GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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Growing Interdependence in Europe: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

by

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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There is a lot going on in Europe. The security situation is complex and unstable. Yet a number of events are taking place that suggests that the region is moving in a positive direction. There is restraint among the nations. NATO has developed the NACC which is developing rapidly into an excellent security forum. The EC has expanded into the European Economic Area and sits on the threshold of further expansion. CSCE continues to develop and almost all see a place for it in monitoring governmental activity and many would like to see it develop as a regional security forum. All of this suggests a general movement toward greater interdependence between sovereign states. It is this increased level of interdependence that will ultimately have the greatest impact on the United States as it tries to shape a new foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. A reasonable model that could develop and should be encouraged suggests that this interdependence will draw the U.S. away from policies that emphasize unilateral actions and toward policies that encourage a greater sharing of power.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel James B. Engle (B.S and M.S., University of Arizona) has had considerable experience working security policy issues in Europe. He recently completed a tour at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) where he was Section Coordinator in the Force Programs Section of the Policy Division. In this capacity he spent several years working on the NATO Defense Review Committee and was responsible for force structure negotiations with the NATO members during the period 1989 to 1991. He was instrumental in developing the rational for levels of contributions for both the CFE Treaty as well as the NATO 1992 Force Goals, both of which largely defined the parameters for Allied contributions to the Military Integrated Structure in the Post-Cold War era. Following this assignment he became the Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and provided rational and arguments on a broad range of issues including the wording for the Rome Summit Communique, arguments for NATO's continued importance in the region, and Allied Central Europe (ACE) military reorganization.

In addition to a successful career in Air Force operations flying transport aircraft, Colonel Engle has served as a member of the facility as an Associate Professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and worked as a staff officer on the USAF Headquarters staff in the Pentagon. In this capacity he was involved with long range planning issues and worked several key projects for the USAF Chief of Staff.

Colonel Engle is a graduate of Squadron Officers' School, Armed Force Staff College, and the Air War College class of 1993.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What direction is the U.S. going with its policy toward Europe? How does NATO fit into that policy? Is there an overall framework that can be useful in focusing on these questions? This paper addresses these issues. Sometimes when policymakers look at complex questions long enough, instead of answers, what they get are more questions. In these turbulent post Cold War times, perhaps this is inevitable. For example, after an initial period of rethinking, nearly every serious policymaker has agreed that the NATO region (including the NACC system) still needs NATO, at least until something equally or more effective can be put in its place. This is not to say that many of these people have not argued that NATO was obsolete, but they recognize that no acceptable political alternative -- such as a European Community political/military structure -- has yet emerged, the Maastricht Agreements notwithstanding.

But there is another audience that has not yet been reached -- the average citizen of the NATO member states. Today, it is these individuals who are increasingly driving their respective governments toward a domestic agenda that is providing a check on foreign policy issues. (1) This is not necessarily undesirable; in fact, given the general economic climate in the West and in particular the fact that Germany continues to slip into recession, perhaps this is inevitable. But this does not mean that the United States can ignore what is happening elsewhere, and it does not mean that new policies or approaches can be delayed or deferred. It is,
perhaps, not stretching things too far to say that the average citizen in both Western Europe and in the United States never really understood what NATO was all about even during the Cold War. (2) Perhaps this was acceptable because the overwhelming threat drove policy, and because as long as governments had a plan to deal with it, the citizenry seemed to acquiesce. But now there is no enemy, or so NATO has said. (3) Consequently, it has become important to explain and to justify what NATO (or similar alliances), can do for the United States when the conditions that led to its creation have either apparently ceased to exist or have fundamentally changed. In other words, governments have entered an age of justification, an inevitable situation when economic resources are scarce everywhere and military establishments are being sharply reduced and refocused.

This paper argues that a proper focus to justify NATO's continuing place in American foreign policy can be found in a growing post-cold war trend toward more rather than less interdependence among the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. If handled correctly, this trend could create avenues in which greater attention can be given to the member-states' domestic agendas, while still maintaining acceptable levels of common security. Furthermore, Europe is central to the argument that interdependence among the Euro-Atlantic states continues to shape U.S. national security policy. (4) But this interdependence does not just deal with security issues. The politics of trade negotiations, defense production, trade and commerce, and many other non-military issues are also increasingly involved.
CHAPTER II

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EUROPE

First, it is important in this paper to dismiss what might appear to be an overly Eurocentric perspective. No one can deny the fact that the U.S. has significant interests and problems elsewhere in the world. However, a similar analysis of other regions, although outside the scope of this paper, would support the model described later. (5) The focus in this paper is on Europe and NATO because at present there is no other region that combines economic, political, and military uncertainty similar to that which is possible in the Euro-Atlantic area. Nor is there any region other than Europe in which the United States can exert any greater level of direct influence to bring stability out of post-Cold War turmoil. Finally, in my opinion, America's historical Atlantic links to Europe will continue to dominate United States interests in this region more than in any other.

