Joint Operations at the Campaign of Santiago

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This study is a historical analysis of the joint operations between the United States Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War. The study examines the U.S. military's preparations for the campaign, including mobilization and development of campaign plans at both the strategic and operational levels; details the actions of the U.S. military during the campaign, from the landing phase through the siege of Santiago to the eventual Spanish surrender; and analyzes the campaign lessons learned as well as the changes and reforms that took place in both services in the ten-year period following the Spanish-American War. The study concludes that, lacking doctrine or a unified command, cooperation between services is imperative to conducting a successful campaign. This cooperation was not evident between the Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign. As a direct result, the U.S. military instituted several important changes and reforms to help ensure better cooperation in future joint actions. This study also shows that doctrine can be developed by examining the lessons learned of a military operation, as was the case for the landing operations and naval gunfire support performance at Santiago.

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JOINT OPERATIONS AT THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

MICHAEL A. FOX, LCDR, USN
B.S., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1994

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Thesis Title: Joint Operations at the Campaign of Santiago

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

JOINT OPERATIONS AT THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO by LCDR Michael A. Fox, USN, 93 pages.

This study is a historical analysis of the joint operations between the United States Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War. The study examines the U.S. military's preparations for the campaign, including mobilization and development of campaign plans at both the strategic and operational levels; details the actions of the U.S. military during the campaign, from the landing phase through the siege of Santiago to the eventual Spanish surrender; and analyzes the campaign lessons learned as well as the changes and reforms that took place in both services in the ten-year period following the Spanish-American War.

The study concludes that, lacking doctrine or a unified command, cooperation between services is imperative to conducting a successful campaign. This cooperation was not evident between the Army and Navy during the Santiago Campaign. As a direct result, the U.S. military instituted several important changes and reforms to help ensure better cooperation in future joint actions.

This study also shows that doctrine can be developed by examining the lessons learned of a military operation, as was the case for the landing operations and naval gunfire support performance at Santiago.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander of the U.S. Fleet, had just completed a successful blockade of Cuban waters during the initial stages of the Spanish-American War. The U.S. naval forces now contained several Spanish ships, under the command of Admiral Pasqual Cervera, inside the waters of Santiago Harbor. However, the U.S. fleet was unable to exploit its successes further due to the defensive fortresses that overlooked the bay and the possibility of mines in the waters. Sampson promptly wired the War Department, requesting the Secretary of War, Russell A. Alger, to send U.S. Army assets to the Cuban theater to conduct a siege on the town of Santiago, facilitating his fleet's destruction of the Spanish ships. In response to Sampson's request the Major-General Commanding the Army, Nelson A. Miles, sent the following instructions (on May 31, 1898) to Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, Commander of the Army's V Corps, which was being mobilized at Tampa, Florida:

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high grounds and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best
enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and
cover the Navy as it sends its men in small boats to
remove torpedoes; or, with the aid of the Navy, capture or
destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago
Harbor.¹

These rather ambiguous orders proved to be the
starting point for what would later be an example of
ineffectual joint operations. Although the Campaign of
Santiago has to be considered an operational success due to
the subsequent destruction of the Spanish fleet and the forts
under Spanish control in the city, it was perhaps due more
through luck and enemy incompetency than by any U.S. tactical
expertise.

The lessons learned from the inept conduct of joint
operations at Santiago, however, resulted in significant
changes in the structure of both the U.S. Army and Navy; they
also influenced future joint doctrine and procedures. The
purpose of this thesis is to examine the conduct of joint
operations during the Battle of Santiago and to determine what
went wrong. The intent is to show how this campaign had a
direct bearing on future joint operations, not to assign blame
for the failures to any one person or service.

One cannot assume that the commanders of the Santiago
campaign completely ignored the standing practices or
procedures concerning the conduct of joint operations.
Several factors combined to handicap military leaders as they
tried to conduct operations against the Spanish in Cuba.
For one, it had been over thirty years since the last joint
operation involving the Army and Navy had been conducted. For another, decreased levels of manning in both the Army and the Navy had greatly hindered the mobilization efforts, which had a direct effect on the training opportunities prior to the campaign. Additionally, the lack of a structured chain of command from the presidential level down to the field commanders provided little strategic direction for the conduct of the campaign. It is equally important, however, to keep in mind that poor execution at the operational level as well as a lack of coordination between Sampson and Shafter greatly contributed to the overall performance of the U.S. military at Santiago.

The joint aspect of the Campaign of Santiago began with the preparations phase. While tensions between the Americans and the Spanish had been on the rise for several years prior to the outbreak of war, the U.S. military was caught offguard when hostilities began. The Navy, through its Naval War College, had begun initial work on formulating possible naval actions in response to a war with Spain whereas the Army had yet to address the issue. Thus, no one cohesive war plan utilizing joint forces had been developed to oppose a sea power with diverse land holdings, specifically Cuba and the Philippines. A significant mobilization of Army troops was required before even the most basic of war plans could be executed. Time spent mobilizing troops detracted from the joint training effort, especially in the area of amphibious
operations. This first became apparent during the embarkation
operations at Tampa and was later borne out when the Army
arrived off the coast of Cuba ill-prepared to transport
personnel, materiel, and supplies from ship to shore.

Furthermore, as a result of not having a unified
commander for the conduct of joint operations in theater,
there were inefficient communications procedures and a serious
lack of coordination. This would prove to be a detriment
during the following siege of the town of Santiago and its
surrounding waters.

Joint operations also suffered from ill-defined
objectives regarding the end state of the Santiago campaign.
Beginning with Miles's order to Shafter and the lack of
presidential guidance that persisted throughout, Sampson and
Shafter conducted operations as they saw fit in order to
accomplish their own perceived goals. Only the lack of a
legitimate threat from the Spanish in Cuba prevented a U.S.
military disaster.

A study of the Campaign of Santiago provides an
opportunity to examine the changes that were made in the
military forces in the years immediately after the Spanish–
American War. The military recognized the need to institute
reforms in order to preclude future ineffectual joint
operations. Some of these reforms included the development of
the General Staff in the Army, the incorporation of the
General Board in the Navy, and the formation of the Joint Army
and Navy Board. Although many of these changes most likely would have been made eventually, the conduct of joint operations at Santiago proved to be the catalyst that accelerated these reforms and other changes throughout the military structure.

This thesis will focus on the conduct of joint operations at Santiago through the examination of both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official correspondence between the participants at the strategic, operational, and tactical level; official reports from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; and the report of the Senate committee that investigated the conduct of the Spanish-American War. First-hand accounts of the Santiago campaign, such as those by French E. Chadwick and John D. Miley, and newspaper reports from the battlefield are also valuable primary sources. Other sources, such as personal papers, letters, and correspondence, provide excellent insights into the conduct of joint operations at Santiago. Secondary sources, including comprehensive histories by Graham Cosmas and David Trask, provide excellent background material for this study.

This thesis will be limited in its review to those reforms that were instituted in the military in the ten-year period after the War. This thesis will not address the causes of the Spanish-American War or the conduct of combined operations with the Cuban insurgents.
The following definitions will be used throughout the study.

Amphibious Operation: An operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore.²

Campaign Plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.³

Command: The authority that a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.⁴

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.⁵

Communications: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another.⁶
Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.\(^7\)

Joint: Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.\(^8\)

Joint Amphibious Operation: An amphibious operation conducted by significant elements of two or more Services.\(^9\)

Landing Area: That part of the objective area within which are conducted the landing operations of an amphibious force. It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the transport areas, the fire support areas, and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective.\(^10\)

Operation: A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.\(^11\)

Unified Command: A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President.\(^12\)

Unified Operation: A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions taking place within unified commands under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.\(^13\)
CHAPTER 2
PREPARATIONS FOR SANTIAGO

Strategic Campaign Plans

As the nineteenth century was coming to a close, the United States, spurred on by imperialistic rhetoric from prominent political, academic, and literary figures, as well as from the press, began to look abroad to enlarge its role in world affairs of the day. Tensions had already begun to escalate between the United States and Spain concerning the latter's treatment of the indigenous people of Cuba. By early 1898, it was apparent that military conflict between the two nations was becoming more and more likely.

Since 1895, Cuban insurgents had been waging a guerrilla campaign in order to gain their independence from the Spanish government. Most of the guerrilla actions consisted of light skirmishes with Spanish regular forces and "scorched-earth" destruction of sugar crops. In response, the Spanish enforced a policy of reconcentration, moving Cuban citizens into camps. It was in these camps that over 400,000 Cubans perished. The United States, horrified at the Spanish actions as well as having significant economic interests on the island, found itself forced to respond to the instability in Cuba.1
As early as 1894, the Naval War College had begun to develop war plans to deal with the possibility of military action against the Spanish. Versions of these initial plans called for a blockade of Cuba while mounting an expeditionary force to seize major Cuban ports. In addition to the blockade, the U.S. Navy would be tasked to defeat any Spanish naval forces sent to protect the island. Consideration was also given to conducting an operation simultaneously in the Philippines in order to prevent the Spanish navy there from sailing for the Caribbean. Other versions called for a much greater reliance on the naval blockade in conjunction with naval bombardment, as the invasion force envisioned for Cuba was estimated to require 90,000 men, almost four times the available military manpower at the time. All of these plans, however, contained variations that had yet to be coordinated between the services when war was declared in April of 1898.2

The structure of the military leadership was ill-prepared to plan joint operations. Secretary of War Russell A. Alger and Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, both chiefly responsible for the manning and training of their respective services, were also the principal cabinet-level military advisors to the President. Both the Army and the Navy lacked any semblance of a General Staff, which could have greatly assisted in the planning, preparation, and waging of a military campaign. Guidance for military actions during the war was often worked out between President William McKinley
and members of his Cabinet and then disseminated down through the secretaries directly to the commanders in the field. Under these procedures, the President frequently had to act as the mediator between Alger and Long.  

