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(Unclassified Paper)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN
(OPERATION ICEBERG)

by

RICHARD ZEE
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Richard Zee

17 June 1994

Paper directed by Captain D. Watson, U.S. Navy
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OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

(OPERA TION ICEBERG)

Nearly fifty years ago, a joint and combined task force undertook the largest naval campaign in the Pacific theater--the Okinawa campaign. Only ten to fifteen years ago, our military establishment, civilian and military thinkers, started formulating and espousing the operational level of war and operational art. To paraphrase a wise and astute writer, these are "new words for an old activity." The leaders of the past, by their actions and deeds, wrote today's "new" philosophy, mindset, and doctrines. The planning and associated activities for Operation ICEBERG validates today's concepts and thinking of the operational art. A study of this operation will prove to be both illustrative and enhance the student's understanding of this very important facet of warfare.
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Figure 1
The Western Pacific. Projected Allied Operations in Early 1945

Source: Frank, Benis M., Okinawa: Capstone to Victory, p. 10.
Figure 2.
Command Relationships

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Twentieth Air Force
  - Gen. H. H. Arnold
- China Theater Forces
  - Lt. Gen. A. C. Fedeczer
- Pacific Ocean Areas Forces
  - Adm. L. W. Beach
- Southwest Pacific Area Forces
  - Gen. D. MacArthur

- North Pacific Force
  - Maj. Gen. V. J. Fletcher
- South Pacific Force
  - Maj. Gen. V. J. Fletcher
- Air Force Pacific Fleet
  - Maj. Gen. V. J. Fletcher
- Service Force Pacific Fleet
  - Maj. Gen. V. J. Fletcher
- U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas
  - Lt. Gen. G. C. Kenney
- Forward Area Central Pacific Force
- Gilberts Marshall Islands Force
  - Maj. Gen. E. S. Harrel

- Strategic Air Forces (after amphibious phase)
  - Maj. Gen. W. H. Draper
- South Pacific Force
  - Maj. Gen. V. J. Fletcher
- Central Pacific Task Force
  - Maj. Gen. W. H. Draper
- Submarine Force Pacific Fleet
  - Maj. Gen. E. S. Harrel

- Overlord Forces and Special Groups (task force 15)
  - Admirals A. H. E. Kent
  - Fast Carrier Force (task force 58)
  - British Carrier Force (task force 11)

- Amphibious Support Force
  - Maj. Gen. P. A. Fallace, USA

- Gunfire and Covering Force

- Expeditionary Troops (task force 15)

- Northern Attack Force

- Demonstration Group

- Expeditionary Corps (Korean landing force)
  - Maj. Gen. P. A. Fallace, USA

- 1st Marine Div (Korean)
  - Maj. Gen. L. G. Shepherd, Jr., USA
- 6th Marine Div (Korean)
  - Maj. Gen. L. G. Shepherd, Jr., USA

- 11th Division
  - Maj. Gen. T. S. Murphy, USA
- 21st Division
  - Maj. Gen. W. E. Furness, USA
- 17th Division
  - Maj. Gen. C. W. Ewing, Jr., USA
- 17th Division (Pacific Islands landing forces)
  - Maj. Gen. A. J. Moore, USA
- 11th Division (Pacific Islands landing forces)
  - Maj. Gen. P. J. Miller, USA

Source: Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, Stevens. Okinawa, The Last Battle, p. 20, 22, 24
OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN
(OPERATION ICEBERG)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The art of war is the art of using the given means in combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war.¹ The conduct of war, then, consists in the planning and conduct of fighting.²

Every attacker, therefore, has to ask himself how he will exploit his victory after the battle. The next objective to be won will then indicate the natural direction of his blow.³

Clausewitz

Nearly fifty years ago, a joint and combined task force waged a campaign to wrestle the island of Okinawa from the Japanese. To students of the art of war, the Okinawa Campaign represents much more than the obvious culmination of more than three long years of bloody and costly war in the Pacific.

