraints and unclear national objectives. In Pike's book, one can see that Ho Chi Minh and the politburo worked in close cooperation and harmony with Giap and the military forces. They were able to focus clearly on the nature of the war and adapt their warfare to meet a changing tactical and strategic situation. For them the distinction between war and warfare remained clear and yielded a harvest of victory.

Although Krepinivich, Palmer, and Pike each have a different perspective on the war, it appears that all would agree that the US was at a relative disadvantage to the North Vietnamese in terms of the link between tactical action and strategic aims. In Vietnam, unclear policy objectives and political constraints hampered US military operations creating a situation in which tactical success was irrelevant in the face of strategic policy failure.
Recent events in Somalia illustrate that similar dangers persist today and make a brief consideration of events there worthwhile.

The United States entered Somalia with a humanitarian mission of protecting relief workers and facilitating the feeding of a starving population. Initially neutral, military forces were conducting operations other than war. Then a Somali attack on Pakistani elements of the UN force led to a UN resolution calling for the arrest of the warlord Aidid. Thus, the US force experienced "mission creep"—a subtle change in mission by circumstances without an explicit consideration of policy directing the change. The US now found itself pursuing a UN policy of direct opposition to Aidid's clan and seeking his arrest.

On 3 October 1993, an American force was completing a military raid in which several of Aidid's key lieutenants were taken when it was hit by a coordinated assault. American bravery and firepower against tremendous odds inflicted hundreds of casualties on Aidid's forces. Nevertheless, 18 Americans were killed and 75 others were wounded.\(^{20}\) After the action, military spokesmen pointed out the tactical success of the raid (all targeted personnel captured). However, the tactical success was overshadowed by its strategic effect. Almost overnight in the midst of a public outcry, the President changed American policy and announced that American forces would be withdrawn by the end of March.
Aidid had arguably suffered severe tactical defeats in raids up to and including that of 3 October; however, he achieved strategic success by eliciting the withdrawal of American forces and ensuring himself a continued role in Somalia’s future. Once again, by conducting military operations in the context of unclear national policy, the United States allowed "warfare" (the tactic of raids against Aidid’s clan) to serve as a substitute for a comprehensive American policy. It is of course impossible to say with certainty what might have been. However, one must wonder whether or not a better understanding of conflict would have helped the United States resist the UN mission creep which led to the 3 October disaster.

In both Vietnam and Somalia, the United States fell back on its comfort zone (conventional warfare operations) in the absence of clear policy objectives (understanding of the nature of war/conflict). In both cases, this led to failure on a strategic level despite tactical success. From these examples, we can see the danger associated with the use of the military in the absence of clear policy objectives. In such cases, there is a risk that war will be seen as a problem of warfare — that the nation’s leadership will substitute tactical operations for strategic vision. Military leaders have a role to play in avoiding this pitfall. Although it is true that they cannot set policy in the American system, they can do much to influence policy formulation through military
advice to the national leadership. The theory of war presented in the remainder of this paper is intended to aid them in doing so.

III. UNDERSTANDING WAR

Theories of War and Warfare

Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu and the multitude of other theorists which help shape military thinking share a common element. They reinforce the tendency to equate war and warfare. Examining traditional theories of war, one sees them riddled with references to the technologies of their time or the forms of warfare which then prevailed. Clausewitz is tied to the decisive battle in the Napoleonic model. Jomini sees success in war as the proper arrangement of the battlefield and the selection of the proper lines of operations and decisive points by which a force should operate. Sun Tzu acknowledges the non-battle complexities of war; yet spends considerable effort in describing principles to be followed in warfare. Mahan and Corbett, although different in their conclusions, have little focus on the fundamental nature of war and describe instead approaches to sea and maritime warfare. Warden understands ideas of will and capability but concentrates on air power as the warfare offering the key to success. Revolutionary war theorists, like Mao, seem to understand war on a different level than conventional war theorists; nevertheless, they too blur the distinction between war and warfare.
It is safe to say that no matter what the theorist’s original intention, each strays from the nature of war into the nature of warfare without clearly identifying a distinction between the two. It is understandable that this pitfall is common, even among such a distinguished group. After all, one can hardly have war without armed warfare. For if in theorizing, one separates armed warfare from war, one would ultimately need to coin another term for dealing with the specific case of conflict involving the use of armed force. Hence, in introducing a different theory of war, we will concentrate on the case in which armed force is used. But, this case does not assume that armed force is the sole, or even the central, instrument of war. Thus, war will be discussed without viewing it as synonymous with warfare.

A Different Theory of War

By confusing war with warfare a nation concentrates on the conduct of military operations without necessarily testing whether or not they contribute to the achievement of the strategic end state. Tactical activity replaces strategic purpose and the nation risks achieving tactical victory within strategic defeat. Conversely, when the nature of war as distinct from warfare is understood, an army may focus its efforts effectively toward the achievement of a strategic end. In other words, an army which understands how its enemy develops and sustains both its capability and will for war, may design an
effective campaign for defeating it. The risk of relying solely on familiar forms of warfare unsuited to the situation is thus avoided.

To further develop these points, we will draw upon contemporary conflict theory and practical examples. In order to maintain a coherent discussion, explanatory endnotes are extensively used. These expose the reader to concepts of existing conflict theories that although pertinent to the theory being presented here would disrupt its logical development if included in the text itself.

Consider first the nature of war. War is conflict between parties. The parties may be nations, states, alliances, coalitions, cultural groups, religious, or economic organizations. It is important to recognize that war may occur between a variety of human entities and not just between what has come to be known as nation states. So, what separates war from a fist fight or a criminal act? Is it the number of participants on each side? Is one against one a war; two against two; ten against ten? Clearly, a specific numeric delimiter for deciding what is war is too arbitrary to be useful. For the purposes of this paper it will be sufficient to conclude that war may exist when groups of people act to oppose each other (particularly with the use of armed force). The general term group will be used throughout this paper to refer to belligerent parties. It should be understood to encompass belligerents of all
types including small revolutionary cells, clans, tribes, nations, states, alliances, and coalitions to name but a few.31

An important aspect of a group is that it is never monolithic nor completely homogeneous.32 Whenever groups of people act, it is the product of an internal process by which the leadership of the group has gained consensus of key sub-elements and mobilized them to support the chosen course or policy. This consensus is not necessarily consensus of all members of the group. On the contrary, in many entities coercive power allows a small leadership to direct the collective actions of the group.33 Once a war policy has been chosen, it is then necessary for the leadership to maintain the group's resolve in pursuing it.34

The degree to which an individual or collection of individuals within a group can effect its policy varies widely based on the nature of the group. For example, in a democracy the opinions of the common man may be very critical in maintaining resolve for the group to act in a certain way. On the other hand, in a dictatorship it may only be necessary to maintain the loyalty of key subordinates exercising coercive power over the majority of the group (e.g. the police or military in a totalitarian state or the ideological or religious leaders of a fundamentalist movement). Furthermore, one must understand that even when a group is acting collectively in pursuit of a chosen policy sub-elements (hereafter called factions) of the group will have different interests in doing
Some factions in fact may have an interest in undermining and changing the group's collective policy. Therefore, to understand a group's will for war, one must understand the internal dynamics of the factions of which it is composed.

