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**Army**

The media and the US Army... you don't always get what you need... you may just get what you want. You may just get what you need. You may just get what you need.
The Media and The U.S. Army: You Don’t Always Get What You Want; You May Just Get What You Need.

A Monograph
by
Major Clinton D. Esarey
Special Forces

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Major Clinton D. Esarey, USA

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School of Advanced Military Studies
Attn: AT2L-5 SW
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
Com (913) 248-3437 AV 552-3437

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Approved by:

Howard S. Floras
Monograph Director

Robert H. Berlin
Deputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director, Graduate Degree Program

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ABSTRACT


Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the United States Army must successfully wield new information technologies to ensure land force dominance into the twenty-first century. Currently, the Army is developing an Information Operations Concept that describes the framework for the Army to conduct information warfare; however, the concept only generically treats the dynamic to move information from the battlefield to external audiences such as the American people. Because the media-military relationship will be instrumental in acquiring and disseminating information to the American people, understanding and invoking a stable relationship is of enduring importance to the Army and the nation. Therefore, the purpose of this monograph is to examine the characteristics of the U.S. media--Army relationship in the twenty-first century.

This monograph begins by reviewing the modern development of the U.S. media--Army relationship from 1962 to the present. This review highlights the relationship during the Vietnam War (1962-1968), Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and the Gulf War. The purpose of this review is to glean the needs and expectations of both institutions from the lessons learned. The monograph then reviews and discusses current writings concerning the Army and the media in the twenty-first century. The monograph concludes by synthesizing the historical needs and expectations of the media and the Army with the applicable characteristics of twenty-first century warfare, evaluating net effects and coming to some conclusions regarding the future relationship between the U.S. news media and the U.S. Army.

This monograph concludes that the twenty-first century U.S. news media--U.S. Army relationship must feature a common, overarching strategy that is founded on interdependence and implemented with decentralized execution by a synthesized organization. The relationship must place its priority on providing the American people with the Army story while taking full advantage of emerging capabilities that reduce the Army's concerns to an institutionally acceptable level.
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Chapter I

Introduction

We must be constantly aware of the changing media environment, its effect on the opinions, attitudes and beliefs held by the American public, our political leaders, our soldiers, their families and other important audiences, and the impact of those opinions, attitudes and beliefs on our force and our missions. Major General Charles W. McClain, Jr., Chief of Army Public Affairs

Recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, stated that the United States Army must successfully wield new information technologies to win the battlefield information war. His comments refer to the Army's current modernization vision for ensuring land force dominance into the twenty-first century.

The Army is currently finalizing an Information Operations Concept that "describes the framework for the Army to conduct information warfare...defines Information Operations in terms of its role as a strategy, and describes the requirements necessary for its planning and implementation...." This concept acknowledges its focus "at the operational and tactical levels of war;" furthermore, it concentrates on the internal dynamics of battle. The concept generically treats the dynamic to move information from the battlefield to external audiences under the term Global Information Environment or GIE. The concept has the following proposed definition for GIE.

Non-Department of Defense Information Systems (Media, Government Agencies, Non-governmental Organizations, International Organizations,
Foreign Governments, and Industry) which collect, process, and disseminate information about operations. These systems largely operate autonomously and are not subject to control by the Army. The information they publish is accessible to all interested parties and can significantly impact decision making and execution.

However, the concept does not discuss the doctrinal requirement, specified in FM 100-5, Operations, to satisfy the American public's right to "timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations." In its study of the media-military relationship, the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force acknowledged,

> The presence of journalists in war zones is not a luxury, but a necessity. Imperfect though it is, our independent press serves as the vital link between the battlefield and the home front, reporting on the military's success, failures and sacrifices.

Second, the concept does not address what Colonel (Ret.) Harry G. Summers pointed out in a May 1986 Military Review article. "It is the media that must serve as the first line of defense against the propaganda onslaughts of our adversaries." Summers noted, "Neither the Army nor the government can protect us from an enemy's psychological power--from the onslaught of his state-controlled media on the strategic center of gravity encompassed by American public opinion."

Recognizing the importance of American public opinion, former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger listed the "support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress" as one of six major tests for
the employment of U.S. combat forces abroad. Assuming that
the media-military relationship will continue to be
instrumental in acquiring and maintaining this support,
understanding and invoking a stable relationship is of
enduring importance to the Army and the nation. Therefore,
the purpose of this monograph is to examine the
characteristics of the U.S. media—Army relationship in the
twenty-first century.

Scope

This monograph does not attempt to justify the idea of a
"modernized" Clausewitzian trinity of people, their
government, and their military that includes the media in
some capacity. It does not attempt to validate the idea that
public opinion is representative of Clausewitz's concept of
moral centers of gravity.

Rather, this monograph accepts as fact that the United
States is a democratic society where the media provides "the
links" between the people and their government and their
military, and where the media has a profound ability to shape
and mold public opinion. In America, a free and unfettered
press performs two critical functions in this regard. With
its skeptical eye, it scrutinizes the actions of the
government and the military. Second, it is the means through
which an informed American public examines "all sides of an
issue in order to arrive at a reasonable decision" regarding
the major issues of the day.
Second, this monograph is intentionally ethnocentric. It is ethnocentric in the sense that it is dealing singularly with the American people, the American media and the U.S. Army. This of course excludes the international media and the Other Services but this is acceptable given the monograph's stated focus on the Army's concept of Information War.