Starting in the early eighties, the services have been placing increasing emphasis on study of the military instrument as it relates to national strategy. It is noteworthy that all of the services' war colleges devote a significant portion of their curriculum to study of the levels of war, placing particular prominence on the operational level and the operational art. Likewise, contemporary writers in increasing frequency articulate and stimulate thinking, study, and debate in this important area of warfare.
Adams and Newell, in June 1988, noted the confusion ensuing the Army's introduction of the terminology of the operational level of war in 1982, and operational art in 1986--a watershed year for jointness due to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. They pointed out that these were new terms for an old activity and went on to encourage the joint and combined communities to develop the doctrine necessary to insure unambiguous command relationships at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In the late seventies, the Marine Corps began adopting maneuver warfare as a mindset or approach to warfighting and in FMFM 1-1 linked campaign or campaign planning as the instrumentation for commanders to relate to the operational level of war. In July 1991, Pugh pointed to the unique capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team and the utility of amphibious forces to unified commanders concerned with warfare at the operational level. Writing in Proceedings in August 1991, Pierce encouraged his service (Navy) to study and understand the operational level of war and its relationship to maneuver warfare--lest there be a regression to the command relationships of the likes of the doomed Gallipoli campaign of World War I. In Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume II, the Air Force formally adopted and defined aerospace operational art.

Of what value then, is an examination of the Okinawa campaign to students of the art of war?

Most notably, the Okinawa campaign serves as a validation of the most current thinking in the operational level of warfare in the joint and combined arena. Indeed, as a key component of the execution of national strategy, to the translation of the
theater commander's vision and the development of the campaign plan, the Okinawa
operation clearly and positively demonstrates many of the corollaries of the
operational art. Clearly then, a study of OPERATION ICEBERG will prove to be
illustrative and enhance the student's understanding of this particular facet of war.

The scope of this paper is limited to the operational leadership and certain key
elements of operational planning of ICEBERG. Details on theater organization, forces'
organization and readiness, operational training, deployment/redeployment, and
operational logistics/sustainment will not be covered.

The Operational Level and Operational Art.

FM 100-5, Operations, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, and Milan
N. Vego's Fundamentals of Operational Art all describe with consistency and clarity
the distinction of the levels of war and the overarching relationship of the operational
art. Joint Pub 1-02, The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, summarily
defines the operational level of war:

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations
are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish
strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.
Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establish-
ing operational objectives needed to accomplish the
strategic objectives, sequencing events .... initiating
actions, and applying resources .... these activities imply a
broader dimension of time or space than do tactics ...

Generally speaking, the operational level is readily and quite distinguishable from
the strategic and tactical levels of war. Vego⁸ and MacGregor⁹ both provide
compelling arguments, however, that technologically altered battlefield dimensions of
time and space can, in some situations, merge the three levels of war. Therefore, it
may be said to loosely associated with, and bracketing the operational level are the operational strategic and operational tactical levels of war. The levels of war conveniently provide a framework and clarify activities for planners. The expectation or outcome intended defines each level.

Operational art is a term associated with, but quite distinct from the operational level of war. "Art," by itself, implies a personal, creative power; suggesting ingenuity and subtlety in devising, inventing, or executing; as well as skill acquired by experience, study, or observation. Operational art, then, is the undertaking of all those activities (preparing, planning, conducting, sustaining) in order to attain operational or strategic objectives in a given theater of operations or theater of war. Significantly, operational art determines when, where, and for what purposes major forces will be employed to influence enemy disposition before combat. The study and practice of the operational art enables the commander to understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle. The commander is compelled to ask and answer:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the (joint) force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?*

A tangible product of the exercise of the operational art is the campaign or operation plan.
**Vision.**

A general in the field literally walks in darkness and his success will be in proportion to the facility with which his mental vision can pierce the veil.¹¹

