The Army's Multifunctional Logistics Units: Can They Support the Joint/Combined Warfighting Effort?

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In the late 1980's, as the budget crunch from the massive modernization effort of the first half of that decade began to take effect, the U.S. Army transitioned its active duty logistics units from single function to multifunctional units. In this process the organization of these units changed dramatically, reducing them in size drastically. At the same time the Army made the smart decision to absorb its troop reduction requirements by reducing the number of its combat divisions but keeping the number of "trigger-pullers" in the division at the pre-reduction levels. What this meant to the Army's logisticians is that they would have to support the same number of combat troops with these smaller multifunctional logistics units. To permit these units to "do more with less", the Army modernized... CONTINUED ON BACK
the equipment that these units have to assist in their mission and it revised its doctrine to make the various echelons of logistics support mutually supporting. These units supported their respective divisions and corps well during Operation Desert Storm.

This paper, however, deals with the future operations that the U.S. Army is likely to participate in around the globe. Most of these are envisioned to be a form of conflict far short of the massive operation that was Desert Storm. They will be military operations that are being called Operations-Other-Than-War (OOTW) nearly all of which will be conducted in the joint/combined environment. The paper concludes that the multifunctional logistics units in the Active Army are not suitable for these smaller, joint/combined operations.

As a solution the paper recommends that the Army Reserve be used to augment the active Army’s multifunctional logistics units, but cautious that there are several stumbling blocks in this solution that will require changes in the law to overcome.
ABSTRACT

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"The thing to remember is this: we are adapting, getting smaller, reshaping and at the same time we are still trained and ready to respond to the Nation's call."

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, US Army

"Logistics considerations should focus on how far we should move toward centralized management and control, with decentralized execution."

General Jimmy D. Ross
Commander, US Army Materiel Command

SOME BACKGROUND

In the late 1980's the Army began to transition its active-duty "specialized" logistics units to "multifunctional" logistics units. The movement began first with the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and has since grown to include the Corps Support Commands (COSCOM) as well.

While the mission of these support commands has not changed, the methodology of how they support has changed drastically. In the past the battalions that formed the DISCOM and the COSCOM were functionally organized, i.e., each was comprised of a Maintenance Battalion, a Supply and Transportation Battalion, and a Medical Battalion. Simply stated the mission of the DISCOM is to provide logistical support to the combat brigades of the Division. The functional battalions of the DISCOM would task-organize to provide their respective support specialties to each of the three (3) combat brigades and to the Division Headquarters. These task organizations were not habitual. A brigade's mission determined how much support that brigade might get from the DISCOM. For example, if one brigade had to move farther than the other two and had more armor attached to it for a particular operation, that brigade would get a larger slice of the
DISCOM's supply and transportation battalion's transportation assets to facilitate the longer movement of supplies, fuel, ammo, and equipment to that brigade. The next day that level of transportation support might shift to the other two brigades as they moved up.

These functionally organized battalions were fairly good size organizations both in terms of personnel assigned and equipment authorized. At strength-level one, the functionally organized DISCOM in an Infantry Division numbered nearly 2500 Officer and Enlisted soldiers.²

In the latter half of the nineteen eighties, however, the Army began to look at the size of its active duty logistics units and in the process began to question the doctrine through which these units supported the Army's combat units. The result was a reorganization of both the DISCOM's and COSCOM's throughout the Army. The functionally-oriented battalions that had comprised these organizations were transformed into multifunctional battalions.³ Though smaller in size, these battalions provided to the combat brigades in the division the same range of logistical service that the functional battalions provided under the old organization and doctrine.

There were several advantages to such a reorganization and revision of the logistical support doctrine. First the Army was able to reduce the logistics side of its "tooth-to-tail" ratio.⁴ Second, the Army correctly chose to reduce the total number of active duty divisions but keep the number of "trigger pullers" in those divisions at a sufficient level, rather than take the tempting but less efficient route of keeping the same number of active duty divisions. A Forward Support Battalion (FSB) assigned to a DISCOM in a heavy division (that is a division with a mix of mechanized infantry and armor in the brigades) has 433 assigned personnel at strength-level one.⁵ A maintenance battalion in the functionally organized DISCOM of an infantry division had over 1000 personnel assigned.⁶ The significantly smaller number of personnel assigned to the FSB's
when compared to the functional battalion represents the decrease in the "tail" side of the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. The "tooth" number has not changed in any of the Army's remaining ten active duty divisions. What has changed since the drawdown of the Army is that the Army has disbanded four active duty divisions to meet its downsizing goal of 535K by Fiscal Year 96.

