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ABSTRACT

THE IMPRIMATUR OF EUROPE: TURKEY, EUROPEANIZATION, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The present study examines Turkey's efforts to fulfill one of its key national interests--Europeanization. Europeanization, for the Turks, implies Europe's acceptance and recognition of Turkey's self-professed European identity. Turkey seeks Europe's "imprimatur" through a number of strategies, but chiefly through its diplomatic efforts to join the European Union (EU) and its associated defense arm, the Western European Union (WEU). This paper examines other Turkish national interests in the 1990s as they impact on Turkey's Europeanization goal, and discusses the two main factors which have shaped Turkish diplomacy--state tradition and ideology. It concludes with a review of significant barriers to Turkey's admission to the EU, the EU's position on Turkey's accession, bilateral views of key EU members, and assessment of the likelihood of Turkey's admission in the coming decade.

Frederick Leo Baier
August 1994
THE IMPRIMATUR OF EUROPE: TURKEY, EUROPEANIZATION, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

by

Frederick Leo Baier

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations in the School of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno August 1994
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"The future of European unity can only be realised within its natural dimensions, which includes Turkey. A growing European culture and concept without Turkey cannot be envisaged."

Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, in a speech before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, 1993.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkey occupies a unique position among the world's nations. Like no other state, save Russia, Turkey borders on a wide diversity of political and geographic conditions. It is at the crossroads of continents, cultures, and civilizations, somewhere between East and West, North and South. Furthermore, Turkey itself abounds with complexity and dichotomy. Specific characterizations do not adequately describe the Turkish nation-state; it is a composite of many features. For example, Turkey can be characterized as Western and European, industrialized and modern, but not completely so; it is also Asian, Middle Eastern, and Muslim, but does not fit precisely into any of these categories.

Perhaps because of the natural difficulty in categorizing Turkey, its importance to Europe is occasionally overlooked by the casual observer. Broadly speaking, Turkey's value is primarily political and predominately a function of its geography. While the West's interests in Turkey are largely security-related, and while a certain reciprocity of interest exists on this score when Ankara considers it relations with the West and Europe, Ankara's economic relations with Western Europe are also significant and expanding.
The focus of this effort then, is to systematically outline, examine, and interpret the European orientation of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s. First, as we will see, the Turkish goal of complete political, legal, economic, and cultural inclusion in the European family of nations is the centerpiece of Turkish diplomacy and has some impact on every other area of significant concern. Turkey's interest is expressed in its desire to achieve full membership in the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) within the coming decade.

Turkey's drive towards Europe is a function of an interesting combination of ideology and pragmatism. It is a product of Ankara's ideological quest for recognition and legitimation of its European nature; for the imprimatur of Europe. At the same time, Ankara's European policies arise out of a long Turkish state tradition, one that precedes the Republic itself—a relatively pragmatic view of Turkey's national interests and how they can best be served.

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign policy is not uni-dimensional. Turkey has and will continue to have important interests in the Caucasus, the Middle East, and in Central Asia. These interests and the strategies supporting them also bear examination, but can only be addressed peripherally based on the limited scope of this study.

Two salient factors make Turkey's European foreign policies in the 1990s worth examining. First, Turkey is
situated adjacent to several conflict zones (the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans, Cyprus) that directly or indirectly affect Europe. As Turkish President Suleyman Demirel put it, "Turkey is in the middle of a triangle of ambiguity and instability." Further, Turkey is an active or peripheral party to several of these regional conflicts. As a member of the Western community located in an especially dynamic region, Turkey's diplomatic responses and initiatives are particularly important, not only regionally, but also globally, and therefore require closer inspection.

Second, with the end of the Cold War, the international environment is in the midst of a great change. This second factor, significant in its own right, nevertheless enhances the strategic significance of Turkey's geographic position for Europe. The end of the Cold War has unleashed dramatic changes throughout Asia and Europe and provoked crises and conflicts around the globe as the international system seeks to adjust to a new, yet undefined, equilibrium.

The new era, an interregnum of sorts, is typified by a quest for radically new definitions and relationships among nations and international organizations like the EU and NATO. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc, the resultant political changes, and new pressures of

nationalism have unbalanced traditional patterns of diplomacy and have introduced a new, and rather large, cast of international actors to the scene, many of whom border Turkey or figure strongly in Ankara's international calculations. In this period of redefinition and flux, an understanding of the impetus and direction of Turkey's European diplomatic agenda is critical to any appraisal of overall European goals in this new era, however broad or narrow that appraisal may be.

Outline

In terms of an outline, Chapters 2 through 5 offer the preliminaries. Chapter 2 attempts to define what appear to be Turkish national interests and their associated motives in the 1990s while Chapter 3 compares the strengths and weakness of the three major theoretical approaches to understanding foreign policy and then attempts to frame the discussion of Turkish Euro-oriented foreign policy within the realist perspective.

Chapter 4 briefly reviews Ottoman and Turkish state tradition with an eye towards understanding how Turkey has responded to Europe and the international environment in the past. Turkish foreign policy has been characterized by some observers as a policy of both change and continuity.² In

order to better understand Turkish foreign policy today and how state tradition has shaped and continues to shape Turkish national interests, Chapter 4 broadly outlines major themes in Turkish foreign policy from the 1980s extending back to the middle Ottoman period. With the historical perspective in hand, our vantage significantly improves, allowing us to more easily see the forces of change and continuity in the post-Cold War era.

Today, for example, Turkey may be able to offer new opportunities to Europe not present in the former bipolar world, given its geographic access and ties to the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. This raises questions about Turkey’s future role in any new accommodation or relationships between East and West (however they may be defined at the present)—questions which we later attempt to address.

Chapter 5 examines the second influence on the formation of Turkish national interests—Kemalist ideology. Alternatively known as Ataturkism, Kemalist ideology exerts a powerful influence on how Ankara understands the nature and role of the Turkish state and its larger role in the international system.

Chapter 6 looks closely at Ankara’s Europeanization policy and the strategies it employs with regard to Europe, the EU, and its other professed European-oriented interests.
This chapter outlines Turkish strategies for fulfilling its Euro-oriented national interests.

As alluded to above, Turkey wishes to be seen as European, Turkish elites consider their country European, and Ataturk’s ideology draws largely upon European philosophical concepts. Nevertheless, Europe and the EU are, at best, somewhat reticent about full Turkish entry into the European community.

Therefore, Chapter 7 looks at a variety of obstacles or barriers that impede Turkish accession to the EU. These barriers encompass not only political issues, like Cyprus and the Kurds, but also economic concerns. Other barriers arise out of the changes in the EU institutions and Europe’s relative cultural homogeneity. Turkey, located on the cusp of Europe proper, may find its entry into the EU further delayed as Europe recalculates its options and redefines itself.

Finally, Chapter 8 addresses the EU response to Turkey’s application for membership as well as key individual state responses to Turkish strategies. The chapter concludes with a cautious outlook on Turkey’s chances for admission over the next decade in light of the aforementioned barriers, and readdresses the impact that ideology may play on Turkey’s future in the EU.
Chapter 2

TURKISH NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE 1990s

Today, Turkey is at the crossroads of continents, cultures, commerce, and politics, just as it has been for centuries. However, the current period—the 1990s—may be unique to Turkey for several reasons.

First, the post-war order that arose following World War II in East Europe and Russia has collapsed and has given rise to new formulations in the broader context of inter-European relationships. Turkey's relations with not only Eastern and Western Europe but also Asia will be affected by whatever framework for relations ultimately emerges in the next decade.

Second, Turkey seeks an expanded role in the new European order, a role that recognizes her special geo-strategic location, her unique ability to bridge the cultural, economic, and political gap between Asia and Europe, and her own desires to be considered a member of the European family of nations.

Third, within Western Europe, the movement towards economic and political union (begun long before the current period of international drift and redefinition) has yet to firmly embrace its own future. Divergent views exist within the European Union (EU) as to its ultimate purpose, size,
and character. Turkey’s request to enter the EU may be vulnerable to any major shifts in EU policy regarding its own future. In light of these factors, Turkey’s national interests become significant as we attempt to define and understand Turkey’s course over the next decade.

The following chapter attempts to elaborate on the immediate objectives—identifying Turkish national interests in the 1990s and understanding how Ankara defines those interests. From there we can begin a discussion that explores Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the ramifications that that relationship engenders.

National Interests and Foreign Policy

In the process of discussing Turkey’s national interests, it is important to draw a distinction and understand the difference between national interests and foreign policy.

In the view of this study, the concept of national interests is useful if we understand them for what they are and no more: a statement of aims/objectives/goals/intentions that represent some interest of the nation. They are based upon prevailing or anticipated political or economic conditions a state’s government deems essential or important to its existence or development.

Generally speaking, national survival and autonomy are the preeminent national interests. They can be considered essential national interests. Other essential national
interests will likely include the preservation of territorial integrity and meaningful sovereignty, internal security, the preservation or fulfillment of a particular "way of life," political system, or ideology, and the maintenance of national wealth.

Sustaining essential national interests appears to be critical to the continued existence of any particular nation-state, whether it be Albania or Zimbabwe. The absence of any of one or any combination of these interests does not necessarily imply the state's immediate demise. It does imply, however, that the state's ability to pursue other national interests will be seriously impaired and that it may be vulnerable to rapid, potentially cataclysmic change.

In psychological terms, the sustaining of essential national interests may be somewhat analogous to the servicing of individual human survival needs in Maslow's hierarchy of needs.¹ According to Maslow's argument, as more basic human needs are met, then the individual can pursue other "higher" interests. Likewise, essential national interests must always be considered before the state can focus on and assign priority to securing supporting interests.²

² James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York:
Supporting national interests, as opposed to essential national interests, generally appear to pursue more tangible objectives and are by definition subordinate to essential interests. They may include objectives like territorial expansion, the return of a former province, economic hegemony, balanced foreign trade, pro-active diplomacy, nuclear parity, or colonialism. Supporting national interests might also include goals like regional or global stability, general disarmament, universal human rights, "free" international trade, or the open navigation of the seas.

Naturally, supporting national interests are not limited to the few examples offered here; rather, they can encompass a wide variety of objectives. Morgenthau notes that national interests that determine political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural content within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.³

As alluded to by Morgenthau, supporting national interests can and do change, dependent on changes in the

domestic or international environment. Revolutions, elections, wars, economic depressions, or advances in technology, among other things, may alter a nation-state's perceptions of its national interests. It should be noted however, that although they can change, it appears that a state's essential interests rarely do without significant alteration to the nature of the state itself.

The differentiation between essential and supporting national interests implies at least a two-tier value system associated with national interests. This notion is akin to the "two elements concept" noted by Morgenthau. According to Morgenthau, national interests can fall into two categories, the necessary and the circumstantial.4 As he defines them, necessary interests are concerned with the continued existence of the nation, while circumstantial interests are flexible and can accommodate changes in the international environment.

Raymond Aron offers a different categorization of national interests, making a distinction between "abstract objectives" and "parallel concrete objectives."5 Abstract objectives may include power, wealth, or values, while


concrete objectives might be represented by having a large army, preserving a favorable trade balance, or advancing democratic values in the international system.\textsuperscript{6}

The concept of "national interest" has been critiqued by some, however, as being too vague a concept for explaining why nation-states do what they do.\textsuperscript{7} For example, critics suggest that confusion may exist as to whether the state is acting upon the overall good of the nation or whether the national interest represents particular interests resident in the national society.\textsuperscript{8} Among those particular interests may be the parochial objectives of specific bureaucracies, key policymakers, private interest groups, and so forth. Other noted criticisms include the inability of the concept to provide a "reliable guide and criterion of rational policy," given the innumerable international and domestic variables present at any one given time.\textsuperscript{9}

There is some validity in these critiques. The concept of national interest does not provide a list or formula of

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. With regards to Raymond Aron's thought, Duroselle cites his own article, "Paix et guerre entre les nations: La theorie des relations internationales selon Raymond Aron," Revue francaise des sciences politiques, 12 (December 1962): 963-79.

\textsuperscript{7} Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 125.

\textsuperscript{8} Duroselle and Renouvin, 260-64.

pre-determined behaviors that we can expect a nation-state to follow. Significant attention must be given to the international and domestic environments in which national interests are framed. Intent does not equal outcome. As Waltz points out, both national interests and state policies designed to implement those goals are affected by the very presence of the international environment.

It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. If the aims, policies, and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can logically be drawn....In the history of international relations...results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors. Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.\textsuperscript{10}

Nevertheless, nation-states do profess certain national interests. Evidence does exist that appears to reasonably demonstrate that self-professed interests do motivate states in some degree to take action in the international environment. Therefore, regardless of the eventual outcomes, the concept of "national interest" becomes a valid line of inquiry when looking at state action.

Foreign policies, on the other hand, are the strategies and actions that nation-states implement in the international environment in the hope of securing their

national interests. Interests precede policy. State action may encompass a wide variety of alternatives from relative inactivity to diplomatic or military assault. It can encompass activities such as humanitarian assistance, the establishment of specific trade regimes, alliance-building and participation, bilateral or multilateral cooperation, diplomatic non-recognition, embargo or boycott, or limited or total war. These policies are the means, good or bad, right or wrong, by which nation-states attempt to obtain, support, or enhance their national interests.

In sum then, national interests can be equated with either general or specific goals/objectives the nation-state wishes to be fulfilled, while foreign policy is the overall process of implementation of strategies designed to accomplish those national goals or objectives. By way of illustration, if the maintenance of territorial integrity is a national interest, then a state may act to arm itself against those who may have designs upon its territory. It may then attempt to project an image of military superiority over its neighbors in the hopes of deterring any hostile actions by them against it. It may also seek to establish alliances with other states, or negotiate with its adversaries over their differences, or exercise some combination of the preceding three alternatives. State actions in support of national goals in the international environment are its foreign policies. The difference then,
between national interests and foreign policies is the difference between intent and procedure.

**Turkish National Interests**

Turkey, like other states, has certain national interests, and like other states, these interests can be categorized as either essential national interests or supporting national interests.

Turkey's essential national interests today are much the same as they were in 1923 at the founding of the Republic. There has been a considerable degree of continuity in Turkish national goals. Nevertheless, Ankara's strategies for securing its goals have had to change, occasionally abruptly and with drama, over the same period. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy has evidenced significant change over the same period.

Turkey's essential national interests are not specifically highlighted as such; nevertheless, Article 5 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution refers to several "fundamental aims" of the state that include the maintenance of Turkey's independence, the "integrity of the Turkish Nation," and the

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11 Oral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and Change," in Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen, Germany: Leske Verlag und Budrich GmbH, 1984), 115-30. Sander's article discusses the basic stability of Turkish national interests and foreign policy based on four relatively constant factors: the Ottoman legacy, Atatürk's ideology, economic necessities, and Turkey's geopolitical situation and resultant sense of insecurity. Turkish national interests are essentially unchanged due to the durability of these factors.
"indivisibility of the country, Republic, and democracy." Further, the Preamble remarks that "no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish National interests," or to the state's territorial integrity, "Turkish historical and moral values," or the ideological basis of the Republic found in Ataturkism. Finally, the Preamble states that the Constitution reflects the resolve of the Turkish nation to "attain the standards of contemporary civilization, as a full and honorable member of the world family of nations." We can glean at least some of Turkey's essential interests (or "fundamental aims") from these excerpts. They are: (1) the maintenance of sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and independence; (2) the preservation of the Turkish political system and its ideological foundations and values; and (3) the affirmation by Europe of Turkey's identity as a modern, European state (Europeanization).

In similar fashion, Ferenc Váli explains that Turkey's "fundamental national goals" include first, sovereign independence, territorial integrity, and preservation of

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12 Republic of Turkey, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982), art. 5.


14 Republic of Turkey, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982), Preamble, para. 5.
national wealth. Other fundamental national goals are "internal power" and "Europeanization."\textsuperscript{15}

As with most nation-states, Turkish independence, territorial integrity, and preservation of national wealth comprise most, if not all, of their essential national interests. However, in Turkey's case we must include fulfillment of Ataturk's ideology--known as Ataturkism or Kemalism.

Briefly, Kemal Ataturk was the first president of the modern Turkish Republic (1923-1938), the preeminent military and political leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, the successful defender of the Gallipoli peninsula in World War I, an Ottoman general, as well as a Young Turk reformer. His memory is greatly revered throughout Turkey; nearly every town of consequence has some monument dedicated to him.

\textsuperscript{15} Ferenc A. Váli, \textit{Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 68-70. The notion of Europeanization connotes the mutual recognition by both Turkey and Europe of Turkey's legitimate European character--specifically in terms of modern Turkey's political, economic, cultural, moral, and historical values. For the Turks it is the hope of recognition by Europe that they have attained the "contemporary standards of civilization" based on the political and social ideals embodied in Europe's development. As Prime Minister Ciller put it, "The future of European unity can only be realized within its natural dimensions, which includes Turkey. A growing European culture and concept without Turkey cannot be envisaged." See "Turkey: Prime Minister's Speech to Assembly: The Kurdish Problem and Foreign Policy," \textit{Summary of World Broadcasts}, The British Broadcasting Corporation, July 2, 1993. Source: Turkish TV, Ankara 1215 GMT 30 June 1993 (Lexis-Nexis). See also Váli, 21-22.
Ataturk was not the sole or even main author of the ideology that came to be named for him. His role was rather one of influence, direction, implementation, and realization of ideas drawn from the exigencies of the nationalist revolution, Ottoman reformist traditions, and European inspiration. The Kemalist program includes the application of the concepts of republicanism, nationalism, secularism, revolutionism/reformism, etatism, and populism. These concepts as well as the ideology and its impact on foreign policy will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.

Here it is sufficient to note that Turkey's national interests include both pragmatic and ideological aspects, and both are equally important to the state.

In addition, it should also be understood that these pragmatic and ideological interests cannot be completely isolated from each other; in reality they overlap, interact, complement, and impact upon each other to a significant degree. For example, "Europeanization" can be seen to be linked to not only Turkish security interests, but also economic, and ideological interests.

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Speeches to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) by the former Prime Minister (now President) Sülüyman Demirel in November 1991, and the current Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, in July 1993, echo these common themes. In a pattern that should not be viewed as coincidental, both leaders reasserted the indivisibility of the state from its territory and political system and continued with the reiteration of the commitment to the goals of economic development and modernization, with pledges to bring Turkey fully into the European family of nations.

Turkey’s supporting national interests are somewhat more varied. Generally speaking they are easiest to categorize when grouped into three categories that relate to and parallel Turkey’s essential interests—physical security, economic development, and political and social modernization.

First, Turkey wants to strengthen and expand its political and security relations with Europe in order to help maintain Turkish independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Second, expanded European relations support the larger goal of Europeanization. Specifically, Ankara wants to maintain and strengthen West European

security structures and regional organizations and its ties to them. These organizations and structures include not only the EU and the EU’s defense organization, the West European Union (WEU), but also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CE), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As part of this goal, Turkey wants full, rather than associate, membership in the EU and the WEU. It also seeks to expand bilateral relations with individual states—but primarily Britain, France, and Germany. Turkey also wants to insure regional stability, which also directly relates to Turkish domestic and foreign security interests. Goals included under this category are a favorable and peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue that protects the political and property rights of Turkish Cypriots; an end to fighting over the Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan and negotiation over its future status—without jeopardizing Azeri territorial integrity; the resolution of the Balkans crisis with an outcome that protects Bosnian Muslim self-determination; and finally, an end to the internal upheaval in Iraq, particularly in the Kurdish north, without


20 "Turkey: Demirel Presents Government Programme."
jeopardizing Iraqi territorial integrity or destabilizing Turkey's Kurdish minority.\(^{21}\)

Second, Ankara wants to enhance its economic portfolio both inside and outside of Europe. With regard to Europe, a customs union with the EU by 1995 is the immediate goal.\(^{22}\)

Although Turkish trade with Europe is by far the most significant in terms of volume,\(^{23}\) Turkey also wants to expand economic relations with states outside of Europe. For Turkey, this means revitalization of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),\(^{24}\) the implementation of the Black Sea Economic Zone initiatives, strengthened and balanced economic ties with the United States, and perhaps most importantly, the further development of strong

\(^{21}\) Republic of Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkey (Ankara, 1993), 66-74.

\(^{22}\) "Ciller to Revitalize Turkish-EC Ties--Economists," The Reuters European Community Report, June 14, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis); see also "Turkey Signs Free Trade Agreement with EFTA," The Reuters Library Report, October 17, 1991 (Lexis-Nexis).

\(^{23}\) Republic of Turkey, Turkey, 152. Exports to the EC accounts for 51% of Turkey's total exports, while the EC supplies 43.8% of Turkey's total imports.

\(^{24}\) The ECO is an economic association between Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, founded in 1964, with the primary goal of promoting increased trade among the member states. In 1992 the membership expanded to include five Muslim Central Asian states--Turkmenistan, Khazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and Kirghizia.
political and economic ties to the Central Asian Republics.  

Third, Ankara is pursuing ideological interests arising out of Kemalist ideology. Both the Turkish 1982 Constitution and Turkish leaders refer back to Ataturk’s legacy and the principles found in Kemalist ideology. Perhaps the most significant Kemalist principle in terms of Turkey’s ideological national interests is the commitment to inkilab or "revolutionism" (also rendered as "reformism"). According to Paul Dumont, inkilab "implies radical change executed with order and method" and also implies devotion to the cause of modernization and to struggle relentlessly to transform Turkey into a rapidly advancing country capable of playing an important role in the chorus of European nations ... to revolutionize society by scientific means and to apply to Turkey the methods that had proved so effective in the West.  

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25 See Prime Minister Ciller’s previously cited June 1993 speech to the TGNA. The Black Sea Economic Zone initiated by Turkey would eventually result in a free trade zone among states bordering the Black Sea. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed presentation of Turkey’s Black Sea initiatives.  

26 The Preamble to the 1982 Constitution states that it be interpreted in accordance with "the reforms and principles introduced" by Ataturk. Speeches by Demirel to the TGNA upon election as both Prime Minister and President refer to Ataturk by name and promise fealty to Kemalist principles. Ciller’s June 1993 speech also mentions Ataturk and again pledges loyalty to his reforms.  

27 Dumont, 34-35. Dumont argues that Kemalism is an ideology, a "system of ideas" rather than a strictly pragmatic political program. In his discussion he acknowledges the debt Kemalism owes to European political traditions and thought. Despite well documented European influences, he looks closely at the six pillars of Kemalist ideology (the "Six Arrows") and highlights the unique
Turkey's ideological interests also include the maintenance of a democratic system of government and secularism, solidification of Turkish nationalism, and the achievement of "contemporary universal values."

Finally, while we have defined Turkey's ideological interests as supporting interests, we should also note that they are inextricably bound up with the pursuit of Turkey's "indigenous" contributions made to Kemalism that arose out of Ottoman reform efforts, the Young Turks, and the political and cultural traditions of Anatolia. Emphasis added.


Ibid., 18. Karal defines Turkish nationalism as a Turkish identity based on "Turkish speakers, practicing Turkish culture, and 'sharing Turkish ideals,' on Turkish territory." In this author's view, Ankara feels quite uneasy with other nationalities within their borders. The nationalist revolution, after all, was designed to create a state for the Turks. It was an explicit rejection of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, and the notion of a multinational state. This explains, in part, Ankara's discomfort with and violence towards the Kurdish separatist movement.

"Demirel: Presidential Impartiality Does Not Mean No Involvement in Politics," Summary of World Broadcasts, The British Broadcasting Corporation, May 18, 1993. Source: Turkish TV, Ankara 1505 GMT 16 May 1993 (Lexis-Nexis). Demirel's speech outlines his vision of Turkish goals during his seven-year term, all of which are drawn from Ataturk's ideological legacy. Further the concept of "contemporary universal values" or "standards of civilization" should be understood as Ataturk himself did, as Western, specifically European values and standards of civilization. See also Karal, 32.
essential interests. At the same time, ideological interests also influence the direction and course of Turkey’s other supporting interests.

Before proceeding with an analysis of Turkey’s goal of Europeanization, it is necessary however, to frame our understanding of foreign policy and national interests within the context of the main theoretical approaches to understanding the international environment. The following chapter outlines these main theoretical approaches to international relations.
Chapter 3

MODELS FOR INTERPRETING FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

A complete understanding of any state's foreign policy is unattainable, not only for the average citizen, but also for the scholar and the statesman. The infinite number of variables (external and internal) and relationships between international actors renders comprehensive understanding impossible. Nevertheless, several conceptual frameworks exist that can help the interested observer draw some generalizations about causality and trends in international affairs. In the field of international relations there are three dominant theoretical approaches to understanding and interpreting the international environment—realism, interdependence (or transnationalism), and the World-Systems perspectives. These conceptualizations help us explain, understand, interpret, and generalize about international conditions and events.

Each of these theoretical approaches views the basic nature of world order in fundamentally different ways and assumes different values, motivations, and outcomes in the international arena. Each views the nature of man, the state, and the three relationships between them (man-man, man-state, state-state) in fundamentally different ways.
While each of these approaches has some ultimate utility, none of these perspectives enjoys the luxury of infallibility (evidenced by the wide variety of interpretations given to even the basic approaches). In short, these theories are explanatory tools whose utility is measured by how well they explain the conditions, actions and circumstances found in the international system.

Our purpose is to look carefully at each view with an eye towards assessing its relative ability to contribute to our understanding of the Turkish-European relationship. With that goal in mind, we will examine the basic tenets of each approach, in addition to its strengths and weaknesses, and then draw from that examination a template by which we can gauge direction and effectiveness of Turkey's Euro-oriented policies.

**Realism**

Realists consider the international environment an anarchic, chaotic place where the only guarantor of individual or collective survival is power. Robert Keohane notes that realism has three basic assumptions: first, that "states (or city-states) are the key units of action"; second, that "they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends"; and third, that states "behave

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in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms." Robert Gilpin states that realism is less a "'scientific' theory" than a "philosophical disposition and set of assumptions about the world." He also claims that realism and its adherents share three assumptions: (1) that the international environment is conflictual; (2) that the "essence of social reality is the group" and its present relevant manifestation is the nation-state; and (3) that power and security are the key elements of human motivation and therefore in politics as well.

In realist terms, power is defined as the ability to exercise "control over the minds and actions of other men." Keohane describes power as "both the ability to influence others and resources that can be used to exercise influence." Another definition states that "power is the

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strength or capacity that a sovereign nation-state can use to achieve its national interests." These definitions of national power imply the presence of a capacity to effect changes in the relationship one state has with another.

