VISION TO PRACTICE: THE TRANSLATION
OF FROM THE SEA INTO JOINT DOCTRINE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Craig A. Tucker, Major, USMC
B.S., University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1994

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Vision to Practice: The Transition of *From the Sea* Into Joint Doctrine

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This study analyzes the ability of the Naval Service to translate the vision articulated in *From the Sea* into doctrine that synchronizes Naval Service capabilities with the Joint Operational Functions of maneuver and command and control. *From the Sea* is analyzed within the context of previous naval strategies. The Joint Operational Functions are analyzed as emerging Joint Doctrine. *From the Sea* commits the Naval Service to full participation in the Joint arena and changes the focus of the Naval Service from sea control to power projection.

This study concludes that this commitment and new focus will require the Naval Service to change its understanding of maneuver and reevaluate its command structure. The author recommends that the organization and command of Naval Task Forces be structured to according to the mission assigned and that Naval Officers receive comprehensive training on the requirements of land maneuver.

*From the Sea*, Naval Expeditionary Task Force, Naval Strategy, The Maritime Strategy, Naval Service Command and Control, Joint Operational Functions, Joint Maneuver
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

VISION TO PRACTICE: THE TRANSLATION OF FROM THE SEA INTO JOINT DOCTRINE by Major Craig Tucker, USMC, 117 pages.

This study analyzes the ability of the Naval Service to translate the vision articulated in From The Sea into doctrine that synchronizes Naval Service capabilities with the Joint Operational Functions of maneuver and command and control. From The Sea is analyzed within the context of previous naval strategies. The Joint Operational Functions are analyzed as emerging Joint Doctrine. From The Sea commits the Naval Service to full participation in the Joint arena and changes the focus of the Naval Service from sea control to power projection.

This study concludes that this commitment and new focus will require the Naval Service to change its understanding of maneuver and reevaluate its command structure. The author recommends that the organization and command of Naval Task Forces be structured according to the mission assigned and that Naval Officers receive comprehensive training on the requirements of land maneuver.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

Topic

In 1992, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps published a joint white paper titled *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*. The white paper articulated a vision to guide the Naval Service out of the Cold War and into a multipolar world of diverse, regional threats. *From the Sea* provides a new direction for the Naval Service, a direction designed to provide "Naval Expeditionary Forces - Shaped for Joint Operations - Operating Forward from the Sea - Tailored for National Needs." Using this direction as an outline, it then proceeds to alter dramatically the focus and purpose of the Naval Service, stating in the introductory paragraph that this new direction "represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea." This reorientation is reinforced in the paper’s conclusion with the statement that "Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea." This shift of emphasis has rocked the foundations of the Naval Services--not necessarily in a
negative way--but in a manner that requires a reorientation of mindset, naval tradition, budget, system capabilities, training, and education. The United States Navy has set about establishing a doctrine. The naval amphibians have assumed the same importance as the aircraft carrier. Command and Control Systems aboard flagships are being reconfigured to accommodate Joint Task Force Commanders. The U.S. Navy is responding to the intermediate level education requirements established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Senior Naval Officers emphatically and enthusiastically support joint doctrine and joint operations.

In the middle of this century Henry Stimson, in recalling his wartime service as Secretary of War, referred to

the peculiar psychology of the Navy Department which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan His prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church.  

The Goldwater-Nichols Act started the reformation, nailed the theses on the door. The U.S. Naval Service has agreed to read them and attempt to change.

Parallel to this process is the ongoing development of Joint Doctrine, a doctrine developed from a vision established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. The cornerstone of that vision is the idea that all branches of
the Armed Forces:

fight as a team.... Joint Force commanders choose the capabilities they need from air, land, sea, space, and special operations...orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on the synergistic effect of joint forces.  

Two visions are driving the development of two doctrines. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the doctrinal results will be compatible. The search for that answer will consider two small, yet vital, aspects of this very large issue: will the visions of *From the Sea* and Joint Pub 1 provide the Joint Commander the maneuver capability necessary to gain positional advantage over an adversary and the control necessary to command that maneuver. The discussion will take place at the very bottom of the visionary pyramid: campaign planning and execution. Specifically, this thesis will attempt to determine if the vision articulated in *From the Sea* can be translated into operations that synchronize Naval Service capability with the joint operational functions of maneuver and command and control.

This topic reflects the ongoing search within the military for a defining role in the post cold-war era. The ideas are easy to articulate. Once articulated, those ideas are easy to discuss at a theoretical level. The revolutionary ideas postulated in *From the Sea* have generated volumes of discussion; discussion centered almost exclusively on attempting to answer the question "what does
it mean?" While that question is certainly important and will be analyzed in some detail, the search for that particular philosophical truth at some point becomes meaningless. Eventually, there is a need to stop asking what it means and decide to make it mean something. This thesis will contribute to that process: a piece of the vision in *From the Sea* translated from theory to principles, with the shape and substance necessary for doctrine.

**Research Questions**

**Primary Question**

Can the vision articulated in *From the Sea* be translated into operations that synchronize Naval Service capabilities with the Joint Operational Functions of maneuver and command and control?

**Subordinate Questions**

1. What is the vision in *From the Sea*?
   a. What is the Naval Service trying to achieve?
   b. How does *From the Sea* differ from previous maritime strategies?

2. What are the joint operational functions?
   a. What is the purpose of the operational functions?
   b. What is the joint doctrinal definition?
   c. Do the Naval Services use similar concepts?

3. What Naval Service capabilities can be applied to
the operational functions?

a. What are the United States Navy capabilities for maneuver and command and control?

b. What are the United States Marine Corps capabilities for maneuver and command and control?

4. What problem areas and issues must be addressed by the Naval Services to facilitate integration of capabilities into the operational functions?

a. What problems must be overcome?

b. What are some solutions to those problems?

c. Have problems been identified and what steps are being taken to correct those problems?

Assumptions

Two assumptions are germane to this study.

The first assumption is that *From the Sea* is still relevant. The document was written during the administration of President Bush as a basis for that administration’s base-force concept. The base-force concept has since been replaced by the Secretary of Defense’s bottom-up review. That study, as well as the soon to be released National Security Strategy written by the Clinton administration, could impact the focus of *From the Sea*. However, through the course of my recent research, I have not uncovered any statements or intelligent speculation that
would lead me to believe *From the Sea* will be negated.

The second assumption is that *From the Sea* is a political and budgetary document developed to provide a framework for Naval Service acquisition and political focus. However, to paraphrase Harry Summers, while that is true, it is also, for my purposes, irrelevant. Theory, despite the circumstances of its birth, must still be nurtured into doctrine.

Definitions

The following definitions provide a common reference for words and terms that will appear frequently throughout the thesis. A secondary purpose is to underscore the fundamental differences in the defining of terms within the Naval Service and between the Naval Service and Joint Doctrine. Terms commonly referred to by acronyms will be noted and the acronyms used in succeeding references.

**Amphibious Operation.** An attack, launched from sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore.

**Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).** A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be large enough to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land
Amphibious Striking Forces. As defined by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Forces capable of projecting military power from the sea upon adjacent land areas in order to initiate and/or conduct operations there in the face of the enemy. This term is not defined or in common usage in the Naval Service. See Naval Expeditionary Forces.

Amphibious Task Force (ATF). As defined by the U.S. Navy: the task organization formed for the purpose of conducting an amphibious operation. The amphibious task force always includes Navy forces and a landing force, with their organic aviation, and may include Air Force forces when appropriate. JCS terms this an amphibious force: a naval and landing force, together with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

Battle Group. A standing naval task group consisting of a carrier, surface combatants, and submarines as assigned in direct support, operating in mutual support with the task of destroying hostile sea and air forces in the groups' assigned area of responsibility and striking at targets or projecting power onto a hostile shore.

Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and Control functions are an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities and procedures used by a commander to control forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Commander Landing Force (CLF).} As defined by the U.S. Navy: the officer designated in the initiating directive to command the landing force.\textsuperscript{13} JCS amplifies CLF responsibilities as including responsibility for conduct of operations ashore, for security of all personnel and installations located within the Area of Operations ashore, and includes operational control of all forces, including airborne and/or air assault forces operating ashore within the landing area. CLF responsibilities are subject to the overall authority of the Commander Amphibious Task Force.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).} As defined by the U.S. Navy, the officer designated in the initiating directive as the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force.\textsuperscript{15} JCS amplifies CATF responsibilities as the Commander exercising operational authority over all forces operating in or transiting the AOA. CATF is also responsible for coordinating planning for an amphibious operation and is responsible for preparation of the overall plan. However, CATF and CLF are coequals in planning matters and decisions. Differences between CATF and CLF that occur during planning are resolved by the Commander who issued the initiating directive.\textsuperscript{16} CATF will be a U.S. Navy officer.\textsuperscript{17}
Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). As defined by the U.S. Navy, a concept of warfare management delegating specific warfare areas to warfare commanders who report to the overall battle group commander.  

The CWC is designated by the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of a Naval Operating Force. The CWC then establishes subordinate functional warfare commanders as required to meet an existing threat. The most commonly employed are the antiair warfare, antisurface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare commanders. Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations (Initial Draft) refers to the CWC concept as a defensive function.  

The U.S. Navy refines that concept as a means for the OTC to counter threats to his force and maintain tactical sea control.

Enabling Force. As defined by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a force that will "allow the National Command Authority to initially respond to a crisis with credible capabilities while our heavier contingency forces are deployed and made ready for deployment."

Expeditionary. As defined in From the Sea, "a mindset, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly." This definition is further explained by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as meaning "service overseas - at sea or in the field. It also reflects an inherent state of mind: to be constantly prepared for immediate deployment overseas for
Initiating Directive. An order given to CATF to conduct an amphibious operation. The initiating directive is issued by the combatant commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. The initiating directive establishes the ATF, assigns a mission, provides forces, defines the AOA, designates CATF and CLF, provides special instructions on command relationships, and contains instructions governing the termination of the operation and the disposition of command relationship once the operation is terminated.

Joint Operational Functions. Functions that provide the Joint Force Commander with an efficient structure and means to integrate and synchronize forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose. The Operational Functions are maneuver, command and control, intelligence, firepower, protection, and logistics. Until August 1993, the Operational Functions were referred to as the Theater Operating Systems.

Littoral. As defined in From the Sea the near land areas of the world which generally comprise two segments of battlespace: seaward, the area from open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore; and landward, the area inland from the shore which can be
controlled directly from the sea.\textsuperscript{26}

**Maneuver.** Defined by JCS: "A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. Employment of forces on the battlefield, in combination with fire, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy."\textsuperscript{27} As an Operational Function: "the disposition of the joint force to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing the operational advantages before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results."\textsuperscript{28} As defined by the United States Marine Corps: "... the employment of forces to secure an advantage or leverage - over the enemy.... By operational maneuver we seek to gain an advantage which bears directly on the outcome of the campaign as a whole...."\textsuperscript{29} The U.S. Navy does not define maneuver in its dictionary of official terminology.

**Maritime Component Commander (MCC).** The U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps Officer designated by the Combatant Commander as the functional component commander for all afloat Naval Service assets. This is a new term and is meant to fulfill the maritime gap left when a Combatant Commander organizes his subordinates under functional commands. Maritime equivalent of the Land Component, Air Component, and Special Operations Component Commanders.\textsuperscript{30}

**Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF).** This term
originated with "expeditionary" as an adjective to describe Naval Forces "swift to respond, on short notice, to crises in distant lands..., structured to build power from the sea..., able to sustain support for long-term operations..., [and] unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval." General Carl Mundy describes the forces able to respond to those missions as "Naval expeditionary forces that include the Sixth and Seventh Fleets [and] expeditionary Marine forces composed of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces." The term has now evolved into a noun used as the term to describe a Battle Group combined with an Amphibious Task Force operating in concert under a common command structure.

**Officer in Tactical Command (OTC).** As defined by JCS, in maritime usage, the senior officer present eligible to assume command, or the officer to whom he has delegated tactical command. The U.S. Navy definition directly contradicts portions of the JCS definition by stating that the "OTC has overall responsibility for successfully accomplishing the mission of his force. His offensive mission objectives...are of overriding importance and focus and may not be delegated; however, responsibility for certain defensive aspects of his operations may be."

**Operational Level of War.** The level of war at which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within one area.
of operations or a theater. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.35 The U.S. Marine Corps definition adds that the "operational level [of war] includes deciding when, where, and under what conditions to engage the enemy in battle - and when, where, and under what conditions to refuse battle."36 Current U.S. Navy official terminology does not address the Operational Level of War.

**Strategic Level of War.** As defined by JCS, the level of war at which a nation...determines national security objectives and develops and uses national resources and force or the threat of force to accomplish those objectives.37 The U.S. Marine Corps definition is substantially the same, adding only that "strategy can be thought of as the art of winning wars."38 The U.S. Navy definition is also similar to the JCS definition. The U.S. Navy also defines a Naval Strategy that directly impacts National Security and National Interests.39 See also the discussion on Naval Strategy in Chapter II.

**Tactical Level of War.** As defined by JCS and the U.S. Marine Corps: "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces."40
As defined by the U.S. Navy: "Operations conducted by Naval units for self protection or in local defense of supported forces engaged in other operations." 41

Limitations

The translation of From the Sea into doctrine and the field experimentation of the Functional Operating Systems are new ideas and concepts that continue to evolve. The spirited discussion of these ideas is a nearly continuous topic in professional and scholarly journals. In December, the author will stop research and write, realizing that new and maybe significant information will be developed after the research cutoff date.