Methodology

This monograph begins by reviewing the modern development of the U.S. news media-U.S. Army relationship from 1962 to the present. This review highlights the relationship during the Vietnam War (1962-1968), Operation URGENT FURY, Operation JUST CAUSE, and the Gulf War. The purpose of this review is to glean the needs and expectations of both institutions from the lessons learned. Chapter three reviews and discusses current writings concerning the Army and the media in the twenty-first century. This includes the perspectives from both civilian and military futurists. The monograph concludes by synthesizing the historical needs and expectations of the media and the Army with the applicable characteristics of twenty-first century warfare, evaluating net effects and coming to some conclusions regarding the future of the relationship between the U.S. news media and the U.S. Army.
Chapter II

The U.S. Media-U.S. Army Relationship

The relationship relies on developing an understanding of each other's special needs, and a confidence on the one hand that the media are hearing the truth, and on the other that it will be reported accurately, proportionately and without bias.14

This chapter examines the historical evolution of the contemporary media-Army relationship. The purpose of this review is to identify, reflect on and better understand the needs and expectations of both institutions.

The Vietnam War

No single period in American history has resulted in more damage to the media-Army relationship than the "cumulative effect"15 of the Vietnam War. William Hammond examined the tensions and controversies that resulted in this effect in his book, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. This book, one in an official military series on the U.S. Army in Vietnam, drew "upon previously unavailable Army and Defense Department records to interpret the role the press played during the war."16

Throughout the book, Hammond points out that journalists had access to and mobility on the battlefield, access to soldiers and commanders, access to official military information to include classified and operationally sensitive information, and assured communications and transmissions. These resources were a direct result of the voluntary support provided to journalists by the Army.
The Army invoked no censorship of media products"; rather, the media agreed to voluntary restraint and complied with clearly articulated operational security guidelines "that largely eliminated security problems but left reporters free to comment on the inconsistencies that plagued the U.S. effort."\(^2\)

All of these factors combined to characterize an amenable relationship where an institution, who had a story that needed telling, had it told by an institution that needed a story to tell. Unfortunately, the story of the Vietnam war, in which the U.S. Army was just a supporting character, was ambiguous and increasingly unpopular.

In his speech to the International Conference on the topic of Defence and the Media in Time of Limited Conflict held in Brisbane during 3-5 April 1991, General (Ret.) Michael J. Dugan, the US Air Force Chief of Staff until he was relieved for his remarks to the press during the Gulf War in 1990, assessed the Vietnam story.

> In the United States there is a good deal of ill-feeling among military members about the role of the press in the Vietnam War. The media sought out and reported the story that the facts prompted. In many cases there was a bad story to tell. A ten-year war on remote foreign soil will almost always be a bad story in a liberal democracy...The easiest way for defense establishments to manage the media is to generate a compelling story.\(^1\)

Hammond highlights several negative story lines "that found their way into the press with disconcerting regularity."\(^2\)
- The repressive and controversial nature of a South Vietnamese government in continuous transition.

- U.S. political and military manipulation of the truth about a war that was not clear-cut to the American people, their government and their military.

- The fanatical ruthlessness of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.

- The valiant but perhaps irrelevant effort by a U.S. led military coalition that defended an emerging democracy whose national leaders had neither the training nor inclination to maintain democratic legitimacy.

- The ever increasing volume of American casualties that resulted in the proportional decline in American public support of the war.

However, it was the conduct of the story's portrayal that resulted in the acrimonious cry of distortion and betrayal by both the media and the Army. Peter Braestrup, a Vietnam war correspondent for the Washington Post, summed up his views on the divergence between the media and the Army.

The "truth" of the war had been masked by statistics, official sleight of hand, a public relations campaign, and a lack of candor with the media and, in the long run, the American people...The military, on the other hand, felt that their significant efforts and sacrifices in an unappreciated war were being undermined by a media which was searching for a sensational story and had appointed itself as a disinterested third observer to an essentially distasteful contest in the backwaters of Southeast Asia.

Hammond discusses incidents of indiscretion on the part of both institutions that also added to the divergence between them. "The military tended increasingly to blame the press for the credibility problems they experienced, accusing television news in particular of turning the American public against the war." For its part, the press often "created
news where none existed...while failing to make the most of what legitimate news did exist.\textsuperscript{25} However, in the end, the bulk of reporting "reproduced the official point of view."\textsuperscript{26}

Unfortunately, this official point of view was as ambiguous as the war itself. Even after a quarter of a century, military pundits continue the debate over the genre and substance of the Vietnam War. It is doubtful if the official point of view given from 1962 through 1968 could have ever adequately explained away the discrepancy between American military involvement in Vietnam and the results. Ultimately, in the aftermath of Tet '68, in spite of all its efforts, the U.S. Army "had failed to secure South Vietnam, or to demonstrate convincingly that they would ever secure it."\textsuperscript{27}

**Lessons from the Vietnam War**

Hammond gives the Army credit for its many positive contributions to the media-Army relationship in Vietnam. The Army did give the media relatively good access to soldiers, units and the battlefield. It skirted the institution of censorship and placed great trust in the media's compliance with operational security guidelines. It provided the media with a plethora of infrastructure and logistical support. In response, the media was more inclined to report on a good story vice a negative one. As Major General (Ret.) Winant Sidle, the chief of information, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from 1967 to 1969 stated, "The vast majority of reporters will be more inclined to tell the
military's side of the story after they recognize that the military is sincerely trying to cooperate—at any level.”

Because of this cooperation, the media was able to inform the American people on the conduct of the war. However, the shortcoming in the media—Army relationship dwelt in the contradictory nature of the information traversing the conduit.

Army doctrine, as currently outlined in FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, stipulates that the Army must provide information, "whether complimentary or embarrassing," in a forthcoming and candid way. Doctrine prohibits the Army from attempting "to influence public opinion through the use of misinformation, disinformation or deceit." Hammond's book highlights the Army's shortcomings in these areas. He notes that the Army's official information often did not match what the media observed on the ground. Therefore, the Army lost credibility by failing to demonstrate the degree of truthfulness, accuracy and consistency upon which credibility is built and maintained over the long-term.