Second, Europe needs definition -- another tricky problem. But this should not be a stumbling-block for the reader. Although there are very legitimate reasons for using a geographical definition to enhance or deflate certain arguments, the point here is not to be constrained by geography. For example, some border states might or might not eventually wind up being included in one or more European international organizations. This is part of the instability in the post-Cold War definitions of "Europe" -- not knowing exactly what the region is. But for the purposes of this paper the key players are in Western, Central, and
Eastern Europe to include Russia. Western Europe includes the European Economic Area (EEA). (6) Central Europe includes all the states of the former Warsaw Pact. Albania should also be included because of its geographic location. Eastern Europe must include the Baltic states, along with Belarus, Moldova, and the Ukraine and The Russian Federation must be included. Turkey can be considered within Europe, but not Iran. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are still in question. As for the rest of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, it is impractical, at least for now, to include them in a Euro-Atlantic area. Their membership in such organizations as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) does not imply their participation in common security as defined in this paper. (7)

With these definitional issues out of the way, let us now consider the characteristics of this area. Eastern Europe continues to be unstable. Although this instability is due primarily to economic problems as these states transition from command to market economies, the potential for political chaos is also high. Public support may provide the time required to develop a new, more democratically market-oriented order. The problem is that there is no commonly-accepted model to follow. But it is clear that the United States wants to see the states comprising the "Europe" part of the Euro-Atlantic area play a bigger part in their own common security. In this respect, the United States continues to support economic and political unity for Europe, even in the face of persisting Atlantic trade tensions. (8) On the other hand, the United States is having difficulty coming to grips with this concept of sharing power in a regional context, with its constraints and compromises, nor does the U.S. seem to
have devised an acceptable alternative formula for the use of its influence.

So, as the United States continues to search for a post-Cold War foreign policy, it is clear that Europe provides one of the most compelling needs for the United States to develop a proactive international agenda. Why? Because there is a close relationship between overall security and economic well-being. (9) Even more than United States oil interests in the Gulf, Europe is vital to U.S. economic well-being. Because the central and eastern parts of this region are defining a relationship with the western democracies, what happens there will affect what happens in the West. If its Central or Eastern Europe descends into chaos, Western Europe will be drawn into it. That is a price (nearly 25% of U.S. foreign trade) the U.S. cannot afford. Therefore, U.S. policymakers need to care about this region because what happens there will shape the United States agenda for many years to come. If the area remains stable, then the United States will have considerable flexibility in the development of its foreign policy for the entire area. If it does not, then Europe's problems inevitably will become America's problems. A key example of this is the increasing attention the current U.S. administration is being forced to pay to the problems President Yeltsin is having in Russia. (10) In other words, there already is a high degree of interdependence between the U.S. and the region.

To help understand this position, let us consider the security concerns of several of the Central and Eastern European (CAEE) states and some of the security arrangements that are, as a consequence, emerging. Woven into this discussion will be the role that the U.S. is playing in this evolving environment.
A considerable body of literature discusses the security situation in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (11) Power, as we know, abhors a vacuum. The vacuum left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union has caused a considerable amount of concern throughout Europe. It was clear almost from the start that this vacuum was going to cause a number of problems in the security arena. These currently include violent strife in Nagorno-Karabak and Georgia, not to mention other tensions created by historic ethnic problems. These are easy situations to watch. But while these problems unfold and hopefully are somehow resolved, an examination of a broader set of problems may provide a glimpse of the overall trends.

The Soviet Union is now fragmented into 15 independent states. Czechoslovakia is broken into two states, and Yugoslavia now consists of only two of the former republics in the old federation. This process of fragmentation could eventually yield as many as 22 new sovereign states (although not all in Europe). What are the dangers as this process takes place? Poland and Czechoslovakia moved troops to their borders to prevent mass migration during the 1992 Soviet coup attempt. In late August the Poles closed their borders after 27,000 Russian citizens moved west in two days. (12)

Thus, migration could be an underlying cause for crises in the future. Over one million migrants will settle in Europe this year. (13) At least 7 million East Europeans and 2 million Soviets are thinking about moving west
according to recent polls. (14) Germany absorbed upward of 800,000 newcomers in 1990, with that number expected to continue yearly. (15) With unemployment in Western Europe running at 8 to 10 percent and housing short, the chance for violence is high. There have already been riots in the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium in the last year. (16)

