Evaluation Framework for Unified Command Plans

A Documented Briefing

Paul Bracken, James Winnefeld, Robert Howe, Margaret Cecchine Harrell

Arroyo Center

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Prepared for the
United States Army

Arroyo Center
PREFACE

This report discusses the development and evaluation of alternative Unified Command Plans (UCPs) and suggests objective ways to view proposed plans or changes to plans as well as to assist in clarifying differences among discussion participants. It does not recommend specific changes to the current UCP or target future UCP. The analysis was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of the Arroyo Center as part of a project to provide special assistance to the Policy, Plans, and Strategy division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, on the Army Staff.

This report should be of interest to planners and decisionmakers responsible for the command structure of the United States armed forces.

The Arroyo Center

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SUMMARY

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the authority of the President of the United States to establish the separate commands for the control of the armed forces of the United States. The UCP is derived, or should be derived, from the National Military Strategy of the United States and establishes the mechanism by which that strategy will be carried out. Although not its primary purpose, the UCP affects relations with other countries by the way in which it establishes commands that conduct military-to-military affairs with those countries. It also affects the rest of the U.S. government by establishing certain lines of communications between commands and other governmental agencies.

Although ideally a new UCP would be developed from a zero base, that is impractical because the current plan affects any future plan. Hence, the Defense Department in developing the UCP is affected, as is any large organization, by its historical legacy. Numerous studies of large business and governmental organizations have concluded that success is achieved by creating structures that not only perform well in the environment in which they are established but that are responsive over time to changes in that environment. Organizations that fail tend to do so because they assume that the future will resemble the past and that their success will continue without the necessity to change their behavior to respond to external events.

The dominant consideration in developing and assessing a new UCP or a modification to the existing one should be the interaction between the expected world environment and the strategy the United States intends to pursue in that environment. Close behind this consideration should be the ability of the organization to adapt and perform well if the world environment takes an unanticipated turn.

We outline a formal process for evaluating Unified Command Plans. This process assesses the likely performance of competing alternative UCPs by evaluating them against specific performance criteria. The purpose of the process is not to develop a scoring system by which one can select mechanically the "best" UCP but rather to provide a framework for objective discussion of differences of opinion. Such differences are far easier to resolve when the reasons for the difference are clear.
We propose eight criteria against which a UCP would be evaluated:

- **Effective use of military power** deals with the degree to which a UCP can accomplish strategic and mission objectives.
- **Efficiency** focuses on cost and cost effectiveness.
- **Responsiveness** deals with “cycle times”—the time to accomplish objectives.
- **Crisis adaptability** refers to the need for a smooth transition between peace, crisis, and war and the ability to concentrate resources on a particular theater.
- **Simplicity** refers to the clarity of command lines and the number of command modifications needed to accomplish mission objectives.
- **Alliance responsibilities** are the political and military commitments to allies.
- **Regional expertise** is our ability to exploit local knowledge of terrain, logistic capacity, military capacity of local forces, and the like.
- **Organizational interfaces** refer to the efficiency of the structure in handling relations with other U.S. governmental units.

Using eight criteria gives the problem a great many dimensions. However, in any given situation, some will be of greater importance than others. For example, during the Cold War the emphasis in military planning, including the development of the UCP, was on responsiveness, since the Soviet Union could attack strategically or tactically with very little warning. As the world changes, other criteria will increase in relative importance. For example, if the U.S. significantly reduced its military forces with the intent of relying on formal or informal coalition partners, regional expertise and alliance responsibilities might dominate.

To demonstrate, we developed four illustrative UCPs that bound the range of alternative approaches. We call these the regional, mission-functional, process-functional, and reduced commanders in chief (CINCs) to reflect the organizing principle under which they were assembled. We likewise discuss three alternative world view/strategy pairs for the purpose of comparing the illustrative UCPs. We refer to these as base force, cooperative strategy, and minimalist, again to indicate the approach to the world that would be reflected in the...
development of each strategy. We then apply a largely subjective process to evaluate the likely ability of each UCP to meet the criteria in each world view/strategy case.

This chart summarizes the outcome of the evaluation process. When the future environment is assumed to be the base force or cooperative security world view/strategy, the regional orientation clearly evaluates best. However, when we assume a "minimalist" strategy, the two functional approaches appear more appropriate, although there is no clear choice between them. It is interesting to note that the approach of simply reducing the number of CINC's, as some have suggested (mostly for cost reduction purposes), evaluated poorly regardless of the world view.

As an aid to discussing plans adaptability, we also postulate alternative long-range futures in which the world is dramatically different from what is expected in the near future and in which the U.S. strategy might become more activist. Review of these alternatives indicates that any UCP should be designed with emphasis on the ability to learn and adapt to changing conditions, analogous to the way in which the U.S. armed forces studied and planned the techniques that won World War II even though during the 1920s and early 1930s it seemed unlikely that we would engage in any future large-scale conflict.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge the reviews of GEN Andrew J. Goodpastor and RAND colleague Richard L. Kugler. They also appreciate the input and critiques of RAND colleagues Roger Brown, who also contributed the issue paper in Appendix E, Harry Thie, Rodney McDaniel, and Dail Turner. The authors, however, are solely responsible for any errors.
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<td>AIRCOMBATCOM</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CINCCENT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, European Command</td>
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<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>CINCLANTFLT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet</td>
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<td>CINCREDCOM</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Readiness Command</td>
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<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Strike Command</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>Continental United States Command</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>JTFME</td>
<td>Joint Task Force, Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>Atlantic Command (former)/USACOM (current)</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Major Regional Contingency</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPLANS</td>
<td>Operations Plans</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

xiii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>SPACECOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
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<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force Deployment List</td>
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<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<td>USCINCSOUTH</td>
<td>United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and issued under the authority of the President of the United States to establish the Unified and Specified Commands and to define their geographical and functional responsibilities. While the plan itself does not assign any forces, it clearly defines the parameters under which these will be developed. In addition, it can have an effect on U.S. international relations by changing interfaces with foreign governments and can affect the relationships between the Defense Department and other U.S. governmental agencies.

The development of a complete new UCP, or a significant revision to one, usually results from some fundamental change that leads to revision of the National Security Strategy of the United States and hence to the National Military Strategy. The UCP is the next document in this sequence and the first that becomes specific about command responsibilities. It hence should be directly derived from and supportive of the National Military Strategy. Since follow-on documents, such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, will assign tasks and forces to the commands based on the missions defined by the UCP, it is important that the UCP be a true reflection of the national will as defined by the political leadership.
It is evident that the way in which commands are defined affects the decision as to the service of the individual who will be the commander in chief (CINC) of the command and numerous other staffing, command, and resource allocation issues. While in a truly rational world the UCP would be developed purely to implement national strategy, it is important to recognize that it is impractical to expect that any UCP will ever be developed from a true zero base implementation point of view. This means that any discussion of the UCP must recognize that it exists in a world of politics ranging from the interservice politics of the Pentagon to the international relations aspects of changing relationships with other countries.
This document proposes a methodology for considering revisions to the UCP and a process for evaluating alternative proposals for command arrangements. We do not recommend specific command arrangements nor do we take a position as to the basis under which a UCP should be developed. We do, however, propose a framework for developing alternative UCPs and an evaluation matrix within which the efficacy of any proposed UCP could be considered.

Throughout this document, when we refer to the terms roles, missions, and functions we use these terms consistently with the definitions used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his February 1993 *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States*.

**Missions** are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders in chief.

**Functions** are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.

**Roles** are the broad and enduring purposes for which the services were established by Congress in law.
In addition, we will refer to the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of commands and to processes. We define these terms as:

**AOR** is the defined area of the globe in which responsibility is assigned to the commander of the area for development and maintenance of installations, control of movement, and conduct of tactical operations involving troops under his control, along with parallel authority to exercise these functions.

**Processes** refer to the flow of work or information in an organization.
HOW THIS PROCESS DIFFERS FROM OTHER METHODOLOGIES

- Explicit statement of criteria
- Allows analysis of "importance" between criteria (e.g., efficiency vs. responsiveness)
- Encourages leadership and planners to share their cognitive maps of the evaluation
- Transparent

RAND has reviewed other UCP studies, reports, and proposals as part of this project. It is reasonable to ask how our proposed process differs from this other work.

The key differences are shown above. Most other efforts do not reveal how they reached the conclusions that they did. Undoubtedly, some method was used. But without knowing the method, it is difficult to reproduce the recommendations offered, and it is difficult to know if any key issues were missed.

It is important for decisionmakers to understand how conclusions were reached. This facilitates clear communication and understanding, and is critical to dispassionate analysis of complex problems.

Moreover, our subjective impression of other studies is that they more or less optimize on one dimension, usually efficiency (cost savings), without paying sufficient attention to other parts of the problem that others would agree are important if they were made transparent. The list of criteria we will propose is not intended to represent everything that might be considered important (to indicate this we will list "other" criteria), but to demonstrate that multiple criteria should be used. Organizational design is too important to be exclusively a budget reduction tool.
The flow of the topics and sections of this document are as indicated in this diagram.

Section 2 provides background material deriving from business school research on large organizations that have adapted or failed to adapt to change. This material is included to stress the importance of organizational adaptability before we get to the process of developing and evaluating Unified Command Plans. Section 3 addresses the potential security environments and military strategies providing the context for future UCPs and proposes some criteria for evaluating UCPs. Section 4 identifies parameters that define the characteristics of a UCP and suggests alternative command arrangements based on variation of those parameters. Section 5 applies a static evaluation methodology to the alternatives suggested by Section 4 and assesses the alternatives' performance in the likely world of the mid-1990s. Section 6 then discusses, in a somewhat subjective fashion, the degree to which plans need to and can adapt to significant changes in the world without requiring fundamental revision. Section 7 contains our conclusions regarding this issue. Finally, Appendices A–D elaborate on the example alternative UCP arrangements and Appendix E suggests ways to address certain topics regarding the UCP in the Joint arena.
CONTENTS

Section
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. UCP Context and Criteria
4. Developing Alternative UCPs
5. Evaluation Program—Near Term
6. Additional Evaluation—Long Term
7. Conclusions

APPENDICES
The United States has a Unified Command Plan that establishes commands and assigns missions. However, as a result of the major changes occurring both within the United States and externally, modifications to the current plan are being discussed both within and outside of the Defense Department. Some claim that the current structure contains too many headquarters and that these headquarters are too large. Others are concerned that the structure is inconsistent with the planning and budgetary process as it has evolved since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which markedly changed the statutes regarding the role of the Chairman of the JCS and of the CINCs. For these and other reasons, a variety of proposals are being floated that suggest changes ranging from the relatively minor to a major overhaul.