For the multifunctional logistics unit in the active army the end result is that it now has to support the same size combat unit with a smaller logistics unit. Doctrinal changes in how DISCOM's and COSCOM's support combat units permit these multifunctional FSB's and Main Support Battalions (MSB) to accomplish more with less. Multifunctional logistics doctrine emphasizes habitual relationships between supported and supporting units. For example, each combat brigade has its own FSB from the DISCOM that provides its support. Whenever any or all of that brigade is deployed, part or all of the FSB that supports that brigade is deployed with it. Likewise the DISCOM FSB is habitually tied to a multifunctional logistics unit from the COSCOM that provides it support whenever all or part of the FSB is deployed in support of the combat brigade. This DISCOM FSB/COSCOM habitual relationship points out the second important piece to multifunctional logistics doctrine; that it is mutually supporting. Each echelon must rely on the echelon above it for proper support. If one echelon fails or is in some way inhibited, the support at the next echelon will be impaired. The science is not exact enough to predict that failure at one echelon would result in a failure of proportional or geometric progression at the next lower echelon. It is sufficient to say that the failure at one level will be felt at all lower levels, ultimately impacting the individual combat soldier who looks for support after he has consumed the forty-eight to seventy-two hours of supplies he is able to carry into combat with him.
A final series of improvements that helps the smaller multifunctional logistics unit do more with less involves new equipment acquisition. Former Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone in commenting on the logistics posture of the Army in 1992 told Congress that the focus of Combat Service Support is, "...Tactical support infrastructure systems and equipment to provide strategic deployability support, unit tactical mobility, logistics sustainment, and enhanced soldier survivability." Among some of the hardware he told congress the Army needed were: the palletized loading system (PLS); heavy equipment transporter (HET); family of medium tactical vehicles; integrated family of test equipment; mobile field kitchens; reverse osmosis water purification units; front and side-loading forklift; and extreme cold weather clothing systems.7

Does this new organization of logistical units, equipped with the latest technology, and employing a new doctrine work for the Army? General Jimmy D. Ross, who recently retired as Commanding General, Army Material Command and who served an almost unprecedented four years on the Army Staff as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (it was in this capacity that he served during Desert Storm) said, "Desert Storm highlighted the importance of a habitual relationship between support forces of the Theater Army Area Command and...between support and supported forces."8

However, it concerns me that while the Army may be able to do more with less logistically, the reorganization of Army logistics units and the revision of Army doctrine may not serve the joint or combined warfighting effort of future battles. The Active Army's move to multifunctional logistics units at Division and Corps level may have created a degree of inflexibility that prevents these "jack of all trades, master of none" logisticians from effectively participating in Joint Task Forces where units of other services and/or other nations require logistical support.
FUTURE WARFIGHTING

*Desert Storm* provided us a look at some of our future warfighting doctrine. In the Persian Gulf, the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (CINC, CENTCOM), was the warfighter who was squarely in charge from the planning phase, the deployment phase, and on through to the execution phase. CINC, CENTCOM was supported by other CINC's, both regional and functional, and the various U.S. services that comprised the CINC's joint force were supported by their respective service staffs, i.e., the Army Staff, the Air Staff, etc. The important point is that there was a clear line of command with CINC, CENTCOM telling the Joint Staff what was needed and the Joint Staff advising the National Command Authority (NCA). After an NCA decision, the Joint Staff, the service staffs, and supporting CINC's set about providing for the warfighting CINC's requirements. This joint warfighting was no accident. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 institutionalized this type of joint warfighting when it was passed into law. The quick victory obtained in one hundred hours with fewer than 200 lives lost served to further entrench this way of warfighting.

