Blainey And The Bottom-Up Review: Increased Potential For Miscalculation And War In The 21st Century

A Monograph by
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Major John W. Nicholson

Title of Monograph: Blainey and the Bottom Up Review: Increased Potential for Miscalculation and War in the 21st Century

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ABSTRACT

On 1 September, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell announced the results of the Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR), an unprecedented collaborative effort to determine America's future defense needs. This analysis of the BUR identifies discrepancies with the methodology and underlying assumptions of the BUR. These flaws, in turn, resulted in serious deficiencies in the results of this important work.

The BUR's point of departure for an examination of future defense needs was the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union. However, rather than develop a comprehensive picture of the nature of war and peace in the 21st Century as a basis for force planning, the BUR assumes limited wars of the DESERT STORM variety are the model for future conflict. Contemporary scholars such as Samuel Huntington, John Keegan, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler disagree with this assumption. They point to a clash of civilizations in the next century and an increased potential for violent cultural conflict. Such conflicts tend to be protracted and costly, not limited.

The BUR's assumptions concerning peace fail the test of history as provided by Geoffrey Blainey's exhaustive study of the causes of war and peace since 1700. The BUR's assumptions are that the best guarantors of peace are a thriving web of free trading relationships and an international partnership of democratic nations. Free trade is more often a result of peace, rather than a cause of peace. Democracy may not be the optimal form of government for all nations. As Blainey comments, free trade and democracy may have caused more international war than peace.

The quantitative analysis approach of the BUR does not adequately assess the numerous subjective factors that have lead to wars in the past. When we do analyze those factors using Blainey's seven point theoretical construct, we find that despite America's preeminent position as the world's only superpower, the strategy, force structure and budget of the BUR actually increase the potential for international miscalculation and war.

The BUR has unquestionably furthered the crucial debate on America's future national security needs. The BUR has kept Congressional attention focused on national security issues at a time of multiple competing priorities. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in methodology, assumptions and results limit the utility of the BUR as a blueprint for our future national strategy and force structure. It is time to put the BUR aside and develop a more realistic set of assumptions and methodology with which to decide our future strategy and force structure.
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I. INTRODUCTION

General Powell: My dear colleague and friend, Secretary Aspin, now my boss, he wins the debates now. He didn’t always win the debates then. But we had great fun and a lot of excitement debating the issue.[1]

—Response by General Colin Powell when asked why he supported Secretary of Defense Aspin’s force structure ideas in 1993 after he had opposed those same ideas when espoused by Congressman Aspin in 1992.

Both Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell have since left their leadership positions in the Department of Defense (DOD), but the debate over the future of America’s armed forces continues. At the center of that debate is the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), Secretary Aspin’s assessment of America’s national defense needs in the post-Soviet era. This assessment encompassed all aspects of defense planning to include strategy formulation, force structure, weapons system modernization, force enhancements and the reconfiguration of DOD.

One week after the 1 September BUR briefing, the Clinton Administration published its draft National Security Strategy (NSS) document, which outlined the goal of containing or resolving regional conflicts which had the potential to escalate or draw in major powers. The draft NSS states the United States will pursue regional conflict resolution, in part, by maintaining the capability to fight two such conflicts nearly simultaneously. Since September of 1993, members of Congress, retired flag officers and defense analysts have all criticized the BUR force structure and budget as inadequate to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. An equally critical,
but less scrutinized, aspect of the BUR is its underlying assumption concerning the nature of 21st Century conflict. The BUR assumes future wars can be limited in time and cost, as were DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE, rather than evolve into protracted and expensive conflicts.

This ongoing debate has significant domestic and international implications for the United States. Not only will DOD have to protect national interests with the remaining force structure and budget, but potential adversaries will closely monitor this dialogue to determine American intentions and vulnerabilities in the next century. Some of these other international actors may calculate they can achieve their ends in the face of reduced American military power. This all leads one to question the validity of the BUR and its potential to alleviate crisis. Perhaps the BUR has the potential to do just the opposite. Will the BUR strategy and force structure possibly increase the potential for the United States to go to war in the 21st Century?

This study examines the BUR's methodology, underlying assumptions and results in an attempt to answer the above question. The BUR's vision of future war and peace is essential to the ultimate validity of its recommendations. Since DOD does not officially subscribe to any particular theory of war with which it predicts the future, it is prudent to draw from contemporary scholars in creating such a vision.

In his work, The Causes of War, Geoffrey Blainey contends that "wars usually end when fighting nations agree on their
relative strength, and wars usually begin when nations disagree on their relative strength." Blainey examines all wars since 1700 and identifies seven factors which influence a nation's assessment of its strength relative to other nations. Through the application of these seven factors it is possible to analyze the results of the BUR and to determine the potential for other nations to risk war with the United States.

II. 21st CENTURY THREATS AND CONDITIONS

A. THE NEXT CENTURY'S THREATS

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have destabilized the world and increased the potential for regional conflict. Regional and ethnic tensions kept in check by the Cold War are resurfacing in the Balkans, the Confederation of Independent States, Africa, the Korean peninsula and in Southwest Asia. Threat groupings are emerging as regional coalitions or informal alliances with strategic interests contrary to U.S. interests i.e. Iran, Sudan, Libya.[2] International bodies such as NATO and the UN are proving less than successful at resolving these regional conflicts.

While the specific threat is not clear, in general the U.S. can expect to face three broad types of foes in future conflicts: High technology, hybrid and low technology.[3] The majority of our military opponents will be of the hybrid variety. While not uniformly equipped or well trained, these hybrid military forces will possess some increasingly lethal and high tech systems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size Force</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
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<td>6400</td>
<td>7014</td>
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Figure One. (Selected Military Capabilities)[4]

Proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction is widespread. Despite international conventions intended to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, NBC and ballistic missile technologies are being sold by the Chinese and North Koreans to the highest bidder.[5] A recent advertisement by the Russian Federation’s State Corporation for Export and Import of Armaments and Military Equipment reads "If required, the entire Russian Defence Industrial Complex is at your disposal." The advertisement shows photographs of attack helicopters, surface to surface missiles and the most modern air defense systems.[6]

For Russia and many other former communist countries, such exports are a primary source of hard currency. The temptation to sell this hardware rather than destroy much of it as required under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty may be too great for these struggling economies to resist. Even if they do comply with CFE treaty requirements, the arms industries in the former Soviet Union are capable of producing and
proliferating large quantities of the modern systems.

Western arms industries have been proliferating conventional weapons for decades. While the international arms trade has dropped since the demise of the Soviet Union, arms manufacturers continue to sell around one trillion dollars worth annually. In 1992, the United States, France and Britain accounted for 90% of total arms sales to third world countries.