The existence of the current plan, however, establishes an historical condition from which we must work. Therefore, before we discuss the process of developing and evaluating UCPs, we will look at some lessons regarding adaptation to change or the lack of it in other large organizations. This work is primarily drawn from business school research.
We begin our analysis by noting that many other "big" organizations have faced what the Department of Defense (DoD) is facing now. Many U.S. and foreign companies are restructuring themselves in fundamental ways. The military, of course, is different from a private corporation but we strongly believe that it is useful for the military to tap into the thinking in other fields as they approach their own restructuring. This can suggest new opportunities, concepts, vocabulary, and frameworks for thinking through what the military should do.

In addition, there are general organizational trends arising out of technology that are major factors shaping organizations. These need to be understood, especially for the military, because of the technically intensive nature of the American military. This is unlikely to change. The successful absorption of technology into military forces or organizations is one of the few ways that the United States can keep its edge over other powers as our force structure is reduced. Technology has had an enormous impact on big organizations. Some have handled it well, others have not. It is important for the military to understand the problems that arise in this effort. UCP designs must recognize the changes in capabilities that technology brings.

Finally, and fitting the new environment we are in, it is useful to develop new metaphors and concepts for what is going on in the organization. We suggest several in this section, such as the horizontal organization and the need to go beyond one-dimensional criteria. Our intent is not to come up with the "answer," but instead to inform the discussion on military organization.
The first major point is that the information revolution is having a profound impact on organizations, especially big organizations. The computer, communication links, microchips, and memory storage offer the biggest opportunity for organizational transformation since the appearance of massive military and business hierarchies in the 19th century.

In broadest terms, large companies are using the information revolution to break down the bad effects of bureaucracy. More flexibility and more responsiveness allow not only doing old things better but suggest entirely new ways of doing things.

It has been said that the biggest change will not involve more advanced equipment but rather new ways of working. There is a new focus on process (e.g., designing an operations plan, filling a logistics order, servicing a target, etc.) as the fundamental building block of the organization of the future.

This has encouraged the private sector, and the military as well, to rethink fundamentally the way it operates. There is a movement away from “kicking decisions upstairs”—vertical information flows—to making decisions at the point of contact with the uncertainty—horizontal information flows.

Parallel development in just this direction is taking place in big corporations and in the military. For example, AirLand Battle very much emphasizes not kicking decisions up the chain of command. Similarly, Japanese auto companies are much less hierarchical, sharing information and work processes in a horizontal way.
HISTORY AND LEGACY EFFECTS: THE NAVAL ARCHITECT METAPHOR

- Can't really start from ground zero in redesign
- Need to operate well in near term, not just long term
- Naval architect: “design a ship that can fight anywhere, against anyone, under any conditions”
- But do the construction on a ship operating at sea, one that can be called on to go to war at any time
- Changes, overhauls, etc. have to balance long-term and immediate needs

But for all the talk about radical redesign, it is important to remember that neither the military nor the corporation can really go back to square one. The reason is that they have to operate even as they try to transform themselves. We use the naval architect metaphor, above, to convey this important point. The U.S. Army, for example, has to transform itself to adapt to new technology, budgets, and deployments. But at any time it can be ordered into battle and it cannot let its overhaul program interfere with this.

Every organization faces this dual challenge: to prepare for the future and to operate tomorrow morning. There are no formulas for resolving this tension. It is a matter of judgment, but it is useful for decisionmakers to be aware of this management problem.

It is not easy to manage the tension. Many things can get in the way. Three classic failure patterns can be identified that show what not to do.
FAILURE PATTERNS:  
A CAUTIONARY TALE

“We are smart, professional, and we’re number one in the world. Steady as she goes.”

- IBM in 1986 (rated #1 firm by Business Week)
- Major reorganization of late ’80s “simply moved boxes and lines around a chart. Nothing really changed inside the company”
- Past successes greatly constrained the search for improving how things were done

The first failure pattern stems from past successes. Success can blind an organization to needed adaptation. As indicated above, IBM was rated the number one firm in the world in 1986. This, plus their repeated success in computer development and marketing created an arrogance, and a dangerous blindness, in their top management. Any criticisms, even constructive criticisms, were rebuffed on the basis that the existing IBM way was better.

The result of this, of course, was an organization that could not learn from the feedback it was getting. Declining market share was attributed to temporary fluctuations, even when it took place for several years. When a reorganization was undertaken in the late 1980s, it turned out to have more to do with internal politics than actually reshaping IBM to the more competitive environment.
The IBM case is useful to keep in mind as an example of how changing lines and boxes on an organization chart may appear to be fundamental change, but in reality may not come to grips with the real problems facing the organization. IBM in 1993 looked very different from the IBM of 1983. It moved from a product- to a market-focused organization, as indicated on the chart. This change was based on the recognition that large companies were buyers of both mainframe and small computers. But inside IBM very little changed from this reorganization. People and processes were the same, with different reporting lines. The reorganization simply shifted problems to different accounting and departmental categories. Moreover, it consumed an enormous amount of top management time and attention.

There are lessons in the IBM case. One is the need to go beyond organizational structure when redesigning the organization. Real change necessitates that consideration be given to nonstructural variables such as people (e.g., training, quality, and incentives) and processes (e.g., how information and work flows really take place). The lesson from the IBM experience is twofold: past success can set the stage for future failure by closing receptivity to important outside trends, and, second, IBM’s top-down structure reinforced this tendency by insulating the company even from its own internal sources of new information and perspectives.

It will be vital in the coming years that the U.S. Defense Department not fall prey to this attitude whether internally or externally imposed.
Operation Desert Storm is already used by many to argue that the armed forces would be capable of repeating such an overwhelming, successful operation even if they were reduced to a much smaller size, with reduced procurement and operating and maintenance (O&M) budgets.
FAILURE PATTERNS:  
A CAUTIONARY TALE (Cont’d)

“Technology is the key to improving performance, and we’re investing massively in it.”

- GM in 1981 (invested $80B over 1980s in technology)
- Steady loss of market share, profitability
- Key difference in the organization of the future is not what equipment people work with, but in how they do what they do

A second pattern is to place all of one’s bets on technology, without understanding that how the technology is used is what matters. General Motors invested $80 billion in technology during the 1980s: computers, robotics, automated assembly plants, and so forth. GM did succeed in reducing labor costs, the objective of the program.

However, overall success as measured by market share and profitability declined over the decade. What GM did is an important lesson for the military.

GM used technology to replace workers, but it did not make fundamental changes in the way it built cars. It simply substituted technology for labor. Japanese competitors, on the other hand, used technology in new ways: to cut down response times, to streamline old processes, and to create a new corporation from the bottom up.

There is a risk that the Defense Department could fall into this failure mode. The current armed forces are the most technologically advanced in the world, and it would be fairly easy to concentrate on the technology and forget the people or, more precisely, and as the GM case makes clear, the link between the people and the technology. The current Pentagon leadership is intensely aware of this risk, but as that leadership is replaced there will need to be constant reminders that technology is not the complete answer.
A final example is to consider planning and reorganization as one-shot decisions, which, once made, set all activities into concrete. The French Army made a reasonable decision about the future character of war in 1926. Unfortunately, they stuck with this decision far too long. In the process, they used it to eliminate contrary advice and suggestions about the need for change.

The French case also illustrates the danger of looking at organizations through only one dimension. The real world is far too complicated to be captured by only one criterion, and there is a need to balance among multiple criteria. The French programmed the enemy to fit their own defense, which is not possible in a world where one's opponents develop their own strategies. In addition to not allowing the enemy to vary his strategy, the French also failed to learn about combined arms warfare. Certain key individuals (De Gaulle) learned this, but it was never translated into organizational practice.
Finally, the introduction of four “new” concepts from research in this field is useful for organizational background. The word “new” is placed in quotation marks because these are ideas that are being rediscovered.

The first one is reengineering, which refers to a fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of an organization by focusing on its processes—what it does—from the bottom up. All major processes are reexamined to see if they could be done better, either by adding information technology or by changing the work flows needed to complete the process. For example, an organization might reroute information flows to minimize the use of auditors and checkers, while at the same time empowering employees to be more responsible for checking on the quality of their own work.

Horizontal organizations are the opposite of vertical hierarchies. In horizontal organizations, decisions, information, and work, to the extent possible, occur at the point of contact between the organization and the world outside of the organization. A good example of this, one that bears out our contention that many of these concepts are not altogether new, is the German Army’s development of blitzkrieg. In essence, the blitzkrieg turned the vertical World War I hierarchy into a horizontal organization, as decisions about advance routes were decided by those in the field and in contact with the enemy. Intelligence and logistics also followed this horizontal pattern, being geared to serving the forward fighting forces.
In a horizontal organization, authority and responsibility are put in the hands of the theater commanders, as General Marshall did in World War II in the cases of MacArthur and Eisenhower, and as was not done successfully in Vietnam. With the pace and speed of military technology, vertical bureaucratic military organizations will have even more difficult problems in the future than they have had in the past.

Many big organizations now understand the need to go beyond structure, that is, to get into the fine-grain analysis of processes as the basis of reorganization. Too often, a reorganization amounts to little more than moving boxes and lines around the top of a chart. This is what took place in the IBM organization of the late 1980s, when virtually all of the IBM processes remained the same.

Finally, there is a new recognition about the importance of high-performance work systems. These are systems that achieve high quality in what they do, like the performance of the U.S. military in Desert Storm. The idea here is to build the rest of the organization, its macro structure and supporting arms, to assist the high performing part—the part that contributes most to mission performance. As obvious as this may sound, it is striking how often the top part of an organization works against the benefit of its bottom part. In the extreme, it leads to the situations seen in the corporate world when management "milks" the organization by squeezing it for short-term productivity gains in a way that sends good employees away, thereby turning a high-performance system into a low-performance one.

These organizational design concepts have influenced our selection of criteria for evaluating Unified Command Plans (see p. 26). The overall goal is effective and efficient use of military power. This means an emphasis on downward delegation of decisionmaking and authority, and a recognition that overhead and support functions should be judged for their contribution to military success. Proper achievement of these requires that the UCP be evaluated beyond purely structural criteria, thus our inclusion of responsiveness and crisis adaptability as evaluation criteria.
This section will address the potential security environments and military strategies that will provide the context for future UCPs.

Multiple criteria for evaluating UCPs and examples of “future” worlds will be identified for later use in the assessment of the alternative UCPs introduced in Section 4.
Our approach is to portray command arrangements as a derivative of alternative future security environments and the interaction of those environments with the national strategy and force employment concepts. Both must be considered and to neglect either is to risk trouble. The command arrangements must be in harmony with both.
VARIABLES THAT DEFINE CONTEXT

• Environmental trends: More malign, more benign, stasis
  - Kugler's "U.S. Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21st Century"
  - Winnefeld's "Post-Cold War Sizing Debate"

• Strategies/concepts:
  - Degree of reliance on others: alliances, temporary coalitions, unilateral
  - Basing: forward-based, U.S.-based
  - Style: active-shaping, reactive-contingency

Sources for describing strategy and the future security environment are drawn from other RAND work. Recent reports, for example, have examined U.S. military strategy and force posture for the next century, as well as the sizing of American military forces.