Delimitations

This thesis will be limited to operational issues and capabilities only; discussing tactics and strategy only when necessary for clarification or explanation. Discussion of capabilities will not be overly technical. The author will discuss synchronization and control of those capabilities in broad terms.

This thesis will also not discuss Naval Service logistics or the impact of From The Sea on combined warfare. Both issues impact command and control and maneuver. However, thorough discussion of both topics would require this thesis to exceed page length limitations.
Notes


2. From the Sea (1992), 2.


7. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 27.


10. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 27.

11. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 49.


22. From the Sea (1992), 3.

23. Mundy, "Expeditionary Forces," 44.


27. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 218.


32. NWP 10-1 (1985), 3-1.

33. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 264.


35. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 349.


38. JCS Pub 1-02 (1989), 362.


41. *Joint Pub 3-56* (1992), 44.
CHAPTER II
THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The concepts discussed in this thesis, particularly From the Sea and the ongoing evolution of Joint Doctrine, are subjects of energetic debate throughout the military. The parameters of the debate are defined in Field Manuals, Joint Publications, White Papers, official public affairs releases, Joint and Services field exercises and commentary and explanations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The debate itself is waged largely through commentary and articles in professional journals and lessons learned data compiled as a result of the field exercises. This chapter explores the depth of that debate in order to provide a framework for further analysis of the subordinate questions listed in Chapter I.

From the Sea

The base document for this thesis is the White Paper titled From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century. From the Sea was written as a joint effort between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps and was signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations on 29 September 1992. My discussion of the literature written on the white paper will begin with a review of the document, discuss Naval Strategy prior to September 1992, transition to commentary by members of the working group that developed "From the Sea" and then to commentary from General Carl Mundy, Admiral Frank Kelso, and conclude with a refutation of the premise of From the Sea written by Admiral Horacio Rivero.

From the Sea

From the Sea is the keystone document for a Naval Service anticipating a requirement to fundamentally and dramatically redefine its purpose. The lead paragraph identifies the origins of this new definition as a recognition in the Naval Service that

The world has changed dramatically in the last two years, and America’s national security policy has also changed. As a result, the priorities of the Navy and the Marine Corps have shifted, leading to this broad assessment of the future direction of our maritime forces.1

The results of this "broad assessment" represent a fundamental reorientation of strategy, culture, and priorities. This reorientation focuses on four points: one, the Naval Service will be full and enthusiastic members of the joint team; two, command of the seas is assumed; three, because the U.S. commands the sea and because of some unique capabilities, the Naval Service can now concentrate
on the projection of power ashore; and four, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Amphibious Forces of the U.S. Navy are equal partners with the submariners, pilots, and surface warriors in the development of naval strategy, doctrine, and budgets.

The fourth point is underscored by the historic fact that *From the Sea* represents a strategy for change developed in a joint effort between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. The first point is reinforced in *From the Sea* by emphasizing the unique contributions brought to the joint arena by a Naval Service capable of providing powerful yet unobtrusive presence; strategic deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuous on-scene crisis response; project power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale warfighting scenarios emerge.

These capabilities, unique to the Naval Services, are particularly important as forward based units of the Army and Air Force are withdrawn to the United States while the requirement for crisis response and forward presence remain vital elements of the National Security Strategy.

The second point provides the focus for much of the debate on the vision of *From the Sea*. In the introduction to the white paper, the Naval Service states flatly that "the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas." This control then allows the Naval Services to "deemphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas [and] allows us to resize our Naval Forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment."
area of the "littoral" or coastlines of the earth."4

The first requirement and a basic premise of From the Sea is the need to "structure a fundamentally different naval force." This restructured naval force will orient on a Naval strategic direction that represents a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea. The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and can provide the initial "enabling" capability for joint operations in conflict -- as well as continued participation in any sustained effort.

From the Sea proceeds to then define specific qualities of each element of the new direction. These elements, printed in bold capitals in the original text, have developed into a that articulates the purpose of From the Sea: Naval Expeditionary Forces--Shaped for Joint Operations--Operating Forward From the Sea--Tailored for National Needs. "Naval Expeditionary Forces" implies a "mind-set, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly."7 "Shaped for Joint Operations" focuses on the ability of the Naval Service to provide a highly sustainable force that can provide command and control capability for a Joint Task Force, act as an enabling force, and provide sealift for heavy joint forces." "Operating Forward, From the Sea" focuses on the capability of the Naval Service to provide forward presence as the United States withdraws from overseas bases, to demonstrate commitment to United States allies, to promote
American interests overseas, and to project United States combat power ashore if necessary. "Tailored for National Needs" speaks directly to the Naval Service shift of focus from an "Open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus . . . ."10 As a result of this shift of focus, and because of the underlying assumption that the United States controls the seas, the naval assets normally tasked with sea control are now available to the Combatant Commander "for tasking in the full range of joint operations with the other services."11

The means to achieve the "new direction" are defined as the four key operational capabilities: Command, Control and Surveillance; Battlespace Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment.12 Two of these: Battlespace Dominance and Power Projection, relate directly to this thesis.

Battlespace dominance is the ability to command and to control "the sea, air, and land environments where we will conduct our operations."13 This dominance involves the ability to bring decisive power to bear against an enemy in a three dimensional space that "expands, contracts, and has limits."14 From the Sea emphasizes that "battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare."15 This concept is of critical importance to this study because it emphasizes command, control, and synchronization of combat power in a non-linear environment.
Power projection as described in *From the Sea* is the ability to take advantage of battlespace dominance to "mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of their [the commander's] choosing."  

The remainder of *From the Sea* discusses the implementation of specific procedures to translate the vision in *From the Sea* into reality. This listing of tasks focuses on two key areas: the integration of open ocean assets into littoral, expeditionary, warfighting; and the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command at Norfolk, Virginia, a command whose historic charter is the integration of Naval Forces into joint operations and the building of a doctrine for expeditionary warfare.  

*Naval Strategy Prior to 1992*

The most striking aspect of discussing Naval Strategy is the fact that one exists. Of all the services, the U.S. Navy is the only one who ascribes to her own strategy. Prior to October 1993, the U.S. Navy codified its strategy in an official publication entitled *NWPl-Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*. This publication has been cancelled to be replaced by a series of Navy Warfare Doctrine publications. Yet, in order to determine where the Naval Service is headed, one must first determine where she has been. To accomplish that, it is necessary to discuss these strategic concepts. This discussion must start with a review of the
work of Admiral A.T. Mahan.

Naval Officers will argue strenuously that Mahan is not the "prophet" of the U.S. Navy. One cannot deny, however, that Mahan had tremendous impact on the "concept" of a Naval Strategy. Mahan's basic premise was that the greatness of a nation is determined by her ability to control and influence commerce on the high seas. This greatness is achieved by the ability of a nation to create "sea power." Sea power is influenced by principles, or elements, that are unchanging "remaining the same, in cause and effect from age to age." Mahan uses history to illustrate the permanence of his theory and states that "Naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war the sea power of a country." Mahan made up the term sea power and provided it with various meanings. Philip A. Crowl, in his essay "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," suggests that two principal meanings emerge: (1) command of the sea through naval superiority; and (2) the combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produce national wealth and greatness.

We see the need for a naval strategy emerging. The path to national greatness is sea power. Sea power is provided by a Navy whose role is necessary in peace and war. The strength of that Navy directly impacts the strength of the nation.

navies exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at
depriving their enemy of that great resource, nor is it easy to conceive what broad military use they can subserve that at all compares with the protection and destruction of trade.\textsuperscript{21}

To deprive the enemy of commerce, a navy must control the sea lines of communication. Mahan invented this term as the maritime equivalent of Jomini's lines of operations. Crowl states that Mahan defined communications as a "general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body is kept in living connection with the national power."...[or] "communication means essentially...those necessary supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their hulls beyond a reasonable amount."\textsuperscript{22}

Used either way, lines of communication are critical to the development of sea power. Crowl goes on to state that Mahan saw little utility in the use of naval forces against the land other than to secure naval bases necessary to the extension of sea lines of communication and that Mahan, in his historical studies, "treated the Royal Navy as an autonomous agent acting independently...and not much concerned with, or affected by, the outcome of land battles."\textsuperscript{23}

The relationship between the writings of Mahan and MWP-1 is best illustrated with excerpts from Chapter 3 entitled, "U.S. Navy Support of the National Military Strategy." The mission of the U.S. Navy:

\begin{quote}

\textit{to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests; in effect, to assure continued maritime superiority for the United States.}\textsuperscript{24}

\end{quote}

The primary tasks of the U.S. Navy:
to organize, train and equip Navy forces...to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces, and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication....

The U.S. Navy’s interpretation of those tasks:

Briefly, the navy’s two basic functions are sea control and power projection. The ability to perform these functions is a requirement if the U.S. is to utilize the seas to support its national policies....

U.S. Navy definition of sea control:

Sea control is the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and connotes control of designated sea areas and the associated airspace and underwater volume.

On the role of power projection as a subordinate element of sea control:

the projection of military power can be an absolute necessity to ensure control and continued safe use of the high seas and contiguous land areas essential to control of the seas.

Power projection as an independent function:

as an independent function, power projection is a means of supporting land or air campaigns utilizing capabilities designed for naval tasks.

On the relationship between sea control and power projection:

the capability to project power was developed in naval forces largely as one means of achieving or supporting sea control.

On the importance of sea lines of communication:

The success of a forward [national] military strategy depends upon the Navy’s ability to maintain the integrity of the sea lines of communication...

In 1986, the Department of the Navy published The Maritime Strategy. This document, articulated in response to the development of Soviet Naval capabilities to challenge
U.S. interests, explained the U.S. Navy's extant strategy - a strategy with broad contours reasonably well understood, but one which had not been submitted to the rigor inherent to codification. The result of that effort was the Maritime Strategy. The strategy, in tone and content, reflects a Naval Service secure in her strength and purpose. There exists a certain arrogance in temperament - defining the Maritime Strategy as the "maritime component of the National Military Strategy" declaring further that:

The Maritime Strategy is firmly set in the context of national strategy, emphasizing coalition warfare and the criticality of allies and demanding cooperation with our sister services.

Allies and Sister Services (other than the U.S. Marine Corps) are not again mentioned in this document. After acknowledging the warfighting roles inherent to the Specified and Unified Commands, this codified strategy concludes its introductory paragraphs with the declaration that:

The strategy has become a key element in shaping Navy programmatic decisions. It is of equal value as a vehicle for shaping and disseminating a professional consensus on warfighting where it matters - at sea.

The vehicle to implement this strategy is the 600 ship Navy. The sole enemy: the Soviet Union. The purpose: deterrence, crisis response, and--in the event of war--the destruction of the Soviet Fleet in that fleets' home bases, a power projection capability that will threaten the Soviet flanks if Western Europe is attacked, and the subsequent capability to prolong the conflict by establishing and
maintaining the sea lines of communication to sustain the land battle in Europe.\(^{36}\)

The articulation of the maritime strategy provoked much debate. With the hindsight available to an observer of this strategy in 1993, one is immediately struck by the unrelenting focus of the strategy on the Soviet Union. The debate is framed by arguments ranging from the nuclear strategy to the wisdom of diverting scarce funding to a 600 ship navy when the land forces of NATO are hopelessly outnumbered on the European Continent. Dr. Colin S. Gray, President of the National Institute for Public Policy and a British nuclear theorist, defends the need for a Maritime Strategy in a monograph entitled *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West*. The central argument of the monograph was the need for the United States to recognize that, as a nation, she was first and foremost a sea power. Strategic air and missile power...must responsibly be regarded as a counterdeterrent, not as a reliable equalizer for theater defense deficiencies. It is argued in these pages that a maritime emphasis in overall US national military strategy makes sense, whether or not one believes that NATO can hold....\(^{37}\)

Dr. Gray analysed the necessity of the maritime strategy through five propositions. First, maritime superiority was essential to deterrence "in that the credible promise of the U.S. exercise of sea control is a necessary precondition for a protracted armed conflict...."\(^{38}\) Second, maritime strategy was wedded to
the strength of land forces in Europe since defeat of those
land forces in a short war would negate the ability of
maritime forces to influence the central front. Third, if
NATO ground forces could remain in the field somewhere in
Western Europe, the instrument of NATO's military recovery
would be the capability of the U.S. Navy to maintain sea
lines of communication and exercise sea-based maneuver
against the Soviet Union's flank. Fourth, even if defeated
in Europe, the United States has to maintain sea lines of
communication and a power projection capability. Defeat in
Europe might not end the war. In dire circumstances, the
U.S. Navy would be required to assume the Nation's first
line of defense and terminate such a war on terms favorable
to the U.S. 3

Fifth, any debate over the maritime strategy
versus a continental strategy should not be fought
over the relative merit of land power or sea power in
U.S. national military strategy. The United States
cannot be a land power beyond North America unless she
is a seapower, and seapower has strategic meaning
insofar as it has influence on events on land. 4

Dr. Gray concludes that a debate between a continental
versus a maritime strategy will destroy strategic focus in a
era when strategic unity of purpose is essential to national
security:

Since strategic geography mandates that Soviet power
can be repelled or brought down only on land, but that
U.S. landpower can be rendered strategically effective
only if transported and sustained by sea...it should be
plain that the U.S. armed services require an inclusive
and non-service sectarian theory of war. 5

Dr. Gray believes that theory should be a maritime theory.
The United States is a maritime, not a continental power.

