NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

AD-A283 357

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY:
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA

by

Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone

June, 1994

Thesis Advisor: Thomas Bruneau

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

94-25695
After Botswana became independent in 1966, the government did not have any immediate plans to establish a permanent army because of the opportunity cost associated with defense spending then. However, external factors such as the nationalist movements in the neighboring countries proved a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Botswana, hence the need to establish a national army. Throughout the post-independence era, Botswana witnessed a wide range of security problems originating from outside her borders. Given her weak economic posture and priorities for providing social amenities in the years following independence, Botswana has attempted largely through diplomatic ties, membership in regional and international organizations and to a lesser extent military capabilities, to maximize her security and influence in an unstable southern African subcontinent.

With the changing global environment after the end of the Cold War, South Africa’s transition and other regional pressures, Botswana faces a new and different situation under which to address her security concerns. Past experience shows that Botswana could not embark upon unilateral action for her survival. In the altered environment described above, it seems the incentives for multilateral approaches are increasing for Botswana.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The Search for Peace and Security: The Case of Botswana

By

Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone
1st Lieutenant, Botswana Defence Force
B.A., University of Botswana, 1987

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING
AND MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1994

Author:

Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone

Approved by:

Thomas Bruneau, Thesis Advisor

Susan Page Hocevar, Associate Advisor

David R. Whipple, Jr., Chairman
Department of Systems Management

Thomas Bruneau
Department of National Security Affairs
ABSTRACT

After Botswana became independent in 1966, the government did not have any immediate plans to establish a permanent army because of the opportunity costs associated with defense spending. However, external factors such as the nationalist movements in the neighboring countries proved a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Botswana, hence the need to establish a national army. Throughout the post-independence era, Botswana witnessed a wide range of security problems originating from outside her borders. Given her weak economic posture and priorities for providing social amenities in the years following independence, Botswana has attempted largely through diplomatic ties, membership in regional and international organizations and to a lesser extent military capabilities, to maximize her security and influence in an unstable southern African subcontinent.

With the changing global environment after the end of the Cold War, South Africa’s transition and other regional pressures, Botswana faces a new and different situation under which to address her security concerns. Past experience shows that Botswana could not embark upon unilateral action for her survival. In the altered environment described above, it seems the incentives for multilateral approaches are increasing for Botswana.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 1

II. APPROACH AND RESEARCH QUESTION .......................... 5

III. OVERVIEW ON BOTSWANA ...................................... 9
    A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEO-STRATEGIC POSITION ....... 11
    B. OPEN-DOOR POLICY ........................................... 14

IV. BOTSWANA AND THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE (1972-79) .... 17
    A. BACKGROUND TO THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE ............ 17
    B. THREATS POSED TO BOTSWANA’S SOVEREIGNTY ....... 22
    C. THE REFUGEE QUESTION ..................................... 24
    D. THE U.N. CONTRIBUTION .................................... 26
    E. THE CREATION OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE .... 28
    F. OVERVIEW ON BDF ............................................. 29

V. BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1966 ...................... 32
    A. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND INHERENT PROBLEMS ...... 33
       1. Introduction of Botswana’s Currency ............... 34
       2. Botswana and the Nkomati Accord (1984-85) ... 35
    B. POLITICAL RIVALRY ......................................... 39
    C. MILITARY RELATIONS ....................................... 43
   a. The National Registration Act of 1986 . 49
   b. The National Security Act .......... 50
   c. Growing Military Expenditure and Duties 52

VI. THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH .......... 57
   A. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA .......... 59
   B. BOTSWANA AND THE SUPERPOWER RIVALRY .......... 61
   C. THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT POLICY .......... 64
   D. THE POST-COLD WAR SCENARIO .......... 69

VII. A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY: SADC? .......... 73
   A. ORIGINS OF SADC .......... 75
   B. OVERVIEW ON SADC .......... 78
      1. Management Pattern .......... 79
      2. Funding for SADC .......... 81
   C. THE U.N OR SADC? .......... 82
      1. Limitations of the U.N. .......... 84
   D. SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC? .......... 89
   E. INCENTIVES FOR REGIONAL COHESION .......... 94
      1. Geography and Size .......... 95
      2. Commonality of Interests .......... 97
      3. Inclusiveness .......... 97
      4. Redefining the Balancing Strategy? .......... 98
I. INTRODUCTION

The search for peace and security in Botswana offers a good example of a relatively weak country (militarily) trying to preserve its autonomous status against stronger neighbors. Historically, the use of military means to resolve conflicts has not been in the nature of Batswana. This goes to explain partly why Botswana has been one of the late entrants in establishing permanent national armies. The use of the military in Botswana has been largely confined to providing latent capabilities more than being an instrument of attaining targets beyond the country's borders. On the other hand, the pressure for providing basic social amenities immediately after independence precluded Botswana from establishing a permanent national army. Against this background, the thesis shall examine the events leading to the evolution of armed forces in Botswana, as part of a complex process of security management.

In a similar vein, the impact of the Cold War in southern Africa had a significant role in determining the nature and patterns of security management in Botswana. This was a period in which the involvement of superpowers dramatically influenced regional security affairs. There were spill-over benefits and setbacks emanating from the superpower rivalry. For example, security assistance programs were extended to
various regional states during times of need, while at the same time the superpowers would support the interests of minority parties. The demise of the Cold War, therefore, means a changing environment in which the involvement of the superpowers in regional affairs becomes limited and questionable. One of the resultant scenarios is that an obligation is being created among the regional actors to address security in accordance with the altered environment. See Figure 1.

Equally important are the changes likely to occur as result of South Africa’s move to democracy. Among Botswana’s neighbors, South Africa has been the most influential country in so far as the nature of security policy choices were concerned. In this regard, the thesis will explore the possible scenarios likely to result from the South African transition to democracy and their impact on Botswana’s security.

Debates relating to security with respect to Botswana reveal one interesting feature; namely, the fact that the present and foreseeable financial and military capabilities of the country preclude it from resorting to fully-fledged conventional means of security management. Even in the post-apartheid era, there remains serious doubts as to whether the military efforts of Botswana and other regional states combined can parallel those of South Africa. The possibility is that South Africa will only cautiously embark upon force
Figure 1. Botswana.

reduction levels. South Africa is yet to determine her national interests and it seems there are potential
difficulties associated with a change to a pluralistic society after decades of apartheid rule. To this end, even if South Africa defines her national interests in such a way that she gives cognizance to the interests of her neighbors, the early stages of transition will continue to pose questions to her neighbors.

There are difficulties inherent in diluting the military might of South Africa. Her neighbors have the ultimate obligation of narrowing the gap between themselves and South Africa while at the same time finding ways to ensure that a peaceful co-existence prevails. The questionable fate of small countries like Botswana remains intriguing for policymakers. The nature of dilemmas already evident and those likely to erupt in the new environment make military means of resolving conflict less feasible for Botswana. Against this background, the thesis shall finally explore the viability of regionalism as one of the possible security management prescriptions in the changing security context of Botswana.
II. APPROACH AND RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines alternative approaches in the search for peace and security in Botswana, addressing security management as an evolving process. To understand the various measures influencing the security process, the overview of Botswana covers the difficulties which arose as a result of the open-door policy and further examines the implications of the country's geo-strategic location. Since much literature treats issues relating to the security of Botswana inferentially, the fourth chapter specifically covers the impact of the Rhodesian struggle on Botswana's security. The establishment of a permanent national army in Botswana was largely a function of the persistent clashes between the Rhodesian forces and the Rhodesian liberation movements. The chapter looks into the refugee factor as a spill-over problem from Rhodesia and the assistance extended to Botswana by the United Nations in recognition of the threat posed to her sovereignty. The final phase of this chapter offers a brief summary of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) since formation.

The fifth chapter addresses the role played by South Africa on Botswana's security mainly by examining the economic dependency and its inherent problems, political rivalry and military relations. These aspects shall be discussed simultaneously with the options chosen and implemented by
Botswana to alleviate the persistent pressure from the aggressive South Africa. In all these relations, Botswana was attempting to maximize her security given her fragility against the preponderance of South Africa.

The sixth chapter focuses on the impact of the Cold War. The primary question to be addressed is: the historical relations between Botswana and the two superpowers, with particular emphasis on the United States. The Reagan era (1980-88) has been the bone of contention in Southern African security talks because of the "friendly" relations between the U.S and the Pretoria regime which were seen by regional states as well meant moves to strengthen South Africa as the significant anti-communist force at the expense of regional peace and stability. However, the strengthening of South Africa by the U.S. diverted international scrutiny from South Africa's controversial domestic policies, a scenario which was exploited by South Africa in pursuing her regional agenda of destabilisation in order to consolidate apartheid.

Because of the fear of the spread of communism on the one hand, and opposition to apartheid on the other, U.S. policy wavered between the support for the Pretoria regime and regional states when circumstances dictated. However, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. policy towards Southern Africa has been altered fundamentally, a major shift from forward presence (during this period, the U.S. involvement in the region was at its highest peak mainly because of the strategic
interests) to a policy more focused on domestic concerns. Currently, the strategic significance of the region remains questionable with South Africa's transition to democracy. On the basis of these changes, especially the apparent need to redefine U.S. strategic and corporate interests towards southern, Africa there is a lively possibility of Botswana facing the difficulties of adapting to a new environment.

As a proposed solution to the dilemmas of the new environment, Chapter VII discusses Botswana's (as a microcosm) use of a regional approach to security. Possibilities of embarking upon unilateral action have never been feasible in the entire history of Botswana's security management. The thesis further addresses the challenges confronting the regional organization and its possible transformation in the event that concerted regional efforts call for its utility as a security management platform in addition to its primary role of reducing economic dependency on South Africa. The current debates by some political scientists are inclined more to the conviction that regional arrangements cannot fill the security vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. Thus, the need arises for an intensive search for alternative measures and exceptional circumstances under which these organizations can work. A discussion of the aspects of cohesion available to the regional organization in the face of the future challenges will be presented in this chapter.
On the basis of the discussion about regionalism, Chapter VIII discusses the future implications for security policy in Botswana. Another crucial dimension of this chapter is the nature of security policy in Botswana assessed against the background of South Africa's transition to democracy. The transition to democracy does not alter the historically sensitive geo-strategic position of Botswana in relation to South Africa. Only the government has changed, but other delicate variables like the economic hegemony, unparalleled military might and dependency factors remain constant. In brief, whatever happens within the borders of South Africa as she faces the real challenges of building a truly united nation will continue to have spill-over effects on Botswana and the entire region. On the basis of this trend, the thesis finally examines the policy implications for Botswana’s security now that the first phase of the long-awaited majority rule in South Africa has been achieved.
III. OVERVIEW ON BOTSWANA

Over the past two and half decades, the search for peace and security in post-independent Botswana presented serious challenges for the newly born country. Emerging from eight decades of British colonial rule in 1966, the underdeveloped country proved to be less capable of responding satisfactorily to military threats posed by its stronger neighbors such as South Africa and Rhodesia. This was largely due to the fact that during the entire colonial period, the British did not make any significant infrastructural developments in the then Bechuanaland Protectorate because of the perceived absence of any strategic value of the country.

The British government declared Botswana a protectorate in 1885 after Batswana had appealed for assistance from Britain as a security safeguard against the possible Afrikaner attempts to incorporate their country into the Union of South Africa. Britain mainly acceded to this request in order to prevent the joining together of the South Africa and the German South West Africa, thus keeping open her access to Central Africa where her interests lay, and to secure law and order in areas adjacent to the diamond mines of the Cape
Because of the seemingly insignificant economic posture of the Tswana country to immediate British imperial interests, the transfer of the reins of power from the colonial masters to the local people in 1966 was a relatively simple and peaceful process in which negotiations were pivotal. The absence of any economic significance traceable to Botswana by the British at this time goes to explain why they treated matters relating to defence in the protectorate with less importance. The only source of security for the protectorate was a paramilitary force known as the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP), responsible for a wide range of administrative duties and involvement in boundary and border issues (Morton et al., 1989, p97). With the changing nature of the protectorate administration, the BBP was gradually transformed to meet the expectations of the colonial administration. A few years before the country became independent, the paramilitary forces changed the name to Police Mobile Unit (PMU), charged with the specific responsibility of patrolling borders which were increasingly being crossed by masses fleeing from the internal conflicts of independence-seeking neighbors. For eleven years after independence, the PMU remained the sole

1. For further details regarding the events leading to the creation and proclamation of the Protectorate and the strategic importance of Botswana to British colonial interests, see Morton et al., (1989, pp. 97-89) and Tlou & Campbell (1984, pp. 142-153).
source of military security for Botswana.

Upon attaining her independence, Botswana came to be preoccupied with the immediate need for developing a self-reliant economy. However, the process of building an economy capable of maintaining its people was a long and arduous one only partially eased by the discovery and exploitation of minerals, economic and technical assistance from the West, far-sighted local planning and African solidarity (Carter & Morgan, 1980, pxxiii). These measures took a long time to bear fruit, thus precluding Botswana from addressing other societal needs. One such sector which suffered as a result of the preoccupation with the economy was military security. Establishing a military capable of satisfying the country’s future security challenges was seen as a measure to be deferred in favor of the economic and other domestic developments such as providing basic education. At this time, the need for a permanent national army was not as pressing as it turned out later with the growing national sentiments in the neighboring countries.

A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEO-STRATEGIC POSITION

Located right at the center of Southern Africa, Botswana’s security has always derived its flavor and direction from the regional and external factors. Owing to the relative degree of peace prevailing internally and a stable political culture, domestic factors did not have a dramatic influence in the
search for peace and security as much as the external ones. Foreign policy administration in Botswana draws heavily from the regional geo-politics which for a long time have not been favorable to the country's internal developments. See Figure 2.

Figure 2. Botswana in Southern Africa.

The weak economic and defence posture of Botswana during
the two and half decades played a significant role in the search for peace and security. The single most important dilemma has been the desire to balance her internal needs, such as the protection and maintenance of railway links while simultaneously embarking upon a prudent and swift policy aimed at opposing minority rule. The dependency of Botswana on her neighbors for survival, mainly economically, dictates that foreign policy be conducted cautiously so as to avoid circumstances which would "legitimize" punitive action by her stronger neighbors. What one sees in Botswana is a militarily weak country geared towards maximizing its "security returns" and influence in a region where it is dwarfed by its immediate and stronger neighbors.

As a landlocked country with a fragile economy, Botswana depends on the economic cooperation of its neighbors. In looking at her neighbors, Botswana readily distinguishes between policy choices likely to jeopardize her long-cherished principle of good neighborliness and security on the one hand, and those which can offer adequate flexibility in dealing with domestic and foreign policy matters on the other hand. A seemingly insignificant miscalculation in foreign policy administration is enough to plunge the country into an unending quagmire with far-reaching consequences.
B. OPEN-DOOR POLICY

One of the most important policy commitments ever introduced by Botswana under the Presidency of the late Sir Seretse Khama (1966-1980) was to offer political asylum to those fleeing from oppressive regimes in the trouble-torn neighboring countries. According to the open-door policy, the Government of Botswana committed itself to providing asylum to refugees as a contribution to the burden of liberation (Carter & Morgan, 1980, pxix). Pursuant to the humanitarian principles of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN), Botswana believed that denying oppressed people asylum within her borders amounted to a serious disregard for human rights.