Daniel Nelson states in a recent article in Foreign Policy that Soviet, or now Russian, hegemony is Eastern Europe is finished. (17) This may be true, but the influence of the various successor states will be felt for some time. Among other problems, migration will be a major factor. For example, over 30% of the population of Latvia and Estonia are Russian; over 14% of the population of Georgia is Armenian; and about 38% of the population of Kazakhstan is Russian. (18) In other words, about 18 million people would be moving around if all of these people went to their national homelands. If just the Russians went home from the various republics this would involve the movement of about 25.6 million people. Although this is unlikely to happen, even if only 1% returns home, Russia is unlikely to be able to handle them, especially if we keep in mind that they are currently dealing with the withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe and the draw-down of their military to about 1.5 million men. (19)

But the problem is not limited to just the CIS. Twenty percent of the Central European populations of Bulgaria and Romania comprising about 6.38 million people, are other than ethnic Bulgarians and Romanians. A large community of ethnic Hungarians lives in Romania and The Czech Republic. Furthermore, each of the large ethnic groups in Eastern Europe has large populations living in other than their most logical national state. For example, there are about 1.12 million ethnic Poles living in various parts of
Unfortunately, ethnic cleansing is not new to this region, having gone on for centuries, and it is unfolding again in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, it is not hard to imagine it spreading, as old animosities resurface.

Equally important is what the *Economist* called "the spirit of retribution." According to this article, the parliaments of former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have passed bills to penalize former communists. What is the price that these states will ultimately pay for these actions? Although this seems to be a quiet problem at least for now, it is pervasive and affects many people. As files are opened and the true magnitude of the communists' actions becomes public, a real test will come for each of the new democratic governments. There is a real possibility that if they go down the path of retribution, they could self-destruct from within, as a new minority group is created and officially persecuted.

So the picture seems bleak. But, with the chance for widespread chaos so high, it is encouraging to note that the level of violence is not higher. All things being relative, the situation could be a lot worse. Although ethnic problems abound there is some good news. For example, in 1989, 300,000 of Bulgaria's one million Turks fled after the Zhivkov government instituted a policy of repression. But Zhivkov is out of office and the new government has reversed those policies, thereby defusing that situation. In Romania, two million Hungarians who live in the province of Transylvania have also been asking for their rights. Some argue that these geographically isolated ethnic groups will reject the idea of regional autonomy for their areas and instead will demand secession, thus causing civil war or worse. Again,
the good news is that none of this has happened -- so far. A good question to ask is why? Ironically, one possible explanation is that the picture in Yugoslavia is so frighteningly compelling that both ethnic groups and governments can not see any benefit in going that direction. The result is accommodation -- at least for now.

Nonetheless, many ways the region seems to be hovering at the brink of chaos. Europe seems to be waiting for some event to push it over the edge with all but Serbia wanting to find a way to give pluralistic democracy a chance. Everyone seems to fear the consequences and therefore they are making conscientious efforts to avoid any form of threatening action. Although there are severe ethnic tensions and a potential for violence on a massive scale, these forces are, for the most part, contained. In other words, there seems to be an acceptable level of rationality present in the region. Some examples of this are Bulgaria's reversal on the Turkish question; a willingness to respect borders by Bulgaria, Poland, and Germany, among others; and the so-called velvet separation in Czechoslovakia.

There is one other aspect of the security situation that merits discussion. As mentioned above, security and economic well being are linked. There is some convincing data that economic well being in the Eastern region could increase soon. (25) But the eastern countries also know that they are trapped by their historic attitudes for reform. (26) One observation suggests that these attitudes are creating a new division in Europe. This division will see wholehearted capitalism develop in some countries and "half-hearted capitalism that relies on old elites to run broken economies" in the rest. (27)

Equally important is the role the western democracies are playing in helping the new democracies move toward free-market economies. At best,
the Western European states are hesitant about finding ways to accelerate the transition from command economies to open markets. Poland, The Czech Republic, and Hungary have all formally requested to join the EC. But the EC will not even grant membership to the established free-market democracies of the Economic Foreign Trade Association (EFTA), let alone the economically destitute states in the East.\(^{(28)}\) But this is not to say that there is not investment, but so far it seems like a one-way street. Robin Remington suggests that the EC and the U.S. should collaborate on a Marshall Plan for post-Communist Europe. However, this does not appear to be a possibility as long as the industrialized states are in recession.\(^{(29)}\) In some ways this developing economic division can only cause friction, even though there is strong sentiment that the eastern developing democracies will make it through the rough economic times as they transform simultaneously their economic and political systems. The question is how long will it be before they can join the club. Again, the argument for increasing the level of interdependence between states emerges.
CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

Events in the region are only part of the equation. Equally important is the perception of those events by the European states themselves. Regardless of U.S. perceptions, the people of those countries see events through different historical lenses. It is easy for Americans to dismiss their concerns; after all, the U.S., along with its NATO Allies, have declared that there is no longer any ill-will directed toward any states in the region. (30) Notwithstanding, threats and security still rest heavily on lie in the minds of the leaders of these states. Because their perceptions count, the U.S. needs to understand their concerns and to work to minimize them. This situation can be considered as another form of interdependence: if their concerns are ignored U.S. policies could fail. This was a prime motive for NATO to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and why NATO is still central to U.S. policies in this region. (31)