Lastly, FM 46-1 states, "It is not 'propaganda' to present positive information about the U.S. military...." However, the lesson learned from Vietnam is that to receive good press coverage—the Army must first do a good job. Ground truth needs to mirror the stated objectives and accomplishments. The Army does not receive positive news coverage for what it is going to do in the future; those are predictions not news. Likewise, it does not receive news
coverage for what it accomplished in the past, that is history not news. The Army is in the best position to receive positive news coverage by allowing the press to observe "what is being done at the time or has just been completed, especially if the results can be seen.""

Grenada and Operation URGENT FURY

If the Vietnam experience between 1962-1968 reflects the peak and beginning decline of the contemporary media-Army relationship, then the years leading up to events in Grenada demonstrate the spiraling of that relationship from an adversarial one to one of "ugly confrontation." In reaction to perceptions of its Vietnam experience, the Army, as an institution, had convinced itself "that it was essential in future limited conflicts to deny media access and mobility, and to limit and carefully control access to official information." The American invasion of Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY) in October 1983, the largest American combat operation since Vietnam, was the first major test for this sentiment.

URGENT FURY was an operation where the military had made no plans to include the media; furthermore, the military prohibited media access to the island battlefield—a prohibition that lasted for the initial forty-eight hours. The prohibition included the enforcement of a military exclusion zone around the island and the muffling of journalists whom the Navy had invited aboard its vessels to observe the operation. These military actions represented a
"serious departure from accepted practices." The result was a total news blackout except for U.S. government and military releases.

On the third day of the operation, the military escorted a small media pool "from the nearly 400 journalists waiting on the island of Barbados" on a three hour media opportunity to a secured area on Grenada. In his paper, "The Press and Grenada, 1983", Vice-Admiral (Ret.) Joseph Metcalf, III, the joint task force commander in charge of Operation URGENT FURY, states that he personally briefed this initial media pool. His briefing was followed by opportunities to interview some of the freed American students, tour the Salines Airport and inspect captured munitions storage sites. However, Metcalf's subsequent "rules for a media presence" restricted American media access to U.S. military operations that were occurring farther inland. At the conclusion of the visit, military officials escorted the media back to the nearby island of Barbados.

On day four of the operation, a fifty member media pool repeated the previous day's activities. By the fifth day, Metcalf gave the media free access to the island; however, the limited availability of aircraft to ferry journalists from Barbados confined the number of journalists who had accessibility at any one time. The "final media event" that generally went unreported, occurred on the tenth day when the U.S. military turned control of the island over to the U.S. ambassador and the Grenadian government.
The absence of media coverage during the invasion provided the military and the U.S. government with the opportunity to "manage the news to its own best advantage." It fulfilled the military's desire for operational security. It provided the freedom from being initially "burdened with the responsibility for the safety of the media."

The military's exclusion of the media did provide it with a short period of control and possibly a warped sense of avengement for the institutional animosity it felt toward the press since Vietnam. However, focus on the military's achievement abated in the wake of escalating controversy as the media continued to express their outrage at being excluded. It was also fanned by the contradictions between the military's initial reports and the information discovered later by the media.

Although initial public opinion sided with the military's barring of the press, subsequent reevaluation resulted in public recognition that some form of independent press coverage of future military operations was a necessity. This reevaluation was prompted in great part by the voluminous stories and editorials defending the media's constitutional prerogatives of a free and independent press. This backlash drove the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr., in November to ask Major General (Ret.) Winant Sidle to convene a panel. Vessey chartered this panel to "make recommendations regarding the question: 'How do we conduct military operations in a manner
that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the security of a military operation while keeping the American public informed through the news media?" 

Public reevaluation was also prompted by the deviation between the military's initial version of events and subsequent revelations of ground truth. "The restrictions on the press access to Grenada during the invasion had an immediate impact not just on the interpretation given to the events but on the recounting of what in fact happened." In the absence of invasion news-coverage, the American people were subjected to numerous media stories that contained reconstructed information that was full of factual "inaccuracies and biased judgments." Additionally, revelations such as the Cuban contingent on Grenada was a fraction of that originally claimed by the U.S. government and that the U.S. military had "played down the strength of the men and equipment ultimately needed to reduce resistance on the island" eroded the military's credibility. In the absence of first hand battlefield reports, the military had opened itself up for dispute with the media. An infamous instance of this was the Lind report.

William Lind, the former defense advisor to then Senator Gary Hart, was highly critical of operations in Grenada. The media coverage of Lind's twenty allegations of military ineptitude was partly responsible for demands for renewed investigations by the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives." General Vessey's written public
response to each of Hyde's twenty allegations forestalled additional investigations."

In spite of Vessey's rejoinder, the American public was still left to make an informed evaluation and judge the merits of the operation in the absence of sufficient first-hand battlefield reports. Even Metcalf acknowledges that this placed the American people in a predicament.

Was the public well served in the reporting of the Grenada operation? Probably not... The people of the United States were deprived of the story of the part that American pride, ingenuity, training in fighting fundamentals, and luck played in the success of the Grenada rescue operation. Most Americans are proud of what happened in Grenada but they do not know why."

The Lessons from Operation URGENT FURY

The first and possibly foremost lesson from this operation is the reminder that the Army needs the media. There is now doctrinal recognition of the vital functions that the news media provides the Army—"informing the American public of military operations, thereby directly affecting public sentiment and support for the military; and, allowing commanders, through their public information programs, to tell the Army story to as large an audience as possible." Because of these facts, the relationship between the media and the Army should be sympathetic if not symbiotic.

The second lesson is that the Army needs to work with the media rather than against or in spite of it. FM 100-5, Operations states, "The Army will not operate alone." The
new doctrine recognizes the fundamental interdependence between the Army and the Other Services. The doctrine also recognizes that the Army may operate as part of a coalition or alliance structure. In such cases, FM 100-5 calls for cooperation, interoperability, accommodation and some policy limitations. The absence of such characteristics in the media-Army relationship during URGENT FURY resulted in the antagonistic handling of the press and the continued absence of credible information about the invasion. The lesson here is that the integration and application of these characteristics would be clearly more aidant to a mutually beneficial media-Army relationship than their militarily enforced absence.