So, war occurs between groups; yet groups are not always at war. What then causes groups to be in conflict and go to war? Once at war what causes them to remain at war? Geoffrey Blainey's work, *The Causes of War*, deals extensively with these questions. Blainey concludes that:

In deciding for war or peace national leaders appear to be strongly influenced by at least seven factors: i. military strength and the ability to apply that strength in the likely theater of war; ii. predictions of how outside nations will behave if war should occur; iii. perceptions of whether there is internal unity or discord in their land and the land of the enemy; iv. knowledge or forgetfulness of the realities and sufferings of war; v. nationalism and ideology; vi. the state of the economy and also its ability to sustain the kind of war envisaged; vii. the personality and experience of those who shared in the decision.

Blainey accepts that groups go to war when they see it in their interest to do so and when they estimate that they have the capability relative to their enemy to achieve their aims. Wars end when they see that their interests are not advanced by continuing. In short, according to Blainey "Wars usually end when the nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength."
To expand upon Blainey’s argument, it seems evident that war is about decision making. When a group sees its interests in conflict with those of another it will pursue war as the result of a decision to do so. The decision for war will depend on the group’s estimate of its capability relative to its enemy and on its resolve to act on that estimate. Of course, the speed with which one group acts may render another group’s decision for war irrelevant (e.g. Iraq’s swift invasion of Kuwait made a decision for physical war essentially moot. However, Kuwait did make a decision to resist by not accepting the Iraqi occupation and calling on the world community to oppose it).

Once at war, a group will continue to fight as long as it maintains the will and capability relative to its enemy to do so. Therefore, the decision to go to war or continue in war is a function of one’s will and capability. Obviously, if either element goes to zero a group will not be able to pursue war. Infinite will with no capability to act on it will not produce war. Conversely, infinite capability with no will to employ it will not produce war.

It is important to explore these concepts further for will and capability are not distinct elements independent of one another. Indeed, they are integrally interrelated. However, before exploring the relationship between will and capability, it is first necessary to consider each more specifically. Let us begin with the elements of a group’s capability.
The capability to pursue war involving armed conflict is a product of a group's sources of power. Sources of capability include military, economic, geographic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic power. Consider briefly each of these sources of power.

**Military power** is a function of the group's ability to employ armed force. Weapons, training, doctrine, and organization of the group's armed forces are all determinants of military power.

**Economic power** is a function of the group's ability to generate wealth drawing upon natural resources, technology, infrastructure, means of production, trade, and information.

**Geographic power** includes not only the attributes of the physical area the group occupies but also the characteristics of its human resources, specifically, the demographics of its population.

**Diplomatic power** is a function of the group's ability to influence other groups to support its aims with their own sources of power. Diplomatic power is also related to the group's ability to effect the enemy's assessment of its relative strength and influence the enemy's perception of its own interests in continuing or ending hostilities.

**Informational power** stems from the group's ability to acquire and employ information within its other four sources of power. Informational power also relates to a group's ability to understand and influence the enemy and its internal power dynamics; including the use of the media, propaganda, ideology, and religious appeals to name a few.

**Cybernetic power** is a function of the group's internal political processes, decision making, and control structures. It is greatest in those groups whose leadership structures allow them to best develop and sustain will and orchestrate the use of the other instruments of power. Groups with strong cybernetic power are able to effectively formulate policy and translate it directly into action.
In short, war capability is a function of a group’s ability to achieve synergy among its sources of power in opposition to its enemies. This includes the group’s ability to bring the power of other groups to its support.

Capability alone will not allow a group to decide for and continue in war. The will to do so must also be present. Will for war may be thought of as the resolve to act in direct pursuit of one’s interests in opposition to another using armed force, if necessary. The will for war is a function of the decision making dynamics of the group (its cybernetic power) and its perception of how best to achieve its interests. If there is a strong unity of purpose among a group’s factions it is more likely to be able to generate and sustain the will for war than is a group marked by disunity.

Leadership plays an important role in generating and sustaining will. Leaders who exercise strong control or coercive power over the led will be more critical in determining the direction of a group’s will than those who lead only by the voluntary consensus of the group. Group leadership is closely related to the distribution of factional power within a group — another critical determinant of the ability to generate and sustain will. In a totalitarian or authoritarian group (where factional power is unbalanced and the leadership has the ability to coerce subordinate factions), the ability to generate and sustain the will for war is more dependent on the will of the leaders independent of the led than it is in a democratic group. In democratic groups, or groups
marked by great diversity of competing factions with balanced factional power, it is more difficult to achieve and sustain a consensus of will for war.

Another important aspect of the will for war is a group’s perception of its interests relative to other groups. Groups will not opt for war using armed force if they believe their interests can be advanced or protected using other means. Peacetime competition and conflict between groups is common. The will to use instruments of power other than armed force normally precedes the development of the will for war. A will for war occurs when a group believes its interests are in direct conflict with those of another group and that armed force is necessary to advance or protect them. Note that the perception is key. Some factions within a group may seek to foster the will for war using armed force before other means have been exhausted if they believe it is in their faction’s interests to do so. Similarly, some factions will work to undermine the will for war in the face of growing group consensus. Hence, disagreement between factions within a group as when to proceed from peacetime conflict to war commonly precedes the consolidation of a group’s will for war. Clearly, the development and sustainment of a group’s will for war is a function of its internal political processes and decision making structures.

Having briefly discussed capability and will, it is now possible to explore the complex relationship between these two essential determinants of war. In fact, they are not mutually exclusive elements. Since cybernetic power
is an integral part of capability and the ability to generate and sustain will is a function of it, we can see that will and capability must be considered in relationship to each other and not as independent factors.

