JOINT PUB 1: A SOLID DOCTRINAL CORNERSTONE OR JELLO PUDDING? (U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL M T FLYNN

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JOINT PUB 1: A Solid Doctrinal Cornerstone or Jello Pudding?

A Monograph
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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
This monograph examines Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. It assesses if Joint Pub 1 is still a sound capstone manual which provides a common perspective for the continuing development of joint and service doctrine. The American experience in war has increasingly demanded joint action. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint doctrine has gained a greater measure of importance. For example, when Joint Pub 1 was published in November, 1991, General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that "joint warfare is team warfare." Joint Pub 1 is essentially his philosophy on joint warfare. He had the manual written to define a "common perspective" for all warfighting services when it comes to joint warfare and the doctrine that guides it. The monograph begins with an examination of the development of joint and service doctrine. Evidence includes an assessment of Joint Pub 1 and each warfighting services "capstone" manuals. Additionally, an examination of the theorists who have had the greatest influence on today's US military doctrine is provided. Along with the theorists another key influence of Joint Pub 1 has been the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The monograph then analyzes Joint Pub 1 using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability model as a framework. The analysis concludes that Joint Pub 1 be reassessed or rewritten by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.
Title of Monograph: Joint Task Force: A Solid Interagency Connection or False Pretense

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ABSTRACT

JOINT PUB 1: A SOLID DOCTRINAL CORNERSTONE OR JELLO PUDDING? by MAJ Michael T. Flynn, USA, 38 pages.

This monograph examines Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. It assesses if Joint Pub 1 is still a sound capstone manual which provides a common perspective for the continuing development of joint and service doctrine. The American experience in war has increasingly demanded joint action. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint doctrine has gained a greater measure of importance. For example, when Joint Pub 1 was published in November, 1991, General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that "joint warfare is team warfare." Joint Pub 1 is essentially his philosophy on joint warfare. He had the manual written to define a "common perspective" for all warfighting services when it comes to joint warfighting and the doctrine that guides it.

The monograph begins with an examination of the development of joint and service doctrine. Evidence includes an assessment of Joint Pub 1 and each warfighting service's "capstone" manuals. Additionally, an examination of the theorists who have had the greatest influence on today's US military doctrine is provided. This examination demonstrates that Carl von Clausewitz, and his seminal work, On War, has had the greatest influence on the joint and service capstone manuals that exist today. Along with the theorists another key influence of Joint Pub 1 has been the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The overall impact of this legislation has been very positive. It has created an atmosphere for further "jointness" in many areas, specifically doctrine.

The next section analyzes Joint Pub 1 using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability model as a framework. It addresses whether Joint Pub 1 still provides a correct vision for development of additional joint doctrine. It assesses if it still provides the necessary flexibility given today's constrained environment which the Armed Forces must operate within. Lastly, it looks at whether or not there is a willingness in the services to accept certain costs based on some very uncertain endstates.

This monograph concludes that Joint Pub 1 represents General Colin Powell's philosophy. While this was a valid philosophy given the conditions that existed in 1991, it no longer represents the conditions we face in 1994 and beyond. The "Bottom Up Review," continued down-sizing, and an unknown threat, has changed the way we will need to prepare for future warfare. These conditions came into being after the publication of Joint Pub 1. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 should, as a minimum, be reassessed by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.
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INTRODUCTION

The American experience in war has increasingly demanded joint action. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, joint doctrine has gained a greater measure of importance. General Colin Powell, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote in Joint PUB 1 that joint warfare is team warfare.\(^1\) Joint wargaming requires services to work together in everything from task force level operations to full scale war. This need demands a doctrinal manual that deals with fundamental issues of how best to employ the military instrument of power to achieve national security goals and objectives. Joint PUB 1 states, "Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war."\(^2\)

Joint Pub 1 is meant to be "capstone" doctrine for inter-service operability. It is meant to guide the mind of future commanders. It is a tool, of which others are experience, intellect, common sense, and leadership abilities. Joint Pub 1's fundamentals were written with the intent of accompanying the future commander to the battlefield. However, it is not meant to restrict him to certain actions once he gets there. A joint force commander should not have to contemplate the other service's capstone doctrinal manuals to understand what his force's potential is. He should be able to base his operations on one fundamental foundation which has joint service acceptance.\(^3\)

Whether doctrine is based on lessons from the past or on a vision of the future, all of the services should have a common perspective to develop their own doctrine. Capstone doctrine provides each service with this common perspective. From this perspective comes a blueprint for further development of the respective services "how to fight" manuals. However, without the foundation set by common
principles, inspirations, and means, actions on a future battlefield may prove

dangerous.

Joint PUB 1 takes the services to integrate its concepts and values presented into
descriptions matter. This may be good advice. However, with decreasing and longitudinal changes, the services are fighting to save their own concepts. These concepts are presented in documents such as the Air Force's Global Reach, Global Power and the Navy's concept...From the Sea. While these may be more "appealing" schemes than service doctrine, their existence may cause a void at the foundation level of doctrine. Even though Joint PUB 1 provides many sound concepts, it was written based on President Bush's National Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense Cheney's National Military Strategy. Then, there is a need to reconcile or at least reconcile the "captains" renewal for joint warfare.

Michael Howard, a famous military historian, presents numerous doctrinal

descriptions in his book, The Theory and Practice of War. In one, a 1965 essay written by Maurice Meroff, he writes, "The possibility that the [United States] might have to rely on a new strategy, based on large land forces prepared to fight for national security abroad...has not been] immediately and squarely faced." The US today lacks both a documented National Security Strategy and a National

Military Strategy.

The lack of these critical documents leaves the military without a true "national"

fight point. General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
published Joint Pub 1 based on his experience and vision. He did this given a

Presidential and Department of Defense administration that set a course with

concrete strategies. He also wrote Joint PUB 1 with a Congressional mandated
draw down which he termed the "base force". However, much has changed since

Joint Pub 1 was issued in November, 1991.
General Shalikashvili, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, needs to conduct a military review with an entirely new focus; one that is not very clear. The issue here is no longer the legacy, rather it is now called the "Top-down Review." This review focuses on the American military strategy on fighting two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously. However, it does not take into consideration the significant number of U.S. forces deployed conducting "peacekeeping/peace-making" operations. General Shalikashvili needs to take this legacy and synthesize it with the current political atmosphere and then place his own visionary stamp on the military establishment.

This study will focus primarily on Joint PUB 1. It will assess whether Joint Pub 1 is still a sound capstone concept; i.e., one that provides a solid foundation for each service to continue with the development of their own doctrine. It will assess the origins of joint and service doctrine. Additionally, there will be a brief examination of the theorists who have had the greatest impact on today's U.S. military doctrine. Along with these theorists another key influence of Joint PUB 1 has been the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and therefore an assessment of its influence, whether positive or negative, will be provided. Finally, an analysis of Joint PUB 1 will be done to demonstrate its influence on service doctrine. This analysis will be done using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability model. It will address if Joint Pub 1 still provides a long term vision for development of other joint and service doctrine given today's constrained environment, whether it still provides sufficient flexibility for the myriad of changes taking place, and whether it still demonstrates a willingness within the military to accept certain costs based on uncertain end-states.
DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT

JOINT PUB 1

This next section examines the capstone doctrinal manuals in existence today. These include Joint Pub 1, The Army’s Field Manual 100-5 (Operations), Air Force Manual 1-1, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, and the Navy’s current ...

...From the Sea white paper as well as Admiral Kelso’s Force 2001 guide to the US Navy. The Navy capstone manual is under development with publication planned for April, 1994. Due to the recent changeover in Chief of Naval Operations from Admiral Kelso to Admiral Boorda, publication may be further delayed.