*Desert Storm* also gave the U.S. a chance to practice coalition warfare. Essentially it was America's first chance to do this since World War II. Grenada and Panama were unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. Vietnam began and ended as an American effort to prevent the spread of communism in southeast Asia. Korea was an expedition into containment that frightened our allies from the outset. Much of our military action there was taken against the advice of our allies. Thus while some of our allies' troops stayed in Korea with American troops up to the final cease-fire in 1956, the decisions that led to that long and costly police action were uniquely American. Memories of Vietnam and Korea, concern over total Iraqi control of middle east oil fields, concern
over a balance of power in the middle east, and responsiveness to Kuwaiti and Saudi calls for help all combined to build a successful coalition. In the Gulf War victory, the U.S. learned again the importance of coalition building and our coalition partners learned that the U.S. can be counted on for overwhelming support.

*Desert Storm* was a window through which the U.S. was able to see the importance of fighting jointly with its own forces and combined with the forces of other nations. However, *Desert Storm* represents only one type of contingency for which regional CINC's must be prepared. In fact it may well represent the type of contingency that the warfighting CINC is best prepared to handle. *Desert Storm, Operation Just Cause, and Urgent Fury (Grenada)* all represent successful operations in which the U.S. brought overwhelming fire power to bear against an enemy that was ill-prepared to match U.S. military might much less defeat it. In fact, there has been some criticism after each of these successful operations over U.S. propensity to take too much into the battle. The question becomes, "Should warfighting CINC's develop some finesse in their force planning skills?"

The answer is "yes" but not because "mass" is no longer a principal of war. The answer is "yes" because the CINC may find that he has smaller forces committed to many locations throughout his AOR. CINC's will be involved with forming Joint Task Forces that will perform in what has come to be known as *Operations Other than War* (OOTW). There are several reasons why the forces are smaller. First, because there are so many places that are likely to require military assistance of some type. Second, because of the draw down of U.S. forces, all CINC's now have fewer forces to work with. As an example in 1993, the United Nations (UN) participated in thirty-one peacekeeping operations around the world. While not all of these
operations involved the commitment of troops and many of the ones that involve troops do not involve U.S. troops, the majority do involve the commitment of troops and some involve U.S. forces. The destabilization in the former Soviet Union, unrest in Africa, the potential for hostility in Korea, and the unpredictability of natural disasters and their devastating effect on the underdeveloped populations of the world, all provide opportunities for the UN (with the U.S. as a chief contributor) or the U.S. unilaterally to provide troops. As another example, in 1992 CINC, Pacific Command had troops simultaneously committed to humanitarian relief efforts in Guam in the aftermath of Typhoon Omar and on the Hawaiian island of Kauai in the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki. At the same time U.S. military forces were in Florida attempting to provide relief from the devastation of Hurricane Andrew.

The U.S. is not likely to shun responsibility in participating in these OOTW’s as they occur and wherever they may occur. The U.S. is in a precarious position as the sole superpower survivor of the Cold War. With the demise of the Soviet Union came the end of the Cold War. The U.S. is expected to become the leader of the world as it seeks a new order. While the rhetoric from the Clinton Administration indicates the U.S. will assume this role of leadership, it is at the same time downsizing its military. President Clinton has also warned the UN that the U.S. expects the UN to act responsibly as the world seeks a new order and "know when to say ‘no’." Given, however, the turmoil in the world and the unpredictability of natural disaster, it is neither irresponsible nor pessimistic to predict that despite President Clinton’s plea at the UN for restraint, in the near term, the world will not see a decline in U.S. military operations around the world.

American forces will likely participate in three different kinds of military missions that will require force planners to use finesse in developing the forces that will be committed. Many of
these missions will be in support of the UN but as was the case in Somalia, there is the very real possibility that the U.S. will be the primary provider of forces or even the only provider of forces. These missions are *peacekeeping*, *peace enforcement*, and *peace building*. Each term requires definition:\textsuperscript{11}

**PEACEKEEPING** refers to non-combat military operations by forces external to a country, who are there with the agreement of all belligerents, in order to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement. Their presence lends a stabilizing influence to the country at a time when diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive peace settlement are on going.

**PEACE ENFORCEMENT** is a form of armed intervention (or threatened armed intervention). The force is coercive in nature and is used to compel compliance with international resolutions or U.S. national objectives. The force's purpose is to restore peace under conditions that are broadly acceptable to the international community.

**PEACE BUILDING** refers to diplomatic and military actions that seek to reduce the trauma to institutions and infrastructure of a country that has been torn by war in an attempt to prevent a relapse into war. Peace building takes place in the post-conflict environment and may require specially tailored military forces whose primary functions are humanitarian assistance.