*British Colonel on Stonewall Jackson*

Fundamental to the successful application of the operational art is the commander's vision of the military undertaking. The commander at the operational (as well as strategic) level is required to deal in a battlefield extended by space and time. Decisionmaking at this level is based to a great extent on forecasting with an uncertain vision.¹² The commander's vision, aided by analysis of friendly and enemy capabilities translated over time and space, may lead to predictions and expectations—which, in turn, directs the formulation of plans. The gap between expectations and reality can be narrowed by sound and timely intelligence. In Frederick the Great's time, the term "coup d'oeil," literally stroke of the eye, a brief survey, or glance, was used to describe today's "vision."¹³ The Germans later derived "estimate of the situation" to aid the commander's glance.¹⁴ This was an acknowledgement that the battlefield had grown in complexity and uncertainty.

Today, the commander's vision, derived from mission requirements, articulated by his intent and clarified by estimates, leads to the concept of operations and sets the conditions for battle.
Strategic Background.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill established the basic strategic offensive concept, and rough timetable, for the prosecution of the Pacific War with Japan at the Sextant Conference in 1943 in Cairo. As a result of this conference, the well known strategy of the converging two-pronged drive across the Pacific to threaten Japan was decided. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA) directed his drive along the north coast of New Guinea and continued the attack north to the Philippines. Simultaneously, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) attacked through the Central Pacific to the island outposts of the Japanese Empire. Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet (he was dual-hatted as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)) supported both strategic theaters of operations. The two drives would converge in a series of concurrent, mutually supporting amphibious attacks on the Luzon-Formosa-China coast triangle in the spring of 1945, preparatory to the invasion of Japan.

Aggressive, well orchestrated campaigns, and fortuitous engagements throughout the Pacific theater of war prompted a reassessment of the Sextant plan in 1944. Among the numerous proposals and options studied, planners consistently locked at Formosa as a necessary objective. As a long-range strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on 12 March 1944, directed CINCPOA to prepare plans for
OPERATION CAUSEWAY—the amphibious assault of Formosa—for early 1945.\textsuperscript{15} The JCS also directed CINCSWPA to prepare plans for the recapture of Luzon, "should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on Formosa."\textsuperscript{16} Not surprisingly, this plan reflected as much a resolution (or compromise) between the two partisan views of the Pacific strategy—MacArthur’s prodigal return to the Philippines and Fleet Admiral King’s insistence of the main effort through the Central Pacific.

\textbf{Decision Okinawa.}

In spite of the March ’44 JCS Directive, the Pacific strategy was far from being set in concrete. The situation remained fluid. The road map to OPERATION ICEBERG, though, reflected insightful visionary thinking, and focus on flexibility, initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, objective, offense, and skillful application of the dynamics of combat power. Even as Nimitz published the CAUSEWAY Joint Staff Study on 23 August 1944, stating his intentions to invade Formosa after MacArthur secured the Philippines, discussion and controversy continued on the selection of objectives.

Admiral Raymond Spruance, for one, was adamantly against going to Formosa. Nimitz had placed Spruance in overall charge of the CAUSEWAY operation, as commander of Fifth Fleet and Central Pacific Task Forces. Spruance’s vision for war termination with Japan and sequence of actions to produce that condition called for the seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. He believed the essence of strategy was to be found in geography and lines of communication.\textsuperscript{17} Applying the principles of interior and exterior lines, he reasoned the seizure of the Marianas secured interior lines of
communication which would permit the U.S. to advance to Japanese-held positions in an arc from Tokyo, Kyushu, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Formosa, the Philippines, and New Guinea. Likewise, Iwo Jima was the focus of an Arc through Tokyo, Kyushu, and the Ryukyus. Iwo Jima’s utility lay in its potential as an air base to support the Fleet in operations against Tokyo and the Ryukyus. The Army Air Force (AAF) favored it because it served as an emergency airfield for crippled B-29’s returning to the Marianas.