This policy was tailored such that it could serve as a legal and internationally-recognized framework for assisting victims of political persecution seeking asylum in Botswana. Such victims could not, however, use Botswana to attack regimes in their respective countries. While in Botswana, their status was to remain strictly within the confines of the behavior of internationally recognized political refugees who had temporarily suspended their political activities since they were in a foreign land. Deliberate moves to avail her soils to be used against her stronger neighbors would have legitimized military intervention by the Rhodesian and South African forces.
The policy was clearly a longterm consideration on the part of Botswana's security equation in which the policymakers held the strong conviction that for peace and stability to prevail in their country, the entire region has to be peaceful. But the policy also required a sacrifice because, in the shortrun, it became a recipe for enduring conflict between Botswana and her neighbors because it ran counter to their domestic policies. At the continental and international levels, Botswana gained recognition and respect for taking a bold step despite its inherent dangers.

An additional intriguing aspect of this policy was the fact that Botswana risked the displeasure of oppressed friends by refusing to allow them to carry out clandestine operations against their adversaries using her soil as the springboard (Anderson, 1979, pxviii). This dilemma was further deepened by the fact that the very desperate parties saw Botswana as their sole source of security because of their common interests and the relative degree of peace and stability prevailing in the country at the time. At the other end of the spectrum, the minority leaders in South Africa and Rhodesia believed that this policy was an open official pronouncement in which Botswana explicitly availed her soils for guerilla activities against them, especially Rhodesia. This was a faulty interpretation aimed at providing the illegitimate regimes with a pretext to violate Botswana's territorial integrity perpetually, purporting to be in search of guerillas believed to operating from Botswana. See U.N.
these conflicting interpretations on the part of liberation movements and the aggressive regimes and their underlying problems, coupled with the uncompromising stance taken by Botswana with respect to the policy which saw the country being drawn hastily into the difficulties of building a national army under duress.

---

IV. BOTSWANA AND THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE (1972-79)

The struggle for independence against the Smith regime in Rhodesia dating as far back as the 1960s was one of the most influential factors in Botswana’s endless search for peace and security. One notable outcome of the prolonged confrontation between the liberation movements and the Rhodesian forces was the degree to which the struggle came to have direct and immediate implications for Botswana’s security and policy choices, resulting in the establishment of a permanent national army. With the mounting pressure for independence and the guerilla activities characterizing the struggle at the time, Botswana suffered mainly because of her proximity to Rhodesia and her longterm goal of working towards promoting majority rule in the neighboring countries.

A. BACKGROUND TO THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE

The Rhodesian civil war was an evolving process which can be partially understood in the context of regional and international politics. However, it is not in the scope of this thesis to discuss such trends and their impact in an exhaustive manner. The crucial period essential towards understanding the impact of the struggle on Botswana’s search for peace and security was between 1972-79. During this
period, four prominent factors in the Rhodesian political landscape converged to hasten the move towards independence, with serious and far-reaching implications for Botswana's security: 1) the active role played by the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in waging the bulk of fighting in the liberation war, 2) the improvement of Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union's (ZANU) tactics of the guerrillas in 1972 and its ability to attract significant African civilian support within Rhodesia, 3) the installation in September 1974 of a Frelimo-dominated Government in Mozambique, providing their ZANU allies with an opportunity to operate along the lengthy eastern and south-eastern borders of the country and to make successful attacks on communications in many different parts of the country, and, 4) the creation of the Patriotic Front (PF), an uneasy but powerful alliance formed in October 1976 between Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU).³

The aggregate internal effect of these changes was the uneasy mood and mounting tension against the Smith regime which had to do everything in its capacity to tighten its grip on the reins of power. The difficulty of dealing with liberation movements led to a situation in which the very regime looked beyond its borders for scapegoats. In order to maintain the status quo, the regime had declared all

³. For an elaborate discussion of the events leading to the transition to independence in Rhodesia and the role played by international mediators, see Africa Contemporary Record (1989).
opposition parties illegal, hence their covert operations from the jungle. It was this clandestine nature of the struggle which deepened dilemmas for the regime with further ripples being sent across its borders. Covert operations accorded the liberation movements an advantage of waging war against the Rhodesian government without being detected easily. In accordance with the Sun Tzu notion of war, one of the essential elements necessary for military decision-making and planning processes during wartime, namely, adequate knowledge about the weaknesses and capabilities of the enemy forces, was lacking in the top echelon of the Smith government. Additionally, the covert nature of the confrontation compensated for the inferior weaponry and other logistic limitations facing freedom fighters against their stronger adversaries.

Where it became clear and evident that the regime could not use its intelligence effectively to curtail the activities of the liberation movements, political persecution remained the only viable options. Africans within Rhodesia became victims of the perpetual searches on the pretext that, as fellow Africans they were automatically opposed to white-led government, and therefore, lent support to the struggle

---

4. Sun Tzu has contributed remarkably towards the understanding and operations in strategic warfare. He has been noted for making observations with a continuous relevance. Most scholars of strategic warfare continue to draw heavily from his theories. For an elaborate discussion of his theories, see (Griffith, 1963).
against the regime. From the regime's point of view, the most effective strategy was one of inflicting fear into the hearts of the oppressed so as to discourage the general population from engaging in any practices threatening the status quo. The strong and far-reaching implication was the preparedness on the part of the regime to export terrorism beyond the Rhodesian borders when circumstances warranted such action. The most serious shortcoming traceable to the Smith government was its perpetual rigidity and failure to acknowledge the financial burden it incurred as a result of the difficulties of counter-insurgency. Similarly, "Ian Smith refused to reckon with the fact that the freedom fighters were operating from within Zimbabwe itself and not from Botswana or any other neighboring state" (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p.217).

With all these factors, Rhodesia became the arena of intense military activity. The regime introduced curfew regulations in all African settlements and considerably increased the share of the national budget allocated to the military. As part its strategy which saw the confrontation strongly in racial terms, the relations between the neighboring African states and the Rhodesian government soured as the terrorism was being extended beyond the Rhodesian borders into these countries. Their moral support for liberation movements brought them into direct conflict with the Smith regime. The regime was sensitive to moves taken by its neighbors with respect to the Rhodesian question and
interpreted most of them as provocative and a deliberate intervention in its domestic affairs.

To many African leaders at the time, the revolution in Rhodesia was an inevitable measure in the debates relating to regional peace and prosperity. While this perception was a common concern and usually backed by strategic reasoning, it usually left the desperate victims of oppression deeply perplexed when their neighbors and allies declined to provide any explicit material assistance because of the dangers inherent in such moves. During the period in question, African liberation movements were in dire need of bases outside Rhodesia which could enable them to reorganize and launch attacks against the regime.

Despite the official positions taken by some neighboring countries like Botswana (the official position articulated through the open-door policy) regarding the Rhodesian struggle, the Smith regime held an opposite view. Its conviction was that the pro-majority rule African governments were in no uncertain terms going to act in its (the regime) best interest where matters pertaining to the welfare of fellow Africans were concerned. This insecurity on the part of the regime was concretized by an open regional political support for liberation movements during this period.

In 1977 the "front-line" states (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola) announced their exclusive support for the PF (a move that was later endorsed by the OAU) in accordance with the view that the years of detente had been a diversion, and that
the regime would yield only after a further heightening of the guerilla warfare.\(^3\)

It was this longterm conviction coupled with the dilemmas of the open-door policy and the proximity factor which saw Botswana being drawn hastily into a direct and prolonged confrontation with the Smith government during the 1970s. At a strategic level, compromising the commitment towards a revolution in Zimbabwe had the potential danger of exposing Botswana to the possibility of the spread of racialism into her borders and postponing the process of working towards a region in which stability prevails. In totality, Botswana welcomed the shortrun burdens of cushioning the side-effects of the revolution, mainly because of the perceived longterm benefits.

B. THREATS POSED TO BOTSWANA’S SOVEREIGNTY

The complexities surrounding the Rhodesian struggle gradually manifested themselves into regional problems more than domestic ones. For the first time in the post-independent Botswana, external threats came to be the primary concern in parliamentary debates. With the narrowing options for the Rhodesian Government in dealing with its domestic problems, Botswana became one of its first victims. The strategic position of Botswana, its weak defence posture and its open-door policy, combined to create relations with Rhodesia that

required the establishment of a permanent national army. The Smith government deliberately seized the opportunity to enter Botswana illegally under pretext that it was pursuing freedom fighters operating from their "guerilla bases" inside the country. Such fallacious reasoning remained the most "persuasive" argument behind frequent border violations. However, the habit of violating Botswana's territorial integrity was not a new phenomenon, it dated as far back as the 1960s. The difference between pre-independence and post-independence circumstances lies in the magnitude of the internal struggle in Rhodesia and Botswana's changing policy commitments towards her own security and regional concerns after independence.

With the heightening unpopularity of the Smith regime, refugees fleeing from its persecution saw Botswana as their only salvation. The regime sent its forces into Botswana, purportedly pursuing guerrillas and not refugees. The regime was not prepared to verify whether Botswana kept legitimate refugees or freedom fighters within her borders. Instead the ultimate goal was to discourage her from embarking upon her open-door policy, thus enabling the regime to curtail the movements of its opponents without the difficulties of operating beyond its borders. Because of the repeated border violations by the Rhodesian forces, in 1976 Botswana complained to the U.N. that the Smith regime had declared the entire 400 mile border between Botswana and Southern Rhodesia.
a war zone (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p.216). It had become a common scene for locals residing closer to the north-eastern border to witness infiltration of Rhodesian forces into Botswana. Such moves often reached a crescendo by cross border shootings between Botswana’s Police Mobile Unit (PMU) and the intruders. Local people could not carry out their farming activities as much as they used to do. The normal operations of the Rhodesian forces were characterized by loss of lives and perpetual pressure on the locals believed to be collaborating with the freedom fighters. Since Botswana’s accession to independence in 1966, Rhodesian forces were reported to have crossed into Botswana on 36 different occasions (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p.216).

C. THE REFUGEE QUESTION

The increasing numbers of the refugees coming into Botswana became a primary concern for the Government mainly because they were a threat economically, politically and in terms of broad security considerations. However, the commitment to the open-door policy remained unchanged despite the difficulties. The Government concerned itself with the settlement and provisioning for the increasing numbers of refugees. Having inherited an underdeveloped economy from the British, the country could not cater to the day-to-day needs of the refugees, let alone those of its permanent residents. According to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, Botswana
aided 30,000 refugees between 1976 and 1978, of whom 20,000 later became residents in the country (Legum, 1980, B803). To alleviate the pressure of provisioning, Botswana directed appeals to the U.N.

The difficulty of creating settlements remained the responsibility of the Government of Botswana while the logistic support was largely provided by the U.N. Two main factors were important in determining the appropriate locations of the refugee camps: 1) the strategic value of the place and, the degree to which such a settlement could be accessible to Rhodesian forces which were targeting these camps, and, 2) the possible danger likely to be posed to the local population as a result of being adjacent to areas of potential trouble. Three different camps were established to absorb the increasing refugee population, Dukwe, Francistown and Selibe-Pikwe camps. The Selibe-Pikwe camp, built for 1,000 refugees, was overcrowded with 8,700 refugees in 1978. The camp was later dissolved because of the booming population associated with the mining activities in the area. It was subsequently converted into a military installation. Of the three camps, the Francistown camp was closed because it did not offer enough flexibility to the Government in handling the insurgents in a densely populated area. In a tragic incident in 1978, two people were killed and a few wounded after the

Mophana Night Club in Francistown was attacked by insurgents armed with hand grenades. The Dukwe camp which was sustained after the other two were closed served the strategic needs of the country in that it was located in a sparsely populated area.

D. THE U.N. CONTRIBUTION

The contribution of the U.N. towards the building of modern day Botswana constitutes one of the most remarkable achievements of the world government. As a result of frequent border violations and the growing concern about the refugee problem, the U.N. became one of the regional protagonists, mainly to augment Botswana’s efforts to continue assisting the refugees. At this time, the Government of Botswana was seriously reconsidering its stand regarding the creation of a permanent national army. However, due to the pressure of immediate domestic needs and the limited resources at hand, the only feasible action was to expand the PMU. The creation of a permanent national army implied a serious diversion of resources at the expense of other sectors of development. Realizing her predicament, Botswana directed her plight to the U.N., emphasizing the pressure for diversion of resources into defence created by the unlawful acts of aggression conducted by the Smith regime.

Owing to the numerous complaints by Botswana, a U.N. Security Council mission under the chairmanship of A.A Farah
arrived in the country in February 1977 to identify the "special economic hardships facing Botswana because of the need to divert development funds to security requirements" (Legum, 1979, B817). After careful assessment of the situation prevailing in Botswana, the Farah Mission made the following recommendations:

1. The expansion of the PMU (the closest thing Botswana had to an army at the time).

2. Projects to safeguard Botswana’s beef industry, to reduce tension along the border, and allow the government to patrol the area to protect citizens and their property.

3. Projects to safeguard Botswana against deterioration or collapse of the railway.

4. Projects to meet emergency food requirements and to provide a strategic food reserve.

5. Projects to allow Botswana to deal with the refugee situation.

Pursuant to the findings and recommendations of the U.N. mission sent to Botswana in 1977, the U.N. took it upon itself to articulate the difficulties under which Botswana found herself as a result of the Rhodesian struggle. Emphasis was placed upon continued efforts to mobilize the necessary resources for an effective program of financial, technical and material assistance to Botswana and further organizing a meeting of donors to look into the situation (U.N. Yearbook, 1982, pp. 239-240). It was these concerted efforts from the donor countries which reduced the severity of the shortage of funds accruing from the creation of an army which was not in
the short-term plans of the country. As of 2 June 1978, the Government of Botswana reported to the U.N. mission, contributions amounting to $46.8 million (U.N. Yearbook, 1978, p.238). These donations were channeled into domestic projects such as construction of the national airport, roads, maintenance of railway network and provisioning for refugees. A substantial amount was used for vaccine production needed for combating the foot and mouth disease in the northern part of the country. This disease was one of the serious threats to the country's beef industry.