The last lesson from URGENT FURY is that the Army needs to understand the ends, ways and means of the media. One of the best descriptions of journalists and a free press was written by Robert U. Brown and published in Editor & Publisher magazine.

The strength of a free press lies not in that it is always and in every instance right. Its strength lies in that many different texts, voices and pictures, often contradicting each other, will give the reader, listener and viewer a possibility to form his own opinion. This is what one of the world's greatest journalists, Walter Lippman, meant when he said: "The theory of the free press is that truth will emerge from free reporting and free discussion, not that it will be presented perfectly and instantly in any one account."  

During the initial phase of Operation URGENT FURY, the press needed access to soldiers, units and the battlefield to
prepare their varied reports. They needed the capability to transmit their reports to their home organizations for publication and airing. Like their predecessors in Vietnam, they required the cooperation and support of the Army; they did not receive it during the initial critical days. The absence of media coverage demonstrates "that otherwise successful operations are not total successes unless the media aspects are handled properly."""

The Siddle Commission

General Vessey's initial concept for a panel to make recommendations regarding the future battlefield relationship between the media and military included equal representation from both institutions. This did not occur. "On 10 January, 1984, ten of the major news organizations, including both umbrella groups and individual news agencies, met in New York City to produce what was called 'a statement of principle concerning future military-media relations.'""" Predicated on this stated position, the media rejected the offer to man their half of the commission. Therefore, the non-military membership consisted of retired media personnel and academicians.

Convening for five days in early February 1984, the Military-Media Relations Panel's initial session set the tone for the subsequent sessions and commission report. By unanimous agreement, the panel announced that "the 'American way' required that the media be permitted to cover military operations under most circumstances.""" Throughout subsequent
presentations from "28 top-level news media leaders from 18 major news organizations and the top public affairs officers from the military services, and reading written comments from 24 news organizations and other experts," the advocacy for this underlying principle remained unchanged.

However, in spite of this dialogue, the panel consciously refrained from passing judgment on two critical issues in its final report. These issues were the media's First Amendment rights and the American people's right to know. According to General Sidle, the panel felt that these issues went beyond the scope and qualifications of the commission, and they left them for judicial judgment. However, the panel did make a statement of principle that did encompass the spirit of these issues.

The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can be provided through both the news media and the government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces.

The panel also made six significant recommendations that would enhance the media-military relationship.

* Planning for military operations should integrate planning for public affairs.

* A sound policy of media pooling should be instituted to ensure adequate coverage of military operations within the constraints of reasonable security considerations.

* Accreditation of combat journalists should be a joint media-military responsibility that results in competent, qualified and trustworthy journalists.
An operational security system should include the media voluntarily complying with the military's stated security guidelines.

The military should provide a support infrastructure to the media that includes logistics, transportation, communications and qualified military public affairs personnel.

The media and the military should continue with periodic meetings and a continuous dialogue to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation.

The effect of the Sidle Commission was more than the sum of its public statements and recommendations. The commission restored the impetus for the media and the military to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship in a "nonantagonistic atmosphere." Also, it was the catalyst for the establishment and stationing in 1985 of the Department of Defense national media pool in Washington, D.C. This pool consisted of a small, media contingent, manned on a rotational basis, that was to be available for immediate, worldwide deployment for the initial coverage of military operations.

Panama and Operation JUST CAUSE

Shortly after 1:00 A.M. on December 20, 1989, elements of the U.S. military initiated the nearly simultaneous attack of twenty-seven targets throughout Panama. The purpose for this invasion included the protection of American lives, security of the Panama Canal and the emplacement of the duly elected government of Panama. Because JUST CAUSE "was the first combat assignment of the Washington-based press pool," its employment in this operation was the test-case for the implementation of the Sidle Commission recommendations.
According to George Garneau of Editor & Publisher, "The national military press pool flunked its first combat assignment...."

Operations in Panama again demonstrated that military operations "are not total successes unless the media aspects are handled properly." The military did not adequately plan for timely media access to the battlefield; therefore, the national media pool was unable to cover military actions until the second day of the operation. "Pool journalists arrived in Panama hours after the fighting at the key points of Rio Hato and Fajillia had ceased, and they were kept well away from continuing fighting at the Commandancia." As a result, press coverage of the military's battles was unavailable to the American public. Even as late as seventeen days after the invasion commenced, editors could find "no detailed, independent account of the attack."

A defensive argument from the military was centered on the fact that many pool reporters arrived for deployment unprepared. A factor recognized by NBC Pentagon correspondent and pool member, Fred Francis." However, there does not appear to be any basis that this factor prevented coverage. A more plausible factor was the military's unpreparedness to employ the pool upon its arrival in Panama. This occurred because "the pool had not been made a part of the invasion plan.""

Furthermore, there were a significant number of journalists already present in Panama when the operation
kicked-off and could have been pooled for the initial hours of the operation. The substantive facts demonstrate that the military fell short in its Sidle Commission commitment to integrate public affairs and media support requirements into its planning of military operations.

Another "blunder in the coverage" occurred when the military was unable to handle the subsequent arrival of hundreds of journalists. The small cell of military public affairs specialists was not able to escort all the allegedly eight hundred journalists throughout Panama and assist them in finding their own particular angle on the operation. As a result, most of these journalists remained inside the operations center of Howard Air Force Base, Panama, until they got frustrated and left.

The authors of Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama also identified a coverage problem related to the inexperience of the correspondents. The authors criticize the media for not devoting the time and effort to train competent military correspondents.