This work described various alternatives by looking at key strategic concepts such the degree of U.S. reliance on allies, basing location, and the assertiveness of American foreign policy in using the military arm to either shape a security environment, or, alternatively, to respond 911 style to various crises.

Given the uncertainties about the future security environment, as well as those about American strategy, it is necessary to conflate these into particular "contexts," and that is the approach taken in this study.

A context is an assumption about the state of the current and future environment and a supporting American strategy. For example, the Cold War context could be described as one with a well-defined expansionist threat with larger military forces, met by a strategy of containment achieved through collective security and forward deployment. Following are three example contexts to be used in the evaluation of alternative future plans within this document.
Our first context, called Case 1, is our interpretation of the present situation. The security environment leans toward a stasis-malign condition. By this we mean that the context that shapes the UCP varies from a continuation of the current environment (stasis) to a deterioration into an environment characterized by greater instability and adverse developments (malign). Emergent powers, such as Iraq, are prepared to exploit newfound military capability to achieve their ends. In addition, the breakup of the communist empire has created great turmoil in certain areas (e.g., the former Yugoslavia) as ethnic rivalries substitute for old ideological ones.

The U.S. strategy in this environment is to play an active role in shaping a new, more stable, security environment. This is done with an American-catalyzed alliance; coalition military forces are prepared to operate from forward bases to achieve this end. There is a premium on reevaluating or identifying U.S. security interests and those of countries that deviate from them.

The Cheney-Powell base force is sized and organized to carry out this strategy. With recent proposals to reduce the base force, questions arise about the continued feasibility of this strategy. It might have to be modified—to include greater allied military effort, for example.
CASE 2: COOPERATIVE SECURITY, BASE FORCE III
(Clinton-Aspin)

- Environment: Stasis (ample warning of fundamental change)

- Strategy: Less active, coalition, reduced forward basing

More response time is anticipated for major conflicts and less responsiveness is required for major regional conflicts. Allies will be asked to contribute more, especially those powerful regional states who will benefit from the results. Forward basing will be reduced more than in Case 1. Some forces will be redeployed back to the United States, or to some degree eliminated from the force structure altogether. Increased reliance on Guard and Reserve units appears likely, as does a lowering of the operational tempo for remaining forces.
A limiting case in the current debate is useful to consider for UCP design and evaluation purposes. A "minimalist" U.S. strategy could arise if two conditions were met. First, if the world became safer—more democratic, stable, and richer. Second, if this trend were adjudged to produce a self-policing world order that did not require any one country to militarily backstop the new equilibrium.

Regardless of different judgments about the validity of these two assumptions, it is still useful to consider how it would affect military organization. This is a context, for example, where little if any overseas basing would remain, where a passive American response to regional crises would be considered acceptable when vital national interests are not threatened, and where long-term interventions would be unlikely, and if needed would benefit from extended actionable warning.
Our research identified many criteria that might be considered important in assessing military command arrangements. Those we consider the most significant are listed here. Not all will be of equal importance in any particular situation and in Section 4 we will discuss the process of weighting to reflect differing emphases on individual criteria.

Effective use of military power deals with the degree to which a UCP can accomplish assigned responsibilities and missions that reflect the major security interests of our country as best we can define them. Although this use of military power will be affected by other variables, such as force structure and strategy, it is important to have a UCP that supports execution of, and is congruent with, these other factors. Four subcriteria are:

- Effective military planning
- Effective force management
- Achievement of prospective political objectives
- Achievement of the goals of U.S. wartime military strategy

Efficiency focuses on cost-benefit ratios. It has been the predominant criterion in systems like the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS), and the subject of considerable controversy. In the current budget-cutting environment, it is receiving even more attention. Redundancy of headquarters, logistics, intelligence, and the like is being examined. Efficiency is an important criterion, but it is
only one of many to use in examining a UCP. It is not hard to think of many organizations that are "efficient" in the narrow cost-benefit sense, but attain that efficiency with a concomitant loss in performance as measured by other, different, and likely more important, criteria.

Responsiveness deals with the time it takes for an organization to respond to demands on it. It requires a certain way of looking at organizational performance, one which asks how long it takes to accomplish certain things. Broadly speaking, one looks for "cycle times," for example, modifying Time-Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDLs), logistic turnaround times, and time to absorb shocks and launch a counterattack. This is an area in which there can be a disjunction with efficiency when looked at in the more narrow sense above. That is, an organization could be very "efficient" as long as it is not stressed to act in a time-responsive way.

Crisis adaptability refers to the need for smooth transition between peace, crisis, and war, and the ability to focus resources on a particular theater. An example is the NATO alert and crisis response system designed to respond to planned or unplanned contingencies as needed.

Simplicity refers to the clarity of command lines and to limiting the number of interfaces needed to accomplish mission objectives. As an example, the Long Commission investigating the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing found that a very long vertical command line confused authority for integrating intelligence and operations. No matter how "good" officers are, excessive layering in the command can contribute to faulty performance. Simplicity of command can also contribute to increased organizational responsiveness.

Alliance responsibilities deal with political and military relationships with allies and potential allies. UCP changes can shape alliance perception by indicating the reliability of the United States as a partner.

Regional expertise is the ability to exploit local "ground truth" on things like terrain, logistic capacity, and military capability of local forces.

Organizational interfaces deal with the efficiency of the structure in its relations with other parts of the U.S. government. As the changing world calls for increased integration of foreign, economic, and defense policy, this will increase in importance. In addition, interactions with foreign entities also will become important. Examples are interactions with the U.N. for military operations, as well as interactions with a more complicated European defense entity involving the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Franco-German defense force.
The "other" represents any "wild card" criterion that may arise at the time of the evaluation. For example, consistency with arms control agreements is another criterion that can impact the design of a UCP. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty or various nuclear reduction or elimination agreements affect the demands on and capabilities of regional commands and, hence, the UCP.
The continuum of environment-strategy pairs necessitates some flexibility in the relative weight, or importance, of the various criteria. This is illustrated above, as criteria are distributed from those most likely to be emphasized in a benign-passive world to those that would probably emerge as more important in a potential malign-active world. Although effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability, and alliance responsibilities are of some importance throughout the contextual continuum, efficiency will tend to be emphasized in a benign-passive world, and organizational interfaces could be considerably more important in a malign-active world. However, responsiveness, simplicity, and regional expertise are judged by the authors to be relatively important for the range of contexts. These relative rankings are the judgment of the authors, and as Section 5 will elaborate, are intended to be adjusted to reflect the opinions of the evaluator.
## CONTENTS

Section
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. UCP Context and Criteria
4. Developing Alternative UCPs
5. Evaluation Program—Near Term
6. Additional Evaluation—Long Term
7. Conclusions

APPENDICES
DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE UCPs

- Bound "universe" of alternative UCPs within current law
- Fill in sufficient detail to highlight potential issues
- Provide basis for testing evaluation criteria

Our research centers on developing criteria for assessing alternative UCPs and then applying those criteria to alternative UCP structures. Section 3 has discussed the criteria; we now set out the parameters that define command structures and describe some interesting alternatives.

Our first objective here is to bound the UCP "universe" while staying within the confines of the current law. Thus, we do not examine command plans that have CINCs reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or CINCs who would take on the responsibilities of the services. Nor do we eliminate the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a congressional special interest item. Our intent is to develop "strawman" UCPs in sufficient detail so that we can sharpen the differences among them to highlight potential issues. These strawmen must be portrayed in such a way as to facilitate application of assessment criteria.

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1 Title 10 USC assigns recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training, as functions to the services. The CINC's combatant commanders carry out operational missions assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense. The chairman of the JCS is responsible for assisting and advising the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to and conducting strategic planning for the armed forces.
There are many possible parameters that could be used for defining alternative UCPs. We are using the following definition of parameter:

*Any set of physical properties whose values determine the characteristics or behavior of anything.*

Thus, we can think of parameters as dimensions—such as yards, pounds, hours, viscosity, and so on—that are relevant only when we assign values to them. This graphic suggests some possible dimensions, but does not assign values to them. We show nine dimensions—there could be many others. Clearly this is too many to handle if we want a small number of UCP cases to examine.

Fortunately, a closer look suggests that some of these values are more suitable as assessment criteria and contexts than as structural parameters. Our purpose here is to show that there are many candidates and there is a need to arrive at a smaller set.
The structural parameters discussed on the previous page tend to boil down to two fundamental dimensions. They center on what a CINC does and where the results occur. We are familiar with these two dimensions because they define the domain of the current UCP—a domain shaped by functions and geographic areas of responsibility.

We have put aside the other candidate parameters for the reasons shown. However, we should keep them in mind if only to remember that they could reappear as criteria or as new parameters in very different national security environments.
Before developing a number of alternative UCPs, we have a few cautionary notes.

First, geographically oriented CINCs do not necessarily have to have their headquarters in their assigned region. The Commander in Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) is a current case in point. While on-site familiarity with the geography and culture brings along with it important advantages, one can bring geographic expertise to bear on national security problems without being located in the region of interest. However, we should note that the fact that a CINC is based forward is an important political statement of commitment by both the sending and the receiving states. The point is that "cleaning up" and realigning organizational diagrams and reappportioning the world to different CINCs reverberate beyond the realm of management and organization specialists and budgeteers.

Second, our two parameters suggest a tension at their extremes. One can vertically integrate—placing all functions for one region or one mission under one commander. Or one can horizontally integrate—placing all similar functions, regardless of geography or other dimension, under one commander. Which is better is determined by context, organizational objectives, and the capabilities of a given management set.

Finally, we need to be clear that the term "function" can mean different things to different people. For our purposes, there can be a mission-related function, such as power projection or overseas presence, or there can be a process-related function such as planning, programming, or operations.
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL ALTERNATIVES TO BOUND DOMAIN

- Regional CINCs
- Mission-functional CINCs (e.g., power projection, nuclear deterrence)
- Process-functional CINCs (e.g., war planning, overseas representation)
- Consolidating current CINCs

With our two parameters and cautionary notes in hand, we now turn to the four alternatives.

The first alternative is a system of regional CINCs, a system that looks very much like our current UCP if one allows for specified commands and unified commands with functional responsibilities. If we use our binary regional-functional model, this system lies between regional and functional, perhaps closer to the former.

A mission-functional UCP is one that takes each task given to the military and puts one person in charge of that task. If one of those tasks is power projection, there is a power projection CINC. Many critics of the current UCP believe that greater functionality along these lines is needed in the interest of efficiency as the United States leaves the Cold War behind it.

A process-functional UCP is one that starts with “how” rather than “what.” If war or contingency planning and operations is the organizing paradigm, a CINC is set up to be in charge of each. Subordinate commanders presumably would take care of specific missions.

The final alternative could be a variant of the earlier three. Here the organizing paradigm is to reduce the number of CINCs by combining some of the current structures to reduce National Command Authority (NCA) span of control and cut down on the number of headquarters (and the resources they consume). The remaining CINCs could be regionally or functionally organized—or a hybrid such as exists now.