E. THE CREATION OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE

As the moves towards independence heightened in Rhodesia during the late 1970s, it became increasingly apparent to the Government of Botswana that the exigency of the situation required a military force with capabilities beyond those of the PMU. With the new set of events along the Rhodesia/Botswana border, the Government quickly abandoned the initial plan to expand the PMU because indications were that no amount of expansion or revitalization could enable it to withstand the challenges of its stronger Rhodesian counterparts. It was in the heat of the events that the Parliament passed "a Botswana Defence Force Bill on 25 March 1977, providing for both a "regular" and "reserve" force governed by a Council appointed by the President" (Legum, 1979, p.817). The PMU was dissolved and its former personnel
(approximately 1,000) became the founder members of the present day BDF. The Government estimated early in 1977 that costs directly attributable to the war in Zimbabwe came to at least P65 million (U.S. $52 million in 1976 dollars) and the BDF, formed in April 1977 to counter the threat, cost another P20 million (U.S. $16 million in 1976 dollars) during its first year. Given the circumstances under which the national army came to be created, issues relating to its support were not addressed fully in the initial stages. The BDF concentrated its scarce resources on training and avoided the purchase of sophisticated equipment beyond its ability to maintain and sustain (Snyder, 1986, p.136). Its new recruits and officers received basic military training and were immediately channelled into active service, the main preoccupation being border patrols. Training was conducted in Botswana, Zambia and to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom by British instructors under a special arrangement entered into between the two governments.

F. OVERVIEW ON BDF

The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The latter comprise two main flanks, ground forces and an air arm. Because of the size of the armed forces and the fact that the BDF is an infantry-oriented military,

the command structure has been designed such that all subordinate commanders report to a single Commander. Since the formation of the BDF, recruitment into the armed forces has been voluntary. The BDF has been growing steadily and its current total armed forces strength is approximately 7,000. Chances of further expansion remain feasible because of the increasing responsibilities of the military both at home and outside its own perimeters. As part of the on-going expansion program, a new military base has been erected at Mapharangwane (northwest of Molepolole) and will become fully operational at the end of 1994. The installation will be used by the air arm and other infantry units.

The primary mission of the BDF since its formation has been counter-penetration and counter-insurgency. Surrounded by trouble-torn neighbors, the BDF has been fighting tooth and nail to ensure that its territory is not being used to attack its stronger neighbors. It suffered repeated encounters with the Rhodesian forces in the late 1970s. In one of the most tragic incidents ever experienced by the armed forces in Botswana, 15 soldiers were killed in an ambush by Rhodesian forces in February 1978, at Leshomo, near Kazungula during one of the intensive patrols conducted by the BDF.

Operating in a volatile security context, the BDF has been getting a larger share of the national budget. Its financing

---

has developed into one of the most costly undertakings for the country. Many other domestic projects were suspended in the past as the need for a strong national army continued to make its impact felt throughout the 1980s. Events in South Africa were the main cost drivers during the 1980-1990 decade. The increased Governmental attention on the BDF meant that other security-related departments could not be developed adequately because of the limited resources. Realizing its shortcomings, the Government further diverted the BDF into internal security duties which could have otherwise been undertaken by the understaffed Police Force. "The BDF also assisted the Department of Wildlife and National Parks with anti-poaching activities".9 Both the Wildlife and Prisons Departments have received supplementary training from the BDF since 1988. With the increasing regional security concerns, the BDF has also spread its missions into the U.N. peace-keeping operations. Botswana has contributed troops to both ONUMOZ and UNOSOM.10

---


V. BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1966

In order to understand Botswana’s defense planning strategies, there is a need to examine the dynamic relationship with South Africa. Economic, political, social and military factors between the two countries have been inextricably intertwined. The large number of ties between the two states have always left Botswana open to a host of manipulative interferences by South Africa (Imrie & Young, 1990, p.12). This interaction limited Botswana seriously when she was confronted with matters pertaining to South Africa. Unlike other African states which had the advantage of being distant from South Africa and being less dependent on South Africa, Botswana’s was confronted by constraints regarding the extent to which she could oppose South Africa. Consequently, during the period following independence, after 1966, there has been a noticeable shift in the manner in which Botswana was willing to take positions contrary to South Africa’s perceived interests (Niemann, 1993, p.28). The dependency relationship between the two countries, acting as a limiting factor for Botswana, and the persistent fear of military reprisals from the Pretoria regime, tended to determine the degree of flexibility she could enjoy in dealing with South Africa.
A. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND INHERENT PROBLEMS

One of the most vital weapons possessed by South Africa in her controversial interaction with Botswana has been the gigantic economy, strong enough to make its impact felt throughout the entire subcontinent. The dilemma facing Botswana’s position regarding the South African economy has been that of being one of countries largely dependent on the very economy which was simultaneously controlled by her historical enemy. As a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), a 1969 Agreement in which South Africa plays a pivotal role, Botswana’s policies geared towards opposing South Africa have historically displayed a substantial degree of restraint.

This goes to explain why representatives from Botswana and other Frontline States (a movement geared towards promoting the politics of liberation) found it difficult to endorse concerted efforts during various U.N. sessions which sought to uproot apartheid through economic sanctions. Such moves were likely to have negative and far-reaching consequences in Botswana more than within the borders of South Africa herself. This has been largely aggravated by the absence of any ports for receiving a large volume of imports. It is arguable, therefore, that, at the heart of Botswana’s foreign policy administration, has been the sensitivity to South Africa’s economic hegemony.
The uneasiness on the part of Botswana came when South Africa occasionally threatened to exploit the dependency relations by regulating the volume of goods channeled into Botswana. Despite the threats, Botswana was not prepared to abandon her perceived benefits likely to accrue from a democratic and multi-racial South Africa. In summarizing the nature of the relations between South Africa at the OAU Summit Conference in 1969, President Seretse Khama stated.

Whilst Botswana accepts that we are part of the Southern African economic complex and that the harsh fact of history and geography cannot be obliterated, for obvious reasons, we have to maintain normal friendly relations with South Africa. But we are not deterred by our present economic weakness from speaking out for what we believe is right (Carter, 1980, p.53).

The strong incentive for South Africa to manipulate her comparative advantage in the economic field to the detriment of Botswana has been partially fuelled by the preparedness on the part of Botswana to question her domestic policies while at the same time being dependent on the South Africa’s economy.

1. Introduction of Botswana’s Currency

The fragility of Botswana at the hands of South Africa was enhanced by the fact that she relied on South African currency (the Rand) from 1961-1976. Given this situation, Botswana had serious limitations in implementing her own policies while her "power of purse" was an inseparable aspect of the South African monetary policy. Realizing the
constraints emanating from the lack of her own currency, Botswana took a strategic move to introduce her own currency, the Pula in 1976.\textsuperscript{11}

Apart from giving Botswana the leverage to make independent decisions and reducing her reliance on her very enemy, this measure has been very beneficial to Botswana due to the problem of prolonged hardships in South Africa which saw the Rand being devalued frequently. While the South African giant economic infrastructure dwarfs that of Botswana, prolonged political upheavals within South Africa have worked to the detriment of the country. Consequent upon this problem has always been the unintended vulnerability of investors in the trouble-torn environment. The longterm payback of the introduction of the Pula has been its considerable reduction of Botswana’s reliance on South Africa, thus an achievement in the security realm. The Botswana Pula has since been pegged to stronger currencies like the U.S. Dollar and the British Pound. \textit{Botswana and the Nkomati Accord (1984-85)}

The mindset in Pretoria was that a hegemonic economic role was the key factor in asserting control and setting limits to Botswana’s autonomous inclinations. Economic

\textsuperscript{11} The basic unit is the thebe (the nation’s shield). Pula means "rain" (let there be rain). The currency derived its name from the time-honored traditional notion held by the citizenry, namely, that there must be plentiful rainfall in order for them to survive as an agricultural society. For further details see Morton et al, (1989, p.26).
supremacy was becoming an increasingly vital national interest which South Africa could not afford to compromise, mainly because it was a means to the political end down the road.

After Botswana's contribution towards the creation of the regional organization, the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) in 1979, the Pretoria regime became insecure in the face of a group which explicitly sought to reduce the reliance of the regional states on its economy. The result was the pressure for a series of non-aggression pacts between South Africa and individual regional states, commonly classified under the general label of the infamous "Nkomati Accord", a specific agreement between Mozambique and South Africa.

12. The regional organization was known as the Southern African Coordination Committee since its formation in 1979. The name was later changed to Southern African Coordination Development Committee (SADC) in 1992, in line with the need to redefine the organizational mission in anticipation of South Africa becoming an additional member. In addition to the economic cooperation, SADC broadened its responsibilities to cover the political arena, strengthening regional solidarity, peace and security, see Africa South of Sahara (1994) and SADCC: THEME DOCUMENT (1992). For purposes of consistency, the newly adopted name, SADC will be used in the general context of this paper. SADC is discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.

13. The Nkomati Accord was signed in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique on the banks of Nkomati River, in Mozambique. It was a non-aggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique, founded on the perceived advantages of the economic hegemony to the South African regime. South Africa took advantage of the economic difficulties in which Mozambique found herself at the time. In exchange for economic gains Mozambique was forced to denounce her commitment and loyalty to the pressure for democratic changes in South Africa. According to this pact, Mozambique promised to cease allowing her soil to be used by exiled ANC while South Africa promised to stop giving aid to RENAMO, an anti-FRELIMO
Having successfully signed the pact with Mozambique, South Africa believed that the same could be applied to Botswana. As a result there began a long and protracted battle in which the Pretoria regime revisited its strategies repeatedly to coerce Botswana into signing the pact of "peaceful co-existence". The trick at the heart of such a pact was to undermine the collective efforts of the regional states. In a situation where South Africa would "reasonably" believe that the terrorist actions were exported into her borders from Botswana, then military or any such punitive action could be taken against Botswana under the pretext that the agreement had been invoked. Had the pact been signed, Botswana would have had to revisit her historical open-door policy because it was obviously going to constitute a lively source of conflict running against the provisions of the agreement. In brief, all the previous agreements entered into by Botswana such as being a member of Frontline States, could not remain in force after submitting to the pact. As a result, Botswana declined to follow Mozambique and enter into such a pact with South Africa.

Even more important to South Africa was the strategic significance of Botswana to the operations of SADC. Botswana's capital, Gaborone, is the home of SADC's Secretariat, guerilla organization. For Further details, see Legum(1988).
therefore, a crucial target to be overcome by South Africa in her attempts to bring her neighbors in line with her regional agenda, aimed at defending apartheid. Signing such a pact would mean that virtually all the meetings commonly held by regional states against South Africa’s economic weapon would be reasonably interpreted to be Botswana’s failure to honor the pact, hence justifying military action. The commitment attached towards such a pact would have been strong enough to see Botswana compromising her commitment towards the struggle for peace and stability in southern Africa in exchange for “good neighborliness” with South Africa.

It is understandable therefore that, President Masire maintained an uncompromising position on at least four different occasions in which the South African delegates attempted to persuade Botswana to sign the pact. The President further made his position before the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 May 1984 (South Africa Using Pressure to Force Pact) as follows;

The proposal to sign an agreement similar to the Nkomati Accord is illogical and unreasonable in that, unlike Mozambique, there are no hostilities between Botswana and South Africa. Such an agreement will provide South Africa with a pretext to invade Botswana, thus endangering our hard-won independence. South Africa is threatening to deploy its powerful army along our common border. However, Botswana will not sign such a treaty, regardless of the pressures.14

Botswana's consistent and prolonged refusal to sign such a pact added to her vulnerability at the hands of South Africa. It was a difficult reality for South Africa to accept that a country as small and economically weak as Botswana could withstand her pressure. The result of the prolonged tug-of-war was a punitive raid in which 12 people were killed by South African Defence Force (SADF) on June 14, 1985. To justify its actions, the Pretoria regime resorted to its usual rhetoric of accusing Botswana of harboring what it described as ANC terrorists. The severity of this bizarre relationship in which economics and military dominance were manipulated as inextricably intertwined factors only came to assume different dimensions in 1988 with ascendancy of Frederick de Klerk to the South African presidency. However, in all these changing relations, economic hegemony remains a constant variable.

B. POLITICAL RIVALRY

While there was no question regarding the bilateral nature of economic relations between South Africa and Botswana since 1966, there was a historical concern about their interaction at the political level. As countries led by governments with diametrically opposed views regarding majority rule, their political exchanges verged on a rather understandable but complicated notion of destabilisation, appearing more like a
zero-sum relationship in which one side sought to win over its counterpart. Botswana's strong conviction has always been that, as long as the Pretoria regime failed to grant franchise to the majority in South Africa, she was not going to compromise even if that meant continuation of strained relations.

In looking at Botswana, the idea is not to prejudge whether destabilisation was not a useful category in a taxonomy of state-to-state relations, but rather to suggest that its use in the Southern African context has been (for understandable reasons) almost entirely polemical and propagandist (Imrie & Young, 1990, p.16). Botswana's refusal to recognize the apartheid system cherished by the Pretoria regime resulted in a relationship which could described as an interaction governed largely by the principle of right versus might.15

In one of the most embarrassing but fruitless historic episodes in 1987, the Pretoria regime, through Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana Homeland, attempted to force Botswana to

---

15. The use of the notion of right versus might is borrowed from the title of book by Henkin, Hoffman, Kirkpatrick, Scheffer et al, (1991) who explore the legality of the U.S. military actions against her weaker neighbors since the 1980s. Such scholars examine the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 and the collective response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 with a particular emphasis on the interpretation of international law regarding the use of force. Their particular emphasis is laid upon the actions purportedly taken by the very members of the U.N. when their national interests are at stake.
recognize its historically questionable and regressive homeland system by disrupting railway networks between Botswana and Mafikeng (in Bophuthatswana). The strategy was to continue with the disrupting activities until Botswana "accorded the homeland a true and due sovereign treatment". Even more important was the fact that the move threatened the 1969 SACU Agreement. To defuse this matter, Botswana went ahead with alternative plans to construct railway facilities at Rakhuna (inside Botswana), which would enable trains from South Africa and Botswana to be handed over there instead of Mafikeng in Bophuthatswana.16 Realizing the failure of this strategy, South Africa reverted to a more practical policy of ranking her priorities. Fearing to lose both in the economic and political fields, she chose to endorse the alternative made by Botswana as a way of promoting her own economic interests.

In dealing with Botswana, South Africa has always relied upon her muscle power more than the governance of international law and humanitarian principles expected to prevail between two neighbors who are members of the U.N. For understandable reasons, nation states commonly adhere to international law if it is not in direct conflict with their "sovereign commitments". The foremost and crucial South

African national interest, namely, the preservation of the apartheid system, precluded her from submitting wholly to the humanitarian principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter since these were two opposed forces. On sovereign grounds, South Africa developed a selective instinct with respect to the use of the U.N. Charter as a frame of reference. Since the formation of the U.N. in 1945, there has been a noticeable pattern on the part of the Pretoria regime to place an excessive emphasis on the principle of "non-interference in the domestic affairs of the respective members", Article 2(7), since it "reasonably" provided her with a latitude to pursue her national interests without "undue external scrutiny".

On the other hand, Botswana's reliance on diplomacy as a weapon and a crucial variable in her security equation, derives largely from Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which stresses the importance of regional arrangements for purposes of peace management. Historically, diplomacy has been used by Botswana to supplement her weak defence posture and the obvious advantage of the prolonged and collective global opposition levelled against South Africa's political values.