The publication of doctrine is an absolutely vital part of the military education system. Doctrine provides each service with a common perspective with which to teach their members what their profession is all about. Each service’s doctrine is essentially a blueprint which provides guidance for a future battlefield.

Formal US Military doctrine was first issued by the Army in 1891 with its manual, Infantry Drill Regulations. By 1905, the Army had produced the ancestor to today’s Field Manual 100-5, Operations, with its publication of Field Service Regulations. Since 1905 a more systematic approach to writing field manuals has evolved. Since the publication of the 1905 Field Service Regulation changes in everything from tactics to technology have caused major shifts in service doctrine.

These shifts were caused by a transformation in thinking at the highest levels of the military hierarchy on how future wars would be fought. Joint Pub 1, for example, has been referred to as the capstone doctrine for all services when it comes to warfighting. It maintains that while it is "neither policy nor strategy, [Joint Pub 1] deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military [instrument of] power to achieve strategic ends." This manual is intended
to provide a comprehensive discussion of doctrine from a joint warfighter's viewpoint. However, some critics have argued that it does not provide enough in the way of information about processes and techniques.

Joint Pub 1 was written in November, 1954 and represents retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell's philosophy on joint warfighting. It is essentially the operational manual for services to follow when fighting as a joint team. As the fundamental joint doctrine for all services perhaps Joint Pub 1 should be the foundation on which all other services build their doctrine around.

To understand the evolution of joint doctrine requires a brief examination of the events following World War II. For example, in early 1946 a series of meetings occurred between the Army and Navy to resolve differences on joint issues resulting from the War. During one of these meetings, under a directive from the Joint Chiefs, a joint operations review board convened at the Army and Navy Staff College (to become the National War College in mid-46). This board studied and prepared doctrine for joint operations based on lessons learned from World War II in an effort to replace existing pre-war Army-Navy agreements. The first manual sent out in draft was Joint Overseas Operations. This manual "envisioned some unity of command with an integrated, tri-service joint staff, but failed to develop this [concept] in any precise detail." Almost immediately, the Air Force disagreed.

Between 1946 and 1950 numerous ideas and concepts continued to be promulgated as joint doctrine. These were done principally by an Ad Hoc Committee for joint policies and procedures. Its mission was to review the 1935 edition of Joint Action of the Army and Navy. "Given the differences in service viewpoints that had to be reconciled, [the Ad Hoc Committee] made slow progress in its efforts to define principles and procedures for the joint action of the armed services." All of these discussions, are what we see happening in today's defense environment. For instance, in 1986, Congress forced the services to unify their
effects in order to realize greater efficiency in the gains of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.\(^9\) The impact of this key legislation and its influence on joint doctrine will be examined later on in this monograph; suffice to say at this stage that it has had a profound impact on joint wargaming.

All of the meetings, agreements, and mandates discussed above took place over a forty year period of time. During this time there were two major wars and numerous other brush fire type operations in which the US military found themselves involved. By the latter part of the 1980s, Congress, by establishing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, had fostered another form of service integration on the military. One of the major impacts of this legislation would be its influence on the development of joint doctrine.

One result of this joint doctrine has been the issuance of Joint Pub 1 to every field grade officer and above by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.\(^10\) Joint Pub 1 represents a comprehensive discussion of his philosophy on joint warfare. General Powell believes that "cooperation requires team players and the willingness to share credit with all team members."\(^11\) However, General Powell wrote Joint Pub 1 after the Bush administration issued its base force review.

There were several reasons for the base force, essentially, however, it was a twenty-five percent reduction in US conventional forces by the end of fiscal year 1995. Following publication of Joint Pub 1, the Bush administration produced its final rendition of the Base Force analysis in January, 1991. At the time there were harsh economic realities of current budgets that Congress was less than willing to approve for defense spending that brought about the Base Force. Joint Pub 1 was a chance for General Powell to reach practically every member of the service community with his guidance on how we will fight in future warfare. As one writer said, "The
great value of Joint Pub 1 is not in what it says but in what it signifies about developments in the future. This statement still holds true today.

What Joint Pub 1 may also signal is an American way of war. This is where the idea of capstone doctrine being evolutionary comes in. As Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work On War tells us, "As...sufficences [grow] more numerous and history more sophisticated, an urgent need [arises] for principles and rules whereby the controversies that are so normal in military history...could be brought to some sort of resolution."13 With so many opinions existing today, this remains sound advice. Service rivalries for resources require consensus on certain things; things such as an accepted theory of war or a "capstone" joint doctrine. This consensus then permeates itself from the top down into the ranks. The greater the acceptance of doctrine the more service members feel a part of the larger joint team.

Therefore, doctrine, particularly capstone doctrine, must achieve a consensus effect.

Joint Pub 1 was written as a means to communicate the Chairman's vision. It claims to be a guide for joint action, based on concepts which are broad and require a leader's judgment in application. Joint Pub 1 further declares that since the military has in many cases fought as part of alliances and coalitions, it also guides the military's " multinational" efforts as well.14 Regardless of who Joint Pub 1 was written for, it remains the accepted "capstone" document for all the services when it comes to joint wargfighting. General Robert Riscassi, former Commander, Eighth US Army Korea, highlights this point with a discussion in Joint Force Quarterly. He first says that to achieve the full synergy of combat power, joint wargfighting doctrine must be common to and easily understood by all services. "In the absence of commonly understood doctrine, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to plan or execute military operations."15
FM 100-5, OPERATIONS

Recently, General Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army asserted, “The consensus and output in [FM 100-5]...are the result of extensive study of lessons learned and future possibilities, and the exchange of a range of ideas among military professionals, scholars, and policy analysts.”16 In many cases, these were difficult issues to agree on. But, over the years the Army has remained very consistent with its approach to developing and discussing doctrine.

From the publication of Infantry Drill Regulations in 1891 through the current edition of Field Manual 100-5, Army doctrine has been at the forefront of the services when it comes to rethinking. The development of Army doctrine has changed over time from one of a field responsibility to a “schoolhouse” responsibility. For example, immediately following World War II, doctrine development was a function of the G3 (operations and plans) staff section of the General Staff, with Fort Leavenworth retaining responsibility for developing the field manual.17 With these responsibilities came the requisite headaches of achieving consensus.

Over the next decade a number of additional organizational changes took place. By the middle of the 1950s, “the problem of doctrine development had not been overcome and yet another reorganization took place.”18 This new reorganization created the Continental Army Command (CONARC). CONARC’s responsibilities included directing the forces within the United States and the continued improvement and development of the Army, including the improvement and development of Army doctrine.

The Army, through intellectual activity and organizational structure adapted its mission and capabilities to changing national strategy during the mid-fifties.19 Still, the Army suffered somewhat from this painful decade of the 1950s due to a
proven strategy of massive retaliation. Yet, it was able to recover by early 1960. This was due to the Army building a training, planning, testing, and developmental organization that was extremely productive of new concepts for the employment of ground forces in a future military environment. The Army War College also reopened in 1950 and by the end of the decade its graduates began to have a tremendous influence on future Army doctrine. For instance, one group of officers ultimately propounded many of the concepts of the strategy of flexible response. Essentially, senior leaders such as General Eisenhowcr, Bradley and J. Lawton Collins saw a future that required the essential elements of overwatching, and thus stuck to those principles.

Not until 1973 with the formation of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) did the Army develop a systematic approach to developing doctrinal concepts. Prior to this, even though there was an appearance of a system, much of it was fragmented and subject to conflicting pressures. Even with the formation of TRADOC and this newly developed systematic approach, consensus within the Army would still be hard to come by.

It was the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 which became the jumping off point for TRADOC to use doctrine as an agent for change. As a consequence, there was significant resistance to this edition from the field and from within the TRADOC community itself, namely Fort Leavenworth. During this time, General DePuy, Commander of TRADOC, was not interested in obtaining consensus either in TRADOC or with the field. He believed a radical departure was necessary. Accordingly, General DePuy took a series of initiatives to consolidate his control over doctrine and used the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 to effect change.