Admiral Spruance noted especially the geostrategic value of the Ryukyu Island chain, Okinawa being the most prominent terrain and decisive point (see map p. v). The chain of islands formed an effective screen of the East China Sea. Seizure of Okinawa meant control of the East China Sea, permitting effective interdiction of Japan’s strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC) as well as threaten Japanese controlled territory in China, Korea, and Japan itself. Other key leaders saw Okinawa as a staging base for the eventual invasion of Japan -- it was only 325 miles from Southern Kyushu and it was very suitable for troop training and staging, contained a number of useable harbors, as well as development of numerous airfields. Spruance, however, was adverse to the idea of landing troops on Japan proper. Rather, he desired to deny Japan of resources, and starve her into submission through a blockade. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral King also advocated blockade and desired not to put troops on Japan. Unfortunately, the August staff study only reaffirmed King’s desire to take Formosa. Spruance reflected his attitude concerning the Formosa concept, when at Pearl Harbor, after the Marianas campaign, he directed
his staff to take leave — "there was no reason to waste time working on a Formosa plan."²¹

In September 1944, the month following Nimitz’s CAUSEWAY Staff Study, the JCS published a tentative course of action containing a schedule of operations. Amongst the options was an invasion of Formosa on 1 March 1945. If this operation materialized, subsequent operations included the seizure of Iwo Jima and the Ryukyus in April and May, respectively; and the invasion of Japan proper would commence in October.²² The promulgation of this plan prompted LTGEN Harmon, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (CGAAFPOA) to propose to Nimitz the abandonment of the Formosa operation and press forward with the seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.²³ Like Spruance’s argument, Harmon’s rationale was also founded in geography and enemy disposition. Launching B-29 strikes from Formosa north to Japan would expose the long range bombers to a gauntlet of enemy anti-aircraft fires from the Ryukyus through Kyushu and all the way north to Honshu. Considering the prevailing winds from the north, the heavily loaded super-fortresses would be most vulnerable if launched from Formosa (as compared to launches from the east). In terms of logistics, as well as troops, the Marianas was more cost effective than the taking of Formosa. Additionally, enemy air on Formosa could be neutralized by operations out of Luzon. Thus, Harmon favored the capture of Luzon, Iwo Jima and Okinawa; running his B-29’s out of the Marianas; and by-passing Formosa altogether. To him, "engaging in major operations for Formosa would decelerate the momentum of the advance against the Japanese empire."²⁴
Another key proponent of abandoning the Formosa strategy was LTGEN Simon B. Buckner, Jr., Commanding General, Tenth Army, and Commander of Landing Forces for CAUSEWAY.\textsuperscript{25} His staff estimates, provided to Nimitz, concluded that the shortages of supporting and service troops in the POA made CAUSEWAY unfeasible. He emphasized his opinion that "if the objective of CAUSEWAY was the acquisition of air bases it (air bases) could be achieved with the least cost in men and material by the capture of positions in the Ryukyus."\textsuperscript{26} Buckner also felt that the planned invasion of Luzon would also diminish the need for invading Formosa.

Finally, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (CGAFPOA), LTGEN Robert C. Richardson, Jr., in responding to Nimitz's solicitation for opinions, replied, "only those steps should be taken which would lead to the early accomplishment of the ultimate objective -- the invasion of Japan proper."\textsuperscript{27} In his estimation, the Formosa strategy was not an economical option in terms of time and effort. He favored the Luzon-Ryukyus and Marianas - Bonins (Iwo Jima) axes.