Many of these weapons are neither high-tech nor expensive, but are nevertheless very lethal. Internationally, there are 80 million land mines buried in countries such as Kuwait, Cambodia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola and the Balkans. American forces have conducted peace operations in many of these countries and will undoubtedly serve in many others in the next century. Regardless of the status of the ongoing conflicts in these countries, they remain very deadly places to serve, as evidenced by their high civilian casualty rates.[7]

Today’s western supplied ally could be tomorrow’s adversary in the new non-Cold War world. American soldiers fought the US trained and equipped Panamanian Defense Forces in 1989. German technology found its way into Iraq’s nuclear program and Libya’s chemical weapons program. French Exocet missiles sank British ships during the Falklands War and western nations supported Iraq in its war with Iran. Iraqi-purchased French plastic land mines were among the most feared by coalition forces in DESERT STORM. Thus American forces have and will again face the best western technology on the battlefield or in operations other than war.
Advances in weapons technology will continue to increase the already substantial lethality of these hybrid forces. The relative destructive power per dollar is increasing and is readily available to those who can pay. Weapons are more user-friendly (i.e. shoulder fired surface to air missiles), thus requiring less training for the same level of lethality. U.S. forces should expect to face large quantities of high quality weapons systems with range, accuracy and lethality comparable to our own. While US forces will continue to enjoy a training advantage, we cannot underestimate the ability of less well trained forces to inflict casualties with high technology weapons.

The low-tech Afghan mujahadeen, when armed with Stinger missiles, were able to inflict high casualties on the well trained, high-tech Soviet forces. While incapable of decisive victory in battle, the Afghan forces were able to protract the conflict to such an extent that the Soviets eventually lost the will to continue and left Afghanistan to the mujahadeen.

Emerging information technologies may provide early warning to our adversaries of a U.S. response to a crisis. For example, access to Federal Aviation Administration computers could compromise large formations of military aircraft departing the United States. Additionally, live coverage by the international media may compromise the deployment of U.S. forces in response to a crisis. Such information would enable enemy forces to concentrate significant combat power at decisive points early in a campaign. These decisive points will include the likely lodgement areas that U.S. early-entry forces will attempt to
seize and hold for follow on armored or Marine forces.

Perceptive enemies will also exploit U.S. vulnerabilities learned from late 20th century operations. U.S. Army Rangers seized lodgements in Grenada and Panama by jumping onto airfields from transport aircraft flying at an altitude of 500 feet. While doing so, they were extremely vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. U.S. airborne forces in Saudi Arabia were vulnerable to Iraqi armored forces while awaiting the arrival of friendly mechanized formations. Decisionmaker responses to high U.S. casualties chaired national policy in Lebanon (1983) and again in Somalia (1993).

The seaborne delivery of Army armored forces in DESERT SHIELD was time consuming and required a secure and adequate infrastructure for offloading. Mining of harbors and likely assault beaches is a low cost way to disrupt this seaborne power projection, thus allowing enemies to mass their combat power against lightly armed early entry forces. We cannot assume that our future enemies will be tactically or operationally stupid. They will exploit these and other American vulnerabilities in an attempt to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces early in a conflict in order to erode domestic support.

The nature of the new multipolar world increases the opportunities for U.S. military involvement around the globe. U.S. forces will be called upon to project power against increasingly lethal and well informed opponents. Achieving surprise will be increasingly difficult due to worldwide information networks and the international media. Many potential
threats now possess weapons of mass destruction and long range deliver/ means. The same hostile nations can also field significant heavy conventional forces with which to attack lodgements prior to the arrival of U.S. armored forces. We must assume these potential enemies will use these means in attempts to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces early in a campaign in order to influence U.S. public opinion and impose their will on U.S. decisionmakers.

B. 21ST CENTURY CONDITIONS

In 1990, President George Bush proclaimed the successful coalition effort against Saddam Hussein to be evidence of a new world order in which the community of nations would punish transgressors and maintain peace. Numerous historians, futurists and political leaders disagree. "I see nothing new or orderly about the new world order" asserted Senator Daniel Inouye in recent hearings on our national defense needs. One's concept of the future is essential to any consideration of national security strategy and the means for implementing that strategy. Flawed assumptions will result in a flawed strategy and an improper force structure. The BUR envisions future wars as limited regional contingencies to punish aggressor nations that have violated the sovereignty of a neighbor. The BUR assumes these conflicts can be militarily resolved with discrete force packages sized along the lines of past successful operations i.e. DESERT STORM, JUST CAUSE and PROVIDE COMFORT.[12] The inherent assumption of this vision is that wars will be limited in scope and America can use overwhelming combat power to achieve
quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties.

Noted British historian John Keegan in his recent work, *A History of Warfare*, asserts that "war embraces much more than politics, it is always an expression of culture... in some societies [war is] the culture itself."[13] From 1945 to 1989, the world was dominated by the Cold War, a struggle between the competing western ideologies of capitalism and communism. This western world view was imposed on the rest of the globe by the two superpowers, who examined war while wearing political and ideological blinders. Ongoing cultural, ethnic and religious conflicts were perceived as Cold War political and ideological struggles. The end of the Cold War means westerners must remove their blinders and examine cultural trends, as well as political events, to determine the nature of the wars we may fight.

Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington agrees with Keegan's cultural focus. In his article, "The Clash of Civilizations", Huntington predicts the next pattern of global conflict will be along the "cultural fault lines" that separate civilizations. These eight civilizations are Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African. The clashes between these groups will occur at two levels: at the micro level, along their physical boundaries, or fault lines, in a competition to control territory and populations; and at a macro level, for military and economic power, control of international institutions, and the advancement of their particular political and religious values. Evidence of these clashes are found in: conflict between America and China over
human rights and weapons proliferation, the economic conflict between America and Japan, the "ethnic cleansing" of the Balkans and the religious bloodletting in the Middle East between Jews and Muslims, to name but a few. The nature of these conflicts is anything but limited; rather, once they become violent, they tend to be protracted and costly. "Violence between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars."[14]

According to Huntington, the central axis of future world politics will be the conflict that he refers to as "the West against the Rest." Many non-westerners view the western civilization as using its military and economic might and its control of international institutions to perpetuate western world dominance and to promote western values. While most western states are reducing their military power, certain non-western civilizations are increasing theirs.

Huntington contends that a Confucian-Islamic military connection has developed which is designed to provide its members with the weapons and technologies to counter the West. China has exported nuclear and nerve gas technologies to both Libya and Iraq. It helped Algeria build a nuclear reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has provided Iran with nuclear weapons technology and Pakistan with 300 mile range missile components. North Korea has provided both Syria and Iran with advanced missile technologies; and Pakistan provided China with Stinger missiles.
All of these nations have taken to heart the Indian Defense Minister's lesson learned from DESERT STORM, "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." This new arms race between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states is unusual because while the Islamic and Confucian states are attempting to increase their power, the West is attempting to limit its competitors while reducing its own military strength.[13]

Huntington concludes the West must maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in the face of increasing non-western power. This means moderating the reduction of Western military capabilities, maintaining military superiority in East and Southwest Asia and limiting the expansion of Confucian and Islamic military strength.

The West must also make more of an effort to understand and accommodate the other civilizations that make up the world community. "For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations."[16] Huntington's conclusions point to increased potential for costly and protracted conflict, rather than a new world order in which the community of nations takes collective action against transgressors.

Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler in their bestseller War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century also reject the notion of a new world order. They see the world undergoing a transformation of unprecedented scope and depth. As we move into the 21st Century, the world is trisecting. States, nations and entities fall into one of three "waves".
informational, each with its own unique characteristics. Rather than a global community of nations that resolve conflicts through effective international institutions, the Tofflers envision a world with sharp tensions between first, second and third wave economies pursuing their own diverging needs through any and all means.

Some "crazy states" may prefer crisis and war to peaceful conflict resolution. The increased speed of events and interrelated nature of the world will increase the risk of war. "Ethnic vendettas generate ethnic battles that generate ethnic wars larger than a given region can handle." Such wars between ethnic groups or between "haves" and "have-nots" tend to be protracted and costly.[17]

While they warn of war, the Tofflers also point to the tremendous opportunities of the next century. If third wave economies help their first and second wave neighbors to meet their needs, many potential conflicts and global problems can be peacefully resolved. But, the Tofflers warn that if we persist in using the intellectual tools of yesterday, we risk losing the promise of the 21st Century. Thus, the Tofflers see a world with high potential for protracted and costly conflict, but one where increased interaction can prevent conflict. Increased interaction means increased numbers of operations other than war as a preventative measure.

All of the trends described by these scholars point to an uncertain and potentially violent future. Far from the DESERT STORM model of international cooperation to punish rogue states,
they envision a great potential for protracted conflict between competing civilizations. There will be increasing demands for peace operations both before and after armed conflicts, and third wave militaries will become involved in rendering nation building assistance to first wave states. These authors reject the assumptions and intellectual tools of the 20th century, redirecting our focus to cultural factors and expanding our horizons beyond the Clausewitzian notion that war is primarily political in nature. The BUR, seems to be focused on underlying assumptions and intellectual tools that are the very ones these scholars warn us to discard.

C. 21ST CENTURY DOMESTIC TRENDS

With the end of the Cold War, many pressing domestic needs came to the forefront of national attention. Imperatives for deficit reduction, economic renewal, solving problems of crime, drug abuse and poverty all require attention. For many, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant it was time to reap a "peace dividend" from the roughly $300 Billion annual defense budget.

The following chart outlines the cost saving proposals put forth in late 1991. It includes proposals from several prominent legislators and the Bush Administration’s planned reduction in defense spending. Then Congressman Aspin recommended four possible force options with force structures varying from the quite small to the robust.
PEACE DIVIDENDS

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<td>50</td>
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<td>Senator Gramm</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Aspin Option C</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Kennedy</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator Sasser</td>
<td>120/140</td>
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<td>Senator McCain</td>
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<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brookings Institute</td>
<td>310</td>
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<td>Representative Dellums</td>
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Figure One: Peace Dividends[18]

The severest defense cuts of all, $400 Billion in four years, were recommended by Congressman Ronald V. Dellums who is now the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. President Clinton’s goal is to realize $127 Billion in defense savings over the five years from fiscal years 1993 to 1997.

This redirecting of resources from defense to the domestic agenda is viewed by many as essential to American maintenance of its superpower status. In his two works, *The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers* and *Preparing For The Twenty-First Century*, Yale University professor Paul Kennedy chronicles the challenges that have faced great powers in the past and that face America today. Kennedy asserts that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." American global interests and obligations exceed our national means to defend them all.[19]

Worsening the situation is America’s economic decline relative to the world’s other great economic powers. Many of the factors that influence this relative decline are beyond the control of national decisionmakers i.e. shifting pace
of productive growth, technological innovation, international changes and alterations to power balances. While the nation can redirect resources within its own economy to affect growth, there is much left to the skill of national leaders and the willingness of the populace to make the necessary changes to remain on top.

Kennedy draws a parallel between contemporary America and turn-of-the-century Britain. When faced with the need for change, Britons decided to "muddle through", rather than suffer the national discomfort of sacrifice and change. The result was slow, steady, relative decline and the eventual loss of their position in the world. [20]

President Clinton took Kennedy's warning to heart and has embarked on an ambitious domestic agenda to overhaul everything in America from deficit reduction to health care. Such an effort requires a painstaking reassessment and redirection of resources within the federal budget. This means budgetary considerations more than any other factor will drive change on the national agenda. This budget driven decisionmaking process is the major domestic factor affecting the debate on military force structure and strategy. [21]

III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW (BUR)

A. CONGRESSMAN ASPIN'S PROPOSALS

In January of 1992, while the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman, Mr. Aspin authored two studies on defense restructuring. Aspin's "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era" proposed a methodology for analyzing America's future defense needs. Mr.
Aspin used the same methodology for the BUR. In his "Four Illustrative Options" document, Aspin recommended a force structure which closely resembles the BUR's recommended force structure. A detailed examination of these studies will provide valuable insights into the intellectual tools used by Mr. Aspin in his assessment of America's future defense needs.

REGIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE IRAQ EQUIVALENT

Aspin's two studies identified six functions for military forces: countering regional aggressors, combatting proliferation of nuclear and other mass terror weapons, fighting terrorism, restricting drug trafficking, peacekeeping and assisting civilians. Within these categories, Aspin quantified the threats in order to determine the necessary level of American force required to counter it. He uses the "Iraq Equivalent", or the pre-DESER DesERT STORM military capability of Iraq, as his basic threat model. Other potential regional aggressors are then quantified in relation to Iraq's pre-war military strength. Aspin chose to measure the capabilities of China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and Cuba. (See Appendix A) All fell well below Iraq's pre-war strength with the exception of China who rated a 1.2 Iraq Equivalent. These numerical values were objectively derived by counting numbers of men and pieces of equipment.

There is not evidence of a subjective assessment of the threat leadership, training, doctrine, tactics, readiness and the conditions that would be encountered in likely theaters of operations.[22] Most importantly, the Iraq Equivalent does not adequately assess the human dimension of these potential threats. Napoleon once commented that "the moral is to the
physical as three is to one." Moral factors always have a profound impact on the outcome of military operations. In Kuwait, much of the Iraqi Army chose not to fight. In another conflict situation, we cannot afford to assume the North Korean or Chinese armies would do the same.

COUNTERING THE REGIONAL THREAT: THE DESERT STORM EQUIVALENT

Since American forces handily defeated Iraq in DESERT STORM, Mr. Aspin uses a DESERT STORM Equivalent as the friendly force structure yardstick necessary for countering any regional threat. However, the DESERT STORM Equivalent is not the force that deployed to Saudi Arabia. Rather, it includes only those units that "mattered" in defeating Iraq. For example, it excludes two Carriers, some Air Force tactical aircraft and one Marine Expeditionary Brigade, none of which were requested by the CINC. It grudgingly includes "some forces that didn't really fight:" Marine Forces at sea, tactical and strategic reserves, and the 82nd Airborne Division.[23] Such an assessment misjudges the importance of reserves, deception and demonstrating US resolve by deploying our airborne division early. In effect, Aspin's methodology penalizes the armed force for their overwhelming success in Kuwait and not using all forces available.