So far the indications are that at least the U.S. and the other NATO member-states are taking these regional security concerns seriously. A good example of this concern is the recent American logistical support to Hungary in the area of air defense. The sale of $12.9 million worth of identification friend or foe equipment is intended to help the Hungarians deal with a perceived threat from Yugoslavian intrusion into their air space without destabilizing the region. (32) Even though from the U.S. perspective, it would be easy to dismiss this threat as groundless. After all, why would Yugoslavia offend one of its neighbors at a time when it is militarily engaged
elsewhere. But U.S. perceptions are not as important as an appropriate response to the Hungarian assessment of the threat. (33)

This is only one example among others that, to varying degrees, offset U.S. interests. Although it may be difficult to argue that the U.S. has a direct security interest in Bulgaria, when Bulgaria's geostrategic location is considered along with the standing ethnic problems in the Balkans, the U.S. level of interest inevitably must increase. This is not because of Bulgaria, but because of Turkey and Greece and through them NATO and Western Europe. From a Bulgarian perspective, there is good reason to fear Turkey and Greece and the current level of armaments in those two countries. Unfortunately, history has demonstrated that Bulgaria's neighbors can harbor bad intentions. However, recent proposals for force reductions in the border triangle region where Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish forces exist in near proximity, have helped this situation from a Bulgarian perspective. (34) Turkey originally declined the proposal, which may have at least helped Bulgarian and Greek relations because of a common fear of Turkey. However, according to Stoyan Andreev, Bulgaria's national security adviser to their president, Turkey has now become involved and Bulgaria is comfortable with this progress. (35)

There is also the Macedonia question -- a historical source of tension between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Although only 2.5% of its population is of Macedonian origin, Bulgaria once controlled all of the area that is now divided between Greece and Yugoslavia. Currently, Bulgaria denies the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality, claiming all as Bulgarians. (36) Historically this was the major center of the Second Bulgarian Empire of the 13th century. Recently, Bulgaria has indicated that it seeks no realignment of borders. (37) What, therefore, is the U.S. interest
in the ultimate fate of Macedonia? Not much, unless Greece invokes Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. (38)

One final example in Southeastern Europe is the presence of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. This situation has been resolved at least for now, but the problem still exists. The Turkish population accounts for approximately 8% of the population. (39) Again, what is the U.S. concern? The concern centers on Turkey, which is important in bringing a vast region of the old Soviet Union closer to the West and out of the arms of an equally ambitious Iran. (40) In the end, any ethnic cleansing of Turks in Bulgaria would severely complicate the region.

In Northeastern Europe there is a different set of problems. Ethnic problems exist particularly in Hungary because of its isolated population in Rumania and because of cross-border spats with The Czech Republic and with Slovakia. There are also possible tensions between the The Czech Republic and Slovakia with Hungary over water rights on the Danube.

But there seem to be bigger problems looming. From a Western perspective, it seems incredible that a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia would do anything to annoy any of its neighbors. But it is a possible tinderbox and, as mentioned above, one that the Hungarians are very concerned about. Sentiment is growing among some NATO member-states that some form of military intervention will be necessary to keep ethnic fighting contained within Yugoslavia. NATO officials are increasingly worried that war could erupt in Serbia's Kosovo province, an area consisting mostly of Muslim Albanians. Such a war might draw in Albania and Bulgaria as well as NATO allies Italy, Greece and Turkey, with the latter two on opposing sides. (41)

Poland seems the only state that does not have any pressing external or
internal security threats of note. Short of some cataclysm taking place in Russia that would force Poland again to close or to defend its borders from the hordes of potential emigrants, it seems secure. But again this is more an American perception than a Polish impression. There still is, and will be for some time, a healthy fear by Poland of its neighbors to the East and West and for good reason. (42)