News organizations that wish to participate should be required to assign reporters to a more permanent pool organization, which would be exercised regularly, perhaps as part of National Training Center rotations and to include outfitting correspondents with MILES gear to give them a feel for the dangers of combat. As Fred Francis put it, "Combat is not time for on-the-job training." The American tradition of combat reporting has withered, with defense reporting having become just Pentagon reporting, another Washington beat.
The Lessons From Operation JUST CAUSE

This operation necessitates an important distinction between the merit of the national media pool's deployment and the dismal performance of its employment during the operation. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the participating media organizations did an adequate job in organizing, training and equipping the media pool to conduct emergency deployments in support of military operations. Like paratroopers conducting an airborne drop, the pool deployment was not faultless but the journalists got on the ground and were ready to do their job.

Yet, like an airborne operation, the execution of the infiltration is ultimately purposeless if the primary mission is not accomplished. The military did not execute a plan to provide the American people with national press pool coverage of the initial hours and days of the invasion. Furthermore, the military did not follow up this initial pool coverage with a sequel plan to support expanded coverage by a larger volume of journalists. Going back to the Sible commission, the military did not adequately arrange for the media within its operational plans.

The authors of Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama chide the military for not anticipating the follow-on mass of journalists given the technological capability and associated mobility of the press. However, this "problem of the volume of press coverage" has been growing incrementally since World War II. As early as the aftermath of Operation
In his book, Siddle pointed out in "The Public's Right to Know" that the military had neither the capability nor a clear constitutional requirement to accommodate an ever increasing volume of journalists. He went on to state that the ever increasing number of journalists wanting access to the battlefield is a trend that will have to be mitigated by the institution of controls "over the numbers of news agencies, organizations and reporters" covering any future military operation. Just Cause demonstrated that the media and the Army have yet to resolve the dialectic between access and battlefield control.

Finally, this operation highlights the need for professional military correspondents and professional public affairs officers. An inherent characteristic in any profession is that each practitioner should possess a basic level of subject matter expertise. For the media and the Army, this implies the need for study and practical application in a training environment prior to practical application in a combat situation.

The Gulf War and Operation DESERT STORM

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, former President Bush clearly articulated the nation's policy to halt and overturn Iraqi aggression. This was translated by the civil-military leadership into a sound strategy that took full advantage of the nation's military power. The military part of this strategy was ultimately
successful and the victory strengthened the American people's confidence and respect for their armed forces.

This entire saga was presented to the American people and the international community by some sixteen hundred journalists that massed in Saudi Arabia. The coverage of the war, in all its facets, was presented live and on a nearly continuous basis. It has even been argued by Lyle Barker, associate professor of journalism at Ohio State University and former chief public affairs officer for the Army that there was "an overexposure and overreportage of war news." "

Throughout DESERT STORM, the public was bombarded with coverage of the Air Force's precision bombing, the launching of Tomahawk missiles from naval combatants and U.S. Marines fighting in Kuwait. Yet, the story of one of histories greatest feat of arms, which was conducted in great part by the U.S. Army's VIIth and XVIIth Corps, "spent a lot of valuable time lost in the desert."

John Fialka, a Wall Street Journal correspondent, who covered firsthand the 3'rd Armored Division's one hundred hour ground war, offers a correspondent's perspective of the media-Army relationship in his book, Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War. He points out that the media dutifully deployed in pools, lived in the field, complied with rigorous security review guidelines, and wrote about, filmed, and photographed the Army's operations. Regardless of their general distaste for the pool system and their
disdain for public affairs officers who prevented access and 
unnecessarily revised copy, Fialka believes that the media 
generally satisfied their share of the pool agreement. 

Unfortunately, a similar statement cannot be made of the 
Army. In the forward of Hotel Warriors, Peter Braestrup 
states, “The sins of the journalists do not excuse the sins 
of General Schwarzkopf’s Central Command in failing to supply 
the necessary means and to insist that all Army field 
commanders make adequate provision for the press assigned to 
cover U.S. troops when the ground war began.”53 Braestrup 
goes on to state, “As Mr. Fialka shows us, access and 
communications were what too many Army units failed to 
provide—and as a result, the public did not get a clear, 
timely picture of the crucial Army effort, an effort that 
revealed the troops, their equipment, and their commanders in 
a great test of combat.”54 

Fialka states, “The Army-designed system of couriers 
and its teams of reporter escorts were hopelessly 
understaffed, underequipped, and poorly trained and motivated 
for the job.”55 The Army did not adequately define nor 
synchronize media pool and public affairs support 
requirements into the ground combat plans. 

Senior Army officers have stated that the speed and 
distance at which ground operations occurred simply outpaced 
the Army’s ability to sustain support to the media.” 
However, the Army was able to transmit command messages, 
intelligence data, firing date, and reconnaissance imagery
around the battlefield with speed and efficiency. It was able to maneuver thousands of troops and vehicles, and move countless volumes of munitions, fuels and supplies in support of fast moving armor and heliborne thrusts. However, the Army was unable to fulfill its public commitment to a small contingent of combat correspondents.

The Lessons From Operation DESERT STORM

Like Operation JUST CAUSE, there was a good story to tell about the Army in DESERT STORM. In Braestrup's judgment, polls show that the vast majority of Americans "felt that neither they nor the news media were ill-served by the Gulf War arrangements." However, both Braestrup and Fialka believe that the American people did not receive the most accurate information concerning the Army's exploits that the media could have provided. The lack of cooperation, access, and military support thwarted the media's efforts.

Summary

Analysis of the modern development of the U.S. news media--U.S. Army relationship highlights its discordance. This discordance was founded on the mythological assessment of the role of the media during the Vietnam War. This unfavorable assessment resulted in the manifestation by the Army of an adversarial relationship with the media that has affected every contemporary interaction between the two institutions.

The media--Army relationship is composed of shared and antithetical needs and expectations. The most crucial need
that is shared by both institutions is their interdependence in fulfilling some of the basic needs of the American democracy. The American people need both a strong Army and an independent press to safeguard the hearts and minds of a free people. Towards this end, the Army must conduct successful operations, and the press must independently inform the American people of the Army's actions.