The Army, in particular, was hampered by its own muddled chain of command. Major-General Miles held the title of Commanding General of the Army, which was primarily an honorary role given to the senior officer in the Army. While the position of Commanding General had no legal authority, it had evolved to where the occupant served as an invaluable military advisor. The problem was that there was no centralized control of the Army and that frequently the Secretary of War and the Commanding General feuded over their respective roles. This situation was further exacerbated later during the Santiago campaign when General Miles left for the field to command troops in the invasion of Puerto Rico, thus leaving the civilian Secretary of War without his chief Army advisor.  

This was the situation when war was declared with Spain. It was quickly realized by the strategic leaders in Washington that an advisory board of some sort was necessary to help devise campaign plans. The Navy, which lacked a senior naval advisor comparable to the Army's Commanding General, had already created its own Naval War Board in response to the growing crisis. This board was charged with advising Secretary Long on matters of naval strategy and with
assisting in the preparation of strategic war plans. Membership on this board included Alfred Thayer Mahan, the noted seapower theorist, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, before he resigned to join the Army. President McKinley and his advisors had determined that any war against the Spanish in Cuba would require the interaction of the Army and Navy. This led to the formation of the Joint Board, an informal group organized with the mutual consent of Alger and Long. This board was essentially the Naval War Board with the addition of a single Army officer. The Joint Board primarily performed an advisory role for the President, Alger and Long, and the remaining cabinet members. The campaign plan that was submitted by the Joint Board and ultimately agreed upon by McKinley was drawn largely from the plans previously developed by the Naval War College. It called for a naval blockade of Cuba to be conducted by the North Atlantic squadron under the command of Admiral William T. Sampson. The fleet would also be poised to engage the Spanish fleet if Spain chose to send its ships to defend Cuba. In addition, a small expeditionary force would be mobilized and sent into Cuba to seize a major port.

The situation remained complicated, however, because the primary objective and the size of the expeditionary force kept changing. Santiago was selected as the primary objective only weeks before the campaign of Santiago began. As for the size of the force, its reasons for varying were due to the
changing estimates of the size of the Spanish forces in Cuba and the state of readiness of the American troops. Additionally, the President failed to identify an overall campaign commander, who could have used the available time to conduct terrain analysis and develop operational plans.  

**Mobilization**

In the two-month interval between the declaration of war with Spain and the first Army soldier to arrive in Cuba, a tremendous mobilization effort had to be conducted. The Army, which in April of 1898 numbered 28,000, had dispersed many of its regulars as well as newly inducted volunteers at several camps throughout the South, busily preparing them to go to war. Since the readiness of the Army had been allowed to significantly deteriorate over the decades since the Civil War, almost every minute was spent on outfitting the troops and conducting rudimentary military drill.

On April 29th, Brigadier-General William R. Shafter was ordered to proceed to Tampa, Florida, to assume command of the V Corps currently undergoing training there. He was charged to prepare his troops to conduct an expedition in support of the naval blockade currently underway. Ten days later, Shafter received the order to move his command, via transports, to "seize and hold Mariel or most important point on north point of Cuba."

It would be over a month, however, before Shafter and his troops would depart for Cuba. Again, confusion among the
planners at the strategic level had delayed a decision about the primary objective in Cuba along with the corresponding number of required Army troops. The Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Cevera, assisted in clearing up this confusion by sailing its ships into the port of Santiago in mid-May. This forced the military planners to shift the focus of the campaign from Havana on the northern coast of Cuba to the southern coast, the objective now being the port of Santiago and the Spanish ships anchored there. The departure of the Army expeditionary force was put on hold, which allowed Shafter much needed time to assemble and equip his forces.\(^\text{10}\)

However, the confusion and indecision at the strategic level regarding the objectives of the Cuban campaign had forced Shafter into a reactive role. He now had to prepare for an invasion into potentially hostile terrain with a force that varied anywhere from 5,000 to 25,000 men. In addition, the current state of readiness of the Army required that almost all of the time in Tampa be spent on just moving supplies from an inadequate railroad line to the pier and then placing them onboard the transports. Shafter was not afforded the opportunity to use the time available to conduct joint training, which would later prove to be critical during the amphibious operations phase.\(^\text{11}\)

While the Army was continuing to build up its forces, the Navy was proceeding with its blockade of Cuba. Admiral Sampson, wanting to begin the siege of Santiago, was growing

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more impatient each passing day with the delayed arrival of the Army troops. On June 7, Sampson sent the following message to Secretary Long, which was relayed to Shafter:

If 10,000 men were here the city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.12

Thus, the mobilization phase came to an end with Major-General Miles's order for Shafter to proceed to Santiago.

Operational Campaign Plans

Shafter's force, numbering almost 17,000 men along with materiel, supplies, and 2,300 animals, left on 14 June for Santiago. The twenty-nine transports and six support vessels, procured by the Army and captained by civilian masters, were accompanied by thirteen naval escort ships. All the ships arrived off the coast of Santiago six days later. On June 20, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, along with General Calixto Garcia, the leader of the Cuban insurgents, met ashore at Aserrado. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the operational objectives of the Santiago campaign as well as to determine the landing site for Shafter's forces.13

The area surrounding the city of Santiago provided a formidable haven for the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor. The entrance to the harbor was, at best, only 350-feet wide, with bluffs on both sides that towered as high as 200 feet. Moreover, on both sides of the entrance sat forts containing gun batteries - Socapa to the west and the Morro Castle to the
Figure 1. Map of Transit to Cuba
east - and the waters at the entrance were strewn with contact and electrical mines. Although the range and effectiveness of the Spanish guns against the U.S. naval vessels stationed outside the harbor entrance were minimal, their location precluded possible countermine operations. There was also the reasonable likelihood that any ship attempting to force its way into the harbor would be damaged and possibly sunk, blocking the narrow channel for both fleets. For the U.S. Navy to clear the mines from the channel and engage the Spanish fleet from inside the harbor entrance, the forts had to be captured or destroyed. 14

Complicating the issue were the garrisons located inside the city of Santiago, approximately three miles inland. While these garrisons were of little strategic importance, their proximity to the Spanish ships in the adjoining harbor and the possibility of mutual gunfire support would be significant to the development of U.S. campaign plans.

General Shafter had arrived in Cuba with very little guidance on what his actual objectives were in regards to the land campaign. The only directive that had been given was the vague and ambiguous order of May 31 from General Miles, which in effect allowed Shafter to choose as his objective the forts at the entrance, the garrisons in Santiago, or both. Thus, with no unified commander overlooking the situation at Santiago, Shafter could chose any of the options with little chance of being overruled.
Figure 2. Map of Santiago Theater
On the trip from Tampa to Santiago prior to the campaign, Shafter had read an account of the British campaign at Santiago in 1741. The British had landed at Guantanamo, located only 40 miles to the east of Santiago, but then proceeded to lose over 3,000 men to disease and had to stop the campaign sixteen miles outside the city, never having fired a shot. To Shafter, this fact stressed the importance of conducting a quick campaign using the best available roads and attacking at the points of least resistance.\textsuperscript{15}

Shafter also believed that the forts at the entrance to the harbor were more heavily guarded than the Santiago garrisons. In reality, there were 400 troops at Socapa, 400 at the Morro Castle, and just over 10,000 men spread throughout the vicinity of Santiago. Additionally, Shafter, possibly after seeing the high rocky bluffs along the coast, reasoned that the best avenue of approach lay further inland. The general, although never having observed it personally, later described the route along the coast towards the Morro Castle as "rugged, devoid of water, and densely covered with a poisonous undergrowth."\textsuperscript{16}

With these factors in mind, Shafter felt his best course of action lay in proceeding inland from Daiquiri and Siboney, the Army's secondary landing site. The Army would then assault the garrisons located in Santiago, with the possibility of using naval gunfire support to cover his siege of the city. This plan stressed rapidity of action, denying
the possibility of massing Spanish troops at Santiago while moving quickly before disease could seriously impede the American advance. Shafter felt that this course would result in less loss of life for his own troops while encircling the city and would also negate the possibility of placing the Army in a subordinate role to the Navy.  

As for Admiral Sampson, he was quite sure what his primary objective was: to destroy the fleet bottled inside the waters of Santiago Harbor. In order to accomplish this mission, the entrance had to be completely cleared of mines so that U.S. ships could engage the Spanish fleet from a more effective firing range. One option would have been to send one or more of the Navy ships into the channel to clear the mines. This plan, however, would most likely have resulted in a significant level of damage from either mines or shore gunfire. This would have strategical implications if the U.S. Navy were later tasked to sail and intercept the remaining Spanish fleet. Loss of any capital ship for the American fleet could have greatly tipped the balance towards the Spanish.  