Mr. Aspin's DESERT STORM Equivalent, the "force that mattered" had six heavy divisions, an air-transportable light division, one Marine division on land, one Marine brigade at sea, 24 Air Force fighter squadrons, 70 heavy bombers, two carrier battle groups building up to four groups over time, and naval
surface combatants providing Aegis defenses and large numbers of cruise missiles. Additional prepositioning ships and fast sealift would insure early arriving light forces would be quickly reinforced with heavy forces.

Mr. Aspin proposes proportionate matching of DESERT STORM Equivalents against the Iraq Equivalent value of potential threats in order to determine the necessary force level required to counter them. For example, since North Korea is a 0.6 Iraq Equivalent, it would only require a 0.6 DESERT STORM Equivalent to counter their invasion of South Korea.

Just as with the threat methodology, there are serious deficiencies with this friendly force methodology. First and foremost, this approach ignores our current military doctrine and how it relates to our National Security Strategy emphasizing overwhelming combat power to achieve quick, decisive victory. If the United States decides to risk the lives of its young men and women, it should not merely be a fair fight. By providing just enough force based on historical hindsight, Aspin's methodology leaves no margin for error. The slightest miscalculation and we have unnecessarily high American casualties. Given the highly subjective nature of warfare and the minimal margin of error inherent in the DESERT STORM Equivalent, the chances of having a catastrophic miscalculation are high.

The DESERT STORM Equivalent does not consider numerous other factors critical to our ultimate success in DESERT STORM. First, it is a purely military assessment. There is no discussion of a political leader's role in setting the conditions for military success by his expert handling of the other instruments of
national power. For example, had President Bush not mobilized American national will, diplomatically isolated Iraq, forged an international coalition, secured Russian agreement, pushed Congress into supporting military action and sought international funding, DESERT STORM might never have occurred, much less been successful. The HASC methodology maintains a myopic view of war as a purely military endeavor.

In terms of military factors the DESERT STORM Equivalent does not consider coalition armed forces and their contributions to the victory. While American forces certainly did most of the fighting, the mere presence of other armies, especially Arab armies, bestowed a legitimacy upon the entire operation that was essential to policy success. The terrain favored American air and ground operations as the Iraqis had nowhere to hide from our firepower. The proximity of waterways allowed the application of American naval air power and cruise missiles against all targets and presented the enemy with the threat of Marine landings on his flank. The Saudi infrastructure facilitated rapid offloading of American troops and equipment from vessels and aircraft. The featureless and unpopulated nature of the battlefield favored heavy force operations and minimized civilian casualties.

America fought DESERT STORM with its Cold War, unlimited war, logistical infrastructure intact. Huge war stocks of ammunition and large quantities of smart munitions intended for the potential conflict with the Soviet Union were available for the Gulf War. Airbases, equipment stores and hospitals in Europe were essential to the effort. The Air Force's C-141 air cargo fleet had sufficient flight hours remaining to sustain the
increased airlift requirements. None of these assets are at their pre-DESERT STORM levels today. In testimony before the Senate, the regional Commanders in Chief testified there were insufficient smart munitions to fight two regional contingencies near simultaneously.[24] Europe had nine military hospitals in 1990, today it has three. The C-141 fleet aged prematurely due to the Gulf War airlift requirements and is undergoing a major overhaul to extend its life until the C-17 is fielded.[25]

PEACEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS: THE PROVIDE COMFORT EQUIVALENT

The Aspin studies severely underestimated the impact of peacekeeping operations on the armed forces. One of these studies states:

Past U.S. peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and elsewhere and our recent experience in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and in Bangladesh demonstrate that these operations involve no more than a few thousand troops, and so are not major considerations in force building. (Author underline added) [26]

On any given day there are 20,000 US soldiers deployed in 60 countries around the world in addition to those permanently stationed abroad.[27] Many of these troops are involved peace operations in Croatia, the Sinai, Macedonia and Northern Iraq. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, while successful, still involves US troops three years after it was begun.[28] Such commitments will continue to have a significant impact on the forces available for regional contingencies. Additionally, none of these operations are funded by Congress. Typically, the services are told to pay for these operations from their existing revenues.
Both HASC studies assume away the potential for protracted war in the belief that future conflict will be of the DESERT STORM and JUST CAUSE limited war variety. "In the post-Cold War era we will not plan on fighting long wars with high casualties," states Congressman Aspin.[29] We may not plan on long wars, but we may get them anyway. Given the predictions of Huntington, Kennedy and the Tofflers, this is a dangerous assumption for future force planning.

Even though we may not be able to afford a "protracted war" active army, our reserve component force structure and mobilization base are dramatically affected by the limited war assumption. For example, the decision to phase out reserve component divisions in favor of enhanced readiness brigades provides the total Army with a more responsive, but less robust, reserve component combat capability. Whereas divisions take longer to train up for war, they are more durable and capable formations once they are combat ready. Should America find herself in a protracted war, she will have to recreate the very formations she is disbanding in favor of a limited war Army.

There is no discussion of funding except in terms of the projected savings or peace dividends that Mr. Aspin's various options provided. At the end of the Bush Administration, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell both criticized Aspin's proposals as unaffordable with the savings he projected and inadequate to meet the nation's needs.
B. SECRETARY ASPIN'S BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

The BUR methodology is based on Mr. Aspin's HASC studies. The very name, "Bottom Up Review," is contained in his previously described documents. While the BUR certainly was the "unprecedented and collaborative effort" that Secretary Aspin claimed, there was not much new in the results. Its stated purpose was to "define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."[30] All of these elements were defined in the BUR in essentially the same manner as they were defined in the HASC studies. (See Appendix B)

These "new dangers" were essentially the same as those identified in Mr. Aspin's previous studies with one important addition: the danger of "the failure to build a strong and growing U.S. economy." Paul Kennedy's research supports the premise that a robust military is affordable only when a nation has a growing economy.[31] The BUR, however, turns this premise on its head by implying that a robust military budget can provide the stimulus to improve sluggish economic growth while simultaneously providing for the national defense. "[DOD] can help address these economic dangers....we can maintain [military] capabilities sufficient to meet our present and future security needs while reducing the overall level of resources devoted to defense."[32]

The BUR states DOD will address economic dangers by: using fewer resources, actively assisting in the transition of the US economy away from a Cold War footing, providing transition
assistance to departing military members, facilitating conversion of defense industries, and encouraging a freer flow of technologies between the civilian and military sectors.

While assisting the national economy in this manner, the BUR asserts DOD will also remain "the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world." None of these assertions are supported by hard budget figures in the BUR documents, rather, it estimates savings of $91 billion over the Bush Administration's baseline defense costs. The budget estimates are caveated with the statement that "the BUR developed a strategic framework for defense reductions, not a budget."[33] This caveat reveals one of the major flaws with the BUR, namely, neither the strategic framework nor the budget could be considered in isolation from one another. Because they apparently were, a significant budget shortfall developed which rendered the BUR results unaffordable.