On 29 September 1944, King met with Nimitz in San Francisco. Spruance was also in attendance, but didn't have to say much. Nimitz, armed with his numerous subordinate staff estimates, provided compelling argument to King to abandon Operation CAUSEWAY -- King capitulated and agreed to cancel Formosa and on 2 October recommended Iwo Jima and Okinawa to the JCS.\textsuperscript{28} It is worth noting that King either remained fixated on Formosa, or felt that he had to soothe the other Joint Chiefs in Washington. King's reason to the JCS for not invading Formosa was for lack of sufficient resources in the Pacific Ocean Area to execute CAUSEWAY and the
War Department’s inability to make additional resources available before the end of the war in Europe -- hence, his recommendation for successive operations in Luzon, Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus. "Favorable developments in the Pacific and in Europe might make CAUSEWAY feasible at a later date," said Admiral King.\textsuperscript{29}

On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to Admiral Nimitz "to seize one or more positions in the Ryukyu Islands by 1 March 1945."\textsuperscript{30}

Significantly, the decision leading to operation ICEBERG was not arrived at in the atmosphere of joint planning as is known today. Rather, each service developed a proponency that pointed to the seizure of Okinawa, but for different reasons. At the strategic level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed fixated on Formosa. At the operational level: Spruance envisioned Okinawa as a base to interdict Japanese lines of communication and as a launching point for future operations in China in order to isolate Japan and avoid the costs that an invasion (of Japan) would bring; Buckner saw Okinawa as an economy of force maneuver while other Army leaders (to include MacArthur) had visions of Okinawa as a better staging base (than Formosa) for the eventual assault against Japan; and Harmon wanted Okinawa as an air base for bombing strategic targets in Japan. It is a testament to the operational leaders, as well as the flexibility of King and the JCS that the Pacific theater strategy could be changed in such a manner. It certainly demonstrates that planning is, indeed, a two-way street. Had there been a Chairman of the JCS at the time, it is probable the same conclusion would have been reached.
Although the selection of Okinawa came about less from a unified national strategy and more-so as a result of the self-interests of each service, clearly the operational leaders possessed vision and practiced the operational art. Enemy and friendly capabilities were considered, staff estimates produced, and military conditions to achieve the strategic objectives in the theater were examined. Chapter III discusses further aspects of operational art.

Command Relationships.

The overall force organization for Operation ICEBERG closely resembles today’s unified combatant command (COCOM) structure. As CINCPOA, Nimitz exercised COCOM authority over assigned forces, which included component, functional, and allied (British Carrier Force) commands. The authority vested in Nimitz was broad in scope and mirrored those delineated for theater commanders in current doctrinal publications. As a theater commander, he received his strategic missions and guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Today, unified combatant (and specified) commanders are directly responsible to the National Command Authority through the Secretary of Defense for mission accomplishment—today, the CJCS provides advice and assistance.

The command relationships for the Okinawa campaign reflected lessons learned since Guadalcanal. It was also a departure from earlier amphibious operations in the Central Pacific as a result of two major factors: earlier operations against smaller land areas required relatively fewer ground forces and were relatively distant from Japan. Due to the physical size of the Ryukyu chain, the necessity to conduct supporting
ground operations to establish more than one position, and size of anticipated enemy forces, the ground combat element comprised of a field army. This factor and Okinawa’s nearness to the Japanese homeland and enemy bases required special consideration regarding battlespace dominance, isolation of the battlefield, deception, intelligence, operational fires, and operational logistics.

Admiral Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet, was designated "implementing commander" of Operation ICEBERG, under the strategic direction of Admiral Nimitz, CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{31} Command of the Joint Expeditionary Force fell upon Admiral Turner, Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet and General Buckner, CG Tenth Army was assigned CG, Expeditionary Troops for the amphibious phase of ICEBERG (see figure 2, page vi for other principal units). All forces under Nimitz were brought together in support of ICEBERG.

As the template in figure 2 indicates, the chain of command for ICEBERG went from Spruance, to Turner, to Buckner. Today, Turner would be called the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Buckner, the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF). Buckner was subordinate to Turner for the amphibious phase of the operation. At such time when the amphibious phase was considered to be successfully completed (to be determined by Spruance), Buckner would assume command of all forces ashore.\textsuperscript{32} This clearly defined command relationship, refined through the Pacific campaigns, essentially reflects current doctrine for amphibious operations. As figure 2 also indicates, Buckner assumed co-equal status with Spruance in the post amphibious phase. As commander of the Ryukyus force, a joint
task forca of ground, air, and naval units, he would report directly to Nimitz (CINCPOA).