To this end, Sampson chose what he felt was his only available option - to have the Army storm and seize the forts so that countermine forces could be sent in to clear the channel. It was with this in mind that he had sent his original request for Army assistance, and when the Army
responded by sending Shafter and his troops, Sampson most likely interpreted this as assent for his campaign plans. At their initial conference on June 20, Shafter and Sampson discussed the possible avenues of approach for the Army troops. Although no formal agreement was reached between the two, both most likely felt that the other had agreed with his respective plan of attack. In his report of July 15, Sampson stated that "the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried," to which General Shafter "gave most cordial assent." Shafter, however, stated in his official report that "approaching Santiago from the east...and making attack from that quarter" was "the only feasible plan." In fact, the notes of this conference, which was concerned mostly with the impending landing of Army troops, contain only one reference to the follow-on plans: "land expedition at Daiquiri and march on Santiago." Since Daiquiri lay due east of both the city and the harbor entrance, it is understandable that there would be misconceptions about the campaign plans.19

Whether by design or by simple miscommunication, it would be several days before Sampson would realize that the Army would not support his plan. Shafter did send the following message to Sampson on June 22:

It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can...I request that you keep in touch during the advance and be prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along the bluffs, or any of the small towns, and to render any assistance necessary.20
Sampson, believing that the reference to the bluffs corresponded to the route towards the harbor entrance, did not seek further clarification regarding Shafter's actual intentions. It was only after Shafter had begun his advance towards the city of Santiago several days later that Sampson became aware of the difference in plans. By this time, Shafter was already committed to carry out his plan and his plan only.21

The conduct of joint operations during the remainder of the campaign went steadily downhill. Each commander, believing that his course of action would result in the least loss of life and material, could not see his way to compromise. Their lack of cooperation would never be fully resolved.
CHAPTER 3
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN

Landing at Santiago

With the arrival of Army troops in the Cuban theater, it was now a matter of deciding where to land them. The initial conference of June 20 between Sampson and Shafter, in addition to discussing operational campaign plans, also was to determine possible landing sites.

Regarding the landing area, Miles’s ambiguous order of May 31 to Shafter provided little direction concerning the choice of a site, whether east or west of Santiago, implying that the commander in the field should make the selection. Admiral Sampson felt that Shafter should land his forces west of Santiago, leaving the Army in a more advantageous position to attack the forts located at the entrance of Santaigo Harbor. General Shafter, however, felt that the better terrain lay to the east and was also subject to less shore opposition. After much discussion, and in accordance with the advice of General Garcia, it was decided that the landing would be done at Daiquiri, a point approximately 15 miles east of Santiago.\(^1\)

Shafter had come to Cuba with the intention that the Army would conduct the actual offloading of troops from the
transports. Secretary Long, while inquiring the previous month about the Army's capability to conduct landing operations, notified the Army that:

While the Navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action can not be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing of the troops, stores, etc.²

Secretary of War Alger responded to Long that the Army was not in need of any special assistance from the Navy. It cannot be determined whether General Shafter ever received this notification of the Navy's planned involvement in the landing operation. However, it was most likely Shafter's intention all along to limit the Army's dependence on the Navy to conduct the landing. It was with this in mind that the Navy was tasked to provide gunfire support to suppress any armed opposition ashore while leaving the offload to the Army transports themselves.³

This quickly changed when it was discovered that the Army had failed to bring along the necessary launches to transport all of its troops in a timely manner. The Navy, in response sent over all the steam launches, whale boats, and life boats that it could spare from its fleet. The transport St. Louis, under command of Captain C. F. Goodrich, was dispatched from its station outside of Santiago Harbor to help lead the transports toward Daiquiri. The Navy also provided a beachmaster, as the Army did not have an individual
qualified to perform this function. After the St. Louis went to within one and a half miles from the shore to demonstrate to the other boats the depth of the water, the landing operation commenced.4

In conducting naval gunfire support of the landing, the Navy bombarded several points along the coast surrounding Santiago. This was done as a deception maneuver to hide the real point of attack. In another move, Navy colliers, made up to look like transports, moved westward from Daiquiri. These colliers even went through the drill of lowering life boats in order to deceive Spanish observers along the shoreline. These feint movements were supported by land attacks from Cuban insurgents. One death occurred aboard the Texas when it was shelled by the Socapa battery at the mouth of the Santiago Harbor.5

After the preliminary naval gunfire cleared the landing area at Daiquiri, launches were loaded and sent towards the shore. Many of these launches had to be loaded several miles out to sea, as the civilian captains of the transports did not want to expose their ships to enemy fire. This forced the Navy launches to make long trips back and forth, slowing down the offload procedure. By the end of the day, a total of 6,000 personnel had been offloaded into the landing area at Daiquiri. All of the personnel and supplies were not completely offloaded until three days later.6
The offload itself did not proceed smoothly. With the few available lighters for offload, priority was given to personnel and then materiel and supplies. Combined with this factor was that many of the small boats were not capable of ferrying the animals to the shore. As a result, animals were thrown overboard under the assumption that they would swim ashore. Since there was no boat available to watch the animals, some of them swam out to sea. Over 30 animals drowned during the landing operation. Also, two soldiers drowned when their boat was smashed against the rocks.\(^7\)

During the onload operation back at Tampa, much of the materiel and supplies had been loaded in the order in which it had been received. While this was necessary due to the short amount of time in which supplies had to be onloaded, this proved to be a detriment upon arrival at Daiquiri. Most of the heavy equipment, including siege guns, were unable to be offloaded for several days. Shafter was forced to wait ashore while the offload continued before he had the necessary armament to proceed inland. On 26 June Shafter was finally able to begin the ground campaign, having two infantry divisions, a dismounted cavalry division, and an independent infantry brigade at his disposal.\(^8\)

That the landing at Daiquiri was done with so little loss of life is due mostly to luck and the lack of armed resistance from the Spaniards ashore. The Spanish commander, unsure where the Americans would select their landing site,
had dispersed his troops along a 50-kilometer front surrounding Santiago Harbor. This resulted in a piecemeal response by the Spaniards that the Americans had no trouble in surmounting. Once the naval gunfire began, the Spanish forces at Daiquiri, estimated at 300, quickly fled from the shore. Had the Spanish massed their forces at Daiquiri or emplaced barbed wire along possible landing areas, the amphibious operation could have had a different ending.\(^9\)

Shafter, from the first days of mobilization back at Tampa, had underestimated the amount of coordination and equipment it would require to offload his entire force. Since there was little time to prepare his troops before the trip to Cuba, he did not conduct any training in landing operations before its arrival at Daiquiri. Inadequate transport equipment and poor pier facilities would have a great impact on Shafter's logistics lines and plague the Army throughout the campaign.

German Rear-Admiral M. Pluddenmann, observing the operations at Santiago, made the following comments regarding the landing at Daiquiri:

There was lack of management generally. No one in authority had been appointed commander of the landing place. The commander-in-chief, General Shafter, did not trouble himself about the landing. Admiral Sampson had only made arrangements as far as the warships and their boats were concerned.\(^{10}\)

Not all the blame can be placed on the Army or the Navy for the chaotic landing operations. There were no
existing regulations that would dictate the conduct of joint landing operations. Having no precedent, neither service was even sure of its own responsibilities in such matters. If this had been the extent of the disjointed operations during the Santiago campaign, then the landing operation would just be an interesting sidebar to the Spanish-American War. What was unforeseen at the time was that the landing phase was a precursor for the joint operations that were to happen during the following campaign.

**Advance towards Santiago**

By 26 June, General Shafter had gathered enough troops, materiel, and supplies to begin his advance towards Santiago. The only existing route between Daiquiri and Santiago was more of a trail than a road, and movement of supplies and heavy equipment quickly became a problem. There were insufficient pier and storage facilities at both Daiquiri and Siboney, forcing the Army to maintain a logistics trail that ran from the offshore transports to the troops in the field. This would later prove to be critical as the distance between the two, combined with rainy weather during the campaign, conspired against Shafter's ability to resupply his troops.11

While Shafter was advancing towards Santiago, Admiral Sampson's fleet continued to maintain its station outside the entrance to the harbor. From their positions, the Navy ships were capable of providing gunfire support that could cover the
entire advance of the Army forces. The shells aboard the ships were capable of ranges out to six or seven miles, but suffered from a reduced impact effect at these greater ranges. This was compounded by the fact that the direct fire would be most effective against the gun batteries emplaced inside, with little or no impact against the forts themselves. Despite the meager amount of support the naval gunfire was able to provide, their possible contributions in the areas of preparatory fire and as a morale builder should not have been overlooked.12

It is difficult, then, to comprehend why Shafter did not choose to employ naval gunfire support until his troops were on the outskirts of Santiago. Even his first request for such support was for deception purposes only. Perhaps he simply did not understand the capabilities of the naval ships or was unwilling to ask the Navy for any support at all, being prepared to conduct his attack on Santiago using Army assets exclusively. Most likely, it was probably due to a lack of joint training in these tactics that lay at the root of Shafter's failure to consider using naval gunfire until much later in the campaign.

