# U.S. Military Doctrine: Culture, Contrasts, and Agendas

U.S. Military doctrine is evolving rapidly. All the services, within the past five years, have produced new "capstone" doctrinal manuals. All but one takes into account the momentous changes that have occurred in the world during this time-frame. These publications seek to establish a culture and system of beliefs that becomes the operational warfighting philosophy of that particular service. Developed in an independent setting, individual service doctrine can look very different from their respective sister service's view of preparing for, and conducting war. Such contrasts can lead to agenda setting that can cause friction in the joint environment. This paper examines the capstone doctrine of each of the services, notes the major contrasts, and identifies the agendas of each. Apparent conflicts are identified and a recommendation is made for each service with regard to making their respective doctrine more compatible with their counterparts. Those recommendations entail a continuous review process that includes a team of senior liaison officers who would provide advice to individual services in an effort to help develop more interoperable doctrine.

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U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE:
CULTURE, CONTRASTS, AND AGENDAS

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: [Signature]

17 June 1994

Paper directed by Captain C. Watson
Chairman, Department of Joint Military Operations
ABSTRACT of
U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE: CULTURE, CONTRASTS, AND AGENDAS

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PREFACE

Anyone reading this paper must realize the obvious. This interpretation comes from a career Marine and, as illustrated in the text, I am (like others) the product of a service culture. Certainly, my view of doctrine is colored by my background. The paper pulls no punches and represents how I honestly feel, based on my study of doctrine and my observations as a participant in the operational environment. Efforts to stay absolutely objective and totally emotionless were, probably, goals not met. I apologize up front. While I accept full responsibility for the content of this paper, it should be noted that most of the material used to support my arguments comes from official doctrine and the written work of members of the individual services commented on. In any case, if I provided something here that was controversial enough to provoke debate, and thus eventual improvement, then this will have been more than just an academic exercise . . . and worth it.
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CHAPTER I: SERVICE DOCTRINES

INTRODUCTION

When the Navy publishes Naval Warfare each service in the United States Military will have published a new "capstone" doctrine within the last five years. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have published Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. This surge of writing and publishing comes at a time when the services are scraping for budgets and doctrine can be used as justification to claim their fair share. At the same time the Department of Defense is trying to meet the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The result is a clash between the services with regard to individual mission accomplishment while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tries to get all the services to work together. To better comprehend the dynamics of the conflicts which are occurring we must first understand what doctrine is and how it influences the individuals of different services.

DOCTRINE DEFINED

Doctrine is defined in the Readers Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary as "... a belief on the part of those who accept it." As we shall see, for the individual services it is, for the most part, accepted as a system of beliefs on how they conduct war. It is instructive to note the dictionary also states that "... belief more often suggests matters of faith rather that reason." This is probably why some services go to great lengths to justify their doctrine based on historical interpretation, and why it is open for challenge. What is more important to understand about doctrine is that from the time a person enters his or her respective service he is taught, or indoctrinated, with the beliefs of that institution and develops a bias toward those teachings. Indoctrination is the process of "...teach[ing] partisan or sectarian
While the basic doctrinal publications of the services are careful not to equate doctrine and dogma, the partisanship developed in any serviceman's early years is real and strongly held. Those beliefs are fostered and reinforced over the span of a career.

**SERVICE CULTURE**

Service culture is the product of a group of people who believe in essentially the same thing (partisanship). The leaders of the services have progressed through the ranks acting on their beliefs and being rewarded for it. Learning, promoting and teaching institutional beliefs made them successful and strengthened the service culture. Their views sometimes contrast with those of other services and they may have been involved in setting agendas to promote their respective positions. Following the basic dictates of established service doctrine may involve promoting their own operating methodologies and procurement priorities. Thus, part of each service's culture includes fighting for its viewpoint, sometimes at the expense of a sister service.

**THESIS**

This paper will assess the impact of the major differences in doctrine of the services. Analysis and interpretation of doctrine will show how each service's doctrine fosters a culture and system of beliefs which sometimes contrasts with sister services. This paper will show this can lead to agenda setting that can cause friction in the joint environment. Finally, it will make some recommendations for future individual service and joint doctrinal development.
CHAPTER II: SERVICE DOCTRINES

U.S. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM-1) Warfighting, is the capstone manual that articulates the Marine Corps' basic doctrine. It was published in 1989 and, as such, is the oldest of service's emerging publications. Compared to the other service capstone manuals it is arguably more philosophical in its approach. Referring to the dictums of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu it attempts to selectively employ parts of each to justify the only dogmatic proclamation in the whole manual: the adoption of maneuver warfare as a warfighting philosophy. The theme of maneuver warfare flows throughout the manual, admitting that doctrine must change in the face the traditional American style of warfare: attrition. The other notable theme Warfighting presents is the Marine Corps, while it is a combined arms organization, believes wars are still decided on the ground.