Using Vego's model for the interrelationship between command echelon and military actions, it can be concluded that: the JCS was at the national strategic; Nimitz at the theater strategic; Spruance at the operational; Turner at the operational tactical; and Buckner at the tactical levels of war. As CINCPOA, Nimitz was the theater CINC and was responsible for theater strategy and theater campaign plans. As Nimitz's "implementing commander," Spruance was responsible for a single campaign, Operation ICEBERG. Turner was commander of a joint task force and responsible for the actual seizure of Okinawa. Commanders from the theater strategic to the operational tactical levels of war exercise the operational art.\(^3\)

As Joint Pubs 0-2 and 3-0 point out, clear command relationships enhance unity of effort in joint forces. Unlike the European theater, the Pacific theater lacked a united command. While MacArthur and Nimitz personified personal and service rivalries, a high degree of effective joint action was achieved by the U.S. services. "Though jealousy and bickering were often evident, the closer one came to fighting the more impressive was the underlying will to cooperate."\(^34\) A point of friction and disagreement in Operation ICEBERG that may have been alleviated by better command relationships was the controversy over the employment of B-29s in the Okinawa campaign.

Nimitz's greatest concern in ICEBERG was the effect of enemy air (Kamikaze tactics in particular) on invasion forces before friendly airfields could be established
on the target island. Estimates of available enemy aircraft from Formosa, Kyushu, and the Ryukyus ranged as high as 3000 to 4000. Considering the threat posed by this enemy capability, it may be considered an operational center of gravity (COG). In a pre-invasion maneuver to minimize this threat, Spruance used Fast Carrier Force (TF 58) to raid Kyushu airfields. The Japanese damaged five carriers, knocking the Franklin out of the war with a loss of more than 700 of her crew. This prompted Nimitz to seek out the B-29s for help. General Lemay begrudgingly complied.

Lemay, Army Air Force, was the only general officer in the Pacific Ocean Areas not under Nimitz’s command. The 21st Bomber Command, headed by Lemay and the China-based 20th Bomber Command made up the Twentieth Army Air Force. This organization controlled all B-29s in the Pacific Theater and came directly under General Arnold—coequal in status to Nimitz and akin to today’s specified command. Consequently, Lemay’s 21st Bomber Command, although within the CINCPAC-CINCPOA theater based in the Marianas, was far removed from Admiral Nimitz’s jurisdiction. The JCS caveated that Nimitz had the right to direct the employment of the B-29s in a tactical or strategic emergency. Nimitz sensed that if anything could jeopardize ICEBERG, it would be the Japanese Kamikaze and thusly, sought Lemay’s assistance. Considering Lemay’s personality, this was bound to be confrontational.

Part of Lemay’s reluctance to support Nimitz was his belief that the B-29 was a strategic weapon suited for strategic missions. The AAF general felt fire-bombing Japanese industrial centers was a more effective way for his bombers to wage
The debate over the strategic value of air power was taking shape. Lemay, in a message to his higher headquarters wrote:

"... the present stage of development of the air war against Japan presents the AAF for the first time with the opportunity of proving the power of the strategic air arm ... strategic air bombardment faces a situation in which its strength is proportionate to the magnitude of its task ... the destruction of Japan's capability to wage war lies within the capability of this command, provided its maximum capacity is exerted unstintingly during the next six months ..."  

This view was not for public consumption as the AAF, at least for the sake of public appearance, recognized the need for teamwork. Additionally, the European experience demonstrated the difficulty of defeating the enemy by air power alone. As a matter of policy, Arnold and Lemay were supportive of ICEBERG, especially since the AAF saw Okinawa as a future air base to continue strategic bombing. Nimitz gained control of the B-29s for five weeks. In addition to missions over Formosa and Kyushu, the super-fortresses performed photo reconnaissance and mining. Philosophically, Lemay remained unsupportive of Nimitz.