While it was clear that the Pretoria regime was opposed to Botswana's political orientation, especially the open-door policy, the regime simultaneously sought some kind of legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of Botswana. Like all governments, even the most brutal and coercive, the Pretoria regime tried to make citizens believe that its laws ought to
be obeyed and that it is legitimate to use force against those who resist, and further sought to bridge the political gap between itself and its neighbors on the basis of the same reasoning.\textsuperscript{17}

Because of her controversial political goals, South Africa experienced serious limitations in seeking regional acceptance. This goes to explain the hypocrisy used by South Africa in exploiting the facade of anti-Communism to appeal to the West as the sole "protector" of her regional neighbors against the spread of communism. South Africa was hoping to achieve recognition as the protector of her weaker neighbors from the threat of communism. When this acknowledgement was not given by the neighboring states, the Pretoria regime often resorted to the use of force under the pretext that the very neighbors were pro-communist. Such measures often ended up adding to her already tarnished image, internally, regionally and globally.

C. MILITARY RELATIONS

Military relations between South Africa and Botswana reveal one interesting distinction, namely, two diametrically opposed perceptions about the role played by the military as an element of national power. A glance at the South African

\textsuperscript{17} For an elaborate discussion of the notion of "legitimacy" as an aspect of political culture, see Almond & Powell (1992, p.39).
power equation throughout the apartheid era revealed a rather
difficult but understandable phenomenon of the military and
politics being two forces presented in close proximity.

In a turbulent South African landscape, the art of
statesmanship resided in the ability to manipulate politics
and military power jointly in order to enhance the maintenance
of apartheid. The two were used complementarily in a manner
which could be summed up as conforming to the Clausewitzian
principle of "war being the continuation of politics by other
means". Perhaps even more significant was the willingness
to stretch the notion beyond its original parameters to
accommodate the conflictual political culture. With the ever
narrowing options for the regime in its defense for apartheid,
military thinking and military methods became more central
than ever before to the upper echelons of South Africa's
bureaucracy (Rotberg, 1985, p.4). Perhaps even more
significant was the overriding readiness to give "politics and
war" an equal treatment, to accommodate the conflictual
political culture. South Africa purported to trace the threats
to apartheid as originating among her neighbors. They then
became the victims of her broad military strategies.

18. Carl Von Clausewitz was one of the guiding forces
behind military thinking. Clausewitz's detailed works have
been noted by various strategists for their distinct flavor of
relating politics to war. For details, see Clausewitz (1976, p.87).
The military relations between Botswana and the Pretoria regime since the mid-1970s came to be largely a function of this mindset in which the regime felt that neighboring countries had a remarkable contribution to its internal affairs. The "total countermeasures" employed by the state involved the steady militarisation of South African society, and the growing deployment of the SADF in a coercive role inside and outside the country (Cock & Nathan, 1989, pxiii). To summarize the South African preoccupation with the military means of resolving internal problems, Hanlon (1986) observes that:

The new government argued that white South Africa faced a "total onslaught" from beyond its borders, and that it must respond with a "total national strategy". This was to be a "comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to the state according to an integrated pattern" (p.7).

It was the implementation of this plan throughout the 1980s which saw Botswana shifting her focus from the north-eastern border where the independence of Zimbabwe had been completed, to her long south eastern border with South Africa.

Apart from the militarization of politics in South Africa, any discussion of military relations between Botswana and the former must acknowledge the crucial fact that the small defence force in Botswana was created largely for purposes of providing capabilities against the ensuing problem of insurgency. It would be a grave mistake to study the arms inventory of the BDF as an attempt to parallel the SADF
armament inventory. The nuclear capability aside, the SADF conventional weaponry alone, has been an immense build-up and accumulation which Botswana cannot conceiv of paralleling. Against this background, the relative success of Botswana in the prolonged confrontation against South Africa has been largely a product of diplomacy coupled with security guarantees (the subject of the next chapter) more than military preparedness. Undoubtedly the clear military contribution has been in the area of conducting patrols as part of the strategic defence against insurgency problems. See Figure 3.

Perhaps even more significant in understanding the military relations between Botswana and South Africa has been the constraints facing South Africa in her power projection propensities.

Questions have always been asked as to why the Pretoria regime could not simply run down Botswana given the enormity of its military? It seems possible to suggest that the absence of a common thinking representative of the various ethnic groups within the borders of South Africa has always acted as a serious power constraint. South Africa lacked one of the vital elements of national power, the historical-psychological-sociological element,¹⁹ thus limiting her real

¹⁹. For details regarding the significance of necessary variables in the any country's national power, see Hartmann (1983, pp. 56-58).
Figure 3. South African Military Expenditure.  

power. In fact, the use of military means against the neighbors has never been welcomed by the oppressed majority inside South Africa and the international community at large. This goes to explain why military operations against Botswana and other regional states were confined to raids. In all these raids, the Pretoria regime had a problem of a double standard,
the struggle for legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the neighbors while at the same time attempting to use military raids and threats as strategic moves.

Despite all the imbalances working in favor of Botswana, the quality of decisions reached by her policymakers revealed the indispensable tendency to appreciate the enormity of the South African military inventory and the potential threat of its utility for attaining longterm goals. Throughout the 1980s, what deepened the dilemmas for Botswana was the existence of a possibility of arbitrary use of military might when pressure from liberation movements heightened inside South Africa. By banning opposition parties in 1963, the Pretoria regime, like its counterpart in Rhodesia, had pushed beyond its borders what could have been an internal struggle, hence the need to look at neighboring countries as sources of security problems.

1. Botswana's Security Response

The events which were to follow as a result of the pressure from South Africa saw Botswana acting tactfully in order to preserve her sovereignty in the eyes of the aggressive Pretoria regime. Changes were not confined only to the military arena, but were spread to the legislative field since it was becoming increasingly apparent that a sound legal justification to the public was required to enable the Government to control the situation. An additional requirement
for instituting legal changes with respect to the prevailing security conditions was the fact that the measures were in themselves, a radical departure from the personal liberties enshrined in the country's constitution.

a. The National Registration Act of 1986

In October 1986, the Government introduced the national identity card as a requirement for all residents of Botswana, aimed at distinguishing citizens from refugees and terrorists who were continuing to be a security problem for the country. The system was launched in 1987, providing for the compulsory registration of all citizens of the age of 16 and above, and of non-citizens resident in Botswana for more than six months.\(^{20}\) The idea of the Act was not welcome in certain quarters, especially opposition parties and privately owned press. Opposition was based on the similarity between the proposed Act and the South African notion of identity cards introduced for blacks as part of the politics of separate development. As a new idea which replicated the evils of apartheid in South Africa, the Act could not be easily endorsed by Batswana (Daily News, 21/3/1986).

The main objection revolved around the fact that identity cards were interpreted as an infringement upon the personal liberties of the citizens who were not used to

carrying identity cards. However, the Act eventually passed the test mainly because of national agreement regarding the inevitability of security measures in the face of the increasing problems of accusations for harboring terrorists and the fact that the SADF continued to impinge on the country's security. Despite the initial opposition to the national identity card, it came to serve other domestic purposes such as providing planning data and alleviating the voter registration problem which could not be conducted satisfactorily without adequate identification procedures. The identity card, commonly known as *O Man* (an expression implying identification in the standard language) among the locals, has since become an indispensable feature of many administrative procedures in public and private circles.

b. The National Security Act

Following the June 14, 1985 raid by the SADF in which 12 people were killed, the Government of Botswana had no choice but to embark upon a strategy based on introducing legislative changes solely for purposes of enhancing internal security. To deter people from collaborating with elements likely to be prejudicial to the security of Botswana, the Government increased the powers of the police forces as one of the limited avenues available to it. The Act gave law enforcement officials, wide and extensive powers, including the right to search without warrant by any officer of the rank
of sergeant or above, if he considered the case to be an emergency and that in the interest of the country, it needed immediate attention (Daily News, 1986).

South Africa viciously sought to discourage Botswana from pursuing policies which were not in the best interest of the Pretoria regime, especially the erroneous belief that anti-government elements were operating from Botswana. In addition to the negative reactions from Pretoria, there was also resistance at home to these security measures. Many Batswana saw these changes as a radical departure from their societal norms. Throughout their post-independence lives, the idea of conferring such immense and discretionary powers upon law-enforcing officers was unheard of and only traceable to South African apartheid policies intended to enable the government to oppress people. The main fear associated with such a change was that it could easily lend itself to misuse since there were no limits regarding its administration. "Discretion" was seen by the opponents as too wide and vague a term to be used as a guiding principle. In explaining the exigency of the situation under which the Act was enacted, the Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Mr Ponatshego Kedikilwe pointed out that:

The richer and older democracies than Botswana had developed sophisticated methods of dealing with similar problems, but in the case of Botswana it will take a long time before reaching that level of sophistication. In the meantime, the problems for which the legislation is intended are already there and need to be tackled urgently. Because of the
tranquil nature of Botswana society, there has been no need for the kind of the proposed legislation in the past, but recent events including fatal bombings and the raid by South African forces have shattered the tranquility, hence the introduction of the legislation.21

In a similar vein, the judicial system was enhanced to enable the courts to carry out their duties in a manner consistent with the prevailing security environment. For an offence committed under the act, "where lack of lawful authority or excuse is an ingredient, the burden of proof was placed on the accused" (Daily News, 1986). Coupled with these measures were open invitations extended to the South African Government to come and point out centers of ANC or guerilla activities within the borders of Botswana. Such offers never met any favorable responses from the Pretoria regime. Despite the displeasures associated with the changes, the Government of Botswana had to redouble its efforts to ensure that a sense of security consciousness was instilled among the citizens and perhaps even more importantly, to exonerate the country from the accusations of working closely with the "terrorists" against the Pretoria regime.

c. Growing Military Expenditure and Duties

The growing pressure from the Pretoria regime saw

the defence budget being increased dramatically. The need for an increased defence budget was further necessitated by the fact that the Government had increased the responsibilities of the BDF. Due to the limited capabilities of the police forces, mainly in the field of manpower, they could not provide the badly required service of manning road blocks and night patrols to conduct elaborate and thorough searches. The police forces were further confined to their primary role of law enforcement. The BDF, with more than 3,000 men who were better trained and well equipped compared to their police counterparts, was given the additional responsibility of internal security. This arrangement was meant to be a temporary one, intended to remain in force solely to augment the security functions of the country at the time. See Figure 4.

The dominant feature which developed as a result of the increased responsibilities of the BDF was the escalating budgetary trends of the military. While this trend was conducted at the expense of other domestic projects, the general citizenry had to learn to live within the constraints of the available resources at the time. The diversion was prolonged longer than it was initially anticipated. It could not be reversed until the end of 1988 when the events in South Africa turned more inwards with the release of Nelson Mandela and the official recognition of opposition parties in the long embattled South African political arena.
During the period between 1986 and 1988, road blocks were mounted on all major roads leading to South Africa from Botswana. All in-coming and outgoing traffic was subjected to thorough searches by the BDF personnel. Border patrols were also conducted on a wider scale. In major towns,
night and day patrols were a common feature. In a bid to ensure that these national efforts did not meet resistance, the Commander-in-chief, Dr Quett Masire, stressed the following points in a message broadcast over Radio Botswana to the nation:

As a result of the grave security threats to the country, a number of security arrangements have been instituted. It is extremely important that people take threats to personal and national security with the seriousness they deserve. The army and the police have more than enough problems at hand now and would not be able to accommodate more problems arising from people who fail to cooperate with them in their efforts to ensure that the security of the country is not threatened. The government understands that the daily activities of the security forces on the roads is in violation of people’s personal liberties which are entrenched in the constitution, but these temporary losses of personal liberties are a sacrifice to safeguard the life without which all the rights the nation is entitled to would otherwise be meaningless.22

In order to ensure that the BDF was prepared to face the challenges of defending the country against South Africa, the Government entered into some defense-related arrangements with the British Government. In addition to the already available services of the Indian Advisory Training Team, the British Advisory Training Team further augmented the training sessions. Training was directed more into the technical fields such as aircraft engineering courses in which Botswana was

deficient. In a similar manner the U.S. continued to extend
different training packages to the Government of Botswana.
Such packages covered military and personnel related fields.
VI. THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

During the Cold War, regional security efforts throughout the world were largely governed by globalism. Typical of the bipolar nature of the world at this time, it was not surprising that the Eastern and Western blocs were engaged in a prolonged competition for spheres of influence across the globe. Southern Africa came to be transformed into one of the battlegrounds for superpower rivalry. From the perspective of the U.S, the nature of the confrontation in southern Africa was appropriately forecasted as follows: "The real choice we will face in Southern Africa in the 1980s concerns our readiness to compete with our global adversary in the politics of a changing region whose future depends on those who participate in shaping it" (Crocker, 1980, p.345). Under the circumstances, the security of small countries like Botswana was overshadowed and seriously impacted upon by the preoccupations of the superpowers in the region.

Whilst it was clear to the international community that the involvement of superpowers in many regional affairs was largely geared towards their own national interests, regional policymakers had to face the difficult reality of accepting the fact that the superpowers themselves had become indispensable parties in the efforts towards promoting peace.
and stability in the region. The prolonged question of Namibian independence was one area in which the involvement of the superpowers played a crucial role. Lack of superior weaponry and other sources of power enabling regional states to withstand challenges peculiar to their own environment on their own, rendered them subordinate to the initiatives of the superpowers. With their preponderant capabilities, the superpowers influenced the nature and extent of regional security management patterns.

Throughout the entire period, the two global giants, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, were engaged in a difficult exercise of placing their ideological commitments before all other considerations, even if these meant acting against the perceived interests of the regional states. For this reason, their respective policy administration was responsive to the threat posed to the ideology, the foremost and important consideration which could not be sacrificed under any set of circumstances. The overriding preoccupation with ideology led to wavering and inconsistent foreign policy approaches on the part of the superpowers. For this reason, a lot of desperate regional parties saw their involvement in regional affairs as an opportunity to be exploited in either bringing them to power or assisting in the overthrow of their rivals. For example, the Soviets spent about $500 million to install the MPLA (Angola) in power; supplied weapons and other materiel, transported Cubans, gave aircraft and maintained a naval
squadron off Luanda (Rotberg, 1985, p.56). On the other hand, South Africa, using the facade of anti-Communism, exploited the collegial rapport between herself and the U.S. during the Reagan era by destabilising her weaker neighbors under the pretext that they were pro-Communist. In totality, the Cold War period was a double-edged sword which sometimes worked to the detriment of the regional actors while under certain circumstances it created an environment in which there were spill-over benefits realized in the form of security assistance from the superpowers.

A. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA

The U.S. policy towards southern Africa during the Cold War was largely a function of the containment theory. Containment, as a policy was launched by the Truman Administration, designed to frustrate Soviet expansion attempts. In general terms, the U.S. policies during the Cold War placed the containment theory above all considerations. What the U.S. did in far-flung regions of the world was justified in terms of the Soviet threat and the strategic importance of a particular area to U.S. interests. Because of the seriousness of the need to curtail Soviet expansion, the policy was broadened to ensure that it offered adequate flexibility in foiling the spread of communism, even

to the seemingly insignificant areas.