Achieving the objective on the ground is the reason for the combined arms approach. "We use assault support to quickly concentrate superior ground forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and we use deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements." Whether its done by maneuver or attrition, the Marine Corps still believes wars are won by controlling real estate.

MARINE CORPS CULTURE

Even though the methodology may have changed from attrition to maneuver, Marines still espouse the necessity of expeditionary amphibious warfare. Crossing a beach is still part of Marine culture. This notion is reinforced in training which "... provides all Marines a common experience, a proud heritage, a set of values, and a common bond of comradeship. It is the essential first step in the making of a Marine." The expeditionary nature of
amphibious operations dictates "... equipment should be designed so that its usage is consistent with established doctrine and tactics." Marines want their equipment simple, reliable, and designed to exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Significant is the stated aversion to "... over-reliance on technology." This position is rationalized by the assertion that any advantage gained by technology will soon be countered by new tactics or a counter-technology. The final major cultural feature of Marine Corps doctrine I would like to point out is the idea of decentralized command. In order to effectively execute maneuver warfare and to "... generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized." It means subordinate commanders must be able to make their own decisions and act based on the commanders intent, not always wait for an information exchange and a decision from the top. This concept answers the contingency of a technology failure. If the subordinate commander cannot communicate via technology, he already knows what to do because the commander has made his desires known, preferably in a face-to-face conversation.

*Warfighting* espouses maneuver warfare and confirms Marines still believe wars are decided on the ground. It emphasis a culture that is expeditionary, amphibious and combined arms in nature. Everything in its organization, training, and equipment is aimed at supporting its concept of warfighting. It produces a culture which looks skeptically at technology and clings tenaciously to the human aspects of war.

**COMMENTS AND CRITICISM**

While only five years old, *Warfighting* is dated. The theory of maneuver was adopted in a time when we faced a Soviet threat that was numerically superior and the current Commandant was an avid supporter of the theory. Maneuver offered a method of coping
with larger numbers. Now that we are the preeminent world military power, even with the draw down, is the inherent risk of maneuver warfare acceptable? Any student of Clausewitz looks cautiously at doctrine that professes the enemy will give up because he has been out-maneuvered, especially when the maneuvering required may have stretched beyond your culminating point of victory, possibly dooming you to defeat. The theory disregards the reciprocal action the enemy will take to foil your efforts. Self critical Marines question whether maneuver warfare can always be employed anyway. Certain missions assigned by higher authority (the National Command Authority or the warfighting CINC) may not lend themselves to maneuver warfare. Some argue the combat experience of the Marine Corps does not support a move to maneuver warfare, while others feel Desert Storm has validated the concept. These arguments will continue. What can't be denied and what may be the chief criticism of Marine doctrine in its present form is that it was written before "... From the Sea", Joint Pub 1, and Naval Doctrine Publication 1. To keep up with the evolution of doctrine, FMFM 1 needs a fresh look.

**MARINE CORPS AGENDAS**

On the surface, Marine Corps doctrine seems fairly agendaless with respect to other services. But this in itself reveals an agenda. Marine doctrine essentially states that Marines must fight on their own terms, as a combined arms team in maneuver warfare. As we will see later, that position conflicts philosophically with some of the other services, especially with regard to decentralized command and an aversion to technology. In terms of the joint arena, Marine doctrine does not address integration with the other services, other than the traditional relationship it has with the Navy in amphibious operations. We'll address more on the relationship of these problems in Chapter Three.
U.S. NAVY NAVAL WARFARE

Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), Naval Warfare is the Navy's capstone doctrine manual. Fresh off the presses, it is the first doctrinal publication the Navy has ever produced. It can be argued that Naval Strategy has really been the doctrine of the Navy, and its father Alfred Thayer Mahan. Some of his thought, conceived in the latter 19th century, is evident in the pages of NDP-1. Another aspect of the manual which is different, is the inclusion of the doctrine of another service, the United States Marine Corps. This dual aspect of ownership gives the publication a naval service flavor rather than a singular navy focus. As such Naval Warfare's stated purpose is to "... outline the principles upon which we organize, train, equip, and employ naval forces... [and] presents broad guidance for the total Navy and Marine Corps team..." Since we have already covered Marine Corps doctrine, our focus will be on the Navy aspects of NDP-1, but it will be interesting to note some of the parallels, as well as disconnects.