We will now take a closer look at each of these four alternatives. More detailed descriptions are contained in Appendices A–D.
In this alternative, regional CINCs, as now, provide the core war-fighting responsibility. They are responsible for planning and execution. They are the combatant command for their forward-based forces in peacetime and for reinforcements in wartime. In almost every case, they are supported by other CINCs who provide reinforcing and deploying forces. Although some of these regional CINCs are currently based overseas, the decision on where to base them is largely a function of stationing of forces. When significant forces are based overseas, the CINC should be also. When forward based, the CINC provides an important on-site link with foreign militaries. Forward-based forces and the largely Cold War-driven need for on-site command have been the principal rationales for forward-based CINCs. See Appendix A for a detailed description of Alternative #1.

Currently, many of these CINCs would require reinforcement of their headquarters staffs in the event of war. In some sense, they are representational outposts in peacetime. CENTCOM during Operation Desert Storm was a good example of staff reinforcement in the transition to war. In some cases, these headquarters reinforcements are planned activities that are based upon peacetime economies. One must determine which objective has the priority: crisis adaptability, responsiveness, or efficiency.
ALTERNATIVE #2: MISSION-FUNCTIONAL CINCs

- CINC structure oriented to four elements of regional strategy: Strategic deterrence/defense, forward presence, crisis response, reconstitution
  - Translates to six CINCs: Space/strategic command; two regional CINCs (EUCOM, PAC) for presence; power projection CINC; central reserve CINC; and SOCOM
  - Variant of Army CONUSCOM and CRS American command proposals
- Power projection CINC would do all contingency planning except for EUCOM and PACOM
  - General purpose force supplier to other CINCs
  - Would provide Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for peacetime deployed forces outside EUCOM and PACOM

The next alternative is based on a mission-functional paradigm. The one we show here is based on the four elements of President Bush’s regional strategy. Other organizing principles could have been chosen, such as strike and continental defense. In our illustrative alternative, we show six CINCs—with the overseas presence function split between CINCPAC and CINCEUR to recognize the different characteristics of those two theaters. This alternative has some resemblance to current Army and Congressional Research Service (CRS) proposals. See Appendix B for a detailed description of Alternative #2.

In our formulation, the power projection CINC would perform two functions: undertake overseas presence functions where needed outside EUCOM and PACOM (using JTFs), and provide forces for other CINCs. The central reserve CINC and the space/strategic CINC would be the principal officers responsible for supporting other CINCs in “big war” scenarios that would require mobilization and very large scale force development and employment. In peacetime, the least ready forces would belong to central reserve CINC.

Please see Acronyms as necessary.
In Alternative #3, we look at functionality differently. Instead of focusing on missions related to strategy, we look at functions in terms of military processes. All CINCs would be in CONUS and exercise "combatant command" (COCOM) over their JTFs responsible for peacetime overseas deployments. The U.S.-based regionally oriented CINCs would be responsible for planning. Contingency and combat operations would come under the command of an operations CINC who would also be responsible for forces based in CONUS (training, readiness, support). See Appendix C for a detailed description of Alternative #3.

A central reserve CINC would be in charge of all reserve, mobilization, and reconstitution activities (not reserved for the services) as in Alternative #2. A space/strategic CINC would parallel the consolidation suggested in Alternative #2.

Although this alternative appears contrived because it is so foreign to our current mission and regional interests, it is useful to examine because it demonstrates some of the problems that may result if functionality strays from a mission orientation. Our purpose in including it among our alternatives is to demonstrate what might occur as we approach the bounds of the UCP domain.
The final alternative is an overlay that could be applied to any of the three we have discussed. In this alternative, the organizing paradigm is reducing the NCA’s span of control to four or five CINCs with expanded use of JTFs to replace some of the current CINCs. The NCA’s span of control may only be of concern, however, in a global crisis, since the supported CINC in a major regional contingency (MRC) receives the NCA’s principal focus while the other CINCs become supporting commands. Of course, the reductio ad absurdum of a smaller number of CINCs is to have just one. Increasing the span of control at the operational level, below CINCs, may also impact effectiveness negatively by increasing command interfaces. However, one of the seldom-discussed advantages of a smaller number of CINCs is the reduction of the number of interfaces among CINCs. For example, to have one instead of two or more supporting CINCs does simplify the engaged CINC’s liaison problem and can clarify lines of responsibility.
Before leaving our alternatives, we should mention some proposals that have been considered in the UCP modification dialog. The first of these was CJCS’s USACOM option, approved by the President on 1 October 1993. This option was a variant of General Powell’s widely publicized and apparently misunderstood trial balloon tied to earlier descriptions of the base force. But instead of having USACOM as a “super-CINC” with EUCOM, CENTCOM, and the former LANTCOM sub-CINCs reporting to him, LANTCOM (renamed USACOM effective with the change) keeps most of his current AOR and picks up a major force supplier role for the other CINCs. In this approved plan, FORSCOM, AIRCOMBATCOM, MARFORLANT, and CINCLANTFLT report to the new CINCACOM. Other CINCs continue much as at present.

This proposal lies between Alternatives #1 and #2, but is closer to #1.

An Army staff proposal would have a CONUSCOM. This command would be a functional command to provide forces to the other CINCs. Its regional responsibilities would be limited to North America. Existing LANTCOM would have been abolished and all forces based in CONUS would be assigned to CONUSCOM through components (FORSCOM, Air Combat Command [ACC], and a new Navy component command combining the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets).

This proposal also lies between Alternatives #1 and #2, but is closer to #2 than the approved USACOM proposal.
Another possibility is one advanced by John Collins of the Congressional Research Services. He would keep the largely regional focus of the current UCP, but would establish two new commands in CONUS: an American Command that would take over most of the former LANTCOM and SOUTHCOM responsibilities and do away with both. The rest of the former LANTCOM and EUCOM would be combined to form an Eastern Command. A separate contingency command would be the principal force supplier along the lines envisioned for CONUSCOM in the Army proposal.
This graphic compares the various alternatives and proposals. Note that the current UCP is at the extreme or boundary of the domain we have described. It has the largest number of CINCs and the least functional orientation. Note also that all the other alternatives and proposals center on a single force supplier CINC in CONUS. The CINC goes by different names (CONUSCOM, Contingency Command, Power Projection Command), but the mission is generally the same. The CJCS proposal folds the force supplier role under a current regional CINC, one with a greatly expanded charter. The CRS proposal also has a force supplier CINC and consolidates most of the former LANTCOM and SOUTHCOM under another CINC headquartered in CONUS.

With four alternatives and three proposals in hand, we will now apply the criteria developed in Section 3 to the alternative UCPs we have outlined in this section.
Having identified different contexts as scenarios for evaluating alternative UCPs, we must step back a moment to argue against relying completely on either anticipated security environments or declared national strategies. The longer term future, or near term in uncertain times, could be radically different from current expectations. We feel that U.S. military organizations should encourage divergent thinking rather than placing all emphasis on conformity. Focusing all attention on the current ship, to use the naval architect metaphor, will not only risk optimizing the wrong factors but will make it harder to anticipate developments that fall outside of the currently defined scenario envelope.

Our suggestion is to think of UCP evaluation in two stages that we call near term and long term. The near-term program emphasizes building for the next few years, relying on national guidance about security environment and strategy. This will be the main arena for debate about alternative UCPs. However, we suggest an additional follow-on assessment to use as a lens on near-term outputs that emphasizes what we will do in the immediate future to ensure a command arrangement that encourages learning, innovation, and enough diversity so that scenarios that fall outside of our expectations in the more distant future can be appreciated by the current organization.

All of this is simply one way to deal with an obvious point—that constructing alternative environments and strategies is useful, but it does not solve the problem of uncertainty. The United States cannot build a UCP to deal with the full range of future possibilities. But it can...
build a command organization that is adaptable and continually thinks about structure and purpose. Our concern is that we not consider the problem ever really solved, the mistake the French made in the 1920s.
Our criteria for evaluating alternative UCPs were discussed in detail earlier. They are repeated here briefly before we apply them to evaluation.

Effective use of military power may be equated with the degree to which a UCP can accomplish strategic and mission objectives that reflect identified security interests.

Efficiency focuses on cost and cost-effectiveness.

Responsiveness deals with "cycle times," i.e., the time to accomplish objectives.

Crisis adaptability refers to the need for a smooth transition between peace, crisis, and war and the ability to focus resources on a particular theater.

Simplicity refers to the shortness and clarity of command lines and the number of handoffs needed to accomplish mission objectives.

Alliance responsibilities deal with the political and military commitments to allies.

Regional expertise refers to our ability to exploit local knowledge of terrain, logistic capacity, military capacity of local forces, and the like.

Organizational interfaces involve the efficiency of the structure in handling relations with other U.S. governmental units.
Our UCP evaluation program is shown above. The near-term evaluation is like a filter that "screens" different UCPs, removing bad ones and allowing better ones to pass. Here, "bad" and "better" depend on strategy and the security environment, and are measured against the different criteria. *It is not possible to come up with a single result for each UCP.* However, it is possible to screen out many bad ones—bad in the sense that they are inferior to other higher scoring UCPs.

The second step above is useful to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. Rarely will all of the criteria be of equal importance and those most critical in a particular environment can be identified. For example, during the Cold War responsiveness was far more important than efficiency, which meant that only very large improvements in efficiency would be accepted for a reduction in responsiveness.

Reduction of the problem is important because debate and further analysis should focus on the smaller number of criteria. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on which criteria are considered more important, then the debate can be considerably sharpened.
This figure shows the matrix we will use to illustrate the evaluation of possible unified command plans against the assessment criteria previously discussed. The UCPs are the four developed in detail in Section 3. Each illustrative UCP will be evaluated against each criterion using a "good, average, poor" judgment. These judgments are a product of the plan itself and have only limited dependence on the U.S. national strategy or the judgment as to the world. The national strategy and world judgment will determine the weight to be accorded that criterion. Hence, a plan might be good in most aspects but if it is weak against the most important criterion under the particular view of the world, then that plan would be unacceptable in that context.
EVALUATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE UCPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Relative Weight</th>
<th>Illustrative UCP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective use of power</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Poor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis adaptability</td>
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<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance responsibilities</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional expertise</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Interface</td>
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<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other criterion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Values are study team estimates for illustration only.

This figure shows the process of evaluating a proposed set of UCPs against the criteria to determine how well a UCP is likely to perform against each criterion. The performance estimates are those of the study team and we fully realize that others might reach different conclusions. The important thing is the process, since the source of differences of opinion will be evident if all parties are using the same process.

Evaluation was by criterion rows rather than down the columns. Thus, the judgments are generally relative between the illustrative plans rather than absolute. This means that adding an additional plan to the matrix would require reassessment of the performance judgments.

The row called “Other criterion” simply recognizes that others might feel that additional criteria are appropriate.

Note that the Relative Weight column is thus far blank. The importance of an individual criterion is more a function of the world environment selected for that context and of U.S. strategy within that world than of the characteristics of an individual proposed UCP.