This evolution of FM 100-5 produced a string of positive changes. Since the publication of the 1976 edition, three more editions have been produced. These have been the 1982 AirLand Battle manual and the 1986 and 1993 Operations...
annals. Each edition builds a stronger foundation than the previous one. General Sullivan wrote after the most recent edition was published, "The most chapter in our history will record an even greater degree of integration, as we respond to a new range of threats with tailored, multi-service force packages both oriented on and trained for crisis response and power projection, and as we employ the power that comes from simultaneous application of unique, complimentary capabilities [ital. added]." The challenge today is for the Army to employ certain central measures to accomplish its uncertain pencilnote role. One of the principal measures consists of producing doctrine that is acceptable. As history demonstrates, the impact of doctrinal failure during pencilnote can produce military disaster in future conflict.

FM 100-5 says, "As the Army's principal doctrine, [it] describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations. FM 100-5 underlies all of the Army's doctrines. The consistency and compatibility of FM 100-5 to multi-service doctrine is in its discussion in Chapter 4 of Joint Operations. It affirms that Army doctrine is compatible with and supports joint doctrine as described in Joint Publication 1-0. In truth, FM 100-5 is the only capstone service doctrinal manual that has a full chapter devoted to joint operations.

The other service manuals discuss aspects of joint warfare, but a reader would be hard-pressed to find specific references to fighting as a member of a joint or coalition team. They also do not make any reference to their compatibility with the joint doctrine outlined in Joint Pub 1. FM 100-5 has demonstrated sound concepts and is fully integrated with the ideas presented in Joint Pub 1. It provides the flexibility to adapt to changes and the versatility to accomplish the myriad of missions required in today's uncertain environment.
General Merrill McPeak, current Chief of Staff of the Air Force writes in the
Preface to AFM 1-1, "Doctrine is important because it provides the framework for
understanding how to apply military power. [Doctrine] is what history has taught
us works in war, as well as what does not [incl. added]." The history of doctrine
development in the Air Force demonstrates a parochial resistance to joint
operations that still exist today. For example, after World War II, the Army Field
Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, recognized the
independence of air power. However, in May, 1946, a General Francis Griswold,
Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, urged the Air Force to formulate its own
decision. He asserted that FM 100-20 was obsolete and totally inadequate. As
valuable this manual emphasized a co-equality of air and ground power. However,
General Griswold felt differently. He believed that air and land power were not
always interdependent. The Air Force was reluctant to push the idea that FM 100-
20 needed revision. This reluctance in turn stirred up a political controversy both
within the Air Force, and between them and the Army; thereby hindering the cause
of armed service unification.

According to the 1946 edition of FM 100-20, "the ultimate objective of air
power is to force the capitulation of an enemy nation by air action applied directly
against the vital points of its national structure." A new group of air "zealots"
were coming to power within the Air Force and with them came this philosophy for
the future of air warfare. This future needed its own base of operations.

Therefore, a seat of doctrine was established at the old Air Corps Tactical School in
Panama City, Florida.
A Major General Louis Knowlton, while serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans in 1946, further recommended the Air University be established at Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama. This institution would serve to guide the future thinking of the Air Force. Attending officers would not be bound to accept official policies; these would be presented for study purposes only. The other institution created was the Air Command and Staff School at Craig Field, Selma, Alabama. This institution would serve much the same as the Army's Command and General Staff College. With General Knowlton's recommendation and the favorable reputation of the Air Corps Tactical School, the Air Force issued the school's mission statement in June, 1946.29

A variety of seminar and panel discussions took place over the next few years. Essentially, the Air Force wanted to get a firm grasp on issues such as air defense, Air Force doctrine, and force structure.30 One example was the publication of AFM 1-1 in April, 1945. It declared that "those [forces] which conduct air operations are most capable of decisive results."31 This differed markedly from the Army's Field Manual 100-5 which maintained that Army forces as lead forces are the decisive component of the military structure. During the course of military operations the Army forces, because of their decisiveness, will be supported by other military components. In any case, the efforts of all service participants would be directed toward achieving the success of lead operations.32 The Navy, on the other hand, sided more with the Air Force's position. In their US Naval Warship Publication 10, they claimed, "Air strategy, designed to seek a decision primarily by air action...is in the process of historic development and...will become more clearly definable with the passage of time."33

The tumultuous decade of the 1950's brought about a revolutionary period of military thought. During the 1961-1962 timeframe came the advent of aerospace concepts and the future application of warfare to space. Because of this, the Air
It was difficult to justify many of the weapon systems because of failures in predicting the future operational environment. Major General Dale Smith, a senior Air Force officer working in the Pentagon, wrote: "the idea of letting [Air Force] doctrine drift from the vision of one operational leader to another, or from one ad hoc measure to the next, will never provide us with...comprehensive, dynamic, and effective doctrine necessary to save the Air Force." Resolution of this argument stayed on the back burner during the sixties as the Air Force turned to waging war in Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam War demonstrated to both Army and Air Force leaders, the interoperability required between these two services. Following the War, the Chief of Staff of both the Army and Air Force, General Abrams and General Brown respectively, shared a mutual understanding and outlook. They wanted to have this common understanding penetrate both organizations and be carried forward into peacetime operations. To do this they set about trying to influence General Robert Dixon, on his way to taking command of the Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), and General William DePuy, Commander of TRADOC. By the fall of 1973, both commanders agreed to establish a relationship that would mature into a dialogue to a partnership.

This partnership persevered during the draw down of the late seventies and flourished correspondingly during the early to mid-eighties. But the term partnership may not be the appropriate term. It could be described more as a relationship that required mutual cooperation in order to survive. With poor performances by all the services during the disorder of Desert One in the Iranian Desert, and the lack of inter-service coordination during the invasion of Grenada, Congress determined to define how the services would work together. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm provided a demonstration of the initial success of Congress' action.
Immediately following this operation came General Powell's philosophy on jointness in Joint Pub 1.

Four months later (March 1992), the Air Force published Air Force Manual 1-1, Volumes I and II. However, joint or jointness is not a word easy to come by in either of these manuals. Volume II contends "that aerospace power is the dominant factor in modern warfare."37 Although they acknowledge that this view remains controversial, "the ability to employ aerospace power rapidly against any level objective makes [the Air Force] the most versatile component of military power."38 It is these types of controversial statements which create inter-service rivalries.

Another similar statement of this same "parochialism" is again found in Volume II. It states, "The inherent speed, range, and flexibility of aerospace power combine to make it the most versatile component of military power."39

All this muscle flexing in doctrine may be nothing more than a push for more resources for their particular service. In a recent speech to the Air Force Association, General McPeak presented still another very controversial attack on the roles and missions of other services:

"Until recently, stationing troops forward was the best, maybe even the only way to monitor events, to show the flag, to guarantee a rapid response...Air and space power now promises a more elegant solution to the presence requirement...[the solution, he said is]...If you're sitting in country 'Y' and you're holding a council of war, you've got to think about the 2nd Bomb Wing in Barksdale [Air Force Base in Louisiana] or the 509th Bomb Wing with its B-2s at Whiteman [Air Force Base] in Missouri as being less than a day away. That is presence."40

This seems to be more like an attempt to justify the purchase of more B-2 bombers than a correct doctrine. If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is truly the integrator of doctrine among the services, he should clearly identify the efficiencies which can be realized. Otherwise, comments such as the one above may guide us right back toward a service parochial atmosphere that we do not need. As General
McPeak says, "General Powell recently completed a review of [current rules and
directives], but I am convinced that another defense budget will soon force us back
to the table for another look at the question of unnecessary duplication of
abilities."41 Maybe General McPeak's comments about air and space power
promising a better solution to forward presence is the beginning of this new
argument. The US Navy has def...opinions about which service is the best at
providing forward presence, and it certainly does not include the US Air Force.