In addition to the desire to overcome communism, four fundamental factors perpetually ran at the heart of U.S. foreign policy: 1) commitment to human rights coupled with the anti-apartheid spirit, 2) the need to act decisively in order to protect the South African economy against the rising tide of violence, 3) U.S. investments in South Africa, and 4) the desire to end Cuban presence in the region (Legum, 1988, pp. xix-xxi). Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. foreign policy was shaped by these factors. However, their individual importance was largely a function of the perceived Soviet threats in the region at a given time and U.S. domestic policies. The striking feature of the U.S. foreign policy administration was its inconsistent nature in attempting to manipulate diametrically opposed factors, the maintenance of "friendly" relations with South Africa while at the same time being critical of its apartheid practices.

Taking harsh measures against the pro-apartheid Pretoria regime, an ally against the Soviet, was seen as a serious tradeoff of U.S. interests. Where anti-Soviet issues were concerned, the U.S. proceeded cautiously in order to compromise other goals even if such moves implied risking international criticism.

Despite the globalist approach to the Soviet problem, the U.S. carefully narrowed its focus to countries satisfying its immediate strategic needs, a propensity clearly amplified in
southern Africa. The National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39), formulated in 1969, was intended to cover the entire region of southern Africa, its attention was concentrated primarily on U.S. interests in South Africa, an emphasis which suggests that South Africa was the cornerstone of U.S. southern African policy (El-Khawas & Cohen, 1976). The policy was designed as an expedient framework intended to further the broad strategic interests in southern Africa by focussing on economic, political and military priorities of the U.S. Other regional states such as Botswana were treated as dependent variables in the overall equation.

B. BOTSWANA AND THE SUPERPOWER RIVALRY

In dealing with the Cold War confrontation during the 1980s, Botswana was able to capitalize on friendly relations with both superpowers, thus benefiting from their diplomatic support in times of crisis (Zaffiro, 1992, p.59). This trend emanated from the fact Botswana was part of the non-aligned movement. The underlying principle of non-alignment was the conviction that global peace could be attained without identifying with either of the two superpowers. Close adherence to either side was seen by members of the non-aligned as a potential step towards heightening the possibility of open warfare. Despite the efforts on the part of two superpowers to lure Botswana into identifying closely with either, she has always remained consistent about her
commitment to the non-aligned movement. While Botswana adhered to the non-aligned movement, her commitment to democracy, human rights and her geo-strategic position were factors which attracted the U.S. In a similar vein, in an effort to diversify its foreign diplomatic, economic, and politico-military relations, Botswana placed considerable emphasis on encouraging the U.S. to be an economic benefactor and shield against pressures and threats from South Africa (Zaffiro, 1992, p.58). Because of the perceived mutual benefits between the U.S. and Botswana, the latter was placed under a group of "friendly" countries eligible for security assistance in accordance with the broad containment theory.

The specific security assistance program under which Botswana came to be placed was called the International Military Education and Training (IMET). The objectives of this program were summarized in the FY 1980 Congressional Presentation Document as follows:

.....[the purposes of IMET] are: first to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of international peace and security; second, to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to use their resources, including defense articles and services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by recipients; and, third, to increase awareness of international human rights issues.

This program supports the foreign policy objectives of the United States by providing an effective and relatively inexpensive contribution to the military
strength of friendly countries. In addition to transmitting professional military skills and instructions in U.S. military doctrine, the program assists in the pursuit of our policy objectives in providing significant opportunities for communication with the military leadership of other countries. In this regard, IMET has a lasting value to the United States and is, dollar for dollar, one of our most effective investments.24

Many other countries became beneficiaries of IMET, under similar arrangements of using the program as a component of the broad Cold War strategy. The conditions underlying this program were uniform among the recipient countries. Botswana signed the agreement in March 21, 1980. The agreement restricted itself to the training field more than other areas. Subsequent to the agreement between the two countries, Botswana received a wide range of training packages from the U.S. To this date, the agreement remains in force.

The exact nature of the interaction between the U.S and Botswana were never amplified as much as the interaction between the U.S. and South Africa. This was partly due to the fact that Botswana was careful in distancing herself from the Cold War rivalry. It seems possible to suggest that the dilemmas associated with the non-alignment provoked skepticism on the part of the U.S. There is reasonable ground to believe that the U.S. policymakers could not easily establish the extent to which they could trust non-aligned countries where U.S interests were at stake in the face of the Soviet threat.

On the other hand, South Africa explicitly articulated her anti-communist inclinations and went further to incur heavy military expenditure to further the common interest between her and the U.S., the primary goal of ending Soviet presence in southern Africa.

C. THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Even though President Ronald Reagan was no exception to the implementation of the U.S. grand strategy (containment), his policy towards southern Africa was a sharp contrast to those of his predecessors. The differences in policy approaches were a function of the party (Republican or Democratic) orientation and to a large extent the personality of a given president. The ascendancy of Reagan to the presidency in 1980 witnessed the reversal of the U.S. policy from the past orientations in which South Africa did not enjoy any form of "close collaboration" with the U.S. to a more friendly interaction.

The Carter administration criticized the apartheid regime, called for majority rule in South Africa and accorded the Front Line states a much more active role in settling regional conflicts (Price, 1982, p.51). However, under the Constructive Engagement policy, the Reagan administration sought to resolve regional problems through a strategy which was based on the principle of "friendship" and acknowledgment of the crucial role played by South African Government, both
within its borders and in the longstanding regional question of Namibian struggle for independence. The policy was best summarized by its chief architect as follows:

The prime ingredient in an effective policy is to maintain a close, ongoing watch on the situation while carefully assessing our own bargaining position. Amer-ican powder should be kept dry for genuine opportunities to exert influence. As in other foreign policy agendas for the 1980s, the motto should be: underpromise and overdeliver--for a change (Crocker, 1980, p.351).

At the base of the strategy there remained the overriding preoccupation with a potential Soviet and Cuban challenge to the United States in the region, and the assumption that this challenge would require continued stability in South Africa itself (Picard & Groelsma, 1989, p.238). Anti-communism as a vital U.S national interest and a common ground between the two was exploited by South Africa who temporarily enjoyed the diversion of scrutiny by the West from her apartheid practices chiefly because of her commitment to the serious and immediate threat of communism and seized the opportunity to conduct punitive raids on her neighbors. It was this "friendly interaction" between the Reagan Administration and South Africa which led Hanlon (1986) to making the observation that:

Relief arrived for the embattled white laager with the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Anti-communism replaced human rights as the main issue in U.S. foreign policy. Whereas Carter had accepted the OAU line of isolating Pretoria, the Reagan policy was "constructive engagement". The U.S. tried to push South Africa to mend its ways by being friendly to it and convincing it of the merits of change, rather than being antagonistic and imposing sanctions (p.23).
According to the desperate regional actors, the U.S., could have embarked upon a different policy which would have enhanced the efforts of the OAU and regional states in isolating the Pretoria regime in order to resolve regional problems. Perhaps one of the most serious repercussions of the constructive engagement policy was its strengthening of South Africa militarily while at the same time opposing weapons acquisition by other regional states. "To encourage the South African "trust", the Reagan administration further relaxed the Carter bans on military exports to South Africa and backed a 1982 International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Pretoria" (Hanlon, 1986, p.23). The far-reaching consequence of this move was that it augmented the already controversial South African appetite for using military means to resolve domestic and regional issues. It was during this period that South Africa seized the opportunity to conduct brutal raids on Botswana and other neighboring countries on the pretext that they were pro-communist.

Pursuant to the alternative use of anti-apartheid and anti-communism for strategic reasons, in October 1982 South Africa sent leaflets into Botswana attacking the government for harboring South African refugees, and even more significant, purchasing Soviet arms. This incident came after Botswana had purchased arms from the Soviet Union in 1980 for purposes of strengthening her security in the wake of continuing problems with her neighbors. Opposition to this
transaction was spearheaded by South Africa in a propagandist manner as a way of consolidating Western support and verifying that her neighbors were pro-communist. For strategic reasons it was logical that, South Africa could not condone any measures which contributed positively towards strengthening her neighbors militarily. According to Zaffiro (1992), Botswana’s purchase of arms from the Soviet Union provoked skepticism on the part of the U.S., as reflected in the congressional sentiments regarding its future with Botswana:

Congressional debate on the FY 1982 Development Assistance allocation for Botswana and emergency drought relief money included assertions that it was difficult to justify U.S. economic assistance to a government which spends its own resources on Soviet military equipment. In reality, the purchases resulted from earlier refusals by the U.S. and Great Britain to sell comparable weaponry to the Botswana government... (p.67).

The overriding sensitivity of the U.S. to playing a tactful game in opposing South Africa led the Vice-president of Botswana, Mr Peter Mmusi to the conclusion that "this now places the United States clearly in league with South Africa in aggressing and fomenting instability in the region" (Johnsson & Martin, 1986, pxix). Desperate as most regional states were at the hands of South Africa, there was virtually nothing they could do in the face of cooperation between two undoubtedly powerful nations, South Africa and the U.S. Even more serious was the fact that U.S. support for Pretoria was seen by regional policy-makers as a deliberate move to undermine the efforts behind the creation of SADC. The
difficulty confronting Botswana in dealing with the U.S. was that under these circumstances it was not easy to rely heavily on the U.S. where Botswana’s security was under threat from South Africa.

However, what deepened the dilemma for Botswana was the fact that the U.S. could tactfully support Botswana under certain circumstances which could not be spelled out clearly. For example, in early 1986 the United Kingdom and USA pledged military aid to help Botswana to deter South African attacks and terrorist infiltration.  

However, what remained questionable was the nature of aid to be accorded Botswana by the U.S, in the event that she was subjected to military action by South Africa. Throughout the Reagan era, the SADF continued to violate the territorial integrity of Botswana on the pretext that the country harbored terrorists and was pro-communist. To justify these actions to the West, South Africa emphasized the collaboration between Botswana and the Soviet Union.

While the Reagan policy towards South Africa has been criticized for strengthening South Africa to the detriment of her neighbors, contributing towards loss of lives (especially within South Africa) and creating policy dilemmas for countries like Botswana, there were secondary benefits gained by Botswana and the entire region. Namibia’s move to

---

independence in 1990 was partly an outcome of the increased military might of the U.S.-backed South Africa which was becoming increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to withstand. Without the involvement of the superpowers in the region, it seems possible to suggest that South Africa would have acted unilaterally and unchecked for a long time since the combined efforts of her neighbors were not sufficient, unless augmented, to end her hegemony in Namibia and Angola. Since the presence of the superpowers determined the nature of policies regionally, equally significant in terms of their withdrawal was the hasty moves towards a democratic revolution in South Africa in the absence of the anti-communism facade. The camouflage which South Africa had used for a long time has since become a thing of the past, hence the ease with which negotiations were conducted in South Africa to move towards the current multi-racial society.

D. THE POST-COLD WAR SCENARIO

Now that the Cold War has ended, the entire globe is engaged in a perpetual search for reasonable means within which security issues can be addressed. The patterns of interaction within southern Africa have been altered fundamentally. The longstanding question of South Africa’s transition to democracy has been completed and brings about a new set of circumstances which seemingly call for increased concerted efforts. In the past, the superpowers were actively
involved in southern Africa to ensure that apartheid, the primary source of regional problems, would be overcome. With the downfall of the white minority government, what is the position of Botswana with respect to the new South Africa? Given the major reforms in the post-apartheid South Africa and the sensitivity of the South African economy to such problems, what are the possible implications of the dependency relations between South Africa and her regional neighbors? Needless to mention is the fact that despite the downfall of the white minority government, certain key variables attributable to South Africa’s advantageous position remain constant and cannot be altered easily. The military might and mineral wealth of the country remain sources of power which are less likely to be affected by the transition to democracy.

What remains crucial for Botswana and other regional states is the need to redefine security management to make it responsive to the new challenges. Adding to the new set of problems are environmental factors which continuously affect the entire region regardless of geographic bounds. Uncertainties regarding the perpetual involvement of the U.S. in far-flung regions continue to deepen the dilemmas. During the Cold War rivalry, there were strong incentives for the U.S. to extend such programs as IMET to various countries in the name of anti-communism and the ability to spend its resources for purposes of influencing policies in southern Africa. Problems generated by U.S. foreign policy aside, the
influence exerted on South Africa to withdraw from Angola and Namibia, and the implementation of internal reforms (within South Africa) were nowhere near the capabilities of the regional states combined.

In the event that South Africa chooses to retain her present preponderant capabilities for playing a hegemonic role, doubts exist as to whether it would be justifiable for the U.S. to intervene in regional problems emanating from such asymmetrical power relations. Given the current tone of congressional debates regarding the use of U.S. troops in regions without any strategic significance to the U.S., it seems possible to suggest that security guarantees will not be made easily. Humanitarian reasons alone are not sufficient to act as pretexts for involvement in far flung regions. The recent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia (Operation Restore Hope), is an indicator of the likely trend of U.S. defense policy beyond the 1990s.

With the end of the Cold War, the incentive for escalating defense budgetary trends seems unjustified in the eyes of the American public. The problem of the opportunity cost associated with national security has become a great concern. In the absence of a well defined policy rationale for engagement in Africa, the U.S. could very well begin a gradual disengagement from the continent (Robinson, 1992, p.39).

In all these changing relations, the bottomline revolves around the exact place to be occupied by small countries such
as Botswana whose delicate geo-strategic position remains unaltered amidst all these diversifying security concerns. Can regionalism be relied upon as a security management platform in southern Africa, if so what kind of a transformation should SADC undergo to cope with the new challenges? It seems possible to suggest that any study which establishes the potential for the success of SADC would be of relevance to the ongoing debates about possible security management patterns at a regional level, perhaps even more serious at the global level.
VII. A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY: SADC?

The post-Cold War environment has come to be largely characterized by uncertainties regarding the patterns of security management to be pursued to ensure that peace prevails. Cold War era bipolarity was at least predictable in the sense that balancing by joining either the Western or Eastern Bloc tended to indicate the parameters within which regional or international security could be addressed. However, the new era is such that professionals from various disciplines are engaged in a perpetual search for reasonable mechanisms capable of being used in peace and conflict management.

Political scientists constitute one group continuing to debate whether globalism or regionalism should prevail to fill the current vacuum. Despite their acknowledgement of the present limitations of the U.N. and changing perceptions about security globally, MacFarlane and Weiss (1992) are pessimistic about regionalism. They base this argument on the following observations: 1) using recent case studies on conflict management in a number of regional organizations, the hopes placed on these organizations are unduly optimistic if not altogether misplaced, 2) while regional organizations are best suited to mediation in local conflict because of their
familiarity with local conflicts, their financial and organizational limitations do not permit them to be entrusted with conflict management, 3) the definitional ambiguity relating to the concept of a "region" (in terms of geography, size, lack of inclusiveness, etc) is a serious limiting factor which plagues regional organizations, 4) the extent to which the power imbalances at the regional level impinge on the behavior of the regional organization and complicate conflict resolution, and 5) the organization's capacity to cope with internal as opposed to interstate conflict.