The variables that can influence each of these types of mission are nearly infinite and to further complicate the matter, it is possible to shift from one type of mission to another. A case can be made that this is exactly what happened in Somalia. What began as a peace building mission became a peace enforcement mission when the decision was made to pursue and capture the Somali warlord Aidid. Somalia also demonstrates what can happen when the force structure does not adapt to the changes in mission. It is not fair to say that the presence of an armored force
in support of the doomed mission to capture Aidid that resulted in the shootdown of two U.S. helicopters and the loss of eighteen American lives would have made a difference in that disastrous outcome. However, it is quite conceivable that had the armored force been in place as the Joint Task Force Commander and CINC, CENTCOM had requested, that mission planners would have planned on its use as a back up to the Army Rangers.

Warfighting CINC's and their staffs will require a high degree of flexibility in putting Joint Tasks Forces (JTF) together and they will experience constraints in the number and types of units that they may commit to an operation. Logistics units must be as flexible in their composition and their ability to support these JTF's. General Ross foresees this eventuality and comments, "Support procedures must be adaptable to a wide range of contingency options and conditions...Consider the situation where the U.S. contributes a brigade to a multinational corps."

He correctly points out the mutual supporting role of active Army logistics echelons and the problem with this doctrine when he observes, "The CSS (combat service support) normally offered by a U.S. division, corps, and theater support units must come from somewhere." Active Army multifunctional logistics units may prove to be the long-pole in the tent for the CINC's and their force planning staffs.

THE PROBLEM WITH MULTIFUNCTIONAL LOGISTICS UNITS IN THE JOINT/COMBINED FUTURE WARGAME

As mentioned, the Army believes that multifunctional logistics units are the answer to sustaining an unchanged amount of combat power with fewer resources expended on logistics. The multifunctional logistics doctrine capitalizes on habitual support relationships, high-tech equipment, and mutually supporting echelons of logistics. But, in light of the future joint/combined warfight, these three advantages with which the Army intends to do more with less,
actually inhibit the regional warfighting CINC and his force planners.

A scenario can illustrate the point. Borrowing from the scenario proposed by General Ross earlier and from events in the news currently, assume there is a U.S. brigade from the 82d Airborne Division that has been positioned in Macedonia as a ready-reaction brigade to any sudden escalation of the war between the three ethnic factions currently fighting one another in the former Yugoslavia. The brigade has with it the Forward Support Battalion that is habitually tied to it for support. Their time in Macedonia has been uneventful, the Brigade has been well supplied through both sea lines of communication (SLOC's) and air lines of communication (ALOC's). However, the brigade has not been exposed to combat. The three belligerent factions in the area have spent much time killing themselves but the fight has been internal to the former Yugoslavian territory thus far. Despite calls from the UN for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention to end the hostilities, both the U.S. and NATO have looked on the war in Bosnia as a "civil war" and therefore intervention would not be appropriate.

Despite the bitter ethnic hostilities that fueled the fierce fighting between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats the civil war has reached a point where the three sides have finally exhausted themselves, or perhaps more correctly, they have exhausted the country and its resources and infrastructure. Drained of the resources of war, they have been forced to sit down at the negotiating table where they have worked through the details of a cease-fire with both the UN and NATO assisting. The essence of the cease-fire is that all sides will turn in their heavy weapons to the UN commander or his representative. To provide insurance that there is a force in place that can put down an uprising by any of the three belligerents, they have agreed that NATO will provide a multinational force in Bosnia that will also secure a seaport at Split and the major airport
in each of the three ethnic regions. The former Yugoslavia continues to be a volatile region. There are extreme factions in each ethnic camp that believes the cease-fire is wrong. They are likely to attack military units that appear to be supporting the cease-fire. However, with the beginning of negotiations their ability to sustain their radicalism with firearms and ammunition has waned. Securing the ports will provide a way of detecting illegal arms shipments to any side as well as provide sustainment bases for the multinational force.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in conjunction with NATO and the UN has suggested that the 82d Airborne Division's brigade of soldiers secure the airport at Sarajevo, that a brigade of British troops and a brigade of French troops secure the other two airports, and that a battalion of U.S. Marines can secure the port at Split on the land side. A combined naval force from NATO will secure the harbor at Split and can reinforce the Marines quickly with naval gunfire and amphibiously landed Marines currently embarked aboard U.S. Navy amphibious ships that are part of the combined naval force.

