Public Opinion: Nuce Triaging and US Views into Account

S. Clinton Hinote

AFIT Student Attending: John F. Kennedy School of Government

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AFIT/CI
2950 P STREET
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH 45433-7765

Approved for Public Release IAW 190-1
Distribution Unlimited
MICHAEL M. BRICKER, SMSgt, USAF
Chief Administration

DTIC ELECTED JUL 2 1 1994

47

NSN 7540-01-280-5500
Nuclear Deposturing
and U.S. Public Opinion
Taking the People's Views Into Account

S. Clinton Hinote
Policy Analysis Exercise
John F. Kennedy School of Government
12 April 1994

Client: USSTRATCOM / J533
(Contact: Pat McKenna)
Offutt AFB, NE

Faculty Advisor: Albert Carnesale

94 7 20 037
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................. 3

MEMORANDUM: Nuclear Deposturing and U.S. Public Opinion ........... 4

- Background — Deposturing to Sustain the Disarmament Momentum .... 4
- U.S. Public Opinion — What the Polls Say .......................... 6
- What Do These Conclusions Mean for Political Feasibility? ........... 7
- Three Options for Factoring Public Opinion into the Evaluation: ..... 9
  - OPTION 1: Don't factor U.S. public opinion into deposturing decisions. 9
  - OPTION 2: 'Screen' deposturing options for cost and trust extended to Russia. 9
  - OPTION 3: Obtain better information by conducting a specific poll... 11

- My Recommendation: OPTION 2 — 'Screen' the Options for Cost and Trust.. 12
- What Changes Could Affect the Above Analysis? ..................... 12

Appendix 1
  Building the Disarmament / Deposturing Momentum .................... 14

Appendix 2
  Threat of War Decreased ........................................ 17

Appendix 3
  High Confidence in the Military and Its Leadership. ................. 24

Appendix 4
  Favor for Military Spending Decreases. ................................ 29

Appendix 5
  Americans Warming to Russia, But Still Cautious ..................... 32

Appendix 6
  Strong and Consistent Support For Arms Control and Disarmament .... 38

Appendix 7
  If One Wanted To Do A Poll, What Questions Should Be Asked? .......... 44

Acknowledgements .................................................. 46

Endnotes ...................................................................... 47
Executive Summary

Current U.S. public opinion trends regarding national security issues:

- The perceived threat of war, especially nuclear war, has greatly decreased since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Domestic problems like the economy, crime, and health care are considered much more important.

- Public confidence in the military and in its leadership is high — higher than for any other government institution in the U.S., including the White House and Congress.

- Support for military spending has significantly dropped and is decreasing still.

- Americans' perceptions of Russia have warmed considerably in recent years, but Russia is still viewed with considerable caution.

- The American people strongly support nuclear arms control and disarmament.

U.S. policy-makers accountable to the people currently enjoy significant 'maneuver room' in making decisions about deposturing because the public doesn't consider national security to be a pressing problem. This maneuver room, however, has three important boundaries:

1. It's risky for public officials to go against the publicly-stated advice of military leadership because Americans have more confidence in these leaders than in them.

2. U.S. citizens are still wary of Russia, so public officials may lose popularity if they support deposturing measures that appear to give too much trust to the Russian government.

3. Americans don't want to spend more money on defense unless they absolutely have to. Expensive deposturing options may be unpopular due to this tight spending mood.

As USSTRATCOM develops an analytical framework for evaluating ways to continue the disarmament / deposturing momentum, it should consider how the boundaries described above impact the public officials who have the authority to make (or reverse) deposturing decisions. I recommend that USSTRATCOM address the political feasibility of various deposturing alternatives in light of U.S. public opinion by quickly screening these alternatives for:

- increases in the federal budget — An alternative that requires an increase in the budget will be difficult for public officials to support as budget pressures continue to tighten.

- extension of too much trust to Russia — Alternatives that appear to let our guard down without ensuring that Russia lives up to its end of the bargain may trigger a negative public reaction that harms or even halts the disarmament / deposturing momentum.

If an alternative exhibits one or both of these qualities, a warning message should be written signifying that (1) the alternative is potentially weak politically and (2) someone (probably not USSTRATCOM) will have to develop a political strategy for that alternative to be implemented.
MEMORANDUM

TO: USSTRATCOM / J533
FROM: 2Lt Clint Hinote
SUBJ: Nuclear Deposturing and U.S. Public Opinion*
DATE: 12 April 1994

I recommend that, as USSTRATCOM develops an analytical framework to evaluate various deposturing alternatives, it should address the political feasibility of these alternatives in light of current U.S. public opinion by quickly screening each alternative for increases in the federal budget and/or the extension of too much trust to Russia. When an alternative exhibits one or both of these qualities, a warning message should be included signifying that (1) the alternative is potentially weak politically and (2) someone (but probably not USSTRATCOM) will have to develop a political strategy for that alternative to be implemented.