Another common need of both the Army and the media is credibility—mutually and in the eyes of the American people. Credibility sustains trust, and trust is the bedrock of our constitutional democracy. As FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations points out, this credibility is achieved through truthfulness, accuracy, and consistency over time. Neither institution increases its level of credibility when it publicly derides or willfully undermines the other; rather, they risk losing credibility.

The media and the military also have antithetical needs; the mishandling of which has led to most of the contemporary discourse between the institutions. The first pairing is media access to the battlefield, units and soldiers that presumably attenuates the Army's need for battlespace control. The second is free and independent reporting by the media that presumably magnifies the Army's security and safety concerns. By constitutional design, the media-Army relationship should be symbiotic not predaceous. Since Vietnam, the Army has continually employed restrictive mechanisms on the media such as burdensome accreditation
procedures, press pools, military escorts, and security review. The Army has been able to constrain the press, but it has simultaneously inhibited coverage of the Army’s battlefield successes.

Balance is achievable by satisfying the needs and expectations of both the media and the Army given the environmental characteristics that exist. In this case, that would be the environmental characteristics of the twenty-first century battlefield that are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter III
The Twenty-First Century

This chapter reviews and discusses the looming characteristics of the twenty-first century that are applicable to the media-Army relationship. This is accomplished by reviewing material from both civilian and Army futurists.

Third Wave Warfare

In his articles and during his presentations outlining the Army's current modernization vision for the twenty-first century, General Sullivan has repeated the ideas and terminology of futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler. For this reason, this monograph begins its investigation of the future using the Toffler paradigm as presented in their book, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*.

The Tofflers envision "the metaphor of history as 'waves' of change." They have categorized civilization into First Wave or agrarian societies, Second Wave or industrial societies and Third Wave or information societies. In each wave, the way a society makes wealth mirrors the way it wages war.

Given the Toffler paradigm, a Third Wave society makes wealth using information and knowledge. Likewise, it wages war using information and knowledge. Of particular relevance to this monograph is the Tofflers' recognition that the
United States is a Third Wave society with a Third Wave military and a Third Wave media.

The Tofflers describe a Third Wave society as constantly changing, heterogeneous and fast paced. It is a society that is distinguished by computer generated high-technology that thrives on information. A controlling idea of Third Wave warfare is to maximize the use of knowledge and minimize the need for brute force. Therefore, the U.S. Army will employ a knowledge-based, high-tech, fully-integrated command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) system. This system will govern a wide range of space and land based, special and conventional, lethal and non-lethal, and human and robotics technologies and capabilities. The quality of intangibles such as strategy, doctrine, intelligence, target acquisition and communications becomes significantly more relevant quantifiers of military power than the quantity of people or weapons systems.

The speed associated with these high-tech means will cause temporal factors to be of greater importance than spatial ones. Precision, selectivity and choice have greater applicability. Innovation and initiative have greater utility and importance. All of this will result in a much smaller, leaner, highly technical Army with a lower leader to led ratio as technology replaces manual labor.

The combination of integrated systems, infrastructure and highly trained soldiers allows the Army to think and act more efficiently; therefore, decision making and execution
transpire faster. This increases the velocity of warfare.

The impact of third wave change on the means, ways and ends of warfare is compro
tant and significant. Likewise, Third Wave change affects the media.

**Third Wave Media**

*War and Anti-War* clearly asserts that the economic
lifeblood of Third Wave societies includes
"mediatization--the rising ubiquity and importance of the media." The book implies that the media cannot be avoided
and can be ignored only at great peril.

Technology has simplified the modes of news production;
the means of mass communication continue to proliferate.
Because information handling and distributing technologies
continue to swell, the volume of data, information and
knowledge moving around the globe is expanding at an
incredible rate. As technology improves, the speed at which
this volume travels will accelerate further into real time.

Currently television imposes its will over other news
media because of its speed and visual images. As the
twenty-first century approaches, "the TV set will eventually
be replaced by a (possibly wireless) unit that will combine a
computer, a scanner, a fax, a telephone, and a desktop tool
for creating multimedia messages all rolled into one and
networked to one another."**

Eventually, Americans will not just watch and listen to
the news; they will be able to interact in real-time with the
reports of live events. The potential for interactive
battlefield programming is real. The permutations are limitless.

As an illustration, you can just imagine Larry King communicating live with commanders and soldiers while they conduct operations on the battlefield. The soldiers just need to wear common, wireless microphones and mount miniaturized, all-weather video cameras on their vehicles, weapons and persons just like professional football players and race-car drivers. The reporter, his technician and his director could even remain outside the battlefield or even the battlespace while they acquire, edit and air their program. This could happen now given present Third Wave technologies. It could go further given future change and technological development.

Alan Campan, in The First Information War, states, "Satellite technology that allows commentators to report instantly on military action can transform reporters from dispassionate observers to unwitting even unwilling, but nonetheless direct participants." Eventually, real-time operations and intelligence reports would become synonymous with live media reports. If that is the case, the Army may find it advantageous to develop a single integrated information system that simultaneously satisfies both institutions' requirements. This would give the Army access to the media's informational feeds before those feeds became part of a news presentation. This gives the Army additional
The alternative is to attempt to censor or control all media information leaving and entering the battlefield. Yet, as the Tofflers point out, "Cellular telephones, PCs, copying machines, fax, video-cass, and digital networks permit the exchange of vast volumes of voice, data, and graphic material through multiple, redundant, and decentralized channels, often out of easy reach of government or military censors."

By the time the Army integrates controlling technologies on the battlefield down to the individual soldier, that soldier may have better commercial capabilities linking and networking him back home to his family, his friends and his local news agency.