What is the U.S. interest in all this? It is one thing to worry about ethnic tension and border disputes in the Balkans. But Central and Eastern Europe is much more complicated. A full spectrum of opinion exists concerning American involvement in this area. Anthony Lewis has suggested that it is the obligation of a superpower to get involved in the Yugoslavian problem when he said, "In a world without menace from another superpower, the U.S. military must be ready to act against mass murder -- which breeds hate and revenge, menaces stability and thus does engage our national interest." (43) The opposite view has also been suggested. At a NATO meeting in December 1992 Mr. Cheney pointed out that if the U.S. can mount a humanitarian mission of 28,000 troops in Somalia, where no direct U.S. national interests are at stake, Western Europe should do more to deal with a crisis in its backyard. (44) While the U.S. role in Yugoslavia is debated, it is worthwhile to note what is actually being done in Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. currently has SEED (Support for Eastern European Democracies Act of 1989) programs in 10 countries in this region with a FY93 funding level of $450 million. (45) Critics would argue that this is an inadequate amount, and they may be right, but this is not the only thing the U.S. is doing. It has also agreed to reprogram loans, to provide credits for goods and products, and to encourage investment. (46) But more important, the relatively modest size of
this official program tends to reflect the problem as to what the U.S. interest actually is in the region, and how much should it provide? A large part of the answer to these questions deals with the overall U.S. level of influence in Europe. Politically, economically, and militarily the U.S. has been very active in the region for the last 50 years, and even though current U.S. policy states that the states of Europe should bear more of the burden for their own security and stability, the U.S. is equally reluctant to give up its influence. This brings into focus the various multilateral security arrangements in which the U.S. is involved in the region, because it is at the security table that the U.S. can bring to bear its most direct and visible efforts.
CHAPTER V

EMERGING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The easy way to look at this is first to consider what the countries in the region want and then to consider what is actually happening. Starting with the CAEE states, clearly they want to establish ties to a Western European security system. This means NATO because in their view, NATO works. It has money, infrastructure, an integrated military structure, and, most important, a political structure that provides a continuous forum for dialogue on a very broad range of topics. Nearly all the CAEE countries have, therefore, expressed interest in joining NATO. (47) In addition, they want ties that link them more to one another -- both through mutual defense pacts and through Western institutions. This includes the EC, the Council of Europe, and the WEU as well as NATO. They all like the CSCE. They favor regional groups such as the Pentagonal (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia), which Poland would like to make a hexagon, (48) and there are still ongoing efforts to build a NATO style defense alliance in the CIS. The current proposal includes six of the 15 original republics. (49)

Knowing how to do this is difficult because there is no single overarching European institution, although several schemes have been proposed. For example, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis viewed the CSCE as providing a roof over separate security alliances. This structure would be transitional with a 10-year goal of bringing Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary into the WEU. Czech President Havel views European security as being provided through NATO, with separate alliances
being concluded by neutral states and by the Eastern European states. (50)
More recently, the idea of NATO serving as a security mechanism for the
United Nations in Europe is being seriously debated. (51) Although these are
good ideas, none of these proposals seem likely to bear fruit.

What is happening, besides a flurry of bilateral discussions between
every combination of states, is the establishment within NATO of the
previously-mentioned North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Work on
expanding the CSCE is progressing, with all the former Soviet bloc states
being members of this organization, it has been possible to strengthen the
various CSCE mechanisms. But the CSCE does not have the cohesion of NATO.
For example, the CSCE does not have a well-developed forum for meaningful
and ongoing discussions; it does not have a substantial budget and is not
likely to get one; and most important, it does not have a mechanism for
building consensus. This does not mean that the CSCE will not continue to be
important, but it will take time to evolve along the lines that everyone
professes to want.

This returns our attention to the NACC, and it is the NACC that brings
American national interests and its concomitant interdependence back into
focus. After all, this forum was created in response to a U.S. initiative at
the NATO Rome Summit of November 1991. (52) It is the U.S. principal
collective link to each of the CAEE countries. It gives NATO a new focus and
direction, and keeps it engaged in the security affairs of the region and
therefore perpetuates U.S. influence. But U.S. motives aside, the central fact
is that the organization is working. It provides the CAEE and CIS countries
with a forum for security discussions, and through this mechanism they are
becoming involved in all of NATO's various forums. They are learning about
the advantages in defense matters of open communication and transparency. Is it a prelude to full NATO membership? Perhaps, but that is not what is important at this time.

Although, there is great criticism of NATO that it is unable to solve the Yugoslav problem, in that NATO failed to agree on new steps in this area during its last DPC meeting in Brussels in December 1992, the debate continues. (53) In any event, given the lack of a militarily intrusive policy by the United Nations, perhaps it is premature to expect this of NATO now. Granted, NATO it has the means to deal with the problem, but NATO is no longer primarily a military organization. It is becoming more of an international political structure with a principal focus on security matters. In this respect, it similar to the CSCE or the EC.