As Shafter closed in on Santiago, he deemed it necessary to conduct coordinated attacks on El Caney and San Juan Heights, located to the east of Santiago along vital roads. Though he privately did not hold the Spanish troops in much regard Shafter felt it was prudent to conduct a feint
towards Aguadores, located two miles east of the Morro Castle, to deceive the enemy as to the primary objectives. In conjunction with this feint, Shafter finally requested the assistance of naval gunfire.13

The assaults on El Caney and San Juan Heights were scheduled for July 1. On June 30, Shafter cabled Sampson about his intentions, asking Sampson to "bombard the works at Aguadores ... and also make such demonstration as you think proper at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible." Sampson willingly acceded to this request, though the action appeared to have little effect on the small number of troops located along the coastline. Additionally, Sampson also had his forces shell directly into the city to keep the Spaniards occupied. This produced the following message from Shafter to Sampson:

A few shells of large size fell some distance behind our lines to-day. It is hardly possible that they came from your ships, but I can not account for them unless they came from the enemy's navy.

This surely could not have helped the already deteriorating relationship between Sampson and Shafter.14

While Sampson was bombarding Aguadores, Shafter and his troops were facing much greater problems. The general had expected little resistance from the Spaniards, who he clearly felt were incapable of holding off the superior American forces. Thus, Shafter was greatly surprised when his troops ran into stiff resistance during their assaults east of Santiago. Though the Americans eventually prevailed after two
days of intense fighting, it is apparent that Shafter was clearly unprepared for any prolonged delay in reaching Santiago.

There were other factors that also had an impact on Shafter's plan of action. Diseases such as yellow fever and malaria had begun to reduce the readiness of the American troops. Also, the tenuous logistics train was in danger of leaving Shafter's forces ill-equipped for the follow-on investment of the city proper. Shafter, who himself was feeling the effects of disease, and perhaps with the experience of the 1741 British campaign on his mind, started to look for ways to finish the campaign as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{15}

The general made his fears known to Alger, cabling him on July 3 that his defenses were thin, that losses (due both to battle and to disease) were beginning to mount, and that rain was having an impact on his ability to keep his forces supplied. Shafter even considered having his forces fall back five miles from Santiago, allowing him the opportunity to build up his troops. This suggestion caused great consternation among the leaders in Washington, but Alger, with McKinley's acquiescence, left the matter to Shafter's discretion.\textsuperscript{16}

It was at this point, on July 2, that Shafter began to request of Sampson that his ships force the entrance to the harbor. The general felt that this would facilitate the
destruction of the Spanish fleet as well as provide more effective gunfire support to assist the Army's advance. In response, Sampson stated that it was "impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines, a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops."

Later that same day, Shafter cabled the following message to Sampson:

It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the Navy can not work under a destructive fire as well as the Army.

This was followed a little time later with another message, again from Shafter to Sampson:

I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life that I can.

Sampson, clearly feeling that Shafter had no knowledge of the Navy's situation, fired off this response:

Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

It was my hope that an attack, on your part, of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.
As a result of these exchanges, both commanders, finally recognizing the need to meet face to face to resolve their differences and possibly to formulate a coherent plan of attack, arranged to meet ashore on July 3. Sampson was prepared to submit a plan in which his fleet would countermine the harbor entrance, followed by an immediate entrance of his ships. He wanted the Marines encamped at Guantanamo to storm the Socapa battery in conjunction with an Army assault on the Morro Castle. Though this plan would surely have resulted in a significant loss of life, Sampson most likely felt it was time to force the issue. As for Shafter, he was prepared to discuss no plan other than his own.20

However, whatever prospects existed for some semblance of jointness were dashed when the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Cervera, picked the exact moment of the proposed conference to sortie his fleet out of Santiago Harbor.

Destruction of the Spanish Fleet

As the morning dawned on July 3, the joint forces of the United States could best be described as disorganized. There existed no coherent plan of attack that would best utilize the joint capabilities of the U.S. Navy's ships and the land forces of the Army's V Corps. Additionally, the tenuous relationship between the two commanders in the field had begun to degenerate into a clash of personalities, as each
maneuvered his forces as he saw fit, with little regard for the other service.

Admiral Sampson's fleet, over several days, had conducted a vigorous shelling of the entire region surrounding Santiago and its harbor waters. The problem was that, although the guns on the ships were well within range of the land targets, the location of their stationing points outside the harbor entrance severely reduced the effectiveness of the shot. The true value of the Navy's armada would only be realized if the ships could draw closer to their intended targets. Sampson felt that this was impossible until the entrance could be completely cleared of mines.

As for Shafter, his forces had reached the end of their advance, encamping on the outskirts of Santiago. While the entrenched Army firmly held the Spanish troops inside their garrisons, it was feared that an assault upon the fortifications would surely result in the loss of many lives. Shafter, facing this choice, was unwilling to commit his troops any further without the direct support of Sampson's fleet.

It was also Shafter's forces who were beginning to feel the effects of the continuing campaign, infinitely more than the Navy. While the Navy's ships could periodically steam over to Guantanamo to conduct resupply of coal and other items, the Army continued to be tied to a rather short logistics train. Shafter reflected his concerns later in his
Our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days.

These factors, combined with the growing number of soldiers afflicted with disease, greatly influenced Shafter's decision-making process.\(^2^1\) Early on July 3, before Shafter and Sampson were able to confer and agree on a mutual plan of attack, Shafter sent a request for surrender to the Spanish commander in Santiago, General Toral. While quite possibly a bluff, Shafter reasoned that it might just be possible to avoid any more loss of life if the Spanish surrendered, obviating further action on the part of the American forces. The Spanish promptly refused to surrender, reassuring themselves that the situation did not yet call for such dire action.\(^2^2\)

In reality, however, for the Spanish forces in and around Santiago the situation was reaching just that point. The Spanish fleet, bottled up inside the harbor waters for over a month, had been told to prepare for movement in case the city was about to fall. Approximately 1,000 sailors had even been redeployed from their vessels to assist with the defense of the city's garrisons. But when Shafter's forces reached the outer limits of Santiago, the Spanish government decided that it was better to risk an escape of the fleet,
Despite having to run past the American fleet stationed just outside the harbor, than to blow up their own ships. Thus, over Admiral Cervera's objections, who felt it was best to keep the fleet in support of the town's defense, his ships were ordered to attempt an escape from Santiago Harbor.23

At 10 o'clock in the morning on 3 July, the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Cervera, filed through the narrow harbor entrance and proceeded westward in a vain attempt to outrun the superior American fleet. The following battle at sea resulted in the complete annihilation of Cervera's fleet of six ships. The Spanish losses in manpower totaled over several hundred killed due to gunfire and drowning, and about 1,300 prisoners. American losses totaled one killed and two wounded.24

While the action of Sampson's fleet in defeating Cervera's ships was strictly a naval operation, the impact of joint operations, however disorganized, cannot be overlooked. Continuous shelling from the naval vessels and the Army's light artillery, despite causing little physical damage, was most likely beginning to take its toll on the morale of Santiago's defenders. Though they were stocked to wait out a siege of up to two months, they quickly realized that, with no reinforcements coming from Spain, it was only a matter of time before capitulation.

The Spanish commanders evidently had no idea of the conflicts and problems that the Americans were facing. From
their perspective, the effects of the joint operations were overpowering. For all practical purposes, the fall of Santiago appeared to be imminent.

Siege of Santiago

The destruction of Cervera's fleet accomplished the primary objective of the Santiago campaign. Any further action on the part of the Americans would only serve to accomplish secondary objectives, none of which were of strategic importance. President McKinley and his advisors back in Washington, however, were determined to continue the campaign until the remaining Spanish forces in Cuba had surrendered. Nothing short of a total surrender in the Cuban theater would be sufficient before continuing with the next phase of the war with Spain.²⁵

Though the Spanish fleet had been destroyed, the situation around Santiago remained tense. While it was most likely that the contact mines had been removed prior to the sortie of the Spanish fleet, there remained the possibility that electrical mines, controlled from the shore batteries on both sides of the harbor, were still emplaced. In essence, U.S. Navy ships continued to face the likelihood of being severely damaged if they attempted to navigate through the channel.

General Shafter, firmly entrenched around the city and not wanting to lose any more lives than he already had, was loath to force the issue. Faced with the Spanish refusal to
surrender and the reinforcement of Spanish troops in Santiago, originally estimated at 8,000 men but actually much closer to 3,500, Shafter began to look for alternate ways to end the standoff. Having missed the opportunity to meet with Sampson due to the sea battle, what followed was a long series of exchanges between the two commanders in the hopes of persuading the other to come around to his plan of attack.²⁶

Beginning on July 4, Shafter began to implore Sampson to force his way into the entrance of the harbor. To this end, he sent the following message to Sampson:

Now, if you will force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me 1,000 men, and I do not wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other - and they have a great terror of the Navy, for they know they cannot hurt you - we shall have them.²⁷

To Sampson, this was just a repeat of the plan that Shafter had proposed earlier in the campaign. With the Spanish fleet no longer anchored inside Santiago Harbor, the admiral was even less willing to sacrifice men and, especially, Navy ships to assist in the siege of Santiago.