His final thoughts:

Superior seapower...is a prerequisite for the basic national security of an insular contemporary United States, as it was for the Britain of the Napoleonic era and well beyond. Then as now, however, success at sea needs to be married to competence on land. 42

Norman Friedman, a physicist who does naval analysis, in his book titled The US Maritime Strategy, continues the justification for the Maritime Strategy through a study of the historical uses of sea power, the relationship between sea power and national strategy, and the future of a maritime strategy. Friedman discusses the use of sea power and power projection as part of the Maritime Strategy:

Naval presence, the primary peacetime use of navies to influence events abroad, is effective to the extent that it carries the threat, more or less direct, of projecting power. In fact it is not always clear that power projection is distinct from sea control or sea denial, because one means of attaining sea control is to destroy the enemy's fleet in its bases or in its home waters. In that case, power projection and sea control might be considered two aspects of the same strategy. 43

Friedman called this integration of power projection and sea control the "current US position, sometimes described as a doctrine of maritime superiority."44 This "doctrine" has matured into the Maritime Strategy, a strategy defined by the establishment of sea control through early offensive action to destroy the Soviet Navy in port or home waters, followed by the release of naval forces from a sea control mission to a power projection and sealift mission. The strategy operates on the assumption that the US Naval
Service must be structured to accomplish both a sea control and power projection mission. The essence of The Maritime Strategy is:

sea control [which] can be seized by early offensive operations, after which the requirements of sea control will fall drastically. Thus, after the earliest stages of a war most of the navy (assuming it is properly configured) will become available for power projection. However, given the offensive approach to sea control, this portion of the overall force cannot be dispensed with...because exactly this force is required to seize and guarantee sea control in the first place.45

Friedman argued that naval power projection used in a tactical or strategic attack against the Soviet Union flank could have decisive impact on the outcome of a war in Europe. These attacks would divert Soviet forces and consequently diffuse Soviet strength at the point of main attack. He then extends his argument to encompass the continental versus maritime budget debate. The argument is made using three assumptions. First, because of the nuclear deterrent, a gradual increase in tensions was more likely than a massed attack. In these circumstances, the mobilization potential of the U.S., a potential realized because of U.S. sea power, would be more decisive in the outcome of a war than the strength of standing NATO ground and tactical air forces. Second, the massive urbanization of Western Europe would present difficult obstacles to any Soviet invasion. These obstacles would prevent a rapid Soviet victory; therefore, it is possible that the requirement to build up land forces in NATO is overstated
and the sacrifice of naval forces to increase land forces could be an over reaction. Third, in the event of major war in Europe, it was likely that a majority of ground based air forces would be destroyed on the ground or through Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) failures. If this happens, the "naval air arm might contribute a disproportionate fraction of total NATO tactical air power," provided, of course, those aircraft were available for power projection and were not involved in sea control."

By 1990, the premises underlying the Maritime Strategy were obsolete. The Cold War was over. There existed a general perception that Russia did not pose a significant threat. Multi-polar regional instability replaced the bi-polar communist threat. The Maritime Strategy required revision.

It is indicative of the change being wrought by the vision of From the Sea that it unequivocally replaces the 1986 Maritime Strategy and that one of the first official acts of the Naval Doctrine Command was the cancellation of NWP-1. To paraphrase Mahan in 1892: all the world knows, gentlemen, that we have built a great navy....Well, now that we have a great navy, what are we going to do with it?"

32
The New Naval Strategy

A glimpse behind the scenes of the forces that shaped the development of *From the Sea* is provided by Captain Bradd Hayes USN and Lieutenant Colonel Alan P. Heim USMC. Captain Hayes is currently the Assistant Director of the Strategy and Campaign Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. In 1991 and 1992, Captain Hayes participated in the Naval Force Capability Planning Effort which developed the concepts contained in *From the Sea*. Lieutenant Colonel Heim is currently a National Security Fellow at Harvard University and participated in the development of *From the Sea* while serving with the Emerging Issues Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Lieutenant Colonel Heim's article describes the development of *From the Sea* from its beginnings at a 1990 Naval Summit between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations. The purpose of the summit was to coordinate overlapping issues generated by the ongoing revision of separate Maritime and Amphibious Strategies. The decision to develop a combined Navy and Marine Corps Strategy took root at this summit. Early efforts to forge the new vision were hampered by "flag officer reluctance, internecine warfare," and a resources rather than capabilities oriented base force, and the introduction of a new Marine Corps Commandant. The 1990-1991 Gulf War provided renewed focus in the form of the
debate over stationing of aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. This action forced a discussion of the unique problems of littoral warfare and provided the seed that would eventually sprout into the enabling force concept. In November 1991, the Naval Forces Capabilities Group was formed by formal tasking from the Secretary of the Navy. Several drafts of a new naval strategy were developed in a flurry of activity that was halted rather abruptly by the Tailhook incident. In late summer 1992, a new Secretary of the Navy placed increased emphasis on the publication of a new strategy. This renewed focus led to a wargaming and the eventual release of *From the Sea* in September 1992.

Captain Hayes provides insight into the specific circumstances that drove the writing of a new naval strategy. The first circumstance was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent irrelevance of the old maritime strategy. As the global situation changed with increasing rapidity and complexity, the U.S. Navy found itself "awash...with no clear direction emerging." This first circumstance was exacerbated by an ongoing feud with the Air Force in which the "Navy and Air Force often have exchanged verbal volleys, believing themselves locked in a zero sum game for assets." The Air Force had achieved the high ground in this feud with a new slogan, "Global Reach, Global Power," and an aggressive public relations game. This rivalry, and the perception that the Air Force was gaining
dominance, was complicated by Congressional impatience with the U.S. Navy implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, a situation in which, Hayes points out,

[the] Navy, which traditionally flaunted its self-reliance was discovering that Congress saw it as a Service with an attitude. Unfortunately for the Marine Corps, there was strong guilt by association.

The fourth circumstance was a need to begin to prioritize acquisitions for the next 20 years. Hayes goes on to explain that From the Sea does not disregard the importance of sea control and sea lines of communication, it assumes them. He also states that Naval Service planners understand that the closer naval forces move to shore, the less time there is available to sort things out. He then identified sea-skimming missiles, coastal missile batteries, and mines as littoral threats with mines being the most dangerous. Hayes then states that the working group focused on two objectives: (1) the Navy must field systems relevant to the littoral environment, and (2) the Navy cannot lose sight of the fact that a competitor could arise to challenge sea control.

Since publication in September 1992, From the Sea has been consistently buttressed by commentary from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Both men have written extensively in professional and strategic journals to further define the vision of From the Sea.

The CNO, Admiral Frank Kelso, provided specific
details on the U.S. Navy's new focus in the inaugural issue of Joint Forces Quarterly. In an article titled "The Wave of the Future," Kelso states that the need for separate, independent Naval Operations at Sea for indirect support of the land war is greatly reduced. As a result, "...our maritime operational focus has shifted to littoral warfare and direct support of ground operations." This use of the term "operational" could be interpreted to mean actions that move ships and equipment or could be a reference to the "operational level" of war - campaigning. Kelso acknowledges the latter interpretation with reference to the ability of "Naval Operations in littoral regions to transform the classic Air-Land-Battle into a unified sea-air-land-space campaign." A good deal of Kelso's article deals with budget issues. He states unequivocally that "Naval procurement programs [will be] evaluated against specific contributions to joint warfighting." Kelso then lists specific uses for 1.2 billion dollars redirected in the Fiscal Year 1994 budget. These budget changes, occurring as a direct result of From the Sea, include an increase of funding for precision guided munitions to support land campaigns, modification to Navy ships to support a Joint Task Commander afloat, and increased emphasis on the U.S. Marine Corps requirement for sufficient medium lift.

The CMC, General Carl Mundy, Jr., in an article
written for *Sea Power*, emphasizes the central, critical importance of the term "expeditionary." His premise is that reduced forward basing and the increased need for a credible forward presence has required the Naval Service to concentrate "on influencing events ashore through the measured application of *sea-based* military power." He then emphasizes that the use of the term "Naval Expeditionary Forces" is deliberate. The term reflects the new realities of the future role of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is both a description of a unique characteristic of Naval Operating Forces and a recognition of the Naval Services orientation away from the Soviet Fleet and towards the requirements of global power and influence projections.⁶⁵

Mundy concludes his article stating that the "...greatest utility of the expeditionary force concept is [its] usefulness in defining the role of future Naval Forces."⁶⁵

For the final, official explanation of *From the Sea*, we turn to a message released by the Chief of Naval Information to all Naval vessels and stations. This message, emphatic in its directness and simplicity, states that the centerpieces of that focus [on power projection] are the aircraft carrier and the amphibious ready groups. Naval forces will continue to conduct fundamental naval warfare tasks such as strike warfare, air warfare, surface warfare, and submarine warfare. However, they will now focus on applying these warfare tasks to the more complex littoral environment.⁶⁶

Jan S. Breemer, a civilian Naval analyst and professor at the Naval Post Graduate School, provides a succinct, critical analysis of *From the Sea* in an
unpublished paper titled "Naval Strategy is Dead - Long Live Maritime Strategy." Breemer's premise is that naval strategy and maritime strategy are not the same. Maritime strategy is a national strategy "shaped by geo-strategic circumstances, and in which the sea is a substantial function." A nation can adopt either a maritime or continental strategy - that decision, however, is the choice of politicians. The purpose of a Naval Strategy is to support the one chosen. Naval strategy means nothing more and nothing less than the use of military forces for the purpose of winning or denying command of the sea in order to project military power onto the soil of the opponent. The side that merely needs to prevent projection of hostile power from the sea can be satisfied with a strategy of denial.

This "denial strategy" will usually be fought in the littoral. Since the U.S. Navy controls the deep water ocean and the sea lines of communication, it can bring its powers to bear against the land. In this role, "amphibious operations will be central to the fleet." To conduct amphibious operations, the Navy must control or defeat the denial strategy. Sea power has then become subordinate to power projection, indeed, "sea control has therefore changed places with power projection as the Navy's adjunct function."

Most critical analyses of From the Sea do not see that flip-flop as a bad thing—a view frequently tempered, however, by the requirement for the Navy to never assume control of the sea.
There are, though, some vocal critics of the new Naval Strategy. Most critics focus on sea control's loss of preeminence in the naval strategy. Admiral Horacio Rivero, USN (RET) voices his criticism that

control of the seas is taken as a given in the calculation of naval force needs and in the design of a future navy. This presupposes that threats to the sea lines of communication - the defense of which has been the principal justification for naval forces since ancient times - either are so weak that they can be ignored or that they can be readily countered by forces designed for intervention in regional conflicts and for operations in littoral areas.  

Rivero then conducts a well-reasoned, historically based argument that focuses on potential sea based threats from Russia, China, India, North Korea and Iran. His final comment is that the United States may well find itself facing situations similar to Spain with her Armada, Napoleon in Egypt, and the Argentines in the Falklands if we fail to assure the continued control of the sea and safety of the sea lines of communication.  

Other critics voice concern that From the Sea subordinates the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Army in a capitulation resulting from years of struggle for preeminence in the United States military strategy. The most vocal, and most direct, of these critics is Anthony Harrigan. His criticism is best stated in his own words. On From the Sea:

From the Sea, which virtually redefines the Naval Service as an auxiliary, bears the hallmark [of General Colin Powell's belief] that Land Power should have the preeminent role in the U.S. National Defense.
On littoral warfare:

A prescription for a Stalin-era Soviet-style Navy focused on inshore operations that are designed to safeguard the flanks of ground forces."

On the concept of an enabling force - equivalent to giving the Navy a mission of "a kind of super coast guard." On the Naval Doctrine Command:

an effort at thought control over the Navy and Marine Corps to force them to bend to the service bias and the political will of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense."

On what should be done about this heresy:

Public and congressional scrutiny of this hurtful coup attempt must start immediately."

The "coup," however, is well underway. Doctrine is being written as these words are being put to paper. It is time to start the explanation of that doctrine.

**Joint Operational Functions**

The evolution of the Joint Operational Functions begins with Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*. In Chapter IV, "The Joint Campaign," the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that

Campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces are joint; they serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare. Modern warfighting requires a frame of reference within which operations on land and sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmonized; that frame of reference is the joint campaign."

The joint campaign, when planned properly, achieves:

sequenced and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces - orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on the synergistic effort of joint"
forces."

That is the vision. The next step was to provide a framework for the structure of that synchronization. This framework was developed at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk and defined in AFSC Pub 2, *Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces* as the Theatre Operating Systems - a subcomponent of the Elements of Operational Design. These Theatre Operating Systems were command and control, intelligence, logistics, fires, maneuver and movement, and protection. It is these functions that provide the framework for synchronization, allowing the "combatant commander to directly influence the outcome of a campaign." AFSC Pub 2 then provides a separate chapter describing each Theatre Operating System, warning the reader, however, that

"AFSC Pub 2 is not doctrine: it is a textbook. It is derived from many sources, both official and unofficial...we have attempted to lay out logically the framework for the synchronization of joint forces."