According to realists, throughout history men have transferred individual power to collective governing bodies in order to satisfy their mutual need for security and order in an nasty, Hobbesian world. As a result, for realists the power of the nation-state has today become the most important determinant of behavior in the international environment. In order to understand the behavior of nation states in the international environment, according to realists, one must understand the state's national interests and its relative power in relation to other states. The realist approach focuses, then, on how nation-states perceive and use their own power as well as how they perceive other states' power in the international system.


7 See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), Chapter 3, passim. In their review of the basic tenets of realism and the significant contributions of some of its adherents, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff provide an extensive account of the various definitions of what 'power' means to traditional realists. Invariably these definitions all point to the state's capability and intention to effect a change in the international system based on its interests.

8 Ibid., 86.
In the realist view, a nation's power is based on several elements. Although realist scholars prioritize various "elements of power" differently, key elements include military and economic power, although, for example, Robert Strausz-Hupe includes geography, technology, resources, population, political institutions and ideology.9 The attempt to quantify power has led many realist scholars to attempt to definitively define "power," to list constituent elements of power, to devise schemes designed to measure a state's power, and to then rank order them according to the state's relative power.10

From the realist perspective, the state is highly autonomous in the pursuit of its national interests.11

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9 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 117-18. Strausz-Hupe's work is briefly reviewed here and includes a section on what he considers to be the key elements of national power.

10 A cursory review of realist writings reveals the prevalence of lists of power elements and ranking schemes. Morgenthau lists a series of elements of power in Politics Among Nations along with a less than rigorous process for gauging a state's power. Other realists like Hartmann and Hupe offer their view on the elements of power, while Michael Sullivan in Power in Contemporary International Politics argues that power can be effectively measured and attempts to do so, while still others like Werner Levi in International Politics: Foundations of the System (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), Chapter 4, passim, claim that while power is important, its constituent elements are variable and relative to the particular situation and cannot therefore be measured in any quantitative way.

11 Michael Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 9. The concept of national interests is covered in some detail in the previous chapter.
There is no higher legitimate authority than the state’s in the international arena. It responds to external developments in the international system only after consideration of its perceived national interests—regardless of others’ perceptions. The state has, according to Hegel, an “objective reality,” distinct from its citizenry.\(^{12}\)

Where the national interests of two or more states temporarily coincide, the relations between nations may result in cooperation, alliances, and intergovernmental organizations; those interests that diverge may result in tension and conflict, and possibly war.

Realism’s strengths lie in its ability to help discern relative power relationships between nations and to expose core national interests. The primacy of power and national interest in the international calculus can be seen quite easily on a daily basis. On any given day, newspaper headlines attempt to either ask or answer what the world’s powerful states will or will not do in specific international contexts—whether it be GATT trade talks, military intervention in Bosnia, humanitarian aid for Somalia, or American political or economic initiatives in Russia.

Further, states continue to promote their interests ahead of others when they perceive the need—witness the

\(^{12}\) Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 93.
shortcomings of GATT sparked by individual state economic interests, numerous instances of petroleum over-production on the part of individual OPEC members at the expense of the entire group (and stable prices), French withdrawal from NATO, ad nauseam. Individual national advantage is and will likely be for the foreseeable future an important national consideration.

Finally, regardless of how we may wish to see the world, the realist view instructs us to see the world as it appears to be, not as it should be, unlike utopian views.13

The primacy of the state as the key unit of analysis in international relations has remained unshaken since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 despite the recent emergence of new and sometimes powerful actors in the international environment.14 It appears that this condition will remain so, for the simple fact that as a rule15 no other entity can

13 Sullivan, 8.

14 Examples of these new actors include intergovernmental organizations like OPEC, the United Nations, and the European Union, as well as multinational corporations like IBM, Shell or Ford, and lastly, nongovernmental organizations like GreenPeace, Amnesty International, or the Catholic Church. See note 23.

15 Every rule has its exceptions. In this case, one might note the powerful commitments made by terrorists to their groups and ideologies, allegiances to kinship groups (like the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey or the Abkhaz in Georgia), religious groups, or the life-long loyalties some corporations can claim from their employees. Nevertheless, these bonds, like the entities themselves, are considerably more ephemeral than the state or the bonds that tie the citizen to it. Even terrorists and CEO’s need passports and visas to travel abroad.
command man's emotional, cultural, and territorial allegiance more powerfully than the state. As Kenneth Waltz comments, a better bet for longevity may be Uganda rather than IBM. In sum, no other entity can confer citizenship, with all its universal and legal ramifications. One can further argue that the state and nation-building capacity of nationalism has yet to be entirely spent, as we witness the continued growth in the number of nation-states and in particular the emergence of new nation-states from the rubble of the former Communist bloc. Lastly, as long as states see themselves and other states as sovereign entities with no superior rivals, and as such, as long as they pursue their perceived interests with an eye towards improving their relative position among other states, then we will be hard pressed to counter their claims of preeminence.

Notwithstanding realism's explanatory power, traditional realism neglected the importance of several non-state actors, both at the sub-state and supra-state levels.

Domestically, the evidence and influence of pluralist interests on the formulation and implementation of state policy is amply documented. The generation of national interests and foreign policies are often a product of


17 Sullivan, 22.
bureaucratic "pulling and hauling," powerful domestic interests, or some combination thereof.

Further, not all state actions appear to be aimed at increasing state power. State support of child immunization programs or Third World water development projects are difficult to ascribe to the "lust for power." Some national interests are mutable while some coincide with other states' interests. Further, the aggregation of power, however it may be defined, may not necessarily exclude mutual advantage.

Moreover, in the realm external to the state, realism does little to explain the current level and complexity of economic relationships between nations or the growing

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18 Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," The American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 689-718. Allison's article outlined several models that may help explain how foreign policy is contrived within the state.

19 The idea that powerful sub-state interests influence or directly shape policy is manifest in a wide variety of studies on policy making and implementation. A number of different explanations are offered. Pluralist conceptions of policy making are represented by Dahl, Beer, Richardson and Jordan, Latham, and others. Elite conceptions of sub-state policy formulation are represented in small part by the work of C. Wright Mills, Mosca, and Max Weber (though he argues for the state bureaucracy as a type of elite). Other notions of sub-state actors and their ability to use power to control the state include the Marxist perspectives and corporatist views. See G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, "Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy," in The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, eds. G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1-14; also see Christopher Ham and M. Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 22-44.
influence and activity of non-state actors. In addition, multilateral consultation on political issues and economic policies seems counter to the traditional realist perspective, yet it is a political and economic fact of life. The emergence of Japan and Germany as U.S. economic rivals in a world of overwhelming U.S. military superiority further dilutes some realist propositions regarding the hegemonic state and the nature of power. International banking, technology transfer, and multinational corporate autonomy also appear to indicate some erosion of the absolute supremacy of national interest and state sovereignty.

In addition, "power" is difficult to quantify, though some might argue otherwise. Many examples exist of small states defeating or foiling the designs of larger, more "powerful" states—note the histories of Israel, Vietnam, Taiwan, Afghanistan. How does one determine the measurable variables much less gauge the elements of power empirically to determine a nation’s relative power without some degree of subjectivity? Even establishing some precedence among the "elements of power" involves a degree of interpretation. In this respect, realism’s central attribute—power—may be

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20 Sullivan, Chapter 4, passim. Here, Sullivan presents a cogent argument for the measurement of power and follows up with a wide variety of empirical data that demonstrate his hypothesis.
a less reliable tool with which to measure international relations than one may expect.

**Transnationalism or Interdependence**

Transnationalism/interdependence theories reflect a departure from traditional realist approaches to the study of international relations, brought about first by an alternative conception of the nature of man and government and second, by the growth in volume and complexity of relationships in the international economy, and third, by the new economic, social, and political opportunities arising out of modern technological development. Transnational/interdependence arguments highlight the changing role of both domestic and international political/economic structures.

Transnational or interdependence theory is framed by four general characteristics.²¹ First, interdependence theorists claim that the international system has undergone a paradigm change—it has been, according to them, transformed by the decline of the state’s importance as an international actor. Citing statistics that show growing interconnectivity in world trade, some interdependence theorists claim that the state is no longer the central actor in the international arena, instead it is just one of

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²¹ Sullivan, 9.
several important actors. New "non-state" actors have emerged to challenge the state's preeminent role in international affairs. These non-state actors include, but are not limited to, multinational corporations (MNCs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and finally other sub-national groups like drug cartels, separatist movements, and terrorist groups. 

Further, interdependence theory characterizes the state as highly dependent (rather than autonomous), subject not only to domestic political processes but also external economic and political forces. Some interdependence theorists argue that in contrast to the traditional notion of national interests, there is an unparalleled growth in system-centered interests—-that is, "national" interests that actually reflect more upon the concerns of the broader, 

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22 Sullivan, 43-52. Although Sullivan's basic premise is that power, as traditionally conceived, is still the important variable in international calculations, he provides a wide variety of economic data supplied by interdependent theorists that purport to demonstrate the theory's validity.

23 Examples of MNCs might include IBM, Royal Dutch Shell or Mitsubishi, while IGOs would include the United Nations, OPEC, NATO, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Finally, NGOs include groups like the Roman Catholic Church, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, or the International Olympic Committee.

global system. The modern state's role in the traditional interdependent view is limited, even minimal. Where necessary, the state's purpose is primarily to encourage and facilitate the strengthening of the international market and to defend itself, and maintain its traditional role of insuring that "thieves and murderers continue to be hanged."  

For example, the state's inability to completely control MNC activity and resources may be seen as evidence of a reduction in the state's economic role and a relative decline in state sovereignty. In the modern era, MNCs are not entirely beholden to sovereign states and national interests. Instead, they often function according to global market principles and their own commercial interests. In the new global economy, the MNC can transfer wealth rapidly from one place to another or trade with corporations or countries with interests inimical to its host nation.  

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26 Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 89. Here Waltz quotes the Abbe Morellet's letter to Lord Shelburne. Waltz argues several pages later that, in the liberal view, the state's main internal obligation was to provide justice, while externally it was obliged to provide for the common defense.

Furthermore, according to interdependence views, nation-states, no longer autonomous actors of yore, often turn to IGOs or NGOs to help solve international problems: witness conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, the Caucasus, Morocco, and Somalia. A host of non-state actors have active roles in these crises and conflicts.

Second, interdependence theorists argue that "the dominant issues in international politics have changed."28 Heretofore, the dominant issue of international relations was the state’s struggle for military security, whereas in the modern era, the focus has shifted to supranational, global issues. Among them are global economic growth, the environment, international communications, nuclear development, global population growth, world food production and distribution, the common use of space, and technology, etc.29

A third characteristic of interdependence is that the world’s economy has become far more interconnected than ever before. Interdependence theory makes the assertion that a myriad of global economic interlinkages regularly penetrate national borders and have significant impact on domestic

28 Sullivan, 10.

29 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1989), 26. Keohane and Nye cite comments made by Henry Kissinger, a noted realist and then Secretary of State, on the expansion of global issues facing traditional diplomacy.
economic structures, and as a result, economic policy choices within one nation or region can have dramatic consequences in others. In essence, completely autonomous national economic structures, capable of making or taking autonomous actions, no longer exist. National sovereignty in some ways has been superseded by international considerations.  

The fourth and final general characteristic of interdependence is that war is no longer a viable instrument in international relations. It has become outmoded and supplanted by the new calculus—economic power. Modern arsenals have become so destructive and the cost of war has risen so dramatically that rational statesmen now find their use less productive (perhaps even counterproductive) than in the past. Economic factors now play a more significant role in shaping the international environment than do military factors. National interests have again been supplanted by global interests.

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30 Edward L. Morse, "Transnational Economies," in Transnational Relations and World Politics, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 23-47. Morse addresses "those trends which have served to undermine the traditional state-centric view," which he considers to be "predominantly economic." See also Sullivan, 10-11.

31 This assertion applies to the relationship between states where an interdependent relationship exists. See Keohane and Nye, 25.

32 Sullivan, 11.
In many respects, interdependence theory draws heavily on traditional economic liberalism, and many of its fundamental tenets lean upon the writings of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mills, and others. From their view, in contrast to the notion that governments must supervise and order the common weal, economic liberals see the market as a more efficient mechanism to control distribution and production.\textsuperscript{33} Despite the variety in shades of liberalism,

All forms of economic liberalism, however, are committed to the market and the price mechanism as the most efficacious means for organizing domestic and international relations.\textsuperscript{34}

The transnational/interdependent perspective is based in part on the liberal notion that free and open markets have reshaped international relations and as liberal trade practices become more common among nations, the justification for conflict is removed. All nations benefit more in peaceful, open trade than by the narrow, rapacious practices of economic nationalism. Each nation finds its special economic niche, or "comparative advantage," in the world economic system that allows it to prosper. The "invisible hand" of the free market promotes order, equilibrium, and stability in international economic

\textsuperscript{33} Waltz, \textit{Man, the State, and War}, 87-89.

relationships and, by extension, to the corresponding political relationships as well. In the modern, interdependent era economic values have become "a central substantive focus of political and other social activities."\(^{35}\)

In sum, the forces extant in the modern world—the international market, technology, and rapid communications for example, have reordered the relations between nations from those measured by hierarchical power relationships to more "horizontal" relations measured by mutual dependence and relative gain.\(^{36}\) The international scene is no longer an anarchic, chaotic realm; rather, it is an orderly, global system growing closer together through mutually beneficial trade and interests, tempered by rationality and reciprocity.

The interdependent perspective does seem to offer insights into the growing economic linkages between industrialized nations. It is correct in noting the importance of non-state actors and the relationships they engender. It does reflect and describe the basic operating features of the economic relations between some industrialized states, the autonomous aspects of the MNC, and the growing significance of IGOs and NGOs.

\(^{35}\) Morse, 25.

\(^{36}\) Keohane and Nye, 8-11.
Further, multilateral decision making is apparent in today's world between many states, and in fact, many issues transcend national boundaries—a key interdependent argument. Trade between industrialized states does create mutual advantages and linkages that directly affect the formulation and implementation of policy at the national and sub-national levels, and war (as evidenced by its practice) is apparently a less likely option between interdependent states.

Still, a critical view of transnationalism offers up a number of shortcomings. Despite their claims of stability, rationality, and order, world events are often punctuated by violence, conflict, and irrationality. Events like the Arab oil embargo, the Persian Gulf and the Falklands War, exclusionary trade practices like countertrade, or the maintenance of protectionist trade advantages or subsidies occur with greater regularity than would be expected in an interdependent world.

In many significant aspects the global economy is not an open market system. Therefore, the "invisible hand" is flawed. Tariffs and barriers do exist; in some cases, between friendly industrialized countries, trade frictions are increasing. Nationalist sentiments have much to do with excluding some agriculture products, services, and

entertainment products from international economic agreements like the GATT. Exclusive bilateral and regional trade agreements like the EC/EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN stand in contrast to the principles of emerging interdependence. States can and do consider their own interests with regularity ahead of "global" interests. To cite just a few examples, we only need look at the clash between Brazil's developmental policies and the vanishing rainforest; French intransigence and protectionism in EC agriculture policies; or the current US-Japan trade relationship and its difficulties.

Further, the growing number of new nation-states runs counter to interdependent claims of the declining importance of the nation-state and nationalism. Nationalist sentiment continues to animate much of the globe and currently contributes beyond its fair share of input into the international environment. Interdependence theory's diminution of nationalism's power and its chief offspring, the nation-state, does not reflect reality, at least as this author presently perceives it.

Finally, interdependence theory has limited utility. While interdependence theory critiques traditional approaches to understanding international relations, neither can it account for all that does transpire nor can it provide a comprehensive, global analytical framework. Instead, it is restricted to theorizing about only a portion
of the world’s relationships between a limited number of actors. At best, interdependence may explain part of the strong political and economic relationships that have developed between some industrialized countries, yet even then these relationships continue to suffer nationalistic tremors and twitches.

**World Systems/ Marxian Approach**

World Systems theory focuses its understanding of the international system on the imbalanced relationship between advanced industrialized nations and the lesser developed countries (LDCs) as a result of the global capitalist world economic system. This imbalance can be understood as a function of the objective nature of capital.\(^{38}\) Capitalism and imperialism, from the world systems view, are the dominant motive forces in the unstable international system.

The world systems approach takes Marxist and Leninist theories as its historical antecedents, although not all who embrace this view are Marxists. Nevertheless, the contributions of Marxist thinkers weigh heavy in any encapsulation of this view, no matter how brief. Just as a wide variance exists in the realist and interdependence

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\(^{38}\) According to Marxists, capital’s objective nature—continuous, and relentless accumulation of profits—shapes every human structure and activity. This notion is taken from a review of Marxist thought on the nature of the state (specifically Miliband and Poulantzas) in Ham and Hill, 32–36.
views, so too does the Marxian tradition suffer a certain non-uniformity of views.

Viotti and Kauppi note that the "global" or world-systems perspective rests upon several assumptions. First, in order to explain international behavior by any actor at any level one must first understand the "global context within which states and other entities interact." The basic unit of analysis is the international system itself. Second, historical analysis is essential to any understanding of the international system. Third, world-systems scholars assume that the patterns of development between and among states is uneven and that "mechanisms of domination" perpetuate the disparity. Last, they assume that "economic factors" play the dominant role in explaining the world system and its patterns of uneven development.

The Marxist perspective on international relations echoes these points. For them, the key elements of this perspective include the following points: (1) Analysis of international relations cannot be conducted solely from a political or economic perspective, rather, analysis of international relations must utilize a combination of both perspectives—the "method of political economy"; (2) "The substance of international relations . . . is inter-class relations," rather than states or other actors as the main

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units of analysis; (3) The ruling classes of every state are derived from and respond to "the basic imperatives of production," whose central philosophical tenet is class conflict; and (4) "The states-system is usually fragmented along the lines of the main class formations" (or less cryptically, that states themselves are divided into "bourgeois" and "proletarian" states, and that the relations between them reflect that distinction).40

Marx's historical materialism provides the world systems view with its basic understanding of the processes and functions of capitalism, while Lenin's work provides a framework for understanding the nature of the relationships between states.41 Lenin's view of imperialism characterizes the approach's fundamental view of the industrialized core states expropriating the wealth from the underdeveloped periphery states. According to Lenin, this is a result of colonial imperialism.42

Although the structure of the international system has changed considerably since Lenin's day (i.e., there are few if any formal colonies left), the relationship between the


41 Viotti and Kauppi, 451-54.

core (the strong industrialized states) and the periphery (the weak, primary product producing states) remains intact. Capitalists in industrialized nations perpetuate the uneven relationship between the former colonies and the core through co-option of the local elites (comprised by the remnants of the colonial compradore class). The continuing relationship allows the core to persist in expropriation of periphery wealth.

In the world systems view, the state is a tool of the elite capitalist class. It is designed to advance capitalist interests both domestically and abroad. The state facilitates and encourages the penetration and domination of peripheral economies through multinational, monopolistic, and oligopolistic corporate practices. Yet the state itself is merely a dependent structure by which the capitalist elites dominate not only their own indigenous working classes, but also other economies internationally.

The approach's strength lies in its descriptive abilities. It is obvious that the world is disproportionate in terms of distribution of wealth, power, and production. The approach's focus on the disparity of wealth allows a

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44 Viotti and Kauppi, 459.
view of international relations from the "have-not" perspective and offers apparently valid reasons for that condition. Further, its explanatory power is enhanced by the voluminous amounts of statistical data available describing the disparities between certain states.

Flaws in the world systems approach surface when one considers that not all conflict in the international arena is engendered by capitalism or imperialism. This is a fallacy of single-factor analysis, in this case an over-reliance on economic conditions.\(^{45}\) Other explanations may account for the motives and actions of international actors. For example, the current conflict in the Balkans is probably far removed from the issue of imperialism, it is more likely centered around nationalism and ethnicity. Further, political confrontation in the Levant or between Iran and Iraq is not about capitalism, rather, it is about national identities, irredentist territorial claims, and conflicting cultures. While the basic philosophy animating the World Systems view--Marxism--offers a unique and useful view of history, its predictive powers are askew.

In addition, state actions often do not serve the interests of the "capitalist elite." Particularly in European countries, labor as a pluralist interest has captured a significant portion of state policy making. In Germany, for example, labor roles have been

\(^{45}\) Viotti and Kauppi, 464-65.
institutionalized in the corporate state," while in
France, policymakers live in fear of a new load of ripening
French fish being dumped on their doorsteps. Further, in
contrast to Marxist explanations (and expectations),
underdeveloped countries can and do assert their sovereignty
over MNCs to extract advantages. The relatively recent
expansion of countertrade techniques underscores the ability
of some less developed countries to manipulate and control
trade relationships with the core. Finally, peripheral
states have been known to expropriate corporate wealth
through full or partial nationalization.

"Manfred G. Schmidt, "Learning from Catastrophes:
West Germany’s Public Policy," in The Comparative History of
Public Policy, ed. Francis G. Castles (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 75.

See Welles.

In brief, countertrade is a trade practice utilized
by states and corporations without or with little currency
involved in the transaction. Countertrade often involves
barter trade, offsets, and three-way transactions between
states or between corporations and states. LDC’s can often
extract significant advantage from MNCs using this form of
trade. See any of the following for a more thorough
definition and detailed explanation of countertrade: Laura
B. Forker, Countertrade: Purchasing’s Perceptions and
Involvement (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Advanced Purchasing
Studies, Arizona State University, 1991); Greg T. Hammond,
Countertrade, Offsets, and Barter in International Political
Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Costas G.
Alexandrides and Barbara L. Bowers, Countertrade: Practices,
Strategies, and Tactics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987);
Dick Francis, The Countertrade Handbook (Westport,
Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1987); or Matt Schaffer, Winning
the Countertrade War: New Export Strategies for America (New
Interpretation: A Framework for Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, there is no way to assemble a comprehensive, all-inclusive understanding of any state's foreign policy. The three models reviewed above can be used to look at the same problem from different perspectives. For the scholar, the choice of perspective is tied to his perception of the theory's explanatory validity, and while each of these perspectives offers insights into the structure and functions of the current international system, none are flawless. Therefore, this study takes the liberty of embracing those particular elements of realist and interdependence theory that best explain Turkey's current and future relationship with Europe.

The world-systems perspective does not appear to offer many useful insights on Turkey's relations with Europe for several reasons. First, the relationship is not characterized in this study's view by economic mechanisms of domination. Second, economic factors, while important, are not the most significant feature in this analysis and cannot fully explain Turkish or European actions. Ascribing causality to one factor is unrealistic. Third, the relationship does not necessarily involve "global" considerations. EU positions on Turkey's action are often colored by individual bilateral relations--the strained relations between Athens and Ankara as a notable example.
On the whole, realism offers the best template for understanding Turkish foreign policy. However, interdependence theory also plays a role in our understanding. Understandably, state action may be constrained by a number of variables. A state's foreign policy does not emerge from a black box, pristine and untainted. Further, we understand that both interdependent relationships and inequities between states do exist, however, these relationships and disparities, in this study's view, are largely the result of state choices and happenstance.49

First, in terms of a framework for understanding Turkish foreign policy, we adhere to the realist view that the world is basically anarchic. This fact does not prevent nor belittle efforts by states to successfully create stable, peaceful relationships among themselves. In our view, anarchy can be held "at bay" by multilateral agreements based on mutual interests. Relative gain in the form of mutual security and prosperity can exist and be understood in a realist framework. Nevertheless, from a realist perspective the dominant issues remain applicable, i.e., we must understand Turkey's policies towards Europe as

49 By "happenstance," we mean those events beyond anyone's control, i.e., unalterable environmental factors--location, geography, distribution of resources, climate, etc.
ultimately a search for security, "power," and ideological fulfillment.

Power in this sense must however be recognized as internal power: economic-industrial, scientific, and intellectual strength, as well as military impregnability . . . [Turkey] seeks to acquire the technological-economic strength of Western great powers.50

Ankara’s pragmatic security interests intermingled with a compelling ideology of cultural/economic modernization and development push it to seek union with Europe.

Finally, from an interdependent view we can begin to value Turkish efforts as a reflection of the wide number of ties already between Turkey, the EU, and its constituent states. The interdependent view is useful in this respect for understanding the "complexity in connectivity" between Turkey and Europe especially as it relates to their mutual economic relations, bilateral economic linkages, and mutual security interests.

50 Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 69.
Chapter 4

THE CONTRIBUTION OF TRADITION: TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH EUROPE THROUGH HISTORY

Introduction

As we have already noted, Turkey’s European policies reflect Turkish national interests. However, it is also important to recognize the contribution of diplomatic tradition to Ankara’s understanding of its national interests and its resulting European foreign policy. In many ways, the traditions of Ottoman and early Turkish diplomacies are today expressed in the pragmatic aspect of Ankara’s approach to international relations.

In order to better appreciate the weight of tradition on current policy, a short history of Turkey’s relations with Europe will help us understand the significance of a pragmatic continuity in the contemporary Turkish agenda. This chapter presents, in a somewhat arbitrary and abbreviated fashion, an expedient review of Turkish diplomacy and European policies during five significant historical periods. We will focus here on the Ottoman period (c. 1400 to 1914), the early nationalist/Republican period (1918-1923), the post-Lausanne period (1923-1939),
the World War II era (1939-1945), and finally the Cold War period (1945-1990).¹

The Ottoman Period

With the fall of Constantinople to the rising Ottoman state, the destiny of the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, Turkey, became inextricably intertwined with Europe. Notably, Constantinople’s capture in 1453 A.D. was a bit of a formality, the Ottomans having already seized most of the Eastern Roman Empire’s remaining land after crossing the Dardanelles and advancing into the Balkans and Greece in the mid-1300s.² The Ottoman state expanded continuously over the next two centuries, pushing its boundaries into present-day Russia, Austria, and Poland. The Ottoman Empire encompassed at its apogee the North African littoral from Morocco to Egypt, significant portions of the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and modern-day Iraq, most if not all of the modern day Balkan states, Greece, Hungary, Romania,

¹ These dates reflect a general guide to understanding different Turkish policy approaches to Europe. Turkish policy approaches did not necessarily shift abruptly as the dates may seem to indicate. For example, the nationalist period overlapped Ottoman diplomacy by roughly two years, while key elements of Turkish foreign policy in WWII were shaped by developments in the post-Lausanne period. Therefore, the reader should view these dates somewhat flexibly.

² Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances:1350-1700 (Liverpool, UK: University Press, 1954), 12-29. Vaughan presents a fascinating and thorough outline of the early stages of the Ottoman state’s extension into Europe and Europe’s failure to stop the Ottoman advance.
the Crimea, and Bulgaria, as well as parts of the Caucasus and the entire Anatolian plateau.