Obviously, changes in will can effect capability and changes in capability can effect will. However, the relationship between the two is complex and highly dependent on the specific situation. It is impossible to develop a simple heuristic describing how changes in one effect the other. Herein lies one of the problems associated with treating war and warfare synonymously. Military planners often work under the assumption that there is a direct relationship between will and capability. The assumption is made that by reducing an enemy's capability one automatically will reduce his will and eventually end the war (and vice versa). The problem is that this is a warfare assumption that is not necessarily true in war. It is accepted as fact because in most tactical actions it appears to be true. Unfortunately, since war and warfare are not in truth synonymous, what is true tactically is not always true strategically.

Thus far, we have defined capability and will for war and asserted that the relationship is complex. It is neither strictly direct nor inverse, but highly dependent upon the situation. Some important corollaries of this conclusion deserve review at this point. First, the conduct of war is a product of a decision to go to war and a continuous re-evaluation of the utility of
remaining at war. In a group's decision to begin or continue a war, absolute capability and will are significant only relative to the enemy's capability and will. War results when a group concludes that the use of armed force is useful to advance or protect its interests. As Blainey points out, they reach this conclusion through a self-assessment relative to their enemy, specifically that their interests are best served by war. 50

Of course, decision making rarely occurs with perfect knowledge (if ever) so groups frequently (if not always) miscalculate in their decision for war. For example, Argentina miscalculated British resolve in defending the Falklands and as a result found itself at war. Faulty assessments are not the only source of poor war decisions. Time pressure is another factor and often results in groups believing they have no choice but war. The skill of an effective war planner lies in making other choices more attractive for an enemy. Specifically, war termination depends upon fostering enemy options in a direction compatible with one's own interests and foreclosing options contrary to one's own interests. The idea is to make the enemy believe his best choice is to protect his interests through negotiated peace or capitulation rather than continuing at war. Consequently, military planners should pay particular attention to both enemy and friendly decision making dynamics and structure operations in the context of the two.
Second, the relationship between will and capability in the decision to undertake and continue in war is highly dependent on the situation. It is a function of the group’s internal structure and distribution of factional power. Different groups have different decision making dynamics and different abilities to generate and sustain the will and capability for war. Furthermore, a group’s interests often evolve during war and effect the will-capability equation. Planners must understand this and adapt their methods to respond to changing war conditions both at home and among the enemy.

Third, we may conclude that to end a war, a group must change the relative balance between its will and capability and that of the enemy in the context of the interests and conditions of the war. It should be noted that the actual change in relative capability is not necessarily as significant as the perceived change on the part of the belligerents. A group will achieve victory in war when it causes an enemy’s will or capability to decrease to the point where it can no longer act to oppose the group’s interests or advance or protect its own interests. Specifically, a group will stop making war when its interests are best served by doing so; or, its capability has been removed to the point where it can no longer resist despite its will to do so. Before moving on to the development of a campaign design methodology based on these theoretical concepts, it is useful to summarize them into a few key points, presented below as a series of postulates.
A Summary of Key Points

Postulate I: War is principally an issue of group decision making and hinges upon an assessment of interests and strength relative to an enemy. Under the theory presented here, war is fundamentally about decision making. It occurs when groups develop the will and capability to go to war and remain at war in the pursuit of specific interests.

Postulate II: A group’s war decisions are a function of the interests and power of internal factions within its decision making structure. Groups are not monolithic. Each group is composed of factions who, within the context of the group’s decision making dynamic, contribute to adopting and maintaining the decision for war. The factions within a group may support the decision for war to different degrees depending on their own interests and factional power. Hence, factions within a group may disagree as to when war should be undertaken, continued, or ended. Consequently, effecting factional interests and the distribution of power among a group’s internal factions should be a key objective of any campaign.

Postulate III: War is a function of two primary elements: will for war and capability for war. The relationship between these elements is situation dependent and may vary based on the group’s perception of its interests and enemy. Will is a function of a group’s decision making processes and relates specifically to its cybernetic power. Capability is a function of its
ability to achieve synergy among the five principal sources of power: military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic.

Postulate IV: War is ended when either a group's will or capability is reduced to the point where war can no longer be sustained; specifically, when the decision is made that continuing in war no longer serves the group's interests. According to this theory, a war is brought to an end by changing a group's will and capability relative to its enemy and interests. The goal of military operations in war should be to influence an enemy's calculations of its interest, will, and capability in order to achieve the decision to end the war.

Postulate V: War and warfare are not synonymous. Success in warfare does not necessarily lead to success in war. Within this theory it is important to draw a distinction between war and warfare. War is a state of conflict in which a group uses instruments of power in direct opposition to another's interests or to protect or advance one's own interests in opposition to another. Warfare is the way in which instruments of power, principally armed force, are applied in war. The type of warfare a group practices should be primarily a function of its enemy's decision making dynamics, i.e. the particular way in which interests, will, and capability relate to the decision to begin and continue in war.

From these postulates, we can begin to develop a practical approach to designing the strategy and campaigns best suited to war with a given enemy.
and put forward a campaign design methodology for use by the United States Army in future conflicts. Before we do so; however, it is important to address a difference between current US doctrine concerning the definition of operations other than war and the definition of war postulated in this paper.

FM 100-5 defines operations other than war as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces." Yet, it acknowledges that combat operations may be an integral part of some operations other than war (i.e. peace enforcement, attacks and raids). The theory presented here defines war as a state of conflict in which a group uses instruments of power (including armed force) in direct opposition to another's interests or to protect or advance one's own interests in opposition to another. One can see that many of the operations defined as "other than war" in current US doctrine would be classified as war in the context of this theory. For example, when US forces began to pursue Aidid in Somalia, it became war by definition according to this theory. Therefore, the methodology for campaign design derived from it and presented below applies both to war and many of the operations other than war discussed in current Army doctrine.

PART IV: FROM THEORY TO CAMPAIGN DESIGN

The theoretical concepts discussed above may be interesting but of what practical use are they to a military planner? The following discussion
attempts to answer that question by translating these concepts into a practical campaign design methodology which might be used by US Army planners in directing the conduct of operations across the spectrum from operations other than war to war.

In order to design a campaign, one must first have a clear definition of what a campaign is. According to FM 100-5 a campaign is "a series of related military operations designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives within a given time and space." Unfortunately, this definition is far too restrictive to be used in the context of the theory proposed in this paper for it focuses the notion of a campaign to "military operations" and in so doing implies that military operations are conceived and conducted independent of other actions. It reinforces the tendency to equate war and warfare with all the danger inherent in doing so.