That framework is becoming doctrine, the next step in the evolution of the Joint Operational Functions being the drafting of Joint Pub 5-00.1, *JTTP For Campaign Planning*. This publication was issued as a Revised Initial Draft in August 1993. It is interesting to note that the lead agent for its development is the U.S. Army--the publication reads very much like Army doctrine. This document defines the Operational Functions as maneuver, firepower, intelligence, command and control, protection, and logistics. The purpose
of these functions being to examine campaigns and major operations in terms of the same basic elements and to integrate and synchronize these functions in time, space, and purpose.\textsuperscript{81}

Joint Pub 5.00-1 then describes in detail the doctrinal meaning of each operational function.

\textbf{Maneuver}

The Joint and U.S. Marine Corps definition are noted in Chapter I. The U.S. Navy concept of maneuver, as it relates to those definitions, can be articulated but is not defined. Maneuver, in the context of joint operations, almost by default concerns power projection onto land. The inherent difficulty for the U.S. Navy, as explained by Commander Terry C. Pierce, USN, frequent writer on amphibious maneuver, is the requirement for the Navy to "operate in a new, complex arena with tools and tactics designed for a different kind of war."\textsuperscript{82} This difficulty in projecting sea power in a land-oriented maneuver concept is most often discussed in terms of airpower and amphibious operations. Commander Pierce addresses the airpower issue in an article titled "Not a CVN Gator" whose central theme is that "supporting the MAGTF may, in time, become the principle reason for the existence of carriers."\textsuperscript{83} His argument is that if control of the sea is assumed and the services are operating in a joint environment, the carrier role in the littoral is to attain air superiority over the AOA and to conduct close air support (CAS) missions once
that air superiority is achieved. The maneuver difficulty is that in a fluid land maneuver battlefield, carrier air needs to be capable of shifting from air superiority missions to CAS and back depending on requirements. Neither aircraft types nor deck cycles facilitate this type of maneuver." The second argument centers on the increased capabilities of the amphibious assets available to a Joint Task Force Commander. Inherent to those capabilities is the potential to strike the enemy at many different places from sea launched platforms, task organize units to hit enemy strong points, withdraw those units to ships, and relaunch to reinforce success in other areas. General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired, states that this type of maneuver capability will never be exploited because of the inherent inflexibility of ship to shore movement due to ship spaces, timing, and safety; all of which require detailed planning." Cushman goes on to state that "such flexibility has not been a traditional characteristic of the amphibious operation, whose hallmarks have been detailed planning and by the book execution." These limitations can be overcome, but only through the use of highly proficient shipboard teams, flexibly employed, plus a Rommel-like determination to seize opportunities...only an all out reorientation of commanders and troops could bring about so profound an attitude change."" Two other manuals already referred to in Chapter I: FMFM 1, Warfighting and FMFM 1-1, Campaigning; will also contribute
to the analysis of maneuver.

**Command and Control**

This is perhaps the most contentious and complex issue to be solved in the transition from vision to doctrine. Two well established, but separate command relationships, Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF), and the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)/Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept are now being thrust together under a command element, Joint Task Force, whose mission and function is not yet firmly established. The problems are legion. This single issue receives a majority of the comments in lessons learned databases. Problems that range from the difficulty of inserting a JTF headquarters on top of a CATF/CLF relationship, to refusal of a Combatant Command to appoint a CATF, to refusal of U.S. Army units to acknowledge CATF authority in the AOA, to the difficulties of inserting an offensive concept, amphibious operations, into a command structure oriented toward the defensive - OTC/CWC. The CATF/CLF relationship, established since 1944 is dependent upon cooperation between both positions. Nevertheless, it seems to work and has now been codified in Joint Doctrine.

Current doctrine regarding the CATF/CLF relationship was developed as a direct result of the dynamics surrounding the relationships between General Vandergrift and Admiral Turner on Guadalcanal. Prior to the landing, formal command
relationships had not been determined. Admiral Turner as CATF, assumed responsibility for all planning decisions as well as land and sea execution of the campaign. This authority was thought by Turner to extend to the disposition of Vandergrift’s defense and approval authority for offensive actions planned by the Marines. The compromise arrangement made at the conclusion of that campaign is now joint doctrine. As Colonel Wallace Gregson, Jr. USMC points out, the U.S. Marine Corps has some concern that the focus landward in From the Sea could revive old problems:

Command relationship problems...will inhibit, absent a real effort, any critical examination of our two-doctrine dilemma. The World War II ghosts of General Archer Vandergrift and Admiral Richard Kelly Turner are with us yet.

Major Thomas Hastings, USMC, who was inserted into an OTC/CWC Command structure as the raid commander for Operation Preying Mantis (the destruction of Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf) in April 1988, writes that the Second and Third Fleets have attempted to incorporate the amphibious task force into the CWC. The OTC designates an Amphibious Warfare Commander (AWC). The AWC may or may not be CATF. If it is not, CLF appoints an "appropriate subordinate" to plan with the AWC. Besides the extra command and control layer, there have been significant problems in the effectiveness of the CWC concept as applied to amphibious operations. Those problems include muddled command relationships, separation of the OTC from the AOA,
and the problems of many subordinate warfare commanders competing for the assets necessary for offensive amphibious operations in order to conduct the inherent defensive operations of a CWC. Major Hastings' solution is to form an Expeditionary Task Force (ETF), designate the Battlegroup Commander as OTC/ETF, then assign the Marine-Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander to the OTC as a warfare commander. During actual conduct of the amphibious assault, the MAGTF CWC would be "chopped" to the AWC. Once the MAGTF CWC was established ashore, the AWC would be subordinate to the MAGTF CWC. This arrangement is workable within the Naval Services but is not transferable to Joint Doctrine.

Commander Pierce, already in these pages earlier, states that present command relationships should not change. What does need to change, however, is the education of U.S. Navy Officers in the tenets of land based maneuver warfare. An understanding of those tenets will reduce the friction inherent to the CATF/CLF relationship through the ability to communicate intent and objective in a common language. General Cushman states that "Joint Commanders have to find a way to streamline command and control during execution of amphibious operations." His comments were made at the conclusion of Exercise Ocean Venture 1992. In his article titled, "Ocean Ventured, Something Gained," he discusses positive trends observed during the exercise that markedly improved command relationships and control of joint forces.
Examples given include the nearly continuous colocation of JTF, CATF, and the CLF staff and the willingness of CATF to deploy a Navy headquarters ashore. After those comments, Cushman suggests that one problem with the command and control arrangement is that the CATF/CLF responsibilities force both commanders to concentrate on tactical and operational issues. His suggestion is to assign a Deputy JTF Commander who will control tactical operations while the JTF Commander, CATF, and CLF focus on operational issues."
Notes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 2.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 3.

8. Ibid., 2.


10. Ibid., 6.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 7.

13. Ibid., 8.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 11.


19. Ibid., 89.


21. Ibid., 455.

22. Ibid., 459-460.
23. Ibid., 461.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 1-3-2.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 1-3-1.

31. Ibid., 1-3-3.


33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 8-14.


38. Ibid., 62.

39. Ibid., 62-63.

40. Ibid., 63.

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42. Ibid., 81.


44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 119.
46. Ibid., 122.

47. Ibid., 119-122.


50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 27.

53. Ibid., 28.


55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 57-60.


60. Ibid., 14.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., 13-16.


64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 52.

66. Department of the Navy "OPNAV Assessment Process" (Official Government Message Traffic):

68. Ibid., 5.

69. Ibid., 20.

70. Ibid.


72. Ibid., 10-13.


74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.


78. Ibid., 47.


80. Ibid., i.


83. Ibid., 75.

84. Ibid., 74-76.


86. Ibid., 43.

87. Ibid., 47.
88. Marine Corps Lessons Learned, Combat Development Opportunities from Operation Restore Hope

89. Marine Corps Lessons Learned, CPX Dynamic Future 21, Conducted by I MEF 11/12/91.

90. Marine Corps Lesson Learned Wargame Spartan Base 92 conducted by USCINCLANT 10/22/92.


98. Ibid., 83-88.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter details the research methods used to address the primary and subordinate questions. Research to address From the Sea and the Joint Operational Functions was primarily conducted through a search of periodicals and Joint Publications. Both of these issues are emerging and there is not a solid body of evidence available from which to draw conclusions. The subjective nature of the discussion of From the Sea and the perceived departure from traditional Naval strategies led to in-depth research on the development of United States Maritime Strategy in the Twentieth Century. The research methods used to study all three subjects will be addressed below.

From The Sea

Research on From The Sea centered on a study of the document itself followed by an attempt to discern the origins of the white paper. All of the information on From The Sea was developed from various periodicals, unpublished manuscripts, and official commentary from the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The Naval Doctrine Command began to publish information on doctrine based on From The Sea principles in 1994. The research cutoff date for this
paper was December 1993; for that reason, and because the Doctrine Command was essentially conducting a parallel study to this paper, that information was not analyzed.

*From The Sea* has generated volumes of emotional debate within the Naval Service. *U.S.N.I. Proceedings* has provided a forum for that debate. Most of the research aimed at answering the subordinate questions about *From The Sea* was conducted by reading *Proceedings* articles and commentary. There is, however, nothing concrete in those articles. The debate, because it is emotional, is decidedly subjective. The value of this research was to frame the issues, present opposing arguments to those issues, and to gain insight into the "official" thought processes that formed the structure of *From The Sea*.

Analysis of *From The Sea* and the conclusions that follow that analysis will be subjective, but based upon a thorough understanding of the scope of the issue.

**Joint Operational Functions**

Research on the Joint Operational Functions was conducted using Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) publications, Joint Pub 1, and a draft of Joint Publication 5.00-1.

The Joint Operational Functions mirror in purpose and terminology the U.S. Army's Battlefield Operating Systems. General Powell instituted the idea in Joint Pub 1, the AFSC refined the concept in AFSC Pub 2, and the Functions are being incorporated as doctrine in Joint Publication 5.00-1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.  

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Maritime Strategy

Research on Maritime Strategy focused on a study of A.T. Mahan, NWP-1 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, and the 1986 Maritime Strategy. Researching Mahan by reading Mahan was difficult. He developed his theories through historical analysis contained in a number of different books, articles, and speeches. The foundation of Mahan's theories are articulated in the first chapter of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. The author relied extensively on other theorists' interpretation of Mahan's writings. The author also discovered that many people use Mahan's concepts without understanding Mahan's theory. This trap was particularly bothersome when researching articles in service publications in an attempt to relate the differences between Mahan and From The Sea.

NWP-1 proved an excellent primer for a study of Mahan. The Department of the Navy cancelled this capstone document in November 1993. It will be replaced by a series of doctrinal publications developed by the Naval Doctrine Command.

The Maritime Strategy, developed in 1986 when John Lehman was the Secretary of the Navy, proved as controversial in its day as From The Sea is today. Research into this document included a study of the strategy and two books written about the strategy. This research was critical to an analysis of From The Sea.

Naval Service Capabilities

The original intent of this research was to discover the specific capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps that could be
applied to the Joint Operational Functions. This approach, because of the technical aspects, sidetracked the development of the thesis. Research then evolved into a study of the general capabilities of the Naval Service and how those capabilities will contribute or will require modification to accommodate the vision of From The Sea.

Research Methodology

Analysis conducted to answer the research question will focus on a discussion of each subordinate question.

From The Sea will be evaluated as another step in the evolution of a naval strategy. A study of naval strategies in the Twentieth Century will provide a foundation for an analysis of From The Sea that will answer the subordinate questions concerning the white paper.

The Joint Operational Functions will be evaluated as emerging doctrine that impacts the Naval Services - both of which have differing views of the purpose and definition of maneuver and command and control. This evaluation will lead to an analysis of how those views can be merged into doctrine that accommodates the requirements of the Naval Service and the Joint environment.

The analysis of Naval Service capabilities will focus on the changes in education, technology, budget, and culture necessary to translate the vision of From The Sea into doctrine.
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS

The Evolution of Naval Strategy: Mahan to From The Sea

The choice of "evolution" to describe the changes to Naval Strategy during the Twentieth Century is intentional. A study of naval theory from Mahan through the publication of The Maritime Strategy in 1986 is the study of a gradual codification and slight refinement of very similar theories. From The Sea appears to be a dramatic departure from those theories, a completely new way of doing business. An objective analysis of the white paper against those previous strategies reveals a theory in evolution. Evolution is defined as "a gradual process in which something changes into a different and usually better or more complex form." From The Sea is different, it is more complex, it may be better, but it is not a radical departure from its predecessors. This point is not evident when one first reads From The Sea. The tone and language of the document seems to refute completely Mahanian theory and The Maritime Strategy. The author is confident, however, in his interpretation because From The Sea is itself evolving. It is a start point not an end state. What comes out the other end will be a Naval Service that has achieved balance.
between the requirements of sea control and the requirements of power projection.