For the remainder of this section, we will use this evaluation of the illustrative UCPs and apply criterion weights based on world view and strategy to illustrate how to use this program.
This figure illustrates the estimated criterion weights for the world view discussed as Case #1 in Section 3 of this report. While all the criteria are important, special significance is attached to responsiveness and regional responsibility. Although prepared short-warning attacks of the Soviet variety have disappeared, our understanding of the new environment and of how regional leaders think and behave is much sketchier than comparable understanding of Soviet leaders. We are less likely to see military threats take shape until they are well advanced. One beneficial feature of the forward Soviet threat in Europe was that it was stark, immediate, and clear. In the future this will not be the case, and this argues for having ready, responsive forces.

Regional responsibilities are critical because mobilizing an international coalition is central to United States strategy in Case #1. If the United States reduces regional commitments in Europe and East Asia, we will not be in a position to exercise a leadership role in creating coalitions among allies. For example, had the United States not had a command with responsibility for the Middle East, it would have been much more difficult to persuade the U.N., Britain, France, and others to coordinate the counter effort against Iraq.
CASE #1 (continued)

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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other criterion</td>
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NOTE: Values are study team estimates for illustration only.

This figure shows the merger of the UCP evaluation with the relative weights of the criterion. The two rows outlined in bold are the two for which we judged the criterion weight to be high. Note that in each row only one UCP was judged to be a good performer under that criterion and in both cases it is the “regional” UCP. Hence, if all parties agreed to this evaluation, the choice of the UCP would be evident.
This figure illustrates the evaluation of relative weights for a case in which the United States is reducing forces and intentionally becoming more dependent on its allies. As a result of this dependence, alliance responsibilities have increased in relative importance, whereas responsiveness of U.S. forces is somewhat less important.
Indicated here is the application of the criterion weights to the earlier estimate of the performance of illustrative UCPs against the criteria. As in Case #1, the Regional UCP still ranks as good against the highest priority criteria, with the others being no better than average against either. Hence, this situation argues even more strongly for retaining the regional orientation of the CINCs and against any reduction in the number of headquarters or the relocation of those headquarters to CONUS.
Case #3 illustrates a U.S. strategy that would deemphasize the U.S. role in maintaining world order with concomitant reductions in U.S. military force structure. The remaining forces would thus be subject to call in a larger variety of situations and with little advance idea as to their geographical focus. Hence, the command structure would have to emphasize responsiveness and simplicity so that the forces would be responsive to a limited number of headquarters and the command lines in any contingency would be short and direct. Efficiency is ranked high in this case since presumably one of the objectives in reducing force structure would be the minimizing of defense expenditures in any way possible.

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<thead>
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<th>Illustrative UCP</th>
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</table>

NOTE: Values are study team estimates for illustration only.
Note that when we examine the entire matrix for this case, we find no single UCP that ranks clearly better against the “high” weight criterion. This is arguably a much more likely outcome than that of the two previous cases in which the preferred UCP was rather evident. Here we find the two process-oriented plans ranking the same against the principal criteria, while both the regional and reduced CINC plans have at least one “poor” evaluation. Hence, the choice would appear to be between the two process plans, with the actual choice likely being made by reference to additional criteria such as crisis adaptability.

We turn now from evaluating UCPs for the current or near-future world to considering them in the context of the larger changes that can occur when we think in decades rather than years.
This figure summarizes the results of the evaluation process and illustrates the outcome for the criteria rated high in the particular world view/strategy case. It also illustrates a technique for compact presentation of the screening results. A striking point about this illustration is that the reduced CINCs approach, suggested by some as a cost-cutting measure, evaluates poorly against any of the concepts.
LONG-TERM STRATEGY
THE ENVIRONMENT BEYOND FIVE YEARS

- Wide range of possibilities
- Analogy of U.S. services preparing for war in 1890s or 1920s
- Thinking long term on strategy/environment
  - Instead of trying to forecast, make sure the UCP “learns” (organizationally adapts)
  - Avoid IBM, GM, French Army patterns
  - Foster creative tension between the “now” and the “where are we going” (prepare for both current and future possibilities)

In many ways the U.S. position today is like that of the nation in the 1890s and 1920s. There is no overarching threat, and yet a good case can be made that the international security environment is at a turning point. Many of the conflicts we see today result from the breakup of the Soviet empire, while others arise from the new sources of violence in the world. This was true in the 1890s and 1920s as well, as the contraction of the British empire and the disintegration of four other empires (in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Russia) unleashed new sources of chaos in the world. But gradually a new order sorted out and produced military dangers very different from the small wars of the 1890s and 1920s (e.g., the Boer War, Balkan wars, tension in China).

The lesson in this is that the security environment is a lot more complex than is indicated by the size and shape of the conflicts we see on the horizon for the next few years. It is essential to allow some flexibility for preparing for these, even though such preparations will be mostly conceptual.

The need to restructure because of the end of the Cold War should not obscure the point that new and unforeseen security dangers could arise many years ahead. It is here, especially, where some of the concepts and metaphors introduced earlier can be useful. Rather than giving great weight to criteria such as cost-saving efficiencies or responsiveness, it is important to consider more fundamental reconceptualizations. The naval architect metaphor can help. The need to exploit technology to move away from slow moving hierarchies is another help. The concept of the horizontal organization captures this point. It suggests a military
with many information flows back and forth in the field, but not as many up and down the vertical chain of command.

We need a command organization that not only possesses all of the characteristics assessed in the near-term process, but one that can learn and reorganize itself as needed. The failures of IBM, GM, and the French Army arose because, although they had very good strategies and structures for a single point in time, they had great difficulty adjusting to environmental change, so much so that their organizations tended to deny that change was actually occurring.

There is an admitted tension between such softer long-term issues and immediate security needs. But our recommendation is to use this tension creatively, to foster innovation and adaptability, and not to see even a very good UCP as an “answer” to the problem.
IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM CASES FOR WHAT WE DO TODAY

- Need attention to fundamental rethinking and radical (conceptual) redesign of military organization

- Avoid building a force that self-reverentially reproduces itself every few years

- The UCP after next might be radically different from the next UCP

What needs to be done today to deal with such long-term uncertain possibilities? Clearly, no one will advocate large purchases of equipment, or even preservation of force structure, for what are uncertain possibilities.

The next military organization can encourage research about itself and how it could change if environmental conditions changed sharply. This is what the U.S. armed forces did in the 1920s and 1930s. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps research on building an organization for long-distance power projection, amphibious tactics, island-hopping tactics, and aircraft carrier attack was worked out at a time when little of the equipment involved actually existed.

It is important to recall that when the war gamers at the Naval War College were starting their work to develop these operational concepts in the 1920s, the U.S. defense budget was less than 1 percent of GNP, Japan was an ally, the public mood was one of “business pacifism,” and not a single aircraft carrier existed. But in the 1920s the U.S. military was a learning organization and it was this capacity, much more than its immediate efficiency or responsiveness, which proved crucial to the nation.

Finally, the UCP several years from now could be very different from the next UCP. It is not too soon to start thinking about what it might look like, even though we recognize that more immediate criteria of the kind in the near-term evaluation process will be the central concern of decisionmakers.
LONG-TERM EVALUATION PROGRAM

After completion of near-term evaluation:

- Consider context of possible long-term environments
- Apply a second screening process to consider:
  - Learning and innovation
  - Leveraging technology/Informational revolution
  - Flexibility

We suggest a second process to assess the next UCP in its capacity to adapt to the longer-term situation. In addition to satisfying important criteria of the near-term process, the next military organization should also have an ability to learn, innovate, leverage technology, and be flexible.

What needs to be done to ensure these characteristics? We recommend that business experience be studied for ideas on these issues. A great deal of ferment is taking place in the corporate sector to ensure that organizations are not merely efficient and responsive but that they adapt, learn, and innovate in uncertain environments.

Centers for innovation and new concepts are needed, much like the War Colleges functioned in the 1920s and 1930s. The Senior Service Schools and service study institutes address this need now. They must continue to do so and, if anything, have their capabilities enhanced.

This longer-term consideration addresses issues that cannot be captured with the exclusive use of an analytic matrix assessment, such as that used for the near term. Moreover, it is “softer” by its very nature. But it is also important and, depending on how the international security environment evolves, it may actually be more important than the near-term considerations. For these reasons, our intent is to raise this two-step approach and to suggest it for consideration, but not to spend too much time and effort on something that is not immediately related to designing the next UCP.
On a different but related subject, the United States needs to better use the ideas on this chart to evaluate competitors and allies. A better understanding of foreign cultures is an outgrowth of no longer being able to focus on a single enemy.
To illustrate the longer-term process, we will discuss two cases in which the world is considerably different from the regional war focus contained in the cases which we discussed previously. Unlike Cases 1–3, which were not in the distant-enough future to vary substantially from the current world, Cases 4 and 5 are a considerable deviation from today’s world environment.

Case 4 posits a Middle East which has made the transition to nuclear, chemical, and advanced conventional warfare. The Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf War served as learning catalysts to nations in the region. They do not make the same mistakes made by leaders in those conflicts.

Strategically, the United States is called on to deal with this problem because there is no one else to do it and our interests require it. The Europeans are economically integrated, but political and security matters prove more difficult. The Europeans are willing to help with arms and money but are not prepared to assume a leadership role.

It is not at all clear that a replay of Desert Storm is adequate to this danger. New forms of organization, warfare, and doctrine might be needed to deal with it. A Unified Command Plan developed now would likely not be right for this environment and would need to be modified. What is important now is that the UCP in the immediate future provide for the learning that would be necessary for the likely future modification.
CASE 5 (LONG TERM):
ASIAN DRAMA

- Environment: Asia is like 19th and early 20th century Europe, on a bigger scale—dynamic, aggressive, and dangerous as 3 billion people experience capitalistic industrialization. China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and unified Korea build "modern" military forces.

- Strategy: U.S. decides to remain a strong (dominant?) military power in and around Asia despite massive Asian military modernization. U.S. cannot deal with this using anything like current concepts of warfare.

We call Case 5 "Asian Drama" because it posits that the simultaneous introduction of capitalism and industrialism in Asia will produce results similar to what happened in 19th and 20th century Europe, when these forces reshaped European development. It is a "drama" because what was played out with 300 million Europeans will be faced with 3 billion Asians.

The geographic scale of the problem facing the United States would be immense if it were necessary in the U.S. interest for the United States to be a strong or dominant military actor in this game. Clearly, existing concepts of military organization, command and control, and war would have to be fundamentally changed to deal with this.

Once again, what is important now is the learning that would be necessary to adapt to a radically changed world should it come about.
IMPLICATIONS OF LONG-TERM EVALUATION

- Need to rethink the processes, not just structure, of how we do things in Cases 4 and 5
- Apply “reengineering” concept
- Apply “horizontal organization” concept
- Need for an Advanced Reengineering Group

This longer-term process introduces considerations that are not part of the immediate debate. Nonetheless, we believe that effort should be devoted to how the United States can exploit its military organization to handle threats that fall outside the envelope of what are now being considered. As developing countries acquire modern military technology, perhaps including weapons of mass destruction, they will learn how to use them more effectively than has been the case in the recent past. The two cases offered here were designed to get across a single point: the U.S. military cannot deal with them by simply doing more of the same. That is, another Desert Storm will not work against really big threats with advanced weapons.