Naval Warfare is up front about where it comes from. "Our nation's maritime strength has enabled us to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and confrontation... whenever these crises have threatened our national interests, our leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces." It is self evident that Naval forces will be required in the future and the purpose of doctrine is to provide the link between the national military strategy and the tactics, training and procedures the Navy uses. More importantly it points out that doctrine provides "... the basis for mutual understanding within the Services and the national policy makers." NDP-1 acknowledges the efficacy of jointness and the emphasis on the shift to the littorals by stating it "... translates the vision of the White Paper...From the Sea" into doctrinal reality." The most telling aspect of the introduction to the manual is in
the last two sentences. "Nevertheless, a significant theme of this publication is that our Naval Services' fundamental missions have not changed. Our nation's continued existence is tied to the seas, and our freedom to use those seas is guaranteed by our naval forces." This sets the stage for the culture reflected in the following pages.

**NAVY CULTURE**

The culture of the Navy was not invented in March of 1994. It is steeped in more than two hundred years of tradition that are reflected in NDP-1. As stated earlier, the spirit of A.T. Mahan is alive and well in *Naval Warfare*, starting in chapter one. "Ensuring the that the world's sea lanes remain open is not only vital to our own economic survival; it is a global necessity." It does not leave the expeditionary aspect adrift, however, by touting the responsiveness and flexibility of such forces. Expounding on capabilities from the sea, NDP-1 says it can cover disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, forcible entry, and strike operations. The impression the reader is left with is, as previously stated, the Navy intends to conduct business pretty much as usual, with a little more emphasis on expeditionary aspects and joint operations. To be sure, the primacy of war-at-sea is never questioned:

"Control of the sea is fundamental to accomplishing our naval roles." This includes those roles that must be conducted from the sea. The most revealing cultural statement in NDP-1 is that "...[t]he ability to engage the enemy at sea decisively will always remain paramount to our naval forces." Not so fast, Julian Corbett. Finally, it must be noted that the Navy has adopted maneuver over attrition as its preferred style of warfare. But, unlike *Warfighting*, both maneuver and attrition have utility, perhaps as a hedge against criticizing a form of warfare that we could very well use again, since it maintains both forms are used today.
COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS

Since NDP-1 is new, the reviews are yet to come. For those in the Navy who have written about the need for doctrine it would appear their expectations have not been met by *Naval Warfare*. The alignment with "... From the Sea" is less than complete and far from an approach that asserts: "The strategic outlook of Mahan and the Maritime Strategy no longer will suffice." Views more along the lines of Sir Julian Corbett have not gained favor in NDP-1, which would have required "... a complete refocusing of the way we think about the Navy as a military force, a testimony to the primacy of land operations in warfare." Several interesting axioms flow from this line of thought, one being that naval operations exist to support the land campaign. Another is that Naval Aviation, while a vital element of the Naval force, is no longer the centerpiece element. The idea that the Navy should turn to a role in line with the Marine Corps' traditional orientation by serving in a "fire brigade" role, is lost on NDP-1. In a naval officer's words "... the Navy has always considered it (crises response) secondary to its primary mission of command, ...g the seas and being prepared to defeat the enemy's fleet at sea." *Naval Warfare* leaves that culture in place.

NAVY AGENDAS

*Naval Warfare* meets the requirement of stating the Navy's basic doctrine. What it allows the Navy to do is essentially conduct business as usual and the manual is up front about saying so. With some minor adjustments for accommodating "... From the Sea," recognizing the Marine Corps as more active partner, and some apple pie about jointness, NDP-1 leaves the Navy to execute its traditional agenda: sea control with big deck carriers. Had the culture and agenda really shifted, the Navy would not be pursuing the funding for Nimitz-class carriers while "... gambling that by not budgeting for the purchase of a
seventh amphibious ship (LHD-7) Congress will actually find the money to pay for the ship in 1995. Those who expected change from NDP-1 will be disappointed. It certainly will stir debate, but "if it stimulates discussion, promotes further study, and instills in readers a sense of ownership as contributing members of a coordinated Navy/Marine Corps team, then NDP-1 will have properly served its purpose." Let the debate begin.

U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS

The new version of the Army's traditional doctrinal publication, FM 100-5, Operations is the capstone (or keystone as they call it) document for the Army. Published in June 1993, only the Navy has newer doctrine. The difference is the Army publishes revised doctrine at a higher pace than any other service. To the Army it is an evolutionary process, as the manual acknowledges this fact in the introduction. Operations takes advantage of recent developments to keep Army doctrine relevant. Published after the Gulf War it directly incorporates lessons learned, which can have positive (as well as negative) impact. It also recognizes the changed world situation and uncertainty facing the nation. It incorporates the basic guidance of the most recent National Military Strategy and acknowledges the need for stronger joint operations as dictated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By trying to cover all conceivable contingencies, Army doctrine tries to be all things to all soldiers by stressing operations in a joint environment using technology to conduct "full-dimension operations."