That balance must be in the relationship between sea-control and power projection. It is this relationship that has been changing as Naval Strategy evolves, it is this relationship that \textit{From The Sea} appears to most dramatically alter, and this relationship that causes critics of \textit{From The Sea} to cry "heresy." Heresy, the most dangerous form of change, identifies and attacks the one critical truth of an issue while appearing to leave the whole intact. The critical truth allegedly attacked in \textit{From The Sea} is the proper place of sea control and power projection in a Naval Strategy. To analyze the evolution of Naval Strategy from Mahan to \textit{From The Sea}, we must analyze the role of power projection and sea control in those strategies.

The Mahanian Theory

A.T. Mahan claimed to have invented the term sea power and, having invented it, he found it necessary to define it. The essence of that definition was the essence of Mahan's theories. Great nations combine maritime commerce, colonies, and privileged access to foreign markets to achieve greatness. This greatness cannot be realized unless a nation maintains command of the sea through naval superiority. Command of the sea is gained through control of the sea lines of communication (SLOC), through sea control. Sea control is gained by destroying the enemy fleet and
depriving the enemy of his ability to engage in commerce, by controlling his SLOC.

The sole purpose for the existence of a navy was to exercise control of the sea. This Mahanian truth provided the structure for the U.S. Naval Strategy from the Spanish-American War to the end of the Cold War. Reality was different of course. The Navy provided other services besides sea control, but those services were definitely of secondary importance to the primary mission of sea control.

When analyzing the effect of Mahan on the evolution of naval strategy, it is important to remember that Mahan developed his theories based on historical study. The critical importance of a strong Navy able to maintain sea control is a concept that was obvious to the admirals of antiquity. Mahan simply observed history and extrapolated principles and theory. A Mahanian truth is a historical truth, the historical truth is that for a maritime nation, the function of a Navy is to control the sea. This concept, that sea control is the foundation of economic and military strength for a maritime nation, is the origin of the U.S. Navy insistence on the necessity of a maritime strategy and the preeminence of sea control in that strategy.

The concept of power projection, a term neither invented by nor used by Mahan is nevertheless discussed when Mahan analyzes the relationship of naval operations to land warfare. According to Mahan, this relationship that should
exist only when necessary to seize the naval bases required to ensure control of the seas.²

Aside from this reference, Mahan did not discuss the issue. In his time, the tools of power projection--missiles, airplanes, large scale amphibious assault--were not available. Destruction of the enemy fleet was accomplished on the high seas in a decisive battle between opposing capital ships. This theory of decisive battle merely proves that Mahan was a product of his time and the history he studied. It is not indicative of a belief that the battleship was the only weapon capable of controlling the sea or that the concept of decisive battle was the central means of achieving sea control. Mahan's central thesis was not decisive battle, and it was not the preeminence of the battleship; his central thesis was the critical importance of sea control. The use of missiles, aircraft, and amphibious forces fits nicely into that thesis provided those means of projecting power are used to gain and maintain sea control. Power projection is not a secondary mission for a navy, it is a supporting mission, a minor player in the quest for control of the seas.

The Naval Service entered mid-century with a firm grasp of the relationship between power projection and sea control. The necessities of a world war and the Korean War had changed the relationship somewhat, power projection had evolved into both a supporting and a secondary mission, but
there was no doubt or debate that sea control was the primary, preeminent mission for the United States Navy.

Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy published NWP-1 *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy* in 1976. NWP-1 articulates the U.S. Navy role in the security strategy of the United States and the National Military Strategy. Despite Admiral Watkins' comment in 1986 that a Maritime Strategy had not before been codified, the concepts put forth in NWP-1 state plainly the purpose of the U.S. Navy. Perhaps it is this document which Watkins' calls "an extant strategy - a strategy with broad contours reasonably well understood." The broad contours of Mahan are very evident in NWP-1 (just as the broad contours of NWP-1 will be evident in *The Maritime Strategy*). Chapter 3 of the publication could serve as a primer on Mahan's writings. This chapter, titled "U.S. Navy Support of the National Military Strategy" codifies the primary tasks of the U.S. Navy, the primary function of the U.S. Navy, and the relationship between power projection and sea control in the execution of those tasks and functions.

Power projection is formally recognized as a navy function in NWP-1. Although the term is used previous to 1976, one may fairly say that, as a specific function of a navy, NWP-1 invents the term power projection. Unlike Mahan, however, NWP-1 does not precisely define the term although the definition is implied through the context of
ics use. Power projection is the projection of naval power onto land. Amphibious forces, airpower, missiles, and naval gunfire are capable of power projection.

NWP-1 lists the two basic functions of the U.S. Navy as sea control and power projection. These functions are applied to accomplish the primary tasks of the U.S. Navy: destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, the achievement and maintenance of naval supremacy, and the control of vital sea areas and SLOC.

The fundamental function of the U.S. Navy, according to NWP-1, must therefore be sea control. The relationship between power projection and sea control is precisely delineated. Power projection was developed to support sea control and, if the requirement for sea control no longer exists, to provide support for land and air campaigns. In the former mission, power projection assumes a supporting role; in the latter mission, power projection assumes a subordinate role. In both instances, power projection assumes a lesser place and exists, as already mentioned, primarily to support the sea control function.

However, in one paragraph buried in Chapter 3 of NWP-1, the U.S. Navy varies from what otherwise appears to be a strict Mahanian strategy. This paragraph recognizes that power projection can exist as an independent function of the U.S. Navy. This separation of power projection from sea control (recognizing, of course, that it is still
subordinate to the sea control mission) begins the gradual process of change that continues with the publication of *From the Sea*. This "independence" also acknowledges the reality of Yankee Station. In an area of operations where the sea control function is not necessary, the navy can project power ashore in support of operations that have nothing to do with destruction of the enemy fleet, suppression of enemy commerce, or the need to engage in combat operations.

The Maritime Strategy

The Department of the Navy developed *The Maritime Strategy* in 1986 in response to the increasing capabilities of the Soviet Union. The strategy focuses almost exclusively on the deterrence or defeat of the Soviet Union. Reference to other nations or regions of the world are limited to the ability of those areas to impact that central conflict. In tone and words, the document conveys a navy independent of the joint environment. With the exception of a short statement concerning sealift requirements, *The Maritime Strategy* focuses on unilateral naval service contributions to deterrence and war. The strategy discusses tactical and strategic power projection in support of land forces. But that support will not be forthcoming until the requirements of sea control have been met and will be conducted "in support of" not "with" those land forces.

The essential requirements of sea control do not
change with The Maritime Strategy. What does change is the role of power projection and the relationship between power projection and sea control.

The premise of the strategy is that sea control, still the critical function of the U.S. Navy, can be seized early in the conflict through offensive operations that destroy the Soviet Fleet in port or home waters. Sea control is assured early in the war at which time most of the Navy becomes available for power projection. This scenario is only possible if the U.S. Navy is properly configured for both a sea control and power projection mission. This configuration in absolutely necessary since the security of the United States and the ability to sustain NATO forces is dependent on the ability to gain and maintain sea control. Victory over Soviet forces in Western Europe is dependent on the ability of the U.S. Navy to project decisive power into the strategic and tactical flanks of the Soviet Union.

By 1986, the concept of power projection as a component of naval strategy had evolved from a bit player in the early 1900's to the point where the U.S. Navy argues that power projection is a central element of her maritime strategy. in The Maritime Strategy, power projection assumes four key roles.

First, the destruction of the Soviet Fleet in port or Soviet home waters is dependent on a capability to project
power. Sea control is dependent on power projection.

Second, power projection becomes a euphemism for sea-based nuclear weapons. The primary naval contribution to the strategic arsenal is a capability to project nuclear power.

Third, the threat of power projection was a key element of crisis deterrence.

Fourth, once sea control was achieved, power projection could have a decisive impact on the outcome of a land campaign.

Implicit in the latter role is a subtle shift of emphasis: sea control is no longer the primary function of the U.S. Navy, it is the first priority. Once accomplished, that priority will change to power projection.

Reword the first role, add sealift as a fifth, and the broad outlines of *From The Sea* begin to emerge.

*From The Sea*

The introduction to *From The Sea* states up front that the "priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps have shifted." This shift in priorities is required because the Naval Service has shifted focus from a global threat to focus on regional threats. The validity of *The Maritime Strategy* collapsed with the Soviet Union. With the Soviet threat gone, the "free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas." A basic premise of *From The Sea* is that control of the sea is assumed. Because control of the
sea is a given, the Naval Services can now concentrate on the conduct of joint and combined operations in the littoral regions of the world using naval power projected from the sea.

The shift in priorities heralded by the new strategy is a shift in the relationship between power projection and sea control. Power projection has replaced sea control as the priority mission of the Naval Service. The Navy and Marine Corps have published a maritime strategy that mentions sea control once, and then only to dismiss it as not relevant to the strategy. The focus of *From The Sea* is on the littoral and the requirement to be capable of responding to multiple and diverse threats. The title of the strategy flaunts power projection. Power projection is finally defined as the capability to "mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of their choosing." The definition is then further refined to ensure the reader understands that power projection refers to "bombs, missiles, shells, bullets, and bayonets" launched from the sea onto land.

The purpose of this power projection is to integrate naval service capabilities with other services to support decisive air-sea-land battle. *From The Sea* is written as a primer on how to use naval power projection in the joint environment, an environment that by its very nature implies land warfare. The conclusion of *From The Sea* emphasizes the new focus of
the Naval Service in a sentence written in bold and underlined: "Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea." 

Critics of From The Sea hate that sentence. Subordination of sea control to power projection is heresy. Those critics are right. But they are right for the wrong reasons.

The logic of From The Sea is faulty. The authors are guilty of omission and fallacy; the former is intentional, the latter a result of 90 or so years of service culture.

The omission is the capability of other nations to develop navies capable of challenging the United States on the high seas or of controlling vital SLOC. India may not have the capability to dominate the world's oceans, but she is capable of acquiring the ability to dominate the Indian Ocean. Indonesia need only develop a naval capability to deny transit of the Straits of Molucca to develop a credible naval power. From The Sea neglects this point although the authors have since claimed, as Captain Hayes mentions, that the working group that developed From The Sea focused on two objectives: (1) the development of systems and doctrine relevant to the littoral environment and (2) the Navy cannot lose sight of the fact that a competitor could arise to challenge sea control. The latter objective is not addressed in From The Sea, a reflection of the difficulty in today's political and financial climate of acquiring money
or justifying roles and missions to counter potential capabilities that might become potential threats.

The argument of fallacy is interesting in that the fallacy is proposed as truth and dismissed, yet the authors unwittingly correct themselves throughout the rest of the document. The faulty premise is that the United States can claim preeminent control of the seas, that sea control is assumed. The problem is the transfer of the Mahanian concept of the seas to a time when a strategy of sea denial can shut the Naval Services down. The sea control assumed by the authors is blue water ocean. But the littoral is part of the sea, and if we cannot control the littoral, we do not control the seas. From The Sea recognizes Naval Services deficiencies in the littoral, in fact, focuses on the requirement to concentrate efforts to correct that deficiency.

Control of the sea, to include the littoral, must be achieved before naval power can be projected ashore. The relationship between power projection and sea control has not changed. The Naval Services must expand their concept of sea control, but it is still a first priority. Unfortunately, a priority that must be fought with weapon systems pretty much ignored during the era of The Maritime Strategy. The conclusion of From The Sea reinforces the relationship between power projection and sea control. Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare (sea
control) in order to be capable of maneuver from the sea (power projection).

**The Purpose of From The Sea**

*From The Sea* was published to provide a framework for the development of a naval doctrine compatible with the challenges of regional instability in a Post Cold War era. It is a startpoint, not an end state. As this vision becomes reality, the necessary balance between sea control and power projection will be achieved.

The second broad purpose of *From The Sea* is to educate Naval Officers, civilian decisionmakers, and officers of the sister services on the capabilities and intent of the Naval Services as applied to the joint arena. The education of Naval Officers on this new direction requires a reorientation of service culture; a culture that for 200 years has existed as the most independent of the services, a culture whose members are accustomed to unilateral decision making, and a culture loathe to present a perception of dependence or support to another service. The education of civilian decisionmakers is necessary to define for them the purpose and roles of the Naval Services in post cold-war world. The education of sister services is necessary because the Army and Air Force have been developing joint doctrine with little input from the Naval Services. As the Naval Services enter the joint arena, those services must be made to understand the capabilities
of naval forces and joint doctrine modified to accommodate those capabilities.

These issues will be addressed in detail in Chapter V.

The Operational Functions

This section will analyze the purpose of the operational functions and determine whether the Naval Services have processes that parallel those functions. Two of the functions, command and control and maneuver, will be analyzed to determine the similarities and differences between the Joint and Naval Service definitions. Integration of Naval Service capabilities into the joint operational functions will be discussed in the next section.

Operational functions are an emerging concept in joint doctrine. The functions were first articulated in Armed Forces Staff College Publication 2 (AFSC 2) and taught to students at Intermediate Level Schools and at the Armed Forces Staff College as a recommended means of synchronizing the activities of a Joint Force.