Ottoman relations with Europe were typified by a curious admixture of mutual suspicions, political and religious intrigue, fear, early Ottoman disdain for the Europeans, and competing commercial interests. While diplomatic intercourse between the Ottoman Empire and Europe took place regularly, diplomacy, in and of itself, was a less important means to achieve Ottoman interests (territorial expansion) than military might. At best, diplomacy was a compliment to military conquest, facilitating the transfer of territories and peoples without further bloodshed, while at worst, the Ottomans appeared to view diplomacy with the weak, disjointed European states as a nuisance. Therefore, foreign relations in this period

were marked less by Ottoman desire to reach peaceful accommodation with other nations, than by Ottoman desire for territorial expansion, and military, economic, and political advantage.⁴

However, following the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottomans concluded their first peace treaty with European powers with the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699).⁵ Some observers mark this point as the beginning of the Empire’s decline, although evidence suggests that the reasons for the Ottoman decline had more to do with earlier internal decay than later military defeats.⁶ However, 1699 is a useful starting point for a brief examination of Ottoman foreign policy as it relates to the modern Turkish state. Previous to 1699, the Ottoman state had been expanding, after 1699 it began contracting. As a result, Ottoman military power could no longer arbitrarily dictate events in southeastern

⁴ Ibid., 29-64.

⁵ Ibid., 276-79.

⁶ It is difficult to pinpoint a precise date that marks the Ottoman decline. Vaughan notes that some scholars consider an earlier treaty, the Peace of Zsitva-Torok (1606), as the highwater mark of the Ottoman Empire. See Vaughan, I. See also Ferenc A. Válí, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 7-8; and also George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 40-41. Both authors note this dilemma and Válí indicates that among noted historians there remain sharp differences over the precise date of the beginning of the Ottoman decline.
Europe; the Ottomans had to now rely as much on diplomatic effort as on military means to achieve their interests. During the 1700s, the Ottoman Empire faced a growing threat from the north in the form of the expanding Russian Empire. Russian pressure against the Ottoman Empire was based on overlapping territorial interests, religious conflict, and commercial interests. As a result, a series of wars between Russia and the Ottoman state ensued, that were based on a combination of these competing interests as well as the outside interests of Britain and France. These conflicts gradually decreased Ottoman holdings in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.


8 A rather graphic understanding of Ottoman losses to Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries can be had by viewing the maps found in Shaw and Shaw, xxiv-xxv.
Ottoman foreign policy during the period of decline was characterized by continuous efforts to enhance its security in the face of shrinking boundaries and near constant warfare. The Sublime Porte therefore engaged in balance-of-power politics, replete with an ever-shifting pattern of alliances among the main European powers--Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. As Ferenc Váli notes:

Amid increasing power rivalries and threats to its independent existence, the Sublime Porte soon recognized that its survival depended on the skillful employment of a balancing diplomacy, built upon a central strategy of inhibiting the most dangerous and threatening power by invoking the assistance of the others.

Ottoman diplomatic efforts ultimately proved useless. By the eve of World War I, the Ottoman Empire had been stripped of any significant European holdings other than a small portion of Thrace, having lost Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and the remaining territory in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. Further, the Empire had lost effective control over its North African territories through European

9 The term "Sublime Porte" was used variously by Europeans to refer to the office of the Grand Vizier, the Ottoman bureaucracy, and government much in the same way that Whitehall, No. 10 Downing Street, Capitol Hill, Foggy Bottom, the White House, and Quai d'Orsay are used to describe British, American, or French governments or foreign ministries. The Sublime Porte was in actuality the main entrance gate to Topkapi Palace in Istanbul where the Grand Vizier's office was once located.

10 Váli, Bridge across the Bosphorus, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 8-12.

11 Ibid., 8-9. Despite its continual decline in size and strength the Ottoman Empire remained a considerable military power up until its defeat in World War I.
colonization beginning in the 1800s; it no longer possessed
the Caucasus, having surrendered them to Russia; and it was
faced with rising nationalist sentiments in several corners
of the Empire.\(^\text{12}\)

Moreover, not only had the Ottoman state lost
territory, in many ways, it had lost control of its economic
and political sovereignty. In 1875, the Sultan ceded
partial control over Ottoman finances to the Europeans after
the Porte defaulted on sizeable loans. Europeans had vital
interests in Ottoman railroads, shipping, customs houses,
and manufactures\(^\text{13}\) while continuing to enjoy the privileges
of the Capitulations.\(^\text{14}\) Further, European states presumed
to intervene in Ottoman affairs when the rights of Christian
subjects were in question.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{12}\) David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of
the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle
East* (New York: Avon Books, 1989), 33-37; see also Frank
Edgar Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform
Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations 1826-1853* (New

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 46-47; see also Harris, 46-47.

\(^\text{14}\) The Capitulations were diplomatic
agreements/treaties made between the various European powers
and the Ottoman Empire which gave foreign ambassadors extra-
territorial judicial rights over their respective citizens. In addition, the Capitulations allowed foreign (European)
citizens certain commercial benefits denied to Ottoman
citizens. The first Capitulation Treaty was signed with the
Venice in 1521; the French signed a Capitulation Treaty in
1535 (see Vâli, 7, note 13). By the end of the nineteenth
century most European states had some capitulatory
arrangement with the Ottoman Empire.

\(^\text{15}\) Fromkin, 47.
Ottoman foreign policy immediately preceding World War I was ostensibly in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) party, the Sultan surrendering much of his authority to these "Young Turks" in the 1908 Turkish revolution. In reality, however, a troika composed of Enver Pasha, Taalat Pasha, and Jemal Pasha exercised the actual authority of the state. CUP/Ottoman policy during this period was again primarily focused on preservation of the Ottoman Empire by the traditional method of acquiring a European ally that could help defend Ottoman interests. Between 1911 and 1914, CUP officials approached each of the suitable (from their view) candidates--first Britain in 1911, then France, Russia, and Germany in 1914. Some evidence suggests that through a series of diplomatic missteps and Turkish machinations, Turkey succeeded in establishing an alliance with Germany at the beginning of

16 The relatively bloodless Young Turk revolution began in 1908 in Macedonia among Ottoman army officers generally interested in reforming the Ottoman state, but specifically interested in restoration of the suspended 1876 Ottoman Constitution and elimination of the Sultan's spy network. Widespread support for the revolution was found among the bureaucratic elite, the military, and intellectuals. See Harris, 48–52; and also Nuri Eren, Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 18. Eren's brief synopsis highlights the significance of the Young Turk revolution as a watershed event in Turkish westernization.

17 Harris, 52.

18 Fromkin, 49.

19 Ibid., 49–50; 58–61.
August 1914 after being rejected by the other three powers.\textsuperscript{20}

The Ottoman legacy left to the modern Turkish state extends perhaps most significantly to Turkey's internal characteristics—government structures, political processes, an emphasis on modernization, and political reform. Even while it appears that the larger contribution of the Ottoman Empire resonates in Turkey's internal character, the Ottoman reform movement turned Turkey inescapably towards Europe not only as a source of political, economic, and social inspiration, but also as a desired political partner. Additionally, Ottoman diplomatic patterns are also reflected to a degree in modern Turkey's policies in the form of consistent diplomatic and economic engagement with Europe and the search for reliable security relationships with strong/stronger European powers.

\textbf{The Early Nationalist/Republican Period: 1918-1923}

The second major period of Turkish diplomacy, 1918-1939,\textsuperscript{21} can be characterized by Turkish nationalist efforts

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 62-76.

\textsuperscript{21} It is important for the casual reader to note that following WWI, for approximately two-three years, there were two separate governments claiming sovereignty and authority over what is now modern Turkey. The first government, administering the defeated Ottoman Empire, did not formally cease to exist until 1922-1923 (dated either from when the last Sultan fled Istanbul or when the Allies gave recognition to modern Turkey in the Treaty of Passanne in 1923). The second government was the emerging nationalist
to secure two different sets of objectives. Here, however, we will focus only on the first set of goals and restrict our view for convenience to the 1918-1923 timeframe.

Initially, from 1918 to 1923, the Turks were primarily focused on securing first, the elimination of foreign military occupation and second, diplomatic recognition within the framework of the National Pact. During this period it is, however, critical to note that Turkish progress in diplomacy was directly tied to their military success against the Europeans and other occupiers.

government in Ankara led by Ataturk. Often in conflict, they did occasionally cooperate against the Allies without recognizing the legitimacy of the other.

22 Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1975), 37-39. This author acknowledges a debt to Sonyel's work insofar as Nationalist foreign policy objectives are concerned. Sonyel outlines four objectives of the Turkish Nationalists: (1) implementation of the National Pact, (2) diplomatic recognition of Nationalist Turkey, (3) "procurement of moral and material support within the framework of defensive or offensive alliances, treaties of friendship, or otherwise," and (4) the use of propaganda designed to facilitate the implementation of the other objectives.

23 The Nationalist agenda was spelled out in the National Pact, drawn upon the declarations made at the Erzurum Congress in July 1919 and later ratified by the Nationalist Parliament in 1920 at Ankara. The principal points of the Pact include (1) the nation (as the Nationalists defined it) was indivisible, (2) the nationalist government would resist foreign invasion if the Istanbul government would or could not, (3) a post-war Allied mandate for Turkey was unacceptable, and (4) that the National Assembly would be created forthwith. See Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy: 1918-1948 (Ambilly-AnneMasse: Imprimerie Franco-Suisse, 1950), 23-28.
The first set of objectives was taken up by the Nationalists on the heels of the Greek occupation of Izmir and the Nationalist Congresses at Erzurum and Sivas in 1919. However, to fully understand the Nationalist movement and its agenda, we must first turn to the activities of the victorious Allies and their postwar plans for dismembering the Ottoman Empire.

Following the Central Power’s defeat in 1918, Ottoman diplomats signed the Mudros Armistice and later the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). The Sèvres Treaty (in addition to a host of secret arrangements made during the war between the Allied powers) aimed to establish Allied mandates over large portions of Anatolia, preserve the Capitulations, strip the Empire of European possessions, and remove Ottoman control over the Turkish Straits. In addition, Sèvres authorized the creation of an Armenian state derived in part from eastern Anatolian provinces, encouraged the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan (also created from territories determined by the Nationalists as within their boundaries), and removed the oil-rich Mosul vilayet (province) from Turkish control and attached it to the newly created kingdom of Iraq.24

As a result of Sèvres (and the other agreements) much of the former Empire’s Asian and Middle Eastern possessions were divided between Britain and France. Britain took

24 Sonyel, 77-82.
Arabia, legitimated its hold on Egypt, secured both Baghdad and Mosul vilayets, and set up a mandate over TransJordan, while France was left with mandatory power over Syria and Lebanon.\(^{25}\)

Further, Ottoman weakness in Anatolia proper, Nationalist hostility, and the Allied desire to extract some recompense for the war's costs anywhere they could find it, prompted the Allies to eventually occupy Istanbul and the Dardanelles. In addition, Italy occupied Antalya and surrounding areas, while France entered Cilicia and Hatay. Greece, which had been overtly encouraged to first merely occupy Smyrna (Izmir) in 1919, was later encouraged by Britain and France in 1920 to seize a large portion of Western Anatolia and Thrace in order to bring the reluctant Ottoman government around to signing the Sèvres treaty.\(^{26}\)

Allied postwar military occupation spurred Turkish nationalist resistance. By 1920, this resistance had coalesced around Ataturk and the self-proclaimed Nationalist government seated in Ankara.\(^{27}\) At first willing to preserve the formal position of the Sultan-Caliph,\(^{28}\) the Nationalist

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\(^{25}\) Fromkin, 410-11.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 427-34.

\(^{27}\) See note 21 on the overlap in time between the fall of the Ottoman government in Istanbul and the rise of the Nationalist government in Ankara.

\(^{28}\) Initially, the nationalists claimed that they were only struggling to free the Sultan from foreign domination and interference, however, the concept of a Turkish republic
government soon ignored the Sultan altogether, disavowed his
government, and finally abolished the Sultanate in 1922, and
later the office of the Caliphate in 1924.\footnote{K. Kruger, \textit{Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East} (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932), 28.}

The new Nationalist government completely rejected the
severe conditions established by Sèvres and demonstrated its
willingness to fight against foreign occupation and economic
domination by Europe.\footnote{A simple comparison of Nationalist aims as found in
the National Pact, with Allied aims as specified by the
provisions of the Sèvres Treaty, validates our somewhat
obvious assertion. (See note 19 for a brief outline of the
National Pact.) See also Vere-Hodge, 23-28 for an
encapsulation of the Nationalist agenda.} With regard to the disposition of
former Ottoman territory, the Nationalists were content to
let the rest of the Empire go, while only demanding the
recognition of the Turkish Anatolian "homeland," the return
of Eastern Thrace from Greece and the Mosul vilayet from
Britain.\footnote{Nationalist territorial claims were also outlined in
the National Pact. While Turkey's northeast borders had been
decided by the Treaty of Alexandropol (1920), the Moscow
Pact (1921) and later by the Treaty of Kars (1923), the
Turkish southeastern borders were as yet undefined. The
Franco-Turkish settlement of 1921 resolved much of the
border between Syria and Turkey although the status of
Alexandretta remained outstanding until 1939. As for the
European borders, the Nationalists claimed the 1913 line
near Edirne (Adrianpole) along the Meriç (Maritza) River.
See Vere-Hodge, 39-42 for a review of the territorial
aspirations of the Nationalists at Lausanne.}
Initially, Nationalist military efforts to dislodge foreign military forces were disjointed and unsuccessful. However, Greek atrocities against local Turks in Smyrna during the 1919 invasion led to a stiffening of Turkish resolve and heightened Turkish awareness of the Nationalist agenda. Eventually, Nationalist forces defeated the Greeks near Ankara and drove them out of Anatolia. Nationalist forces also inflicted sharp losses on French and Armenian forces in Cilicia, turned back an Armenian invasion in the east, and encouraged the Italians to abandon Antalya.

Turkish diplomatic objectives were pursued rather adroitly by the nationalists by playing their new (albeit expedient) friendship with Soviet Russia against the West's growing fears of Bolshevik domination in the East. Furthermore, Nationalist diplomatic efforts also reflected an astute ability to play competing British, French, and Italian economic and political interests in the region against each other.

In addition, unwavering adherence to the nationalist agenda as outlined in the National Pact gave Ankara's

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32 Vere-Hodge, 24.

33 See Sonyel, 73-77 for a discussion on French-Nationalist relations in Cilicia, and Sonyel, 48-54 for a discussion of the Turkish-Armenian conflict; see also Fromkin, 531-33 for a review of Turco-Italian relations.

34 Sonyel, 65.
diplomatic position constancy that held up against the shifting and conflicting diplomatic interests and war-weariness of new governments in France, Italy, Russia, Greece, and Britain. Without unity of purpose, the Allied postwar agenda for Turkey foundered. Finally by forcing a dialogue with the Allies brought on by military defeat, the Nationalists were able to achieved de facto recognition from France and Italy prior to any new peace settlement, as well as strong indications of French and Italian support against British demands at the upcoming Lausanne Conference.\(^{35}\)

Unable or unwilling to defeat the Turks militarily, the Allies agreed in 1922 to a new peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland. Subsequently a new peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne, was signed with the Republic of Turkey in July 1923. The Lausanne Treaty recognized Turkey as an independent state within the basic boundaries it enjoys today, secured the evacuation of all foreign military forces, acknowledged the elimination of the Capitulations, and relieved Ankara of much of the Ottoman debt.\(^{36}\)

Further, the treaty was recognized as a overwhelming Turkish diplomatic success.\(^{37}\) Of the three defeated Central

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\(^{35}\) Ibid., 102-05, 135-43.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., Chapter 7, passim.

\(^{37}\) Vere-Hodge, 38. The Treaty of Lausanne is generally recognized as a Turkish diplomatic success for the simple reason that despite the Turkish perception that they were at a disadvantage, they skillfully negotiated a treaty that gave them nearly all that they had been asking for in the
Powers, Turkey was the only state to secure the vast majority of its interests in the subsequent peace negotiations. In a real sense, the argument can be made that while the Ottoman state was destroyed by World War I, the Turkish "nation" by force of arms, military stamina, and skillful diplomacy emerged in a stronger position after the war than they had been prior to 1914. As a result, Turkey emerged a

homogeneous, unified homeland; within it, freedom from the obligations imposed by foreigners and from privileges of a nature creating a state within a state; freedom from imposed financial obligations; a free, rich homeland with a recognized absolute right of self-defense.38

Post-Laçanne Diplomacy: 1923–1939

Once recognized by Lausanne, Ankara aimed to cultivate Turkey’s reshaped relations with the West, as well as relations with the new Soviet Union. These objectives were developed in consideration of Ankara’s desire to focus on internal development and national reconstruction.39

While the focus of this study remains fixed on Turkey’s relationship with the West, Turkey’s relations with Russia also assumed a preeminent position in Ankara’s diplomatic affairs in the immediate period after Lausanne.

38 Ismet Inonu’s 8 August 1923 speech before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, cited in Sonyel, 226.

39 Eren, 21.
Turkey had maintained good "brotherly" relations with the Soviets before Lausanne as both a counterweight and as leverage against the West Europeans. Turkish-Russian relations culminated in the Moscow Pact (1921) in which the two parties agreed among other things to expand commercial ties, recognize respective boundaries, abolish the Capitulations, prevent subversive propaganda against the other party, and demarcate boundaries between the Transcaucasian states and Turkey.\textsuperscript{40} The Moscow Pact was subsequently followed in the post-Lausanne period by a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in 1925.\textsuperscript{41}

In the West, these Turco-Russian agreements were seen by some among the erstwhile Allies as a latent threat to their own political interests.\textsuperscript{42} From the Turkish perspective these treaties gave most importantly, recognition to the Nationalist government, and also a firm basis from which to proceed in its diplomacy with the West. However, by 1930, Turkey's strong relations with the Soviets began to fade in favor of better relations with the West, brought about by the settlement of the Mosul issue with

\textsuperscript{40} Vere-Hodge, 69-71.

\textsuperscript{41} Váli, 25. See also Vere-Hodge, 69-71.

\textsuperscript{42} Sonyel, 87. Sonyel cites the unease that the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Carlo Sforza, felt over a potential Turkish-Russian rapprochement. Like some French observers of the day, he counseled his government and the other Allied governments to revise the harsh conditions of the Sèvres treaty to help prevent just such a relationship from developing.
Britain in 1926, ham-handed Soviet attempts to control the Turkish nationalist movement and Ankara's policies, a proactive Italian Mediterranean policy, and resolution of the Turkish-Syrian border in 1929 that sparked increasingly better relations with France.43

On the bilateral level, Turkey's relations with Europe over the post-Lausanne period were mixed. Turkish relations with France during the post-Lausanne period focused on settlement of the Turkish-Syrian border, the status of Iskendrun (Alexandretta) and Antakya (Antioch).44

Prior to the war, France enjoyed a preeminent diplomatic position among West Europeans at the Sublime Porte. Further, Turkish-French relations (during the nationalist period) had steadily improved once the French agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in 1921. However, despite auspicious beginnings, relations between the two states declined following Lausanne and did not resume their previous character until 1939 with the cession of the Hatay province to Turkey and the signing of a mutual assistance treaty.45

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43 Vere-Hodge, 58-69, 76-80.
44 Ibid., 65-69, 115-22.
45 Ibid.
Turkish etatist economic policies in the post-Lausanne era, Turkish hostility to foreign capital and entrepreneurs, and the Hatay difficulties all created complications for French investors, companies, and local French entrepreneurs. Together these factors contributed to a decline in commercial ties between Turkey and France.47

Nevertheless, common recognition of the threat posed by the rise of fascist Italy and, more importantly, French accommodation of Turkey’s interests in Hatay provided the impetus for closer relations on the eve of World War II.48

Turkish relations with Britain after Lausanne were characterized by continued suspicion and hostility. The Mosul question, having been deferred at Lausanne, became the centerpiece of the diplomatic struggle between Turkey and Britain. A bilateral commission took up the problem in 1926 but failed to resolve the issue, whereupon it was submitted

46 Etatism is the idea that the state directly participates in the economy, performing specialized tasks such as providing capital for development, providing power and transportation services, as well as operating large industries. Following World War I, Ankara provided much of these services. Etatism does not preclude private property or capitalism. For a thorough explanation of Turkish etatism see Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principles of Kemalism," in Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), 11-35; see also Ergun Ozbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), 79-102.

47 Vere-Hodge, 65-69.

48 Ibid., 119.
to the League of Nations for adjudication. Mosul vilayet was subsequently awarded to Iraq (still under British mandate), and in June 1926 Britain and Turkey reached a political and financial settlement.\textsuperscript{49} With the removal of the Mosul obstacle, relations between Britain and Turkey gradually improved to the point where, in 1930, they signed a commerce and navigation accord and a Friendship Agreement.\textsuperscript{50}

Anglo-Turkish relations continued to improve as Ankara and London recognized their shared interests in preserving a Mediterranean balance-of-power and drew closer together in response to the growing threat from fascist Italy.

Further, British efforts to accommodate Turkish demands for revision of the Montreux conventions on navigation through the Black Sea Straits and remilitarization of the Dardanelles in 1936 can be seen as an effort by London to prevent Turkey from gravitating any closer to either Russian or nascent German power. Turkey, for its part, again used the perception of good Turkish-Russian relations as leverage against the British in the Montreux negotiations. As a result of the general rapprochement between London and Ankara in the late 1930s, Anglo-Turkish trade increased significantly and a tripartite Mutual Assistance Pact (which included France) was signed in 1939, signalling a re-

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 64.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
orientation of Turkish foreign policy towards the West.\textsuperscript{51}

In addition to strengthening ties with Britain and France in the last decade before World War II, the Turks also enjoyed a strong commercial relationship with Germany throughout the interwar period, especially after 1925.\textsuperscript{52} German efforts to further penetrate the Turkish economy were reinvigorated in the Nazi era, as Berlin saw an opportunity to draw Turkey firmly into the German orbit. German intrigues in the Balkans began to worry Ankara, however, and by 1936, despite strong economic links, relations began to cool.\textsuperscript{53} German displeasure over the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement and the resulting revision of the Montreux Conventions resulted in a German protest to Ankara in 1937, which was sharply rebuked.\textsuperscript{54} Nevertheless, Turkey continued to balance relations between Britain, a Mediterranean ally, and Germany, a valuable trading partner through 1939 and well into World War II.

Turkish relations with Greece also improved in the post-Lausanne period, albeit slowly. By 1930, Italian diplomatic efforts bore fruit and gave way to an accord between Greece and Turkey that settled outstanding issues remaining from the Lausanne negotiations. This accord led

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 119-25.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 111-15.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
to subsequent treaties of neutrality and commerce in the same year.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{World War II: 1939-1945}

Turkish diplomacy passed through three distinct phases during WWII.\textsuperscript{56} The first phase, "benevolent neutrality" lasted for nearly a year (1939-1940). Despite the tripartite Mutual Assistance Pact (1939) signed by Turkey, Britain, and France which required the contracting parties to provide "all aid and assistance" possible in the event of an attack on any of the three states, Ankara opted to adhere closely to the provisions of Article 4 which allowed Turkey to observe at the minimum, "benevolent neutrality towards Britain and France."\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{55} Eren, 231. See also Vere-Hodge, 79.

\textsuperscript{56} Vere-Hodge offers a view of Turkish diplomacy divided into four stages during World War II. While this study loosely bases its understanding of Ankara’s diplomacy during this period on the time frames set out by Vere-Hodge, this author views their character somewhat differently. Further, apparent typographical errors in Vere-Hodge’s text are misleading to the casual reader as to the inclusive dates of these different periods. A close reading of the Table of Contents gives a better explanation of Vere-Hodge’s intentions.

\textsuperscript{57} Vere-Hodge, 129-30. The Turks had also insisted on a clause that would render Turkish obligations under the pact to become void if future hostilities required Turkey to be a party to armed conflict with Russia. See Selim Deringil, \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Appendix, for a full text of the agreement and associated protocols.
The second phase, "balanced neutrality" began roughly in the fall of 1940 as the war stalemated. However, the Spring 1941 Nazi conquests of France and the Low Countries led to Ankara’s subsequent reevaluation of its diplomatic position. Further Turkish apprehension developed as first, German diplomatic pressure and military posturing collapsed the weak Balkan states; next, German troops invaded Greece in support of Italy; and finally, as Turkey became aware of German scheming with Russia over the Black Sea Straits conventions and Turkey’s northeastern boundaries. German-Russian plotting included plans for a new agreement on the Straits more favorable to Berlin and Moscow as well as the provision for Soviet land and naval bases in the Dardanelles.

With little regard for their plotting with the Soviets, the Nazis also began making direct overtures towards Ankara with the aim of completely detaching Turkey from the Anglo-Turkish alliance. From Ankara’s perspective--now nearly surrounded by German occupied or influenced states--it was necessary to make some formal agreement with the Germans about their mutual relations, first, for reasons of national security, and second, to enhance their sagging economic fortunes.

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58 Eren, 233; see also Vere-Hodge, 138-40.
59 Eren, 233.
60 Vere-Hodge, 148.
German offers to Ankara included a Treaty of Friendship and certain territorial adjustments beneficial to Turkey in exchange for German military transit rights through Turkish territory to Iraq.\(^61\) Despite strong German diplomatic pressure, Turkey was not to be hastened from her neutral position. While Turkish footdragging resulted in German frustration at the highest levels,\(^62\) Turkish intransigence only yielded in the end to a rather benign Turco-German agreement signed in 1941 that stated: (1) each state's mutual respect for the "integrity and sanctity of territory"; (2) that the two states would not "take any measures that directly or indirectly could be turned against the other Contracting Party"; (3) that the two states would consult with each other on all mutual problems; and (4) that "joint consultations" would be undertaken for a future economic agreement.\(^63\)

In the end, the Turco-German agreement did little but solidify Turkey's neutral status and offer Ankara a willing trade partner. Still, Ankara's apprehension was heightened once again when four days after signing the agreement with Germany, the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, and a subsequent Anglo-Russian entente emerged. Turkey maintained

\(^61\) Deringil, 121. At the time, an anti-British insurrection was occurring in Iraq, sponsored in part, by the Germans.

\(^62\) Vere-Hodge, 144.

\(^63\) Ibid., 144-45.
a precarious balance between the rival combatants into 1943 when once again the war's fortunes changed the political landscape, precipitating a new Turkish response.

The third phase of Turkey's war diplomacy was characterized by the slow, deliberate evolution from neutrality to tacit belligerency. By the Fall of 1942, the tide had turned against the Axis with the defeats at Stalingrad, Guadalcanal, and El Alamein. Axis reversals continued into 1943 and the Turks remained firmly neutral despite the strong trade ties with Germany that lasted until 1944.64 As the Axis military threat receded from the Mediterranean and Balkan areas, Turkish accommodation of Allied war plans and operations became more apparent.65

Nevertheless, recent Turkish fears of an Axis victory were now overshadowed by the fear of Soviet military and political resurgence, its growing hostility towards Turkish neutrality, and the perception of Western accommodation of Soviet post-war interests.