Military actions are only one part of war and in many operations other than war a very small part indeed. Therefore, a military planner who focuses solely on military operations will be in danger of achieving tactical success against enemy armed forces while accepting strategic defeat. Campaign design to be effective must consider military operations in the broader context of operations to effect an enemy's will and capability within each source of an enemy's power -- military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic.
The natural objection to expanding the concept of a campaign in this way is that the Army does not have a Constitutional charter to act in areas outside the military realm. Critics will quickly point out that if Army planners concern themselves with these other areas they will not only far exceed their expertise and resources but will also lose the focus necessary to execute successful military operations. This criticism has merit but assumes more is being proposed in this expanded notion of a campaign than is in fact intended. This will be evident as the discussion continues.

To design an effective campaign, the military planner must begin by defining a campaign as a series of related actions within the military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic realms designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives. Note that this definition is different from that of FM 100-5 in two significant ways. First, it sees a campaign plan as encompassing more than just military action in isolation of other instruments of power. Second, it removes the restriction of a pre-determined time and space.

Consider the first of these two differences. Under this definition of a campaign, the military planner still concerns himself principally with military actions but the objectives for those actions are seen in terms of five possible areas of enemy power rather than mainly in the military versus military realm. The planner is given the charter to consider military actions to effect the enemy in other than military ways. His role does not become that of policy
maker. He is merely given a broader understanding of his role as a military advisor to the policy setting leadership. Specifically, he is called upon to place greater emphasis on exploring the ways in which military action may be used to influence the non-military sources of an enemy's power than he has in the past. His role remains as an advisor to policy makers on military matters but his perspective is changed to include a greater range of options.

The second area of difference relates to the lifting of time and space as fixed constraints in campaign planning. The risk involved in setting time and space restrictions at the outset of campaign planning is that it limits the range of options a military planner may recommend. It confers advantage to an enemy who takes a longer view of the war and is unrestrained in his willingness to act outside a fixed theater. Time and space considerations are not to be ignored under the definition of a campaign proposed here; rather they are changed from fixed pre-conditions to factors which will be set in the context of the situation relative to the nature of the enemy. Under this view, they may legitimately change during the course of the campaign.

Having redefined the concept of a campaign, we can now proceed to outline a specific methodology for campaign design drawing upon the theory set forth in this paper. There are two underlying principles which this methodology assumes. First, that every planned action must consider not only the effect on enemy will and capability but also the effect on one's own. Second, that
military actions will be used to achieve effects within all of the enemy's sources of power, not just against his military potential.

**A Campaign Design Methodology**

**Step One.** Identify the groups in conflict (both friendly and enemy) and analyze their interests, factional composition, and decision making structures. This step seeks to identify enemy interests and the resilience of enemy will. It does so by examining the enemy's cybernetic power and identifying the military actions which might be used to weaken it. The greater the centralized control of the decision making apparatus (i.e. the greater the difference in factional power and the concentration of coercive power in the leadership) the stronger a group's ability to form and sustain a will for war.

Similarly, the more balanced the distribution of factional power and the more representative the decision making process then the more fragile a group's ability to generate and sustain a will for war.

In analyzing the belligerent groups one must also consider the prospects for support from other groups (either directly or indirectly). In other words, one must assess the probability that other groups might enter the war or provide direct support to a warring group. The factional composition and decision making structure of these potential belligerents must also be evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine how a group's decision for war will be achieved and sustained in the face of competing internal factional
interests. This will allow the planner to select the means by which the enemy's will for war may best be undermined. In general, one undermines an enemy's will for war by fostering the divergence of factional interests relative to undertaking or continuing war or by changing the balance of factional power. This may be thought of as a divide and conquer strategy in the realm of enemy resolve. It is accomplished by causing enemy factions to perceive their interests in different ways and conclude that those interests are not best served by war. Efforts are particularly aimed at undermining the power base of the group's leadership factions.

Once this analysis has been completed, the military planner selects the types of military action which may influence the enemy decision making structure. There are at least five military approaches which may prove useful in this realm. The specific actions discussed below are examples only. The actual actions in a particular war will be entirely dependent upon the situation.

The first is to reduce the group leadership's power relative to other factions. This may be thought of as decapitation -- the targeting of leadership power centers with physical means. For instance, if a Presidential guard is the means by which a despotic leader coerces subordinate factions, then a key element of the campaign might be the destruction of those units.

The second approach involves actions aimed at discrediting the leadership. This may be accomplished by any military action which
demonstrates the leadership’s incompetence in military operations. Examples of this may include: the defeat of elite units; the circumvention of those defense structures considered impenetrable (like an air defense net or a raid on a well guarded command structure); attacks against basic life support infrastructure (utilities, services, etc.) to demonstrate the leadership’s inability to conduct a coherent defense; the targeting of key subordinate personnel to emphasize the personal risk involved in supporting the leadership (e.g. raids to take key members of a clan in an operation other than war); or the timing of military actions to undermine enemy diplomatic initiatives.

The third approach, is to use military means to increase the power of factions competing with the enemy’s leadership and sympathetic to one’s own interests. For example, this might include providing arms and advisors to dissident guerrilla factions or specifically avoiding the destruction of sources of a particular faction’s power. For instance, if a particular general is known to have designs on the enemy presidency it might be useful to spare the units loyal to him while destroying the military units loyal to the leadership. In an operation other than war, it might involve approaching neutral or even unfriendly factions and providing support that competing groups are unable to provide. An example might be in using military trucks to carry a particular tribe’s produce to market or providing engineer or medical support to the people
through an influential faction leader to raise his status within the group relative to a more hostile leadership.

A fourth approach, is to work to promote factional distrust and infighting. The idea is to create the perception that one or more factions have "sold out" in some way. For example, this might take the form of false statements to portray cooperation with a particular enemy faction where no cooperation exists. Or, this might be accomplished through arms drops to a particular area under a certain faction's control, through agent activity to plant false evidence and information, or by specifically refraining from striking certain elements of an enemy group.

A fifth approach is to attack the enemy's ability to realize the interests for which it went to war. For example, an enemy which chose war to seize territory may have its interests in continuing the war removed by its physical expulsion from the seized territory. Similarly, a group that is fighting to expand its areas of control at the expense of certain ethnic groups might have its willingness to fight undermined by an occupation and enforced partition plan which leaves it with less area than it originally had.