Force 2001 A Program Guide to the US Navy &
...From The Sea A New Direction For the Naval Service

Until recently the US Navy had neither a home for its doctrine command nor
even such a command. Many of the publications that were produced by the Navy
over the years were done so by a variety of organizations and branches within the
Navy. But on 1 October, 1993, the Navy established the Naval Doctrine
Command at Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia. The Navy planned on publishing the
first edition of their capstone warfighting manual by February, 1994. Eventually,
delays forced a revision of the projected date to early summer, 1994. Admiral
Frank Kohn, Chief of Naval Operations, is the principal force behind this doctrinal
effort.

Traditionally a "blue water" service, the US Navy story began in 1794 when
Congress "authorized the completion of...six frigates...construction, purchase, or
rental of additional warships; and the creation of a Navy Department."42 Many of
their early efforts were spent supporting international conflicts. These types of
operations consisted of missions such as commerce protection and commerce
raiding. Additionally, the Navy fought open ocean naval engagements and
provided coastal support to amphibious operations of the Army and the Marine
Corps.
Success in the Navy did not stem from any formal doctrine. It usually resulted from a higher national strategy which set the Navy on a particular course. Strategies such as isolationism or forward presence required the Navy to play certain roles. These strategies produced either larger or smaller budgets to produce more or less ships. Writing doctrine in the Navy, unlike the Army, was not viewed as an important function.

Following WWII and the tremendous success of sea power, the US Navy moved boldly to provide some basic doctrine to its forces. This was done largely because of the efforts of Congress and the National Security Act of 1947. The Navy began to see itself being cut in force structure. They also viewed Congress as having a desire to get the services to work more closely together. Therefore, the Navy prepared "a series of US Fleet (UFP) publications. The key manual in this series—UFP-1, Principles and Instructions of Naval Warfare... was published on 1 May, 1947." At the time this document represented the best opinions and knowledge within the Naval service.

In the 1950's, the Navy's opinions, particularly over the use of air power, became a central focus of inter-service relations. This same air power debate is enhanced even further today due to advanced levels of technology and different national strategies on the part of various administrations. For instance, national strategy has always been a prime concern of the Navy's. In June 2001, it says, "The US Naval Service...plays a central role in national strategy. With the shift in focus from global to regional contingencies, the Naval Service's power, speed, strategic agility and mobility offer the country its best force for addressing crises and conflicts anywhere in the world [ital. added]."

This seems like an argument for the Navy to get more resources than the other services, and it probably is. The Navy is pushing for a CAPSTONE doctrine that promotes their traditional operational capabilities. In the past they maintained four
"traditional capabilities of forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift." In order to execute this new direction of the Navy-Marine Corps team, the Navy has added four additional capabilities. They are identified by the Navy as "four key operational capabilities [which] are required." They are command, control, and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; and, force sustainment. Each of these has a major impact on resources as well as on joint warfighting.

Many of the concepts in both ...*From the Sea* and *Force 2001* provide the reader with a joint image. The jointness however, is in terms of the Navy-Marine Corps team, not the full complement of all four services. The ...*From the Sea* concept paper emphasizes that the new direction of the Navy-Marine Corps team, both active and reserve, is to provide the nation with naval expeditionary forces tailored for national needs and shaped for joint operations, and to have those forces operating forward from the sea.

This discussion about the Naval Service's new role becomes expanded when one looks back upon their traditional expeditionary roles. For example, in the Naval Force policy document, ...*From the Sea*, it states that the design of Naval forces allows them to operate forward in austere environments and to respond swiftly if called upon. One of the five specific tasks is for the Navy-Marine team to operate without needing transit or overflight approval from foreign governments in order to reach the scene of action. The term transit means land forces and the term overflight means air forces. While this in fact may be the case in many instances, these types of statements only work against the whole concept of joint warfare. The Navy is simply arguing to keep aircraft carriers. The Chief of Naval Operations further contends, "as the Navy shifts from [the] Cold War... naval organizations must change. Responding to crises in the future will require greater flexibility and new ways of employing [Naval forces]." These future crises will
In most of the services, joint operations require significantly greater complexity than single-service operations. The expectation is that when the Navy finally publishes their operations doctrine, it will be in line with the concepts put forth in Joint Pub 1. If not, the preoccupation that has choked the services in the past will have a much stronger grip on them.

FLEET MARINE FORCE MANUAL 1
WARFIGHTING

Doctrine in the US Marine Corps revolves around two military functions. There are waging war and preparing for war. In the Marine Corps, doctrine and the proper use of it, enables them to conduct a present war and train for a future war simultaneously. General A. M. Gray, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, once suggested, the Marine Corps effort to separate conduct and preparation, both are inextricably related. Without sound doctrine, failure in preparation can lead to catastrophe on the battlefield. 50

In the foreword of the Marine Corps operations manual, FMFM 1, Warfighting, dated 6 March, 1949, General Gray professed, "This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight (ital added)." 51

Although the Marine Corps is a small service compared to the others, it is still part of the larger military force structure. The striking thing about General Gray's statement is the use of the word "we" instead of Marine Corps. The further one reads through this manual, the more one-sided it sounds. For example, none of the chapters in the manual discuss joint operations. One need only look at a brief history of the Marine Corps to see they have a dependency on joint operations. Given their operational history it is difficult to imagine the Marines operating outside of the joint model.
The Marine Corps has existed since almost the first military laws of the Continental Congress in 1775. At the time, they supported the Navy with shipboard police, boarding and small landing parties, gun crews, and embassy guards. By the twentieth century, the Marines began providing police for restless underdeveloped areas of the world where there were American citizens, investments, and imperial interests. It was the prospect of an island hopping campaign that gave the Marines a clear "raison d'être" for existing. As early as 1906, members of the Marine Corps were advancing the idea of using the Marines for landing operations against islands to obtain and protect advance bases for the Navy.

In 1920, the Marines established a school of instruction at Quantico, Virginia where they began working the issue of advance base work. Then in 1921, Marine Corps Major Pete Ellis wrote a paper projecting the amphibious strategy of a Japanese-American war outlining the procedures for amphibious assault operations to acquire bases across the Pacific. With the acceptance of this concept, the Navy-Marine team continued to work "with civilian manufacturers to develop new types of landing craft and vehicles for amphibious warfare. The Marine Corps base at Quantico became the dynamic center for the evolving art of landing operations." The whole idea of ship to shore attacks seemed to offer a major military mission for which the Marines were particularly suited. Perhaps the prospect of an island hopping war against Japan might provide the Marines with a distinct reason for their continued existence.

By 1933, a Major General John Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, was instrumental in establishing the Fleet Marine Force as the amphibious arm of the Corps. Additionally, with his blessing, the next year the Corps began concentrating their efforts on publishing a tactical manual, which was issued with the title Tentative Manual of Landing Operations (1934). This manual became
the doctrinal foundation for all Marine landings in World War II and was one of the
most significant tactical innovations during the War.97

In the late 1980s, General Cope declared, "As our nation begins its
requirement for military forces in light of the changes...[proceeding] within the
world's security environment, we should focus on...using the sea as an operating
area, not just for transportation. Marines (as soldiers from the sea) can project
continued combat power almost or sustain sustained presence anywhere around
the globe.98 This is clearly in agreement with the Navy's concept paper. From the
first paragraph, "The same model of Theater Battle Groups into an area of heightened
US interest made a clear signal.99 No better argument exists for a strong Navy-
Marine Corps force structure.