What is the U.S. position on all this? Obviously the U.S. is a principal supporter of the NACC and NATO. Former Secretary of State James Baker, III laid out the U.S. position during his intervention at the May 1992 NACC Ministerial Meeting. In the opinion of the U.S., NATO's infrastructure, resources, and operational experience are well-suited to support peacekeeping efforts that may be sanctioned by either the CSCE or by the UN. In this respect, the NACC should have a mutually reinforcing relationship with CSCE. The NACC should expand regular consultations that can build confidence, can address the urgent problems of defense conversion, and can explore all means to halt the outbreak of ethnic and regional violence. NATO, through the NACC, can concretely provide expertise and operational experience in defense and security affairs that will help NATO's "Cooperation Partners" to make their transition to durable democratic systems. But there is one catch: NATO's response to individual Partners should be commensurate
with their pace and extent of democratization, of economic reform, of
demilitarization, and their fulfillment of commitments made regarding the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their technologies. Put
simply, the U.S. believes the NACC will contribute to security and stability
throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. (54) This is the principal focus of
U.S. interests in the region.
CHAPTER VI

A MODEL FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The question, therefore, is what to do about all of this. How can this regional orientation be placed within the larger context of a global foreign policy? What is the overall policy framework that will help guide the U.S. as it makes decisions about how to respond to the multiple and complex situations described previously in this paper?

A close look at current U.S. national security strategy will quickly reveal that there are many traditional factors that are routinely considered. Fundamentally, strategy links means to ends or resources to goals. This exercise takes place in several environments, such as in the Congress, in DoD, or in the JCS. The debates in these forums continually influence either the production of the means or the determination of the ends. For this reason, the obvious factors that must be considered include international institutions, and the distribution of national power. These factors not only define the international security environment but also they help to frame national goals and interests that are equally important parts of the equation. These national goals and interests are largely shaped by domestic and international pressures. Finally, the other side of the equation -- the resource dimension -- plays a critical role. Resources link both our goals and our strategy to reality and therefore must be considered a key factor in any strategy development process.

In addition to these straightforward considerations, there are a number of less obvious factors that play a role in policy and strategy
formulation. These include such things as the U.S.'s desire to influence events through its ability to manage international coalitions, and how the U.S. can participate and support multinational or multilateral political and security structures. They also include how the U.S. responds to crises. The reason that these factors are important is that close and objective analysis of these factors provides a picture of what the United States actually does. These factors define the national psyche, which in turn influences how a country tends to see the world and how it uses the traditional factors listed above to define strategy. (57)

It is difficult to build coherence into strategy formulation if these factors are examined in a piecemeal fashion. Obviously, each is interwoven with the others. In fact, each factor has its own spectrum, usually comprising numerous players. However, if these factors are considered together, they have traditionally defined two general descriptive poles within which the U.S. has oscillated. These are internationalism and isolationism. Over the past 45 years, the U.S. has moved consistently toward internationalism because of the demands of the bipolar world. (58) This movement was driven by the pressure of international issues that have overshadowed the pressure of domestic issues. These two pressures define the forces that move any state along the spectrum. These forces are illustrated in Figure 1. As international pressure increases, this does not mean that domestic pressure decreases, but generally the U.S. has either not had the resources or the leadership to ever get to location three on the plane.
A close and objective review of U.S. actions over the Cold War period will indicate that the U.S. has indeed acted as the leader of the Western world. The reasons for this are straightforward. One reason is that the U.S. has been the richest, most powerful country, which has caused the U.S. to act frequently in a unilateral manner. Given the nature of the superpower confrontation, perhaps this is to be expected. However, there is another force to be considered which could be called the pressure for multinational cooperation. This force provides the third axis and defines a cube which shows graphically how the U.S. must operate. (See figure 2)
The cube is defined by three planes. The first, described above, can be called the **unilateral plane**, because it represents a view of the world from the U.S. great power perspective. The second plane is defined by the pressures of multinational cooperation and international issues. This can be called the **power plane** because it describes the sharing of power in the international arena. Finally, there is a plane that is described by the pressure for multinational cooperation and domestic issues. This plane can be called the **economic plane** largely because most of the pressures of domestic issues fall in the economic area and force consideration of multinational cooperation. It can be argued that the U.S. has moved away from the unilateral plane for various reasons over the last century. Certainly this occurred during WWI and WWII, in which the U.S. participated in a coalition. It can also be argued that recent initiatives to build greater international free trade has also pulled the
U.S. slightly away from the unilateral plane.

This then defines the framework in which to consider about future strategy. Where is the U.S. today? Where is the optimum place for the U.S. to be in this analytical cube? Put another way, how long should it take the U.S. to arrive at the optimum place within this cube? It could be argued that the U.S. has not yet really moved very far from the far back corner. (Position A, Figure 2) As the domestic issues gain momentum, some persons would argue that the country will move back to position B. However, it is unlikely that the international pressure will decrease to this extent and it is equally unlikely that the resources would be available to move to position 3 in Figure 1. How then should the U.S. proceed? It would appear, from an examination of current U.S. strategy statements, that U.S. intentions are to move closer to the center of the cube. (59) This would appear to be the optimum point because it balances the pressures among the three planes. However, neither the resources nor the political will are currently available to do this. On the other hand, current strategy indicates that the U.S. policy makers are aware that this is the fundamental point: if the U.S. can find a way to move further away from the unilateral plane, to really share power in the international arena, then the U.S. can deal more effectively with both the domestic and international pressures by distributing the resource burden across a greater cumulative gross domestic product. (60)