In August 1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the initial draft of Joint Pub 5-00.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Campaign Planning (JTTP). The purpose of JTTP is to "set forth doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States." In Chapter II of JTTP, the Joint Chief's list
the six Operational Functions as maneuver, firepower, command and control, protection, intelligence, and logistics. The purpose of the Operational Functions is to provide the JFC with an efficient structure to complete the campaign design. They provide a means to examine campaigns and major operations in terms of the same basic elements and to integrate and synchronize these functions in time, space, and purpose.12

The U.S. Army wrote Joint Pub 5-00.1. The influence of Army doctrinal concepts is evident in the terminology and purpose of the Operational Functions, functions that combine the "battlefield framework" with the "battlefield field operating systems." FM 100-5 Operations defines the "battlefield framework" as:

an area of...operational responsibility established by the commander;...it helps him relate his forces to one another and to the enemy in time, space, and purpose.13

Battlefield operating systems are defined as:

the major functions performed by the force on the battlefield to successfully execute Army Operations.... They include maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and combat service support.14

The U.S. Army will have no difficulty integrating their existing doctrine into this area of Joint Doctrine. The Naval Services, however, do not conceptualize their warfighting activities into battlefield operating systems or a battlefield framework. They do, however, synchronize their warfighting. The concept and purpose is the same as the Army’s, the semantics are different.

The intent of this section is not to analyze the
internal synchronization mechanisms of the United States Navy and Marine Corps. The intent is to review those mechanisms to determine if the concepts in place can lead to an understanding of the Operational Functions that will facilitate integration of capabilities into those functions.

Synchronization of warfighting activities in the U.S. Marine Corps is inherent to their organization, education, and service culture. The Marine Corps is organized into Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) with each MAGTF consisting of a service support element, a ground combat element, and an air combat element under the command of a single MAGTF commander. These elements train together as a team and form habitual relationships between units that facilitate integration. All six of the Joint Operational Functions are included in this structure and synchronized by the common commander. Marine Officers are steeped in this method of organization and warfighting from the moment of commissioning. The planning requirements, capabilities and limitations of each element, as well as the coordinated execution of the MAGTF, become second nature to Marine Officers. It is this synchronization of air, ground, and support assets under a single commander that led General Al Gray to comment that the Marine Corps already fights joint. The Marine Corps will have no difficulty understanding the concept and purpose of the Joint Operational Functions. The functions were developed by a land combat organization, the
U.S. Army, for combat in a two dimensional battlefield. The concepts transfer easily to the U.S. Marine Corps.

The U.S. Navy synchronizes warfighting through the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) and the Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC). Both are often lumped together and referred to as the OTC/CWC, a bonding of acronyms that can result in a misunderstanding of the terms. This means of synchronization seems complex, although in concept the OTC/CWC is an elegant, relatively simple solution to the synchronization of warfare in an extraordinarily complex environment.

The Navy fights in four dimensions: air, sea surface, subsurface, and land surface. Success in this difficult environment requires the Navy Commander to protect himself from attack from four dimensions while he attacks in four dimensions. Eight dimensions of complex technical combat require a synchronized division of labor. The OTC/CWC accomplishes this by designating the OTC as the officer in overall command and ultimately responsible for accomplishing his mission. This authority cannot be delegated, the OTC cannot designate a subordinate OTC, just as ultimate command responsibility cannot be delegated. The offensive mission objectives of the OTC are of "overriding importance and focus and may not be delegated." The U.S. Navy wants the OTC focused on attack in the four dimensions, so authority is given to the OTC to delegate responsibility
for "certain defensive aspects of his operations..."

Defense of the force is accomplished through the use of Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC). The CWC is inherently a defensive function, a point often forgotten when discussing integration of the OTC/CWC structure into a joint or amphibious operation. Much of the confusion surrounding the OTC/CWC is the fact that the Officer in Tactical Command is also the Composite Warfare Commander. That confusion can be removed by understanding that the OTC, the overall commander, is, of course, responsible for offensive operations (OTC) and protection of his force (CWC). The difference is that the OTC can delegate some CWC responsibilities to facilitate integration and synchronization of his assets. These subordinate warfare commanders are responsible for defense of the force from attack in a specific dimension: the anti-air warfare commanders synchronize defense of the force from air attack, the anti-surface warfare commander defends against surface attack, the anti-submarine warfare commander defends against submarine attack.

The OTC/CWC concept does not transfer easily to the Operational Functions. Although effective, the OTC/CWC structure was developed to fight a war at sea. The Operational Functions were developed to fight a joint campaign on land, the concepts, as mentioned earlier, emerging from Army doctrine. In the joint environment, sea
control will be a Navy component mission capable of being fought under Navy control using Navy tactics and command structures. Power projection will be a supporting mission, fought on land, integrated and synchronized with other Services supporting the Joint Force Commander, and must be fought with an understanding of the doctrine land forces use to synchronize their warfighting. An Army, Marine, or Air Force commander requires only a general knowledge of the OTC/CWC concept, just as a Navy commander requires only a general knowledge of the Army synchronization of the battlefield operating systems. All four, however, must understand the Joint Operational Functions. Because joint warfare is land-oriented warfare, two of those functions, command and control and maneuver, will pose the greatest challenges. Before those challenges are explored in detail, it is necessary to arrive at a common definition of those terms and establish the parameters for further analysis.

Maneuver

Maneuver in this thesis is used in the context of positioning of forces and does not refer to maneuver warfare. The definition of maneuver as an Operational Function is the disposition of the joint force to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing the operational advantage of position before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success...

The U.S. Navy has no official definition of maneuver, but
would certainly understand the essence of the meaning. Maneuver involves gaining positional advantage over an adversary in order to be positioned to strike a decisive blow. The JTF identifies operational reach and the direct and indirect approaches as critical elements affecting the function of maneuver.

Operational reach is "the distance over which the joint force can be concentrated and employed decisively. It is influenced by geography in relation to friendly and enemy forces." The key element of operational reach is basing. Bases should be "positioned within operational reach of the enemy [and] must be supportable with a sufficient infrastructure." When discussing the direct and indirect approach, the words define the terms. The direct approach involves a linear straightforward attack into an enemy center of gravity. This approach often risks attack into an enemy strength and requires "highly synchronized elements of the joint force" in order to be successful. The indirect approach attacks enemy center of gravity indirectly, that is from an unexpected direction with emphasis on the massing of friendly strength to attack enemy vulnerabilities.

Maneuver from the sea, conducted by sea based, self sustaining Naval Forces provides the Joint Force Commander with the operational reach necessary to attack enemy vulnerabilities.
Command and Control

The JTTP defines command and control as the exercise of authority and direction by the JFC over assigned operational forces..." The analysis of command and control will focus on the lines of authority and procedures used to exercise that direction.

The Integration of Maneuver

From The Sea describes maneuver from the sea as "the tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land," a simple description, but one that does not address the fact that few Naval Officers understand land maneuver. Navy officers understand maneuver at sea. Marine Corps officers understand amphibious operations and have begun to display some understanding of maneuver warfare on land. None of this is sufficient. Maneuver at sea is of importance to Navy officers only and requires little or no integration with other services. Integration of the operational function of maneuver is going to require Navy officers to learn and synthesize an entirely new type of maneuver: maneuver on land, a type of maneuver with its own set of rules, tactics, and dangers. Amphibious warfare, to most Marines, involves a rigid, set piece, direct approach to mission accomplishment. Maneuver in amphibious operations (as such operations have been conducted) involves maneuver in its simplest context: movement of people and equipment from point A to point B for no other purpose than to deposit
those people and assets on point B. The new Naval Service focus on maneuver from the sea provides a golden opportunity to reorient Naval concepts of maneuver. Navy shipping, navy power, amphibious capability, and the emerging Marine Corps maneuver doctrine provide the operational reach and assets to attack from the sea into the heart of enemy centers of gravity.

This transition will be difficult to implement. Maneuver is an art. Those who practice it best do so through an intuitive understanding of capabilities and the execution of capabilities to gain positional advantage over the enemy. That intuitive understanding is gained through years of concentrated application of specific tactics, techniques, and leadership skill. The ability to see a battlefield, to have an artist's understanding of the canvas, is the critical element of maneuver. For the U.S. Navy that battlefield has changed, and it will require concentrated focus on the tenets of land maneuver and continued emphasis on the complexities of sea maneuver to gain the intuitive understanding necessary to execute maneuver from the sea. Adding to this difficulty is the importance of commanders intent and mission type orders to the execution of maneuver. Inherent to both of these is a large element of risk since a mission type order executed with an unclear understanding of intent could be catastrophic. Naval history is replete with examples of
courageous initiative undertaken in the absence of specific orders, but those examples occurred in a battlefield environment that was understood by those involved. In the strange, different environment of land maneuver, that intent will be much less clear; mission type orders much more risky. Flexibility and the agility of forces to adapt to rapidly changing situations is another critical element of land maneuver. The Naval Service has successfully developed very rigid, detailed procedures to conduct carrier and amphibious operations, procedures developed to reduce the danger and extraordinary difficulty of those operations. Those procedures, codified in the Navy centerpieces of power projection, by their nature limit the capability to maneuver from the sea.

The U.S. Marine Corps teaches maneuver, and maneuver warfare, as doctrine. This doctrine has started to permeate tactical operations conducted by land based Marine Forces, but has not translated to the conduct of amphibious operations. Doctrine for amphibious operations is still very linear, very direct. Beaches are secured, force-beachhead lines (FBHL) are established, followed by a breakout from the beachhead or the establishment of a defense to await linkup with other forces. This conservative approach ensures a secure area is established to offload follow-on forces and logistics. Improved technology and capability, such as the helicopter and LCAC,
have been used to increase the enemy difficulty of pinpointing where point B is, but has not been applied to remove the requirement for point B to exist at all. Amphibious forces have the capability to extend their operational reach directly to enemy centers of gravity. Unfortunately, that capability is being used to extend the possible locations of the FBHL. Once ashore, the traditional tactics of amphibious assault are still being used.

For both branches of the Naval Service, it is not capabilities which limit maneuver, it is the imaginative application of those capabilities which limit maneuver. Maneuver is a function of the mind, a state of mind. To integrate naval capabilities into the Operational Function of maneuver, the Naval Services must broaden their minds. That broadening will require education and experimentation. *From The Sea* starts that process. Two of the operational capabilities identified in *From The Sea* speak directly to the issue of maneuver. Battlespace dominance and power projection provide the foundation for a Naval Service doctrine that will provide guidance on the execution of maneuver from the sea.

Battlespace is the "sea, air, and land environment where [the Naval Service] will conduct operations." This battlespace is recognized as being fluid, it expands, contracts, and has limits. Battlespace is no longer the
rigid circular sphere inserted over the carrier battlegroup with an area defined by the flight radius of an F-14. Battlespace is fluid, it changes; changes depending on the situation and mission. Because it is fluid, battlespace, and the application of combat power within that battlespace, must be flexible and capable of adapting to rapidly change situations. As stated in *From The Sea*, "Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval warfare."²

Power projection masses naval power rapidly and at decisive points to project strength against enemy weakness. In one of the most telling passages in *From The Sea*, the authors state that "forces projected ashore can maneuver and build up power rapidly deep in the objective area to disorient, divert, and disrupt the enemy."² The buzzwords of land maneuver have crept into Naval strategy. The awakening of new thought is subtly encouraged. Possibilities become limited by the mind and not tradition. Chapter V will discuss the means to encourage these possibilities so that a realistic doctrine of maneuver can be applied to the joint environment.

The Integration of Command and Control

The Naval Service shift of focus from sea control to power projection in a joint arena requires a reexamination of the Naval Services traditional command and control structure. This section will discuss the definition of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF), the integration of
the NETF into a joint command and control structure, an analysis of who should command the NETF, and a discussion of the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) relationship.

Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF)

The concept of an NETF evolved from a description in *From The Sea* of Naval Forces as "expeditionary". This adjective describes "service overseas - at sea or in the field. It also reflect an inherent state of mind: to be constantly prepared for immediate deployment...in an austere environment." The adjective became a noun when this definition was combined with the "Notional Expeditionary Force Package" referred to in *From The Sea*. This force package is a toolbox (to use General Powell's analogy) available to Unified Commanders from which forces can be tailored to accomplish specific missions.

*From The Sea* lists seven tools available from the Naval Services toolbox: (1) aircraft carrier and air wing, (2) amphibious ships with embarked marines, (3) surface combatants, (4) navy special warfare forces, (5) submarines, (6) maritime patrol aircraft, and (7) mine Warfare Forces. These forces, when tailored, become a NETF, but the precise definition of an NETF has eluded comment. To discuss the integration of the NETF into a Joint Command, we must define the term. The definition of a NETF, for the purposes of this thesis, will be a Naval Force task
organized to accomplish one of three missions: sea control, power projection, or a combination of sea control and power projection. The first two are unilateral missions: sea control with no requirement for power projection; power projection with no requirement for sea control. An example of the former would be convoy escort. An example of the latter would be Operation Sharp Edge - the evacuation of Liberia. The third mission requires sea control to accomplish power projection (Inchon) or the projection of power to accomplish sea control (Operation Preying Mantis, Guadalcanal). Naval missions that do not require the tailoring of assets from the "toolbox" (ballistic missile submarines, sealift with no escort required) would not constitute a NETF. Since no task organizing is required to ensure mission accomplishment, no unique command and control arrangement is necessary.

The analysis of the integration of the NETF into the joint arena will discuss each mission separately. Forces are tailored, or task organized, according to that force’s mission, or purpose. The command and control structure should also be tailored to that forces mission. The NETF Commander will be designated the OTC. In that capacity, as discussed earlier, the NETF Commander is responsible for mission accomplishment, he should focus on his offensive mission, and can delegate responsibility for certain defensive responsibilities. The CWC, a defensive command
and control relationship, is not affected by mission type since all NETF's will be required to protect themselves.