Although in 1942 the Soviets were effusively praising Turkey's neutral stand, the changed military situation and Russian contemplation on the shape of the post-war international environment led to Moscow's increasingly belligerent tone. By March 1945, Soviet displeasure with

64 Deringil, 172-73.
65 Vere-Hodge, 155-60.
Turkish neutrality resulted in Moscow's unilateral abrogation of the 1921 Moscow Pact.\textsuperscript{66}

With the fall of Germany imminent, Turkey finally declared war on Germany in Spring 1945 in order to secure a place at the peace conference to follow the war's end, thus ending Turkey's formal neutrality.

\textbf{The Cold War Period: 1945-1990}

In May 1945, Turkey faced large Russian troop concentrations in the Caucasus and on the Bulgarian border as well as new Russian demands for certain political and territorial concessions. First, Moscow wanted a new maritime convention on the Black Sea Straits, second, the creation of joint Turkish-Soviet defense plans for the Dardanelles that included the basing of Soviet troops on the Dardanelles, and third, territorial adjustments in the Turkish northeast. These demands were followed by a spirited Turkish diplomatic defense of Ankara's activities during the war and a firm refusal to renegotiate territorial claims or the Straits regime.\textsuperscript{67} The visit of the battleship, USS Missouri, in 1946 signalled, however, growing U.S. support for Turkey's territorial integrity and independence. In less than a year of the Missouri visit, U.S. support and aid in the form of the Truman Doctrine was

\textsuperscript{66} Eren, 233; see also Deringil, 178-83.

\textsuperscript{67} Vere-Hodge, 168-75.
authorized by Congress, and Turkey soon began receiving vital military assistance and economic support from its new benefactor.68

Creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1948 was initially expected to include both Greece and Turkey. However, they were not admitted into the alliance until February 1952, based in part on the interjection of the Korean conflict and some European reluctance to embrace the non-contiguous southeast states (Greece and Turkey) in fear that the overall chances of conflict with the Soviets would increase by allying themselves with states apparently in Russia’s sphere of influence.69 However, Turkey’s eventual entry into NATO marked the natural outgrowth of her long association with Western Europe and her historically pragmatic interest in developing a counterweight to Russian pressures.

During the Cold war period Turkey remained a consistently steadfast NATO member despite domestic problems that surfaced over the unsteady nature of Turkish democracy. For example, Turkish military intervention in domestic

68 Eren, 235-36.

politics in 1960 was followed immediately by Turkish military pronouncements promising early restoration of democracy and assurances that Turkey’s NATO commitments remained firm.\(^{70}\)

Nevertheless, Turkey’s relationship with the West through NATO has not been without obstacles and disagreements. Both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cyprus Crisis in 1964\(^{71}\) provoked serious examination of the NATO relationship and Turkey’s role in the alliance. Cyprus, in particular, with its large population of Turkish Cypriots is an issue in which Ankara has an emotional stake.\(^{72}\) Still, even the 1974 crisis in Cyprus, the resulting Turkish invasion of the northern part of the island, the subsequent hostile relations with Greece, and the American suspension of military aid did not cause an irreparable rupture in overall relations with the U.S. or the West. By 1978, U.S. military aid was restored and in 1980 a new Defense and Cooperation Agreement was signed.\(^{73}\)

Turkish support of Western security objectives remained strong even as the Cold War era now passes away. Turkey’s

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\(^{70}\) Váli, 40.

\(^{71}\) The 1964 crisis was spurred by Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece which led to civil war (1964-1965). This particular crisis is not to be confused with the subsequent 1974 crisis.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 129-37.

\(^{73}\) Harris, 196.
support for Coalition forces during the recent Persian Gulf War serves as strong evidence of Turkey's continuing ties to Western security interests despite the high political and economic costs to herself.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The history of Turkish diplomatic tradition leads us to several recurrent and interconnected themes which bear directly on Turkey's foreign policy today. First, just as Ottoman diplomacy sought to establish some condominium between the Russian and British Empires as a result of its precarious position between the two, so too does Turkey's foreign policy reflect its geopolitical position. Located square in the path of historic Russian/Soviet interests and aspirations, the Turks have naturally developed a strong fear of their neighbor to the north. This fear has resulted in the past in a series of alliances with West European powers—notably Britain, France, and Germany. These alliances proved disastrous in the long run for the

\textsuperscript{74} Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 70 (Spring 1991): 34-48. Kuniholm indicates that Turkey may have lost more than $9 billion in revenue due to the Persian Gulf War. In addition, the war displaced thousands of Iraqi Kurds which fled into Turkey causing a refugee nightmare; further, the war led to upswing in Kurdish insurgence inside Turkey in its aftermath.

Further, Turkish support for the Allied cause was not well received by some Turkish religious conservatives, political factions, and apparently elements in the military. The Chief of the General Staff, for example, resigned following Ozal's decision to allow Allied forces to use Turkish facilities for the war.
Ottomans, however, modern Turkey has by and large profited from its alliance relationships. While Turkish reassessment of their role within NATO has been underway for several years, Turkey will continue to be motivated by the exigencies of her geopolitical situation and remain committed to the West.

Furthermore, in spite of a martial spirit, conscription, and large standing armies, Ankara has relied on a strong and active diplomacy based in part upon the clear articulation of their national interests as reflected in the National Pact.

These four themes--fear of Russia, alliance with West European powers, emphasis on diplomacy, and the clear articulation of non-hegemonic nationalist interests--will continue to help shape Turkey’s foreign policy in the coming decades.
Chapter 5

KEMALIST IDEOLOGY: THE DRIVING FORCE OF TURKISH ASPIRATIONS

Introduction

While Turkish perceptions of their national interests are colored by a pragmatic approach to diplomacy based upon traditional themes, Turkish perceptions of their national interest also reflect the profound impact of Kemal Ataturk's ideology.1 As Ankara asserts in its own official publications, Turkey's foreign policy is "based on a synthesis of deep-rooted state tradition and the aspirations of contemporary Turkey."2 These aspirations are in large part embodied in the Kemalist ideology. Kemalist ideology, in both its origins and in its aims, draws Turkey inexorably towards the West—and Europe in particular.

Even Ataturk himself remarked on this theme upon the founding of the Turkish Republic, by noting the necessity of Turkey’s ties with Europe.

Our object now is to strengthen the ties that bind us to other nations. There may be a great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to achieve progress, she must be part of this

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1 Ataturk’s ideology is known both as Ataturkism and Kemalism. Kemalism seems to be more prevalent among Turkish writers. Therefore, their terminology has been adopted here.

2 Republic of Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkey (Ankara, 1993), 58. Emphasis added.
... The Ottoman Empire began to decline the day when, proud of her successes against the West, she cut the ties that bound her to the European nations.\textsuperscript{3}

As Versan notes, Ataturk then forswore any repetition of the Ottoman error.\textsuperscript{4}

Finally, our purpose here is to first provide a short overview of Kemalist principles, second, render an interpretation of what those principles mean to the Turks, lastly, and most importantly, elaborate on how the Turkish understanding of Kemalism affects their contemporary foreign policy.

The Six Arrows

Kemalism, according to the \textit{History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey} is Ataturk's vision of a Turkish nation-state embodied in six basic principles--commonly referred to as the "Six Arrows."\textsuperscript{5}

These six themes represent the major pillars of Kemalism, and although they do not necessarily address all


\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.

aspects of the ideology, a simple explanation of their meaning and intentions will help put Kemalist ideology in the proper perspective for our later analysis. The Six Arrows include the ideologies of nationalism, republicanism, populism, secularism, etatism, and reformism/revolutionism.

The principle of nationalism as conceived by Kemalists was designed to help establish historic, cultural, and geographic points of reference by which a new understanding of the Turkish "nation," divorced from the Ottoman past, could be drawn.

As a result, the new government in Ankara took steps to redefine Turkish nationality by replacing the use of Arabic script with Latin lettering and eliminating many Arabic and Persian words from the language (1928), outlawing traditional costumes, and sponsoring and circulating pseudo-scientific studies claiming the origins of humanity and human language could be found among the Turkish race. Further, they eliminated the previous Ottoman conception of "nation"--the millet, and replaced it with a broader


8 See Shaw and Shaw, 375-76.
understanding of what it meant to be Turkish. Kemalist notions of nationalism now defined the Turkish national identity as that of Turkish speakers, "brought up with Turkish culture," sharing "Turkish ideals," and living on Turkish territory. ¹⁰

Finally, Ankara's only geographic claims lay in areas that were undoubtedly populated by significant Turkish communities—Anatolia, Thrace, Hatay, and Mosul. ¹¹

The concept of republicanism was also aimed squarely at rebuking the Ottoman past. The new Turkish state renounced any claim to the political or moral leadership of Islam by elimination of first the Sultanate and later the Caliphate, and sought to destroy the old "Ottoman social system through

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⁹ Millet refers to the various resident religious communities throughout the Ottoman empire. The millet system under the Ottomans allowed these various ethnic, cultural, and religious groups (Jews, Catholics, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, etc.) within the Empire to run many of their own affairs. Separate schools, hospitals, and other social services, as well as the use of national languages, and judicial courts were allowed to exist for these communities. In addition, various non-Muslim religious leaders were appointed by Istanbul and were allowed to exercise considerable political and moral authority over their respective communities.


¹¹ As previously noted, the Mosul vilayet, while claimed by Ankara, was ultimately allowed to pass without violence to Iraq then under British mandate. Hatay was ceded by France to Turkey in 1939. See the previous chapter for elaboration of these points.
which a small Ruling Class governed and the mass of subjects existed to support it.\textsuperscript{12}

The new conception of government asserted that sovereignty was now ascribed to the Turkish "nation"--the people themselves rather than the Sultan.\textsuperscript{13} Further, Kemalist republicanism implied the concepts of "freedom and equality before the law."\textsuperscript{14} This understanding of sovereignty and guaranteed political rights encouraged all Turkish citizens to identify their interests with the new form of government and to feel that they were represented by it, thereby insuring the irreversibility of the Nationalist agenda.

Populism as understood by Kemalists supported the concepts of nationalism and republicanism. Embodied in the principle of populism was first, the notion of democratic practice, and second, social equality.\textsuperscript{15} Karal offers the following insight on Kemalist conceptions of populism. Populism defined "the basic principle of Turkish democracy, if one interprets it as meaning the governance 'of the people, with the people, for the people.'"\textsuperscript{16} Paul Dumont notes that populism is "a rather vague notion," that implies

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Shaw and Shaw, 375.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 375.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Dumont, 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Shaw and Shaw, 378-79.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Karal, 19-20.
\end{itemize}
mobilization of the intelligentsia to serve the masses and a classless national solidarity, as well as a more commonly understood notion—democracy. Still, the Kemalist conception of populism, despite its egalitarian claims, did not make any significant inroads on the favored position of Turkish elites. While populism seems to have disappeared from the official lexicon, populist themes resonate in the term replacing it—"democracy." The new emphasis on democracy does not, in our view, reflect the abandonment of populism, rather the emphasis on democracy reflects the refinement of populist themes for the conditions of the modern era.

Secularism, as Akural notes, "is the most salient and fundamental aspect of Kemalism." It intended to displace the role of religion in Turkish society in order to facilitate the modernizing changes desired by the Kemalists. While Ataturk's principle of secularism embodies the separation of church and state as the West understands it, secularism also has a broader application according to Karal,

The principle of secularism as developed by the Turkish

17 Dumont, 31.
19 Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 57.
20 Akural, 126.
revolution is more extensive than its Western counterpart. Aside from the liberation of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers from religious influence, it expels entire traditions in the life of a nation tending to restrict social, individual or family activities in the name of religion.\textsuperscript{21}

Kemalists launched their secularization program shortly after the founding of the Republic. In a rather short space of time, the Caliphate was abolished, the sharia (Islamic law), the religious courts, and the Islamic calendar were abandoned, the ulema (religious leaders) were stripped of their privileges, religious schools were incorporated into the national education system, the Sabbath was changed to Sunday, religious shrines and societies were closed, the veil was discouraged, and the use of Arabic forbidden. Further, the secularization program enfranchised women, removed Islam as the state religion, made civil marriages mandatory, allowed the sale of alcohol, substituted metric weights and measures, allowed paintings and sculptures to be displayed, and standardized the national education system.\textsuperscript{22}

Perhaps no other state has taken steps as drastic to completely alter prevailing cultural patterns and traditions as did Turkey under the early Nationalists. Despite appearances however, the practice of religion was not opposed. The Kemalists did not substitute or plan to substitute another belief for Islam. According to Shaw,

\textsuperscript{21} Karal, 22.

\textsuperscript{22} Shaw and Shaw, 384–388.
"the state was not anticlerical as long as the ulema made no overt attempt to interfere with the reforms."^{23}

Despite the sweeping changes in almost every facet of life, secularization initially effected meaningful value changes only among the Turkish elites. \(^{24}\) Still, secularism has now apparently taken hold in Turkish political culture according to surveys conducted by Turan in 1974.\(^{25}\) Nevertheless, in rural areas, traditional values and practices still appear more commonplace than in urban areas, although the effects of secularization are also apparent.\(^{26}\)

The principle of etatism (statism) is, like secularism, somewhat expanded beyond the Western definitions. Z.Y. Herschlag points out that Turkish etatism reflects the "convergence between two conceptually opposed systems and ideologies--capitalism and socialism--in what has been

\(^{23}\) Shaw and Shaw, 387.

\(^{24}\) Akural, 129.

\(^{25}\) Ilter Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey," in Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet Evin (Opladen, Germany: Leske und Budrich, 1984), 90-91. Among the number of surveys conducted and/or reported by Turan several gave indications that secularist attitudes are present in the Turkish polity. In one survey, respondents answered a set of questions that measured, among other things, factors that were most important to a society and its development. Results indicated that human actions (hard work, good government planning) are factors more important to society than "good luck" or "God's help."

\(^{26}\) This unscientific observation is based on the author's tour of central and southeast Turkey, April-June 1992.
called the 'mixed economy.'” While etatism connotes the
direct participation of the state in economic matters, Karal
implies the Turkish principle of etatism was designed to
insure a balance between private and public economic
requirements. The Turkish state, as a "new" nation, without
benefit of large industries, a viable transportation system,
or extensive capital, was forced to take up the mantle of
performing specialized economic tasks. These included the
provision of public utilities, banking, transportation, and
large manufactures. These state-run enterprises still
exist and are commonly referred to as State Economic
Enterprises (SEEs).

Herschlag’s essay also notes etatism’s Turkish roots,
its ideological character, and pertinent historical Ottoman
influences, as well as, most significantly, etatism’s
implementation as a tool for Turkey’s "rapid economic
development in support of political and economic
independence.”

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29 Herschlag, 175.
Although etatism has long been a pillar of Kemalist thought,30 civilian governments in the post-1983 period have placed a stronger emphasis on privatization of Turkey’s SEEs in order to reduce huge government outlays in support of the state sector and also to bolster Turkish productivity in the hopes of unification with the EU. This new emphasis on privatization reflects the decline of etatism as a operative economic philosophy.31

The last pillar of Kemalism has been plagued by an inherent difficulty in expressing the proper meaning of the concept in other languages. It has, therefore, been alternately labelled "reformism" or "revolutionism," rooted in two distinctly different Turkish words.32 The Kemalists

30 Váli notes that the principle of etatism was dropped from the Constitution in 1961. See Váli, 57.

31 "Turkey--Government Economic Policies," Market Reports, December 19, 1991 (Lexis-Nexis). [This report is based upon US Embassy Ankara’s report on the Turkish economic agenda following the election of the new Demirel government in 1991]; see also "Privatization on Course," Barron’s, December 7, 1992, 68 (Special Advertising Supplement). Since 1980, successive Turkish governments have gradually drawn away from enthusiastic state support of the SEEs and have initiated a privatization program despite fears that slashing state sponsored enterprises (and thereby significant numbers of employed) would result in voter backlash. The commitment to privatization has survived the political transition from one ruling party (Motherland) to the next (True Path/Social Democrat Populist Party coalition) in 1991. The new president, Süleyman Demirel, and the new prime minister, Tansu Ciller, have both stated their commitment to see privatization of government subsidized enterprises run its course. See cite above.

32 Dumont traces the etymological differences between inkilab (revolution) and ıslâhat (reform). See Dumont, 34.
settled upon *inkilabçilik* (revolutionism), which implied "radical change executed with order and method" and for them meant

among other things a transformation in outlook, adoption of western ways of life, a fight against ignorance and superstition, the import of new techniques, economic development, and, in particular, a constant resort to science.\(^3\)

In addition to the commitment to modernism, an element of pragmatism runs through the idea of revolutionism as well by acknowledging the use of whatever methods required to insure the success of other Kemalist ideals.\(^3\)

Finally, Váli notes that first, the idea of revolutionism also carries an inherent Western thrust, "since this transformation was directed toward the modernization of Turkey after the Western ideal, it also implicitly carried a Western political orientation" and that second, in subsequent years, the Turkish term was changed to *devrimcilik*, meaning "transformation."\(^3\)

\(^3\) Dumont provides an illustrative quote by Ataturk himself regarding the semantic dilemma surrounding the word "revolution": "These great changes effected by our nation in the space of only six years represent grandiose movements, more sublime and intense than what is commonly meant by the word revolution." See Dumont, 35. Quoted by Dumont from Tekin Alp, *Le Kemalisme* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1937), 15. Emphasis added.

\(^3\) Dumont, 34-35.

\(^3\) Shaw and Shaw, 384.

\(^3\) Váli, 56. (See Váli’s footnote 39).
The Influence of Ideology

Here, instead of viewing the practice and preservation of Kemalist ideology as a component of the national interest, we must note Kemalism's influence on Ankara's foreign policy and its ability to support Turkish national interests.

For the fledgling Nationalist government in Ankara following the successes of Lausanne in 1923, Kemalist principles were seen as the only method by which the new nation-state could shed itself of the Ottoman past. Kemalists believed that the transition from universalistic, pan-Islamic Empire to a modern European-style nation-state could only be accomplished by the adoption of the same European concepts and notions underlying the modern European states.37

Kemalists did not seek to emulate Europe because of some infatuation with the Continent, rather they sought to produce a modernized nation-state based on proven methods and ideas that happened to originate in Europe. It was only later, as we noted in the preceding chapter, that Turkey turned towards the West, the first, hesitant commitment just before WWII, and finally, a permanent relationship in the post-WWII era. The Turks first adopted European concepts as

37 Karal, passim.
a method of reshaping Turkish cultural and society for reasons of expediency rather than sentiment. In sum, as many scholars have noted, we must view Kemalist ideology as a program of modernization through the process of Westernization. Indeed as Váli points out,

the underlying motivation for these principles and for the policy of Westernization was the goal of assimilating the Turkish people into the nations of developed Europe. In the eyes of Ataturk and his followers there was only one civilization, the Western one, and they would join it 'in spite of the West.'

When taken together, Kemalist principles first reflect an ideology that suggests that the primary focus of Turkey's foreign policy will be aimed at Europe (and the West). Second, these principles imply an element of subordination in Turkey's relationship with the West that can only be erased by European recognition of Turkey's "European-ness." In other words, by vocalizing its European aspirations, Turkey has allowed itself in some ways to be manipulated and judged by whatever standards Europe sets for Ankara.

Further, Turks note their ideological commitments to democracy, secularism, republicanism, and modernization, and

38 Akural, 125. Here, Akural points to the significance of Kemalism as an instrument of social change.

39 This theme is well documented in many scholarly works on Kemalism. For further reference see Osman Okyar, "Ataturk’s Quest for Modernism"; David Kushner’s "Ataturk’s Legacy: Westernism in Contemporary Turkey"; or Ismet Giritli, "Kemalism as an Ideology of Modernization." These can be found in Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey, edited by Landau, cited previously.

40 Váli, 56.
expect those commitments to be recognized by Europeans at face value. Ankara, therefore, is taken aback at European complaints about their human rights record and their democratic practice. The Kemalist ideology compels Turkey to first seek links with states they view as sharing like values and common goals, and second, to expect validation of shared values and commonality by their partners, rather than censure.

This self-identification by Turkish elites with European "civilization" and their perception of shared common values with the West has been translated into powerful Turkish policy considerations that are bent upon achieving European recognition.

Kemalist ideology's influence upon Turkish foreign policy is then somewhat sublime. Ideology is more useful to Turkey's foreign policy as a means of influencing European perception than by its actual impact on specific or isolated diplomatic activities. Ankara's adherence to the European concepts in Kemalism helps reinforce European perceptions of commonality, assuages European concerns about Turkey's bumptious past (and present), and eases the implementation of common Turkish-European interests.

Further, successful application of Kemalist tenets, in particular secularism, may help to eliminate European

41 The human rights and democracy issues will be dealt with in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8.
"cultural apprehension." Secularism is seen by the Turks as evidence of their modernity and the shared common ability with European states to separate religion from politics.

Moreover, successes in Turkish democracy, for example, have been cited by President Demirel as proof that Turkey "has come of age." The selection of Tansu Ciller, a woman, as Prime Minister has been cited as proof that Turkey is a Western, modernized, European-style state. Finally, Turkish leaders see the successful implementation of most Kemalist principles as preconditions for fulfilling long-held aims of economic development and eventual unification with Europe.

42 A number of Turkish leaders have held that one of the impediments to closer relations with Europe is the West's "cultural apprehension"—i.e., the fear that in some way "Muslim" Turkey will disturb the balance of "Christian" Europe. Insofar as the term is concerned, it appears to have been coined by Cem Duna, head of Turkey's mission to the EU. See Alecia McKenzie, "Turkey: Ankara Banking on British Presidency for EC Entry," InterPress Service, July 31, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).


44 Alan Cowell, "Istanbul Journal: Turks Espouse Change (She has a 'Smile of Steel')," The New York Times, 3 July 1993, sec. 1, 4 (Lexis-Nexis).

While these aspirations are seen by the Turks as their necessary destiny, Turkey’s European aspirations are at the same time a willing yoke, (for now) worn loosely by Ankara, the reins woven through the collective fingers of the EU. In this sense, some aspects of Kemalist ideology can be seen as impediments to Turkey’s full membership in the EU. The following examples serve to demonstrate the binding nature of ideology and how it can impede Turkey’s accession to the EU as well as indicate some of the issues with which the EU can attempt to manipulate Turkish policy. While these issues will be discussed in greater detail below, for now a short discussion serves to indicate the kinds of entanglements that can restrict policy options in Turkish diplomacy.

First, the Kemalist principle of nationalism, has sidetracked Turkey’s ability to successfully deal with the Kurdish problem. Ankara’s narrow interpretation of Turkish nationalism has allowed successive Turkish governments to forbid the use of Kurdish language, Kurdish cultural practices, and above all, Kurdish political activity. As Paul Henze correctly points out, the Kurds in Turkey enjoy significant advantages in terms of civil and political rights far beyond that which their brethren in Iran, Syria,
or Iraq enjoy, however, they do not enjoy these rights as Kurds, but as Turks.\footnote{6 Paul B. Henze, "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century," in \textit{Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China}, eds. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 21.}

The EU, for its part, has chided Ankara over its Kurdish policies and human rights practices.\footnote{7 "EC Calls on Turkey to Improve Record on Human Rights, Cyprus," \textit{Agence France Presse}, 13 May 1993 (Lexis-Nexis); "EC: EP [European Parliament] Calls on Turkey to Respect Human Rights and Work Towards a Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Problem," \textit{Agence Europe}, 10 April 1992 (Nexis-Lexis); "Turkey Rejects EC Protest over Kurds," \textit{Xinhua General News Service}, 3 April 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).} Unless a reformulation of Turkey's state structure allows more Kurdish political autonomy and/or more recognition and political/cultural latitude is granted to the Kurds, the Kurdish problem, exacerbated by a narrow Kemalist definition of what constitutes a Turk, will continue to fester.

Nationalist sentiments also resonate in a broad sense in Turkey's position on Cyprus and the status of the Turkish community there. Turkey is unwilling to abandon the Turks in Cyprus to the vagaries of UN mediation or an unfavorable Greek Cypriot agenda. Turkish nationalism is also reflected in the strong fraternal feelings Turkey has towards the Azeris and the Turkic states in Central Asia. These sentiments based predominantly on the perception of a shared national ancestry, rather than a common religion, shape and
delimit the viable options available to Turkish diplomats engaged in the region.

Second, the practice of etatism, though fading, has been seen by Europe as an impediment to closer economic ties. Only since the early 1980s have Turkish leaders seriously abandoned the principle of etatism. Nevertheless, despite current Turkish intentions, the government still has not privatized many industries, and has shown some reluctance to subject state industries to full competition with the EU. Residual etatist practices serve then as a brake on privatization efforts and make economic relationships with the EU that much more difficult to consummate.

In sum, while Kemalist ideology serves primarily as a facilitating vehicle in the Turkish foreign policy environment for other Turkish interests, designed in part to demonstrate to Europe a community of common values and interests between Ankara and Europe proper, it also to a lesser degree restricts the viable policy choices Ankara can make. Finally, Turkey’s leaders, past and present, see Ataturk’s transformation of Turkey in some ways as unfinished—in large measure because Turkey remains formally unrecognized by the "civilization" it aspires to join.
Chapter 6

THE IMPRIMATUR OF EUROPE: ANKARA’S POLICY OF EUROPEANIZATION

Introduction

Motivated by national interests that are in turn strongly shaped by state tradition and ideological dimensions, Ankara remains committed to a foreign policy that seeks the "imprimatur" of Europe. Turkey continues towards Europeanization on several levels.

Turkey’s quest for the legitimation of ideology and tradition impels Ankara to seek an official validation by Europe of Turkey’s professed European character. While NATO and the other European organizations give Turkey a significant voice in Europe, for the Turks, accession to the European Union (EU) remains the ultimate stamp of approval.¹ One Turkish academic noted that "NATO is our legal foot in the Western camp, but the EC is the real one."²

¹ The terms "European Community" (EC) and "European Union" (EU) are used interchangeably throughout the text. Although the author has struggled to standardize terminology for the sake of easier comprehension, with the recent Maastricht Treaty, the EC is now officially referred to as the EU.

² Professor Seyfi Tashan’s remarks were originally reported in the Economist, June 18, 1988, 29. Quoted by Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War," in Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, eds. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 106.
This chapter explores several Turkish strategies for Europeanization in a broad sense, but particular emphasis is given to the prime Turkish strategy--accession to the EU.