The BUR uses the same building block methodology as the HASC studies. The "Desert Storm Equivalent" of the HASC study is called the "MRC Building Block" in the BUR. The "Panama Equivalent" of the HASC study is transformed into forces required for "Peace Enforcement and Intervention Operations." A comparison of these building blocks reveals the similarity of the conclusions produced by these similar methodologies. The BUR force structure options are almost identical to the four options described in the Aspin HASC studies. (See Appendix C) The final BUR force structure is very similar to Aspin's recommended Option C of the HASC studies.
One who agrees with this methodology might argue the BUR results confirm the validity of Mr. Aspin's earlier HASC studies. However, this assessment ignores the early criticism of Aspin's proposals by DOD agencies and in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It also ignores another motivation for agreement with the BUR methodology, namely, budget preservation.

While most DOD services and agencies preferred the larger budgets and force structures they enjoyed under the Bush Administration, they recognized the domestic agenda demanded more resources. The BUR methodology, flawed as it was, offered a sound rationale for more budget authority than they would otherwise retain. Mr. Aspin, a genuinely conscientious and intellectually honest public servant, found himself caught between his intellectually driven BUR results and the fiscally driven budget constraints of the domestically focused Clinton Administration. The result was his resignation.

This interpretation is not intended to paint a picture of cynical bureaucrats and flag officers desperately holding onto every last dollar as their boss is forced to resign. Nothing could be further from the truth. Reduced budgets and force structure translate into greater risk for the nation. As the custodians of national security, the leadership of the armed forces will always seek to minimize that risk, hence their desire for adequate budgets and force structure. The JCS evidently believed the BUR strategy minimized risk, but the force structure and budget to support that strategy was found
unaffordable by the Administration.[34]

C. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS)

Fourteen months into office, the Clinton Administration has yet to publish a National Security Strategy. In an apparent bottom-up strategic development process, the NSS is being derived from the BUR. The draft NSS published after the BUR in September of 1993 focuses on the same dangers and opportunities as the BUR. The proposed NSS puts hope in a strong international economic system and promotion of democracy and human rights as the best guarantors of world stability. It underscores a US commitment to fight two MRCs as well as support United Nations peace operations.

IV. BLAINEY’S CONCLUSIONS ON THE CAUSES OF WAR

In his work, The Causes of War, Geoffrey Blainey contends "wars usually end when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength."[35] Blainey asserts the Soviet Union and the United States never fought World War III because they agreed on their relative distribution of power and on the costs such a war would entail. This measurement of power is critical. "War itself is a dispute about measurement; peace ... marks a rough agreement about measurement."[36] Blainey identifies seven factors which influence a nation’s assessment of its strength relative to other nations. If the factors combine to convince a nation it is more powerful than its rivals, and its rivals are equally convinced they are more powerful, than the potential for war is high. Blainey’s seven factors provide a
useful methodology for analysis of the BUR results to determine
the potential for other nations to risk war with the United
States because of a disagreement over our relative strengths.

As he develops his theory, Blainey examines several
popular theories concerning war and peace. Some of these popular
theories are incorporated into the BUR's underlying assumptions.
Blainey's insights concerning short wars, the Manchester Doctrine
and democracy are useful for examining the validity of the BUR's
underlying assumptions.

A. THE SEVEN FACTORS

Blainey's "abacus of international power" is based on
relative perceptions of these seven factors:

1. Military strength and the ability to efficiently apply
it in the chosen theater.

2. Predictions of how outside nations will behave in the
event of war.

3. Perceptions of friendly and enemy internal unity.

4. Memory or forgetfulness of the realities and
sufferings of war.

5. Perceptions of prosperity and of the economic ability
to sustain the kind of war envisioned.

6. Nationalism and ideology.

7. The personality and mental qualities of the leaders
who decide for war or peace.

No one factor is more important than another. It is their
combination that is key. The nation state determines its
relative strength based on how it perceives and combines these
factors. It is important to remember non-Western nations may
weight the power derived from their ideologies as more important.
than the quantifiable measures of power traditionally used by Western nations.

B. POPULAR THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE

Blainey examines over twenty different popular theories concerning the causes of war and peace. His analysis of three of these theories is relevant to this examination of the BUR. Remember, the BUR assumes future wars will be limited and we will win them with our overwhelming military might, technological superiority and our quick, decisive victory doctrine.

Both the proposed NSS and the BUR cite economic strength as the key to long term national security, and argue international prosperity will bind nations together and decrease the likelihood of war. The proposed NSS and BUR advocate support for emerging democratic states in the belief more democracy means less conflict and lower potential for war. While his book predates the BUR, Blainey’s analysis reveals flaws with each of these beliefs, thus invalidating some of the BUR’s most important assumptions.

Limited War and Quick, Decisive Victory

While wars have generally shortened in the last 300 years, there is no discernible formula for predicting their duration. "Most predictions are simply projections of recent experience. they are assertions that history will repeat itself," contends Blainey.[37] In wars between major powers, optimism and confidence often fostered the belief that wars would be quick and decisive. Prior to the First World War, all of European powers
believed increases in the volume and lethality of fires
would result in a short conflict. Instead, these technological
advances resulted in stalemate and unprecedented destruction.

In wars against third world countries, major powers often
found themselves unable to apply their military superiority in
the local conditions. America's nuclear arsenal was irrelevant
in Korea; and, in Vietnam, guerilla warfare was difficult to
combat with air power. Blainey points out feelings of
cultural superiority hinder major powers in these types of
conflicts. Anything short of total victory is nationally
humiliating. Blainey concludes one cannot predict a
war's duration with any certainty and four factors
typically lengthen conflicts. These are: one, multiple fronts;
two, unexpected conditions which equalize the sides; three,
cultural and ideological differences make similar peace aims
incompatible; four, the conflict is insulated from outside
interference.[38]

America's future conflicts could certainly feature some of
these characteristics. Restrictive terrain and weather could
degrad the effectiveness of our air power and severely degrade
this important advantage. Poor theater infrastructure would
prevent our armored systems from getting to the battlefield and
disrupt our ability to achieve quick, decisive victory. A highly
dedicated opponent who chooses to wage protracted guerilla war
will present challenges to our doctrine. All of these conditions
are present in Bosnia today. Thus, protracted war is not the
anomaly that HASC/BUR studies would have us believe. The danger of protracted war is real and it has significant implications for our force structure and budget.

THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE

The US seeks to move its economic interaction towards new modes of cooperation rather than to an intensification of fundamental rivalries among major powers....Our influence will increasingly be defined by our competitiveness in the international marketplace, [rather] than by the predominance of our military capabilities.[39]


This assumption which underlies the proposed NSS and the BUR closely resembles a false theory of peace that Blainey calls the Manchester Doctrine. This doctrine gained popularity in mid-nineteenth century Europe during the long period of peace following Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo. Its adherents believed that was an international marketplace. The free flow of goods and ideas between nations would curb national prejudices, forge new respect between peoples and guarantee long and unbroken periods of peace. Contemporary believers in this credo might add that international political institutions like the United Nations, international economic linkages such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and stock exchanges, and modern information systems so closely link the world that misunderstandings will become increasingly unlikely.