Even if the Army was technologically capable and willing to isolate the battlefield, our current democratic principles and constitutional safeguards would deter the Army from totally excluding the press. Therefore, the combination of mutual dependency on information and knowledge, emerging technological capabilities and American democratic principles appears to predispose that any future relationship between the Army and the media will necessitate more than mutual amity and toleration. The combination requires the development and execution of an overarching strategy. This knowledge strategy "must acquire, process, distribute, and protect information, while selectively denying or distributing it to its adversaries and/or allies."
According to the Tofflers, this strategy can be developed by breaking down this statement of requirement into its component parts and construct a framework for the strategy upon them."

Information Operations Concept

Currently, the U.S. Army is developing "the framework for the Army to conduct information warfare." This framework is currently embodied in the coordinating draft, version 2 of the Army's "Concept for Information Operations." The intent of this concept is to "assess present capabilities, guide future underlying concepts and doctrine, and assist in identifying future required capabilities."

The concept addresses four distinct elements of information operations: the U.S. Army's information system, an adversary's information system, the capability of both sides to protect their own system while interdicting the opposing side's, and the Global Information Environment (GIE). The GIE encompasses the media, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, foreign governments, and industry."

For this monograph, it is of particular significance that the Army's concept acknowledges the empowering effect that information technologies have on the media.

Real-time or near real-time GIE information has led military operations to become a spectator event watched by the American public, allies and adversaries. The result is analysis, critique and commentary about events which affect operations. Debate can begin before military leaders or the national command authority have
time to evaluate, form a perception or develop a response to those events. This enables public opinion to be rapidly shaped and changed without consideration of the Army perspective. This can affect strategic goals, operational decision making, tactical execution, morale, esprit, and effectiveness of the forces involved. The GIE has made a transition from merely informing the public of actions and events to being an instrument of actions and events itself.  

It is important to recognize that this statement does not characterize the effects of the GIE as being negative or positive. It only states that the Army must assess the impact of real-time or near real-time reports, and it leaves open the opportunity for the Army to respond as it deems fit. It is also important to note that there is no recognition of interdependency. The concept clearly defines the Army and other institutions such as the media as distinct entities.

Later in the document, the Army does sketch out the required capabilities of the friendly information systems to interact with the GIE.

GIE access must be incorporated into the overall plans of the operation. This requires deliberate actions to determine what is not to be prematurely revealed to outside organizations. The organizations of the GIE will demand high quality audio, video, and written products to enhance their presentation of the military operation. Providing those products in a timely way considering the information restrictions increases the credibility of force and places the US military in a positive light to these critical messengers to the world.

This paragraph recognizes the media's requirement for access and requires the Army to incorporate the media into their plans. It notes that operational security concerns
will delay but not prevent the release of sensitive information. The paragraph acknowledges that the Army has some obligation to support the media, and it recognizes the importance of the media. It also acknowledges the importance to the Army of its public credibility.

Finally, the document also acknowledges a key limitation of the concept. Any Army information operations concept must conform to the Principles of Information and the DOD/Media Guidelines outlined in DOD Directive 5122.5, Change 1 and Change 3. "The Army, operating under this guidance, supports the timely and accurate release of information to the media and open and independent reporting as the principal means of coverage of US Army operations."

Sensation

There is a great deal of similarity between the wording and ideas in the Tofflers' book and the Army's information operations concept. Knowledge is the core for both works. However, there is a significant difference on how each work is constructed around this core.

The Tofflers took a holistic approach to Third Wave change. Starting with their central valuation of information and knowledge, they challenge the fundamental rationale, justification and dynamics of every concept, institution and relationship. They clearly reinterpret a new concept for a Third Wave military and media. Regarding the media-military relationship, they consistently describe the media and
military as being inextricably intertwined and mutually dependent on a common knowledge strategy.

Conversely, the Army's "Concept for Information Operations" appears to begin with the acceptance of current C4I concepts, institutions and relationships to which Third Wave qualities are then applied. The concept does not discuss the necessity or relevance of C4I; rather, it simply applies third wave technology to C4I to promote effectiveness. Unfortunately, C4I is a Second Wave construct that may not be applicable or relevant given the characteristics and dynamics of Third Wave or twenty-first century warfare.

The Army's information operations concept neatly separates the belligerents from other relevant institutions and the information environment in which they all reside. The concept's emphasis is clearly on the dynamics of and between the belligerent's information systems which are portrayed as being distinct and precedential to those of the other institutions. Unfortunately, the concept does this without determining or clarifying whether such separation and sequential resolution are adequate, feasible or desirable.
Chapter IV

Conclusions

The previous chapter highlights the potential danger in passing off a Second Wave information operations concept as a Third Wave construct. Similar caution should be applied to Second Wave lessons learned that are used to characterize a Third Wave relationship. Therefore, this monograph concludes by reevaluating the previous lessons learned in context of Third Wave change and comes to some conclusions regarding the media-Army relationship of the twenty-first century.

If the media is reporting accurately, proportionately and without bias, then the stature of the Army story is characterized by the available information. If the facts are negative and the reporting is fair, the Army will rightfully have a bad news story on its hands. Given this situation, the Army must continue to cooperate with the media even in the face of rigorous journalistic scrutiny and criticism.

The Third Wave phenomena will greatly underscore this principle. As the availability of information expands, the media will be able to find, reveal and possibly sensationalize minor as well as major Army faults. The Army's reaction must remain positive to include placing the media’s information in its proper context, discussing it within the those limits, ensuring its accuracy and taking the appropriate action to follow up on any informational shortfalls.10
The future relationship must also be built on the credibility of both institutions. Yet, Third Wave phenomena will greatly challenge the Army's ability to develop and maintain credibility.

Because Third Wave phenomena increase the velocity of warfare, which will result in a compression of time, Third Wave warfare should be short in duration. Second, there will be an overflowing volume of information being acquired, processed and distributed within this compressed period. Finally, there will be greater potential for news reporters to develop a story by querying the Army regarding individual bites of battlefield audio-visual information.