The Marines know where their front line. Without the Navy, they would
continued not operate as they do. The Marines' functions are essentially to be ready
to fight anywhere, anywhere to perform such duties as the President may direct; to
serve at sea with the Navy as a ready amphibious expeditionary force; and, to do
their share in the Navy's shore-based establishment. FMFM 1, Warfighting says
basically these things. However, it was written almost two years before Joint Pub
1. It was written before the Rare Force of General Powell and the Bottom Up
Review of Defense Secretary Argen. If the Marine Corps is proposed to change,
and it looks like they are, they are, it is the Navy, must get in line with joint
decisions. As General Cope bluntly, current Commandant of the Marine Corps
recently said, "The Marines have significantly improved their joint interoperability
in the last decade. [They] have also benefited from the effort to make service
decisions consistent with joint doctrine."99 This statement still remains to be proven.
Possibly, with the advent of a new Naval doctrinal manual in the spring of 1994,
the Marine Corps may publish a new edition of FMFM 1.
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz writes: "Given the nature of [war], we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the command can rely for support at any time." In war, good commanders find themselves falling back on their own innate qualities. This inner-self of the commander on the battlefield usually finds itself outside the model and, at times, in conflict with it. Capstone doctrine, therefore, must be presented with such consensus and flexibility as to allow a commander to use his talents and genius to operate outside the established rules of doctrine when these rules conflict with his learned practice.

Carl von Clausewitz gives the military much in the way of theoretical concepts. His ideas dominate each of the service's capstone manuals. Many of his theories are still sound practical concepts that can easily apply to today's environment. For example, Joint Pub 1 uses Clausewitz's elements of friction, chance, and uncertainty to characterize battle. In the discussion on the Nature of Modern Warfare, Joint Pub 1 asserts that "members of the US Armed Forces should understand the nature of warfare, both through solid grounding in the tested insights of the finest theorists...and by carefully keeping those insights up to date." This is clearly a mandate to the professional officer to continue studying theories of warfare. Since Clausewitz is the main centerpiece of joint doctrine today, he may have the greatest influence on future warfighters.

When today's leaders reach higher levels of responsibility and authority, problems tend to multiply. In war or operations other than war, things such as confusion, conflicting information, and the stress and pressure of command itself magnify these problems. "At this level," Clausewitz says, "almost all solutions must
be left to [the] imaginative intellect." As the commander determines the effects combat is having on his forces, it is his intellect alone which may be decisive. In this case, all of the opostope elements, particularly Joint Pub 1, tend to stress the intellectual role of warfare more than the physical nature of warring. They leave the latter to be described in subordinate Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TCP) annexes.

Field Manual 100-5 describing the American Way of War contends, "The ultimate aim for deciding to employ military forces exemplify the dynamic link among the people, the government, and the military. This is exactly as Clausewitz describes his positional trinity. In Chapter one of On War, he states, "As a total phenomenon [war's] dominant tendencies always make [it] a positional trinity. This trinity is composed of primarily violence, custom, and hatred. The first consumes the people, the second, the government, and the third, the commander and his army. This use of Clausewitz's trinity to describe the American Way of War demonstrates once again his influence, not only on FM 100-5, but on the way the Army thinks about warfare. This is another example of the impact Clausewitz has had on the development of US capstone doctrine.

The Air Force still debates which theorist dominates its doctrine. Unlike the past however, the current AFM 1-1 quotes Clausewitz no less than forty times. This again demonstrates the influence his theory of war has had on today's Air Force. The development of Air Force doctrine has come along in the years since Clausewitz wrote. In 1915, General Billy Mitchell, at the time assigned to the War Department General Staff, "had theorized that Army aviation would be a valuable second line of defense if the Navy's first line of defense should fail to stop an invasion of the United States. Rather than looking back at the results of aviation from World War I, he tended to look ahead at logical projections of air power capabilities. In his new position as Chief of Air Service's Training and Operations
Group, General Mitchell gathered a group of veteran airmen together. They studied Mitchell's ideas and concluded that air action on land and air action on sea were clearly distinctive.67

This assessment drew much criticism from the Navy. For example, at a meeting of the Navy's General Board in April, 1919, General Mitchell urged that aircraft could successfully attack naval warships. He believed that defense of the nation's coast be given to land-based aircraft, and urged the United States to organize some type of ministry of defense, combining the army, navy, and air forces under one unified direction.68 The Navy disagreed with Mitchell's views on the role of air power and never again invited General Mitchell to speak before the Board.

During this time many in the military considered the First World War as an aberration. "Since the turn of the century American military planning had been geared to two dominant themes: Continental defense and protection of possessions in the Pacific."69 The former represented the traditional viewpoint, while the latter gained prominence after colonial expansion in 1898. For the Army, defense of the continent was its basic objective while the Navy became preoccupied with the Pacific. Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, became the principle military theorist who influenced the Navy at the time.

In his remarkable book, Mahan set forth his views on both sea power, and strategic analysis and theory. Essentially, he presents two themes. The first is that sea power is an indispensable ingredient for national greatness and the second is the recognition of the overriding importance of the political object that is achieved by naval warfare.70 Samuel Huntington, in his timeless work, The Common Defense, writes, 'Mahan had constructed a doctrine of sea power without specifically denigrating landpower. For the supporters of airpower, however, the attack on the surface forces was unavoidable. Once the Air Force was established, the intensity
of their doctrinal concern perhaps moderated somewhat, but by this time the other
service had felt compelled to reply in kind."71

Mahan wrote his classic work before the turn of the twentieth century. The US
Navy formed its first doctrinal headquarters on 1 October, 1993. The Navy had
"doctrine" per se in terms of US Fleet Instructions. Yet, it took them nearly one-
hundred years to establish a Naval Doctrine Command. In Admiral Kelso's Forces
2001 philosophy, he states, "With a far greater emphasis on joint...operations, our
Navy...will continue to provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting
future security challenges."72 One of the reasons for this sudden doctrinal
This abrupt realization of "jointness" has taken the Navy by surprise. On the other
hand, the Marine Corps took quick measures to get their ideas out.

In FMFM 1, Warfighting, the Commandant of Marine Corps established the
Corps' official doctrine. The manual defines doctrine as a "teaching advanced as
the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature
and theory to its preparation and conduct."73 The Marines' theory of war is based
on Clausewitz. In Chapter two, The Theory of War, the manual emphasizes that
the Marines theory of war will become the foundation for the way they prepare for
and wage future warfare.74 In this chapter, Clausewitz is credited no less than
fourteen times for assisting in the development of the Marine Corps' thoughts and
concepts on a theory of war.

Carl von Clausewitz serves as the primary influence for both service and joint
capstone doctrine. Although others exist such as Jomini, Brodie, and Corbett, his
ageless classic, On War, is evident on many of the pages of Joint Pub 1 and the
other service manuals. In identifying terms which are important to doctrine,
Clausewitz classifies and defines two universally accepted ones; tactics and strategy.
He does this to help the reader understand if one wants a theory of war that is valid
for the great majority of cases and not completely unsuitable for any, it must be
based on the most prevalent means and their most significant effects.

Understanding this distinction between tactics and strategy is critical to
understanding the cause and effect relationship found in joint and service doctrine.
Universally accepted concepts and ideas in doctrine among the services are
supposed to be in documents such as Joint Pub 1. However, since it was written in
November, 1991, things such technology continue to rapidly change. Therefore,
Joint Pub 1 may need to be rewritten or at least reassessed to its worth.

One of the greatest influences besides history and theory on Joint Pub 1 has
been the United States Congress. In this next section, the monograph will examine
the influence that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 has had on doctrine. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act was initially the results of two studies. The first was the
Senate Armed Services Committee staff study of October, 1985 and the second
was the Final Report to the President's Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense
Management of June, 1986. Then on 1 October, 1986, Public Law 99-433,
known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 was signed into law.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 represents the first major legislative change
in the Department of Defense since 1958. In fact, there have been little substantive
changes since the National Security Act of 1947.75 The 1986 Act was an
ambitious attempt by Congress to fix many perceived problems within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, and
the military departments. What brought on these dramatic attempts to change the
Department of Defense was a dissatisfaction on the part of Congress and the
country as a whole with the past performance of the military. The military's
performance in places like Vietnam, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, and the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut caused much of this dissatisfaction.