The Army, like the Marine Corps, recognizes the need for technology but does not go so far as to say it will always be countered. It is similarly cautionary in tone by stating: "At the same time, however, warfare remains a test of a soldiers will, courage, endurance and skill. Freezing rain, muddied foxholes, blistering heat, physical exertion, and imminent
danger will remain the domain of the soldier."^42 The Army also believes wars are won on the ground.

**ARMY CULTURE SHIFT**

The recent world events affect the Army more than any other service. Oriented for decades on the problem of how to deal with the Soviet juggernaut, the Army now finds itself in the throes of adapting to an uncertain threat. As soon as the Gulf War was concluded and hailed as the validation of current AirLand Battle doctrine, the Army was already considering ways to modify what some considered obsolete doctrine.^43 This development does not alarm the Army's top leader: "The rationale for revising our doctrine is simply that some of the major factors on which current doctrine is based is changed . . . our doctrine needs updating to keep pace with the fast changing environment."^44 With the modifications to AirLand Battle, endorsement of joint operations, and the inclusion of operations other than war, the Army has incorporated into its culture the attitude that it can adapt to any form of operations in the spectrum of conflict. "It goes beyond AirLand Battle to full-dimension operations."^45 The Army recognizes the need for change and if it is to play a viable role in the future it must be willing to change its outlook. The real culture shift is the recognition of interdependency and jointness.

**COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS**

As the service that depends most on the other services to get it to the fight and support it once there, the Army is logically the biggest proponent of joint operations.^46 In this sense *Operations* comes across as the least parochial of the service's doctrine. In an effort to comply with the National Military Strategy it addresses the full spectrum of conflict as it
applies to all branches of the Army. With its adoption of full-dimension operations it is the
most forward looking and comprehensive of all service capstone doctrines.

The one critical aspect I found is the aversion toward using the term attrition. This
does not seem to be a recognized form of warfare to the Army. Yet, Operations speaks in
Clausewitzian terms when it refers to combat power, overwhelming force, and the use of
firepower. Discussions of the Center of Gravity and massing effects on the enemy's main
source of power have an attrition "ring" to them. Calling a frontal attack a maneuver is
farther than you can reasonably stretch the concept with credibility.

ARMY AGENDAS

The Army's doctrine sets an agenda for an internal culture change. A CONUS based
force that is to contribute to the National Military Strategy must recognize its dependence on
other services to provide the means to get to the fight. The external agenda for the Army is
to get the other services (and the government) to recognize its support needs and assign the
appropriate priority to them. As a warfighting doctrine Operations puts the other services on
notice that it expects to fight in the full spectrum of conflict in "full-dimension operations."

U.S. AIR FORCE BASIC AEROSPACE DOCTRINE

The title of Air Force Manual 1-1 (AFM 1-1), Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United
States, tells the reader a lot about the manual from the outset. We have a manual written not
just for the Air Force but for the United States. So, one would assume the capstone manual
for the Air Force also serves as the doctrine for all aerospace assets of the United States,
including those of the Army, Navy and Marines. The first two chapters of AFM 1-1 build a
case for the Air Force's preeminence in the air "medium" of warfare and its prime duty of
"development and cultivation of a specialized competence" in that medium. As a logical follow-on it also makes the case that each respective component (air, sea or land) in a joint operation should be commanded by one who is competent in his respective medium of warfare. This leads to the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. Since only an "airmen" can handle this concept, "an airman, acting as an air component commander, should be responsible for employing all (emphasis added) air and space assets in the theater." This theme is the dominant feature of AFM 1-1.

The second major theme proffered is the superiority of stealth technology and Precision Guided Munitions (PGM's). "Precision weaponry has greatly enhanced the efficiency of strategic attack." To deliver those weapons in the strategic environment more survivability is required. "The range, endurance, payload, precision,[PGM's] and survivability [in the form of stealth technology] of Air Force platforms are key factors in the ability to project power effectively." These statements, while self-evident, establish the culture for a definite procurement agenda.

AIR FORCE CULTURE OR THEOLOGY?

The Air Force uses Basic Aerospace Doctrine as a means to develop a culture which will resist subordination of aerospace power to "surface elements of power" and promote "... parallel or relatively independent aerospace campaigns." AFM 1-1 formally promotes a concept called "airmindedness" which stresses the "... importance of the development of an aerial mindset..." since two dimensional surface warfare concepts dominate military thinking.