The belligerents have accepted the plan authored by SACEUR and endorsed by the UN and NATO with the caveat that forces over and above the combat troops from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, Britain, and France shall not exceed 700 total soldiers and that the American total shall not exceed 250 total. Their reasoning is that they do not want to see the multinational force become too entrenched in their country or their business. Combat troops provide protection during the delicate negotiations. Combat support and combat service support troops represent entrenchment. The American total was specified because the warring factions are well aware of the logistic ability of the American military and did not want to see all 700 support personnel come from U.S. forces. The same reasoning applies. The more logistics a force projects into a country,
Because the multinational force will own a seaport and three major airports, the SACEUR suggests that the UN and NATO agree to the caveat and that the negotiating process move forward under the watchful eyes of the multinational force. European Command's (EUCOM) J3 and J4 have both looked at the decision and believe that the Marines at the port can be sustained for the most part from the combined naval force securing the waters around Split. This enables them to devote the entire 250-soldier U.S. combat support/combat service support package to sustaining the brigade from the 82d at Sarajevo's airport. EUCOM therefore directs the Army to determine the composition of its 250 soldier support package.

The question now becomes can the multifunctional forward support battalion that habitually supports that brigade at the airport, with its high-tech equipment, but without its mutually supporting echelon from either the Division's main support battalion or the COSCOM, provide the support necessary to support the brigade at the airport? I suggest that the support will be inefficient at best, lacking completely at worst for the following reasons. First, in the scenario, the 250-soldier limit on support troops represents a significant drop in the number that are needed to support a brigade using the multifunctional concept currently employed by the Army. When cut to the bone as support troops are in this case, great care must be taken to determine what is needed the most and in what numbers. For example, truck drivers would in all likelihood be needed badly to establish a main supply route(s) from the port to the Sarajevo airport. The already significantly reduced numbers of support soldiers of all skills in the forward support battalion may mean that there will be insufficient numbers of the critical skills in the multifunctional battalion to fit the demand. This would not be the case in a functionally organized DISCOM where the Supply and
Transportation Battalion would be tapped to provide a larger number of its personnel to the multinational force. Second, high-tech equipment may not help in multinational situations. For example, the specialized pallets that are used on the Palletized Loading System (PLS) may not be available. Without them the sophisticated system aboard the trucks that unloads the pallets will not work. Even if the matching pallets were available, there is no supporting echelon of logistics that would configure the cargo to the PLS's specialized pallet. Which brings up the third reason why the multifunctional battalion may prove less effective in multinational situations; the loss of the mutually supporting echelons of logistics. In this scenario, the 250-soldier support group will be essentially the only in-country echelon. They will receive no support for maintenance, supply, medical, or transportation from echelons above or below. This situation is a complete reversal of the multifunctional logistics doctrine that the Army currently practices. Had the DISCOM's and COSCOM's remained functionally oriented, they could have tailored the 250 soldier package from the specialized transportation, maintenance, supply, and medical battalions of the DISCOM and the COSCOM to provide elements of support from both echelons as needed to properly support the force in the former Yugoslavia. The tailoring could have provided the right mix, number, and echelon (by drawing from the functionally oriented COSCOM) so as to maximize the mission effectiveness of the 250 soldier support package called for in the scenario. While habitual working relationships are important, it is in this situation more important to provide the right mix of logistic specialties and let the working relationships form as the support is provided.

One might argue that the scenario paints a worst case situation. But the reality of the current world order is that while there are still several major regional war scenarios, specifically the middle east and Korea, there is a greater chance that the U.S. will be deploying smaller forces to
out-of-the-way places to perform one of the three peace missions defined earlier. Another scenario might see a battalion of U.S. Marines and a battalion of U.S. soldiers committed somewhere. Should each bring its own logistics “tail” with it? For a force this size it makes sense for the regional CINC to task one or the other to provide the logistics for both. The Army’s multifunctional logistics units would be hard pressed to do this. They have simply been cut to deeply both in people and equipment to take on this mission. In this scenario one company of the FSB would be deployed with the Army battalion. That company could be augmented with another company from an FSB and that company could be devoted to support of the Marine battalion. By doing this, however, some U.S. combat battalion somewhere no longer has its support company because they are now off supporting a Marine battalion. One Army division has now had its readiness significantly reduced. Functionally organized logistics units could, on the other hand, be easily tailored to fit the CINC’s requirement.