There were also serious questions about the mechanisms for planning and managing combat operations involving joint action. Such things as unnecessary lagging and duplication of effort between the services are one of the most significant concerns. This particular concern deals with the role of joint doctrine or the lack thereof. It also received some confusion arising from conflicts in service doctrine. For there to be meaningful and successful joint operations, joint doctrine would have to be developed. A result of this was the creation of a separate directorate on the Joint Staff.

Out of this came the establishment of the Joint Operational and Plans Directorate (J-7). The J-7 supports the Chairman by improving joint interoperability through the focused integration and assessment of the following areas: conventional weapon, exercise and training, simulation, doctrine, education, operational requirements, and human factor. According to the J-7 joint doctrine is the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This clear mandate given to the J-7 by the Chairman is a direct result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Congress mandated the creation of a joint culture in place of individual service cultures by emphasizing a more centralized Joint Staff. The legislation they passed died law power away from the service secretaries and toward the office of the Secretary of Defense. Two examples of this are in the areas of budgeting and command. First, unlike private industry where budgets are decentralized to realize cost savings, Congress has centralized control of the multi-billion dollar defense budget at the center. Next, Congress viewed the services as to quadrinominate and
parochial. They became frustrated at having to continuously resolve disputes between the services. Therefore, Congress empowered the Chairman and the Joint Staff so that they would be able to settle disputes and unite the efforts of the unruly services.80

Contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act are six major provisions which are known as "Titles." Title II, Military Advice and Command Functions, deals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. Within Title II the Chairman assumes some additional responsibilities. Two of these are developing joint doctrine and submitting a report every three years to the Secretary of Defense on the roles and missions of the Armed Forces.81 This latter requirement will be more difficult for the current Chairman simply because there is currently no National Security Strategy set by the Clinton Administration. This is in contrast to Chairman Powell who had a National Security and National Military Strategy developed by the Bush and Cheney administration.

This new direction in joint warfighting required by Congress established the publication of Joint Pub 1 in November, 1991. Chairman Powell wanted his thoughts presented on how future warfare will be fought and on his perceptions of what the future battlefield will look like. However, what Congress and Chairman Powell wanted and what they got have turned out much differently.

Joint Pub 1 was an effort to "serve as a unifying focus for [the military's] conduct of warfare."82 As such, it established basic military values, presents certain fundamentals, and identifies the nature of modern warfare and its consequences. It was written with a very strong Desert Shield/Desert Storm flavor. In the afterword of the document, it quotes nine senior officers' opinions about joint warfighting in the desert. Additionally, the manual uses four examples of joint operations throughout its' chapters. While the war in the desert was a tremendous display of
Joint operations and while the examples in the manual are sound joint-multipurpose
examples, the uncertain nature of future missions requires more.

Congress expects the military to work together regardless of the type of
operations in which we find ourselves. The Goldwater-Nichols Act does not
restrict the Chairman to defining only one type of mission. For example, Joint Pub
1 does not address peacekeeping missions or how the US military may be
integrated into future United Nations operations. What Congress sees today is the
political requirement to apply the military instrument of power to solve international
problems. Because of this, it may be necessary to re-look Joint Pub 1 and assess if
it still provides a suitable framework for future joint operations and doctrine.

Doctrinal development since Joint Pub 1 has seen clear progress and has in
some cases been open doctrinal compromise due to the players involved and to
legitimate differences of opinion. Optimistically, it may take a decade or more to
reach any significant progress. For example, since the formation of Joint Staff
Command in the early 1970s, the Army has published its own
manual, FM 100-5, five times. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs needs to
understand this trend and see that Joint Pub 1 does not become useless
documents.

ANALYSIS

Feasibility

Feasibility defines whether or not an action can be accomplished by the means
available. The question then becomes, does Joint Pub 1 still provide a long term
vision for the continual development of joint and service doctrine? With so
many rapid changes taking place in the international environment, the military is
hard pressed to maintain its fighting edge. Therefore, one way to cure the "bug" on
the military's ability to accomplish the myriad of missions is to have sound doctrine.
There are many choices in the environment which are pulling away the attention to accomplish this important requirement.

One factor is the availability of money to do the necessary functions that our doctrine tells us we must do. However, with a view of the political environment one can see just how difficult this might be. For instance, in August, 1992, then Candidate Bill Clinton speaking to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles defended his agreement with Senator Sam Nunn of South Carolina enhance the future of the 1949 Key West Agreements. This agreement was essentially an arrangement that Secretary of Defense Peres and the services which came to on service roles and missions. Candidate Clinton said, "I agree with Senator Sam Nunn that it is time to take a fresh look at the basic organizations of our armed forces...while respecting each service's unique capabilities, we can achieve consolidation...and get better teamwork."

The United States military is in a greatly constrained environment. Since Candidate Clinton became President Clinton his administration has placed the Defense Department under a high powered microscope. Joint Pub 1 does not and should not begin to try and address this problem, but it should identify the need for increased flexibility. Stephen Kinser, author of Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, states, "The genius used in promoting jointness and to cope with declining budgets may combine to produce a military whose strength is one, and only one, capability for each identifiable function: intelligence, medical services, general combat, power projection, and so on. In the future, this integration may and possibly should include doctrine.

Joint Pub 1 as it is written today provides a vision as seen through the lens of General Powell's eyes. It provides some ideas and concepts of how we have succeeded in historical campaigns. It also sets a foundation for values and fundamentals that should be carried on into future doctrinal manuals. However,
this may not be enough. General Robert Riscassi charges that much of our doctrine is based on historical experiences. These perspectives tend to analyze leaders who led victorious formations in battle. This leads to conclusions more on leadership and the strength of personality than methods. He further tells us, "A doctrinal foundation must be based on methods" not individual leadership traits. The variety of examples throughout Joint Pub 1 are exactly as General Riscassi describes. There is Vicksburg and the impact of Grant, Korea and General Macarthur, the Solomon Island Campaign and again Macarthur, and finally the Normandy Campaign and General Eisenhower. It appears from General Riscassi’s remarks that Joint Pub 1 may have looked more at personalities than methods.

General Powell may not have foreseen the impact of the "Bottom Up Review." Therefore, his vision of the future of joint warfighting may be somewhat skewed. Since he had Joint Pub 1 published on the "Base Force" concept, the environment has changed. For example, force structure continues to be reduced while operations other than war continue to increase. However, the new Chairman along with the Joint Warfighting Center, which is responsible for developing joint doctrine, must see this period of time as an opportunity. The time may be now for the current Chairman to set a new vision. A vision that allows joint manuals still in draft and those yet to be published to set a course for joint warfare of the twenty-first century.

Acceptability

Acceptability is the cost-benefit relationship between joint doctrine and the services. It addresses the consequences of cost and whether or not they are justified based on the importance of the effects desired. If one of those consequences is a rise in competition between the services then the net effect may not be desired. For example, the application of air, land, and sea forces can have a resounding synergistic influence during a campaign if forces are employed as part
of a joint team. However, the USAF Air Force states in AFM 1-1, "It is possible that
drones drones can make the most effective contribution when they are employed
in parallel or relatively independent drone campaigns." This statement may
be interpreted as a move to place the Air Force at the dominant force in future
situations as long as they are able to operate "in parallel" or "independently."

Another consequence of this competing environment again comes from the Air
Force. AFM 1-1 states, "The advantages of operating in the third dimension...make
drone drones the most versatile component of military power." This is in
contrast to Joint Pub 1's core philosophy that any weapon in the future will be
turn versatile.