The Air Force spin on the Principles of War are about the consistency of poetic syrup and condescending at the same time. On simplicity: "The fluid, featureless, boundless nature
of the aerospace environment makes the execution of aerospace operations elegantly simple compared to surface forces (emphasis added). Then, under economy of force, the common theme of AFM 1-1 comes back in a different package: "Because aerospace power is precious, it must be conserved by caring and competent airmen." The final notable piece of culture development concerns equipping the Air Force. "Numbers do count, and the lack of adequate force size can prevent the Air Force from fully exploiting the flexibility of aerospace power." It seems intended to build an attitude in airmen that they must guard against a surface-minded procurement system.

The danger in Air Force doctrine is that it develops a culture that is not balanced. Its interest in asserting its independence and need for sovereignty over all aerospace assets produces zealots who profess: "The airplane is the supreme offensive weapon. It is not an inherently supportive creature - it can win wars all by itself." It appears these really are religious men.

**COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS**

The independent and strategic nature espoused in AFM 1-1 leads to a different approach to the conduct of a campaign. It places the Air Force directly in the realm of attrition warfare and fosters concepts that represent the enemy's centers of gravity through the monocular lens of an airpower advocate. Such a concept is described by five concentric rings: "the most important element - the enemy command - is in the center circle; essential production is the second; the transportation network is the third; the population is the fourth; and the fielded military forces - the shield and spear - are fifth." The man who is given credit for the strategic ground work for Desert Storm is the author of this concept. He is considered by some as the "... epitome of an airpower enthusiast... a true zealot." His
attitude reflects the typical Air Force position that "in many cases . . . [airpower] would be the medium that would be the decisive thing in warfare." This line of thinking is consistent with the priority the Air Force ascribes to "support" missions, such as Close Air Support (CAS). The commander of the Air Combat Command states: "One of our goals is to try not to be involved in close air support, to try and do a better job a little deeper so you can . . . avoid direct contact with the forward line of troops." Not focusing on the enemy's forces as a priority leaves the Air Force alone in the domain of operational thought.

Yet the Air Force, more than any other service, can use Desert Storm to justify the efficacy of their philosophy of warfighting. However, the exercise of extreme caution is required when using Desert Storm as a case study for future conflict. It was an Air Force officer who pointed out the ideal nature of the desert for air attack, the unprecedented unity of world support, and the extensive facilities already in place, as factors in our favor that will not always exist. I would add to that list the lack of enemy reciprocal action as a most unusual occurrence in warfare, which we can't rely on in the future. Regardless, the Air Force uses their doctrine, culture, and Desert Storm to set their agenda.

AIR FORCE AGENDAS

Independence, control of everybody's air assets, and strategic stealth bombing with precision guided munitions (PGM's) are the main agendas of the Air Force. These agendas, supported by the justification that the Air Force is the only service that can properly employ aerospace assets, is cause for concern among the other services. Air Force doctrine tells me that when an Air Force officer steps into the joint arena he will insist that there is only one way to properly fight the air war: his way. Their doctrine clearly states they are not given to subordination. Working in support of surface forces is contrary to the culture of an airman.
Indeed, the authors of AFM 1-1 went to great pains to "... differentiate aerospace power from surface-bound power." In the process they have written a document that makes questionable assertions, derides services that have a surface function, promotes inter-service alienation, and puts their own agenda at risk. The success of Desert Storm has convinced the Air Force leadership that stealth technology is the only answer to warfare of the future. This ignores the possibility of effective counters to new technology, the expense of fielding high-tech weapons in an austere budget era, and the questionable ubiquity of limited numbers of high-cost PGM's and aircraft.

**DOCTRINE SUMMARY**

The general contrasts of individual service doctrine may seem apparent after a preliminary analysis of each of the capstone manuals. The next chapter will address the more specific major contrasts in individual service doctrine. Out of that comparison we will see the potential for the development of conflict in the execution of joint operations.
CHAPTER III: DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

Some of the services have similar roles and functions and train to fight using forces that are logically similar with regard to equipment and organization. The way services plan to employ their forces is dictated by their doctrine. The greater the contrast in individual doctrine the better chance there is for conflicts which can cause friction in joint operations. A side-by-side comparison helps to clarify the differences and lays a foundation for some common ground to resolve conflicts.