Mission: Sea Control

Sea control is a U.S. Navy mission. The NETF OTC tasked with a sea control mission will report to a component commander or a Joint Force Commander (JFC), but the internal command structure of the NETF will be organized using established Navy procedures.

If forces from other services are tasked to support a sea control mission, the NETF OTC can be designated a JFC and those forces provided to him under tactical control (TACON).

Mission: Power Projection

Power is projected from the sea by Naval Forces or by Joint Forces.

Power projected by Naval Forces is a naval service mission. The NETF OTC will report to a component or JFC, but the internal structure below the NETF OTC will be organized using established Naval Service procedures.

When power is projected by Joint Forces, the NETF OTC can be designated the JFC and elements of the other services organized within that Joint Task Force (JTF) along functional or component lines. The NETF OTC can also be subordinate to a designated JFC as the Maritime Component Commander with responsibility for the execution of the naval service mission.
Mission: Power Projection and Sea Control

Command structure for this mission will be dependent on the relationship between sea control and power projection.

If the purpose of power projection is to support sea control, the command structure will be the same as the sea control mission.

Conversely, if the purpose of sea control is to support power projection, the command structure will be the same as the power projection mission.

Summary

A search for an absolute command and control structure is doomed to failure. The organization of a command is dependent on the mission of the command; the structure of the command should reflect the mission of those forces commanded. Along those lines, a JFC or Maritime Component Commander can task organize several Naval Expeditionary Task Forces within his area of operations, each NETF organized to accomplish a specific mission, the command structure of each NETF reflecting that mission.

Command of the NETF

This section will discuss who should be designated as the OTC of a NETF.

The traditional organization of Naval Service assets to accomplish specific objectives is changing as a result of
the shift in priorities called for in From The Sea. A premise of this thesis is that the shift will result in a balance between power projection and sea control. In an era of ill-defined, multiple threats, the Naval Service has recognized the necessity of flexibility in the organization of Naval Service capabilities. This flexibility should extend to the issue of command. A Naval Service willing to task organize according to the mission assigned must also be willing to place in command an officer whose training and experience provide the focus necessary to place overriding importance on the offensive mission assigned.

A NETF, as determined earlier, is formed to accomplish one of three missions. The purpose of each mission should determine what officer is best suited to command.

Mission: Sea Control

Sea Control is a U.S. Navy mission. The purpose of sea control is to gain and maintain maritime supremacy, a mission for which the U.S. Navy is best suited by training and experience. The OTC for a sea control mission should be a U.S. Navy officer.

Mission: Power Projection

A naval force task organized for the purpose of projecting navy air power, missile power or gunfire ashore should be commanded by a U.S. Navy officer. The 1986 raid
on Libya provides the power projection example for this type of mission.

A naval force task organized for the purpose of projecting amphibious power ashore should be commanded by a Marine Corps officer. The mission model for this type of operation would be Operation Restore Hope, the peacekeeping mission in Beirut from 1984-1985, or the assault on Grenada.

**Mission: Power Projection and Sea Control**

If the purpose of power projection is to support sea control, the OTC should be a U.S. Navy officer. The example for this situation would be the island campaign in the Central Pacific Ocean Area during World War II.

If the purpose of sea control is to support power projection, the OTC should be determined by the preponderance of Naval assets used to accomplish the mission. A mission where the majority of power projected is Navy power, with a small or absent amphibious force, the OTC should be a U.S. Navy officer. A mission whose primary purpose is to project amphibious power ashore should be commanded by a U.S. Marine officer. Inchon provides an example of this type of mission.

There is a danger in using historic examples to illustrate this point. The command structure appears to have worked in those examples, and if it worked then, it should work now. That, in fact, is the response of most Marine Corps officers to whom this idea is presented. To
describe the reaction of Navy officers, we must refer to the reformation analogy noted on page 2 and then describe that reaction as akin to Pope Leo's reaction to Martin Luther's declaration that the Pope was not infallible. Because of this resistance, I will address the two primary arguments advanced in defense of the status quo.

The first argument states that the command structure in place, i.e., Navy officers in command, has worked in the past and will continue to work. This argument does not recognize the "fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea." The present command structure focuses on sea control and is organized to fight a war in which sea control is the first priority of a Naval Service. The historic examples occurred when sea control was the primary mission of the Naval Service and power projection was always subordinate to that mission. In those circumstances, it makes sense to have a commander who understands maneuver on the sea. There will be times in the future when sea control will be an assigned mission, and in those circumstances, the OTC should be a U.S. Navy officer. However, the fundamental shift addressed in *From The Sea* is the shift of power projection to the priority mission of the Naval Services. This thesis has recognized that power projection will require sea control, but if power projection is the primary mission of the Naval Services, and amphibious forces
conducting land maneuvers are the centerpiece of a specific power projection mission, then it makes sense to have a Commander who understands maneuver on land. If the centerpiece of a specific power projection mission is navy air, missiles, or gunfire, then the Commander should be an officer who understands how best to employ those assets from the sea, in this case, a Navy officer. The Naval Service cannot claim a fundamental shift in focus without a reasonable shift of command structure.

The second argument has two parts. The first part centers on the argument that a Marine Corps officer does not know how to fight or position ships. The second part centers on the argument that Navy officers will not endanger their ships to support an amphibious power projection mission.

The answer to the first argument is that while it may be true, it is also irrelevant. When amphibious assaults supported sea control, the Navy OTC was capable of positioning and fighting ships yet did not know how to fight on land. The subordinate mission, power projection, was entrusted to an officer who understood the peculiarities of land maneuver. This allowed the OTC to focus on the offensive mission of overriding importance, in this case sea control.

When sea control supports amphibious power projection, the OTC must be capable of fighting on land.
The subordinate mission, sea control, will be entrusted to an officer who understands the peculiarities of war at sea, thus allowing the OTC to focus on the offensive mission of overriding importance, in this case, amphibious power projection.

The second part of the argument is valid in a mission where sea control is more important than power projection. When sea control has priority, the assets capable of gaining and maintaining sea control must be protected at the expense of the power projection mission. This is the Guadalcanal argument, and whether or not one agrees with Admiral Fletcher’s actions, this example has become so ingrained in Naval Service mythology that the purpose of the Guadalcanal campaign, sea control, is not evaluated against Fletcher’s decision.

When power projection has priority, assets providing sea control must protect that power projection capability at the possible expense of ships, aircraft, or lives. Naval officers who argue the impracticality or impossibility of the Naval Service accepting this statement would do well to recall the Vicksburg Campaign or the amphibious assault on Normandy - when the Captains of several destroyers risked their ships and men, at times running ships aground, in order to provide naval gunfire support to Omaha beach. Chapter V will complete the circle between this issue and maneuver. This section will close with the statement that
the Naval Services should put in command of a NETF men who
best understand their assigned offensive mission.

CATF/CLF

This section will discuss the integration of the
CATF/CLF arrangement into the NETF concept.

Two points require clarification. First, in keeping
with our definition of a NETF, amphibious ships with
embarked Marines (ARG) do not constitute a NETF since an ARG
in its entirety is just one tool, not a combination of
tools. An ARG, task organized with other Naval Service
tools, can be part of a NETF or can be employed separately.
Second, a Marine officer commanding a NETF will not be
Commander Landing Force (CLF). The two billets must remain
separate.

The CATF/CLF relationship generates a great deal of
discussion and has had its share of problems. Prior to
Goldwater-Nichols, the CATF/CLF command structure was
unique. Today the relationship approximates a combination
of the tactical control (TACON) and support concept
frequently used in a joint environment.

A major point of discussion is how to integrate CATF
and CLF into the navy command structure. Attempts have been
made to insert CLF into the CWC structure, an attempt that
fails since amphibious operations are offensive and the
purpose of the CWC is to coordinate defense. The fluid
relationship between CATF and CLF is the origin of the sense
that CLF needs a solid place on the wire diagram.

During the planning for amphibious operations, CATF and CLF are, by Joint Doctrine, coequal. Realistically, they take turns having responsibility for a sequence of decisions that begin and end with decisions made by CATF. If the two men get along, this process is conducted in a professional manner with a sense of common purpose. If the two men do not get along, this becomes an arduous, contentious process. In either case, disputes between CATF and CLF are resolved by the next higher commander. During execution, CLF is subordinate to CATF until such time as control of land forces is passed ashore. To put the relationship in joint language, CLF provides direct support to CATF. Once control is passed ashore normally, but not always, the CATF/CLF relationship is dissolved. This transfer of control is designated in the initiating directive issued, according to Joint Doctrine, by the common higher commander.

An understanding of the purpose and use of the initiating directive is critical to the CATF/CLF command structure. The author of the directive must precisely delineate command relationships, precisely specify when control is passed ashore, and precisely specify command relationships for CLF and CATF once control is passed ashore. If the initiating directive is used properly, the current CATF/CLF structure should remain essentially the
same. The term "essentially" is used because there must be flexibility built in to the structure. There may be times when control is not passed ashore, times when CATF assumes a supporting role and provides direct support to CLF, and times when the traditional relationship remains intact. The CATF/CLF relationship will be mission dependent and should be organized to accomplish that mission.

If the initiating directive is used properly, the remaining problem results from differences in opinion between CATF and CLF. These differences normally result from competing requirements perceived as essential to each officer’s mission, and are, by doctrine, resolved by their common commander. When an ARG is employed as part of a NETF that is organized and commanded as discussed earlier, that commander will be an OTC selected because of his capability to perform the mission assigned and will resolve differences in accordance with the requirements of that assigned mission.

NETF Doctrine

The purpose of doctrine is to provide "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions.... Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgement in application." There are no doctrinal absolutes. This proposed NETF command structure should be applied with a strong mission focus and a great deal of common sense. The concept of the NETF provides building blocks the Naval
Service can integrate into a Joint Command Structure or can stack under a Maritime Component Commander. The following diagrams provide examples of how this doctrine might be applied. As U.S. Army units can be involved in amphibious operations, all references to an ARG in a diagram refer to Army or Marine units with the understanding that CLF is always the commander of the embarked service, or, in the case of Army and Marine forces, the senior officer embarked.

1. A NETF task organized for a sea control mission.

\[
\text{NETF} \\
\text{\quad (OTC:USN)}
\]

\[
\text{Carrier Battle Group} \quad \text{Surface Action Group (SAG)} \quad \text{Mine Warfare Group (MHC)}
\]

2. A NETF task organized for a sea control mission supported by Air Force aircraft.

\[
\text{NETF/JTF} \\
\text{\quad (JFC/OTC:USN)}
\]

\[
\text{CVBG} \quad \text{USN Maritime Patrol Aircraft (VP)} \quad \text{Air Force Component (AFC)}
\]

3. A NETF organized for a power projection mission using U.S. Navy assets.

\[
\text{NETF} \\
\text{\quad (OTC:USN)}
\]

\[
\text{Carrier SAG} \quad \text{Navy Special Warfare (SpecWar)}
\]
4. A NETF organized for a power projection mission involving maneuver forces placed ashore. This example is modeled after the organization used for the evacuation of Liberia.

```
NETF
(OTC:USMC)

| Amphibious Ready Destroyer SpecWar Group (ARG) (DDG) |
```

5. A NETF organized for a power projection mission supported by Joint Special Operations Command.

```
NETF/JTF
(JFC/OTC:USN)

| CVN MHC JSOTF |
```

--- or ---

```
NETF/JTF
(JFC/OTC:USN)

| ARG MHC JSOTF |
```

6. A NETF organized to project power in order to achieve sea control.

```
NETF
(OTC:USN)

| CVBG ARG MHC |
```

7. A NETF organized to achieve sea control in order to project power using U.S. Navy Assets.

```
NETF
(OTC:USN)

| CVBG SAG MHC |
```
8. A NETF organized to achieve sea control in order to project amphibious power.

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<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>CVN MHC</td>
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9. A NETF organized to achieve sea control in order to project power ashore. The preponderance of assets used to project power are U.S. Navy.

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<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>CVBG</td>
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Examples 6 through 9 can be integrated into a Joint Command structure by designating the OTC as the JFC and the NETF as a JTF as was illustrated in previous examples.

10. A NETF organized to fight in a major regional contingency requiring balance of sea control and power projection.

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<td>NETF (OTC:USN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBG VP Submarine</td>
<td>CVN ARG MHC</td>
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11. A NETF organized to fight in a major regional contingency with the MCC designated as the JFC.

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<td>NETF (OTC:USN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFC ARMY COMPONENT</td>
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12. The MCC organized as a functional component of a JTF.

MCC AFCC Army JSOTF
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**Challenges**

Technology normally drives doctrine. The integration of technological capabilities and limitations into "the way we fight" requires experimentation and education. When new technology is fielded, a military normally fights old doctrine with new weapons until a new doctrine is developed. The Naval Services, as noted by Jan Breemer, have become an exception to that theory. With the publication of *From The Sea* the Naval Service is fighting new doctrine with old technology. More precisely, the U.S. Navy is attempting to execute the "tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land" with technology built for warfare at sea. This has presented some challenges. This section will quickly review some major challenges as the Naval Service attempts to overcome those difficulties. This will be a general analysis and not a detailed evaluation of technology or specific programs.