The way to approach this problem, we think, is to shift the focus from UCP redesign to one that redesigns fundamental combat processes and meshes these with supporting intelligence and logistics capacities. We freely admit that we do not know exactly what this would look like. But it is likely that a reengineering approach to the problem is one very good way to start because it looks at basic processes and how they fit into the whole organization. In addition, there was a clear shift toward “horizontal” organization in Desert Storm. Information flows in the theater were much greater (and faster) than in Vietnam, which was run in a much more vertical way from Washington. This is not an overly ambitious proposal. The U.S. military has often set up Advanced Studies Groups (e.g., by General Eisenhower) to assess the kinds of issues which we refer to here as reengineering.
The implication of this is that the services, or perhaps DoD, should set up an Advanced Reengineering Group to examine these concepts and compare them to the stressful cases not currently being examined by anyone. The recent high-level DoD reorganization puts more emphasis on immediate policy issues like counterproliferation, the former Soviet Union, etc. In conjunction with the pressure for military budget cuts, there is a danger that the whole DoD and military enterprise is focusing on short-term issues, as there was a tendency to do in the 1920s. This tendency was offset by long-range planning activities in the services then, and really what we are calling for is a return to this kind of organizational thinking in the armed forces of the 1990s.
Clearly, the Unified Command Plan cannot be considered in isolation. A good plan must "fit" within the world as it exists and is likely to exist in the near future and it must be consistent with the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States. To ensure this fit in the short term, we propose the process to define explicitly, and to evaluate in a consistent manner, the important criteria the UCP must meet.

We are less able to provide an explicit enunciation for the longer term, but it is clearly an important factor in assessing the organization of the armed forces and must be considered. It appears that regular attention to research regarding the behavior of large civilian organizations could provide considerable information valuable in assessing the capacity to learn and innovate within the UCP.
CONTENTS

Section
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. UCP Context and Criteria
4. Developing Alternative UCPs
5. Evaluation Program—Near Term
6. Additional Evaluation—Long Term
7. Conclusions

APPENDICES
A dominant theme in the results of research on large organizations is that it is both possible and necessary to organize to adapt to changes in their environment. Those who fail to do so find themselves shrinking or failing to perform to expectations.

The Unified Command Plan establishes the organization for command of the armed forces and hence affects relations within and among the military departments as well as with other national and international agencies. This critically important document must reflect an appropriate match between the world environment in which the United States exists and the strategy which the United States intends to pursue in that environment.

Too often, discussions of alternative arrangements are conducted in a manner that facilitates hidden agendas and fails to make clear the causes of disagreements. We propose that the process be made more objective by defining carefully the understanding of the environment and strategy, defining criteria and agreeing on the relative importance of criteria for the environment and strategy, and then assessing the degree to which potential UCPs satisfy the demands of the important criteria.

Such an approach can never reduce the UCP selection to a simple scoring process, but it can greatly facilitate, and raise the level of discussion about, military high command issues.
Appendix

A: ALTERNATIVE #1: REGIONAL CINCs

Overview

Alternative 1, shown in Figure A.1, uses the command paradigm that underpins the current UCP. Most of the unified commands are regionally oriented commands that have their headquarters in the United States (or soon will). Within a few years, only CINCEUR will have his headquarters on foreign territory. This alternative is based on the premise that there are overriding advantages to a regional focus for unified commands. These advantages are seen as particularly germane in those cases where there are combined command structures and U.S. officers occupy key positions in those structures.

![ALTERNATIVE #1: REGIONAL CINCs](image)

Figure A.1—Alternative #1: Regional CINCs

Unified and Specified Commands and Their Boundaries

*Unified Commands (two or more military services)*

Geographic responsibilities:

1. USACOM
2. CENTCOM  
3. EUCOM  
4. PACOM  
5. SOUTHCOM  

Functional responsibilities:  
1. SPACECOM  
2. SOCOM  
3. TRANSCOM  
4. STRATCOM

_Specified Commands (one military service)_

Geographic areas of responsibility are as set out in the current UCP.

.Interfaces Among Unified and Specified Commands

For peacetime operations, each command is largely freestanding. However, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (and derivative force apportionment documents) apportion earmarked forces for planning purposes. Most of these forces come from outside any given CINC’s AOR. Thus, this UCP alternative relies on a complex web of relationships among CINCs who support each other. For example, USEUCOM has few permanently assigned naval forces. Rotational naval forces are supplied by USACOM in peacetime and naval augmentation for major OPLANS would come from both USACOM and PACOM. STRATCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM would provide major augmentation support during crises and any ensuing contingency. These complex support arrangements are tested and evaluated during major exercises.

1 Freestanding means that each CINC “owns,” through SecDef-directed force assignment practices, the forces in this AOR, and they are not supplied by another CINC. A notable exception is CENTCOM, which relies on other commands to provide deployed forces in peacetime. EUCOM relies on LANTCOM to provide its naval forces on a rotational basis.

2 During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, USCINCCENT received support from all the other CINCs except CINCSOUTH.

3 These exercises are becoming less frequent not only because of the need for greater economy, but also because alliance commitments are receiving less attention than during the Cold War era. For example, the key NATO biennial exercise, WINTEX/CIMEX, has not been held in recent years. Exercise TEAM SPIRIT with the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been reduced in scope and appears to be a hostage to the status of ongoing negotiations between the ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Responsibilities for Planning and Operations

In the current UCP, a CINC is responsible for all planning and operations pertaining to his AOR. This system is not particularly nimble. A new OPLAN may require 18–24 months to develop the necessary TPFDLs. The splitting of planning responsibilities between the engaged and supporting CINCs has resulted in disconnects and delays in executing OPLANS. Moreover, the “receiving” CINC has little assurance that he will receive integrated force packages that cross service component boundaries and are trained and ready to conduct joint operations.

Responsibilities for Joint Training and Readiness

CINCs are gradually coming to rely more on JTFs than on service components to conduct less than major operations (e.g., Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Eastern Exit, Proven Force, Restore Hope). This is the result of the better recognized need for joint command units made up of tailored service components.

Responsibilities for Relationships with Regional Security Partners

The current UCP places great emphasis on the CINC’s responsibilities to orchestrate U.S. military policies and relationships with regional security partners. Each of the five regional CINCs has important contacts with his allied counterparts and in some cases the CINC and his subordinate commanders are dual-hatted in combined command structures. EUCOM and USACOM are prime examples. USFKorea, a sub-unified command in PACOM, is another. Even CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, where there are little or no formal combined command arrangements, have extensive and important informal ties to the military structures of regional states.

Transitioning from Peace to Crisis to War

The current UCP’s focus is on the CINCs’ role for peacetime administration and planning and not on wartime operations. In some respects, the CINC’s peacetime role is primarily representational and programmatic. As a result, the CINC’s staff requires an enormous expansion (including the acquisition of capabilities not normally attached to the staff in peacetime) during the transition to crisis and war. Thus,

there is a major transformation of the staff during the transition. While the staff is changing, the forces assigned and the number of interfaces with other CINCs are increasing. Moreover, in some cases, the CINC’s staff might have to be moved while all this is going on. If JTFs were already in the region at the onset of crisis, there might also be a need to fold them into the emerging war-fighting command arrangements. All these challenges were faced during Operation Desert Shield in 1990. By most accounts, the five-month window between August 1990 and January 1991 was needed to straighten out the various command and support arrangement difficulties.

Critical Issues Associated with This Alternative

1. The importance of the CINC’s regional responsibilities when measured against the need for the economical employment of limited resources.

2. The advantages and disadvantages of having the CINC located within his AOR.

3. The effect of having the regional CINC divorced from the responsibility for the readiness and joint training of forces earmarked for him but located in CONUS.

4. The importance of the CINC’s peacetime policy and representational and programmatic roles, compared with his war-fighting operational role.

5. The NCA’s span of control in directing the efforts of nine CINCs.

6. The turbulent effects of infusing large numbers of units and various types of forces at the very time a regional command becomes engaged in a major contingency.

Summary

This alternative is the UCP currently in use. It is based on the importance of the CINC’s regional expertise and connections in a collective security environment. A key premise is the feasibility and suitability of interactive (and complex) user-supplier relationships among CINCs in the event of active combat operations. Regionally oriented structures have been the preferred command paradigm since the onset of World War II.

for rapid staff augmentation in crisis and the possibility that staff “tail” may be more important than some forces in crisis.
Appendix

B: ALTERNATIVE #2: MISSION-FUNCTIONAL CINCS

Overview

Alternative 2, as described here and shown in Figure B.1, is one of several possible structures that could be developed using a mission-functional paradigm. Recall that mission is defined as:

The task, together with purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor.

In our exemplar alternative here, we use the four elements of the Bush administration's regional strategy and recast them as functions to be performed under the guidance of the UCP. The reader will recall that these four elements are strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.

![Figure B.1—Alternative #2: Mission-Functional CINCs](image-url)
Unified Commands and Their Boundaries

1. Strategic Command (combines current STRATCOM and SPACECOM)

2. European Command and Pacific Command (using current UCP boundaries, these two commands perform most of the forward presence [function])

3. Power Projection Command (performs the crisis response function and is an amalgam of USACOM, SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, and TRANSCOM)

4. Central Reserve Command (performs the reconstitution function)\(^1\)

5. Special Operations Command\(^2\)

Geographic areas of responsibility would be the same as the current UCP except that the Power Projection Command would encompass the current SOUTHCOM, USACOM, and CENTCOM AORs.

Interfaces Among Unified and Specified Commands

Because there are fewer CINCs, the number of interfaces among the CINCs would be fewer. In most cases, an engaged CINC would be supported by no more than three others. USCINCEUR, if faced with a contingency in his AOR, would obtain most of his forces from the Power Projection CINC. In a major reinforcement of Europe, instead of dealing with TRANSCOM and USACOM, he would deal directly, and almost solely, with the Power Projection CINC. The latter would be responsible for providing ready and tailored forces well versed in joint operations.

The Power Projection CINC would have the dual mission of supplying forces to the engaged CINC and of planning and conducting operations within his own very large AOR. He would probably also be the senior CONUS-based CINC and would have the responsibility of orchestrating the training, readiness, and deployments of Strategic Command (current SPACECOM and STRATCOM) and SOCOM with those of the Power Projection Command.

\(^1\)This command could be folded into the Power Projection Command. We have kept it separate in this alternative to keep the alternative in line with the Bush regional strategy and to highlight a neglected dimension of that strategy.