Blainey points out historically, the free flow of goods and ideas is more often a result of peace, rather than a cause of peace. Furthermore, nations which tend to promote this theory are those least threatened with foreign invasion, for example, 18th century Britain and 20th century America. Blainey’s analysis of peaceful periods in history reveals strong
military forces were maintained by those nations at peace in spite of their extensive web of trade relationships. A study of twelve international wars between 1850 and 1914 revealed wars were most likely to occur when an economic recovery was well underway. Often the warring nations had tasted some prosperity and were quick to confront any perceived obstacle to continued growth.\textsuperscript{40}

America is currently undergoing an economic recovery and is exerting a significant diplomatic effort in order to gain access to markets in Europe, Japan, China and other parts of the world. Many of these nations restrict the free flow of American goods into their markets. Foreign obstacles to domestic economic recovery, whether real or perceived, have been a contributing factor to past wars and could be so for America in the future. Thus, a national policy of peaceful economic engagement does not inherently reduce the potential for war. Indeed, by raising national expectations of prosperity, such a policy could actually contribute to increased domestic frustration resulting in calls for retaliation against the competitor nation.

The proposed NSS implies that as economic power increases, it will predominate over military power as a means of influence. Blainey sees no such dynamic. The mere existence of a strong US economy will not dissuade adversaries from acting against our interests. Strong economies can better support strong armed forces, which in turn are very effective deterrents to miscalculation and war initiation by potential enemies. Blainey’s analysis shows economically strong nations with
strong military forces and favorable geographic position have best defended their interests throughout history.

**DEMOCRACY GUARANTEES STABILITY**

A broad coalition of democratic states provides us with our best assurance of long term international stability. --Draft US National Security Strategy, September 1993[41]

Again, Blainey's analysis leads to a different conclusion than our proposed NSS. The causes of peace are much more complex than merely sharing a common form of government. He points out the popularity of a democracy among Anglo-Saxons has had as much to do with the military security provided by oceans as with the inherent qualities of democracy. When Britain faced invasion, she often suspended her democratic procedures in favor of more efficient wartime practices. Blainey points out democratic nations rely as much on threats and force as do autocratic nations. Ultimately, it has been the favorable geographic position and military strength of Britain and the United States that has guaranteed the survival of their democratic forms of government, rather than the inherent qualities of democracy.

To sell democracy as the best form of government because it has worked in America and western Europe will undoubtedly alienate nations with other forms of government. The conditions for the success of western-style democracy may not exist elsewhere due to the cultural differences described by Huntington. The People's Republic of China is modernizing and expanding its interaction with the rest of the world in spite of its non-democratic government. African cultures that recognize
the leadership role of clan or tribal elders might view democracy as a threat to their traditional and effective means of self-government. Muslim nations that incorporate religious values into their governmental systems might criticize democracy because of its secular nature. Thus, a stated national interest of propagating democracy may actually increase, rather than decrease, the potential for conflict and war in the next century.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE BUR

Factor One: Military Strength and Applying it in the Theater of War

Blainey’s first factor involves two separate issues: US military strength and our ability to project it to the appropriate area of the world. Most states would agree that the US armed forces are the most technologically advanced, lethal and well trained in the world. But potential enemies will reasonably question our ability to get sufficient forces to the fight if we are already involved in another conflict. Despite the BUR strategy statement that the US will be able to "deal" with two major regional contingencies (MRC) near simultaneously, the numbers do not add up.

During their 1 September 1993 BUR briefing, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Colin Powell discussed the force structure that is to accomplish this two MRC strategy. GEN Powell stated that eight active duty Army divisions, six reserve component Army divisions, eight carrier battle groups, the entire Marine Corps and a reduced air force would provide sufficient force for one major...
regional contingency and "a little extra." This leaves two active Army divisions, three carrier battle groups and some air wings to "deal" with the second MRC until the US resolves the first MRC.[42]

The military Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the regional unified commands confirmed the inadequacy of the BUR force structure during hearings before Congress in February of 1994. "Forget fighting two major regional wars at once...is the message from the [CINCs]."[43] Shortages of strategic lift, specialized weapons and munitions, and certain kinds of troops were all sited by the CINCs in their testimony.

Both the service secretaries and service chiefs have expressed concerns about the size of the force structure. Army Secretary Togo West Jr. recently outlined the Army's 1993 support for operations other than war which involved over 20,000 soldiers in Somalia, Croatia, the Sinai, Macedonia and Northern Iraq. Army troops also assisted state and local governments with flooding in the midwest, earthquakes in California and heavy winter snow and ice removal. Forces involved in these operations may not be training for their wartime missions and are not readily available for deployment to a conflict.

General Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, stated his service lacks sufficient precision bombers and strategic transport to handle two wars at once. The Marine Corps has 11 Amphibious Ready Groups, one fewer than required by the unified commands. The Navy has no carriers assigned to the Persian Gulf and limited coverage in the Mediterranean Sea.
Essentially, the services have been cut to the bone; and their sufficiency to execute the national strategy is being called into question by the very men who will have to execute that strategy.[44]

The response to this criticism resulted in a declaring of a "win-hold-win" strategy backed by a force structure strategic lift and force enhancements making it a "win-win" capable force.[45] These force enhancements include pre-positioned equipment, additional carrier airpower and precision guided munitions. However, those supporting the BUR conceded "in the short term, you can't get more lift... and we have problems with one of the key elements of this lift... the C-17." Since the BUR briefing, DOD has further reduced the programmed number of C-17 aircraft from 100 to 40. While DOD plans to build twenty additional fast sealift ships, these are years from completion.

The CINC's were more direct in their assessment. "Strategic lift in this country is broken right now," asserted Marine Corps General Joseph P. Hoar, Central Command Commander. General Gary Luck, the CINC of U.S. forces in Korea, asserted that the U.S. would have difficulty delivering troops and equipment to Korea quickly enough if already involved in another regional conflict. The CINC of U.S. European Command, General George Joulwan, emphasized that troop reductions in Europe increased his command's dependence on strategic lift in the event of war.[46]

In March 15, 1994 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, all of the service chiefs emphasized the criticality
and current inadequacy of strategic lift. Admiral Frank B. Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations said sealift would have to be contracted because his service lacks sufficient lift for two MRCs. General Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said the airlift is even more tenuous than the sealift fleet. The C-141 Starlifter fleet is near retirement and the C-17 over budget and behind schedule.[47] The bottom line is the BUR requires the nation to assume strategic risk, hoping that any two MRCs will be sufficiently separated in time to permit the shift of decisive combat power from one conflict to the other.[48]

Potential enemies read these reports and know these US vulnerabilities. These enemies may calculate they can achieve their ends against the smaller MRC #2 force before the US can shift decisive combat power from MRC #1. They may calculate existing US commitments to OOTW will sufficiently reduce our MRC# 1 force to give them an opportunity for victory. OOTW commitments might preclude the US from sending anything but a token force to MRC# 2. Worse still, these potential enemies could form coalitions to synchronize their actions in order to force the United States into a simultaneous two MRC situation.