ARMY AND MARINES

The comparison of Army and Marine doctrine reveals more similarities than differences. It is not surprising that services that employ ground forces employ similar concepts to accomplish the mission. Maneuver warfare, on the surface, does not look that much different than "full-dimension operations," but some believe there are sticking points. Those points involve the concepts of synchronization, battlefield geometry, top down planning and others. The dissention by the maneuver warfare guru himself, is that these concepts lead to "... methodical battle, the opposite of maneuver warfare."¹ The escape of the Republican Guards is attributed by others to the strict adherence to the concept of synchronization.² This is a prime example of how joint operations may be affected when two land components of differing philosophies are involved. In Desert Storm the rapid advance of the Marines on the first day of the ground war "... knocked the VII Corps timetable into a cocked hat."³ The methodically planned offensive was out-of-whack because of the Marines' aggressive offensive culture. The Army was left with only one choice: catch up.⁴ Awareness of such cultural differences can possibly prevent a repeat of such a scenario in future joint operations.
The common views are more prevalent. The Army and the Marines believe that the war is won on the ground using combined arms operations. Their focus is on the enemy forces that confront them on the battlefield. Everything else that goes into achieving a defeat of the enemy's forces by the ground element is considered support in the accomplishment of that goal. The two services believe technology is important in enhancing its respective mission accomplishment but, are at the same time, cautionary about the fact that technology does not eliminate the human aspect of war.

There are also some common shortcomings. These come mainly in the area of ideas about attrition and reciprocity. The Marines recognize and disdain attrition as a form of warfare. The Army apparently also disdains it and goes further in not even addressing it. While an indirect approach to winning a war may be the most elegant way to defeat an enemy, it can be argued that the United States has never won a war using maneuver philosophy - even Desert Storm. What contributed most to the near walk-over achieved in the Gulf War is the very effective attrition campaign waged from the air and the enemy's lack of reciprocal action. Unlike Desert Storm, odds are we will face a determined foe in the future, who has learned his own lessons from observing the Gulf War. If we do not take care to address this fact in our doctrine we may make the mistake of underestimating the enemy. The result may be an opponent who is adept at swallowing up bold, deep maneuvers that pass beyond the culminating point of attack - or victory.

NAVY AND MARINES

"... From the Sea," was supposed to signal a much closer union between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Naval Warfare is an awkward attempt at following through on that perception. The primacy of littoral warfare alluded to in "...From the Sea" is categorically
rejected in NDP-1. Sea control is now *codified* in doctrine as the Navy's number one function. In this regard the Navy suffers from a serious mirror-imaging problem with regard to the projected threat. In order to have a Mahanian battle for control of the sea you must have two Mahanian navies. Right now their is only one of those in the world - ours. War-at-sea is attrition warfare, and that is possibly why the Navy recognizes it as an acceptable strategy that may have to be employed in the future. At the same time the Navy, like the Marine Corps, recognizes the desirability of operational maneuver from the sea. But it will never become a reality unless the right tools are procured to train for and execute it. Sufficient amphibious lift, surface fire support, cutting edge mine warfare, and over-the-horizon assaults are all elements required for operational maneuver from the sea. With a war-at-sea culture still prevalent, it looks like the amphibious fleet will continue to take second place to maintenance of the big deck carrier Navy.

The Gulf War experience has had a profound effect on the Navy. Realizing that future warfare is joint warfare they have incorporated jointness into their doctrine. This realization may be the turning point needed for a gradual culture shift that will finally change the attitude towards power projection and the littorals. Until then, joint planners will face an emerging risk of losing the option of coming "... From the Sea."

**THE AIR FORCE AND EVERYBODY ELSE**

The Air Force can desist from waving its flag of independence. No one in the U.S. military establishment challenges the need for an independent Air Force. This primal attitude fosters a culture which requires command of all the nations aerospace forces. The fact of the matter is that the other services use their airpower in different contexts and do not need the Air Force to instruct them on how to employ or command it. Energies would be better
expended on hammering out the coordination issues required when all the services are required to work in a joint operation.

The controversy that revolves around the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is an issue that grows from the Air Force's need to dominate. The JFACC role is envisioned to be assigned to the service that has the most air assets in theater, as a solution to some of the problem of sorting out the air war. In a conflict of any size, can anyone guess who that will be? I submit this approach is wrong. This is because the need for coordination is not the issue, the matter of priorities is the issue. Any JFACC lead by an Air Force commander is going set up the priorities for all air assets in accord with his culture. In a situation that called for the focus of effort to be on the enemy forces rather than command and control, serious internal friction at the operational level of war would result. The individual representing the service who has the most at stake, in terms of needing support, should be the JFACC. Such a concept is not new. "It was determined early that the Tenth Army's Tactical Air Force (TAF) should be commanded by a Marine flyer." During the invasion of Okinawa Major General F.P. Mulcahy USMC, commanded the TAF consisting of four Marine Air Groups, seven Air Force Groups, several Navy squadrons, and an integrated air defense system. With the Air Forces stated aversion for the support role, I wonder what the level of support the forces on Okinawa would have received had a Marine not been running the show.