Seth Gruzdew, a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
described General Powell's tenure as Chairman, as excellent. Gruzdew says that
Powell created an environment with "the image of the military as a powerful
equation composed of mutually dependent and cooperative groupings of all
forces." Without General Powell's dominating personality and understanding
of politics, the services may not have come together on as many issues as they did.
This ability to get others to agree when it may not be in their best interest, but in the
interest of the larger body demonstrates an exceptional measure of leadership.

Accepting the consequences of future costs means having to make realistic
decisions today. One of the decisions for the services is to work more closely
together when it comes to developing doctrine. Joint Pub 1 can and should set a
time for this type of effort. For instance, today, there are five different doctrinal
headquarters. One for each service and one for joint doctrine. While there are
strong arguments for maintaining their existence, there are equally strong ones for
combining their efforts.

Is having five different doctrinal development establishments justified in today's
economic climate? Many who argue against consolidating functions would say this
provides an atmosphere of creative competition. As Stephen Rosen says, "We should never lose sight of the fact that a little competition never hurt anyone. After all it was the principle that won the Cold War." The point is that today the United States needs fewer forces in being and a wider menu of potential military capabilities from which to choose. We need this precisely because the US does not know what the threat will be or how it will fight. Doctrine can greatly assist this refinement of future capabilities. However, before Congress or the White House reacts to public demands, the military, i.e., the Chairman and the service chiefs, should quickly consolidate their efforts. Joint Pub 1, if strongly worded and equally accepted by all the services, may achieve the desired effects.

Suitability

Joint Pub 1 was published and distributed to a large audience. Yet, it appears to have become an obscure document. General Powell had the best intentions, but the system for developing additional joint publications was not in place. This system for developing joint doctrine would take another two years to come into existence. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 became a nice document to have in one's professional library, but ends up having little relevance. Thus, will the attainment of Joint Pub 1's underlying philosophy of team warfare accomplish the desired effect for future joint warfighting?

As General Riscassi exclaimed in the summer of 1993, "In truth, we have not had, nor do we yet possess, a commonly agreed [to] doctrine for forming or fighting as part of a military [team]." Moving into the twenty-first century presents many uncertainties. Regardless of these uncertainties, it is clear that future warfare will require all the components of the joint military team. The risks and problems of coordinating all these elements can be reduced by creating flexible doctrine that is agreed to by all services. A way to do this is to set a concrete
foundation of doctrine. Currently, Joint Pub 1 does not go far enough in identifying the pieces of this foundation. It simply describes a "way of warfare."

According to General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Marines "have significantly improved their joint interoperability in the last decade...[we] have also benefited from the effort to make service doctrine consistent with joint doctrine."92 The Marines should know better than any other service the need to work as part of a joint team. Without the historical relationship between the Marines and the Navy, and the Marines own efforts to demonstrate service unique capabilities, they may have disappeared as a fighting force. Still, the Marines have not set a new doctrinal foundation since 1989. Even though this foundation took them successfully into Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it was written by former Commandant, General Gray in 1989. This doctrine greatly reflects his views based on the conditions and the environment during his tenure. From this we could draw the conclusion that Joint Pub 1 has not accomplished its desired effect in regards to the Marine Corps.

If attainment of jointness espoused in Joint Pub 1 is to come to fruition, the services must let rivalries take a back seat to teamwork. As General Gordon Sullivan writes, "within the context of joint operations, there is room for achieving economies of scale and consolidating functions."93 Consolidating doctrine may be one of the ways to achieve this end. If we say we will always fight as a joint team, which is the current wave of thought coming out of the Pentagon, consolidation of doctrine should be one of the places to start. Joint Pub 1 can easily set the tone for this kind of thinking.

While each service contributes to all major missions of the national military strategy, their contributions in the past have varied considerably. For instance, the Army, during the 1950's, defense of NATO was primary, closely followed by limited war functions. Defense of the Continental United States ranked third.
Trailing far behind, a poor step sister to the others, was strategic deterrence. The Air Force functional areas were in order, strategic deterrence, continental defense, NATO, and limited wars. The Navy's areas were limited wars, NATO, strategic defense, and finally, continental defense. Although there are similar missions here, none of the services could agree on the same priority.

Joint Pub 1 does not identify one set of functional areas for all the services to focus on. This may be another aspect of what a cornerstone doctrine should provide to accomplish the desired effect. When all is said and done, for Joint Pub 1 to be suitable for accomplishing the desired effect, it must provide the linkage between the required end-state, the ways to get there, and whatever means are available given today's political environment. Joint Pub 1 provides the linkage between the national security and military strategies and all other doctrine. From this linkage, the other services can easily fall into a hierarchy of doctrine. Right now, one does not exist.

CONCLUSION

General Powell has professed many times that the military needs people who have mastered the tools of modern warfare while maintaining their traditional fighting spirit. With the future of the United States military heading toward the information age, we must be skilled in the use of bytes and bayonets alike. Joint Pub 1 gives a mere two short paragraphs to technology and the speed of communications. This is one area that may need to be expanded. For example, a discussion on the use of space based systems and their application to joint warfighting would be appropriate. Another would be to encourage the other services to seek better connectivity through information management systems. These types of concepts are fast becoming the wave of future warfare. While Joint
Pub 1 can not give a guide for much needed of wartime, it should focus on those
premises that will take us into the twenty-first century.

During this monograph, the discussion proceeded through the development of
joint and service doctrine and many of the premises that underlined this process.
It looked at the influence of theory and determined that while there were many
individuals who greatly influenced the development of Joint Pub 1 and the other
service operational manuals, it is Carl von Clausewitz that dominates much of our
thinking today.

Carl von Clausewitz establishes a valid doctrinal foundation. This is a
necessary component of any successful military doctrine. From this we analyzed
the impact that Congress has had on the development of doctrine, particularly Joint
Pub 1. Without the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, there may have been no Joint
Pub 1. Admiral James A. Winnefeld, serving as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs after
the law was enacted, said, "In every case, the keys to success have been a vision of
the future and the determination to make it become a reality." It is comments
from officials of this rank and status that demonstrate these truly is light at the end
of the tunnel.

The great value of Joint Pub 1 may not be in what it says but in what it has
signaled to the rest of the services. It sent a signal to many in the military,
particularly the Air Force and Army, who followed suit with updates to their own
operational manuals shortly after the publication of Joint Pub 1. Today, the US
military continues to draw down with no real anticipation of significant hostilities
on the horizon. Like other periods of peace in the twentieth century prior to
outbreak of global war, a need exists for sound doctrine that maintains a high level
of military readiness. Military planning, although limited to fighting major regional
consequences, requires ideas that Congress and the American people have come to
accept.
The last section examined whether Joint Pub 1 meets the feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability test. The underlying question being addressed during analysis was whether or not Joint Pub 1 still provides a current vision for future joint warfighting. Each element of this model looks at different pieces of a framework. For instance, feasibility looks at the ways available and asks if they are still doable given limited resources and the current and future environments. Acceptability seeks to address the cost-benefit relationship of what Joint Pub 1 champions the services to think about. It states, "decisions cannot replace clear thinking or alter a commander's obligation to determine the proper course of action under circumstances prevailing at the time of decision." Next, suitability examines the examination or backlash that Joint Pub 1 should provide.