The People’s Republic of China and North Korea already violate weapons proliferation agreements in selling restricted arms to Iran and other countries. It is not unreasonable to assume the mutually beneficial Confucian-Islamic military trade relationship might provide the foundation for synchronized military actions against US interests in the future. Thus, despite the apparent military superiority of the United States, a
potential enemy or coalition of enemies could calculate they have sufficient combat power to prevail in a regional conflict or two synchronized regional conflicts against US military forces.

**Factor Two: Behavior of Outside Nations**

Miscalculations over Blainey's second condition could result from the lack of specificity in current US definitions of regional interests. While GEN Powell spoke of Southwest Asia and North Korea in the 1 September briefing, neither DOD nor the State Department has addressed how America will respond to regional wars in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe (excluding the former Yugoslavia), the Spratly Islands or between India and Pakistan. While this ambiguity allows the US maximum latitude in dealing with regional crises, it increases the potential for miscalculation by both sides.

**Factor Three: Perceptions of Internal Unity**

US and NATO inability to effectively deal with Serbian and Croatian aggression. United Nations disharmony over Somalia and UN inaction in Haiti will certainly increase the potential for miscalculation by potential aggressors as to Blainey's third issue: perceptions of internal unity. While the BUR does not specifically address UN, NATO or other combined operations, both the NSS and BUR articulate a policy of support for budding democracies, especially in the former Soviet Union and the developing world. Nevertheless, the lack of a National Security Strategy document signed by President Clinton, coupled with the ambiguity of the US position on regional conflicts could lead to miscalculation unless the US states its position early in a crisis.
Factor Four: The Realities of War

Assuming the US will only fight limited, regional conflicts that can be won with small high-tech forces, DOD is creating the expectation that the nation's conflicts will be short, decisive wars with few casualties. Indeed, both the BUR and the proposed NSS emphasize the goal of quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties. This expectation constitutes a vulnerability. If potential enemies can convince the US that conflict with them would be protracted, indecisive or result in high casualties, they could place the US at a willpower disadvantage before or during a conflict. The willingness of Mohammed Aideed's clan to suffer fifteen casualties for every one American they hit in Mogadishu on October 3rd 1993 enabled that First Wave entity to impose its will on the world's only superpower. On the heels of that action, Haitian military leaders only had to threaten "another Mogadishu" in the streets of Port au Prince in order to achieve their ends in a confrontation with US and UN peacekeeping forces.

The perception of such an advantage on an aggressor's part could lead to a miscalculation as to American resolve in a given scenario. Thus, the BUR, essentially a force structure decision, has implications not only for government policymakers but for public perceptions of the realities of war, as well.

Factor Five: Economic Ability to Wage War

On the surface, Blainey's fifth factor of economic ability to wage war has the least potential for miscalculation. The US military outspends its allies by a factor of seven and most third
world countries by a factor of thirty to fifty.[49] Even though the BUR knowingly takes the defense industrial base down significantly from Cold War levels, there is substantial consideration given to maintenance of selected defense industries and upgrades of existing systems to maintain technological superiority.

It is unlikely potential enemies will miscalculate our economic capacity to wage limited war. If conditions indicate the potential for a world war, the strategic position of the United States between two oceans and two smaller friendly nations bodes well for our ability to safely gear up the defense industrial base. Nevertheless, there is cause for concern in this area.

Precisely because of our current superiority, there have been numerous calls for deeper cuts in the defense budgets than the already severe ones the services are undergoing. The Clinton Administration seeks $104 billion in defense savings over the next five years to support its long range economic plan. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the current defense reductions will not achieve the desired savings. The CBO believes the two MRC strategy can still be supported with an even smaller force. Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Representative Ronald V. Dellums advocates further troop reductions to save an additional $23 billion. Numerous lawmakers disagree with Dellums. None of the Army’s current OOTW receive additional funding from Congress. Rather, they are all funded out of the existing Army budget.[50]
Factor Six: Nationalism and Ideology

It is important to note the BUR essentially ignores Blainey's sixth factor, namely, the moral domain of war. The conclusions of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" is that such differences not only are significant, but will become more pronounced in the future. Ideologies or religions that glorify death for their cause, such as the Somali warrior culture or martyrdom in an Islamic holy war, hardly lend themselves to quick, decisive defeat. On the contrary, these potential belligerents are capable of ideologically or culturally sustaining protracted struggles against their enemies. Saddam Hussein lost a big part of his Army, but he is still in power and has yet to comply with all of the provisions of the DESERT STORM cease fire.

While our limited war victory evicted him from Kuwait, he in effect is waging a protracted struggle that continues to cost American lives and resources. The BUR has defined away this part of the problem of war by not considering the requirements of protracted conflicts. The ideological, religious and nationalistic resiliency of our potential opponents may enable many of them to survive our quick, decisive victory focus. The BUR does not address the important issue posed by such scenarios, namely, what to do when quick, decisive victory doctrine fails to achieve the desired endstate.
Factor Seven: The Personality and Mental Qualities of the Leaders Who Decide For War or Peace

The BUR has no impact on the personality or mental qualities of the leaders who decide for war or peace. While it may shape a President’s perception of what the nation can or cannot do in a time of crisis, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his advisory role will provide the necessary military information for such decisions. Foreign leaders who are opportunistic and have interests counter to those of America may see the reduced military capability directed by the BUR as providing new opportunities.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

America faces difficult choices with respect to the 21st Century. Our political leaders apparently want to retain the power inherent in our military might, but are unwilling to pay for it. These leaders have four options:

1. Maintain a Superpower National Security Strategy and adequately resource it.

2. Maintain a Superpower National Security Strategy but do not adequately resource it. Essentially, assume increased strategic risk by bluffing the American public and the rest of the world.

3. Adopt an isolationist National Security Strategy, significantly reduce the military and devote those resources to domestic needs.

4. Adopt a National Security Strategy that incrementally reduces global commitments as it draws down military capability. Such a strategy must leverage other instruments of national power to replace influence lost by the reduction of military power.
The BUR falls in the second category. By maintaining a global NSS, but inadequately resourcing it, we are setting the conditions for strategic failure. The consequent loss of American prestige and referent power will be much more severe than the incremental loss we will knowingly accept under the fourth option. In this sense, the BUR represents a "muddle through" solution to the "imperial overstretch" described by Kennedy. The result is continued decline.

We need an NSS that clearly defines American interests now. The force structure and budgetary decisions before Congress can only be properly made in the context of a clearly defined national strategy. Without such a strategy and well defined defense endstate, the nation will have to live with the strategy, force structure and budget that emerge from the legislative process. While there are many important issues on the President's agenda, the responsibility for our national security strategy is clearly his and his alone. The BUR is not a national security strategy, it is essentially a force structure decision driven by budgetary considerations.

America must leverage its other less costly instruments of national power in protection of our vital interests abroad. If the nation can no longer afford a superpower military, than it must maximize the effectiveness of its other means of influence. This necessitates a more holistic approach to national security than that implied by the BUR. Interagency cooperation and synchronization must improve if we are to effectively protect our interests with fewer resources. Reviews of other governmental departments and agencies may reveal areas for enhanced efficiency.
and cooperation.