In any event, the U.S. needs to continue to evaluate all the factors above. What this framework argues for is a greater sharing of power by the U.S. But the country cannot do this as quickly as its current strategy might suggest, because neither the international environment nor the
country as a whole is ready. Therefore, movement from position A to position C must be gradual and deliberate. Equally important, U.S. policymakers need to keep in mind that what they are trying to do is to balance the complex pressures discussed above in order to optimize American international influence, national security and domestic tranquillity with limited available resources. The framework described above can help maintain this focus.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

One of the best near-term options that the U.S. possesses, with which to begin to balance these pressures discussed previously, relies on the vestiges of the primary Cold War regional security organization -- NATO. This should, therefore, be encouraged to develop and to evolve. Even though there may come a time when the European Allies and Cooperation Partners can handle their own security requirements, it is obvious that this is not possible today. Perhaps in the future the U.S. may want to disengage entirely from Europe and help to nudge the region toward some form of regional political unity, but now is not the time to do it. It is fair to debate the level of U.S. involvement and influence, but for now and the foreseeable future some level is required.

This brings the discussion back to NATO. There is a lot published about why various regions of the world will be increasingly important to the U.S. One example is presented by Valerie Hudson of the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University. She builds an argument for an "American Zone of Cooperation" that should focus the U.S.'s future foreign policy agenda on the Western Hemisphere. Unfortunately she also suggests that, the Europeans should be left to worry and deal with their own problems. (61) Although she may be right about the importance of the Western Hemisphere, she is wrong in considering Europe to be of diminishing importance. The U.S. should not lose interest in any part of the world. Whether the U.S. likes it or not, it is already globally interdependent.
This argument provides a slightly different twist as to why the U.S. should build up rather than neglect NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance provides a model of how to successfully build interdependence between sovereign states by allowing the sharing of power that is central to moving the U.S. away from the unilateral plane discussed above. The U.S. is going to have to move toward greater interdependence in order to optimize its global position as the only superpower. This paper, therefore, suggests that the same analysis should be applied to any other region of the world. The U.S. has had over 45 years of practice sharing power with our NATO Allies, which is why NATO is the best model available to facilitate the movement of the U.S. away from the unilateral plane.
NOTES

1. Hugo Young. "Europe to Clinton: A Wary Welcome." Newsweek. 22 February 1993, pp 36. Mr. Young argues from a European position that they are alarmed about Clinton's philosophy of government which seemed to them to be that world leadership was a burden Washington didn't want and that Europe should learn to solve their own problems. There have been many articles written about the focus of the U.S. 1992 elections being on domestic affairs with a general lack of attention paid to international issues by both parties.

2. I can site no specific reference for this observation. However, in personal discussions with many citizens from the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany that had no association with their nation's military or NATO, the typical response when asked if they knew what NATO did, their answer was "no."


6. Robert S. Jordan. "Atlantic Relations and the New Europe." Published as an occasional paper for The Eisenhower Center for Leadership Studies, University of New Orleans, March 1992, pp. 10. The countries of the EEA are Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, The United Kingdom, Ireland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein, and Greece.

7. Ibid., pp. 6-11. Professor Jordan provide a very good analysis of the region that demonstrates the overlap between various organizations. It is a complex problem and difficult to precisely define Europe.


25. Mr. Aubrey Hooks, American Embassy Economics Officer in Poland, told us during a visit in February 1993 that Poland's gross domestic product was 1/2 to 2% in 1992 and expected to rise to 2 to 4% in 1993. In addition, Poland has attracted $5-6 billion in foreign business since 1990. The Polish private sector is currently responsible for 45-50% of the 1992 GDP, 55% of employment, 90% of retail trade, 77% of construction, 40% of transportation, and 31% of industrial output. Not bad for three years of work. Unemployment was 13.6% in 1992 and expected to rise to about 15% or 16% in 1993 largely due to privatization but compared to some
unemployment figures in Western Europe this is not bad. Although these are not bad figures given Poland's starting point, Mr. Hooks estimated that only 20% to 30% of Polish society is doing well, and another 30% to 40% will benefit from economic growth that is expected. Poland's transition to a market economy is the most successful in Eastern Europe and is the first country out of recession. In discussions with Mr. Chuck English, Economic Counselor at the American Embassy in Hungary, I found a similar story. Hungary has attracted about 50% of the foreign investment in Central Europe. About 35% of their economy is now private. Mr. English pointed out that there were about 60,000 Hungarian millionaires currently in the country out a population of about 10 million. His point was that there is a lot of money in the country and it shows in the level of commercial activity.