As a military planner considers the feasibility of any of these approaches relative to an enemy, he must consider the effects they will have on his own group's ability to wage war. The planner must assess the vulnerability of friendly cybernetic power and act to consolidate and protect will or at least
to insure that chosen actions do not undermine it or allow the enemy to do so. Clearly, a planner cannot recommend the pursuit of actions which by their success might defeat his own group's interests. For example, he should avoid actions which make the enemy appear a victim of injustice in the eyes of the world community or among one's own people. This is a particular danger in the use of excessive retaliatory force perceived as disproportionately harsh.

**Step Two:** Analyze the enemy's military power and the military power of groups which might provide direct and indirect military support. In this step, the enemy's weapons, force structures (disposition, composition, strength), training, and doctrine are analyzed relative to friendly military power. A determination is made of relative strengths and weaknesses and of what is feasible given friendly limitations and enemy vulnerabilities. For example, if the enemy is a large, organized army, then American military force might be brought directly to bear in high intensity combat. On the other hand, if the enemy is organized into small guerrilla cells indistinguishable from a mostly benign population, then the role of military force might be drastically different. Here again, there are five possible approaches to military operations.

The first approach is the destruction of enemy armed forces and military infrastructure. This is possible when an enemy is clearly defined and well understood -- most usually in a conventional war setting.
The second approach is to prevent enemy armed force from being brought to bear. This includes any action which prevents an enemy from maneuvering his armed forces or employing them as intended. For example, in a peace enforcement operation the military force might seize by force an exclusion zone to push enemy artillery out of range of a key airport or population center.

The third approach, is to prevent the resupply or sustenance of the enemy force. Arms embargoes, strikes against logistics centers or arms factories, and the destruction of key transportation nodes are all examples of actions included in this approach.

The fourth approach is to render the enemy defenseless without full scale destruction. For example, isolating and surrounding a particular group or destroying any unit or individual which acts in a hostile manner within a given area. Perhaps, this might entail eliminating enemy air defenses and destroying only those assets which attempt to move (i.e. a no fly zone or the destruction of any unit which leaves its garrison areas).

The fifth approach is the elimination of the ability of the enemy leadership to direct and control its forces. Destruction of communications links, arrest of key subordinates, and isolation of armed elements from group leaders are all examples of this approach.
Again in all of these areas the planner must be sensitive to friendly vulnerability. In some circumstances tactics in which losses are suffered may be tolerated (i.e. high intensity war); whereas, in many operations other than war even a few losses may defeat friendly will. In such cases, risk assessment and force protection take on greater strategic significance.

Step Three. Identify how military actions can be used to weaken enemy economic power. Approaches to the use of military means to damage enemy economic power include the destruction of key manufacturing, utility, and transportation infrastructure (factories, power plants, dams, roads, ports, railroads, airfields, etc.) and the military enforcement of trade embargoes (through land, sea, and air blockades).

Step Four. Assess enemy and friendly diplomatic power. How likely is each group to be able to influence other groups to act on its behalf with direct and indirect support? The key to this step is identifying those acts which can isolate the enemy and restrict his diplomatic effectiveness. For example, a military show of force might deter other group’s from joining an enemy cause. In an operation other than war, this might mean demonstrating the intent to disarm (militarily and economically) all factions who ally themselves with a certain group while allowing those who remain neutral to remain armed. In the case of a more conventional war it might mean positioning AWACS and air assets or a naval task force in such a way as to
interdict any attempt on the part of a potentially hostile group to move its forces into a theater of war. Another means by which the military might influence a group’s diplomatic power is by co-opting potential enemy allies. This might be accomplished by providing military aid or negotiating training agreements with groups to preclude their alliance with an enemy.

**Step Five.** Evaluate the enemy’s informational power relative to friendly informational power. How may the enemy use information to effect factional relationships within the friendly group? How can media, propaganda, and other information be used to influence factional unity within both the enemy and friendly camps? For example, it may be far easier for an enemy to reach the American population with its message and promote disunity through the use of the media than it might be for the US to use the media to influence an enemy’s factional unity. Consequently, a media and public relations plan may be critical to the strategic success of tactical actions. Planners must always consider how military actions will be perceived among enemy, friendly, and neutral groups whether through the media, word of mouth, or other means of communication. Therefore, psychological operations, media campaigns, and propaganda must all be considered as part of military operations. Yet, another aspect of targeting enemy informational power is to interfere with the flow of information within other sources of enemy power. This might be accomplished
by targeting enemy communications and intelligence systems, satellites, computer networks, or internal media operations for example.

**Step Six.** The final step in this campaign design methodology is a comparison of strengths and vulnerabilities among the five sources of an enemy's power. For each group that may play a role in the conflict, it is necessary to determine which areas are the most conducive to attack with the friendly means available and which are the least likely to be influenced by friendly power. As a result of this assessment, the planner will identify which cybernetic, military, economic, diplomatic, and informational objectives are least likely to be effectively accomplished by military means and request that national policy makers direct appropriate agencies to act in each area. This step is critical to the success of this methodology. Military actions must be seen as only one part of a concerted effort involving all the sources of national power. Although the military planner maintains his focus as a military advisor, he must also seek to identify those actions outside the military realm which can assist in achieving strategic goals. These he recommends for action to complement and multiply the effects of military operations.

So, to this point we have developed a campaign planning methodology which encourages military planners to see war as an orchestration of actions to target enemy cybernetic, military, economic, diplomatic, and informational sources of power. This emphasizes the need to understand that war is a
function of both will and capability and that the relationship of these factors is situation dependent. The pitfall of equating war and warfare is to be avoided with all actions being evaluated in their strategic context rather than only in terms of tactical success. However, can't it be argued that all that is recommended here is inherent to a correct understanding of the tactics, techniques, and procedures recommended in doctrine such as Joint Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for Campaign Planning? This study concludes by addressing this question.

PART V: CONCLUSIONS

The question of whether or not the theory put forth in this paper and the campaign methodology derived from it are of practical use to the Army, is a fairly subjective one. One might easily argue that nothing in existing doctrine precludes a planner from examining the ways in which military operations may be used against enemy non-military sources of power. Indeed, there are many examples of how such targeting was used in operations ranging from the Second World War, to Just Cause, to Desert Storm. Conversely, there is ample evidence from experiences such as Vietnam and Somalia of the dangers of allowing tactical success to be substituted for strategic utility. Does the theory presented in this paper pretend to eliminate the problem of US forces committed without specific policy objectives? Of course not, the US Army will
probably continue to find itself thrust into situations where national objectives are not clearly defined or well understood.