The broad spectrum of threats in the littoral includes mines, coastal batteries, sea-skimming missiles launched from shore, and diesel submarines. For the latter three threats, the U.S. Navy has the capability to defeat
the threat but lacks the training in how to apply that capability. This problem can be overcome with increased training emphasis and experimentation with the application of existing weapon technology to defeat threats in the littoral. The fourth littoral threat, mines, is a threat almost ignored by the U.S. Navy. During the Cold War, our NATO allies provided the bulk of the mine warfare capability and expertise. No mine warfare ships were built for the U.S. Navy between 1958 and 1987. Mine warfare was normally fought with ad hoc means. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the mine problem severely limited amphibious operations. Minesweeping ships deployed to the Persian Gulf arrived on 27 February 1991, after the completion of Desert Storm. The Navy recognizes the severity of the mine warfare problem and has undertaken several programs to correct it. Increased training and the requirement to emphasize training in mine warfare is a CNO priority. The Navy will convert USS Inchon (LPH-12) to a mine warfare command ship and has funded construction of nine glass-reinforced-plastic minesweeper hunters (the first of these, the USS Osprey (MHC-51), was commissioned in November 1993).

Challenges in power projection include lack of heavy naval fire support, limitations of executing close air support from a carrier deck, and requirements for an advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) and a replacement.
for the CH-46 helicopter. The challenges listed all involve support for amphibious operations. Projection of navy power ashore (Tomahawk, airpower) is a developed capability. Amphibious power projection was not a priority during the Maritime Strategy era. Capabilities were allowed to atrophy.

Naval gunfire support provided by destroyers or frigates is limited by range and limiting to amphibious maneuver. The Navy and Marine Corps have recognized the problem and are evaluating a modification to the Army Tactical Missile (ATACMS) that would allow launch from a sea borne platform. New technologies are also being evaluated; however, this weakness could plague power projection capability for years to come.

Close air support, to be effective, must be immediately responsive to the requirements of the ground force commander. Legitimate requirements for carrier protection and air interdiction missions limit close air support capabilities. The Navy has experimented with different carrier configurations to solve this problem, assigning one of two carriers a close air support mission and the second carrier the requirement to provide combat air patrol for both carriers.

The CH-46 and assault amphibian vehicle (AAV) limit operational reach and consequently, maneuver from the sea; the former due to age, the latter to speed. The Marine
Corps is developing the V-22 Osprey to replace the CH-46 and the AAAV to replace the AAV. The Osprey, after years of budgetary combat, found recognition in the Fiscal Year 94 budget. Funding for developing the AAAV is also included in the FY-94 budget. Both are high priority for the Marine Corps. Both are years away from production and integration into the amphibious capability.

The final, and largest challenge facing the Naval Services will be to gain acceptance of From The Sea from Sailors and Marines. This will require a radical shift in education and thought. The culture of the Naval Services must change, a change that may require decades of focus on the tenets of From The Sea to bring about. This issue will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter V.
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7. Ibid., 2.

8. Ibid., 8.


10. Ibid., 10.


14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., II-14.

19. Ibid.
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21. Ibid., II-17.
22. From The Sea, 10.
23. Ibid., 8.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 9.
27. From The Sea, 6.
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31. FM 100-5 Operations, Glossary-3.
33. Ibid., 152.
34. Ibid., 205.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

From The Sea

From The Sea provides a strategic vision for the Naval Services. The white paper provides broad guidance for the employment of Naval Forces in support of national policy. From The Sea describes the "what" of naval strategy - what the Naval Services are expected to contribute, what the capabilities and limitation of the Naval Services are, and what must be done to correct existing limitations. The white paper has some flaws. However, as stated earlier, the vision articulated in the white paper is a beginning, a roadmap for change. As this vision is adapted to real time circumstances, the Naval Service will achieve a balance between the requirement for sea control and the requirement for power projections.

There are two major flaws in From The Sea, both of which must be corrected for the vision to become doctrine. The first flaw is the context of the statement that control of the seas is assumed. The second flaw is the intended meaning of the above statement applied to a littoral environment.

The sentence in From The Sea claiming that the United
States can assume control of the sea provides most of the fodder for the document’s critics. The flaw is the author’s failure to articulate the intent of the statement; by inserting it unexplained and unsupported into the introduction to *From The Sea* the authors provided ample opportunity for misinterpretation. Arguments over the worth of *From The Sea* rapidly become entangled in historical and current examples of why the Navy should not and cannot claim "preeminent control of the seas." This author believes the white paper’s intent was that control of the seas must be assumed in order for the basic premise of *From The Sea*, the shift in emphasis to projection of power from the littoral, to be valid. Therefore, the basic requirement to execute *From The Sea* is sea control. The Naval Services have not abandoned the sea control mission nor are they ignorant of potential threats to sea control. It is unfortunate this point is not articulated well in *From The Sea*. A reader’s interpretation of "assume" blocks further understanding of the white paper. The Department of the Navy needs to articulate the role of sea control in *From The Sea* in precise, deliberate language to educate and, in a very real sense, persuade the Naval Service that *From The Sea* does not assume away the need for sea control.

The second flaw is easily corrected. The littoral must be considered as part of the sea. Control of the littoral sea is a critical requirement of power projection. The
Naval Service must broaden the definition of sea control to include all of the sea, not just blue water ocean. This new definition of sea control must then be hammered into the Naval Service culture.

Correction of these flaws will negate much of the criticism of *From The Sea* and allow the Naval Services to concentrate on their primary, overriding function: control of the sea so that power can be projected ashore.

A strength of the Naval Service is a tendency to build her strategies on historical foundations. *From The Sea* is not an exception, but the interpretation of this vision into doctrine must remain true to historical precedent. This cannot be accomplished by blind traditional adherence to sea control as the fundamental function of a Navy. *From The Sea* must be interpreted through an objective analysis of history; a history that provides splendid examples of sea control, power projection, and a combination of both. As the Naval Service builds a new doctrine, she would be wise to post in the halls of Naval Doctrine Command the following quote from Mahan: "...there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant. It is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ." An objective analysis of Naval history reveals many constants: control of the sea is necessary for power projection; there will be times when power projection is more important than sea control, times
when sea control is required independent of power projection and times when a negligible threat allows power projection to be independent of sea control. An analysis of the post Cold War world reveals things that differ: credible regional threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the intent to project power ashore as a decisive and sustainable element of Joint Warfare. *From The Sea* is the first step in the development of a doctrine that will wed the lessons of history to the realities of a post Cold War world. It is timely, necessary, and an adequate framework for the building of a doctrine.

**Maneuver**

Maneuver on land is different from maneuver at sea. Joint operations, by nature, are land campaigns. Maneuver on land is the decisive form of warfare. Naval Service doctrine on maneuver must begin with the premise that naval officers must have a solid, cultural understanding of land maneuver. A second premise is that other services do not require an understanding of maneuver at sea.

Tenets of land maneuver must be emphasized during Officer Education. From the Naval Academy, through the basic schools, to the Naval War College, officers should be required to study *FM 100-5 Operations, FMFM-1 Warfighting* and historical land campaigns. This study should concentrate on Naval Service support to land campaigns with particular focus on the use of Naval assets to compensate
for land forces limitations and the use of Naval assets to bring decisive power to bear on land. Teach officers to study the sea for positional leverage against land forces, teach officers to articulate capabilities, limitations, and their knowledge of land maneuver. This study must not replace the education and training of Naval Service officers to fight at sea or from the sea, but must be given more than passing attention. A Naval Service serious about operational maneuver from the sea must develop a Naval Service culture that understands land maneuver as well as sea maneuver. This change will take time and will not occur unless the Department of the Navy focuses resources and sustained support to educate naval officers how to maneuver from the sea, on to land, as a decisive element of a Joint Force.

The Naval Service needs to expand the concept of amphibious maneuver. Amphibious maneuver combined with other power projection capabilities provides the Joint Force Commander with extraordinary operational reach and opportunity to execute the indirect approach. These capabilities will not be realized if the Marine Corps does not reshape amphibious landing doctrine. Naval Forces can attack deep into enemy operational centers of gravity, withdraw to naval shipping then attack again to reinforce success in a different direction. Naval Forces can exploit and penetrate gaps to conduct envelopment or turning
movements from the sea. Such maneuver will require extraordinary thought and practice; amphibious assault is a complicated business. The only operation more difficult is a tactical backload, an operation that, along with sustainment of land forces from a ship instead of a beachhead, must be practiced in order for operational maneuver from the sea to become a reality. Amphibious operations must focus on decisive maneuver from the sea. Securing a FBHL is not a decisive maneuver and should no longer be the purpose of an amphibious assault or the focus of the CATF/CLF relationship.

Naval Doctrine Command should develop a capstone document similar to FM 100-5 Operations and FMFM-1 Warfighting to describe maneuver from the sea and the doctrinal concepts to guide that maneuver. Publication must be preceded by experimentation of different concepts to ensure validity of developed ideas. Codify maneuver doctrine that allows imaginative application of capabilities, base that doctrine on realistic experimentation, then allow the doctrine to evolve. Open the minds of officers. Maneuver is an art. Teach it as such. Integrate land and sea maneuver with intelligent application and the Naval Services can set the standard for Joint maneuver.

Command and Control

The Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) concept must
be defined before doctrine on it is developed. However
defined, the purpose of the expeditionary force must remain
a paramount consideration: the NETF must be a tailored,
flexible force. Doctrine concerning the organization and
control of the NETF must not deal in absolutes. Not every
circumstance can be foreseen, not every example will be
applicable. The NETF should provide a structure or
framework for the organization of naval service assets to
accomplish a specific mission. Pieces of the NETF must be
movable; forces must be capable of being shifted from one
NETF to another. NETFs can be organized under a larger
naval command or large NETF built from subordinate NETFs
task organized for different missions. Flexibility in
action and thought is necessary to this concept. A NETF
should be task organized according to mission.

Command of that NETF should be given to the officer
best able to accomplish a given mission. U.S. Marine Corps
officers should command NETFs organized for the primary
purpose of amphibious power projection and land maneuver.
Mission focus and capability should determine command. The
intricacies and technology of maneuver at sea is a U.S. Navy
function. Sea control is a navy function. If these are
primary, U.S. Navy officers should command, U.S. Marine
Officer's provide support. The converse is also true.
Amphibious power projection is a Marine Corps function. If
it is primary, U.S. Marine Corps officers should command,
U.S. Navy officers provide support. The precedent for this type of command flexibility exists in the joint environment as the "supporting" and "supported" relationship.

**Naval Service Culture**

For *From The Sea* to be successful the Naval Services must adapt their service culture to incorporate the white paper vision. The Navy and the Marine Corps will not be doing anything different from what has been done in the past. Admiral Watkin's comments concerning *The Maritime Strategy* are germane; the Naval service is subjecting an extant strategy to the rigor of codification. The difficulty results from a misunderstanding of that extant strategy. The Naval Services project power, control the sea, and at times do both, at times priorities will change. This reality is acknowledged in *From The Sea*. *From The Sea* also acknowledges the requirement to project power as a priority in support of Joint Operations. Suddenly the supported become supporting players. That realization may be difficult for some Naval officers to accept. To execute *From The Sea*, some fundamental cultural changes must be made. Command of Naval Forces is one already addressed. The littoral sea as a priority for sea control is a second. The relative standing and respect accorded the "Gator Navy" is a signature issue for the willingness of the Naval Service to execute the vision of *From The Sea*. Will the Navy force feed the amphibious forces quality entry level
officers? Will the "Gator Navy" be voluntarily requested by service school students in a decade? If the answers to these questions, and questions raised by previous issues is "yes", the seriousness of the Naval Service will be signalled even more clearly than a restructuring of funding or emphasis on types of weapon systems.

*From The Sea* can be translated into doctrine that integrates Naval Service capabilities with the Joint Operational functions of command and control and maneuver. *From The Sea* can become doctrine if the Naval Services look to capabilities and missions, and then integrate both into the joint arena through intelligent discourse and publication. *From The Sea* will become doctrine if the Naval Services truly reorient culture, thought, and focus to the requirements and relationship of power projection and sea control.

**Topics For Further Research**

This thesis does not address command and control of combined operations. The integration of combined forces into any Naval Service command structure developed as a result of *From The Sea* will require innovation and flexibility. The traditional independence of all Navy Commanders, regardless of nationality, further complicates an already complex issue. An understanding and analysis of other nation's navies and command traditions would be essential to the topic. While probably not feasible until
Naval Doctrine Command publishes basic command and control concepts, a detailed study of this issue will be crucial to future U.S. Naval Service operations conducted from the sea.

The second issue that requires further study is the logistic sustainability of U.S. Marine forces projected ashore. Current logistical planning limits operational maneuver for Marine forces. The vision of From The Sea anticipates a capability to project power ashore from over the horizon, sustain Marines ashore directly from shipping (thus removing the beachhead requirement), and the ability to supply Marine Forces ashore for sustained operation. All of these capabilities are pipedreams until a logistical infrastructure is developed to support emerging maneuver concepts. Further study of the logistical requirements to execute future Naval Service maneuver is necessary.
Notes


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CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 04/03/94

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3. Thesis Title: Vision to Practice: The Translation of From The Sea into Joint Doctrine

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