26. Colonel Ruth Anderson (retired, USAF), Defense Attache to Hungary between 1989 and 1991, suggested in a recent discussion that pessimism seemed to be a central part of the Hungarian national ethic. She pointed out that this was reflected in their recent elections when it required four attempts to get a majority of people to vote. (Personal Notes from a discussion at Air University, November 1992) In Poland a different attitude persists. According Andrzej Korbonski there are two things that shape Poland's approach to reform, one is the Polish intelligentsia and the other is a deeply-rooted mistrust and dislike of authority. For many complex reasons the origin and make up of the intelligentsia coupled with this mistrust has hindered the process of state-building. Andrzej Korbonski. "Poland: 1918-1990" in Columbia University History of Eastern Europe. Edited by Joseph Held. Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 242-243.


33. In a recent discussion with Andros Babos from the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, I learned that they are very concerned about Serbian interpretation of this action. Hungary believes Serbia would attack them if Serbia perceive that Hungary will be the launch point for an attack by NATO against the Serbs. (Meetings between AWC Class of 1993 and Hungarian officials on 16 February 1993)


35. Personal notes from a meeting with Lieutenant General Stoyan Andreev, National Security Adviser to the President of Bulgaria on 12 February 1993.


38. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization - Facts and Figures, 1990, pp. 377. This presents the entire North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington D.C. on April 4th, 1949. Specifically this article is the one in which all parties agree that an armed attack against one is an attack against all and that in such an event all will exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.


40. Umit Enginsoy. "Iran Expands Economic Influence in Republics." Defense
41. Robert J. Wielaard. "NATO worry is rising on action in Balkans." 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 Dec 92, pp. 10.

42. Personal notes from a meeting with Andrzy Karkoszka, Polish Bureau of National Security on 9 February 1993. Mr. Karkoszka pointed out that in looking east the ethnic and economic problems are the biggest threats ahead. None seem to threaten Poland and most scenarios have a very low probability. However, Poland is worried about migration which is a difficult problem to solve with no apparent answers on the horizon. Right now there are one half million illegal immigrants in Poland. The Baltic states will remain important because of their relationship to Russia and dependence on Russian raw materials. They would like Kaliningrad to remain Russian. Poland now has an MOU with Belorussia on military cooperation. Poland is working hard to nurture a relationship with the Ukraine. Finally, he pointed out that the biggest threat to Poland is loss of control over Russian forces by Russia. There are still 300,000 Russian forces in Kaliningrad. This more than the Polish Army. The second biggest threat would be the Ukraine. As an interesting side note Mr. Karkoszka stated that the US presence in Europe is necessary historically and must be credible which means at least a corps level of forces. The US provides a psychological balance between the British, German, and French. He said that without the US in NATO the Alliance has no credibility.


44. John M. Goshko. "NATO Officials Fail to Reach Accord on Balkans." Washington Post, 11 Dec 92, pp. 52. (Results of the DPC meeting Dec 92)


52. "NATO Summit." USIS, 12 November 1991, pp. 4. (Fact Sheet published by the Embassy of the US)

53. John M. Goshk., "NATO Officials Fail to Reach Accord on Balkans." Washington Post, 11 Dec 92, pp. 52. (Results of the DPC meeting Dec 92)

54. Secretary James A. Baker III. "NACC Intervention." US Department of State Dispatch. 10 March 92, pp. 201. (Baker's intervention at NACC meeting 10 Mar 92)

55. National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1993, pp. 1. These factors include political initiatives to encourage the spread of democracy, economic policy that reduces protectionism, and military strength that provides the United States with a global influence.

56. William P. Snyder. "Strategy: Defining It, Understanding It, and Making It." Air War College Publication MS 610, Book 1, February 1992, pp. 6-11. This is an excellent discussion of what strategy is and how it is formulated.

57. National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1993, pp. 19. Our latest National Security Strategy provides several examples of this discussion. For example, we continue to state that we support the evolution of the European security architecture but at the same time work to strengthen the viability of NATO in which we have a strong central leadership position.
58. William G. Hyland. "The Case for Pragmatism." Foreign Affairs, 1991/1992, pp. 38-52. This article is just one of many that makes the point that the Cold War has driven our foreign and domestic policies for the last 50 years and because of our perception of the threat from the USSR we had little choice during this time but to remain engaged in international issues.

59. National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1993, pp. 5, 10-11, 15, and 19. We advocate building a global economic system based on multilateral cooperation, liberalized trade and international institutions for financial cooperation. We want to convince others that free trade offers greater prosperity that protected markets. We focus our overseas diplomatic activities to support U.S. jobs and create opportunities for business to expand. We recognize that our Allies have the potential to provide critical defense manufacturing capabilities. Finally, as mentioned above we continue to support regional security structures where each region plays a greater in providing for themselves.


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