**Turkish Strategies**

Turkish strategies for Europeanization are like tines on a fork, each approaches the problem from a slightly different perspective, yet each complements in some fashion the predominant interest--in this case, meaningful integration with Western Europe. It appears that Ankara has four basic strategies. They include: (1) strengthening European and domestic perceptions of political commonality, (2) demonstrating political loyalty, (3) advancing the strategy of economic incentive, and (4) increasing the scope and depth of formal diplomatic association.

**The Strategy of Perceived Commonality: Political Structures and Functions**

First, the Turks have shaped their domestic political structures to resemble those found in the West, i.e., separate, independent branches of government. Turkish structures, like those in Western Europe, include an executive, a parliamentary legislature, independent courts, a differentiated bureaucracy, and competitive political parties. Even the rules of the game in Turkey are derived from European sources: ideas such as constitutionalism, universal enfranchisement, competitive elections, political
compromise, majority rule, and electoral proportionality, appear to be imbedded in the Turkish political system and culture.³

It should be noted however, that the Turkish practice of democracy is not, in and of itself, motivated by some desire to impress Europe. Instead, it is first, a reflection of elite perceptions of Kemalist ideology, and second, flows from their understanding of the logical development of Turkish history.

Even so, democracy, as Graham Fuller recently noted, "strengthens Turkey’s standing in the West where democracy is perceived as a fundamental value ... Ankara is aware that any weakening of democratic practice at home simply makes it harder for the Western world to deal closely with Turkey."⁴

Further, the functions of Turkish political structures follow (and in many cases are drawn from) European patterns.


Here we are referring to the process and performance of Turkish political structures—the rules, methods, and procedures as well as the outputs and outcomes for political participation and policy making.\(^5\) Despite some flaws, to which we will return later, system functions like socialization and recruitment, process functions like interest articulation and aggregation, policy making and implementation, as well as policy functions of extraction, regulation, and distribution follow typically Western patterns.\(^6\)

While Turkish domestic politics remains outside the narrow scope of this study, it bears repeating that the nature of Turkey's democratic political system has placed Turkey on a path of convergence with West European political systems. This political convergence with Europe has allowed Ankara to claim political and social commonality with Europe. Therefore, the domestic political environment, bolstered by an ideology of Western parentage, helps legitimate Ankara's claim to a European identity.

\(^{5}\) For a more precise definition of the differences between structures and functions as well as an outline of various system, process, and policy functions, see Gabriel Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Robert J. Mundt, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993), 4-11.

The 'Good Soldier': Perceptions of Political Loyalty

On another level, since the end of World War II, Turkey has periodically sought to demonstrate its political loyalty to the West and to Europe. These demonstrations of loyalty create, on occasion, heavy political burdens for Ankara. Still, the appellation as NATO’s "good soldier" serves to reinforce perceptions that Turkey is fully committed to the broad outlines of the Western political agenda. Further, as in the past, recent Turkish demonstrations of loyalty during the Gulf War carry with them an unspoken sense, or hope at least, of Western reciprocity. Even today, Turkey still hosts one of the two remnant military operations of the Persian Gulf War in the form of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. PROVIDE COMFORT, a "coalition" military effort, continues to operate from Incirlik Air Base near Adana despite Turkish domestic political concerns over its potentially

7 Turkish participation in the Korean War, Turkey’s strong support of NATO even during periods of estrangement, Turkey’s continuing diplomatic relations with Israel, and most recently Turkish support in the Persian Gulf are just a few examples.

8 Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991): 34.

9 The Turks refer to this operation as "Poised Hammer," though one may rightly wonder whether the 'hammer' is intended for the Baghdad-regime or the PKK camps in northern Iraq. The author served as a liaison officer in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT during April-June 1992.

10 Coalition operations involve joint participation of U.S., U.K., French, and Turkish military components.
destabilizing ramifications for Iraq and southeastern Turkey.\textsuperscript{11}

Western payoffs have historically appeared to have been tuned more to Turkish security-related issues than to economic-related concerns.\textsuperscript{12} While Turkish loyalty to Europe and the West may be appreciated by policymakers in London, Berlin, or Paris, it has not prevented Europe as a whole from keeping Turkey at arm’s length. For all Ankara’s efforts, Turkey’s political loyalty has not brought it appreciably closer to formal political or economic integration with Europe through the EU.

**The Strategy of Economic Incentive: Turkey as Entrepôt of the East**

A third strategy involves the less-than-subtle Turkish attempts to blandish Europe with economic opportunities not

\textsuperscript{11} The Turks have reservations about PROVIDE COMFORT, given that it has allowed the development of Kurdish semi-autonomy in Iraq under Coalition air protection and provided a refuge of sorts for the PKK. The Turks are extremely sensitive to any political action that may have any consequences among their own Kurdish population. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) must revalidate the requirement for PROVIDE COMFORT every six months. Thus far, it has continued to do so. The last renewal was granted in December 1993.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, Turkish participation in the Korean War was rewarded by NATO membership; the Turks have been the beneficiaries of Western military largesse during the Cold War. In contrast, during DESERT STORM/PROVIDE COMFORT period, the Turks have been only partially reimbursed for financial losses stemming from the war, (estimated to be at least $3 billion a year since August 1990, and still running), while their hope for more favorable consideration with regard to EU membership remains unfulfilled.
only in Turkey, but perhaps more significantly, in Central Asia, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. These regions are made more economically accessible to Europe by Turkey's own political, economic, and cultural access to them.

Hence, in February 1993, Turkey sponsored the development of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone that includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Further, Turkey is an active member in the expanding Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) that includes Iran and Pakistan and which recently added the Central Asian republics in February 1992.

Turkey has expanded contacts in all these regions, and in particular Central Asia, over the last five years for a number of reasons. First, Turkey has increased political and economic contacts with Central Asian, Caucasian, and Black Sea states because it suits Ankara's European interests. Close ties with friendly, nonfundamentalist Central Asian states as well as economic ties to the Balkans and the Black Sea zones serves to further enhance Turkey's political and economic stature amongst its friends in the


West, particularly among several EU members.15 While Turkey's role as a Western military bulwark against the Soviets has diminished with the close of the Cold War, Turkey's value as a stable, regional power still has plenty of credence with the West and Europe.16 Nevertheless, though Europe still sees Turkey from a predominantly security-oriented perspective, new interest is being expressed in Turkey's potential role as a regional entrepôt. Therefore, Turkish economic access to these regions may give Ankara some leverage with the EU and enhance Turkey's membership chances.

Second, as regards Central Asia, it represents one of the last economic frontier areas left in the world. Central Asian resources can help fuel Turkey's economic development and modernization efforts. Its energy, manufacturing, mining, and agricultural potential is vast, especially


16 The European view of Turkey is expressed rather well in Sir Leon Brittan's remarks in Ankara on 10 February 1994 noting that the EU must draw on Turkey's strengths if we [the EU] are to play our full role in the rest of Europe and in the lands beyond . . ." and that Turkey is "the most stable and most developed neighbor to the Southern Flank of the zone of greatest change." See European Union, Commission of the European Communities, "Speech by Sir Leon Brittan at the Opening of EU Research Center Ankara University - 10 February 1994," RAPID, 10 February 1994 (Lexis-Nexis). Italics added.
considering that the past has been colored by Soviet economic inefficiencies across the board.

Third, Turkey sees relations with the East from a regional vantage point, irrespective of their European relations. Prime Minister Ciller has noted that while EU membership remains a key interest, Turkey would also "fulfill the historic opportunities that lay before it." Although rebuked by President Ozal, a perhaps over-optimistic Turkish cabinet minister publicly announced in January 1990 that "several states in the Soviet Union, and in China, will be under the Turkish flag in the next century." Still, Ozal himself declared at a summit of Turkic republics in October 1992 that the next century would be a "Turkish century."

Ankara's policy in the Black Sea region is focused on expanding trade and promoting a regional free trade zone that will encompass the "free circulation of people, communities, capital, and services." In this regard the


Turks anticipate Istanbul becoming the commercial hub of the entire region, strategically located to access relatively "uncharted" economic territories.\textsuperscript{21} Prime Minister Ciller observed that it was Turkey's intention to transform the Black Sea into a region of peace, stability, and prosperity and to activate the economic and commercial potential of the region and turn it into an attractive center in the international arena.\textsuperscript{22}

There are significant obstacles to the implementation of a free trade zone in the Black Sea basin, notably the generally unsteady political environment in the region, but more specifically, ethnic conflict in Georgia and Armenia, political disagreements between Russia and the Ukraine concerning the Black Sea fleet, and sour relations between Greece and Turkey. Still, some observers note that Turkey's initiatives in the Black Sea area enhance its value to the West in general, and more specifically, Turkey's prospects for EU membership.\textsuperscript{23} For Europe, Turkish initiatives in the region carry little or no risk, only potential gain.

Ankara's policy towards the Central Asian region is based on an effort to sell themselves as a model for political and economic development and to become the

\textsuperscript{21} Marion Cotter, "Turkey: Queen of the Black Sea," \textit{Accountancy Age}, October 1, 1992, 41 (Lexis-Nexis).

\textsuperscript{22} "Turkey; Prime Minister's Speech to Assembly: The Kurdish Problem and Foreign Policy," \textit{Summary of World Broadcasts}, The British Broadcasting Corporation, July 2, 1993. Source: Turkish TV, Ankara, 1215 GMT, 30 Jun 1993 (Lexis-Nexis).

\textsuperscript{23} Lesser, 103.
political and economic conduit between Europe and the
Central Asian republics. The Turkish relationship with the
former Soviet republics is characterized by strong
diplomatic, cultural, and trade components.

For example, in January 1992, Turkey was the first
foreign government to extend diplomatic recognition to
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, thereby signaling an end to
Russian hegemony over Central Asia. Within the month,
Ankara had recognized all six new republics, racing with
Iran to establish embassies and consulates throughout the
area. Diplomatic relations have led to the signing of
several trade, security, and cultural accords.²⁴

Culturally, the Turkish mind set is revealed by their
reference to the region as the "Turkic Republics." Shortly
after their independence, Central Asian politicians began to
de-Russify their cultures. In their efforts to reclaim
their national identity they turned to their closest
cultural cousins--the Turks and Persians. Turkish rightist
newspapers, Zaman, Turkiye, and liberal-reformist Milliyet
have appeared in stalls throughout the region.²⁵ The Turks
have even begun to beam Turkish language satellite radio and

TV broadcasts into the region. Ankara’s Turkish Culture Ministry is scheduled to have a communications satellite, TURKSAT 1B, launched in July 1994 that will provide Turkish-language television service to not only Turkey, but also Central Asia and Turkish speakers in Europe. Further, Turkish Air Lines (THY) quickly established air links to most capitals in the region.

In addition, Ankara has also encouraged the Muslim republics to send nearly 10,000 students to Turkey to study in Turkish universities and high schools, while Azeri diplomatic candidates have attended courses at Ankara University.

Trade relations form an important facet of Turkish policy towards Central Asia. Trade with the region is only 1% of Turkey’s entire trade picture (exports: $183 million; imports $88 million), the potential for growth is enormous.

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26 "Choosing Partners," The Economist, April 25, 1992, 34.

27 "Turkey’s Travails," The Christian Science Monitor, June 4, 1993, 18; Republic of Turkey, Directorate General of Press and Information, "TURKSAT Launching in July," Newspos (Ankara, 7 April, 1994), 5. TURKSAT 1A was scheduled for launch in December 1993. A launch was attempted in January 1994 from Guyana but an accident apparently destroyed the rocket and satellite.

28 "Turkey Suddenly Casts."

29 "Turkey and Central Asia: Businesses Play Pioneering Role," The Independent, June 1, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis).
Turkish investment in Central Asia include a $595 million loan to Uzbekistan, the construction of a new telephone system in Azerbaijan, and banking ventures with Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.30

Turkey and Germany recently agreed to establish a common Chamber of Commerce designed to promote and facilitate trade with Central Asia and have laid the groundwork for Turko-German joint ventures in the region.31 Further, during Demirel's December 1992 visit to Japan he raised the issue of joint Japanese-Turkish investment in Central Asia, particularly, in energy production.32 In addition, Turkey's Eximbank is negotiating with Japan's Eximbank for increases in their lending credit line to Central Asia because available funds are quickly drawing down due to the current volume of financing.33

Recent expansion of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) to include all six of the Muslim republics may provide long term advantage to Turkey and


33 "Turkey and Central Asia."
Central Asia, but in the near term, the Central Asian economies are not sufficiently developed to compete with Turkey’s volume of trade with Europe. Still, the ECO is supposed to provide the structure to establish common tariff schedules among the members which may lead to an expansion in trade among the members.

The EU and Turkey also have long term plans to develop a trade/transportation corridor to Central Asia. Called TRACECA, it would tie Europe to Central Asia through Turkey and the Caucasus. Fundamental problems such as funding and a specific route still remain. The EU is also keen to coordinate with Ankara on European aid to the republics. Some EU aid may be directed to the region via Turkish-EU joint ventures or direct assistance to Ankara to support Turkish commercial activities in the region.

Nevertheless, Turkey is avidly pursuing other links to the region, specifically those designed to access oil and gas from the region. BOTAS, the Turkish oil and gas conglomerate has already drawn up plans for gas and oil pipelines extending from Central Asia to Turkey and then on to Europe.

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34 "Central Asia."
35 "EC Offers to Work With Turkey to Aid CIS," Reuters Money Report, May 6, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).
36 "Central Asia."
Taken together, Turkish political and economic access to Central Asia, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus offer strong economic incentives for European governments and businesses to accommodate Turkish interest in further association with Europe.

The Strategy of Diplomatic Association

Finally, a fourth strategy for Europeanization aims at enmeshing Turkey in a web of formal diplomatic association through participation in profoundly European or Western-oriented intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Organizations to which Turkey currently belongs include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of Europe (CE), NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Turkey has a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), but is not a full member. European-oriented IGO’s that Turkey wishes to join include the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU).

Foremost among these two organizations targeted by Turkish policy is the EU, and, while our discussion of Ankara’s efforts in the following section may touch briefly on the others, our primary focus will be on Turkey’s

37 Republic of Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkey (Ankara, 1993), 61; 154; 158.
attempts to join the EU through two complementary processes—customs union and enhanced security ties through the WEU.

Turkey and the European Union

A Brief History of Turkish-EU Relations

The first two decades after the end of World War II were a period in which Ankara made nearly every effort to associate itself with Europe and the West by joining, or attempting to join, European organizations like the Council of Europe and the EC, as well as Western sponsored security and economic organizations such as NATO, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)\(^{38}\), and the OECD.

As part of that process, Turkey expressed early interest in the European Community. As early as 1959, just two years after the Treaty of Rome was signed forming the EC, Turkey made its first bid for membership.\(^ {39}\) Following negotiations with the newly formed Community, an EC-Turkey Association agreement was signed in 1963 granting Turkey associate membership as of December 1, 1964.\(^ {40}\)

The initial goals of associate membership were focused primarily on establishing a customs union between the EC and Turkey and the convergence of economic policies including

\(^ {38}\) CENTO has since been dissolved.

\(^ {39}\) Republic of Turkey. *Turkey*, 59.

\(^ {40}\) Ibid., 152.
the easing of restrictions on the movement of capital and labor. A shift in the nature of the relationship, from a "preparatory" phase to a "transition" period, was inaugurated in 1973 wherein both the EC and Turkey were to begin lowering tariffs. In 1976, however, the tariff reduction schedule was tacitly abandoned by the Turks.

The Turks abandoned progress towards customs union for a number of reasons, including the ongoing crisis in Cyprus that led to estrangement with Europe, the oil crises of the 1970s, and the growing domestic disturbances and political disequilibrium in Turkey that disabled domestic political continuity.

After the return to civilian government in 1983, the Ozal Administration put new emphasis on Turkish-European relations, and in particular, reviving and strengthening the Turkish-EC relationship. This was in part motivated by President Ozal's economic program, designed to increase Turkish exports and foreign investment, eliminate price controls, and reduce state expenditures in support of state-run enterprises through privatization. No less a

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41 Ibid.
43 For brief background on Ozal's economic program, see "Foreign Labor Trends Report," *Market Reports*, January 15,
motivation, Ankara also desired to reinvigorate Turkish-European political ties to signal an end to the hiatus in the overall relationship between them."

Ozal's new emphasis on Europe culminated in April 1987 when Ankara made a formal request to enter the EC after nearly 25 years as an associate member. After two years of deliberation, the EC Commission issued an "official opinion" in 1989 on Turkey's application which noted several political and economic shortcomings on Turkey's part which rendered negotiations on admission premature. The Commission noted that negotiations for Turkey's admission should not begin prior to 1993. The EC Commission, furthermore, did not commit themselves to begin negotiations at that time. The opinion did encourage the resumption of the customs union process and increased political cooperation both of which Turkey agreed to in early 1992.


44 Republic of Turkey. Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, (Ankara, 1993), 152.

45 Kuniholm, 41. The EU Commission's opinion specifically noted economic shortcomings and political immaturity. See Chapters Seven and Eight for a more thorough treatment of the EU's official opinion.


Turkey’s policy towards the EC/EU can be summed up by a Turkish Foreign Ministry statement in May 1992: "The development of our ties with the EC on a full membership perspective by utilizing all resources, is a basic principle of the government." ⁴⁸

The 1995 Customs Union

As an interim step towards full EU membership, Turkey is moving ahead with the EU towards a full Customs Union scheduled to be fully in place by the end of 1995. In many respects the Customs Union has become the immediate Turkish foreign policy objective as regards Europe.

The Customs Union is intended to allow the free movement of industrial products, open competition in the services industry, better access to Europe for Turkish agriculture and textile products, as well as implement an intellectual property rights regime.⁴⁹ Further, the Customs Union has sparked Turkish executive and legislative efforts to harmonize Turkish law with EU protocols on banking and consumer protection.⁵⁰ Finally, perhaps most significantly for some sectors of the Turkish economy, Turkey must

⁴⁹ "Foreign Trade and Payments: Moves."
implement the common EU tariff for imports coming from outside the EU.\(^5\)

Turkish government officials from the President on down promote the Customs Union on a number of levels---political, social, and economic. The governing coalition, for example, recently created three new executive/cabinet-level bodies to ease the implementation of the Customs Union. The "European Community High Committee," personally chaired by Prime Minister Ciller, is tasked with defining new "political and economic strategies regarding the Turkish-EC relationship" and advising the Turkish Cabinet on potential policy choices. The "Coordination Committee" will streamline bureaucratic efforts while the "Inquiry Committee" will advise public and private industries and businesses on government progress.\(^5\)

In political terms, the 1995 Customs Union will signal an end to the "transition" period in the EC-Turkey relationship, and the beginning of the "final" period that should, according to the Turks, culminate in full membership.\(^5\) Failure to fully implement the Customs Union, according to the Turks, the "final" period should primarily be devoted to formal entry negotiations between the EU and Turkey on Turkey's membership.

\(^5\) "Foreign Trade and Payments: Moves."


though not likely at this point, may signal a government
defeat of serious proportions with potentially unsettling
domestic political consequences for the coalition parties
currently in power.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, the inability to
implement the program may have more far reaching
consequences, i.e., derailing the main foreign policy agenda
that in turn, may eliminate any chance for EU membership in
the near term.

These concerns are taken seriously by both the EU and
the Turks. Recent statements by both the EU ambassador in
Ankara and the Turkish ambassador to the EU note the high
political price of failure if the Customs Union is not
achieved on schedule.\textsuperscript{55}

Economically, Turkey’s trade with the EU already
accounts for 51.7\% of the Turkish export market while EU
provides 43.9\% of Turkey’s imports.\textsuperscript{56} In early January
1993, Turkey cut duties on EC imports 10-20\%\textsuperscript{57} and the

\textsuperscript{54} The Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP or "True Path Party") led
by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and the Sosyal Demokrat
Halkci Partisi (SHP or Social Democratic People’s Party) led
by Erdal Inonu currently govern Turkey in coalition. The DYP
in particular, under Ciller’s leadership, has a large
political stake in the successful implementation of the
Customs Union.

\textsuperscript{55} “EC Warns Turkey to Complete Customs Union by 1995,”
\textit{Xinhua General Overseas News Service}, December 3, 1993
(Lexis-Nexis).

\textsuperscript{56} “Turkey Fact Sheet,” \textit{Country Forecast}, Economist
Intelligence Unit, February 28, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis).

\textsuperscript{57} “Turkey Cuts Import Taxes on EC Products,” \textit{Xinhua
Turkish lira has been made fully convertible to facilitate currency transfers between EU states and Turkey.58 Turkey has asked the EU for a relaxation on restrictions on free movement of Turkish labor, freeing of frozen EC aid (from 1980 forward based on Greek vetoes) and removal of quotas on all its exports by the end of the transition period (1995).59

President Demirel has suggested that the Customs Union will not only increase foreign investment in Turkey, but further boost production and modernization while raising society’s living standards.60 Still, Demirel warned Turkish businessmen fearful of competition with Europe to get their respective "houses in order"--the Customs Union and the onset of European competition are inevitable. In addition, he fired a warning shot to both state industries and etatists alike with the statement that "state enterprises have fulfilled their roles. Government funds no longer exist

58 "Turkey Fact Sheet."

59 "Ciller to Revitalize Turkish-EC Ties--Economists," The Reuters European Community Report, June 14, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis). It is unlikely at this point that the EU will grant Turkey's requests in full, although some minor accommodations may be made.

60 "Turkey Urges Preparation for EC Customs Union," The Reuters European Community Report, September 12, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis).
to finance protectionism. It is absurd to subsidize industries that are not rational.61

Through all of this, unspoken, but understood, is the message that in order to fulfill Turkey's goal of economic modernization, and thereby provide greater overall economic prosperity, Turkey must be an integral part of the European economic system. Further, any hopes for political integration with Europe must be preceded by economic integration.

Despite the high-level efforts by the Turkish government, the Customs Union has not played well to all sectors of Turkish society. Nongovernment economists and businessmen warn that, in particular, the Turkish auto industry will suffer, not from EU imports but from even cheaper Eastern European imports flowing into Turkey under the common EU tariff rates. In addition, Turkish pharmaceutical, glass, and electronics firms will suffer from European competition.62

Furthermore, EU demands that Turkey scrap its Mass-Housing Fund (created to construct low-income housing and funded by an import tax) will create a nearly $3 billion

61 Ibid.

62 Metin Demirsar, "Success May Drive Turkish Carmakers Out of Business," The Reuter European Business Report, January 12, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis); see also, "Turkish Businessman Warns About EC Customs Union," The Reuter European Community Report, June 22, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis); also see "Turkey Cuts Import Taxes."
loss in government revenue, without direct EU compensation. Greek vetoes based upon the lack of progress in negotiations over Cyprus and the Turkish military presence in the northern portion of the island continue to hold up previously allotted EU funds already designated for Turkey that would help replace the lost Housing Fund revenues. Greek intransigence has led, in turn, to discussions of a plan that would channel funds from European states via direct bilateral assistance to Turkey. This action, however, has incensed Greek officials and led to Greek charges of violation by British, German, and French governments of the spirit and letter of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) protocols. Within Turkey, the loss of the fund without some mechanism to replace it from domestic or foreign sources may upset left-of-center parties in the TGNA and cause political

63 "EC/Turkey: Confirmation of Customs Union in 1995," European Report, November 11, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis). Several EU sources have called for the elimination of the fund. Turkey has asked that the EU financial protocols frozen by Greek vetoes be released to help compensate the loss. In addition, one EU official noted that transitional periods for some outstanding issues may be in order in some cases.

64 Greece continues to veto EU funds for Turkey based upon Greek concerns over the lack of progress on Cyprus and the Turkish military presence on the northern portion of the island.

65 Xu, "Round-Up: Turkey Pushes."

difficulties for Ciller’s government, without mention of the economic loss.

Although certain political and economic obstacles remain outstanding, the overall indications are that Turkey and the EU will reach full customs union sometime before the end of 1995. While the official schedule has marked 1 January 1995 as the completion point, other indications exist that both the EU and Turkey would be willing to let the end of the year serve as the completion date to allow more time for adjustments in EU textile tariffs and elimination of the Mass Housing Fund.

**The Western European Union and Turkey**

The WEU serves as another mechanism by which Turkey has attempted to draw closer to EU membership by organizational association. In April 1987, Turkey made its application to the WEU shortly after its application for EU membership was submitted. Turkey later applied for associate membership

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in the WEU in November 1992. Associate membership was finally granted by the WEU to Turkey in December 1993.69

The WEU was initially established as a defense association of EU members. Under the 1993 Single European Act,70 the WEU now forms the basis for the EU's formal defense organization.71

For the Turks, associate membership in the WEU is certainly less than optimum, particularly since Greece was offered full membership and both Greece and Turkey are NATO members. While other non-EU NATO members currently remain outside of the WEU,72 the Turks see full membership in the WEU as another requisite way-station on the path to accession into the EU. From Ankara's perspective, full WEU membership, in contrast to the Custom Union, would signify Europe's recognition of Turkey's long association with


70 More commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty. It provides for the "eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense". See The European Union, Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union: Declaration on Western European Union, February 7, 1992. Published July 29, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).

71 Ibid.

72 As of January 1994, non-EU NATO members Norway and Iceland are not full members of the WEU.
European security affairs and the continuing necessity of full Turkish involvement in them.

Turkish concerns about their relative position in European security considerations have been expressed pointedly by top Turkish officials. In light of movement in Eastern Europe towards applying to the EU and the WEU, Prime Minister Ciller recently noted that if the East European states were to "gain a status approaching WEU membership, ... then Turkey's status must be changed." On a bilateral level, France, Germany, and Britain have made efforts to reassure Turkey of her position in European security affairs in general, and in the WEU, in particular. In a January 1994 trilateral discussion between the Turkish, British, and the German foreign ministers, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, noted pointedly and publicly that "Turkey should continue to be fully involved in the evolving arrangements for European defense." In March 1994, the Turks continued to press their desires for a larger role in

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73 As opposed to European security in the broader Western context, understood here as NATO's mission. Ian Lesser notes ironically that the general perception of the Turk in European security affairs may be colored more by the historical memory of the Turk as adversary rather than as ally. Lesser, 107-108.

74 "Turkey: Ciller Wants a New Status for Turkey Within the WEU," Reuter Textline Agence Europe, January 15, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis).

75 "Hurd Seeks to Deepen Ties Between Turkey and EU," The Financial Times, January 20, 1994, 2 (Lexis-Nexis).
the WEU with the visiting French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe.76

The likelihood of any formal upgrade in Turkey’s status in the WEU is unlikely to precede completion of the Customs Union. From a European viewpoint, Turkey has an appreciable voice in European political and security matters in NATO, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE. Turkey’s associate membership in WEU is sufficient at the present moment insofar as the EU/WEU states are concerned. However, any attempt to formally include European non-NATO members in the WEU will provoke serious protest from Ankara and may induce Britain, France, and perhaps Germany to press for Turkey’s full WEU membership over the inevitable Greek protest.