The Air Force needs to incorporate in their doctrine a better understanding of how other services intend to fight. With all the other services espousing commitment to the practice of various forms of maneuver warfare (including decentralized command) with a focus on the enemy's forces, the Air Force seems out-of-step with its tilt toward attrition and
focus of rigid *centralized control* in destruction of enemy command, production, transportation, etc. If jointness is to be served and fratricide averted, the Air Force needs to understand that ground tactical maneuver forces may end up in their strategic backyard.

The Air Force has learned a lot of false lessons from Desert Storm. The number of articles attempting to justify air power theory as a result of the Gulf War\(^9\) are reminiscent of Mahan and Corbett using the Russo-Japanese War to justify their very different theories on the employment of sea power.\(^{10}\) Wholesale adoption that airpower can win wars all by itself by use of stealth weapons and PGM's could lead the Air Force to a fate similar to the Japanese Navy in World War II. The superiority of any technology is a fleeting thing and a finite number of PGM's will only kill a finite number of large, high-value, and usually immobile targets. Even some Air Force officers realize there will always be the need to concentrate massive firepower against large troop concentrations and other "area" targets better suited to large numbers of conventional unguided weapons.\(^{11}\) If the Air Force stakes its future on expensive delivery platforms and PGM's there won't be much capital left to invest in conventional munitions. When the last PGM goes down range, what will they contribute?

**THE ARMY AND MARINES, AND THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE**

One final issue. Relegated to the backwaters of their respective doctrine, the Navy and the Air Force address strategic lift. Since the Army and the Marine Corps depend on the Navy and Air Force to get them to the fight this is a worrisome aspect to the Army and Marines. Probably the most relevant lesson of Desert Storm was the difficulty we had getting forces to the theater, in spite of a cooperative enemy. Is it safe to assume we currently have the technological superiority to defeat any enemy in the foreseeable future? I think so. Would it not then be a wise thing to devote more time and effort on the technology to get us
to the conflict expeditiously? Unfortunately, the doctrinal culture of the Navy and the Air Force leads them to invest more in arrows, than in quivers. This may leave the Army, and the Marines to a lesser extent, without a ride to the fight.

CONCLUSION

We have shown that seeing eye-to-eye from a doctrinal perspective is not an easy task. The manual for joint warfare should shed some light on an approach to resolving these conflicts. The next chapter briefly explores that question.
CHAPTER IV: JOINT DOCTRINE

JOINT WARFARE

Joint Warfare of the United States, Joint Pub 1, is the capstone doctrinal manual of the armed forces. It puts in historical perspective the U.S. Armed Forces traditional method of fighting war: as a joint team. It also acknowledges the cultural differences in the services and refers to them as indispensable. Many of the common held beliefs of the services are contained in its pages. At the same time, it sides with no particular service. No one service will be able justify its agenda based on support of Joint Warfare, with the possible exception of Army's synchronization tenet. It is largely a feel good document, that as one might expect, stresses teamwork and the value of individual service contribution to the total effort. It may provide a little inspiration but, it does not provide the joint officer with the tools he needs to make the joint environment work. One thing it ceratinly cannot do, is establish joint culture.

By the time an officer reaches the point where he faces a Joint assignment he is relatively senior and no amount of "Jointness" is going to make him forget or set aside his strongest service loyalties and biases. He will bring his service culture (and fundamental beliefs) to the job. It would be wishful thinking to believe that we will ever have a joint culture that officers aspire to at the expense of their own service careers. The longevity of the joint culture instilled in any one individual will not normally survive beyond the end of his joint duty tour. Given that we don't get a lot of help from Joint Pub 1 in establishing joint culture, how should the services adapt their doctrine to work better in the joint arena? That is the subject of the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

In spite of the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislating jointness, it is obvious from an analysis of individual service doctrine that we have a long way to go to create a common viewpoint on how to best conduct war. While the Marine Corps and the Army struggle with incorporating variations on maneuver warfare into their doctrine (and in the case of the Marine Corps, in-fight among themselves as to its validity), the Navy and the Air Force have stayed with their more traditional concepts of war-at-sea and strategic air attack. All the services have signed up to jointness in their doctrine (the Marines by way of NDP-1) but not at the expense of subordinating their own beliefs on how warfare is conducted. Sorting this out in the context of the joint operation becomes the crucible of the joint staff officer. Setting aside his own service culture to the best of his ability he must contend with the prejudices of officers, who come from a different culture, and make it work. Usually, they are extremely successful. But can the job be made easier? I think so. It starts with individual service doctrinal development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The rest of the services could learn from the Army by making doctrinal development a part of their service culture itself. New technology, tactics and the changing political environment demand that doctrinal development become an frequent, iterative process. It appears the Army has a healthy developmental process that looks critically at doctrine and is willing to modify its fundamental beliefs to adapt to meet future challenges. The Army's dilemma revolves around their dependence on other services to provide them the strategic lift they need. This is where joint doctrine must be the voice for the Army. What ever flaws
you think are inherent in *Operations*, lack of constant improvement is not one of them. I recommend that the process be pursued as aggressively in the future as it has in the past.