However, the seemingly irredeemable history of certain regional organizations should not be used as a guiding principle on which analysts can reasonably base their general rejection of regionalism. There have been certain exceptional cases in which the groupings have been successful and continuously face compelling circumstances to contribute remarkably towards peace and security management in future. Prospects for collective self-reliance and conflict resolution exist in certain regions like southern Africa where SADC's "Program of Action" is geared towards security arrangements (Tow, 1990, p.69). Despite its initial preoccupation with economic pursuits, SADC has successfully worked towards reasonable security management in a region which was turbulent for a long time.

The exceptionalism of SADC as a regional organization tends to draw heavily from a wide range of variables
prescribed by the geopolitics of the region. Given the fact that South Africa has become a democratic and multi-racial society, the political atmosphere in the entire region has been altered dramatically. On the basis of all the current and foreseeable patterns of interaction, this chapter examines the challenges confronting SADC and the possibilities of its future success as a security management platform.

It seems possible to study the changes confronting SADC in a similar manner in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is currently being assessed in terms of its future roles. NATO was originally strengthened by the existence of the Soviet threat. Now that the Cold War is over, questions emerge regarding its future management trends and challenges. Concerns with the declining economies and growing population creates pressure for alleviating deteriorating situations all over the world. In a similar manner, SADC was formed as a response to the ensuing threat of the then aggressive South Africa. With the post-apartheid South Africa, the unifying factor among the founder members remains to be redefined.

A. ORIGINS OF SADC

The first SADC meeting was held at Arusha, Tanzania in July, 1979, aimed at harmonizing development plans and reducing the region’s economic dependence on South Africa, resulting in nine (9) member countries from southern Africa
signing a treaty.\textsuperscript{26} SADC came into existence mainly because of South Africa's attempts in 1979 to exploit her comparative advantage in the economic field by advocating a regional grouping in which local states could benefit from combined economic pursuits. The proposed grouping, a "Constellation of Southern African States" (CONSAS), was to become fully operational with South Africa playing a pivotal role (Jaster, 1980, p.33).

The strategic thinking behind the creation of CONSAS replicated the Warsaw Pact interactions, which were a series of bilateral treaties with Moscow at the center, an arrangement that did not hamper "fraternal" socialist military policy (Grundy, 1986, p.86). Similarly, neighboring states would be restricted to the provisions of CONSAS (favorable to the Pretoria regime), without altering the military supremacy of South Africa. Although the chief architect of CONSAS, Foreign Minister Pik Botha emphasized economic rather than political interaction among the members, the neighboring states were skeptical about the ulterior motives underlying such a grouping. Adding to their skepticism was their familiarity with the possibility of military reprisals from South Africa in the event that any member could be "reasonably" interpreted to be invoking the provisions of CONSAS.

\textsuperscript{26} For further discussion of the principles underlying the formation of SADC, refer to SADC: THEME DOCUMENT (1992).
From the perspective of the regional states, CONSAS was an economic weapon intended to consolidate white minority rule through coercive diplomatic arrangements which were to be honored by all the members. Because of the overriding preoccupation with political gains, South Africa emphasized the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of individual members as stipulated in the U.N. Charter under Article 2(7). The guidelines of the grouping deliberately distanced themselves from making any specific references to the application of enforcement measures provided for under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.\(^\text{27}\)

Realizing the danger inherent in CONSAS, regional states created SADC as an alternative to CONSAS. South Africa advocated interdependence, while other regional states chose to embark upon a strategy of dependency reduction. SADC was thus a clear case of regional balancing.\(^\text{28}\) While it was clear to SADC member states that they were inviting military reprisals (destabilisation could work either way) by refusing

---

\(^{27}\) Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter provides regional organizations under the umbrella of the U.N. to pursue measures which are in line with the maintenance of international peace and security. Reading Article 2(7) in isolation was a deliberate move intended to promote the interests of the South African government. For an elaborate discussion of the abovementioned Articles, see Bennett (1991, p. 437 & pp. 447-448).

\(^{28}\) Balancing is a situation where weaker states form their own alliance against the preponderant power while bandwagoning prevails when weaker states join the side of their adversary. For an elaborate discussion of the two notions, see Walt (1987).
to join hands with South Africa, they were largely driven by the fear of the South African hegemonic role in CONSAS.

B. OVERVIEW ON SADC

Prior to the establishment of SADC, there was the Frontline movement, that was largely functional in political terms. In contrast, SADC managed to impact upon the fragmented and individualistic approach to widespread regional concerns through concerted efforts towards managing resources. At its inception, SADC deliberately restricted itself to the economic sphere without any specific references to political or military goals. The Committee avoided the unintended problems of creating a tense mood in which South Africa could easily conclude that the operations of the organization were a direct provocation levelled against her. However, with the improving political situation at the end of the Cold War when the pressure for democracy was undoubtedly becoming difficult for the Pretoria regime to suppress, SADC redefined its integration mechanisms, envisaging a cooperating and friendly South Africa.

It is not in the scope of this thesis to venture into a detailed examination of the past successes and failures of SADC in the economic field (quantitatively). The reduction of dependency on South Africa was a strategic move fashioned on the management of resources. However, there has been a noticeable improvement in the economic performance of
individual countries attributable to the existence of SADC. In accordance with the collective regional stability concerns, the organization has made a tremendous achievement. More than anything else, the greatest success has been in creating a regional identity and a sense of a common destiny among the ten member States (SADCC, 1992, p.3).

1. Management Pattern

Because of the wide areas to be covered in an attempt to maximize benefits from the available resources throughout the entire region, the architects of SADC embarked upon sectoral responsibilities which were divided among the individual members. The allocation of respective sectoral responsibilities was based on the type of resources traceable to individual members and their potential capabilities in a given area. However, all members were expected to contribute significantly to the overall goal of harmonizing the resources held by individual members for the benefit of the entire region. Individual sectoral responsibilities were purely intended to serve as coordination mechanisms harnessing the efforts of the members as a way of encouraging complimentary relationships. Sectoral allocations were conducted as follows: Angola (energy); Botswana (crop research and animal disease control); Zambia (development fund and mining); Tanzania (industry); Malawi (fisheries, forestry, and wildlife); Zimbabwe (food security); Mozambique (transport and
communication; Lesotho (soil conservation and land utilization); and Swaziland (manpower). 29

The most important assumption underlying these allocations was to help individual members to develop the respective resource capacities and alleviate problems peculiar to their geographical location with the ultimate goal of interdependence. For example, Botswana has been one of the important beef producers (South Africa excluded), hence the need to assign the sectoral responsibility which enhances her already available capability. In a similar vein, Lesotho as an undulating and mountainous country has always had problems of maximizing food production under difficult conditions of severe soil erosion. Exposure to combined regional efforts has been a remarkable effort towards addressing the problems confronting individual members.

The selective nature of the allocations should not be used to judge the potential resources of all the members. It was rather a matter of devising a management technique for purposes of the smooth running of the organization. The tourist industry is one area in which most of these countries derive their national income. They continue to manage individual industries at national levels, though acknowledging

29. For details see Maasdorp (1985). Namibia was not part of the initial allocations since she had not attained her independence then. With her transition to independence in 1990, she became the tenth member, leaving South Africa as the only non-participant.
their allegiance to SADC. Zimbabwe is currently debating whether to reduce her large elephant population for control purposes and environmental preservation. This is one decision which does not fall specifically under the jurisdiction of SADC but has implications for the regional cooperation.

2. Funding for SADC

The most crucial question facing SADC has been funding its operations. Most of the economic pressures confronting individual members made the process of releasing a substantial amount of financial assets towards the organization a difficult one. Funding for projects has been obtained from donors, international agencies and individual countries (Maasdorp, 1985, p.93). The impact of financial limitations has not been felt severely partly because there was a sense of shared purpose among the members, thus making it difficult for them to differ so openly as to prejudice their unity against South Africa. With the South African democratization and the end of the Cold War, there exists now, a possibility for a notable negative shift in attitudes towards funding for SADC.

The need to ensure that the region was stable and worked efficiently towards the eradication of apartheid provided a strong incentive for donor agencies to release their funds towards the operations of the anti-apartheid SADC. The recent downfall of the pro-apartheid government leaves the
region in a dilemma regarding further assistance from former donors. This situation is aggravated by the fact that, in the post-Cold War era, government elites and publics seek to divert expenditure from foreign policy and security to long postponed domestic, economic and social needs (MacFarlane & Weiss, 1992). Similarly, there exists a strong possibility that the former donors will focus on the economies of former communist countries in Eastern Europe (Nathan, 1992, p.55) and (Zaffiro, 1992, p.66). In terms of infrastructural developments and the possibilities of guaranteed cash flows, Eastern Europe undoubtedly offers better investment opportunities.

With these possibilities, the need for managing regional security now falls squarely on the shoulders of the very regional actors. The new era is such that southern African countries should become true protagonists in managing security related affairs to ensure that they suppress even the seemingly insignificant differences likely to prompt an undesirable trend of escalating defense expenditure. This will lead to a situation where the limited resources are released towards other areas which have not been addressed in a long time due to the volatile security context.

C. THE U.N OR SADC?

There are no doubts regarding the superior capabilities of the world government over those of regional organizations. In
fact this is a reality which sovereign states themselves have long acknowledged by joining the U.N. and allowing the decisions reached by the latter to take precedence over their sovereignty on those occasions when they deem dilution of sovereignty to be in their interest.

The crucial point is not one of supremacy, but rather how the two should operate together in order to manage peace as an indivisible entity. In all these changing relations at the global level, regional organizations are will most probably become an indispensable phenomenon in world peace and security management. While these organizations vary greatly in terms of capabilities, their comparative advantages lie in their ability to mediate, cultural affinity among members (not in their logistics or military) and perhaps even more significant their preventive diplomacy roles. The usefulness of SADC comes in as the only regional grouping currently capable of diversifying its responsibilities in order to undertake this mammoth task in southern Africa.

It seems possible to suggest that where a goal of congruence exists between two entities like the U.N. and SADC, a "blending theory" remains as the most reasonable approach to security management. The proposed "blending theory"

---

30. See Laurentti (1992) and Boutros-Ghali (1992). Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the U.N. elaborately lays out a detailed plan founded on three different notions; preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Boutros-Ghali harnesses regional organizations as major and indispensable players in his proposed future plan.
acknowledges the mutual co-existence and complementary interaction between the U.N. and various regional organizations. In this framework, regional groupings shall assume the role of the core because it is at their level where intense action takes place on a gradual and continuous basis. The U.N shall play a supervisory role i.e., providing an ongoing assessment of regional activities. Detailed programs of action should be conducted by the regional protagonists themselves, thus relieving the U.N. of the pressure of addressing its lengthy agendas. The two must necessarily operate complementarily because they have the same goal, namely, maintenance of peace and stability. Where prospects for regionalism exist, they must be encouraged because without such possibilities (such as in Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia), mediation by the U.N. becomes a difficult process. The proposed solution to security management takes into account the limitations of the U.N.

1. Limitations of the U.N.

In as much as debates continue about the weaknesses confronting regional organizations, the U.N. has limitations ranging from its enforcement capabilities, impartiality, financial and procedural. The latter includes such as the power of veto which has always been the source of dissatisfaction among the disadvantaged members. Using this procedure, permanent members of the Security Council can
easily debilitate the U.N. whenever they feel it is in their best interest. This provides an incentive to the ordinary members of the U.N. to address their concerns through regional organizations. In the changing global environment, sovereign considerations are becoming increasingly polarized with the multiple economic problems emerging lately. As a gathering of sovereign states, what the U.N. does depends on the common ground that they create between themselves (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p.1). The world government cannot therefore attempt to operate in a sphere which does not accord the notion of "sovereignty" the attention it deserves. By the same token, the U.N. cannot direct a lot of attention to sovereign issues since such a focus is likely to be prejudicial to its major function of overseeing the activities of the overall sovereign states.

SADC is a case in point in which mediation in issues relating to sovereign interests has been conducted at a regional level. After redefining its mission in 1992, the Committee established a tribunal to arbitrate in case of disputes between members arising from its treaty. The use of this tribunal will most probably be extended to defusing matters which verge on sovereign and regional questions. One such matter arose in 1992 between Namibia and Botswana over the ownership of the Sedudu Island in the northern part of Botswana. In what many viewed as a potentially explosive sovereign issue, the two countries, largely because of their
perceived mutual benefits, have appointed a joint commission to resolve the matter through peaceful means, thus relieving the OAU and the U.N. of the burden. The importance of regional players in resolving this matter is necessitated by the fact even where the U.N. has to arbitrate in a matter such as this one, it will still rely on the familiarity and input of the regional protagonists themselves.

The sensitivity of the current and foreseeable patterns of security-related debates requires nation states to be the primary custodians of their own peace. It has been historically proven that leaving such a thorny institution in the hands of outside parties often gives rise to the "principal-agent" dilemma.31 Policymakers can only be aware of the impact of their administration regarding national and regional security if they are to become actively involved in regionwide concerns. In view of the impending dilemma, the incentive for decentralization on the part of the U.N. remains valid.

31. The principal versus agent dilemma is commonly applied in economics as a description of a situation where employees in a given firm, especially managers (agents), pursue their own goals at the expense of the profits anticipated by the firm (employees). See Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1992). In the context of this paper, the U.N. or any security guarantor, plays the role of the agents in regional security management while the pledging countries will represent the principal. Complications are most likely to accrue where the anticipated security assistance is not realized, possibly out of circumstances beyond the operating capabilities of the U.N/security guarantor at a given time.
Decentralization is further necessitated by the ever diminishing financial contributions to the U.N. by its members. Because of the "free-riding" propensity, in the past nation states failed to make contributions while at the same time enjoying the benefits from a "central pool" at the expense of others. An increasing number of countries are likely to hold back their contributions towards the operations of the U.N. since the justification for increased military expenditure has become questionable amidst widespread inflation problems. In this regard, the operating capabilities of the U.N. have become increasingly problematic. At the receiving end, are the former beneficiaries from the spill-over benefits of the Cold War, those countries compelled to remake their budgets in order to survive the challenges of the "new U.N.", which does not offer any hopes of overcoming its financial difficulties. What remains questionable is the manner and the extent to which most of the former recipients of the aid are going to adjust and choose some possible avenues which will truly alleviate the situation.

One of the possible options available to security managers is to utilize regional organizations as responsibility centers. Managers (represented by policymakers and other high ranking officials) will be held

---

32. For an elaborate discussion of responsibility centers as a cost accounting technique, see Deakin & Maher (1991, p. 869).
accountable for the resources and operations of their respective sectors. In a decentralized U.N., various regions serving as responsibility centers will provide a strong incentive for working within their budgetary constraints. In the past, costs have been approached in a fragmented manner where individual countries did not coordinate their security efforts jointly, a factor which would have most probably led to reduced military expenditure. Within a given region, costs would be monitored carefully, creating an obligation on the part of groupings to seek cost-effective methods of security management and defraying the underlying costs accordingly. Economic difficulties of the 1990s and beyond 2000 continue to shatter any further possibilities of unilateral action or explicit assistance programs. Where the responsibility to promote a stable region is shouldered collectively by regional actors, in which they shall, inter alia, be sensitive to costs, it seems possible that such arrangements will give a fresh impetus to the interpretation and challenges of security management.