As the theater CINC, Nimitz remained focused and protective of his command relationship. When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Vandegrift, proposed to visit his Marines fighting on Okinawa, he was flatly turned down by CINCPOA. Nimitz later wrote, "Things are very active up there now and I am not willing to have my agents there interfered with--even by me."  

Vandegrift understood Nimitz's concern, particularly in light of the Saipan controversy, and that
Nimitz was not going to chance the applecart of command relationships being upset by even the good intentions of a friend.
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONAL PLANNING

It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.42

Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery

Campaign Plan

The campaign plan is the mechanism by which the operational commander links related and joint actions to achieve strategic (as well as operational) objectives or goals. The focus must be on the strategic objective and center(s) of gravity. The campaign plan incorporates phasing, synchronize and sequence joint activities, provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment, achieves unity of effort, provides direction and focus for subordinate plan development, and applies operational concepts. Not surprisingly, campaign plans were routinely prepared during World War II as the means to direct theater-level operations.

The strategic goal in the Pacific theater called for the capitulation of Japan. The operational commanders seemed at variance as to the enemy’s strategic center of gravity and how to attack it. Lemay and Arnold must have felt the COG to be the will of the Japanese people. Hence, the execution of the "Empire Plan," whereby urban areas of the mainland were struck day and night—excluding the atom bombs, 64 cities and 178 square miles were burned out.43 Lemay believed he could force a surrender before the eventual invasion. The Army felt the destruction of the Japanese military was key and therefore considered the invasion of the homeland
essential. As previously mentioned, Spruance believed the SLOCs through the East China Sea and resources were key and thus, endorsed blockade. This was also a recognition of the will of the people. Strategically, it would be correct to say both the will of the people and its military were centers of gravity; considering the militaristic society of Japan at the time.

Okinawa, then, became the final operational objective to facilitate the attainment of the strategic goal. Spruance and Nimitz both recognized the Kamikaze as an operational center of gravity. If anything could seriously jeopardize the amphibious phase, it was the Kamikaze. Significant time, effort, and resources were devoted to reducing this threat. When Lemay’s B-29 efforts to eliminate Japanese aircraft factories proved marginal, Spruance directed Mitscher’s Task Force 58 to strike aircraft factories, airfields, and aircraft on Kyushu in February and March (D-Day was 1 April). Said Spruance, “We would use our accuracy to attack military targets and would leave attacks on the civilian population to the Army Air Force.” In spite of these efforts, the Kamikaze would still exact a heavy toll on the American invaders.

Extensive effort went into isolation of the objective area and achieving battlespace dominance. Land-based air from SWPA engaged in strikes against Formosa. In the month preceding the landing, B-29s from China and the Marianas struck at Formosa, Kyushu, and Okinawa. The naval air of the Forward Area Central Pacific Force conducted antisubmarine operations, neutralized bypassed enemy bases, and provided logistic support. Submarine Force Pacific Fleet provided intelligence and interdiction of the sea approaches from Japan and Formosa. Spruance assigned Fast
Carrier Force (TF 58) the lion’s share of the mission of neutralization of enemy air. In addition to early strikes previously mentioned, Mitscher’s TF 58 isolated Okinawa from the east the week prior to the invasion and supported the assault with strikes and patrols. The British Carrier Force (TF 57) neutralized enemy air installations southwest of the Ryukyus. Other special task groups conducted aerial search, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare.

Exclusive of the pre-assault phase and the activities therein, the Okinawa campaign was largely divided into three phases. The first phase comprised of the seizure of southern Okinawa, a group of nearby islands for the establishment of anchorages, a heavy artillery base, and support facilities, and the initial development of base facilities. The second phase called for the occupation of Ie Shima and control of northern Okinawa. The final phase consisted of the seizure and development of additional islands for future operations. Deception was integrated in the first phase by a demonstration and turn-away landing by the 2d Marine Division.