Further, the Europeans have a different perspective at this point on how to draw Turkey into Europe. From the European view, the economic relationship between Turkey and Europe has no formal structure to it other than individual bilateral ties and the broad outlines of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement. For the EU then, at the present stage, upgraded economic ties, rather than enhanced security relations, should remain the prime focus of expanded relations between the EU and Turkey. EU Customs Commissioner Christiane Scrivener summed up the EU view

succinctly by pointing out to the Turks that "a customs union is the best way of strengthening our relations."^77

**Conclusion**

Turkey’s European policy in the short term is characterized by Ankara’s attempts to achieve intermediate goals that will enhance Turkey’s overall prospects for EU membership which remains the *sine qua non* of its Europeanization policies.

While NATO, EFTA, the CE, and CSCE, enhance Turkey’s position in Europe, the most significant way stations on the path towards real integration with Europe are the Customs Union and the WEU. Despite realization that full membership will not likely be granted before the end of the decade, both Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller have noted that accession to the EU will remain the country’s main focus.^78

For the Turks, all these roads hopefully lead to Rome. Deploying different strategies to persuade, entice, and engage Europe, Ankara hopes to achieve in one fell swoop the aims of several of its national interests—security,


democratic consolidation, economic modernization, and ideological fulfillment. As Ian Lesser notes, not the least of these interests is the symbolic value of EU membership. The "imprimatur" of Europe epitomizes the formal institutionalization and legitimation of Ataturk's goal of reaching "the standards of contemporary civilization," but also will serve as a validation of Turkish state tradition and Turkey's future political orientation.

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79 Lesser, 106.
Chapter 7

THE BARRIERS TO ADMISSION

Introduction

While previous chapters have been concerned with Turkish national interests, state traditions, ideology, and strategies, any evaluation of Turkey's prospects for entering the European Union (EU) and fulfilling the goal of "Europeanization" cannot be accomplished without spending a moment looking at some of the major obstacles that face the Turks. From Europe's perspective, Turkey suffers from a number of shortfalls. These obstacles, or barriers to admission fall into four sometimes overlapping categories. These categories include: (1) political problems relating to Turkish foreign or domestic policy, (2) socioeconomic problems relating to the Turkish economy or society in general, (3) institutional obstructions, emanating not from Turkey, but from the EU itself, and (4) the cultural barrier reflected in Europe's "cultural apprehension."

The purpose, then, of this chapter is to explore the dimensions of these four categories and to shed light on the nature and ramifications of specific issues within the four general problem areas that stand between Ankara and Brussels.
Political Barriers Facing Turkey

There are three political issues Europe has raised as impediments to Turkey's admission to the EU. First, the EU wants the issue of Cyprus and the political and military division of the island resolved to the satisfaction of the Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, and Britain. Second, the issue of Turkish human rights and the Kurdish "problem" remains outstanding. Third, the stability of Turkish democracy remains a significant EU concern.

Cyprus

Cyprus remains a difficult foreign policy problem for Turkey primarily because it involves issues of ethnicity and nationalism, heightened by particularly intense emotional feelings towards its Aegean and Balkan rival, Greece.

Greek presence on Cyprus extends back until the 13th century BC. It was ruled in subsequent centuries by a variety of conquerors, until 1571 AD when the Ottomans, in turn, conquered Cyprus. The presence of the Turkish minority on the island can be traced to that date. Ottoman rule effectively ended in 1878 when the island was leased to the British. After World War I, it became a British colony (1925).¹

Greek Cypriots, the majority of Cyprus's population, began pushing for enosis or political "union" with Greece in the late 1800s. Greek Cypriot demands for enosis continued throughout the early 1900s leading to the occasional suppression of violence by British arms. Finally, a full-scale guerilla war erupted in the 1950s, which led to a Conference in 1959 on Cyprus's future between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the respective Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. All parties agreed (though some reluctantly and with reservations) to the provisions of the declarations which provided for Cyprus's independence in 1960, although Britain maintained two sovereign military bases—Dhekelia and Akrotiri.

The constitutional arrangements formulated by the 1959 Zurich and London conferences proved unwieldy at best and led to ethnic conflict in 1963 and again in 1967. Political efforts to restore a peaceful constitutional balance resulted in deadlock. In 1974, Greek and Greek Cypriot military officers working with underground elements staged a military coup d'état against the then-current Greek Cypriot government led by President Makarios. Sponsored by the Greek military junta in power in Athens, the 1974 crisis resulted in massive population shifts and Turkish military

\[2 \text{ Ibid.}\]
invasion of the island, ostensibly to restore Markarios and to protect Turkish Cypriots.³

Since 1974 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have remained divided behind a thin zone patrolled by U.N. peacekeeping troops. As a result of the 1974 crisis, the panicked Greek military junta, in power since 1967, resigned in favor of a civilian government led by Constantine Karamanlis. In Cyprus, the military-led coup collapsed and civilian government was restored in that portion of Cyprus under Greek Cypriot control. The Greek Cypriot government continues to have international recognition as the de jure government of Cyprus despite the de facto division of the island.⁴

Since 1974, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political position was based on the establishment of autonomous Turkish zones under a cantonal system of government, while the Greek Cypriots wished to restore the 1960 constitutional system.⁵

U.N. mediated efforts to resolve the island's problems have not met with success. While a general agreement on principles was reached in 1977 that outlined the common interests of the two sides, notably the desire for an "independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic,"

³ Ibid., 116-118.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 117.
Turkish Cypriot actions in 1983 may have rendered the 1977 framework moot. In November 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared their independence and founded the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It has been formally recognized only by Turkey.

Complicating matters further, Cyprus made its own application to the EC in 1990 and in 1993 the EU Commission decided to allow Cyprus to begin negotiations on admission as soon as a political solution to the island's division is found. The Commission gave Cyprus until 1 January 1995 to arrive at a solution, but has allowed itself the option of asking the EU Council to open negotiations with Cyprus even if no solution is found by that date.

Various Turkish policy statements continue to reflect a view that the resolution to the political differences remains in ongoing negotiations between the two communities and that Turkey's involvement in that sense is minimal. In

Ibid., 121-22.


Sophia Huet, "Il Faut Deux Personnes pour Danser un Tango, Selon Ankara" (It Takes Two to Tango, According to Ankara), Agence France Presse, April 27, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis); see also, Lawrence Bartlett, "Mme Ciller accuse la Grece de ne pas soutenir les measures de confiance de l'ONU" (Mrs. Ciller Accuses Greece of not Supporting UN Confidence Measures), Agence France Presse, April 26, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis).
that regard, since 1990, Turkey has resisted U.S. and EU pressure to push the Turkish Cypriots to a solution. Some observers have noted that for both Greece and Turkey, the current impasse demands no rapid action, and while it presents some problems, is not intolerable.

Nevertheless, as long as the EU expresses an interest in Cyprus, (which it will, given Greece's position), its division and Turkish military occupation of the northern portion will remain an obstacle to Turkey's admission to the EU.

The Kurds: Political and Human Rights

After the Turks, the Kurds are the next largest ethnic group in Turkey. Estimates place the Kurd population somewhere between 10-15 million people; in terms of percentages, the Kurdish population is approximately 17% of total population. The Kurds generally reside in


southeastern Turkey in the provinces that border Iran, Iraq, and Syria, although significant Kurdish communities can be found throughout Turkey. Though Turkey is a multi-ethnic state, other nationality groups are smaller and do not have the political and cultural élan Kurds seem to possess. While the Kurds have a separate language and customs, voluntary assimilation into Turkish society is not difficult. For example, Kurds have served as high officials of the Turkish state and in the military, as well as elected members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.13

Further, Kurds in Turkey do enjoy much broader political rights than Kurds in Iraq, Syria, or Iran. Moreover, many Kurds in Turkey willingly recognize their Turkish citizenship while still emphasizing their Kurdish identity. Some observers note that the sole issue provoking the Kurds is the issue of language and simple recognition by the Turks as a separate national identity.14 Only in the last several years has the Turkish government allowed the printing of Kurdish-language newspapers; however, the use of Kurdish is forbidden in schools or in broadcasting.15


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s Kurdish population has engendered serious domestic concerns. A Marxist Kurdish group, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), has conducted attacks on Turkish villages, army garrisons, and government facilities from bases in the Turkish southeast as well as from Syria, Iran, and Iraq. In turn, Kurdish villages, newspapers, and political supporters have been subject to equally harsh Turkish military reprisals.\textsuperscript{16}

Ankara is fearful of internal disturbances among the Kurdish population in Turkey and is adamantly opposed to any efforts to establish an independent Kurdish state, which would open the door to questions about sovereignty and control in the Turkish southeast and challenge one of the fundamental bases of the state, nationalism. In that respect, the Turks are joined by Iraq, Syria, and Iran, who all reject an independent Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{17}

Some elements of the PKK have apparently shifted their focus from complete independence to “a negotiated settlement within Turkey that would acknowledge Kurdish rights.”\textsuperscript{18}

Prime Minister Ciller appeared to have been moving in favor of a political settlement but was pressured by President

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\textsuperscript{16} Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 70 (Spring 1991): 44.
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\textsuperscript{17} Peter Bakogeorge, "Fears for Iraq Create Some Odd Bedfellows," \textit{The Calgary Herald}, February 11, 1993, C5 (Lexis-Nexis).
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\textsuperscript{18} Cowell, A3 (Lexis-Nexis).
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Demirel and the military to scrap the notion. She subsequently denied she had made any conciliatory statements on the Kurdish issue. PKK guerrillas have been quite active since the beginning of 1993, with kidnappings and killings of Turks and foreigners alike. Some observers have noted that Turkish policy towards Kurdish separatism in the mid-1990s has shifted in favor of a military solution before a political dialogue can begin.

While it may be difficult to discern Kurdish political aims, many Kurds live peacefully in Turkey, participate, and accept the legitimacy of the state and government. Others reject the status quo in its entirety, while still others wish to make modifications to the Turkish state and Constitution as it now stands to accommodate greater Kurdish autonomy. Still, for the most part, according to Ilter Turan, most Turkish citizens (Kurds included) recognize the legitimacy of the government in Ankara even though some may not like particular aspects of it.

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19 Ibid.
22 Ilter Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey," in Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change, ed. Ahmet
On the other hand, while no survey data are available to help illuminate specific Kurdish political or cultural interests, it is also apparent that a significant percentage of Kurds form a viable, albeit fragmented, political subculture, distinct from the mainstream and focused on attaining some measure of individual and political autonomy in Turkish society.

With regard to political and human rights, Turkish laws are designed to be protective of individual political and civil rights. Still, while the Constitution provides a legal framework for the protection of these rights, it also has provisions within it for denying those same rights to citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Politically, a significant level of participation and competition is open to all qualified citizens. Political processes are essentially inclusive as long as citizens accept certain limits on expression and activity, i.e., those views that challenge the legitimacy, sovereignty, or "indivisibility" of the state or challenge the democratic regime.

While in general, the constitutional framework is adhered to fairly well, the constitutional "rules of the game" are occasionally ignored in the area of civil/human rights, most often, it seems, when the particular situation involves Kurdish or leftist elements. Several human rights

Evin (Opladen, Germany: Leske Verlag und Budrich GmbH, 1984), 90.
reports issued within the last two years highlight gaps between Turkish intentions and realities. A 1993 Freedom House survey gave Turkey a "2" rating in political rights, indicating a relatively free country, but only gave Ankara a "4" in the area of civil liberties. While low marks do not necessarily reflect the intentions of any given government, below "2" implies that the level of [government] oppression increases, especially in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state carry out political terror that undermines other freedoms.

Despite government denials and dissembling, human rights groups maintain that torture, illegal detentions, extrajudicial killings, failure to provide counsel or quick trial, and harassment of the leftist or Kurdish press and

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23 A number of human rights groups have issued reports on Turkey including the International Federation of Human Rights, Amnesty International, Turkish Foundation for Human Rights, and Helsinki Watch to name just a few.

24 Freedom House, Freedom Review 1993 24 (February 1993): 15-16, "Table of Independent Countries Comparative Measures of Freedom." The Freedom House survey defines "political rights" as rights that "enable people to participate freely in the political process." The "political process" is defined as "the system by which the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community" (p. 11).

"Civil rights" are defined as "freedom to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state" (p. 11).

By comparison, using the same survey, no current EU member-state was rated less than "1" in political rights or less than "2" in civil rights.

25 Ibid., 14.
local politicians continues despite constitutional guarantees against such activities. Though these incidents are not limited to the southeast, they do appear more prevalent there. Occasional disregard for the "rule of law" appears to demonstrate a flaw in Turkey's democratic system, points to residual traditional political culture patterns, and may be a factor in the slow pace of democratic consolidation since 1983.

Although the 1982 Constitution has safeguarded political stability, the trade-off has been, in the past, an inflexible attitude towards any notions that hint of Kurdish political or cultural autonomy. Seen in ideological terms, the very thought of a nonhomogeneous, multi-ethnic state flouts Kemalist notions of nationalism and makes Ankara extremely uneasy.

Nevertheless, the current government has recently attempted to modify the Constitution by eliminating some restrictions on the use of Kurdish language and the practice of Kurdish culture. Further, recent speeches by Turkish officials seem to indicate a fair degree of flexibility


towards some Kurdish concerns, however, in practice, the Turkish military/security policies in the southeast have not provided a suitable climate for the development of Kurdish rights.

Finally, the March 1994 revocation of immunity from Kurdish members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for prosecution has again raised concerns in Europe over Ankara's Kurdish policies.  

**Turkish Democracy and Political Stability**

Europe still remains wary over the future course of Turkish domestic politics and Turkey's commitment to democracy. Europe is fully aware that Turkey has undergone three full or partial military takeovers since the advent of multi-party politics in the late 1940s. This gives rise to some concern over Turkey's democratic future.

These concerns are only partially justified. Turkish difficulties with democracy have been centered on the implementation and practice of democracy as opposed to the

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democratic ideal itself. The concept of "democracy" has not undergone serious challenge in Turkey while the mechanics of democracy in Turkey have been tinkered with many times since 1945. Assuredly, troubling flaws in the practice of Turkish democracy exist and there are gaps between realities and intentions. However, democracy in Turkey has been, for the most part, a struggle for democratic "consolidation."3

When discussing democracy and democratization it is incumbent that we define the terms. The modern, contemporary notion of democracy implies universal suffrage and popular participation, guaranteed political rights, civil rights, peaceful transitions of power, compromise, and so forth. A minimal, yet defensible, definition of democracy includes participation and competition in politics based on universal criteria under a legal framework that guarantees access to the average citizen. Democratization, then, becomes the process by which democracy is institutionalized in the state and inculcated into society.

While an extended discussion of Turkey’s democratic regime is beyond the scope of the present work, in a brief review of Turkish democracy this study takes the view that much of Turkey’s social, political, and economic structure would fit comfortably (though not perfectly) into a

"competitive elitist" model of democracy. The model's key features include parliamentary governments and strong executives; competition between political parties and among elites; party dominated legislatures; strong political leadership; independent, professional bureaucracies; and "constitutional and practical limits" on decision making.

Further, certain general conditions exist that shape competitive elitism: society is fairly industrialized; the electorate is poorly informed, passive, and/or "emotional"; political culture allows differences of opinion; a technical-managerial class exists; and the international system is characterized by realism.

While the structural side of the model fits very well with Turkey, there are two shortcomings in the applicability of the "general conditions." First, the Turkish economy is only partially industrialized and the majority of Turkish

31 David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), Chapter 5, passim. David Held reviews many of the basic models of democracy. In Turkey's case, the 'competitive elitism' model is significant. Held refers to the competitive elitism model as, in large part, the product of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of democracy in the early 20th century. The model's basic premise is that the individual citizen has little to do with governing other than to select which body of competing elites will rule. Democratic rule is legitimated by citizen voting, but government is directed and administered by professional, yet competitive elites.

32 Held, 184.

33 Ibid.
labor remains in agriculture. Second, the political culture suffers from noticeable weaknesses. It allows differences of opinion, but it does not encourage them. Intolerance, uncompromising attitudes, and high political costs associated with being a party out of power have obstructed in the past Turkish democratic processes. Still, these differences do not prevent us from ascribing the basic outlines of the model to Turkey’s democracy.

As for concerns about democratic stability, in our assessment of Turkey, the status of Turkish democracy and democratization comes down to an evaluation of Turkey’s place on the democratic continuum. As argued above,

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34 Figures for 1990 show agriculture contributes 18.1% of Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while services contributed 52.07%, and industry contributed 29.2% of the GDP. See "Turkey," IRC International Risk Guide, July 1992 (Lexis-Nexis). Data for 1991 shows that industry employs only 15.7% of the Turkish labor force versus the 48% employed by Turkish agriculture. See "Foreign Labor Trends Report."

35 Ozbudun, 213. Ozbudun notes the low tolerance for opposition within the Turkish political culture. Ozbudun attributes this factor to vestigial Ottoman influences on modern Turkish political culture. Also see Turan, 101-105. Turan provides some survey data to buttress this argument.

36 Turan, 109-112.

37 Georg Sorenson, Democracy and Democratization (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 42, Figure 2.1. Sorenson outlines a scale, or continuum of democratic development beginning with national unity as a required background condition. The next stage, the "preparatory phase," involves the breakup (or breakdown) of the old nondemocratic regime. The second stage, the decision phase, results in the initial formation of a democratic political system. The third and final phase involves the consolidation of the new democratic regime. In the consolidation phase,
Turkey appears to be in the process of democratic consolidation.

Consolidation is the recognition by the major players that democracy is "the only game in town." It implies that major institutions and organizations accept the democratic process without any claim to overturn legitimate decisions of the government other than by democratic means.

This claim for consolidation can be made if we note that in each event in which the military intervened in Turkish politics, the military never questioned the legitimacy of democracy or government decisions insofar as they perceived them to be democratic. Instead, they only responded once they perceived serious challenges to Turkish democracy existed and that these issues could not or would not be addressed through normal processes. For the military, these challenges existed in the form of usurpation of the democratic process and Kemalist ideals (1960), rampant terrorism, chaos, internal instability, and government paralysis (1971, 1980).

the practice of "democracy" and "democratic values" are inculcated by society and expressed in the political culture. According to Sorenson, progression from one stage to another is not inexorable nor is regression ruled out.

38 Sorenson, 45.

39 Ibid.

40 See Semih Vaner, "The Army," in Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives, eds. Irvin C. Schick and
With Sorenson’s continuum in mind then, Turkey’s national unity is essentially in place, the old Ottoman regime and many of its values has been broken down and swept away, democratic procedures have been institutionalized, and "creeping" consolidation has begun. Still, democracy in Turkey is yet unconsolidated, and Turkey may be best characterized as a "restricted" democracy. It will probably remain so for the foreseeable future for several reasons.

First, the military remains a powerful broker in Turkish politics and the ultimate arbiter of ideological standards. Its de facto role as "defender of the faith" (Kemalism and its notions of the state, nation, and regime) means that it can and probably will intervene should things go seriously awry. Rather than let the process work itself out, it has in the past stepped in to "reequilibriate"

Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chapter 8, passim. Vaner discusses the military's role in politics in Turkey, particularly its institutional concerns that have led it to intervene in civilian politics. These issues seem to be the main reasons that civilian governments have been replaced by military-led administrations. See also Ozbudun, 220.

Sorenson, 47. Sorenson defines restricted democracies as those that are democratic in form but have restrictions on certain individual liberties and forms of participation and competition. Elites in restricted democracies reserve unto themselves the means and ability to limit or intervene in the democratic system to protect their interests. This approaches the condition of democracy in Turkey.
democracy. As a "sword of Damocles" hanging over civilian politics, the military may unduly influence the expansion of the political arena, restricting participation to "approved" parties and agendas. Thus far, the military has been the guarantor of Kemalism and democracy, but its ability to intervene leaves open, however remote, the possibility of more sinister outcomes.

Second, economic factors will impede consolidation, specifically income distribution and inflation. Inflation, as noted above, is due to heavy government spending on State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), but also to patronage, the Giant Anatolian Project (GAP) in the southeast, and the Kurdish insurgency. None of these conditions will go away overnight. Privatization is slowly moving forward, but many SEEs remain connected to government revenues for finance and operations. Patronage is a product of political culture that will only change over time and the

42 Ozbudun, 211.


44 GAP is an ambitious scheme to construct over 20 dams across the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in order to provide power, irrigation, and development in the Kurdish southeast. See Bob Mantiri, "Turkey: Huge Water Project Faces Political Obstacles," InterPress Service, August 10, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis).
GAP hydroelectric project is not due to be completed until at least the year 2000. Finally, the Kurdish problems rest on political solutions that thus far neither side seems willing to seriously consider. Income distribution also remains within the government purview, and though the government has stated its intention to remedy the problem, changing tax structures and redistribution policies is a significant political challenge for the coalition government.45

Third, Turkish political culture has not sufficiently developed to the point where full consolidation is likely to occur soon. The "noticeable weaknesses" referred to above are impediments to further democratization. The 75 years since Ottoman rule have changed political attitudes and values, but further changes are required. Turks have accepted the form of democracy, but they have not yet completely implemented the practice of democracy. Government human rights abuses and polarization over the Kurdish issue demonstrates lingering inabilities to successfully cope with the substance of democracy.

Moreover, Turkish constitutional restrictions on radical political movements (right or left) point to either the inability of the electorate to recognize specious or ludicrous political positions or the inability of elites to

tolerate diverse political agendas. While there may be some truth in either case, the point is that Turkish political culture demonstrates low political tolerance for alternative views.

It appears that Ankara has now opted for economic development ahead of further political development. Because Turkish politics have reached a relatively stable plateau, the focus has shifted to increasing Turkey's global economic standing and domestic well-being, hence the rush to customs union with the EU, the abandonment of etatism and the push towards an export-driven economy. Broader democratization involves the risk of instability, opens to question the foundation of the state and regime, and jeopardizes the economic agenda of the government, things elites are not ready to countenance.

Ozbudun points to several areas that may help or have helped strengthen democracy in Turkey.46 They include the strengthening of civil society by strengthening the economy, local governments, and voluntary associations; presidential powers that prevent deadlock and intransigence in government; electoral threshold requirements for parties (10% nationwide minimum) to win seats in the TGNA; and new policies designed to promote economic growth and equity.

46 Ozbudun, 222-26.
As noted above, European concerns about Turkish democratic stability are only partially justified—the outlook for stability has, in this author’s view, improved significantly since the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. The current coalition government indicates, if not growing values of toleration and compromise, then at least a salute to Turkish political pragmatism. Additionally, elite commitment to the idea of democracy remains strong.47 Finally, as long as the current equilibrium in the Turkish political structure and process is maintained, democratic stability is likely. And as long as the fabric of the state and the regime are bound together by Kemalism, the democratic ideal itself will be not be in serious jeopardy.

Socioeconomic Barriers

From the European perspective various Turkish socioeconomic factors remain below par, and therefore, must be remedied before Turkey can begin admission negotiations with the EU. Chronic inflation, skewed income distribution, low per capita earnings, and high population growth highlight European concerns.

For example, inflation over the 1980-1988 period averaged 39.3% per year. Inflation in 1990 was charted at 60.4%, while 1991 figures were above 70%.48 A well-

47 Ozbudun, 226. Also, see Turan’s article cited above.

48 "Foreign Labor Trends Report."
documented cause of inflation is the substantial amounts of government revenue poured into the state-owned SEEs.\textsuperscript{49} On the positive side, since 1983 successive Turkish governments have worked to dismantle the bloated state sector. Continued efforts may produce a significant reduction in government outlays by the end of the decade.

Income distribution also remains a serious problem. Income distribution is heavily skewed towards the richest sectors of Turkish society. Hershlag found that in the late 1970s the lowest 16.5\% of the population received less than 5\% of the total income, whereas the top 13.8\% of the population reaped 37.6\% of the total income. When we review the income of the top quarter of society (26.8), we find they received 55.3\% of the total income.\textsuperscript{50}

A Turkish State Institute for Statistics (SIS) 1990 survey showed the poorest 20\% received 5.24\% of the national income. The next 20\% received 9.4\% of total income and the middle fifth received 14.06\% of the total. The fourth 20\% gathered 21.15\%, while the richest fifth garnered nearly 50\%.


\textsuperscript{50} Z.Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy (New York: Routledge, 1988), 134-36. Hershlag calculates Turkey's Gini index to be approximately .40, while other calculations put the figure near .51. Both are fairly high scores, indicating uneven distribution.
(49.94%) of total income. SIS claimed slight improvements in distribution since the last survey (1973), but also noted that the findings of the 1990 survey were based on unsound data. Still, income distribution appears markedly uneven over the last ten years even if slight gains were achieved.

Other statistics that show Turkey’s per capita GDP varies considerably by reporting source, but overall is considerably lower than the European average. OECD data show that Turkey’s per capita GDP in 1986 (three years after the return to civilian rule) was $1,142. Comparisons among modern democratic states shows Turkey’s 1980 per capita ($1,353) was considerably lower than Spain ($5,305), Portugal ($2,351), Greece ($4,007) or France ($11,188). U.S. Department of State reports indicate Turkey’s per capita GDP rose to $2,621 in 1991. In fairness, income per capita GDP/GNP figures are difficult indicators of performance for several reasons. First, they do not reflect distribution, only average income. Second, they may be


52 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 121.

53 Georg Muller, ed., Comparative World Data: A Statistical Handbook for Social Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). For comparisons with Turkey, see sections on UK (441-44), Greece (219-22), France (204-07), Portugal (368-71), and Spain (395-99).

54 "Foreign Labor Trends Report."
calculated differently, and therefore may reflect biases. Still, Turkish per capita GDP has risen at least modestly over the last ten years, but exactly how much is difficult to tell. However, coupled with distribution figures, Turkey remains below European standards.

On the positive side, average annual economic growth rate in GNP from 1980-1989 expanded by 5.3% per year. This period saw Turkey achieve one of the highest growth rates of OECD countries.\textsuperscript{55}

Some social statistics seem to indicate positive social changes, however, other indicators bode less well for Turkey's chances with the EU. Of serious concern to the EU is Turkish population growth and the possibility of being inundated by huge numbers of Turkish workers under EU rules that will allow the free movement of labor between EU members.