The practical usefulness of the theory and campaign design perspective outlined in this paper is threefold. First, it should help planners avoid the pitfall of equating tactical and strategic success (the result of seeing war and warfare as synonymous). Second, it should prompt military planners to take a more complex view of their enemy and plan military operations in view of their effect on his cybernetic, economic, informational, and diplomatic power and not just his military capability. Third, it should encourage planners to evaluate all actions in terms of their impact on friendly as well as enemy capability and will. In these ways, this theory may serve more than academic interest and provide a starting point for further work to explore the nature of war and conflict and how military action may be used to influence the non-military realm.

The Army faces a future of uncertainty in which smaller standing forces may be called upon to react to a wide variety of missions ranging from operations other than war to general war. It is not sufficient to be well prepared for a narrow range of scenarios; the Army must be equally effective in dealing with first, second, and third wave warfare, as well as hybrids of the three. Bringing the military technological revolution to bear in the form of sophisticated intelligence, command and control, and weapons systems may
prepare the Army to win tactical actions but it in no way guarantees strategic success across a broad range of situations. The Army must see its role as a military instrument never to be used in isolation, but rather in concert with other instruments of national power. Army planners must learn to view war and warfare as distinct concepts and apply an understanding of war in designing campaigns. The theory presented in this paper is intended to contribute to the process of change needed to meet the challenges of the future.
This appendix outlines ten cases describing the relationship between will and capability — five in which changes in capability effect will and five in which changes in will effect capability.

Effect of Changes in Capability on Will

Case I: Capability increases relative to the enemy through an increase in friendly capability (or a decrease in enemy capability) and results in an increase in group will. For example, Blainey points out that during the eighteenth century when monarchy was a common form of government, the death of a long reigning monarch often brought about war. This is because other kingdom’s saw in the succession of a weaker monarch a decrease in their rival’s strength and hence an increase in their own relative capability. Therefore, their will for war increased and war occurred. Thus, the wars of the Spanish, Polish, Austrian, and Bavarian succession’s may all be seen as examples of this case.

Case II: Capability decreases relative to an enemy and results in a corresponding increase in the will for war. The mobilization dynamics which contributed to the outbreak of World War I may be seen as an example of this case. The principal European powers could not afford to let their capability relative to the enemy be decreased to the point that they would be susceptible to attack. Therefore, once the mobilization spiral began groups had no choice but to begin and continue to mobilize. The will to carry through mobilization as a defensive measure thus became a manifestation of will to war and war occurred. One might argue that this isn’t really an example of an increased will for war just an unfortunate accident of mobilization physics which propelled the belligerents reluctantly into war. On the contrary, each had the option of not mobilizing. Each realized that mobilization meant war. Each developed and acted on the will to mobilize and hence had the will for war.

Case III: Capability increases relative to an enemy and results in a decrease in the will for war. Oddly enough, Desert Storm can be seen as an example of this case. The United States developed a will for war which led to the deployment of a formidable military force to Saudi Arabia and the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. With every day of the deployment, with every successful air strike, with the skillful operations of the ground war the US/coalition capability relative to Iraq increased. Yet, the United States made a unilateral decision to cease fire rather than striking to occupy Iraq and eliminate Saddam
Hussein. Thus, the United States will for war decreased as its capability increased for at the time it saw its purposes in the war as having been fulfilled.

**Case IV: Capability decreases relative to the enemy and the will for war decreases.** Most instances in which a group negotiates for peace while yet maintaining the capability to resist its enemy may be seen as examples of this case. For example, after the dropping of the atomic bombs, Japan surrendered to the United States. It was still capable of resistance but saw that its capability relative to the United States had so changed as to make continued war futile. Thus, its will for war decreased as a direct result of its decrease in relative capability.

**Case V: A change in relative capability does not significantly change a group's will for war.** For example, throughout the arms race with the Soviet Union changes in American strength had no significant effect on Canadian will for war with the United States or vice versa. Similarly, as disarmament and force drawdowns decreased American capability Canadian will for war with the US again remained unchanged. This case shows an important component of the will for war — a conflict of interest between groups which exceeds a level of acceptability in the context of peace. In other words, will for war involving armed conflict will not occur unless groups believe their interests are in conflict and can be advanced or protected through war.

Having examined how changes in capability may effect will, it is now useful to examine how changes in will may effect capability. Again their are five cases in which changes in the will for war significantly effect capability relative to an enemy.

**Effect of Changes in Will on Capability**

**Case I: Will for war increases and results in an increased capability for war.** An example of this may be found in how groups may modify power structures as will increases. A group which develops the will for war may mobilize its reserves, institute conscription, or increase the budgets of its armed forces thus increasing its military capability. Economically, it might institute government control over certain industries to ensure a focus on war production or institute rationing of critical resources. Cybernetically, it may grant its leaders special wartime powers expanding their authority. In the realm of information, it might restrict freedom of speech or censor the media. For example, all of these methods were used by the United States during World War II.
Case II: Will for war decreases and results in a decreased capability for war. The United States in Vietnam is an example of this case. As losses mounted and the war dragged on, US will began to decrease. The loss of will resulted in a decreased capability to employ US power in Vietnam. For example, unpopularity of the war at home and abroad decreased US diplomatic power and internal disunity among factions decreased cybernetic power.

Case III: Will for war increases and results in a decrease in capability for war. This curious phenomenon may occur when will for war results in actions which actually lower a group's power relative to its enemies. For example, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany declared war on the United States. The US responded by entering the war in Europe. This influx of American power decreased German capability relative to the Allies. Had Germany not declared war, internal pressures in the United States might have led to its effort being concentrated against Japan without an immediate entry into the European war. Instead, German will for war with the US led to a decrease in its capability for war relative to its enemies.

Case IV: Will for war decreases and results in an increased capability for war. This might occur when one group opts to press for peace and in so doing gains allies, and hence capability relative to an enemy. The alliance between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia may be an example of this. By decreasing their will for war relative to each other they increased their capability for war relative to the Serbs. Additionally, in time it may prove that this action helped co-opt the UN and NATO into siding with them against the Serbs, thus increasing their capability relative to the Serbs.