Background – Deposturing to Sustain the Disarmament Momentum

Since the mid-1980's, the U.S. and the Soviet Union / Russia have agreed to landmark reductions in nuclear weapons. It's unlikely, however, that any more disarmament agreements will be made in the near future due to the expense and time required to carry out the existing agreements. In addition, further reductions may have to include the other major nuclear powers, adding great complexity (and time) to the

*The analysis and observations contained in this report are those of the author. None of this material should be construed to represent official views of USSTRATCOM or any other organization in the U.S. government, or of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Questions, comments, and suggestions are welcomed by the author.
process. As a result, the U.S. and Russia are now experiencing a lull in disarmament

talks. In an effort to continue the positive momentum that has resulted from recent
disarmament agreements, USSTRATCOM is one of the organizations currently
evaluating alternatives for *deposturing* our forces (decreasing the high state of
readiness that characterized both our nuclear forces and those of the Soviet Union /
Russia during the Cold War).* Many hope that agreements of this nature can sustain
this momentum until further nuclear disarmament talks can begin.²

USSTRATCOM is currently developing a rational framework for evaluating
deposturing alternatives that range from distancing the 'nuclear football' from the
President to storing land-based ICBM's away from their silos.³ One of the areas that
may be considered by USSTRATCOM when evaluating these alternatives is the
political feasibility of implementing different alternatives. An important determinant of
this political feasibility is domestic public opinion, as it can encourage or constrain the
actions of the elected officials who are directly accountable to the people. *This Policy
Analysis Exercise helps USSTRATCOM take public opinion into account in the
analysis by considering the views that U.S. citizens hold on defense issues and
recommending how these views should be included in the evaluation of different
deposturing measures.*

---

*The word *deposturing* has become the working term for the concept of decreasing the high state
of readiness of nuclear forces. During the Cold War, this high state of readiness was thought to be
essential for stable deterrence, but it was understandably viewed by the other side as a very aggressive way
to store one's nuclear arsenal. Now that the Cold War is over, there appears to be a window of opportunity
in which the U.S. and Russia can lessen the perceived aggressive nature of their nuclear arsenals by
decreasing their readiness. This decrease is implied by the prefix "de-" in *deposturing*. It's my view,
however, that this term is confusing. What we are really doing is reposturing our nuclear forces from a high
state of readiness to a lower one. We will still have a force posture after this process is completed, but this
force posture will be a different one. While the prefix "de-" correctly conveys a sense of reversal, it
incorrectly implies a negation and removal of our force posture.
U.S. Public Opinion – What the Polls Say:

In an effort to find out what the American public thinks about national security issues, I explored numerous public opinion polls taken since 1980. These polls gave information on five key indicators: (1) the perceived threat of war, especially nuclear war; (2) public confidence in the military and its leadership; (3) Americans' attitudes toward military spending; (4) U.S. citizens' views of the Soviet Union / Russia; and (5) the general attitude toward nuclear arms control and disarmament. After examining the polling data, I've reached the following conclusions:

- The perceived threat of war, especially nuclear war, has greatly decreased since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Domestic problems like the economy, crime, and health care are considered much more important. (Appendix 2, Threat of War Decreased, presents the data on which this conclusion is based)

- Public confidence in the military and in its leadership is high — higher than for any other government institution in the U.S., including the White House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. (Appendix 3, High Confidence in the Military and its Leadership, presents the data leading to this conclusion)

- Support for military spending has significantly dropped and is decreasing still. (See Appendix 4, Favor For Military Spending Decreases, for a presentation of the data on which this conclusion is based)

- Americans' perceptions of Russia have warmed considerably in recent years, but Russia is still viewed with considerable caution. (Appendix 5, Americans Warming to Russia, But Still Cautious, presents the data on which this conclusion is based)

- The American people strongly and consistently support nuclear arms control and disarmament. (Appendix 6, Strong and Consistent Support for Arms Control and Disarmament, presents the data leading to this conclusion)
What Do These Conclusions Mean for Political Feasibility?

In order to evaluate which deposturing alternatives are politically feasible and which are not, we need to develop an understanding of how public opinion affects the officials in government who will ultimately have the authority to make or reverse deposturing decisions — the President and the Congress. These officials (and the people whose jobs depend on them remaining in office) are also the players who care the most about what the U.S. public is thinking, because they need to gain the public's approval to be considered effective and to keep their jobs. To understand these officials, we need to ask the questions: How does U.S. public opinion affect decisions made by the President and Congress regarding deposturing, and how will it in the future?