Financial considerations aside, the U.N. Charter does not make any specific references regarding explicit enforcement prerogatives to compel regional organizations to redress their potential sources of conflict. Operating on the principle of goodwill and, sometimes, the respect for sovereign rights, the U.N. can only go as far as supporting actions which in the realm of international peace and security
are deemed as essential efforts towards promoting stability. In implementing certain decisions, the U.N. tends to rely heavily on its implied power more than explicit and legitimate power, hence the fear to act ultra-vires the expected norms of international law. Similar problems exist at the level of regional organizations, though with one distinct attribute, the fact that respective members who are beneficiaries tend to have a stronger incentive for upholding decisions and influencing their quality. To this extent, the incentives for transforming SADC and utilizing it as a responsibility center remains a compelling if not an inescapable measure in the search for peace and security in the post-Cold War environment.

D. SOUTHERN AFRICA AND SADC?

With South Africa having joined SADC as the eleventh member, thus completing the regional process, the organization stands to redefine its goals. The major questions facing the entire region are: 1) the nature of interaction between the various members & in South Africa introducing her unparalleled economic might into the regional organization, or the possibility of the region reverting to the idea of a "constellation", 2) what happens if the government of national unity focusses more inward or internationally without much attention being given to immediate regional neighbors? 3) is it going to be possible to work towards a more equitable
distribution of benefits, and 4) given the foreseeable security-related problems and the defence posture, what role is South Africa likely to play, a hegemonic role or base her policies on the expectations of other SADC member states? These questions constitute the main area of focus within SADC and will most probably determine its success or failure.

Prior to the South African democratization, issues relating to equitable distribution of benefits among SADC members with diverse capabilities were deferred as a strategic move against South Africa. Unity against apartheid was the key regional concern and could not therefore be compromised easily. With the new South Africa, there is a serious call for revisiting the objectives of SADC. For example, regional military institutions must become transparent in order to create a sense of stability. However, dependency reduction will continue to be a major preoccupation among members with weaker economies. On strategic grounds, all countries need to work towards developing their respective economies. Their vulnerability before South Africa will continue diluting their capabilities in interacting with South Africa.

Policies, strategies and programs of economic development should be restructured in such a way that all countries of the region have a fair share of opportunities for investment, trade, employment creation, etc., (SADCC, 1992, p.5). In a similar manner, interdependence will be encouraged among the SADC member states as way of enhancing regional cooperation.
The asymmetrical economic capabilities of SADC member states against that of South Africa were compiled in 1989 as shown in Table I below:

**Table I. SADC COUNTRIES & SOUTH AFRICA--BASIC INDICATORS 1989**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC COUNTRIES</th>
<th>Pop. In millions</th>
<th>Area 000 (sq.km)</th>
<th>GNP/Cap US $</th>
<th>GDP US $ (bn)</th>
<th>Life Exp. (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>5,708</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>28.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>80.37</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most important factor which will largely determine the success of combined regional efforts is the role likely to be played by South Africa, the most serious and far-reaching alternative could be the one described below:
If the post apartheid government adopts nationalist, protectionist view of the region's political economy, the borders could be closed to foreign workers, the efforts of SADC states to disengage from South Africa's regional transport network, energy grid, and trade monopoly could be undercut, and the interests of the neighboring states could be subordinated to the narrowly defined interest of South Africa (Boyd, 1993, p.147).

The possibility of such an action can only be understood in the context of the government of national unity attempting to reverse the structural inequalities of apartheid in favor of the long oppressed victims of separate development. At the heart of apartheid was the maximization of economic benefits for the white population. Its end implies a change in the way South Africa will generate profits in future. The immediate policy consideration confronting the new South Africa is the attempt to address the problem of equitable distribution of social amenities and benefits in a manner congruent with the expectations of the citizenry. The success of statesmen will be largely assessed in terms of their ability to satisfy internal needs while at the same time responding to the delicacy of the economy and the interests of the neighbors.

On the other hand, there is moral argument emanating from the fact that surrounding states have borne much of the burden of apartheid all these years; should they bear the end of apartheid's burden as well (Boyd, 1992, p.147)? South Africa's neighbors have historically upheld policies intended to uproot apartheid and have consequently suffered destabilisation at the hands of the white-minority government. It seems possible
to argue that, despite these fears, there is a wide range of unifying factors between South Africa and her neighbors despite the fears associated with a nationalistic policy. The latter is absolutely necessary given the history of South Africa and will undoubtedly lead to a more stable South Africa in future. On justifiable grounds, an inward-oriented vision should not be thought of as driven by self-interest. Dissenting views should rather take into account the necessity for the nationalistic policy as a transition period despite its temporary disadvantages to the operations of SADC. It will most probably defer the envisaged economic benefits for the region, hopefully with a longterm benefit to the very region.

SADC's concern with the near term equitable distribution of benefits should not be allowed to take precedence over its ultimate goal of being a stable regional organization. Within the southern Africa subcontinent, precautions should be taken against any moves likely to jeopardize regionalism through an early and excessive emphasis on the economic benefits traceable to individual countries. A heavy but rewarding price has to be paid towards true regional integration, otherwise the subcontinent will revert to its old fragmented approach to regionwide problems.

In Europe, questions of equitable distribution of benefits have seriously threatened the creation of a common European market. While similar checks and balances are necessary in southern Africa, there is a need to proceed prudently given
the urgent need for combined regional efforts in many spheres. The exigency attributed to regional consolidation is currently taking precedence over the concern for equitable distribution of benefits (economic ends). Historically, the gravitational pull of the South African economy works to the detriment of the country during times of need when a lot of people move across the region in search of economic opportunities. To this end, South Africa needs a framework within which herself and the surrounding states can discuss these issues before they degenerate into security problems.

For the newly born post-apartheid South Africa to be fully integrated into SADC, her neighbors must have the advantage of discussing the enormity of her military inventory and arms control measures. Chances of discussing military related problems among the members will largely be determined by the willingness on the part of South Africa to introduce changes towards her use of the military. The only medium within which these problems can be addressed remains SADC.

E. INCENTIVES FOR REGIONAL COHESION

Despite the various questions emanating from the altered environment in southern Africa, there remains a wide range of variables in the regional context which increasingly draw the various states towards regionalism. As the world becomes a global village, practical realities are such that, unilateralism is not only anachronistic but arouses skepticism
among neighbors. The distinct nature of the geo-politics and commonality of interests provides a strong case for regionalism in southern Africa.

1. Geography and Size

The geography and size variables in the case of SADC have proved to be integral elements in the operation and cohesion of organization. The proximity of the members to the strife-torn South Africa played a crucial role in determining the composition of organizational membership. Owing to the clandestine nature of the South African struggle since 1963, when opposition parties were banned, the neighboring countries were directly brought into the struggle because the liberation movements saw them as a sanctuary from which they could wage their struggle against the regime. As it became clear that countries adjacent to South Africa were prime targets of the South African intelligence machinery, the liberation activists maneuvered deeper into the interior as far north as Zambia and more to eastern flank of the continent, around the vicinity of Tanzania.

During the systematic searches for refugees, all countries in the subcontinent were subjected to "collective punishment" and scrutiny by the South Africa government in an attempt to thwart their collaboration against apartheid. It was this very setup which provided the criterion for size and membership. No country outside this "destabilisation
"perimeter" was willing to expose its citizenry to the perpetual threats of the South African military machinery by expressing explicit interests in joining SADC.

The vulnerability of southern Africa to prolonged droughts has also played a significant part in forcibly bringing the region together. The catastrophic droughts which attack the region on a frequent basis have a distinct pattern of decimating the entire subcontinent on a uniform basis, thus forcing the countries into concerted efforts in the face of the ecological calamities which serve as an "invisible hand" in fostering collective norms. Because of similar economic difficulties in the northern part of the continent (see Figure. 5), the victims of droughts in southern Africa do not have alternatives but to work together within their region to address the problems.

The mindsets of policymakers across the entire region are guided by an interplay of factors largely driven by the strategic location. Unlike other regional organizations whose members are dispersed over a given continent or from separate continents, SADC is different in the sense that it is responsive to problems arising from its immediate environment. As a sharp contrast, NATO is spread over two continents and was brought together by the Soviet threat. Valuable lessons can be learned from possible NATO success in bringing together its geographically dispersed members in the face of current sentiments about revitalizing economies. Geographical
dispersion and distance can either dilute the sensitivity to certain intrinsic factors. The willingness to be adequately responsive to regional problems is partially a function of the proximity factor.

2. Commonality of Interests

SADC member states are brought together by a number of different factors which are largely propelled by history. A substantial part of the population in the subcontinent belongs to one large African family known as the Bantu-speaking people. They share cultural ties and a common outlook emanating from their history. One of the most significant unifying factors has been the desire to reconstruct their economic and political institutions after the withdrawal of the colonial masters. The newly born post-apartheid South Africa is no exception to this inclination. The long awaited day on which regional efforts could be truly harmonized, has finally come. What remains to be done is the implementation of regional programs without the obstacle of racialism.

3. Inclusiveness

As history unfolded, practical realities tended to depict SADC as an organization capable of contributing remarkably towards the search for peace and security in the region. While SADC did not spell out explicitly initially, the role to be played by South Africa, it simultaneously accorded the liberation movements a recognition status. Consequently,
SADC gained indirect support from within South Africa because of its pursuit of ideals which diluted the preponderant capabilities of the Pretoria regime. Regional interdependence and the dilemma of fighting for legitimacy by the white-minority government converged to ensure that the limitations generally associated with lack of inclusiveness did not hamper the operating capabilities of SADC. With the transition to a multiracial society in South Africa and common regional concerns, it seems the incentives for integrating mechanisms to harness the efforts of SADC and create channels for a recognizable and binding forum will strengthen the aspect of inclusiveness within SADC.

4. Redefining the Balancing Strategy?

In the past the major preoccupation of regional actors was to balance (militarily, politically, and economically) against South Africa. The dilemmas confronting the Pretoria regime, especially the need to consolidate its power and the desire to gain internal, regional and international recognition saw the success of the SADC balancing strategy that emphasized diplomacy rather than conventional and superior weaponry. Despite the apparent changes, the security dilemmas associated with the enormity of South African military will continue to be a source of insecurity for her
neighbors. The strategic location of South Africa (situated at the southern tip of the continent where the Atlantic and Indian oceans meet) precludes her from addressing her defence posture without "due regard" of her naval (and inherent economic) interests from which the very neighbors are beneficiaries.

Against this background, the notion of balancing must necessarily be redefined within the broad parameters of a regional approach to security while at the same time acknowledging the sensitivity of all the players to certain changes and the aggregate effect on future regional security patterns. Depending on the careful manipulation of the politics of self-interest, the South African defense posture remains critical to the overall latent capabilities of the region.

5. Population and Environmental Questions

As southern Africa inevitably progresses towards replicating the Malthusian Theory of Scarcity, environmental management becomes one of the crucial channels available for responding to the challenges of the uncontrolled population

33. The notion of security dilemma operates on the principle that, whatever a country does to defend itself creates a sense of insecurity on the neighbor's side, thus encouraging retaliatory measures from the "threatened party". For an elaborate discussion of this notion, see Jervis (1978).
growth. In most SADC member states, population growth rates have been well above economic growth rates (SADC, 1992, p.12). As resources in different countries get depleted, southern Africa will increasingly become an arena in which illegal border crossings will be rampant. There has been a disturbing trend since the mid-1980s in which "environmental refugees" lured by comparatively successful economies in the neighboring countries have continued to find their way into countries with relatively self-reliant and stable economies. This phenomenon is not peculiar to southern Africa alone. Advanced economies like the U.S. one, have a magnetic effect which make the country vulnerable to invasion by "environmental refugees". For example, the U.S. is currently facing dilemmas in distinguishing between political and environmental refugees (or economic refugees) from the neighboring Haiti. See Figure 5.

Southern Africa in particular faces a potential threat from the problem of imbalanced economies, the effects of which are increasingly becoming a difficult reality to be treated in unilateral terms. Complaints about border violations

---

34. The economist, Thomas Malthus asserts that human hardship is unavoidable because human population grows geometrically when unconstrained, while food production can only grow arithmetically, see (Malthus, 1770).

35. The notion of "environmental refugees" has been used by Thomas Homer-Dixon to distinguish between refugees bred by political upheavals and those who are products of severe economic hardships, see Homer-Dixon, (1991).
manifesting themselves through entering countries at ungazetted points as a result of ecologically driven problems are becoming an indispensable feature of regional life. The large numbers of elephants in Botswana have started creating
problems since they attract poachers throughout the entire region. Since Botswana derives a significant amount of her national income from the tourist industry, it has become a nationwide concern about the need to protect wildlife and other endangered species in the face of scarcity and increasing poaching, hence the diversion of the military into wildlife protection duties. While this approach remains the only course available for now, the use of the military in overcoming such problems in the future is likely to instill a sense of insecurity among the neighbors. The need for joint efforts in managing these diminishing resources and alleviating poaching becomes more compelling than it was the case in the past.

In a similar vein, the South African economy has continued, through its gravitational pull, to attract a lot of environmental refugees. Since the past decade, population migration routes are leading into South Africa.

One disturbing and foreseeable side effect of these patterns of migration is their likely impact especially that they are targeting a country whose citizenry has been denied a wide range of benefits from in their own land through apartheid. The ethnic cleavages which have become so entrenched in South Africa (more than her neighbors) will most probably be revived once the locals face the challenges for limited resources.
Should the politics of self-interest be allowed to overshadow regionalism, then the very ecological dilemmas will eventually transform themselves into lively sources of conflict, enough to destabilize the entire region. Under such circumstances, three different types of conflicts are most likely to happen as a result of environmental problems: 1) simple scarcity conflicts which we would expect when state actors calculate their interests in a zero-sum or negative-sum situation such as might arise from resource scarcity, 2) group-identity conflicts arising from the large-scale movements of populations brought about by environmental change, and 3) relative-deprivation conflicts founded on the assumption that as developing societies produce less wealth because of environmental problems, their citizens will probably become increasingly discontented because of the widening gap between their actual level of economic achievement and the level they feel they deserve (Homer-Dixon, 1991, pp.106-9).

Given the vulnerability of most regional economies to the conflicts described above, it is worth stressing the importance of a regional approach to environmental problems because no country in the region is an exception to the widespread ecological changes. South Africa, the regional economic giant, has water sources far less than the post-2000 needs. She will therefore require substantial imports, thus creating an obligation to negotiate more equitable downstream
user rights with Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, South Africa’s interests also extend to the energy sector in which SADC has a comparative advantage (Chipasula, 1993, p.159). This is one instance in which ecology will foster interaction mechanisms regardless of ideological differences or border restrictions.