IMPROVEMENT OR PAROCHIALISM

The scenarios abound but the answer for the Army in nearly all of them is that unless the division as a whole is committed and optimally unless that division is part of a Corps, the Army’s multifunctional logistics units will be hard pressed to support the mission. Commitment of an entire division, however, as the smallest effective fighting force that the Army can effectively employ is old thinking. We do not have a division currently on the ground in Macedonia, neither has there been any discussion of a division intervening in the crisis in Haiti. The force planners and the J-3’s and J-4’s working for the regional CINC’s seem to be thinking in much smaller terms these days.

The Army’s move then to the multifunctional logistics unit and the mutually supporting
logistics doctrine that has accompanied the reorganization, does not appear to be an improvement that facilitates the flexibility that warfighting CINC's are likely to need as they undertake the peace missions in their various Areas of Responsibility. It is, however, too harsh a condemnation to say that the Army revised its organization and doctrine for logistics in an attempt to protect its viability as a force. The Army began the transition to multifunctional logistics in the latter half of the 1980's. It was a not a knee-jerk reaction to impending budget cuts. It was an attempt to reduce the "tooth-to-tail" ratio at a time when the Soviet Union still posed the biggest threat to U.S. national security but when the massive expenditures for force modernization undertaken in the first half of the 1980's were beginning to take their toll. "Reaganomics" was under sharp attack by the Democratic opposition. Multifunctional logistics was a way to keep the Army's combat power up and at the same time provide the logistical support that U.S. soldiers ought to have when placed in harm's way.

RESOLVING THE DILEMMA

While the active Army has moved to multifunctional logistics units, the Army Reserve has retained the specialized approach to logistics. This has been by design and the design proved itself in the Gulf War. During the war, Army Reserve logistic units performed support functions ranging from mail delivery to pipeline operation to graves registration to port operations. During Desert Sortie, as an example, Army Reserve Transportation Terminal Units assigned to the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) were called upon to operate some of the ports in Saudi Arabia as the U.S. attempted to recover the millions of tons of supplies and equipment that it had shipped to the region for the war. What was so unique about this situation is that these Transportation Terminal Units, by doctrine, were only to be used to operate ports in the
Continental United States. Doctrinally they were not supposed to be deployable outside of the continental US.

The use of Army Reserve logistics units that are functionally organized can be the answer to the crunch that the multifunctional Active Army logistics units are in. Most importantly this is a win-win situation for both the Active Army and the Army Reserve. The Active Army can be augmented with the specialties that it needs to meet the warfighting CINC's mission. The Army Reserve unit can get the best training it ever had... the real thing. Over the years, I have had many occasions to observe Reserve unit training and to talk with the Reserve officers, NCO's, and enlisted members of the Reserve. One of the common complaints is that there is a lack of meaningful training opportunities. I have heard the training characterized as, at worst, nonexistent, and, at best, unrealistic. Units lack confidence in their ability to perform their unit mission and their individual tasks when training falls short of the mark. Generally speaking, Reserve logistics units can quickly assimilate into their mission without the extensive training needed to integrate them into the Active Army. Many Reserve logisticians work in a related field in their civilian job, this is particularly true of the medical field. Desert Storm proved how quickly these Reserve logisticians can make the transition. So for the Reserve logistician, let's not worry that they can't do the job. They have already proven that they can.