Any review of America's defense needs must use valid assumptions. One of the uses of theory is to provide a framework for predicting future events. DOD could draw on the substantial body of available theory to derive valid assumptions concerning the nature of war and peace in the 21st Century. The scholars quoted in this work: Blainey, Huntington, Keegan, Kennedy and the Tofflers, provide a solid point of departure for such an analysis. Realistic assumptions concerning budget authority are essential to prevent a repeat of the BUR fiscal miscalculations. A DOD and State Department regional review of expected coalition partners in the event of regional conflict will facilitate realistic assumptions concerning required force structure by region.

The methodology for a comprehensive review of future defense needs must be based on a sound vision of the future, a realistic set of assumptions and on a coherent NSS that clearly defines national interests. The methodology must consider all instruments of national power and projected budget authority. Finally, it must involve the national political leadership from the beginning, in order to prevent any further loss of time in resolving the future of the nation's strategy, force structure and budget.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This examination of the BUR identified flaws with the methodology and underlying assumptions of the BUR. These flaws, in turn, resulted in serious deficiencies in the results of this
important work. The BUR's point of departure for an examination of future defense needs was the demise of the Soviet Union, an event that is already three years old. However, rather than develop a comprehensive picture of the nature of war and peace in the 21st Century as a basis for force planning, the BUR assumes limited wars of the DESERT STORM variety are the model for future conflict. Contemporary scholars such as Samuel Huntington, John Keegan, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler disagree with this assumption. They point to a clash of civilizations in the next century and an increased potential for violent cultural conflict. Such conflicts tend to be protracted and costly, not limited.

The BUR's assumptions concerning peace fail the test of history as provided by Geoffrey Blainey's exhaustive study of the causes of war since 1700. These assumptions are that the best guarantors of peace are a thriving web of free trading relationships and an international partnerships of democratic nations. Free trade is more often a result of peace, rather than a cause of peace. Democracy may not be the optimal form of government for all nations. As Blainey comments, free trade and democracy may have caused more international war than peace.

As for the results of the BUR, the quantitative analysis approach of the BUR does not adequately assess the numerous subjective factors that have lead to wars in the past. When we do analyze those factors using Blainey's seven point theoretical construct we find that despite America's preeminent position as the world's only superpower, the strategy, force structure and
budget of the BUR actually increase the potential for international miscalculation and war.

Secretary Aspin's BUR has unquestionably furthered the crucial debate on America's future national security needs. The BUR has kept Congressional attention focused on national security issues at a time of multiple competing priorities. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in methodology, assumptions and results limit the utility of the BUR as a blueprint for our future national strategy and force structure. It is time to put the BUR aside and develop a more realistic set of assumptions and methodology with which to decide our future strategy and force structure.
Appendix A: HASC Study Iraqi Equivalents Chart

Land, Sea and Air Strength of Major Regional Powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Nation</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th>Air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (pre-war)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/SW Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (1992)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Land ratios based on calculations of equivalent heavy divisions, specifically, inventories of tanks, APCs and artillery with slight modification based on quality of equipment. The current (1992) Iraq score is based on equipment destroyed in the Gulf War and reported reorganizations within the Iraqi forces.

Air scores are based on numbers of aircraft modified by quality of equipment. Naval scores are similarly based but are somewhat more subjective because of the variety of equipment and formations. Data on numbers and type of equipment from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992.
Appendix B: Comparison of HASC Threat Chart with BUR’s “New Dangers and New Opportunities”

HASC STUDY

Title: Situations for which Americans Might Want Military Forces in the 1990s

1. Countering Regional Aggressors
2. Combatting the spread of Nuclear and other Mass Terror Weapons
3. Fighting Terrorism
4. Restricting Drug Trafficking
5. Keeping the Peace
6. Assisting Civilians

BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

Title: New Dangers

1. Regional Dangers
2. Spread of NBC Weapons
3. Dangers to Democracy and Reform
4. Potential Failure to Build a Strong and Growing US Economy

Title: New Opportunities

1. Expand Security Partnerships
2. Improve Regional Deterrence
3. Implement Dramatic Nuclear Reductions
4. Protect US Security with Fewer Resources
Appendix C: Force Building Block Comparison: HASC and BUR

1. HASC Alternative Future Force Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Force A</th>
<th>Force B</th>
<th>Force C</th>
<th>Force D</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Divisions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARINE CORPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Divisions</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Reserve Divisions</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active Wings</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Wings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships (total)</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Ships</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SEALIFT</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Sealift Ships</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afloat Preposition</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ships</td>
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2. Bottom-Up Review Force Options for Major Regional Conflicts

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<th>STRATEGY:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Win 1 MRC</td>
<td>Win 2 MRC</td>
<td>MRCs</td>
<td>MRCs plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win 1 MRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hold 2d MRC</td>
<td>MRCs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY:</strong></td>
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<td>Active Divs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Divs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Enhanced Readiness Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11+1 (Res)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MARINE CORPS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Brigades</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve Fighter Wng</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</table>

Force Enhancements
ENDNOTES


[3] The concept of hybrid threats is developed in "Threats to U.S. Security", cited above. "High-Tech" forces possess modern, lethal weaponry and are well trained in its use. Hybrid threats possess some modern weapons, but are not uniformly equipped or trained. "Low-tech" forces are increasingly rare because of weapons proliferation. These are forces which possess neither modern systems nor are well trained.


[10] During DESERT SHIELD, sea deployment of the 24th ID(M) from Savannah, Georgia to Saudi Arabia using "fast sealift" required 23 days. The shallow harbor depths in Mogadishu, Somalia and Mombassa, Kenya were inadequate for Afloat Prepositioning ships during humanitarian operations in Somalia December 1992 and early 1993.

[11] Two U.S. Navy vessels suffered severe mine damage during DESERT STORM. The Navy has only seven modern Avenger-class minesweepers in its inventory, although 14 more are in production. The Navy's other 21 Aggressive-class minesweepers are being retired in FY 1994.

[12] This is explained in detail later in the monograph.


[15] Ibid. 47-49.

[16] Ibid. 49.


[22] Mr. Aspin acknowledges that these are purely quantitative assessments: "estimates do not reflect intangible contributors to force effectiveness as personnel quality or training, command and control, morale or military doctrine." Aspin, 11. However, even this caveat does not recognize critical factors such as the impact of the terrain, weather, time and distance from the United States. For example, the terrain and weather in Bosnia have severely degraded the effectiveness of NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb ground targets. This reality is not factored into Aspin’s purely quantitative model, resulting in skewed estimates of the effectiveness of various elements of American combat power.


[28] PROVIDE COMFORT was cited in the HASC studies as a model peace operation, however, it did not acknowledge that the operation continues to cost American lives and dollars and has no end in sight.


[31] Preparing For The Twenty-First Century, 294.


[33] Ibid. 108.


[36] Ibid. 122.

[37] Ibid. 217.

[38] Ibid. 197.


[40] Blainey, 28-32.

[41] NSS, 3-4.


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"Threat of War Looms in Europe", *Army Times*, 14 MAR 94.