Recent (1990) figures revealed a Turkish population of 56.7 million. Projections for the year 2000 indicate that Turkey's population will be near 73 million. Other figures indicate a youthful population. Figures gathered in 1985 showed that over 60% of the population was 29 or younger, 37% was under the age of 14. Sex distribution figures indicated a nearly even split in percentages: males

\textsuperscript{55} Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 121.
accounted for 50.4% of the population, 49.6% of the population was female.\textsuperscript{56}

Occupational data by sector and population show agriculture currently claiming the largest percentage of workers, employing 48% of the workforce, while industry and services employ 15.7% and 36.3% of the civilian workforce respectively (1991 data).\textsuperscript{57} Agriculture's share of the labor force was 59.8% in 1980.\textsuperscript{58} While the share of Turkey's population in agriculture is declining, comparatively speaking, Turkey employs more of the population in agriculture today than the leading democracies of Europe did over a decade ago.\textsuperscript{59}

Sectoral share of GDP figures show agriculture's share of the Turkish GDP was 22.7% in 1980, while industry's share was 30.4% and services added 46.9% of GDP.\textsuperscript{60} Figures from 1985 show agriculture's share of GDP declined to 18.4%, while industry remained essentially the same (30.7%), but


\textsuperscript{57} "Foreign Labor Trends Report."

\textsuperscript{58} Muller, 433-36. See note on industry's share of labor for 1980.

\textsuperscript{59} See Muller for comparisons between Turkey and other European states: UK (441-44), Greece (219-22), France (204-07), Portugal (368-71), and Spain (395-99).

\textsuperscript{60} Muller, 433-36.
services rose to total 50.9%. Figures from 1990 show agriculture contributing 18.1%, services 52.07%, and industry only 29.2% of GDP. Over the ten-year period Turkey's industrial sector has shown relative stability, claiming slightly less than a third of GDP, while agriculture's contribution declined slightly and services' contribution climbed by nearly 10% over ten years.

Somewhat favorably, urbanization has increased in the post-war era. Demographic indicators show 1988 urban population at 47% of total population in comparison to the 1965 figure of 34%. Turkish urbanization figures for 1980 indicate the rate was 47% of the population, compared with 91% in the UK, 78% in France, 77% in the US, 74% in Spain, 62% in Greece, and 31% in Portugal. Turkey's urban population growth from 1985-1990 grew at 3.05% compared to rural population growth over the same period at 1.05%. Data for 1991 show urban population at 51.8%, up .5% from 1990. This trend is likely related to expansion of the Turkish

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63 Kurian, 1971.


65 "Foreign Labor Trends Report."
services and manufacturing sectors and may also point to increasing secularization of society.

Taken together, the socioeconomic data are mixed. Certainly, rising urbanization and high economic growth are favorable indicators. Further, service sector expansion, declining agricultural employment, and a viable (though static) industrial base indicate that middle-class and industrial working ranks are probably growing.

However, serious flaws still exist. Population growth is worrisome. Income distribution remains abysmal. Modest increases in per capita GDP are probably offset by inflationary pressures. These are considerable challenges to both Turkish economists and a government interested in attaining European standards.

Further, current income distribution patterns inhibit rapid development of middle class ranks as well as provide a general disincentive for social-economic mobility. Inflation too, erodes the citizen's purchasing power and also inhibits mobility patterns.

The current Turkish government, aware of the dangers these factors present, not only to their longevity in office, but also to the often stated national goals of economic modernization and "Europeanization," has attempted to curb inflation, alter distribution patterns, and encourage economic growth through export-driven policies and
privatization of the cumbersome, bloated government SEEs. Whether Turkish efforts will be seen as sufficient remains the purview of the EU Commission.

The European Union and Institutional Barriers

Institutional barriers to Turkey's admission are shaped by the internal dynamics and dilemmas within the "institution" of the EU itself. Tied inextricably together are two problems of definition that Europe must resolve before Turkey can easily enter the EU. Although we separate them for academic convenience, in reality they are closely intertwined. Further, it should be noted here that although we have not included "international environmental factors" as a specific barrier to Turkey's admission, they do play heavily on the institutional barriers outlined below.

First, the EU in many ways has not yet defined its own direction for the future. By this we mean that the EU as an association of currently sovereign nation-states has not yet concluded what the nature of their common future association


67 This author would be the first to acknowledge the importance and legitimacy of such weighty "international environmental factors" as Western Europe's new focus on Eastern Europe, the uncertain future of Russia, or the impact of Yugoslavia's dissolution. However, given the limited scope of this study, we must only acknowledge here their relevance as they affect the EU's ability to come to grips with its own internal problems of definition.
will be. Notably, part of that definition process, the debate over "deepening versus widening" is tied closely to the issue of state sovereignty and how it may be defined in the future Europe. Europe’s search for a new understanding of "community" and "union" has in some ways slowed the EU’s willingness or ability to accommodate additional change.

Second, there appears to be no real common understanding among the EU members or Europeans in general of what "Europe" itself means anymore. The demise of the Communist bloc removed the most obvious method of definition—"us" versus "them," "West" versus "East." The sharp political and economic contrasts of the past no longer serve as boundary markers in the present.

Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of truly independent states in Eastern Europe have thrust new challenges upon Western Europe and the EU, challenges that literally sit threadbare upon their doorsteps and will not go away.

Europe’s response to the new international environment has been mixed. At times perceptive, as with the rapid diplomatic and economic engagement of Eastern European

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*Deepening* versus *widening* implies a difference in policy directions available to the EU. One choice is to further develop political, economic, and social integration among the current members of the EU (deepening) or in contrast, expand the EU current membership before attempting further integration among its member states (widening). See the following section for a more detailed review of this issue.
states like Hungary, Poland, and Czech and Slovak Republics, while at other times, vacillating and inconsistent as with Yugoslavia and Iraq.\textsuperscript{69}

Given the current international environment characterized by drift, chaos, and redefinition, it is that much harder for the EU to consider Turkey's application for membership when the EU has not yet even conclusively defined the notion of "Europe" in geographic, political, or cultural terms. Turkey's application is caught up in the midst of this period of redefinition and reorientation.

**Community to Union: A Short Review of the Past Decade**

If we are to appreciate where the EU is headed, we should review briefly the events of the past decade that have put the EU where it is now.

Following a decade of political and economic lethargy\textsuperscript{70} the European Council issued the 1985 White Paper which set


1992 as the target date for the completion of the internal market and sought to eliminate all further barriers to the "four freedoms"—free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. The White Paper identified three types of barriers still impeding the internal market. Identified by the White Paper were physical, technical, and fiscal barriers. Physical barriers were primarily cross-border customs controls and immigration policies, while technical barriers amounted to the wide variety of standards and policies for consumer products among the member states. Finally, fiscal barriers primarily involved wide differences in tax rates among EC members.\(^71\)

To redress the problems identified in the White Paper the Single European Act was adopted in July 1987. It strengthened the ability of the EC to make common economic policy by changing policy making procedural rules within the European Council and European Parliament as well as pushed forward efforts to "harmonize" individual member state tax, tariff, and technical policies.\(^72\) As a result changes have been made that have established common policy in these areas, although the rate at which individual member states have implemented EC common policies has varied.\(^73\)

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 6-10.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 10-11. See also Howell et al., 422.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 13.
In February 1992, the original Treaty of Rome founding the European Community was amended by the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, Netherlands. The Treaty on the European Union became effective in November 1993.74

The Maastricht Treaty calls for a common EU tariff and the elimination of all duties and customs among members, the abolition of barriers to free movement of persons, services and capital, and the adoption of common policies for agriculture, transportation, and trade competition. It further establishes the European Social Fund, the European Investment Bank, and calls for association and cooperation with other "overseas" states in areas of trade and social development. Further, the treaty ratifies the procedural and structural changes made to EC institutions by the Single European Act of 1987.75 It has also established the framework for the formation of a common EU foreign and security policy and encouraged the establishment of the WEU as the EU defense arm.76


75 Ibid.

Since the treaty has come into force, the EU has been focused on implementing the broad outlines of the treaty's agenda. With regards to specific questions and policies, many minor differences and several major ones remain to be resolved before the name "European Union" can be legitimately applied to the current members. The following section outlines one of the most contentious issues.

Redefining the EU: Deepening versus Widening

The single biggest issue confronting the EU is the future nature of their common association. Two schools of thought prevail. The first argues that the relationships among the Union members should be strengthened in the direction of full economic and political integration prior to the extension of membership to other states. This perspective calls for "deepening" the relationship among current EU member states.

The second viewpoint calls for the expansion or "widening" of the Union to include states in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and the Mediterranean. This perspective argues that the Union must take advantage of the historic opportunities in front of it and take up the more difficult problem of full integration later.

Arguments and motivations for each perspective vary, but in our estimation, come down to a basic difference over
questions of national sovereignty versus the potential economic aggrandizement of the whole.

Britain, for example, has been on the side of "widening" rather than "deepening." Britain differs with the EU over sovereignty issues, monetary policies, and future social aspects within the EU agenda. With the Conservative Party in power, British leaders have a philosophical difference with some of the EU's political agenda, in particular, British leaders have been reluctant to relinquish sovereignty beyond what is required to complete the economic aspects of the Union. From the British view, further unification should be taken slowly and should be based upon "enlightened national self-interest and market competition." Hufbauer notes British fears about their ability to control their borders and prevent the penetration of terrorists and narcotics. Further, British Conservatives are reluctant to embrace the social safety net envisioned by the EU's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights.

Germany has shown willingness to eliminate internal borders and to adopt common immigration and visa policies,

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77 Hufbauer, 13-15.
78 Ibid., 14.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 15.
81 Ibid.
but has also pushed for early Austrian admittance to the EU. France fears that Germany may eventually seek to draw its traditional East European allies into the Union, thereby leading to a possible shift in favor of a strongly German agenda. Britain, in turn has been drawn in to support German efforts to widen the Union, because it defers any plans to further deepen the Union.

The strongest efforts to deepen the Union come primarily from France, although Italy and the Benelux states are proponents of deepening also. French concerns over a resurgent, united Germany appear to have led it to promote further integration among members in order to bind Germany more closely to the European Union. France has therefore been more interested in deferring full membership for Eastern European states in favor of association agreements akin to the EU relationship with Turkey. In addition, the French have a leading voice in the current voting arrangements and have exercised considerable influence on the EU’s common agriculture policies. The French role may be somewhat diluted by the addition of other states to the EU.

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82 Howell et al., 394-95.
83 Ibid., 426. Hufbauer also notes French Mitterand’s call for faster integration. See Hufbauer, 17, note 35.
84 Ibid., 395.
85 With the expansion of the EU, France’s percentage of the vote in the European Council and in the European
Another strong proponent of deepening the Union comes from within the EU Commission. President Delors has argued for further integration ahead of expansion. Delors has called into question the current concepts of national sovereignty arguing for limitations on national sovereignty so that multi-lateral organizations like the EU or the UN will have enough authority to make decisions on foreign policy or security issues and take action on them. Other members of the Commission lament the unwillingness of certain member states to adopt the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and their continued use of bilateral channels and lack of inter-EU consultation.

Parliament (EP) would decline. Currently France’s share of the EP vote is 17.4%, under expanded membership that includes Austria, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, France’s share decline to 13.6% of the vote. In contrast Germany currently has 17.4% of the EP vote but would have 15.5% of the EP vote under expanded membership. Together, Germany and Austria will have almost 20% (18.6%) of the EP vote making it the largest cultural voting block.

A commensurate decrease in France’s share of the EU Council vote also follows with expanded membership. See "Treaty on European Union" for precise voting figures in the anticipated future expansion of the EU.

86 Hufbauer, 16.


Despite interest in deepening, the EU has completed accession negotiations with Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Finland. Following a likely recommendation from the EU Commission, a subsequent vote by the EU Council, and national referendums in the petitioning states, their entry into the EU is very likely by 1995. This brings forward the issues that widening may engender and may lead to a renewed push in 1996 for deepening prior to another round of expansion.

**Redefining Europe’s “Boundaries”**

A second major problem that Europe and in particular the EU faces, is how to define itself. More philosophical in nature than the practical problems of widening versus deepening, a definition of “Europe” calls into question nearly every quantifiable and qualitative measure of what Europe has been in the past. In the past Europe was defined with geographic terms that had political implications, i.e., Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Today, the political implications do not hold; the extension of the free market and democracy into Eastern Europe has reshaped the political dimensions of Europe.

One perspective on the definition of Europe is provided by recent comments made by EC Commissioner Hans Van den
Van den Broek noted recently that geographically Europe encompassed a "triangular peninsula of Eurasia," with its base along the Urals and as its apex, the Iberian Peninsula. He further noted, however, that Europe was more than just a "geographic expression." Van Den Broek allowed that geography does little to address the wider political and psychological dimensions of Europe. He summed up the matter by stating that

Europe today is not a geographic expression but rather a political aspiration, the desire of the diverse peoples of our continent to live and work together in conditions of political and economic freedom. This aspiration... focuses on the European Union.

The redefinition of Europe has a strong impact on Turkey's application for admission. We should logically assume from a geographic viewpoint that Turkey also falls within the geographic boundaries of Europe based upon the EU's assent to Cyprus's eventual membership and Van den Broek's brief comments on geography. It should follow that the EU cannot deny Turkey admission for geographic reasons.

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90 Ibid.

91 We should note here, perhaps rather obviously, that Cyprus lies to the south of Anatolia Turkey by approximately 50-60 miles and that, as an island, it has no contiguous land borders with the European continent. Still, it is apparently within the rough geographic boundaries outlined by Van den Broek. If this is definitive of the EU's geographic view, then Turkey falls within the same geographic criteria, and further, enjoys a contiguous border with a current EU member--Greece.
Insofar as "Europe" being a political aspiration, one can also argue that there are few states that have as strong a political aspiration to belong to Europe as does Turkey.

Still, Van den Broek’s comments do not square with President Delors’ past conception of Europe and the EU. According to his view, there is a system of concentric rings centered on the EU and growing larger as they get further away from Western Europe. The first ring encompasses the EU, the second, the EU and assumably the remaining EFTA countries (some of which may be EU members by next year). This ring would be labeled the European Economic Area (EEA). Within it, there would be commonality in the "four freedoms" and other environmental and social aspects, but the non-EU states would not be subject to the full body of EU law. Outside the EEA, the EU would form another ring of Eastern European states based upon association agreements and "reciprocal free trade," and a final ring including Mediterranean states that would be linked to the EU by customs unions.92

President Delors’s view, at least insofar as we understand it, has changed subtly however. Recent comments of his seem to indicate that these concentric rings now form

92 Howell et al., 426-27.
stepping stones towards full EU membership as opposed to
their formerly implied static nature.93

Both Van den Broek and Delors’s conceptions of Europe extend a reasonable hope for Ankara that Turkey ultimately cannot be excluded based on geographic or political considerations. Regardless, however, of how Europe may be ultimately defined in the future, a redefinition of what it means to be a European state remains a prerequisite for the EU’s future internal development, its relations with aspiring members, and specifically to Turkey’s accession to the EU.

The Cultural Barrier: Europe’s "Cultural Apprehension"

Finally, beyond the above mentioned obstacles may lay the hardest hurdle for Turkey to surmount—Europe’s "cultural apprehension." No current EU member-state has a majority Muslim population. Further, Turkey’s addition to the EU would make it the second largest in terms of population, surpassed only by Germany, but as a member it would have the highest population growth.94 While the challenge of admission rests principally with Turkey, the cultural factor is in a sense Europe and the EU’s test. The cultural factor takes Europe full circle, back to the point

93 The European Union, The Commission of the European Communities, "Speech of President Delors."

94 See Muller (previously cited) for country comparisons.
of definition. Is Europe defined as a set of political ideas, a cultural orientation, or geographically, or further, as some combination of these factors?

Understandably, EU policy makers generally shy away from overt cultural characterizations of the EU or Turkey, although EU President Jacques Delors once noted that Europe consists of "counties of Judeo-Christian identity,"95 while the Turks, conversely, openly proclaim their Islamic nature as a great benefit to Europe as a bridge to the East. Others are more forthright. The German Chairman of the CDU-CSU coalition recently argued against Turkey's admission to the EU, noting that the organization should be restricted to those states with a "basis in western Christian tradition."96

Samuel Huntington's recent article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" highlights Turkey's unique cultural position and the ramifications of Europe's reluctance to accept Turkey as European. While Huntington's view of the future of international conflict may not be wholly acceptable, his characterization of Turkey's place between two distinct "civilizations" is quite accurate. Huntington notes that Turkey is the "most obvious and prototypical 'torn'
country. Huntington further explains that in order for a nation-state to reorient itself from one civilization to another, three factors must be present. First, the political and economic elites must be "supportive and enthusiastic" about redefining the state's "civilization identity." Second, the public must be "willing to acquiesce" to the change, and third, the recipient civilization must be willing to accept the newcomer. In Huntington's view, which this author shares, the first two factors are present in Turkey; the last factor, however, remains unfulfilled. The reason, according to Turkish officials and other observers, is based on Europe's inability to accept Turkey as a member of the Western/European family of nations.

Ankara has expressed strong opinions on the matter. President Ozal angrily noted during the Gulf War that Europe continues to see Turkey first as Asian and "Moslem." President Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller have on several occasions decried the European attitude that the EU is an

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97 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 42-45. Huntington describes "torn" countries as those that "have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs in one civilization or another." Huntington argues that Turkey is torn between Western and Islamic civilizations.

98 Ibid.

"exclusive Christian club" that denies admittance to Turkey because it is predominately Muslim. Further, the Turkish ambassador to Brussels warned against European "cultural apprehension" and noted that it was up to Europe to "prove" that there is no racism involved in delaying Turkey's application.

This view is reinforced by the relatively easy time Austria and the Scandinavian states have had in entering the EU, despite the fact that their applications came after Ankara's. Europe's relatively swift reaction to the potential Iraqi threat to a significant portion of the West's oil supply contrasts unfavorably with its limp reaction to the plight of Bosnian Muslims. These responses further reinforce the Turkish assertion that Europe cares little for Muslims in general.

While Europe's "cultural apprehension" remains for the time being officially unspoken, other observers note the disparity between Europe's strong interest in Turkey for security needs and its hesitation to embrace Turkey in any other sense--economically, socially, or culturally.

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102 Mortimer, "Friend When in Need." One observer crudely, but perhaps accurately, attributed the low attendance of international figures at President Ozal's
Europe's "cultural apprehension" with regards to Turkey may be best explained by historical conceptions of the "Oriental." Edward Said's landmark book, *Orientalism*, provides key insights into the Western/European perspective. Said explains that Orientalism is a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience. The Orient has helped define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.

Said notes further that Orientalism is never far from the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures.

These notions, according to Said, color even today the essential emotional character of Europe's relations with Islamic nations, and we may add by extension, with Turkey. There is now an innate sense in the European psyche, shaped

funeral in April 1993 to the fact that the West probably just "thought of him as a 'wog.'"


104 Ibid., 7.
by Europe's historical encounters with Islam, that
distinguishes between the whole of European civilization and
the "outsider"—Islam.\textsuperscript{105}

Turkey, ironically, has thrust itself onto the horns of
this dilemma. By pursuing a quest for Europeanization,
Turkey has forfeited the ability to gauge its own progress
by its own standards; instead, Ankara has allowed Europe to
measure Turkish progress towards its goal of
Europeanization.\textsuperscript{106} In light of Europe's "cultural
apprehension," the bureaucracies and policy makers of
European states and the EU may be able to engineer subtle
adjustments to the cultural barrier that may be enough to
keep Turkey from achieving the "standards of contemporary
civilization" in the coming decade.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 70-71. Also see Daniel Pipes, \textit{In the Path of
1983). Pipes presents a thorough historical review of the
relationship, attitudes, and misperceptions between Islam
and the West in Chapters 4 and 5.

\textsuperscript{106} "Kohl Calls on Turkey to Respect Human Rights; Sees
Rosy Future for German-Polish Relations," \textit{The Week in
Germany}, German Information Center, April 3, 1992 (Lexis-
Nexis). Chancellor Kohl is noted in this article as
reminding the Turks that they are being judged by Europe’s
standards, in this case, on human rights.
Chapter 8

CONCLUSION: THE LIKELIHOOD OF TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Overview

The probability of Turkey’s admission to the European Union in the 1990s is not high, particularly in light of the barriers to Turkey’s admission outlined in the preceding chapter. Although the European Union (EU) has published its official opinion on Turkey’s membership application, in reality, a multiplicity of perspectives help shape the EU view towards Turkey. Naturally, each EU member-state holds its own perspective on Turkey’s accession, shaped by its own individual national interests and its bilateral ties with Turkey. These bilateral relations and national interests affect the perspective of the organization as a whole.

This chapter’s purpose is twofold. First, it aims to recapitulate briefly the EU’s official opinion, as well as highlight the individual perspectives of several key EU member states. This will allow for a better understanding of the EU’s position and likely strategy towards Turkey in the coming decade.

Second, an analysis of Turkey’s prospects for admission into the EU in the next decade will be presented. Here, we begin to evaluate the usefulness of Turkey’s strategies to enter the EU and fulfill its goal of
Europeanization in light of the significant barriers that stand in Ankara's way.

The European Union's Position

The EU Commission's official opinion, delivered in December 1989, is fairly straightforward with regard to Turkey's 1987 application to join the EU. According to the Commission, Turkey has not yet sufficiently developed economically, population growth is unchecked, the human rights/Kurdish problem and the status of Cyprus are still unresolved, and the Turkish political system is still immature. The EU therefore deferred any prospects for negotiation with Turkey until after 1993. Today, the EU and its member nations continue to cite one or more of the above reasons as justification for holding Turkey's membership application in abeyance.¹

The EU viewpoint offered constructive suggestions, however, for improving the EU/Turkey relationship. These suggestions are centered on resolving or ameliorating some of the outstanding economic and political obstacles between Turkey and Europe. Significant among the EU proposals was the revitalization of the Customs Union process, now in progress.

¹ "Turkey: Trade and Exchange Regulations," Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, February 1, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis). This article provides a brief comment on the contents of the EU Commission's official opinion on Turkey's accession to the EU.
While the EU's opinion focused on political and economic obstacles, it did not address the significant institutional or cultural barriers that Turkey still faces. Regardless of any future progress Ankara may make on economic and political obstacles, some observers note that "the longer-term prospects for membership will be shaped not only by economic and political developments in Turkey, but by the evolution of the EC itself," as well as "the awkward cultural questions of how Europe should be defined."\(^2\)

**Key EU Members and Their Views**

Before we can address the EU's likely strategy towards Turkey for the next ten to fifteen years, it is necessary to understand how the individual EU members see Turkey's quest for admission. While the scope of this paper prevents a full discussion of every EU member's position on Turkey's potential entry into the Union, a review of the positions of several key EU member-states will allow us to better frame the EU's future response to Ankara's Europeanization goal.

Of the current twelve EU members, Germany, France, Britain, and Greece are the most significant in relation to the Turkish question for several reasons. First, all four EU members have strong historical ties to the Turkish

Republic and its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Their individual positions reflect to some degree their historical relationships with the Turks.

Second, Germany, France, and Britain are economic and political heavyweights in the EU. They have now, and will have in the future, the preponderance of votes in the Council of Ministers and in the European Parliament. Their policy decisions regarding Turkey will likely have strong impact on the other smaller states.

Third, each state has a strong interest in Turkey’s economic and political future, irrespective of the EU position, based on their individual national interests.

Finally, the Greek position is particularly important because of its stand on Cyprus, a key political obstacle to Turkey’s entry into the EU. Until the Cyprus problem is resolved, Greece will remain the most vocal opponent to Turkey’s accession in spite of Turkey’s best efforts to meet other EU requirements. The following paragraphs briefly describe these individual views.

**Britain**

British interest in Turkey goes back to the 16th century as the British Empire began to expand and first

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encountered the Ottomans. British interests in the Middle East and Central Asia, colored by Britain's historic competition with Russia ("The Great Game"), thrust the Ottomans directly into the middle of European power politics. Traditionally, the British have had significant economic relationships with the Ottomans. The British Conservative Party, in particular, embraced the notion of an enduring relationship with Turkey, albeit, not out of any overfondness for the Turks, but rather for political reasons—as a buffer for Britain's Empire.

Current British policy supports Turkey's accession to the EU. While the Tories are again in power, the broad outlines of their geopolitical concerns have not changed greatly. Britain still sees Turkey as vital to Europe's prosperity and security, and by extension, their own

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6 Current British policy has been marked by continued efforts to draw the EU and Turkey closer together, specifically with regards to European security policy and Turkey's regional role. See Robert Powell, "Britain Urges EC to Do More for Turkey," Reuter Library Report, May 1, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis); "EC/Turkey: Foreign Ministers Postpone Decision on Future Relations with Ankara," European Report, European Information Service, July 22, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis); Robert Mauthner and John Murray Brown, "Hurd Visit Aimed at Reassuring Turkey on EC," The Financial Times, April 21, 1992, 3 (Lexis-Nexis).
political and economic interests in Asia and the Middle East. Turkey has been referred to by ranking British officials as being in a "pivotal geographic position." According to them, it would be "unwise to take Turkey's westward orientation for granted" given its recent overtures to the Central Asian Republics and the Black Sea region.

Still, in realistic terms, the British do not see Turkey's EU membership as immediately forthcoming. There is continuing concern over Turkey's handling of the Kurdish situation, Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, and recognition of the Turkish Cypriot regime. While London is in favor of Turkish admission to the EU they do not have enough political capital to sway the other members.

Britain, therefore, has pursued a policy of actively engaging the Turks in their calculations on European

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7 "Cyprus Could Be Key to Future of Turkey in Europe," The Guardian, July 14, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis). Article quotes British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's position paper on Turkey for an EC Minister's meeting.

8 Ibid.


10 The British concern with the Kurdish situation is in itself somewhat ironic given British machinations in Kurdistan in the post-WWI period and the current British presence in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. See Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation," in Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, eds. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 42.
security, while assuring Ankara that it will eventually gain full membership in the EU and WEU.

France

Franco-Turkish relations also have a long history. The French had an ambassador at the Ottoman court and substantial relations with the Sublime Court several decades before the British. Today, France has the highest level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey with substantial interests in the Turkish auto industry and cement manufactures sectors.

France, too, recognizes Turkey's unique geopolitical position. French officials in consultation with Turkey over Bosnia and Central Asia have noted that the two share a "fundamental interest in working together" as a basis for not only resolving these problems, but also as an element of their overall political cooperation. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, during a recent visit to Ankara, stated that "Turkey has France's full support in the development of its European identity." Juppe simultaneously


identified a strong French commitment to Turkey while subtly noting that Turkey’s European identity was not completely "developed."\(^\text{14}\)

France also officially favors Turkey’s eventual admission into the EU, but, like the British, have some reservations. France is also concerned about the Cyprus partition and has supported EU demarches chiding Turkey over the Kurdish situation.\(^\text{15}\) However, recent French policies outlawing French-based PKK groups has probably restored some equilibrium to Turco-French relations from Ankara’s perspective.\(^\text{16}\)

Further, Paris is not hesitant to put their interests in Turkey before the EU’s. For example, France moved quickly to encourage Turkey to buy French arms after the Germans stopped arms sales to Turkey following the disclosure that German-made armored personnel carriers (APCs) were being used in anti-Kurdish operations.\(^\text{17}\)


\(^\text{15}\) "Germany Says EC Agreed to Joint Protest to Turkey," The Reuters Library Report, April 3, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).