The joint nature of ICEBERG required extensive coordination and cooperation of the three services in all operational and logistic problems. Planning was always concurrent. Interoperability was the watchword—from the joint intelligence center to the integration of air and all supporting arms and all aspects of logistics. Joint conferences resolved issues involving troop lists, shipping, supplies, and strategy. At each major echelon, Tenth Army intelligence was closely coordinated with that of the Pacific Fleet’s Amphibious Force. Vertically, Corps and task force commanders
worked together on plans for amphibious operations. Navy and Marine liaison officers were assigned to Tenth Army general and special staff sections.

The efforts of joint planning activities resulted in important decisions and modifications. Tenth Army increased the troop list by 70,000, to include more combat support and service support elements; additional objectives were decided upon to accommodate protected anchorages; a deception plan was incorporated into the overall plan; and details on operational fires were resolved.

**Operational Fires**

Operational fires are designed to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or a major operation. It is distinguished from fire support in that it is planned to counter the enemy’s operational firepower, operational maneuver, and facilitates friendly deception and security. Operational fires permit friendly maneuver, isolates the battle area, (LOCs, focal points and enemy command and control), and destroys critical functions and facilities.

Operational fires for ICEBERG include the efforts of the AAF and Carrier Task Force strikes to contain and diminish the effects of the Kamikaze. The controversy between Lemay and Nimitz was a seed for today’s Air Force focus on strategic targets. Ground forces today, as well as in the past, tend to focus on operational targets. Nonetheless, today’s concepts of asset allocation, deconfliction, coordination and the JFACC and JTCB could all be found in the execution of ICEBERG. A testimony to the effect, development, and sophistication of naval gunfire support is that the amphibious landing on the beaches of Okinawa was unopposed. The
Japanese garrison commander was well aware of the lethality of American naval gunfire support and modified his defensive scheme to engage the invaders inland.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

History truly repeats itself. Today’s concepts and doctrine regarding operational level thinking and the operational art were written by the leaders of the past. As a footnote and final example, Admiral Spruance’s understanding of the operational art (TEMPO) is reflected in his comment, "In war the time element is often an important consideration. Sometimes, time is working for the enemy, and we ought to push the fighting. Sometimes, time is working for us, and then we can slow down the fighting."46

Interoperability and joint thinking was at its zenith in the Okinawa campaign. A study of Operation ICEBERG is illustrative and will indeed enhance the student’s understanding of the operational art. What remains for the future with regard to amphibious operations is an open ended question and the subject of intense debate. The utility of "From The Sea" remains to be tested. Has naval gunfire support become a dinosaur? The dimensions of space and time have compressed incredibly since soldiers, sailors, and Marines stepped ashore on Okinawa. Quantum leaps in technology have altered the battlefield. The only certainty is that future leaders are doomed if they do not study and understand operational level thinking and the fundamentals of the operational art.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 128.

3. Ibid., p. 546.


5. Ibid., p. 38.


13. Ibid., p. 43.

14. Ibid., p. 43.


18. Ibid., p. 332.

19. Ibid., p. 332.

20. Ibid., p. 332.

21. Ibid., p. 333.

22. Ibid., p. 333.


24. Ibid., p. 15.

25. Ibid., p. 15.


27. Ibid., p. 4.

28. Ibid., p. 4.


31. Nichols and Shaw, p. 17.

32. Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p. 23.

33. Vego, p. 23.


36. Ibid., p. 369.
37. Ibid., p. 356.
38. Ibid., p. 357.
39. Ibid., p. 369.
40. USAF Historical Division, p. 626.
41. Potter, p. 373.
42. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, p. 2.
43. USAF Historical Division, p. xx.
44. Buell, p. 345.
45. Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, p. 25.
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