What altered the situation was that Shafter had begun to inform Secretary of War Alger about his requests for Navy assistance. Almost every message between Shafter and Alger over the next week contained references to the possible role of the Navy in forcing an entrance into the harbor. Additionally, press correspondents that had been traveling with the Army began to send back Shafter's messages for
reproduction in their daily newspapers. With no opposite response from Sampson's quarter, it steadily began to appear to the leaders in Washington and to the public in general that the Navy was not carrying its end of the operation.\(^{28}\)

Consider the following messages from Shafter to Alger, both sent early on July 5 and within twenty minutes of each other:

I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life.

and

If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago, we can take the city within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 15,000 troops speedily, and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and speedy way is through the bay.\(^{29}\)

This exchange quickly gained the attention of President McKinley. As the Commander in Chief and the only person who was in both the Army and Navy chain of command, he had the authority to decide the issue outright by choosing a course of action. Though there was no equivalent to our present day Secretary of Defense, McKinley did have at his disposal several military advisors, including Secretary of War Alger, Secretary of Navy Long, and the Naval War Board. However, instead of opting for a specific plan, McKinley, believing it best not to interfere with the decisions of the on-scene commanders, instructed Sampson and Shafter to
"confer...at once for cooperation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views you will agree upon the time and manner of attack." ³⁰

In response to these instructions, Admiral Sampson sent word to General Shafter on July 5 that he would like to meet with him in order to reach an agreement on a plan of attack. Shafter concurred with this request but asked that Sampson come ashore for the meeting, as he was too ill to make the trip out to Sampson's command ship. Arrangements were made for the two to meet on July 6. ³¹

Meanwhile, Alger, seeing that the Navy was unwilling to force its way into Santiago Harbor, formulated his own plan in which the Army would clear the channel themselves. He outlined his plan in a message to Shafter:

...take a transport, cover the pilot house in most exposed points with baled hay, attach an anchor to a towline, and, if possible, grapple the torpedo cables, and call for volunteers from the Army - not a large number - to run into the harbor, thus making a way for the Navy...One thing is certain; that is, the navy must get into the harbor, and must save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we assault the enemy in his entrenchments without aid.

While not entirely implausible, this scheme does reflect on the misapprehension by the Secretary of War, and the Army in general, of the proper application of the U.S. Navy. ³²

On July 6, Sampson sent word that he was ill and would not be able to attend the meeting with Shafter. In his place, Sampson sent Captain F. E. Chadwick, his chief of staff. Sampson's plan, as relayed by Chadwick, was, again, to employ
the Marines on the western battery at Socapa while the Army assaulted the eastern battery at the Morro Castle. Once done, Sampson would send in his countermine assets to clear the channel. Shafter, quite naturally, opposed this plan, fearing that his troops would suffer the brunt of the casualties while the Navy would experience very little, if any, loss of life.

Finally, a compromise agreement was worked out between Chadwick and Shafter. Under this plan, a letter of truce would be sent to General Toral, requesting the immediate surrender of all Spanish forces in the Santiago vicinity. If the Spanish failed to comply, the naval fleet would commence firing 8- to 13-inch shells on the city for a 24-hour period, at a rate of one shell every five minutes, except for one hour when the rate would be one every two minutes. If, at the end of this period and after submitting a second demand for surrender, the Spanish still did not comply, Sampson and his fleet would then force its way into the channel entrance. The commencement for the naval gunfire was set for noon on July 9. Chadwick drafted the surrender notice, to which Shafter affixed his signature, and it was then sent to General Toral. An informal truce, for all intents, would be in place until the commencement of the naval gunfire.

Shafter was less than enthusiastic about this plan. For one, he was not convinced that, when the time came, the Navy would actually carry through with its forced entry. For another, any further delay in ending the siege only added to
the logistic woes that continued to plague Shafter and his troops. Additionally, while the rate of disease had not reached epidemic proportions, there were just too many casualties to continue an extended investment of Santiago. His concerns were voiced in this message, dated July 7, to Alger:

The failure to have tugs and lighters for use in handling the fleet is of so serious a nature that I must again refer to it. Transports go off miles from shore and there is no way of reaching them or compelling them to come in. It is a constant struggle to keep them in hand...It is with the the greatest difficulty that one day's food can be issued at a time.35

These logistical and communications problems were later compounded when the truce was extended a day to allow General Toral to communicate with the Spanish government over the latest surrender offer.36

The Spanish, hoping to make the best of a bad situation, agreed to the surrender offer, with certain stipulations. Most notably, these included allowing the Spanish forces to march out of Santiago with their guns and baggage. When Shafter forwarded this information back to Washington, he initially stated that he "did not think his (Toral's) terms would be accepted." Several hours later, though, Shafter wired that he was now inclined to accept the offer. His reason for the change of heart was that acceptance of the terms would open the harbor while preventing the great destruction that a bombardment would entail. Clearly hoping to forestall an extended siege, Shafter's wavering brought

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down on him a sharp rebuke from the President. Shafter would thereafter seek only the unconditional surrender of the Spanish forces.\textsuperscript{37}

On July 10, at approximately 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Navy ships, in conjunction with Army light artillery, commenced the bombardment of Santiago. Army personnel outside of Santiago spotted the impact of the Navy's shells in relation to a local cathedral, which were then relayed to the firing ships. The firing stopped after one hour, but was started again the next day at 9:27 a.m. The gunfire continued until just about 1:00 p.m., when the order to cease firing was given by General Shafter.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Surrender at Santiago}

General Miles, who had spent the previous couple of weeks with his troops in Tampa, arrived in the Cuban theater on 11 July. Though he was there primarily in a reinforcing role for Shafter, Miles immediately sought an audience with Sampson. The intent of this meeting was to work out the details for storming the westernmost batteries at the harbor entrance, using newly arrived Army troops. These plans, however, would be for naught as the fighting at Santiago was all but over.\textsuperscript{39}

Later that same day, July 11, Shafter sent another letter of surrender for consideration by General Toral. This time, having begun to see the hopelessness of holding out
against the American forces, the Spaniards had no choice but to consider the offer seriously. As they deliberated, a conditional truce was in place for both sides.  

Shafter, however, was still not satisfied at the turn of events while conducting the siege of Santiago. After only two days of shelling the town, he was still looking for any way to end the conflict as quickly as possible. He also felt that, as long as the Navy refused to force its way into the harbor, his troops would only be subject to more pain and hardship in a situation that may take weeks to resolve. Indicative of his growing exasperation with Sampson was this message to Alger, sent early July 11:

After twenty-four hours' bombardment navy promised to try and get in close the harbor with some of her large draft boats. If to-morrow bombardment is not satisfactory I shall ask them to make the attempt. I will not sacrifice any lives...The obtaining of launches from the navy was not satisfactory, and I prefer calling on them as little as possible.

Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson, who was still underway at sea aboard the New York, had no idea that surrender negotiations had begun to take place ashore. Sampson cabled Shafter, inquiring if further gunfire support would be required for the next day. In response, Shafter notified Sampson that a truce was in effect and that he felt fairly confident that a surrender would soon be reached.

The truce continued to remain in effect as the Spanish commanders in Santiago conferred with their governmental leaders back in Spain. Over the next several days, each
surrender offer was met with a counteroffer. As the negotiations continued the American forces, both ashore and at sea, essentially played a waiting game.

General Shafter, still feeling the effects of his tenuous supply line, maintained his posturing about the lack of Navy support to Secretary Alger back in Washington. On July 12, Shafter cabled Alger that, "So far no attempt to enter the harbor by the Navy. They should be required to make a determined effort at once." This prompted a heated discussion between Secretary Alger and Alfred Thayer Mahan, who had been advising both the President and the Secretary of Navy as a member of the Naval War Board. The only outcome of this further example of disjointed operations was the urgent message from Secretary Long to Sampson:

The commanding general of the Army urges, and Secretary of War urgently requests, that Navy force harbor. Confer with commander of Army. Wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy, I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels are not to be risked.43

Sampson was quietly outraged upon receiving this latest message. For one, he truly felt that he and his men had fully cooperated with the Army throughout the campaign. For another, Sampson, though prepared to continue the shelling and quite possibly the forcing of the entrance, had not done so because he understood that Shafter had called for the truce. The arrangement reached earlier between Chadwick and Shafter had called for a 24-hour period of shelling, which
Shafter had postponed after only seven hours. Sampson was determined not to force the entrance until the gunfire support had been fully exhausted and the Spanish given another chance to surrender in response. He felt that, as of yet, this had not been done.44

It is also interesting to note that both the Secretary of War and Commanding General of the Army in the field were calling for a major naval operation against the Spanish defenses while a truce was in effect. Though the American forces were correct in continuing the siege of Santiago, any actions that could have been construed as offensive in nature would have delayed the surrender negotiations while possibly serving to prolong the campaign, with a corresponding loss of life. It is doubtful that the Spanish forces would have allowed the Navy to clear out the mines at the harbor entrance, truce or no truce.