Movement across the borders within one region will have to be addressed on the basis of consensual checks and balances since a wide range of problems are increasingly difficult to contain within the borders of one unique nation state. Such an approach has become an imperative in southern Africa as already evidenced in the observation by Olson & Stedman (1993):

Even the resolution of violent conflict can have negative spillover effects on regional security. During the ceasefire in Angola in 1992, weapons experts noted that the Angolan weapons were being sold in South Africa. A sizable cross-border trade in AK-47s has developed from Mozambique back into South Africa, fuelling violence in Natal and the Vaal triangle. Such developments show that conflict resolution cannot be based solely within nations, but must take into account the larger region as a whole (p.420).

SADC, the current regional resource management platform, remains the only vehicle with the capabilities of assisting policymakers in manoeuvering within the entire region without fears of being accused of promoting sovereign interests

\textsuperscript{36} See \textit{Africa Contemporary Record}(1989).
instead of concerted regional efforts.

6. Military Security

Perhaps the most important aspect of cohesion in the new southern African environment is military security. The role played by the military has not only been costly in the face of threats from the Pretoria regime but has also become an inseparable source of broad policy decisions aimed at bringing about peace and security in the entire region. According Olson and Stedman, (1993), in assessing the past and future role of military security in the region, policymakers must necessarily acknowledge the following reality:

Southern Africa today lacks three kinds of institutions that might counteract interstate conflict: first, there are no formal crisis prevention, crisis management or conflict resolution mechanisms or institutions on the level of the region as a whole; second, there are no formalized regional confidence-building measures (CBM) in the military arena; and third, no process exists towards substantially reducing force levels, military arsenals and military expenditure (with the exceptions as yet not effectuated, personnel cutbacks in Angola and Mozambique, as stipulated in the respective peace accords) (p.423).

The ensuing security dilemma and its underlying costs will be aggravated across the region if the situation continues as one in which there is no framework within which to address the force levels. In a similar vein, the region has now come to contribute troops towards U.N. peacekeeping operations without any specific guidelines governing the levels and nature of inputs. Given the possibility of increased U.N operations in
future (not only within the region itself) concerted efforts are needed to redress these imbalances and integrate the diverse efforts towards a common goal, measures which could eventually contribute remarkably towards reducing unnecessary overhead expenditure.

F. TOWARD A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF SECURITY

The diversity and interrelatedness of problems in post-Cold War era are such that the past interpretations of the concept of security are narrowly defined and therefore likely to be prejudicial to the study and management of peace in future. According to Nathan (1993), in the past, the concept of security was interpreted by statesmen as follows:

The conventional approach views security primarily in terms of preserving sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the state. Threats to security are seen mainly in military terms, and the chief sources of threat are construed as other states, though internal opposition may figure prominently. The dominant response to perceived challenges is in turn the threat or use of force (p.46).

The new thinking which is increasingly making its impact felt has the advantage of being less militaristic and state-centric, viewing "security" as a holistic phenomenon which is not restricted to military matters but broadened to
incorporate political, social and environmental issues.\textsuperscript{37} This approach should not only be restricted to nation states but should be extended to regional and global levels.

The advantages of such an encompassing approach to problems which are not unique to any particular nation state, but are diverse, far-reaching and cannot be exhausted:

1. Reducing the possibility of armed conflict fuelled by the "security dilemma".

2. Encouraging the transparency of military institutions between neighbors and further inducing an atmosphere conducive to complimentary interactions.

3. Opening more channels in which senior military officials exchange ideas with their civilian counterparts in order to seek cost-effective methods of utilizing the diminishing resources.

4. Reorienting the training of military forces and making them adaptable to the prevailing set of conditions within the entire globe (e.g guidelines of peacekeeping operations), for use at regional and international levels.

5. Creating an obligation towards a holistic (or multidisciplinary) approach to security, and awareness among policymakers from a wide range of decision-making fora, especially where neighbors are (intentionally or not) engaged in interstate exchanges.

6. A much clearer approach to resource capabilities, establishing ground rules for potential utility will necessarily be realized for the benefit of all. For logical reasons, in a multiparty negotiations, the parties themselves will incur costs unless they are being conducted under agency auspices (Gray, 1989, p.73).

\textsuperscript{37} For details, see Nathan (1993). Additional studies elaborating on the broadened concept of security and relating the importance of environmental factors with particular emphasis on their potential to act as future sources of conflict are Ulman (1983), Homer-Dixon (1991) and Obasanjo (1993).
Perhaps one of the most important historical episodes which is an indicator of problems likely to emanate from environmental questions in as far as they impinge upon the security of all mankind is the difficulty experienced in ratifying the "Law of the Sea." Self-interest and diverse claims make it difficult for statesmen to compromise and address the problem in a different fashion other than the zero-sum type of approach. In the meantime, the importance of ocean resources in as far as being looked upon as potential sources of national wealth has become an overriding concern.

Only the broadened concept of security management under the auspices of collective efforts is capable of relating the potential future threat scenarios to the present set of circumstances and provide a sense of direction as to the feasible actions needed for conflict prevention. The initial building block has been established in Africa during the early years of this decade during the Kampala Conference:

In May 1991 over 500 participants from Africa and other parts of the world met in Kampala, Uganda, to deliberate on the issue of security, stability, development, and cooperation in Africa. This was the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDA) process modeled on the Helsinki process, but with African realism. The resultant Kampala Document stipulated that peace, security, and stability are interrelated; further they are the preconditions and the basis for development and cooperation in Africa. The security, stability, and development of African states are inseparably interlinked; the erosion of security and stability is a major cause of the continuing crises and a main impediment to economic growth and human development on the continent (Obasanjo, 1993, p.202).
The necessary steps to be taken in the southern Africa context should be geared towards relating the recommendations contained in the Kampala Document and manipulating them to suit the regional circumstances. With the foreseeable trends of interaction and the evolving perceptions of security, SADC must diversify its resource management to encompass other security related aspects. It is almost impossible to adopt an approach which harmonizes the utilization of resources without acknowledging their relationship with future conflict. The heightening concern about increasing military budgetary trends cannot be reversed unless a truly broad understanding of the notion of security is encouraged.

The nature of Southern Africa geo-politics makes regionalism an important security management alternative. The interstate exchanges founded on the proximity and cultural factors discussed so far present a strong case for regionalism. With the new set of regional challenges, it seems a multilateral approach to security management in the subcontinent will become an increasing phenomenon.
Despite the recent transition to democracy in South Africa, certain factors about Botswana remain unaltered. The fundamental factor which has played a crucial role in determining Botswana's policy choices in the past, the geo-strategic position, will continue to have a profound impact on internal security affairs. Presumably, the country stands to gain in a number of security-related spheres as South Africa changes. On the same note, Botswana will continue to suffer from spill-over problems deriving from her location. "Cognizance must also be taken to the fact that political change and transition is seldom unaccompanied by instability and political violence (du Plessis & Hough, 1992, p.123).

With South Africa having recently joined the non-aligned movement, OAU and looking forward to being inaugurated as the eleventh member of SADC, the political gap which historically existed between the government of Botswana and other regional members on the one hand, and the South African white-minority gap is being closed. The far-reaching implication of this change is that it is going to be difficult for Botswana to treat matters prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and stability in South Africa as being purely outside her own jurisdiction. For her survival, Botswana will most probably
face the difficulty of becoming an active participant in the complicated but rewarding process of reversing the structural inequalities of apartheid in South Africa.

A. Dismantling Apartheid

After three hundred (300) years of apartheid rule in South Africa, the new government of national unity faces the difficult and multifaceted task of creating a true pluralistic democracy in which the benefits are shared equally. Owing to the politics of separate development (apartheid), the African population was relegated to the least desirable position when social amenities were distributed, consequently it has suffered in the following key areas: employment opportunities, health care, food security, education, judicial treatment and other societal departments. For example, the Bantu education, tailored specifically the African population, did not receive equal governmental attention and funding compared to its "superior" counterpart, education for the white population. The result has been a noticeable trend in which the rates of illiteracy among the African population were increasing.

Notwithstanding the measures articulated in the program of action of the new government, there remains dilemmas inherent in redressing these imbalances: 1) where and how to start given the fact that these problems were not uniform and the response to the limited offers from the Nationalist Party were utilized in varying degrees, and 2) the overall response of
the citizenry, weighing the actual governmental measures against the expected. Related to the second dilemma is the fact that these measure are being implemented in a fragile and changing environment which is still rooted in a society with ethnic cleavages, hence the intriguing question of the possibility of a civil war or any form of turbulence associated with the transition period.

A strategy which emphasizes the welfare of the long oppressed "minority groups" is inherently controversial in that it calls to question the nature of democracy and the principle of equality in the eyes of the former beneficiaries from the apartheid system. On the same note, a strategy which leans more towards "equitable distribution" of amenities to all citizens without due regard to history is likely to generate dissatisfaction among the former victims of apartheid.

The complexity inherent in this process lies in the ability to integrate the diverse and historically conflicting "publics" within South Africa. To overcome these dilemmas, the orientation within the country should develop such that the diverse groups become a single and unified society in which ethnicity questions are downplayed for the sake of progress, otherwise the process of harmonizing efforts will lend itself to one in which the economy of the country is placed in jeopardy, a scenario which is not in the best interest of South Africa and her neighbors whose chances of economic
The participation of the neighboring states is largely due to the fact that South Africa is now and will continue to be the economic colossus of the region (Boyd, 1993, p.151). In this regard, the strategic and corporate interests of Botswana compel her (and other regional states) to be sensitive to any moves within South Africa likely to endanger peace and stability.

B. REINVENTING THE SADF

One of the most important and pertinent questions vital to Botswana’s survival with respect to her proximity to South Africa revolves around the ability of the former to reinvent her military. The necessity is further prompted by circumstances germane to political change. Unlike many military institutions across the world which are strengthened to counter external threats, the SADF was developed to its current levels largely for foiling the internal struggle. The victimization of the regional neighbors through the grand strategies, the total strategy and total onslaught, were not as important as the internal role of the armed forces. Within and across the borders of South Africa, the SADF has a historical stigma of being an instrument of oppression. It has been difficult to draw proper lines of distinction between the military and its sister department, the police forces. The two have been used on an alternative basis for "law enforcement" tasks.
Now that the old internal threat has faded away, the new government must necessarily make choices regarding what has to be upheld for continuity purposes. Consistent with the altered environment are the changing threat perceptions which create additional pressure for redefining the roles and missions of the armed forces. In the post-Cold War environment in which clear and distinct global threats are yet to be determined, it seems South Africa will have to commit her armed forces towards patrolling the Atlantic and Indian Oceans because of their increasing strategic significance, shifting the focus from inside. Apart from the crucial question of depoliticizing the SADF, broad defense policy considerations within South Africa must focus on the following processes: 1) redefining the roles and missions of different services, 2) restructuring, downsizing and integration of armed forces, the former homelands armies (part of the SADF military machinery) must be dissolved for purposes of a single a unified national army, and 3) building the notion of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry through the goal of improving civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{38} Apart from reducing the large share allocated the military and further reversing the opportunity cost associated with defense spending, the structural changes have some far-reaching implications for

\textsuperscript{38} For a detailed discussion of the measures to be taken in the broad process of reinventing the SADF, see Williams (1993).
Botswana (as a regional microcosm) in terms of broad policy choices.

While the rebuilding of the SADF has been one of the critical policy initiatives cherished by Botswana, it does not seriously alter matters relating to military security. Perhaps the most important and favorable changes are in the area of lessening the notion of "security dilemma". For a long time, military security in Botswana was addressed within the parameters of threats posed by South Africa and can only be altered on the basis of the latter implementing necessary changes in the military arena and creating a stable. One further manifestation of restructuring armed forces is the likelihood of reducing escalating defense expenditure. For as long as South Africa retains her present preponderant capabilities, diversion of resources from the military within Botswana remains less feasible.

On the other hand, the elaborate process of reinventing the military in South Africa does not imply that Botswana should alter significantly the roles and missions of the armed forces, namely, counter-insurgency and counter-penetration. Again, the geo-strategic location of Botswana vis-a-vis the gravitational pull of the South African economy renders the country a stepping ground into South Africa. As migration problems deepen, South Africa is likely to intensify patrols to curtail illegal crossings into her borders. This move will leave Botswana as an accumulation point for parties migrating
from the northern part of the continent drifting southwards, thus creating further security problems. Given these challenges, Botswana can only reduce the magnitude of her past military roles if her neighbors are willing to be equally involved in these regional dilemmas through concerted efforts and dialogue, otherwise, a complete change will most probably place the country in jeopardy.

C. REGIONALISM OR NATIONALISM?

In the past Botswana played a crucial role in the elaborate process of integrating her regional neighbors. The strategic reasoning behind such a strong commitment towards the usefulness of regionalism in addressing a wide range of problems remains vital to Botswana’s interests. With the rapidly diversifying regional security concerns, the need to promote a sense of unity among neighbors will most probably become an indispensable measure for Botswana to survive.

Given the vulnerability of Botswana to various external forces, there are serious limits to which the country can attempt to adopt a nationalistic policy in dealing with matters which have serious ramifications for regional stability. Nationalistic approaches should continue being evaluated against their likely impact on the tempo of regional and international politics prevailing at a given time. As a product of concerted international efforts, Botswana has the obligation of continuing to play a pivotal role in
accomplishing goals which will create cohesion among her neighbors. The essence of such a role is further enhanced by the fact that the long awaited South African transition to democracy has opened paths for regionalism to be practiced for the benefit of all.
IX. CONCLUSION

Given the past difficulties under which Botswana found herself as a result of her geo-strategic location, it seems the measures adopted by the government in maximizing influence in the region will still remain applicable in future. Botswana’s security functions in a volatile security context in which proximity related factors play a crucial role. Located right at the center of the subcontinent, the country faces the inescapable obligation to continue contributing remarkably towards regional amalgamation. The use of military security will, however, remain subservient to diplomacy. The incentives for regionalism discussed so far can enhance the security of Botswana considerably. This is largely due to the fact that the country’s geo-strategic location has worked its disadvantage in the past and will remain one of the crucial determinants of foreign policy.

The increasing pressures for domestic developments across the region call for concerted efforts in managing security i.e., adopting an approach based on the broadened concept of security in which regional neighbors will most probably assist each other. Such an approach is becoming increasingly desirable as regional states are perpetually confronted by socio-economic, military, political and environmental problems.
The need to divert resources from defense spending into various domestic projects in southern Africa must necessarily be a collective effort which can only be achieved through an open dialogue regarding military institutions in the region. Failure to do so will most probably call to question the efforts towards economic and political stability in the region.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Williams, R., "The Institutional Restructuring of the South African Armed Forces" Strategic Review For Southern

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Defense Technical Information Center</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameron Station</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Library, Code 52</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Professor Thomas Bruneau, Code NS/Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Professor Susan Hocevar, Code SM/Hc</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Systems Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Professor Roger Evered, Code SM/Ev</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Systems Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Professor David Whipple, Jr, Code SM/Wp</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Systems Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Professor John Arquilla, Code SM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of National Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monterey, California 93943-5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The Commander</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Bag X06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaborone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Mabe Gaborone
Botswana Defence Force Air Arm
Private Bag Xll
Gaborone
Botswana
Southern Africa