The President and Congress currently feel no public pressure to follow a specific course in deposturing nuclear forces because Americans don't see war as a pressing problem relative to other problems, and the public isn't sufficiently well-informed about nuclear issues to have specific views about how deposturing should take place. The result is that these officials enjoy significant freedom of action and can make up their own minds on these issues. There are, however, three important boundaries to this freedom. First, it's risky for these officials to go against publicized recommendations made by military leadership because the public has more confidence in this leadership than in them. Second, the public attitude toward military spending is very stingy. Programs that increase military expenditures must be seen as absolutely necessary. Third, the American people do not completely trust Russia. Any measure that requires the U.S. to extend a great amount of trust to Russia may be unwise due to the negative
public reaction that may follow. Politicians can't afford to look as if they're putting the U.S. at a disadvantage relative to Russia, because Russia's future is still very uncertain in the eyes of Americans. (See Figure 1 below for a graphical representation of the situation.)

If politicians cross over any one of the three boundaries mentioned above, they can expect to lose a degree of public support. This does not mean that some politicians won't cross these boundaries for something they think is right and necessary, but it does mean that they will pay a price for doing so. Furthermore, because most of these officials have a very good sense of public opinion, they are likely to recognize the risk they take in crossing one of these boundaries and will carefully consider this information as they make decisions on deposturing issues.

For the public officials who stay within these boundaries and work for successful deposturing outcomes, however, there is a valuable political payoff at the end. Because U.S. citizens have supported arms control and disarmament in the past, it's reasonable to assume that they will strongly support deposturing agreements that stay within the boundaries listed above. Being able to claim part of the credit for deposturing would, therefore, be a prized feather in any politician's cap.

Figure 1: A Politician's Maneuver Room With Regard To Deposturing Issues
Three Options for Factoring Public Opinion Into the Evaluation:

OPTION 1: *Don't factor U.S. public opinion into deposturing decisions.*

USSTRATCOM could simply ignore this analysis of U.S. public opinion and political pressures explained above and concentrate on evaluating deposturing alternatives according to more traditional types of analysis. Doing so would save time and effort. In addition, there are those who think that public opinion is an area where USSTRATCOM has no expertise. The command, they contend, should concentrate on the military implications of deposturing and leave politics to the politicians. Adopting this option would prevent criticism along this line.

If USSTRATCOM didn't pay any attention to political feasibility, however, it would risk recommending deposturing alternatives that were impossible to implement politically. If this were to happen repeatedly, the civilian leadership may suspect that USSTRATCOM is one-sided in its military point of view and begin to discount its recommendations ("Those people at USSTRATCOM simply don't see the big picture!" they might conclude). By not allowing all of the available information to be taken into account, Option 1 may handicap the command in the eyes of those who listen to it.

OPTION 2: *'Screen' deposturing options for cost and trust extended to Russia.*

USSTRATCOM could 'screen' potential alternatives to see if they cross the trust or expense boundaries explained above. The warning signs would be:

1. **Increases in the federal budget** — An alternative that requires an increase in the budget may not be feasible due to the public's tight spending mood.

2. **Extending too much trust to Russia** — If an option, when printed in headline form, gives the impression that we're letting our guard down without making sure that the Russians are following suit, it may draw a significant unfavorable reaction. Such a reaction could quickly halt the positive momentum we're seeking to sustain.
Adopting this option would not mean that alternatives exhibiting one or both of these qualities would be excluded from consideration – there may well be sufficient reason for recommending them despite their political weakness. This option would call for such alternatives to have a warning message attached to them signifying that someone will have to develop a political strategy in order for that alternative to be implemented. USSTRATCOM could then use this information to point out the possible political difficulties inherent in its recommended alternatives as it briefs interested officials.

This option cuts a middle road between the view that the military is out of its element when it comes to politics and the opposite view that the military is too one-sided in its thinking and doesn't consider the big picture. This approach would allow USSTRATCOM to take this information into account and possibly make better recommendations because of it. Also, adopting this approach wouldn't take a great amount of time or effort. All that would be required would be a quick look to see if implementing a specific alternative would require an increase in the federal budget or the extension of a lot of trust to Russia. If so, someone should write this message next to the alternative: \[ \text{WARNING – Potentially Weak Politically!} \]

As with most middle-of-the-road options, this approach may lead to criticism from the extremists on both sides. Some may charge that, by taking U.S. public opinion into account, USSTRATCOM is putting political expediency above military necessity. Others may say that, as it spends so little time on this area, USSTRATCOM doesn't do enough to get a handle on the political side of things.
OPTION 3: Obtain better information by conducting a specific poll.