Case V: Static will results in a decreased capability for war relative to an enemy. This occurs when an enemy group increases its capability but the other group lacks the will to change its capability. An example of this would be the appeasement of Hitler prior to World War II which allowed him to increase his power militarily and geographically relative to the other European powers.
ENDNOTES


2 This tendency toward technology as the panacea for future conflict is evident in the attention being given to the Military Technical Revolution (MTR) in Army planning for the future. Efforts to "digitize" the battlefield are one example of this, notably demonstrated in this year's test of the concept at the National Training Center.

3 The criticism that many confuse war with warfare is not new. Consider this comment from an essay written by a Major Douglas, in *The Causes of War* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1935), 73: "The technical definition of war is 'any action taken to impose your will upon an enemy, or to prevent him from imposing his will on you.' You will, I think, recognize at once that this definition of war makes the motive rather than the method the important matter to consider. I am much afraid that more energy is devoted, at the present time, to the endeavor to modify the methods of war than to removing the motive for war."


6 Ibid., 116.

7 Ibid., 119.

8 Palmer describes the Tet offensive and its significance in detail in Chapters 21 and 22 of his book. He gives specific evidence of the devastating effects of the losses suffered by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese on their ability to conduct tactical operations; but acknowledges that the strategic effect was the opposite; bringing the North Vietnamese closer to victory. (Ibid., 182 - 217).

9 Ibid., 201.

10 Ibid., 262.

11 Ibid., 266.

45
Although not discussed here, it is important to note that the United States pursued a series of programs aimed at strengthening the South Vietnamese government and improving social conditions as a means of undermining the insurgency. The interested reader is referred to Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History* for a broader discussion of the many facets of the Vietnam War.


This view is supported by Douglas Pike's work, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986), particularly in his discussion of dau tranh (Chapters 9 & 10, pp. 213 - 253).

Long after the war a North Vietnamese general explained the approach to Lieutenant General (retired) Harold Moore as he researched his book on the battle of the Ia Drang Valley (*We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young: Ia Drang The Battle that Changed the Vietnam War* (New York: Random House, 1992). The general explained that they knew that if they went to an area the Americans would come to them to do battle so they sought engagement for the sole purpose of killing Americans without other military objectives. They understood that the loss of life would help exhaust American will.

It should be noted that this view, as advanced by Pike and others, is not universally accepted. Palmer's discussion of the war suggests that the North Vietnamese had less strategic clarity and more luck. For example, he views Tet as much as a tactical miscalculation in the face of North Vietnamese impatience as a carefully planned move in accordance with a grand strategic design. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the North Vietnamese military played a much greater role in policy formation for the war as a whole than did the US Army. In that respect, they enjoyed a relative advantage over their American counterparts.

This brief discussion of *dau tranh* is derived from Douglas Pike, *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986) and his extensive treatment of the subject in Chapter's 9 and 10, pp. 213 - 253.

Ibid., 241.

Ibid., 241.

The author recognizes the danger in a generalization which may be interpreted to include every writer on war in the history of the world. However, he stands firm in the belief that the effect of these writings on American military thinking has been to reinforce the equation of war with warfare despite what one might argue a particular theorist actually intended.


Of course there is more to Jomini’s theory than this, but, he like Clausewitz had a focus on the Napoleonic model of a decisive battle. A condensed version of the theories of Antoine Henri Jomini may be found in J. D. Hittle’s, *Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War*, in *Roots of Strategy Book 2* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1987), 387-557.

Obviously, the theory attributed to Sun Tzu saw that war was more than armed warfare. Nevertheless, he (and the ancient commentators which captured and perpetuated his concepts) often blur the distinction between war and warfare. Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s principal works on sea power include *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1600-1783* (1890), *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812* (1892), and *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (1897). Julian Corbett’s principal work is *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* first published in 1911.


Although the term war does not necessarily assume the use of armed force (e.g. a "trade war" or a "war on poverty"), this paper concerns itself primarily with a definition of war which does.
Of course, there are many instances where tactical success has corresponded directly to strategic victory independent of whether or not military planners understood a difference between war and warfare. However, the fact that this serendipitously occurs does not outweigh the risk involved with failing to understand the distinction.

James A. Shellenberg in his work, *The Science of Conflict*, classifies scholarly work to explain the nature of human conflict as falling within three major themes: biological, social psychological, and sociological. Biological theories are often akin to social Darwinism seeing man as in a competition for survival and therefore in conflict with others competing for survival. Social psychological theories contend that men have a variety of differing interests which are not always harmonious. Conflict occurs when these interests clash. A sociological perspective maintains that conflict is a product of groups struggling for position within the overall framework of society. Conflict is therefore based on the structure of the society and the groups within it. pp. 9-10.

Many war theorists have made the mistake of limiting their view of war to conflict between states. In fact, John Keegan in his book *The History of Warfare* is critical of Clausewitz's view of war as an extension of policy in part because his theory is bound to the concept of the nation-state rather than understanding the role of culture in warfare.

Judy S. Bertelsen, in her work *A Conflict Theory for the Study of International Politics* (Ann Arbor Michigan: University of Michigan, 1970 reprinted by University Microfilms, 1992), deals extensively with the fact that international actors are composed of factions and that these factions will have varying degrees of attachment to the group's policies. She postulates a coefficient of value as a measurement for these differences in factional attachment to group interests (p. 17). This is one element of a theory of conflict which she postulates and tests in the context of a case study of the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. The reader may find her discussions on the effect of internal group disunity in inter-group conflict of further interest.

Schellenberg quotes sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf as making the following observation about the coercive power of a group's leadership to set policy for a group: "So long as ruling groups are effectively superior to the ruled we can analyze the course a society takes in terms of the interests, goals, and social personalities of those in power." p. 74.

Shalit makes this point well: "Leaders of nations or groups spend much effort in convincing their people that an enemy exists, because without this
perception they cannot expect their followers to engage in the necessary combat behavior." p. 23.

35 Ralf Dahrendorf acknowledges this phenomenon and describes it as follows: "Those in power pursue certain interests by virtue of their position; and by these interests certain groups in society are tied to them. Similarly, opposition is based on interests, and social groups with these interests adhere to the opposition cause." (quoted by Schellenberg, p. 74) Note that "factions" may be separate states within an alliance or coalition as pointed out by Bertelsen, p. 15.

36 In Crane Brinton's, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) he draws several conclusions about the level of disaffection of groups within a society effecting its tendency toward revolution. His conclusions reinforce the notion that the interests and attitudes of groups within a larger group play a key role in the direction the group takes.