As Shafter and Miles, who was beginning to exert his influence in the theater, continued to negotiate with the Spanish, Sampson felt that it was important that he also be represented in the talks. On July 13, the admiral cabled this request to Shafter, who responded that he would be glad for Sampson to do so, but that it would be difficult to coordinate. Shafter advised Sampson to send a representative to sit in on the negotiations. Before Sampson could respond, Miles sent word to him later that day that "The enemy has surrendered. I will be down to see you soon."45
The enemy, however, had not yet agreed to all of the surrender terms, and over the next three days it was still unsure if the fight for the Santiago garrisons would have to be conducted. Sampson, having failed to send someone to represent the Navy in the matter, had to rely on the cables that continued to come in periodically from the shore. Why Sampson did not send anyone ashore sooner is open to speculation. Perhaps he did not want to risk having a senior officer away if the Navy was suddenly ordered to force the entrance. This is quite possible after his earlier experience, when the scheduled conference of July 3 prohibited Sampson from participating in the only naval action of the campaign.

Finally, on July 16, the terms of the surrender were agreed to by all parties and the formal surrender took place the next morning. In notifying Sampson of the formal agreement, Miles told him that he was "glad that the Navy has been able to contribute such an important part."\textsuperscript{46}

Sampson, however, was still not pleased with the outcome of the surrender. He clearly felt that, in a joint operation of this type, all commanders, or their representatives, be signatories to any notice of surrender. This oversight by Shafter and Miles, intentional or not, was compounded by the fact that no mention for the disposition of shipping was included in the surrender articles. Even after Captain Chadwick arrived at the front to sign the articles
Shafer refused to allow him to do so. Chadwick stated that Shafer did so only because Sampson had failed to mention the Army and its role in his report of the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Shafer later stated his only reason for refusing Chadwick's signature was that the articles had already been agreed to, and no further signature was required.  

While amusing at best, these actions were soon to lead to another conflict between the two services. There still remained a few merchant ships and colliers inside the harbor waters. Since the matter of shipping had been omitted from the surrender negotiations, each service attempted to claim these vessels as their own. As Sampson stated:

Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint as directed by the President and so confirmed by their character. All propriety and usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it...I do not think the commanding general quite appreciates how necessary a part our forces were to the reduction of Santiago and the surrender of its garrison.

Shafer, however, was not prepared just to hand over the vessels to Sampson and the Navy. He sent notice to Sampson that he would not recognize the authority of Secretary of Navy Long in this matter. Shafer also told Sampson that:

I respectively invite your attention to the fact that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and his fleet has been made by the Army, although it is a fact the Spanish fleet did not leave the harbor until the investment of the city was practically completed.
Eventually, the President had to step in and decide that the ships were the rightful property of the Navy. The final irony to this entire campaign was that the Navy had to return these captured ships to the Army, only days later, for service as transports. The Navy, in this case, prevailed in what had been a long series of unnecessary skirmishes between the two services. Sadly, this was also another example of the disjointed operations that had existed throughout the campaign.50
CHAPTER 4
CAMPAIGN LESSONS LEARNED AND SUBSEQUENT REFORMS

It would be only a month following the campaign at Santiago before the war with Spain would be concluded with the Treaty of Paris. During the interim, military action between the United States and Spain would continue both in the Philippines and in Puerto Rico. While both of these theaters had Army and Navy forces, the operations of each service were mostly unilateral in nature. Thus, the matter of joint operations between the two services during the Spanish-American War ended at Santiago in July of 1898. While the U.S. military was able to accomplish its objective of defeating the Spanish forces at Santiago, the victory was more the result of Spanish incompetence than any joint expertise on the part of the Army or Navy. Indeed, a more formidable foe might have handed the United States a military disaster.

As circumstances usually dictate, the immediate months following the military operation at Santiago were spent getting U.S. forces redeployed out of Cuba and back home. This was especially true for the V Corps, which was now seriously debilitated with numerous cases of yellow fever and malaria. Much of the Navy had been redeployed to the Puerto Rico campaign. The military leadership, both at the strategic
and operational level, were rightly more concerned with the health and safety of their men and less interested in discerning any lessons learned from their performance at Santiago.¹

Given this situation, it should be no surprise that the after-action reports from the principals in the Santiago campaign highlighted the U.S. accomplishments while barely mentioning any of the deficiencies. Shafter's report to Secretary Alger, dated September 13, 1898, was especially glowing in his evaluation of the Army's performance. Shafter did outline his problems with disease and logistical support, but only to demonstrate the obstacles the Army had to overcome in their victorious action. Shafter went on to give faint praise to the Navy, saying:

My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain Goodrich, U.S. Navy, for their efficient aid in disembarking my Army. Without their assistance it would have been impossible to have landed in the time I did.²

As for Sampson, his report to Secretary Long, submitted immediately following the Spanish surrender at Santiago, was more critical of the joint operations between the two services. This was because his report used the communications between himself and Shafter to speak for themselves, messages that Long had not been privy to during the campaign. Sampson's intent was to show the correctness of his actions in relation to Shafter's requests, in order to set the record straight concerning the Navy's performance.
Sampson had become acutely aware of the press reports of the Santiago campaign and the perceived inaction on the part of the Navy. His report, which was later published in the Army and Navy Journal, was written "in order that a more complete history of the actions of the fleet in combination with the Army...may be at the disposal of the Department."\(^3\)

For both Sampson and Shafter, the after-action reports essentially ended any further contribution on their part to the campaign lessons learned effort. Sampson, for his part, went on to contend with the Schley affair, in which questions arose over the proper credit due Commodore Winfield Scott Schley for the Santiago naval battle of July 3. Schley had been the senior naval officer present during the naval action, as Sampson was on his way to confer with Shafter. Sampson, who felt that Schley had been less than aggressive during the naval blockade and was to some extent responsible for allowing Cervera's fleet to slip into Santiago Harbor, was now loathe to credit Schley for the destruction of the Spanish fleet. This ultimately led to a Court of Inquiry, requested by Schley, to determine who exactly was responsible for the Santiago naval victory. The matter was eventually settled some years later, in Sampson's favor, but the controversy only served to diminish Sampson's accomplishments at Santiago.\(^4\)

As for the Army, barely had the troops arrived back in the states before charges of mismanagement were made, leveled especially at Secretary of War Alger. Cries for an
investigation forced President McKinley to form a commission, headed by railroad executive and former Army general, Grenville M. Dodge. The Dodge Commission conducted extensive hearings in late 1898, inquiring into all aspects of the Army's participation in the war with Spain. The Commission concluded, while there had been no intentional mismanagement or negligence:

In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the Army.\(^5\)

This conclusion would have profound effects on the near and later future for the Army.

The Dodge Commission also investigated the Army's performance at Santiago, but concluded that the Army had done an exemplary job at meeting the objectives of the campaign. The members of the Commission went on to point out:

All this was accomplished without the loss of a prisoner, a gun, or a color, and with a list of casualties aggregating in killed less than 250 and in wounded less than 1,400 - losses which, in comparison with results, are less than have ever heretofore occurred in modern warfare.

In fact, the Commission went on to state that, "The cooperation of officers and men in this campaign is to be noted."\(^6\)

It would not be long, however, before both the Army and the Navy would begin to reflect on their respective Service's performance at Santiago. Their analysis of the campaign would ultimately lead to calls for changes in a
multitude of military procedures. Combined with the growing state of reform that was prevalent in the United States, these changes soon had a tremendous impact throughout the military.

**Development of the Army General Staff**

Based upon the findings of the Dodge Commission, President McKinley sought to solve the Army's mismanagement problems by replacing Secretary Alger. He decided on Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer from New York. Root, who had no prior military experience, brought a leadership and management style to the War Department that would rival that in any successful corporation of the day.7

Root, after carefully examining the Dodge Commission report, concluded that it was paramount to reform the Army's senior-level leadership structure by instituting a General Staff. Root, however, recognized the inherent distrust in such a staff structure that was widespread throughout the Army and in Congress, which would have to approve any change to a General Staff format. As a result, it would take Root almost three years to bring his efforts to fruition.8

To advance his argument, Root used the Army's performance during the Santiago campaign to show exactly why an organization such as the General Staff was necessary. In his annual report to the President for 1902, Root outlined the need for such a staff, arguing that:

The most important thing to be done now for the Regular Army is the creation of a general staff....
It is easy for a President, or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided among the different arms of the service, and how they shall be armed, and equipped, and to do that he must get all the information possible about the defenses of the place to be captured and the strength and character and armament of the forces to be met. He must determine at what points and by what routes the place shall be approached, and at what points his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must be informed about the various harbors of the island and the depth of their channels; what classes of vessels can enter them; what the facilities for landing are; how they are to be attacked; the character of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed movement; the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants; the quantity and kind of supplies that can be obtained, and a great variety of other things which will go to determine whether it is better to make the approach from one point or from another, and to determine what it will be necessary for the Army to carry with it in order to succeed in moving and living and fighting.

All this information it is the business of a general staff to procure and present....