\(^2\)Absent congressional special interest in this command, it would be folded into the Power Projection Command.
Relationships with the Services

The critical interface is the one between the Power Projection Command and the services that would continue to discharge their force development, equipping, training, etc. responsibilities under current law. At some point in each unit's training cycle, it would come under the Combatant Command (COCOM) of the Power Projection Command for joint training, exercising, and (if needed) for deployment or employment. Because of their unique missions, some units would probably stay under service OPCON arrangements (e.g., anti-submarine warfare [ASW], training battalions).

There is also the matter of the Pacific Fleet, which in current practice is under the COCOM of USCINCPAC. Under the UCP alternative considered here, the Atlantic Fleet would become a component command under the Power Projection Command. The Pacific Fleet could also be placed under the commander in chief of the Power Projection Command.3

Responsibilities for Planning and Operations

A CINC would remain responsible for all planning and operations within his AOR, as is current practice. However, planning coordination between the forward presence CINCs (PACOM and EUCOM) and the force supplier CINC (mainly Power Projection Command) would be more focused and effective. The Power Projection Command’s planning responsibilities would be enormous. He would have to plan for contingencies in a very large and diverse AOR and plan to be the principal force supplier for the forward presence CINCs. There is a danger that his headquarters would concentrate more on his responsibilities for his AOR than in preparing forces to reinforce the forward presence CINCs.4

A variation of this UCP alternative would have the power projection CINC also responsible for planning and conducting major combat operations in the two forward presence AORs. The overseas presence commanders under this scheme would concentrate on their representational and less-than-major contingency responsibilities. If a major contingency were to occur in their AOR, they would in effect become JTF commanders under the direction of the power projection

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3A UCP alternative developed by the Army Staff would place both fleets under the COCOM of the functional equivalent of a Power Projection Command. That command is labeled CONUSCOM in the Army alternative.

4We have not addressed the domestic political implications of a “mega-CINC” in CONUS. In authority, responsibility, and prestige, the power projection CINC would wield more power and gain more public attention then the uniformed service chief, and perhaps the CJCS.
Responsibilities for Joint Training and Readiness

The power projection CINC would be the principal commander responsible for joint training and readiness. Although the forward presence CINCs would have parallel responsibilities for the forces under their COCOM, the principal driving agent of “jointness” would be the commander in chief of the Power Projection Command. It is likely that he would establish joint doctrine and practices for DoD. He would face an enormous readiness challenge because of the global scope of his force training responsibilities. He would have to make forces ready for warfare from the tropics to the poles, for guerrilla warfare and large-scale armored warfare, and from low-tech military assistance to high-tech warfare against technically sophisticated opponents.

Responsibilities for Relationships with Security Partners

For USACOM and PACOM, their responsibilities would remain as under the current UCP. However, the new power projection CINC would take on responsibilities for national security coverage for the rest of the world. While there is the potential for some economies of scale achieved by the creation of a single large staff, there is also the danger that the span of control would be too large, and that some regions that now receive a regional CINC’s attention would be lost in the shuffle. Expertise in some regions might suffer and contacts with some foreign militaries might atrophy. The power projection CINC would probably have to rely more on JTFs for operations—and even for the discharge of his representational responsibilities—in his AOR.

Transitioning from Peace to Crisis to War

Under this UCP, transitioning would probably be simplified compared with the current UCP. A single general-purpose force supplier CINC would probably smooth out the transition. However, there is the anomaly that the power projection CINC, who has presumably transformed the service-supplied forces and support elements into a smoothly running joint fighting machine, then turns that machine over to a forward presence CINC who has little experience in commanding large forces. The arriving forces are strange to him and to his theater. The fact that this paradigm worked fairly well in Operations Desert Shield/Storm may say more about the scenario than the wisdom of the method.
Related UCP Proposals in the Command Arrangement Literature

The Army Staff has developed a proposal for a "CONUSCOM" that would include the force supplier functions of the Power Projection Command suggested in the UCP alternative examined in this appendix. However, that proposal includes disestablishment of the current Navy-led LANTCOM (former term) and the retention of the Army-led SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM.\(^5\)

The Congressional Research Service has developed a proposal for an "American Command" (carved out of LANTCOM [former term], SOUTHCOM, and PACOM) that covers the western hemisphere. This command would be the major force supplier for overseas contingencies but does not include TRANSCOM (which would be under a separate combat support CINC).\(^6\) This option retains much of the geographic orientation of the current UCP, but the establishment of the American and combat support commands suggests a leaning to greater mission functionalization.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his review of service roles and missions, has suggested another variant of a power projection CINC in his proposed greatly expanded LANTCOM. The current LANTCOM would encompass the responsibilities of FORSCOM, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Command, and the Atlantic Fleet Marines. The Chairman also recommends that a closer look be taken at folding SPACECOM into STRATCOM.\(^7\)

The Special Case of Central Reserve Command

Analogs to this command are not mentioned in most UCP alternatives and options. As contemplated under this alternative, Central Reserve Command would control those reserve forces that cannot be made ready for early deployment (for example > C+45 or C+60). Reserve Command would be a major force provider in large or extended lesser conflicts. In effect, it would be a force supplier to the Power Projection Command. It would also be the command responsible for reconstitution of U.S. military power insofar as forces and major support capabilities were concerned.

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\(^5\)Point paper provided by the Army Staff, "An Alternative to the LANTCOM Option: Continental United States Command (CONUSCOM)."

\(^6\)This alternative (and two others) are sketched out in Collins (1992), pp. 46-56.

Thus, it would have planning (including requirements setting) and monitoring responsibilities for such elements as the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and wartime stocks (programmatic responsibilities would remain under the services).

**Critical Issues Associated with This Alternative**

1. The benefits of improved readiness and “jointness” as opposed to the loss of some expertise, focus, and representation in certain overseas regions.

2. The incentives for the power projection CINC to balance his responsibilities for his own AOR with those of supporting the forward presence CINCs.

3. Breadth of power projection commander’s responsibilities.

4. The blurring of the dividing line between service and Power Projection Command roles.

5. The “charter” of the Central Reserve Command.

6. The utility and feasibility of combining STRATCOM and SPACECOM.

7. The blurring of service responsibilities (mobilizing, equipping, and training) with the responsibilities of a Central Reserve Command CINC.

**Summary**

This alternative UCP carries echoes from the past (e.g., CINCSTRIKE and CINCREDCOM), while at the same time seeming to reflect the realities of a reduced U.S. overseas force posture. The functional frame of reference capitalizes on mission orientation (which in turn can lead to more incentives for jointness) and reduces the emphasis on regional expertise and clout except in the two “overseas presence” theaters. The splitting of CONUS forces into two commands—power projection and central reserve—might be seen as a fracturing of the total force concept across functional lines. However, the two commands could be combined if total force concepts had the same priority as immediate force readiness. There would be immense problems—and opportunities—in such an amalgamation that we do not address in this description.
Appendix

C. ALTERNATIVE #3: PROCESS-FUNCTIONAL CINCS

Overview

Alternative 3 portrays a UCP structured around military processes. These process functions include intelligence, operations, planning, and support. In one sense, this alternative follows the staff organization paradigm: J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and so on. Under this framework, all CINCs would be in the United States. While regionally oriented CINCs would be retained, their functions would be limited to planning and to operations for such forces as might be under their combatant command (COCOM) in peacetime. An operations CINC, similar to the power projection CINC concept developed in Appendix B, would be in charge of all major contingency deployments and would direct their employment in the "planning AORs." An intelligence command (not shown here as a "CINC") would provide intelligence support and a mobilization command would provide backup forces to the active structure. This alternative is illustrated in Figure C.1.

Figure C.1—Alternative #3: Process-Functional CINCs
Unified Commands and Their Boundaries

1. EUCOM (a planning CINC in CONUS, with one or more JTFs in Europe)
2. PACOM (a planning CINC in CONUS or Hawaii, with JTFs in Korea and Japan)
3. CENTCOM (a planning CINC in CONUS, with a JTF in the Persian Gulf)
4. LANTCOM (a planning CINC in CONUS, with a NATO-oriented JTF and a SOUTHCOM-oriented JTF; SOUTHCOM disestablished)
5. AMERICOM (an operations CINC with many of the functions of the power projection CINC in Appendix B, except that he would assume COCOM of forces in theaters with ongoing major contingencies)
6. STRATCOM (an operations and planning command that would fold in the mission and capabilities of SPACECOM)
7. SOCOM (a planning and operations command as now)
8. CENTRALRESERVECOM (the reconstitution CINC as in Appendix B).

Geographic areas of responsibility would be largely as now except for the new USACOM that would also include the current SOUTHCOM. AMERICOM would be responsible for all forces in CONUS.

Interfaces Among Unified and Specified Commands

Under this alternative, the regional commands would concentrate on their representational and planning responsibilities. They would continue to have COCOM of forces in their AOR under all conditions short of a major regional contingency. In a major regional contingency, the operations CINC would take over. Thus, the regionally oriented CINCs (all located in the United States) would have one or more JTFs deployed. Most of these forces would be supplied by the operations CINC. The operations CINC is the war fighter. In one sense, the regional CINC is a force supplier, since he would chop his deployed JTFs back to the operations

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1This arrangement will seem bizarre to the experienced eye, but it is the mirror image of CENTCOM's experience during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. If there had been an "AMERICOM" in August 1990, he would have deployed forces already under his control in CONUS to the Gulf and would have taken COCOM of JTFME. This example highlights the key difference between this alternative and the mission-functional alternative described in Appendix B: here the split is between planning and operations, while in the mission-functional alternative the split is between force training and readiness in CONUS, and overseas operations. One can have unity of force command across the transition or one can have unity of planning and operations.
CINC once a contingency was declared to be major. But in a larger sense, the distinction between force supplier and force user goes away under this alternative because the operations CINC has strings to all the forces.

Relationships with the Services

The relationship between the operations CINC and the services under this alternative closely approximates that which would exist between the power projection CINC and the services outlined in the mission-functional alternative UCP (Appendix B). Drawing a distinction between service responsibilities for fielding, equipping, and training forces—and the operations CINC’s task of readying them for joint combat in a variety of theaters—would remain a thorny issue.

Responsibilities for Planning and Operations

Minor contingency operations conducted mostly with forces already in the theater would be directed by the regional planning CINCs through JTFs. Major contingency operations would be the responsibility of the operations CINC. Under this scheme, a future “Urgent Fury” would be directed by the regional planning CINC (CINCLANT). A future “Just Cause” would probably be directed by the operations CINC. A future “Desert Shield/Storm” would be directed by the operations CINC. A future “El Dorado Canyon” would probably be directed by the regional planning CINC.

In one sense, this alternative reflects the de facto situation today wherein the regional CINCs’ duties are heavily oriented to planning and representation (as well as to program execution). Today’s regional CINCs fight mostly with forces provided by other CINCs.

Responsibilities for Joint Training and Readiness

This UCP places heavy training and readiness responsibilities on the operations CINC. He would be the force supplier of JTFs to the regional planning CINCs. Thus, in many ways, he would be the single command responsible for the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct joint operations. He would have even greater incentives to perform this function well, because (in the case of major contingencies) he would command these same forces in combat.