\(^\text{17}\) "German-Turkish Relations Threatened by Arms Boycott," MidEast Markets, Thompson Publishing Corp., May 4,
The French have inferred that Turkey will eventually become a member of the EU, and like Britain, feels that it is imperative to strengthen ties with Turkey because of its regional access. Yet, Paris is in no rush to push Turkey’s membership. French concerns echo other EU members when addressing the issue of Turkish guest workers, especially in light of French unemployment figures.

Further, broad French policy goals are currently directed towards deeper integration among existing EU member-states rather than widening membership.

**Germany**

The Turko-German relationship is by far the most complex of all the EU members. Obviously, the German-Turkish World War I military and political alliance is well documented as is the Nazi German economic relationship with Turkey, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).

\(^{18}\) Powell, "Britain Urges EC."; see also, Republic of Turkey, "Viewpoint: French Foreign Minister.", 1; Republic of Turkey, The Directorate General of Press and Information, "Juppe: "France Fully Supports the European Identity of Turkey," Newspot (Ankara, 23 March 1994), 3.

\(^{19}\) "EU Unemployment Rises Slightly to 10.9%," The Reuter European Community Report, May 6, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis). This article reports French unemployment at 11.2% for March 1994, up from 10.5% in March 1993. The addition of Turkish guest workers to the equation does not appeal to French policymakers.

\(^{20}\) Lesser, 110.
Turkey. Although modern German relations with the Turks have been warm (though at times patrimonial), recent developments have put some distance between the two. Germany now stands out as one of the countries that has attempted to slow Turkish entry into the EU.

German fears revolve around several issues. First, the Germans are concerned that Turkey’s entry into the EU will trigger further influxes of Turkish gastarbeiter (guest workers) into Germany’s already laden unemployment roles. German preoccupation with absorbing former East Germany has made Berlin wary of the EU’s ability to absorb 60 million Turks, many of whom are under 21 and under-or-unemployed. Current tensions between neo-fascist elements and the Turkish community would likely be heightened if more workers arrived.

Second, domestic interest mandates that Berlin must pay close attention to the human-rights situation in southeast Turkey. Nearly 25% of the 1.5 million Turkish

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21 Refer to Chapter 4 for a detailed review of Turco-German relations in the pre-WWII era and during the war.

22 "West German April Unemployment 8.4% vs 8.5% in March; East German 16.2%," AFX News, AFP-Extel News Limited, May 5, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis). This article reports the (western) German unemployment rate for April as 8.4% for April 1994, while in eastern Germany the rate is a disturbing 16.2%. See also, "Bonn and Ankara Pledge to Improve Relations During Kinkel Visit," The Week in Germany, German Information Center, July 17, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis); see also, Lesser, 110.

23 Lesser, 109-10. See also Fuller, 42.
gastarbeiter are Kurds and pro-PKK groups are known to exist in Germany where they have only recently been outlawed.\(^2\) Chancellor Kohl has told the Turks that they are being judged by “European standards” when it comes to Kurds and human rights.\(^2\)

The Germans have reacted swiftly to public pressure on Kurdish issues. For example, the German Bundestag suspended arms sales to Turkey in November 1991 over Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds, but German Defense Ministry officials allowed the sale and shipment of Leopard tanks to Turkey that same month. The Kohl government subsequently suffered serious political damage, and as a result, the defense minister was forced to resign following disclosure of both the sale and the use of German arms in suppressing the Kurds. Political fallout from that episode further strained Turco-German relations as Germany sponsored an EU demarche to the Turks to protest human-rights abuses.\(^2\)

The arms issue resurfaced in April 1994 when German human rights activists returned from the Turkish southeast claiming proof of Turkish use of German weapons against the Kurdish insurgents. Arm shipments were again suspended briefly by the German government under public pressure but

\(^2\) “Assembly Speaker Meets French Parliamentarians.”

\(^2\) “Kohl Reminds Turks of ‘European Standards’ of Behavior,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, April 2, 1992 (Lexis-Nexis).

\(^2\) “Germany Says EC.”
were resumed when the "proof" was found to be inconclusive.27

Third, Berlin is concerned over the state of the Turkish economy. Despite a boom in the 1980s, Turkish inflation still is above 50%,28 many state enterprises remain unprivatized, and many markets remain regulated.

Finally, the Turks have noted a concern, echoed by some analysts, that Germany has put distance between the two and sidetracked Turkey's entrance into the EU because Berlin is concerned that Turkey may prove to be a strong competitor in the race for new markets in Central Asia, the Balkans, and in the eastern Mediterranean.29

Turkey, for its part, accused Germany of being an unreliable ally during the Gulf War, while in April 1991, President Ozal pointedly referred to Germany's "arrogant"

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28 John Murray Brown and David White, "Economic Watch: Turkish Inflation Rises to 107%," The Financial Times, May 5, 1994, 3 (Lexis-Nexis). The annual inflation rate as of April 1994 was 107%. The rise in inflation was attributed to new government sponsored price increases (+55%) in state-controlled commodities. the price increases were part of an austerity plan designed to reduce the budget deficit. By comparison, the April 1991-April 1992 inflation rate was approximately 74%. See "Foreign Labor Trends Report: Turkey," Market Reports, January 15, 1993 (Lexis-Nexis).

behavior as "Hitler-like." Moreover, the Turks are particularly sensitive to human-rights abuse charges and adamantly reject German and EU censure. According to Ankara, the PKK is a terrorist group and its activities threaten Turkey's security; therefore, Turkey's response is well within legal and moral bounds. In responding to the 1991 arms cut-off, Turks countered with their own popular boycott of German goods. The German boycott ended less than three months later, following Chancellor Kohl's visit to Turkey in May 1992.

Despite occasional political strains, the Turco-German economic relationship is basically strong. Twenty-five (25%) of Turkey's exports go to Germany, while Turkey buys 15% of Germany's exports (almost $2.8 billion worth). Germany also accounts for nearly 10% of all FDI in Turkey.

Nevertheless, German opposition to Turkey's near term entry into the EU is a major obstacle to Ankara's Europeanization policies. Berlin's fears over the economic ramifications of Turkish entry into the EU and its own struggle to assimilate eastern Germany will prevent it from

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30 Ozal's comments were apparently in reference to German pressure on Ankara to change its policy towards the Kurds. See Dave Todd, "Turkey; Crushing Kurds Could Kill EC Bid," The Ottawa Citizen, April 1, 1992, A9 (Lexis-Nexis).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
endorsing Ankara’s application for at least the next five to seven years.33

**Greece**

Like Germany, Greece stands against the immediate accession of Turkey into the EU. Greece’s position, although ostensibly based on Turkey’s political and economic shortcomings, has a more emotional, nationalistic aspect. This emotional aspect forms the backdrop to Greco-Turkish relations.

Of all the EU members, only Greece was at one time an Ottoman province. Greco-Turkish relations have been colored by their common turbulent history. The Greek rebellion of 1821 against the Ottomans was particularly bloody, with atrocities committed by both Greeks and Turks. It provoked the Russians to declare war against the Ottomans resulting in Greek independence in 1829 under the auspices of the three Great Powers—Britain, France, and Russia.34 Later, in the aftermath of World War I, Greek and Turkish nationalists clashed over the Greek invasion of Anatolia.

33 German concerns over the prospect of additional states applying for EU membership were addressed by Chancellor Kohl who recently stated that Germany will welcome Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EU but will block the entry of any other new applicants for the near future. See Michael Binyon, "Bonn Sets Limits on Expansion of European Union," The Times, April 28, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis).

In the recent era, differences remain over the partition of Cyprus, the status of minorities, the Aegean seabed and islands, and most recently, over conflict in the Balkans.  

Despite the historic tension in relations, beginning in the late 1980s, Greek and Turkish officials reinvigorated the political dialogue between the two states following the Davos summit in Switzerland. By 1992, the Greeks and the Turks had sketched the broad outlines of a potential friendship treaty and the Greeks had responded favorably to Turkey's initiative on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone proposal.

However, Greco-Turkish relations have once again turned sour following the October Greek 1993 elections and the return of Socialist Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister. Stalled progress on Cyprus as well as caustic remarks by the Greek Foreign Minister in December 1993 have not helped

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36 Republic of Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General for Press and Information, Turkey (Ankara, 1993), 65.

smooth relations between the two states, nor did the recent Greek Parliament decision to establish a day of commemoration for the Pontius Greek "genocide" of 1921. In turn, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rapidly responded by censuring the Greek Parliament over the "so-called genocide" and called upon Athens "to act with common sense and goodwill."

Finally, while Greek objections to Turkey's membership formally include the aforementioned economic and human rights problems, Greek concerns are focused primarily on the political outcome on Cyprus, itself an applicant to the EU. The Greeks have refused to entertain any notion of Turkey's admission pending a solution to the division of the island and have injected their foreign policy agenda directly into the EU's relationship with Turkey. Until a solution on Cyprus is reached, Turkey will face a certain Greek veto on its application.

38 Leonard Doyle, "Greek Minister Lambastes UK over Turkey Deal: Theodore Panglos Has Added London to His List of Enemies," The Independent, December 3, 1993, 15 (Lexis-Nexis). Panglos stated that Turkey "is dragging its bloodied boots across the carpets of Europe." Panglos also earlier incurred Germany's ire when he described Germany as "a giant with bestial force and a child's brain" over the issue of Germany's diplomatic recognition of the former Yugoslavian province of Macedonia.


The EU Strategy Towards Turkey

The EU’s current strategy towards Turkey is based on two courses of action.

First, the EU will continue to defer Turkey’s application until it can resolve its internal difficulties and make its way through the new round of accessions. With respect to Turkey’s prospects for admission, it is highly unlikely that the EU Commission will reject outright Turkey’s application for membership, now or in the future. However, neither will the EU make any concrete moves to accommodate Turkish membership in this century.41

The second course of action is based on creating a common economic framework between the EU and Turkey. This strategy is based on the hope that it will produce, over time, stronger economic ties between the two parties, thereby creating a suitable climate for political integration. Notably, the EU has not committed itself to future entry negotiations with Turkey should a suitable political climate exist. Any decision to begin negotiations with Ankara would be contingent upon the EU’s interests, not Turkey’s.

As noted previously, the 1996 Customs Union is viewed as the best vehicle for reaching a useful level of economic commonality with Turkey, according to the EU. For the EU, the Customs Union is a means to keep Ankara constructively engaged until the EU itself is prepared to deal with Turkey's admission. The Customs Union process now underway strengthens ties between the EU and Turkey without requiring any further commitment from the EU and without the EU having to bear the potentially heavy social, economic, and political costs of Turkey's full membership.42

**Outlook: The Prospects for Admission**

*Assessing the Future: Turkey, Europeanization, and the European Union*

The outlook for Turkey's accession to the EU during the remainder of the current decade is low, barring any major changes in Europe. There is reason, however, for cautious optimism for Turkey's accession beyond 2000. A realistic appraisal of Turkey's chances for the following five years (2000-2005) is better.

There are several reasons for this observation, but in order to better understand Turkey's current difficulties and future prospects, we must first bear in mind Turkey's Europeanization strategies, the obstacles to admission Turkey faces, and finally, the EU's response to Turkey.

42 Howell et al., 436.
Then we will address the following question—how do Turkish Europeanization strategies play against the various barriers to Turkey's admission to the EU?

As noted earlier in Chapter 6, Turkish strategies for Europeanization include the strategies of perceived political commonality, political loyalty, economic incentive, and diplomatic association through European organizations. We also highlighted in Chapter 7 significant obstacles to Turkey's admission to the EU, in itself a key component of Turkey's Europeanization goal. These included political, economic, institutional and cultural barriers to Turkey's EU membership. Finally, we noted above that the EU's response to Turkey is based primarily on economic measures, i.e., the Customs Union.

Turkey's chances for entering the EU in this decade are low for a number of reasons. In general terms, Turkish strategies have not yet adequately addressed the political and economic obstacles to admission from the EU's perspective. Furthermore, those Turkish policies that are designed to resolve or eliminate the political and socioeconomic barriers facing Turkey's application to the EU will not bear fruit for at least five years to ten years at best.

Moreover, Turkey does not have any concrete strategy for dealing with the institutional barrier facing them. Ankara, therefore, can do little else but wait patiently to
see how the EU eventually resolves its internal problems and respond as the future situation warrants.

Finally, while the Turkish strategies outlined above do address certain elements of the cultural barrier, they are ineffective against it. The following paragraphs detail specific Turkish shortcomings in each of these areas.

The socioeconomic barrier. Although Turkey has offered itself to the EU as the economic "gateway" to Central Asia, the EU is currently more interested in trade harmonization between itself and Turkey than Turkey’s economic potential in Asia.43 Even though the Turkish strategy is focused on enticing Europe with economic access to the East, Turkey has taken some steps to address the EU’s immediate economic concerns. Principally, Turkish efforts are focused on harmonizing tariff rates, tax codes, and intellectual property rights laws in anticipation of the 1995 Customs Union.44 Other Turkish government efforts involve reducing the number of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) by selling state enterprises off to foreign or domestic purchasers.45

43 Certainly the EU is interested in Turkey’s access to the Middle East and Central Asia, but from the EU perspective, the Customs Union will facilitate any eventual trade through Turkey with the East.


For its part, the EU seems content to let the Customs Union take effect in the hope that it will strengthen the Turkish economy, speed privatization, and increase living standards. Realistically however, Turkey will have to do more to accommodate EU policies than vice versa. Even with the Customs Union, it is unlikely that the EU will fully accommodate Turkish counter-demands by 1995, particularly with respect to the free movement of Turkish labor, the unrestricted import of some textiles, and various Turkish agricultural products.

Finally, even with the Customs Union in place, it will probably take at least the balance of the decade before the custom union regime is working smoothly. Further, income distribution, low (albeit rising) per capita income, and inflation remain chronic problems that will not be solved by the Customs Union alone.

Moreover, other socioeconomic impediments like population growth's impact on the future Turkish economy is difficult to measure. However, given the current Turkish unemployment/underemployment rates, expected population increases will probably only make matters worse. Any Turkish efforts to reign in population growth may take an additional generation before significant positive results are visible.

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46 Howell et al., 436-437.
Turkish government efforts to address these socio-economic problems have not been successful thus far. Further, it is unlikely that Ankara can remedy these problems to the EU's complete satisfaction within the next ten years, much less in the six years remaining before the end of the century.

Political obstacles. As noted in Chapter 7, Turkey faces three obstacles of a "political" nature. First, resolution of the Cyprus problem, an event that would significantly alter Europe's perceptions of Turkey, remains only an indistinct possibility in spite of EU prodding and the UN sponsored negotiations. Despite the presence of Turkish military forces on the island, Turkey takes the position that its involvement in Cyprus is minimal. Ankara's official argument is that any resolution must be based on the principle of "equal partnership" between the two Cypriot communities, but Turkey would likely be content with official recognition and legitimation of the status quo. Turkey will likely do little on the Cyprus problem in the next five to six years, due to strong domestic interest on defending Turkish Cyprus "rights." Turkey will resist UN and EU pressure to "deliver" Turkish Cyprus in any further negotiations, instead Ankara will

47 Republic of Turkey, Turkey, 66.
continue to "endorse" the Turkish Cypriot negotiating position.

While at this juncture one might be tempted to note that five years is a fair amount of time to resolve the issue, we are reminded that the status quo has endured for the last twenty years. Furthermore, according to some observers, Cyprus does not rank high on Ankara's foreign policy agenda despite its linkage to Turkey's EU admission. Given these conditions, a settlement on the Cyprus issue will not be likely in the near term.

Second, with regard to the broad category of human rights, President Demirel promised to correct Turkey's tarnished image, but human rights watch groups continue to claim that little has changed. Turkey's strategy of political commonality has done little to overcome the glaring abuses reported by both Turkish and international human rights groups.

Furthermore, as regards the Kurds, Ankara sees the Kurdish issue as an internal problem, not subject to outside interference. Therefore, Turkey will continue to reject European complaints about Turkish policy towards the Kurds and human rights.


Turkish policy is now focused on military efforts to defeat the PKK, coupled with only limited and incremental changes to Turkish law to accommodate Kurdish cultural demands. Continued use of Turkish military forces to eliminate the PKK will provoke EU concern, regardless of Turkey's legitimate rights to internal security. EU concerns will continue to be present, particularly since Turkish forces do not appear to have adequate civilian oversight or legal restraints when conducting anti-Kurdish operations. International human-rights groups will continue to exert domestic pressure within the EU member-states to keep this issue on Europe's agenda.

Three attainable intermediate goals will go a long way to eliminate the conflict in the Turkish southeast and improve Turkey's standing within Europe. First, continued economic investment such as the Southeast Anatolian Project (GAP) will help develop employment and commerce in the impoverished region. Additional government investment in schools and social programs will also help.

Second, the opening of a broad political dialogue coupled with the repeal of overly restrictive laws against the use of the Kurdish language and the practice of Kurdish culture may undercut much of the PKK's popular political base. Some efforts were undertaken by the Ozal government
in 1991 to allow the use of Kurdish in public. Further, amendment of the 1982 Constitution to encompass additional changes is within reach of compassionate and committed Turkish leaders. However, this would entail fashioning a new understanding of the Kemalist notion of nationalism, something Turkish elites have been heretofore extremely reluctant to do.

Third, strict and accountable civilian oversight of Turkish military efforts against the PKK would likely diffuse some of the EU's criticisms of Turkish policy as well as boost the legitimacy of Turkish military efforts. The Turkish military could still pursue legitimate military targets and eradicate the PKK's military capabilities while limiting collateral damage to private property and the indiscriminate and uncontrolled military attacks against Kurdish civilians.

In sum, unless rapid and far-reaching efforts are made by Ankara to change the nature of the conflict from military confrontation to political dialogue, the Kurdish problem and human rights abuses will not be resolved in the near future. In all likelihood, these problems will continue to impede Turkey's accession into the EU for at least the remainder of this decade.

50 "Turkey: Political Background," Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, February 1, 1994 (Lexis-Nexis).
Lastly, any Turkish efforts to bolster democracy by minor changes to the Turkey's political structures will not significantly impact the EU's position on Turkish accession in the near term. Turkish political structures are for the most part already democratic, and although minor adjustments to the Turkish Constitution and laws are foreseeable in the near term, they will not significantly alter Europe's perceptions of Turkey's political immaturity.

While democratic in form, Turkey suffers shortcomings in substance. From Europe's perspective, Turkey's practice of democracy is tainted by the three military interventions. Further, Turkish political culture has only slowly adjusted to the practice of democracy and democratic concepts. An additional ten years of uninterrupted democratic government in Turkey will do more to help convince the EU of Ankara's political maturity than will any tinkering with Turkey's political structures.

The institutional barrier. As noted above, Turkey can do little to affect the pace or direction of European integration. As far as the EU itself is concerned, in this author's view, Europe will only be ready to entertain newcomers to the EU by the end of the century, not before. As it is now, the addition of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Austria in 1995/1996 will occupy the EU for the next five years. Beyond the recent additions, the EU faces the likely internal political struggles that will arise if (when?)
renewed efforts to deepen relationships among the members are undertaken.

As previously noted, the EU also faces the prospect of future membership applications from several East European states. EU consideration of other countries in front of the long-standing Turkish application will cause Turkish policymakers to reflect further on the EU's ultimate intentions. Turkey has pointed out that continued deferral of their application will be difficult to explain to the Turkish electorate and that the very proponents of Turkey's European orientation may suffer from the repercussions of a frustrated polity.

One outcome touted in this scenario is that Turkey may drift closer towards Islam and the Middle East and away from the West. Turkish policymakers have noted that Europe's rejection of Turkey may lead to an unpleasant consequence—the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic Turkish state in Europe.51 While this sort of statement may be hyperbole, given the current climate of ethnic relations in Europe and recent gains made by religious conservative candidates in Turkish municipal elections,52 such a statement may cause

51 Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), 42-43.

some EU states to reevaluate Turkey's place in an integrated Europe.

In the past, the argument has been applied that EU membership encouraged the development of democracy, economic growth, and the free market in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Turkey has not been afforded the luxury of this logic. Should Turkish domestic politics reflect any significant diminution of Turkish commitment to secularism, democracy, and the free market, the EU may move to narrow the scope of its contacts with Ankara.

The cultural barrier. Turkey has addressed the cultural barrier only tangentially and without much effect, through its strategies of political commonality and diplomatic association with Europe. In spite of Ankara's best efforts to promote the perception of its "European identity," Turkey falls outside of the European mainstream both linguistically and culturally. Historically, the Turks have been more often the enemy of Europe than its ally. As noted earlier,

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53 John Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), 1982, 10; 290. Herz notes the influence of foreign policy choices upon the development/growth of democracy and cites Spain, Greece, and Portugal's entry into the EC as examples. See also Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 87-91. Here Huntington notes the specific influences of European institutions, in particular, the EC [EU]. Ian Lesser also notes that these three states suffered economic and political shortcomings similar to Turkey's prior to their admission to the EU. See Lesser, 107.
orientalist traditions that characterize Islam and Muslims as the "other" also influence the European psyche. Based on these factors, the strong likelihood exists that Europe cannot overlook its own deep-rooted prejudices.

Nevertheless, despite "cultural apprehension," the EU has already opened the door to Turkey's eventual accession. To close the door abruptly may damage the EU's relations with not only Turkey, but perhaps the entire Islamic world. Until the EU decides what is and what is not "Europe," they confront the eventuality of a large and growing Muslim state within its ranks.

For Turkey, the cultural barrier will subtly affect Turkey's application to join the EU by counterbalancing the effects of Turkish strategies of political commonality and diplomatic association. Although the cultural barrier will not be a formal impediment to Turkey's entry into the EU (at least for the foreseeable future), the cultural barrier may give cause for the opponents of Turkey's admission to be more inventive in discovering new political or economic obstacles to Turkey's accession to the EU.

Moreover, the cultural barrier can only be eliminated in two ways—either by the EU's willingness to define itself in the broadest cultural terms or, alternatively, define itself in political, geographic, and economic terms only. Thus far, the EU has not embraced a wider, more inclusive
cultural definition, nor has it settled on a final geographic, political, or economic definition of "Europe."

The Outlook Beyond 2000

In this author's view, the prospects of Turkey's entrance into the EU are somewhat better after the year 2000. Even so, Turkey will probably not enter the EU until after the year 2005. The aforementioned political and socioeconomic barriers, in the best of circumstances, will take another ten years to evidence the kind of positive changes the EU would like to see.

In another ten years, the EU may be ready to entertain a new round of accessions from Eastern Europe. Certainly, the current internal institutional problems the EU faces today--deepening vs. widening--will likely be resolved over the next ten years. Further, the EU will have had an additional ten years to definitively address questions concerning its cultural, political, geographic, and economic criteria for membership.

Finally, this author does not foresee the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and others before Turkey. Given Turkey's long security association with Western Europe in the post-war era, the most likely outcome would include Turkey in any new list of applicants to the EU.
**A Final Dilemma**

Beyond the barriers we have noted here, there remains a final contradiction the Turks must face. At issue is the balance between sovereignty, modernization, and security. Thus far, ideology and tradition have propelled Turkish national interests towards Europe. While Kemalism and state tradition continue to shape the goals for the modern Turkish state, in this study’s view, the current understanding of ideology and tradition will be insufficient for defining any new relationship between the EU and Turkey. Kemalist thinking and the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and autonomy must be modified to encompass the developing EU conceptions of limited sovereignty and supranationalism.

Ironically, the Kemalist ideology that drives Turkey towards Europe contains equally powerful elements that may make Turkey’s eventual integration with Europe very difficult. Although secularism, free markets, and democracy will merge nicely within an overall European political and economic framework, continued strong Turkish attachment to the concepts of nationalism and republicanism may impede Turkey’s integration with the European Union. Further, Ankara’s jealous attachment to autonomous state action and her zealous guard over her sovereignty will probably encourage the Turks to join other member-states favoring wider rather than deeper relationships within the EU.
Turkey now seeks the imprimatur of Europe for not only ideological reasons, but also for enhanced security and economic modernization. Yet the "standards of contemporary civilization" may come only at the price of Turkey's absolute sovereignty—a price that Ankara and Turkish elites may be reluctant to pay in full. Nevertheless, Turkish interest in the EU will probably remain strong over the next ten to fifteen years, given the ideological and historical impetus to the Europeanization goal. Further, as long as Turkey continues to press for membership, EU policy makers will have to periodically revisit the application.

Finally, a realist understanding of Turkey's eventual accession into the EU would likely argue that (1) Turkey will press for EU membership based on her perception of her national interests, and (2) Turkey will fight against significant erosion of her capability for unilateral political action once inside the Union. An interdependent view, on the other hand, would note that current economic linkages between the EU and Turkey have already compromised Ankara's ability to act with complete autonomy, and that continued development of the political and economic interrelationship will limit Turkey's autonomy and sovereignty even further.

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54 Turkey's trade in 1992 with EC/EU states accounted for 53% of Turkey's exports and 48% of its imports. See Mauthner, "Survey of Turkey."
Regardless of the perspective, the internal contradiction in Ankara's quest for the imprimatur of Europe may, in the end, present the Turks with a far wider challenge—that of accommodating integration with the EU. This potential future challenge may be more difficult than Turkey's current quest: that of gaining Europe's recognition of her European self-identification and her formal admission into the European family.
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Maps

CIA. 505581 (A01410) 4-83.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

TABLES
Table 1. Turkish per Capita GNP and National Income

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mid-Year Population (per 1,000)</th>
<th>Per capita GNP (TL 1,000)</th>
<th>Per capita national income($)</th>
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<td>56,098</td>
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<td>2,706</td>
<td>4,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>57,326</td>
<td>11,003</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) according to purchasing power parity

Source: Republic of Turkey, Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, Turkey (Ankara, 1993), 80. Statistics taken from the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO) and the State Institute of Statistics (SIS).
Table 2. Turkish Export/Import Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markets</th>
<th>% of Turkish Exports (1990)</th>
<th>% of Turkish Imports (1991)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (total)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD (total)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Turkey in the Middle East
Figure 5. Turkish Economic Data by Sector by Percentage
Figure 6. Turkish Income Distribution Trends 1990/1978-79
Source: "Turkey: SIS Reveals Results of Household Income and Expenditure Survey," Reuter Textline, January 1, 1991 (Lexis-Nexis);