The drawback to the use of the Reserves is the "time factor" both in terms of short or no-notice requirements and in terms of length of time that a unit may be involved in an operation. Army Reserve units, logistics-related or not, are all comprised of citizen-soldiers, most of whom have families who depend upon them and employers who count on them. Planned use of Army Reserve logistic units is the key to meeting the expectation of quick deployment, the Reservist's
desire to provide properly for his family, and the employer's desire to avoid jeopardizing the 
profitability of his business. Planned use of Army Reserve logistics units to augment the Active 
Army's logistics units requires some changes to the law, which is currently very restrictive over 
who may call up the Reserves and for how long. Congress has proven to be balky at changing the 
legislation despite the necessity of having certain Reserves on board quickly. Recently it did not 
pass Department of Defense-sponsored legislation to allow the Secretary of Defense to have 
early-call-up powers on a selective Reserve pool of 25,000 personnel. Desert Storm 
demonstrated the need to have these people in the first few days of mobilization to move to 
seaports, airports, and installations where deployments would occur. Their critical task is to 
coordinate the departure of units from home station, expedite their transportation to their proper 
seaport or airport of departure, and receive, loadout, and account for the equipment and personnel 
as they move through these critical transportation nodes. Given the frequency with which OOTW 
is likely to occur and the requirement to better tailor logistic forces to support these smaller 
operations, Congress has got to ease the restrictions on call-up. No longer is calling up the 
Reserves "the step just before declaring war".

No discussion of Reserve call-up would be complete without mention of the employers of 
Reservists. Clearly employers must be considered in any plan that makes call-up easier or more 
frequent. If employers are written off, that is exactly what they will do with the employee when he 
departs for six months...write him off the payroll. If this happens, the Army Reserve ranks will 
thin rapidly and what is currently a viable force will rapidly become ineffective. A solution is a 
reimbursement to the employer of a portion of the employee's salary in the form of a direct
payment to the employer, followed up by a tax allowance for the remainder of the employee's salary. In return the employer guarantees the employee return rights to his old job, a better job, or at least a job with the same pay as the employee earned before he or she was activated for duty.

CONCLUSION

Active Army combat units are going to be committed in more and more places around the world with increasing frequency. Many of the missions that they are asked to perform will not be the traditional missions that combat units have always performed. One thing that is constant, however, is that these combat units will require support to sustain them throughout the operation. The smaller, high-tech equipped, and mutually supporting multifunctional logistics units that habitually support that combat unit may find that it has insufficient personnel and equipment to handle these more frequent, more geographically dispersed requirements.

Army Reserve logistic units that are functionally organized can make up for this lack of flexibility. But their use in the numbers and frequency that may be required in the future necessitate some changes in the law about the use of Reserves and about the treatment of their civilian employers. The opportunity is at hand to integrate the Army Reserve and the Active Army. An opportunity is at hand to do what General Craighton Abrams wanted to do when he was the Chief of Staff of the Army in the late 1970's...to create a Total Army.

Is 10 Divisions as low as the Army will go? Or will it go to 8? The answers are really moot. The Reserve logistics units need this integration now to stay trained, ready, and a part of the force. The Active Army needs them now to help cover the short fall in logistics units needed to cover the many events around the post-Cold-War world.
Appendix A is an organizational chart for the single function DISCOM. While the DISCOM has other functional organizations, the S and T Battalion, the Maintenance Battalion, and the Medical Battalion represent the three largest organizations within the functionally organized DISCOM. Source for this diagram is the Table of Organization and Equipment 29001H000 dated 30 November, 1979, p. 8. This TO&E is for an Infantry Division's DISCOM.

Appendix B is an organizational chart for the multifunctional DISCOM comprised primarily of three forward support battalions and one main support battalion. Source for the chart is TO & E 63000L100, p 7

There is considerable discussion as to what this ratio is. I have heard estimates by knowledgeable Army logisticians that place the number anywhere from 11:1 to 16:1. While I personally consider these high, I do believe that the estimate is correctly placed somewhere between 5:1 to 7:1

TO & E 63005L100, dated 1 April, 1988, p 837
TO & E 29015H000, 30 November, 1970, p 361
Stone, Michael P.W., "Logistics Posture of the Army". Army Logistician, July-August, 1992, p. 15
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Fletiz, Frederick H.; Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations. 1993; Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; May 1993
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Ross, pp49
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
1 OCTOBER 1988

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FOOTNOTE A

* TOE 63000L100 WHEN SUPPORTING A MECHANIZED DIVISION WITH A 5 TANK, 5 MECH AND 1 AH8 (AH8) CONFIGURATION.

FOOTNOTE B

* TOE 63000L600 WHEN SUPPORTING A MECHANIZED DIVISION WITH A 5 TANK, 5 MECH AND 1 AH8 (AH8) CONFIGURATION.

APPENDIX B