It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa and elsewhere was the necessary result of having a large number of men, each of them doing his own special work the best he could, but without any adequate force of officers engaged in seeing that they pulled together according to detailed plans made beforehand. Such a body of men doing general staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an Army properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war.9

In his drive to institute a General Staff Secretary Root also enjoyed the enthusiastic support of President Roosevelt. As a volunteer regimental officer during the Santiago campaign, Roosevelt had witnessed firsthand much of the mismanagement and confusion. After listening to Root's arguments, Roosevelt was convinced that the General Staff
structure was sorely needed by the Army. After a hard-fought battle with Congress, Root's arguments eventually won out with the General Staff becoming law in February of 1903.10

The duties of the staff under the law included "to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war." Additionally, the staff would "investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations."11

**Development of the Navy General Board**

The U.S. Navy, based upon its naval actions at Santiago and at Manila Bay, was regarded by the public to have been quite successful during the Spanish-American War. As far as the Navy was concerned, much of its success was due to the invaluable role of the Naval War Board, which performed admirably as Secretary Long's chief advisor. It was evident that Long was quite appreciative of the board's efforts, as he stated in his annual report of 1898:

> It (the Naval War Board) was equal to every demand and through it proper control was exercised by the Department over all movements in the field; at the same time all officers there were left ample discretion and were never hampered in their work. The board was charged with delicate and most important duties, and yet the Department is not aware of an error in its performance of them.12

The Naval War Board was disestablished in the fall of 1898, shortly after the war ended, when its services were no longer necessary. However, many people throughout the Navy, including Long, felt that it was time to implement a permanent
advisory board to eliminate the need to form a temporary one in time of war. Thus, the Secretary established the Navy General Board, under executive order, in March of 1900.13

The purpose as envisioned by Long was "to insure efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast". Their duties in practice were to devise plans for deployment of the fleet, advise on training and acquisition matters, and recommend possibilities for naval bases overseas. The board, keeping in mind the performance of joint forces at Santiago, was also tasked to develop an "effective cooperation with the Army."14

**Development of the Joint Army and Navy Board**

While internal changes were being made to each service, officers from both the Army and the Navy also recognized the need to foster greater joint interservice cohesiveness. A few years of reflecting on the joint operations during the Santiago campaign had made it obvious that there was a great requirement for improved liaison between the two services.

To meet this end, the service secretaries created the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1903. It would be this board that would function as the precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was later developed in World War II. The initial board was designed to consider mutual matters of interest that the secretaries chose to present before it. As with the
Navy's General Board, the Joint Board lacked executive authority and was purely advisory in nature. Approval of its recommendations would require the approval of both secretaries and, in some cases, the President.\textsuperscript{15}

The Joint Board was composed of officers from both the Army's General Staff and the Navy's General Board. While the board was limited to only those matters placed before it by the secretaries, it was to play a considerable role in the development of war plans, a noted deficiency in the Santiago campaign preparation. The board also had a tremendous influence on the selection process for U.S. bases overseas.\textsuperscript{16}

The Joint Board first flexed its available muscle in 1904, when, at the suggestion of the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General A.R. Chaffee, it was tasked to develop a series of war plans against possible enemy threats. The initial work was a collaboration between students from the Naval War College and the Army War College, who then forwarded their ideas to the Joint Board. The first war plan developed by the Joint Board was for a possible military intervention and the acquisition of bases on the island of Santo Domingo. This plan, known as the Haiti-Santo Domingo Plan, called for a naval landing force which would then be relieved by an Army expeditionary force thirty days after the initial seizure.\textsuperscript{17}

Over the next several years, the Joint Board developed a series of color-coded plans that were aimed at possible U.S. adversaries. These plans included Plan BLACK for Germany,
Plan ORANGE for Japan, and Plan RED for Great Britian. Most of these plans would essentially remain the same until they were modified at the beginning of World War II.18

The board, however, was also subject to disagreement between the two services. Specifically, in 1907 the members of the board split along service lines over the choice of Subic Bay, Philippines as a Pacific base of operations. While the matter was eventually settled in the Army's favor with Subic Bay being dropped as a base, the heated dispute between the two services only inhibited the board's potential in future years.19

One important matter that the board failed to resolve was the concept of unity of command in joint operations. It was precisely this aspect that had resulted in the disjointed operations throughout the Santiago campaign. Each time the board was asked to consider this concept, it chose to recommend that, instead of designating a unified commander, the services would best accomplish their objectives through mutual cooperation. The board felt it was better to avoid possible service dissatisfaction, by subordinating one service to another, at the expense of having a unified command. This was indeed one instance in which the military failed to heed the lessons learned from the conduct of joint operations during the Santiago campaign.20

58
Changes in Landing Operations and Gunfire Support

Since the services had had no existing regulations or doctrine for the conduct of landing operations prior to the embarkation at Tampa, the success of this phase of the operation in Santiago had truly depended on the mutual cooperation between the Army and the Navy. The basis of this cooperation, however, was for the simple reason that both services would benefit from getting the V Corps ashore as soon as possible. Realizing that future landing operations might not be able to rely on this forced cooperation, both services began to explore the adoption of rules governing this type of operation.

It would be almost seven years after the end of the war with Spain, however, before the first real effort at codifying rules for landing operations would be attempted. Some of this delay was due to the reforms (i.e., General Staff, General Board) that occupied much of the attention of the services during this period. Additionally, the reduced chance for any near-term military action provided an excuse to delay studying landing rules.21

In 1905, it was another collaborative effort between war college students that led to a first draft of landing rules. These officers recognized that future landing operations had to be conducted in a more professional manner, with clearly defined areas of responsibility assigned to each
service. This draft was forwarded to the Joint Board for its consideration and recommendations.22

After the Joint Board reviewed the rules they were sent, in February of 1906, before the Secretaries and the President, who promptly accepted them. These rules were promulgated by the Army as General Order No. 174. It was not until 1910 that these rules would appear in the Army's Field Service Regulations. The Navy published the rules as General Order No. 25.23

Under these rules, the Army was responsible for the procurement and equipping of the naval transports, as well as the loading of troops, animals, and stores. Great emphasis was placed on the use of an embarkation schedule to prioritize the onloading, something that was not done at Tampa. The transports themselves had to meet minimum standards for the health and morale of the troops, such as required amounts of water. The Army would control the offloading from the transports onto the boats, where the Navy would then assume control of the movement to the shore.24

Under a situation similar to the one at Santiago, the Army commanding officer would decide the destination and time of sailing of the convoy. If circumstances were to change after the convoy had sailed, the Army and Navy commanders would then confer to decide on alternatives.25

Once the convoy began to sail, the Navy commanding officer assumed control over the movement and protection of
the convoy formation. The senior naval officer aboard each ship was to maintain command of his vessel - at no time would the captain of the ship become subordinate to the senior Army officer aboard. This was important in case a ship would become detached from the main formation. The Navy would keep control of the convoy until it reached the pier or anchorage. The Army commanding officer would decide the plans for landing, to include the site and time. This point, however, hinged on the stipulation that the Navy commanding officer be consulted. Once the landing site was determined, the Navy was responsible for placing the transports at the point of debarkation.\textsuperscript{26}

Throughout the landing operation, there would be a continued emphasis on establishing and maintaining communications channels between the two commanding officers. It was highly recommended that the Army commanding officer be embarked on the flagship of the naval convoy commander. Again, this was an effort to counter the confusion of the disjointed operations that had taken place at Santiago between Sampson and Shafter.\textsuperscript{27}

As for naval gunfire support, there was some concern over the performance of naval gunfire, especially in support of the siege of Santiago. It had been determined that there were only forty-six major-caliber hits on fifty-seven houses in Santiago, out of over 1300 rounds fired. This performance, however, was, in part, explained by the restrictions placed on
the naval gunfire by General Shafter. He had specifically asked Admiral Sampson to have his guns fire into the western portion of the city, thus avoiding any possibility of Navy shells falling on Army troops. This restriction severely limited the amount of damage the naval bombardment was able to inflict. The Navy was of the opinion that greater damage would have occurred if their guns had been trained on the center of the town. They also believed that, although this would have caused the shells to fall closer to V Corps troops, the Navy was more than capable of deconflicting the naval gunfire.28

Thus, the performance of naval gunfire support was due more to misunderstanding of joint capabilities than to a disregard for tactics, techniques and procedures. This was especially true since there had been no joint training in this area prior to the Santiago campaign. After the war, in an effort to combat this deficiency, the Army and Navy proposed exercises that would conduct joint gunfire training. This was accomplished by the development of the Army and Navy Maneuvers, a joint exercise that first took place in 1902. Although primarily concerned with gunfire support in a coastal defense scenario, the maneuvers used personnel from both services to observe the other service's gunfire or artillery techniques. This early attempt at conducting joint exercises greatly helped to foster the growing reliance on service cooperation.29.
The U.S. military prior to the Spanish-American War, suffering from inadequate readiness and an ineffective command structure, was in great need of reform. The decade after the war provided the opportunity to bring about these changes. Although all of these changes and reforms were not a panacea, it was apparent that both services were willing to put aside many of their interservice differences in order to achieve better joint cohesiveness. It had been the disjointed performance of the Army and Navy during the campaign of Santiago that had provided the impetus to do so.
CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have provided a background of the conduct of joint operations during the Santiago campaign during the Spanish-American War of 1898. While not the first or last time that joint operations have been conducted by the U.S. Army and Navy, it is important to understand that there was much to learn from just how these operations were executed.