Neither a Pentagon nor field briefing team will be aware of nor conversant on every fragment of information available to and acquired by the media. The volume of press coverage will continue to increase and the quality of media query will be increasingly discerning. The situation requires soldiers, who are intimately associated with or knowledgeable of a matter in question, to provide the right context and perspective in the Army's responses. Given this situation, the Army will find it difficult to maintain any type of centralized media relations; rather, the Army's interface with the media will have to become more decentralized and provincial.

Such decentralization will result in more soldiers at lower echelons responding to the media on issues of great consequence. Still, the application of ground truth,
concomerate with the scope of the responding individual's knowledge, responsibility and authority, will convey honesty and implant accuracy at the initial point of media-Army contact. Yet, there is potential for inconsistency as the responses from one Army echelon are bounced against those given by another Army echelon. This potential for inconsistency can be deterred by having an integrated information system that makes media query and Army responses immediately and simultaneously available to all echelons of both institutions.

Both the media and the Army want enough accurate and timely information of a given military event or topic to generate a clear and reliable understanding of it. This allows the Army to make timely decisions and responses; this allows the media to make timely news reports to the American people. Both institutions solicit comparable first-hand reports from a variety of Army sources and echelons to generate the required information. In the twenty-first century, they will process, distribute and protect that information using the same integrated and seamless information system that the Tofflers envision. This common user precondition spurs the two institutions towards some degree of interoperability.

Decentralization and interoperability logically induce the media and the Army to integrate--task organize--themselves at lower echelons. The media would not be subordinate to the military under this feature any more
then are the Red Cross workers or civilian contractors that are now found on the battlefield. Such synthesized organizations give the media greater access to soldiers, units and the battlefield while spreading the corresponding support responsibilities throughout all Army echelons. General (Ret.) Colin Powell, in a 1990 message regarding the national media pool, wrote, "Essentially, the goal should be to treat reporters as members of the units, allowing them to move with the units, without recklessly exposing them to hostile fire."

Under this relationship, when an Army unit trains, deploys or fights, their civilian media goes with them. The unit and its media operate with a mutually supporting, common, integrated Third Wave information system. The correspondents stay with and are supported by the military unit. They are fully integrated into all facets of that unit's plans and operations similarly to the way that a combat camera team, a public affairs team or any other combat multiplier currently is. This level of interoperability would necessitate the negotiation of media-Army doctrine that sufficiently abated the Army's battlespace control concerns while providing the media continuous battlefield access.

At this point the access versus control issue triggers the Army's operational security concerns. Generally, more access results in more information which leads to more detailed news reports which attenuate the Army's security concerns. Yet, the characteristics of Third Wave warfare can
eliminate or significantly mitigate the Army's concern for operational security to a level within its institutional comfort zone.

The media agrees with the Army that "they should not publish information that would clearly impair military security or the safety of U.S. forces." Therefore, the media should be disposed to negotiate guidelines concerning the delayed transmission of their uncensored reports. These reports would be delayed long enough to prevent the opposing force from having the ability to degrade the intended effects of the Army's operation. Given the speed of Third Wave warfare, this should constitute a short delay that would forestall the enemy while allowing the media to meet their news deadlines.

Even if there was an inadvertent security leak in a news report, the Army intends to interdict its opponent's C4I system. Given an ineffectual means to acquire, process and distribute information, the enemy would find it difficult to identify correctly and process the one bite of sensitive information from the ever increasing volume of information. If it found that one bite, the enemy would still have to use an interdicted C4I system to make and execute a favorable decision on it. Given these conditions, a leakage of sensitive information would pose an acceptable risk considering the realized gain of getting the Army's story out to the American people through accurate, timely and balanced news reporting.
In summation, the twenty-first century media-Army relationship features a common, overarching strategy that is founded on cooperation and interdependence. This strategy is implemented through decentralized execution by a synthesized organizational structure. This relationship places its priority on providing the American people with the Army story while taking full advantage of Third Wave phenomena that reduces the Army's security and control concerns to institutionally acceptable levels.
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"This monograph prescribes the broadest definition for the word media. This definition includes the following meaning: Any system of mass communications such as newspapers, radio, television, periodicals, computer networks and telecommunications that is used to acquire, process and distribute information about recent events or happenings by a writer, an investigator or a presenter of news.

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10 Young, 168.

11 Ibid., 51.


13 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the US Invasion and the Caribbean History that Provoked It (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1984), 204.

14 Diehl, 28.

15 Willey, 76.

16 Young, 172.

17 Ibid., 171.

18 O'Shaughnessy, 207.

19 Young, 172.

20 Ibid., 168.


24 Major General Winant Sidle, US Army retired, served as chief of information, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from 1967 to 1969, after which he assumed duties as the Army's chief of information. In 1974, he became deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, a post he held until his retirement from the military in 1975.


26 O'Shaughnessy, 214.

27 Ibid, 217.

28 Ibid, 207.


30 O'Shaughnessy, xvi.

31 Young, 174.
My highlighting of the adjective "combat" is to emphasize the distinction between employment of the pool during JUST CAUSE and previous deployments aboard US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf. Although some pools did observe unplanned combat, the previous deployments to observe tanker escorts in the Gulf represented media pool practice deployments. George Garneau, "Military Press Pool Misses Most of the Action," *Editor & Publisher* 123 (January 6, 1990): 84.

- Garneau, 4.
- Kiernan, 32.
- Young, 52.


- Donnelly, 410.
"Reports vary, but all agree that less than 100 newsmen were put to sea to cover the massive Normandy invasion in 1944. And there were certainly less than 400 U.S. reporters covering World War II on the ground in Europe at any one time. In Vietnam where, in March 1968, there were 648 U.S. reporters accredited, numerous checks showed that there were less than 100 in the field on any one day." Sidle, "The Public's Right to Know," 43.
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