The Marine Corps *Warfighting* is not old, but it is stale. Urgent review in order to get abreast of the other services is required. Especially important is the incorporation of the Marines role in the joint environment. Addressing compatibility issues where doctrinal conflicts exist are essential to integrating effectively into the joint effort. The Marine Corps cannot afford such long intervals in revising doctrine, the world is changing too rapidly.

The Navy must decide if they are going to follow their doctrine, as written in NDP-1, or the philosophy espoused in "...From the Sea." *Naval Warfare* says the Navy's basic function has not changed while "...From the Sea" says the focus has shifted to the littorals. Anyone trying to reconcile these differences is left in a quandary. Only the Navy's procurement agenda seems to give an indication of the future, and the future looks remarkably like the past. Before the ink dries on NDP-1 the revision process needs to start.

The Air Force needs to take a very close, introspective, and objective look at itself. If the authors who had written AFM 1-1, read it from a sister service perspective as part of their review process, they might have realized how inflammatory the document actually was. No amount of supporting volumes can justify the condescending tone of *Basic Aerospace Doctrine*. Their effort to differentiate aerospace power from surface-bound power only served to alienate the two. AFM 1-1 should be rewritten with all haste and new authors who carry around lighter cultural baggage.

Finally, as long as services develop doctrine in a vacuum the possibility of producing a document like AFM 1-1 still exists. The individual service doctrine developmental
processes are stovepipes that do not allow for feedback from other services prior to publication.

To break the stovepipe, a team of senior liaison officers from the different services is required at each doctrine center. Their duty would be to review doctrine before it is published, not necessarily to recommend changes, but to provide an initial reaction with regard to perception and compatibility as it relates to his or her respective service. These "devil's advocates" would not have to shed their cultural biases to provide the critical feedback necessary to produce high quality, interoperable doctrine.

While the services share a great deal of common ground with respect to doctrine, there are also significant gulfs on many issues. To provide closure on those differences cooperation is required before doctrine is published. While all the differences will never be resolved, we can establish even more common ground by this process and enhance our joint warfighting capability.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


2. Ibid., p. 391.

3. Ibid., p. 687.

CHAPTER II


2. Ibid., p. 37.

3. Ibid., p. 76.

4. Ibid., p. 42.

5. Ibid., p. 46.

6. Ibid., p. 52.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 53.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 62.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 63.


17. Gary I. Wilson, "New Doctrine or Slipping into the Past?" Marine Corps Gazette, October 1993, p. 44.


19. Ibid., p. ii.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., pp. iii, iv.

22. Ibid., p. iv.

23. Ibid., p. 3.

24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. Ibid., p. 11.


27. Ibid., p. 27.

28. Ibid., p. 29.


30. Ibid., p. 31.


33. Ibid., pp. 70, 73.


37. Ibid., Naval Warfare, p. 71.


39. Ibid., p. v.

40. Ibid., p. 1-3.

41. Ibid., p. iv.

42. Ibid.


47. Ibid., Operations, pp. 2-9, 2-10.

48. Ibid., p. 6-7.

49. Ibid., p. 7-12.


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 8.

53. Ibid., p. 9.

54. Ibid., p. 12.

55. Ibid., p. 19.

56. Ibid., p. 6.
57. Ibid., p. 9.
58. Ibid., p. 15.
59. Ibid., p. 16.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 20.
65. Ibid.

Chapter III

3. Ibid., Trainor, p. 73.
5. Ibid., Lauer, pp. 55, 56.
7. Ibid., pp. 372, 373.
8. Ibid., p. 291. "In the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are most difficult to control are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective." This mind set existed as a result of the North African Campaign and subsequent publishing of FM 100-20: Command and Employment of Air Power. The above quote in Sherrod's book, lifted from p. 12 of FM 100-20 is amazingly similar to AFM 1-I's position on CAS, p. 13: "Close Air Support produces the most focused and briefest effects of any force application mission; consequently, close air support rarely creates campaign level effects. Although close air support is the least efficient application of aerospace forces, at times it may be the most critical by ensuring the success or survival of surface forces."

9. See Bibliography.

10. A.T. Mahan argued for sea control in "Retrospect Upon the War Between Japan and Russia," Naval Administration and Warfare, Boston: Little, Brown, 1908. J.S. Corbett believed in the Navy as a supporting arm of land operations in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. The Russo-Japanese War offered cases that could support both of these opposing arguments.

11. Ibid., Meilinger, p. 177.

Chapter IV

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