37 These are the subjects of volumes of scholarly work a detailed examination of which is far beyond the scope of this paper. For example Franco Fornari, in his The Psycho Analysis of War (New York: Anchor Books, 1974) uses Freudian psychology as an explanation for war and Ted Gurr, editor of the Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1980) includes thirteen articles on conflict behavior including dozens of theories that attempt to explain the basis of human conflict.


39 Ibid., 122.

40 In describing coping strategies which are involved in an individual or group decision to fight, Shalit notes that appraisal occurs in four domains. These are psychological (attitudes, perceptions, motivation), social (identifications, grouping, norms), instrumental (means, skills, facilities), and physical (health, conditions, time) (Shalit, p. 25). These appraisal strategies common to individuals are also common to groups and may be used to describe the complex relationship of will and capability in a group's decision to fight. The exact relationship is hard to predict for groups can be very resourceful in overcoming a negative appraisal relative to an enemy. As Shalit notes: "A negative appraisal can be changed into a positive appraisal by two strategies: we can increase our motivation and involvement, and/or decrease our perception (whether or not on objective bases) of the enemy's motivation, skill, and so on." (Shalit, p. 26.)
Although the first four of these are commonly cited as sources of group power, the fifth one (cybernetic power) is not. The author believes the ability to bring any of the other sources of power into play in a conflict is a function of the group's decision making and control structures — hence cybernetic power is used in this paper as a measure of the group's ability to formulate policy and act to execute it based on the strengths and weaknesses of its internal decision making dynamics.

John M. Rothgeb, in his book *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993) draws a tight link between economic power and military power in the modern world system pointing out that the costliness of modern weaponry makes this so (p. 162). He devotes a significant portion of his book to a discussion of the use of economic power in coercion, defense, deterrence, and compellence in the international system, pp. 161-182.

The Tofflers argue that the way nations make wealth is the way they make war and that the information age is upon us. Information thus becomes the grist of Third Wave warfare with the ability to wield information a formidable instrument of power. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Little, Brown, & Company, 1993).

Rothgeb lists three methods of influencing the behavior of others: coercion, bribery, and propaganda or political and economic theory (p. 130). Under the theory postulated in this paper coercion and bribery are elements of power most closely associated with military, economic, and diplomatic sources. Propaganda, political and economic theory are appropriately examples of informational and cybernetic sources of power.

FM 100-5 clearly sees will and capability as directly related in the synonymous context of war and warfare: "War is a contest of wills. Combat power is the product of military forces and their will to fight. When will is lacking, so is combat power; when will is strong it multiplies the effectiveness of military forces." (p. 6-7)

Bertelsen argues this convincingly in the presentation of her conflict theory. She states it as her 2nd axiom as follows: "When parties [groups] are in conflict, each party can lose an increment of utility from disunity in policy... a party can conduct its conflict with another party more efficiently if it is acting as a unified agent than if it is expending resources on an internal controversy about the conflict policy." (p. 24)
"We aggress and fight what we feel opposes us." (Shalit, p. 83.)


The reader interested in exploring the relationship between will and capability in greater detail is referred to the appendix. Here, ten cases with historical examples are used to explore the complex, situation dependent relationship between will for war and a group's capability for war. For the purposes of the remaining discussion; however, it is sufficient to understand that the relationship between will and capability varies among groups and even within groups under different circumstances and interests.

According to Blainey "When leaders of rival nations have to decide whether to begin, continue or end a war, they are consciously or unconsciously, asking variations of the same question: they are assessing their ability or inability to impose their will on the rival nation." (p. 293)

Throughout the development of the theory thus far, we have worked from the assumption that groups rationally weigh and act upon their interests. However, this view is not universally accepted. For example, Robert Mandel, in his book *Irrationality in International Confrontation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), explores four themes of irrationality: 1) incompatibility of decisions with policy goals or preferred outcomes, 2) non-comprehensive search and evaluation of options, 3) inconsistent statements and actions, 4) non-dispassionate style (p. 2). In essence, Mandel asserts that groups frequently don't act in accordance with their interests for a variety of reasons. By these arguments, then a state might not cease war just because its interests would be served by doing so.

The use of the term postulate implies a next step -- proof. The limited scope of this paper does not undertake to prove these assertions, merely to advance them as a means of prompting critical thought concerning the nature of war.

FM 100-5, Glossary-6.

Ibid., Figure 2-1, p. 2-1 and pp. 13-8, 13-9.
To be fair it should be pointed out that there is doctrine within the US military establishment that suggests a broader view of campaigns as involving the need to orchestrate instruments other than military power. Specifically, the Marine Corps publication FMFM 1-1 Campaigning dated 25 January 1990, shows a strong understanding of the danger of equating tactical success with strategic utility. Nevertheless, it too leaves open the way for planners to focus on military aspects and ignore non-military factors in the prosecution of war.

Charles Reynolds, in his book, The Politics of War: A study of the Rationality of Violence in Inter-State Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) understands the nature of factional interests in decision making: "War is taken to be a complex of actions explicable only in terms of human reasoning. Human actions with unforeseen consequences, are the product of intentions and purposes articulated by individual human agents, anxious to protect and secure their interests, acting for the most part as agents of the state or political factions." (p. 1). Hence, an examination of a group's interests and factional structure is a logical starting point for developing a campaign for war.

Bruce B. G. Clarke, in his book Conflict Termination: A Rational Model (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1992) makes it clear that effectively undermining an enemy requires an understanding of an enemy's internal structures. In his words: "we must . . . properly channel our efforts against the internal political entity that will have the power as the dispute/conflict unfolds, to change the opponent's objectives." (p. 23)

Anders Boserep and Andrew Mack, in War without Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defense (New York: Schocken Books, 1975) include a discussion of "Undermining Activities: Splitting and Weakening the Opponent" in their discussion on appropriate responses to an occupation (p. 47). Such activities as causing disaffection and dissent among the enemy or mobilizing other external forces against the enemy are excellent strategies for undermining enemy will in a variety of war situations.

Nothing in Joint Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for Campaign Planning (August 1993, Revised Initial Draft) appears to preclude the analysis recommended in the campaign design methodology proposed here. Consequently, a critic might legitimately argue that there is no need to augment the JTTP approach in light of this paper's proposed theory or methodology.
61 Blainey, 68, 69.

62 Ibid., 68.
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