Joint Pub 1 fits into the hierarchy of doctrine just below the national military strategy. It should link national security interests and military strategy to all other doctrine. This is accomplished by providing a set of basic functional areas for the services to focus on. It is also done by providing a vision of a desired end-state. Without providing some attainable functions for joint warfighting, a capstone joint doctrinal manual becomes misguided doctrine. And doctrine without true believers merely becomes useless.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Political controversy, that is, changes in administrations, changes in foreign policy, changes in the political environment (wars, treaty violations, trade barriers, reaction to human rights abuses) is a major cause for the proliferation of service doctrine. Each service has no purpose to exist other than to defend and protect some aspect of the nation's political will. Even though the services have fought together during this century on a number of occasions, it has taken an act of Congress to force them to think as one fighting element.
Joint Pub 1 is written to help ensure that members of the US Armed Forces fight effectively and successfully together. The deeper a reader gets into Joint Pub 1, the more it appears to be guidance from General Colin Powell on how to wage future warfare. The values and fundamentals he identifies are still valid. Yet, there is no identified thought process on planning and executing operations. This type of discussion could involve the strategic link between the National Command Authority and a Joint Force Commander. It could involve fundamental planning considerations which show an appreciation for the simultaneous nature of joint operations. There should also be some discussion on the framework of the future battlefield.

The future battlefield will include an area of operations, some measure of "battlespace", and some level of organization. Joint Pub 1 needs to recognize that these physical and intellectual concepts exist and attempt to define them. If Joint Pub 1 is to remain useful and continue to represent the foundation within a hierarchy of doctrine, it needs to identify certain methods of thinking about joint warfare. Identifying the framework of a future battlefield is only one example. Although many of these elements of joint doctrine will be found in subordinate manuals to Joint Pub 1, there still remains a need to identify the critical pieces of joint warfare.

Finally, since Joint Pub 1 was written without the foresight of fighting two major regional contingencies almost simultaneously, are its concepts still valid? As mentioned above, its values and fundamentals are still valid, but there may be too basic. What if the US is heavily involved in "Operations Other Than War?" What if the two regional contingencies are coordinated by some like-minded enemies? Of these possible conditions, it is operations other than war which may involve the bulk of the US Military. Situations such as military intervention in places like Peru or Colombia against drug cartels; riots in US cities; or peacekeeping/peacebuilding
In peace-like modes. There are numerous "what if" questions, and for the most part, they are all difficult questions to answer, but they are not impossible questions.

The Joint Wargaming Center is concern with the new Chairman need to consider Joint Pub 1. They should identify if it remains the authoritative guide on how joint forces will fight now and conduct operations other than war. If Joint Pub 1 is found to be no more than a philosophy of a former Chairman, then it should be revised. If it still meets the test of time and accurately reflects the vision of war that has been identified by the Bottom-Up Review, then it may only need to be reviewed. In the end, a superior joint doctrine manual must be accepted by all the services and from this their respective doctrine manuals should flow. So far, only the Army appears to have made this connection between Joint Pub 1 and the Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Hopefully, the next conflict will not require joint and service doctrine in more compatible.
ENDNOTES


2Joint Pub 1, p. 6.

3Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 141. These are Clausewitz's thoughts on theory not being doctrine, but existing so that "one need not start afresh each time sorting out [available] material...but will find it ready to hand and in good order."

4Joint Pub 1, p. iii. Joint Pub 1 states, "leaders must integrate the concepts and values presented in this publication into the operations of the US Armed Forces." The only way to accomplish this would be to begin integrating them into service doctrine, i.e., "capstone" manuals.


6Joint Pub 1, p. 5.


9Hereafter referred to as Goldwater-Nichols Act.

10Joint Pub 1, p. iii. It states, "To this end, Joint Pub 1 is being given exceptionally broad distribution." The result was, every field grade officer in all services was provided their own personal copy of this manual.


13 Clausewitz, p. 134.

14 Joint Pub 1, p. iii.


17 Cannon, Michael Major, FM 100-5: Just Meeting a Requirement? Military Review, August, 1992, p. 64.

18 Ibid, p. 64.


20 Ibid.

21 Cannon, Michael Major, FM 100-5: Just Meeting a Requirement? Military Review, August, 1992, p. 64


23 Sullivan, p. 12.


25 Ibid, p. 4-1.


27 Futrell, Volume I, p. 366.

28 Ibid, p. 365-366. This was written by a Major General David Schlatter in 1946.
in Air Force Magazine.

29Futrell, Volume I, p. 365. Futrell discusses the formation of the Air Force's Air War College, Command and Staff College, and the Air Tactical School. These schools were part of the Air Force's early efforts to identify Air Force doctrine.


33Ibid, p. 407. This is taken from Futrell's Volume study of the Air Force. However, Futrell takes this quote from an article in Air University Quarterly Review (Winter 1956-1957), written by a Colonel Wendell E. Carte, pp. 47-48.


35Ibid.

36Ibid, pp. 539-540. This partnership began to realize a number of efficiencies. The commanders established joint working groups on electronic warfare, air logistics, and remotely piloted vehicles. By 1976, an air-land forces application directorate began working seven problem areas including those mentioned above. Truly, a joint effort was underway to realize new efficiencies due to force structure drawdown concerns following the Vietnam War.


38Ibid.

39Ibid, p. 79.

40This is taken from an Air Force Times article written by Steven Watkins, an Air Force Times staff writer. It appeared in the issue during the week of 28 February to 4 March. Watkins writes that a new battle appears to be beginning on service roles and missions, and this is one of the Air Force's opening salvos.


45Patrell, Volume I, p. 366.


47Ibid.

48Ibid, p. 2.


50Ibid, p. 6.


52Ibid, This quote is found in the foreword which is in the form of a letter to the Marine Corps. It is additional guidance on the philosophy and distribution of the manual.


54Ibid.


56Weigley, p. 254.


58Howard, p. 222.


60From the Sea, p. 9.

61Clausewitz, p. 140.

62Joint Pub 1, p. 2.

63Clausewitz, p. 140.


65Clausewitz, p. 89.

66Futrell, Volume I, p.31.

67Futrell, Volume I, p. 32. "On land, battle is determined by morale: The aim ...is to destroy morale by methods ...based on unchanging human nature. Naval warfare, ...was a product of industrial and inventive genius firepower. Aircraft together with submarines, had the ability to destroy naval vessels, and it was obvious that the airplane had altered the means by which sea power was to be attained."

68Ibid.


73US Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting. p. 43.

74Ibid, p. 19.


76Ibid, p. 4.
This is taken from a briefing provided to the AMSP students during the East Coast trip taken in January, 1994. The J-7 provided a briefing on their roles, missions, and functions.

Ibid. This comes from one of the briefing slides depicting the definitions the J-7 has given to the terms Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.


Association of the United States Army, pp. 11-12.

Joint Pub 1, p. 45.

Cropsey, Seth, p. 75.

Rosen, Stephen Peter, p. 37.


Ibid.

AFM 1-1, Volume 1, p. 9.

AFM 1-1, Volume II, p. 79.

Cropsey, Seth, p. 74.

Rosen, Stephen Peter, p. 39

Riscassi, Robert W., p. 59. General Riscassi’s article discusses principles for coalition warfare. He has a sound argument in this article about the failures of doctrine. As earlier stated in this monograph, he feels doctrine is based on historical personalities versus methods. I agree. While personality is clearly important and can, at times, be the dominant factor, it should not be the centerpiece for creating doctrine.

Mundy, Carl E., Complementary Capabilities From the Sea, Joint Force Quarterly, Washington, DC: National Defense University, Summer 93, p. 21.

Huntington, Samuel, pp. 405-407. Huntington is describing the functional areas espoused by the services during the 1950's. Truly this decade was trying time for the services. Each competing for resources. The 1990's are no different. Also, the Navy's functional areas include the Marine Corps as well.

Joint Pub 1, p.3. General Powell also discusses this in his opening remarks in the professional journal *Joint Force Quarterly*. Although, General Shalashkavili has yet to establish his framework for warfighting, his initial tenure has been characterized along the same lines. That is, people in the military need to understand that no longer will we fight as separate services.


Joint Pub 1, p. 5.
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