Responsibilities for Relationships with Security Partners

Under this UCP, the regional planning CINCs would have the day-to-day responsibilities for dealing with regional security partners and
representing DoD interests in dealings with other regional states. During major contingency operations in his region, operational responsibilities would shift to the operational CINC, who would be deploying forces to the region. This shift could be awkward because it would involve new policy, organizational, and command interfaces during a critical crisis or war period. It is this difficulty that establishes a powerful argument for a regional CINC responsible for both planning and operations. As indicated earlier, the choice hinges on the benefits of continuity of force command as opposed to the continuity between planning and operations.

**Transitioning from Peace to Crisis to War**

This subject lies at the heart of this alternative UCP. We have seen how having one CINC responsible for regional planning and another responsible for regional operations poses difficulties during the transition. However, on the positive side, the staff support available has doubled. The full resources of two CINCs are available to discharge the heavy staff workload during the transition. The need for these resources is validated by the Operation Desert Shield experience, when CINCCENT forward (Lieutenant General Horner) was deployed to direct operations while General Schwarzkopf stayed in CONUS to fill in the gaps in the planning.²

**The Special Case of Central Reserve Command**

This command would be similar to the one outlined in Appendix B. That is, it would be the principal provider of reserve forces to support the operations CINC. Indeed, in wartime, he might take over the force training and readiness job of the operations CINC while the latter directed combat operations.

**Critical Issues Associated with This Alternative**

1. The benefits of continuity of force command at the expense of shifting major regional responsibilities during crisis and war.
2. The ability of the operations CINC to direct more than one major combat operation at the same time.

²The TPFDLs employed in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm had not been updated prior to 7 August 1990 and had to be put together on the fly. This effort required significant personal involvement by General Schwarzkopf and consumed most of the energies of the CENTCOM headquarters staff in August and September 1990.
3. The interface between the Central Reserve Command and the Operations Command during a major conflict requiring national mobilization.

4. Defining what constitutes a major contingency, and thus warranting chopping regional JTFs back to the operations CINC.

5. The comparative benefits of expanding an existing regional organization (i.e., a forward deployed JTF) vs. moving major forces to the theater and grafting deployed JTF forces onto the deploying forces' command structure.

6. Blurred responsibilities between the services and the reconstitution CINC.

Summary

This alternative is more an intellectual exercise and "test" than a structure that would fit in some functional-regional continuum of alternatives. In its own way, it highlights what is lost if functionality (even mission-oriented functionality) and efficiency swallow up regionality as a command paradigm.
D. ALTERNATIVE #4: FEWER CINCS

Overview

This alternative UCP could be an overlay on those described in Appendices A–C. It responds to the complaint that in a period of declining force structure the command structure should shrink as well. Under this alternative, most existing unified commands are combined with others to achieve economies of headquarters resources and to reduce the NCA’s span of control, and there is an expanded use of JTFs to compensate for the decreased number of CINCs. Alternative 4 is illustrated in Figure D.1.

Unified Commands and Their Boundaries

1. STRATCOM (includes SPACECOM)
2. EASTCOM (combines EUCOM, CENTCOM, most of LANTCOM)
3. WESTCOM (a new name for PACOM)
4. AMERICOM (combines FORSCOM, part of LANTCOM, SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM)

5. SOCOM (as now)

Geographic areas of responsibility are expanded versions of current AORs using current AORs as building blocks. The exception is AMERICOM, which would include the western part of LANTCOM and North and South America.

Interfaces Among Unified Commands

These interfaces are similar to those described in Appendix B for a mission-functional UCP. AMERICOM would be both a regional CINC and the principal force supplier for other regional CINCs. All CINCs would retain both planning and operational responsibilities for their regions or functions. Because there is a smaller number of CINCs, their interfaces with one another would be fewer if not simpler. For a major contingency in Europe, EASTCOM would have to deal principally with one other CINC: AMERICOM.

Relationships with the Services

These relationships would encounter the same difficulties that were outlined in Appendices B and C. The dividing line between the services' responsibility for fielding, equipping, and training forces and AMERICOM's responsibility for organizing and training joint force packages for deployment would still need to be negotiated. From a service perspective, there are now fewer "customers" for their forces and capabilities.

It is likely that the USAF's Air Combat Command and the Navy's Atlantic Fleet (perhaps Pacific Fleet as well) would be under AMERICOM's combatant command (COCOM).

Responsibilities for Planning and Operations

No change from current practice. Regional and functional CINCs would be in charge of both planning and operations for their AOR or functions. Note that AMERICOM would be responsible for mobilization and reconstitution functions that were given to CENTRALRESERVECOMMAND in Appendices B and C.
Responsibilities for Joint Training and Readiness

AMERICOM would assume major joint training and readiness responsibilities that parallel those of the power projection CINC in Appendix B and the operations CINC in Appendix C.

Responsibilities for Relationships with Security Partners

These relationships would be discharged as now except that the EASTCOM and AMERICOM CINCs would be responsible for regions currently the domain of two or more CINCs. While this alternative UCP reduces the U.S. NCA span of control, it increases the CINC’s scope of responsibility—and perhaps his span of control as well. However, there are likely to be synergisms in giving EASTCOM responsibility for both Europe and the Middle East (including Southwest Asia). The dividing line between the current EUCOM and CENTCOM AORs is somewhat arbitrary and can be inconvenient (as during Operation Desert Storm). Similarly, by giving EASTCOM the eastern part of current LANTCOM, the U.S. military interface with NATO is simplified (SACEUR would take on SACLANT responsibilities as well). And command arrangements for contingency operations at the seams of current adjacent AORs are simplified (e.g., Liberia in 1990). Finally, consolidating SOCOM and LANTCOM responsibilities under AMERICOM would remove another artificiality under current arrangements. Latin American security partners would deal with one CINC instead of two, as is sometimes the case now.

Transitioning from Peace to Crisis to War

Transitions would be in accordance with practices under the current UCP. AMERICOM would be a single force provider, thereby avoiding the necessity for overseas CINCs to deal with a variety of force providers (e.g., FORSCOM, TRANSCOM, Air Force Combat Command, CINCLANT). In the case of contingencies within AMERICOM, there would be no distinction between force supplier and the operational commander.

Critical Issues Associated with This Alternative

1. The tension between reducing NCA span of control and increasing the span of control (and scope of responsibility) of a smaller number of CINCs.

2. The loss of representational and planning focus by CINCs with a greatly enlarged AOR or functional responsibility.

3. The size and scope of responsibilities of AMERICOM.
Summary

This alternative is really an option under any of the other three alternatives. A reduced number of CINC's is likely to be only one of several objectives in command realignments under a new UCP. However, it is useful to think through which consolidations are most logical and incur least cost in terms of regional expertise, functional competence and simplicity, etc.
Appendix

E: ISSUE PAPER

Background

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433, 1 October 1986) and subsequent manifestations, such as those observed during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, have created significant changes to the military environment that develops Unified Command Plans (UCPs). The central role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is clearly prevalent, if not dominant, in the design of the UCP. The increasing influence of the combatant commanders or CINCs is also apparent. The services' role has been directed more to providing support to the combatant commands.

Issue

How can service chiefs leverage their functional responsibilities in the development and evaluation of UCPs?

Observations

The service chiefs have less influence than before 1986 in the design and development of UCPs. They now perform in the undeclared but legitimate role of specified, functional-process, quasi "supporting CINC." The service responsibilities that are assigned by law are not new functional processes, but the lack of responsibility for the conduct of military operations or direction of operational forces was a key change. The full appreciation of these environmental changes has been evolving since the 1986 legislation, but Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought the full weight of these changes into sharper focus. The services continue in the role of long-term architects of military requirements and programmers of resources, but this role has been lessened by new DoD acquisition processes, increased Joint Staff oversight of operational requirements, and stronger influence of the Chairman and CINC in the DoD PPBS resource allocation process.

The combatant commanders now command essentially all the services' operational forces. The CINC are responsible for the preparedness of their assigned forces and the planning and conduct of military operations, including coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support, and discipline necessary to execute assigned missions. The services support these military operations through the execution of 12
assigned process functions: recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including research and development), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, construction and repair of military equipment, and construction, maintenance, acquisition, and repair of buildings and real property. Forces and units retained under the control of the services, with approval of the Secretary of Defense, are primarily those forces responsible for the execution of the services' listed process functions. Assigned roles and missions, to which the services apply these functions, are routinely reviewed at least every three years.

The services' legitimate responsibilities, as altered by any decision on changes to roles and missions, should be used to augment the criteria suggested in the evaluation tools provided in the Arroyo Center briefing. Using this expanded application of the methodology, the service chief obtains three separate bases of argument for evaluation of a UCP. First, as evaluator, with CINCs and the Chairman, JCS, of external criteria that all participants could develop for joint evaluation of UCPs using the suggested RAND methodology. Second, in the role of "supporting CINC," the service chief uses the same methodology to evaluate UCPs based upon criteria that are derived from service-assigned functional processes that support the combatant commanders. Last, as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, providing professional advice that may correctly include service parochial interests and considerations.

It is useful to distinguish these different roles of the service chiefs to assist in developing more objective methods of evaluation. Examination of how the 12 functional processes may be affected by regional boundaries, varied command structures, and alternative functional interfaces appears to offer a sound and logical foundation for the service response to any proposed UCP. This "supporting CINC" basis provides arguments to the Chairman that can counterbalance the operational mission arguments provided by the combatant commanders. It ensures that the continuing debate over roles and missions remains directly related to any discussion of a UCP change. It expands the context of consideration for UCPs to encompass a fuller range of defense responsibilities and allows for more comprehensive evaluation of efficacy, impacts, and costs. Clearly, not all functional processes of the services will be impacted by UCP changes (e.g., demobilization or recruiting), but others, such as organization, and to lesser degrees equipping and training, may be directly affected by almost any change. A reduction or expansion of unified commands creates a demand for change by the service in its component command organization and the number of functional interfaces involved in supporting the resultant combatant command structure. Using service responsibilities for supporting functional processes as a basis of evaluation ensures that the debate is elevated beyond the parochial interests of how many CINCs or flag officers for each service are justified by any UCP.
These responsibilities, as a form of supporting CINC, suggest that the services' ability to perform assigned functional processes should become an objective basis for evaluating the supportability of UCPs. This is analogous to a combatant commander's basis of UCP evaluation being the ability to conduct military operations in the execution of assigned missions. While not inconsequential considerations in UCP evaluation, service parochial interests seem to be more appropriately within the broadly defined responsibilities assigned to members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide professional advice to the Chairman. However, in this environment of diminishing resources, more public awareness, and increased participation in defense decisionmaking, the services need to bring more objective arguments to the debate on how UCPs are developed and evaluated.

**Recommendation**

The Army should develop criteria based upon their assigned functional processes as an additional set of measures, with appropriately determined weights, to evaluate alternative UCPs to support the Chief of Staff, Army, in discussions with the JCS.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