It is not merely enough, however, to restate the actions of the American military during a war that occurred almost a century ago. It is also important to understand that their actions in a remote area of Cuba would have a far-reaching impact on the future of the two services. To that end, it is necessary to realize that the actions at Santiago and the military reforms that took place in the years after the war were linked, that one caused the other. That is the primary objective of this thesis—to show that the conduct of joint operations at Santiago directly affected the U.S. military in the following decade.

There is little argument that the United States military was faced with a difficult task in defeating the Spanish forces in Cuba during the summer months of 1898.
Prior to the war, the military had been reduced to its lowest level of readiness and manning since the end of the Civil War. The build-up of forces required to meet the strategic war objectives was not initiated until war was declared in April. These objectives were simply to defeat the Spanish troops in the Cuban and the Philippine theaters, using a joint effort between the Army and the Navy.

The joint operation at Santiago began as a hastily prepared Army expeditionary force thrown together with a fleet of thinly stretched Navy ships conducting a naval blockade. The state of pre-war readiness and the need for mobilization had negated any opportunity to conduct valuable joint training before the campaign began. There also existed a dearth of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures on which the services could have drawn as a starting point for joint operations. As a result, the Santiago campaign was characterized by the inability of the two services to operate in a cohesive manner.

Despite the disjointed means, the Santiago campaign, in the end, had to be considered a success because the operational objectives, though ill-defined, were met. The constant pressure applied by the U.S. Army on the garrisons of Santiago had forced the Spanish fleet to attempt an escape of harbor waters. In turn, the Spanish ships under Admiral Cervera's command had been destroyed by the U.S. Navy's guns. The siege of Santiago that followed forced the Spanish troops
to eventually capitulate, leading to the surrender of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba. The U.S. military actions in Cuba set the stage for the highly successful follow-on campaign in Puerto Rico. Combined with the actions in the Philippines, the Spanish-American War lasted a short four months, with a small number of casualties.

The overarching lesson that can be drawn from the conduct of joint operations at Santiago is that as much, if not more, can be learned from an ineffective campaign as well as from a totally successful one. This was certainly the case for the Santiago campaign. The performance of the Army and Navy forces at Santiago, and the lessons to be drawn from this campaign, were directly responsible for many of the initiatives and reforms that were instituted in the services in the decade following the Spanish-American War.

Secretary Root successfully argued for a General Staff, stating that such a command organization would have avoided the Army's mismanagement of the Santiago campaign. Secretary Long established the General Board because he had been tremendously impressed by the Naval War Board's advice concerning the Navy's role in Cuba. These intraservice reforms led to the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board, which later resolved the issue of joint landing operations, among others. Although many of these changes most likely would have been made at some point in history, it is
evident that the events at Santiago clearly precipitated these events.

The major deficiency of this campaign was the lack of command guidance and structure, especially in the failure to dictate unity of command. Although there have been successful operations that have lacked a unified commander, in this case joint operations between the Army and Navy was greatly hampered by having two commanders in the field who were, in effect, working against each other. It is apparent that both General Shafter and Admiral Sampson were conducting their operations, rightly or wrongly, with their own service interests at heart. A joint operation under a theater commander from the start quite probably would have resulted in a shorter campaign and with possibly fewer casualties.

Cooperation between services and their commanders, while clearly a good thing, is not always a matter of common application. This was true in the relations between Sampson and Shafter. Even when the degree of their conflict became known back in Washington, the only correction to the situation was a dictum from President McKinley to cooperate better. Though the two commanders did not consciously ignore McKinley's advice, the lack of doctrine or guiding principles, either formal or informal, concerning service responsibilities in a joint arena was a decisive factor for the high degree of disjointed operations.
Given a situation where military operations are called for, the most common response is to refer to doctrine to develop a basis for future operations. This doctrine may be written down or may simply be a philosophy that pervades throughout a military service. Whatever the form, this doctrine provides the commanders the same "sheet of music" from which to perform. As long as there is this common thread, the operation will be able to adjust to any deviations that are necessary in order to adapt to the situation. The Santiago campaign, however, suffered considerably from a lack of doctrine, especially in the areas of landing operations and naval gunfire support.

If there is no doctrine (or common tactics, techniques, and procedures) from which to draw upon, the next step is to look for, lacking a better term, "institutional memory." This refers to the corporate knowledge that exists in the military from previous occurrences of similar operations. Despite this lack of doctrine, the existence of this institutional memory can be just as valuable, if not more, in conducting military operations.

For the Santiago campaign, there was none of this knowledge that either service could utilize. It had been over thirty years since the Civil War, when the last instance of joint operations had occurred. If the commanders at both the strategic and the operational level had gone looking for
someone to offer his expertise, they would have quickly
discovered that no such person existed.

Finally, if there are no apparent answers, written or
otherwise, then the next step is one of innovation, heavily
influenced by the exigency of the situation. Military leaders
for generations have been valued for their ability to solve
problems in a timely fashion. At Santiago, there were signs
of this talent during the landing operations phase, when the
services put aside their differences in order to get the V
Corps ashore as quickly and as safely as possible. Although
later on there was a considerable amount of fingerpointing
from both sides concerning service responsibilities, the
landing itself greatly benefitted from a unified effort. The
deception plan in support of the landing was especially
remarkable given the lack of pre-war planning and training.
This effort to cooperate, however, was quickly forgotten as
soon as the advance on Santiago began.

Whether through the application of doctrine,
institutional memory or innovative ideas, the overriding
influence in conducting successful operations comes down to
the personalities of the commanders involved. Examples of
this include General Ulysses Grant, whose leadership ensured
success at Vicksburg, and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, whose
guidance prevented failure in Operation DESERT STORM/DESERT
SHIELD. The power of their personalities, in conjunction with
command guidance, played a significant part in their operations while resolving the matter of unity of command.

For the Santiago campaign, it is apparent that both Sampson and Shafter, with no strategic guidance and lacking any doctrine or institutional memory concerning joint operations, were left overly dependent on their own ability to identify the problem and reach a unified solution. Their failure to do so at Santiago, then, was because the personalities of the commanders involved essentially nullified any willingness to cooperate. One can only speculate as to their reasons why they acted as they did.

For one, both men probably viewed defeating the Spanish at Santiago as, in the end, a consequence of their own service's actions. For this to occur, both Sampson and Shafter had to have recognized that success of their own service was greatly dependent on the other service setting the stage. Given this, it is likely that neither man wanted his service to play a subordinate role in the eventual outcome. They may have been overly concerned that the recognition for the major role in the Santiago campaign would go to the service who had ended the fighting, while ignoring the contributions of the service that had set the conditions.

For another, it is evident that both commanders were misinformed as to the capabilities and limitations of the other's service. This would explain why Sampson could not comprehend why the Army could not just storm the garrisons at
the entrance to the harbor. Shafter correctly saw that this action would probably result in a larger loss of life on the Army's part than in conducting a siege of Santiago. Conversely, Shafter was mistaken in his belief that opening the entrance to the harbor was simply a matter of U.S. naval ships forcing their way in. This type of action would also have led to a large loss of life, this time at the expense of Navy seamen. This lack of understanding also explains the ineffective naval gunfire support that existed throughout the campaign.

In hindsight, perhaps there was not an acceptable joint course of action that the two commanders could have agreed upon that would have achieved the same results. Regardless of whether there was one or not, the main point is that Sampson and Shafter should have at least gotten together more frequently to discuss the conduct of the operation and, at least, explore other possible solutions. The two commanders met face to face only once during the entire campaign and that was upon Shafter's arrival in the theater. Instead, they chose to conduct the Santiago campaign via message, hoping against hope that one of them would eventually come around in his way of thinking. This was not to be.

Fortunately for the Americans, the Spanish forces were not equipped to counter the U.S. offensive, no matter how disorganized. As stated earlier, the entire campaign was over in a matter of months, long before any long-term effects of
the disjointedness between Sampson and Shafter could be realized.

To some extent, credit must be given to both services for their actions in the years following the war. After reflecting upon the conduct of the campaign, the Army and Navy recognized that there could not be a repeat of the joint operations at Santiago. In the decade following the Spanish-American War, the services, singularly and jointly, underwent the greatest amount of reform in their histories. Though these reforms did not solve every problem that had arisen during the Santiago campaign, it did show that it is possible to discern valuable lessons learned from the conduct of military operations. Ultimately, the Santiago lessons learned were translated into doctrine, as in the case of landing operations, or into the establishment of vital command and advisory structures.

This study focused solely on the changes and reforms that occurred in the decade following the Santiago campaign. Many of these reforms, however, had an impact on the way the military operated for several decades. In the case of the landing rules developed by the Joint Army and Navy Board in 1906, they bear a striking resemblance to current amphibious doctrine. For example, the division of service responsibilities afloat and ashore arrived at by the Joint Board remains essentially unchanged almost ninety years later. Therefore, further study is recommended to determine if there...
is a link between the initial landing rules and the development of current amphibious doctrine. It is quite possible, then, that the Santiago campaign had an influence on joint military operations that continues to this day.
ENDNOTES

Chapter One

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