Option 3 recognizes that there is a fundamental uncertainty in the public opinion analysis presented above. None of the five indicators mentioned above directly measure the public's views on deposturing. I've had to take general information about public opinion on defense issues and make assumptions about what the public specifically thinks about deposturing. I believe these assumptions are strong ones, but we can't be sure that they're absolutely true.

In order to better understand what U.S. citizens think about deposturing, USSTRATCOM could commission its own poll to ask more specific questions. The information obtained in this poll could then be factored into USSTRATCOM's deposturing recommendations. Appendix 7, If One Wanted To Do A Poll, What Questions Should Be Asked?, contains a list of questions that would offer greater insight into public attitudes regarding various aspects of deposturing.

This approach offers the best chance for obtaining accurate information to help improve deposturing decisions. It would, however, leave USSTRATCOM wide open to the criticism that, instead of concentrating on the military aspects of deposturing, the command is basing its decisions on public opinion polls. Another negative point is that it's questionable whether these polls would offer better information than the analysis presented above due to the public's limited knowledge about the specifics of deposturing. In addition, this approach would be expensive, and the poll would probably have to be updated periodically in order to keep the information current.
My Recommendation: OPTION 2 — 'Screen' the Options for Cost and Trust.

I recommend that the approach outlined in Option 2 be adopted by USSTRATCOM. This option strikes the best balance between paying too much attention to public opinion and not paying enough attention to it. By screening the deposturing alternatives for cost and for trust extended to Russia, USSTRATCOM avoids the perception that it doesn't take political reality seriously as it makes its deposturing recommendations. On the other hand, limiting the consideration of public opinion to screening potential alternatives for cost and trust correctly recognizes that the political maneuver room is large (due to the diminished threat of war as perceived by the public), and USSTRATCOM resources can do the most good when they are concentrated on areas where the command enjoys a comparative advantage in analytical expertise (as it does in military matters).

What Changes Could Affect the Above Analysis?

It's likely that the above analysis concerning the boundaries faced by politicians would change with significant opinion shifts. These shifts could result from a major event or string of events, they could occur rapidly or slowly over time, and changes in one area may or may not affect others. The following is a first cut at thinking about changes in the five indicators:

- **The Threat of War** - An increase in the perceived threat of war could raise the importance of deposing for both the President and Congress and encourage them to 'do something'. A decrease would make the political maneuver room even larger.
Confidence in the Military - A downturn in the public's confidence in the military would make it easier for politicians to go against the publicly-stated positions of the military leadership. An increase in this confidence would make it more risky to contradict recommendations made by these leaders.

Military Spending - A tightening in the public's attitude toward military spending would further increase the pressure on politicians to find low-cost (or cost-saving) deposturing solutions. If the public became more willing to spend money on defense, the restriction on politicians would relax, and costly solutions would be easier for them to support.

Trust in Russia - If the public became more willing to trust Russia to live up to its nuclear agreements, the range of options acceptable to politicians would grow. If the public's trust in the Russian government dropped for some reason, the opposite would be true.

Support for Arms Control - This is the least likely indicator to change, as it has been very consistent since 1980. If it were to change, it would probably go down because there's not a lot of room for it to go up. If support for arms control and disarmament were to go down significantly, then politicians would not perceive the payoff to be as large, and there would be less willingness on their part to spend time on the subject. If support dropped dramatically (to < 50%), we could expect that many politicians would consider deposturing measures unwise and would work against such agreements.
Appendix 1
Building the Disarmament / Deposturing Momentum

In the mid-80's, the U.S. and the Soviet Union reopened negotiations aimed at controlling the number and types of nuclear weapons developed and fielded by each country. Both U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Leader Gorbachev felt significant pressure from within their countries to do this.

These negotiations led to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 that eliminated all short- and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This treaty was very popular in the U.S., where it enjoyed a 76% approval rating. The success of the INF treaty made possible a new set of talks aimed at reducing the strategic armaments of both countries. Two agreements resulted from these Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, known as START I and START II.

The START I treaty, completed in July 1991, defined a rigid timetable for the reduction of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. In this treaty, both countries agreed to reduce their strategic stockpiles to 6000 warheads within 7 years. Signed on 3 January 1993, the START II agreement eclipsed START I as the most far-reaching nuclear reduction agreement ever negotiated. This treaty increased the arms reduction rates agreed to in the first START treaty and called for both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear inventory to between 3000 and 3500 warheads by the year 2003. The U.S. and Russia also agreed to completely eliminate all Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) armed with Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs).

It's unlikely that another arms reduction agreement will be signed in the near future for two reasons:

1. Because the destruction of nuclear weapons is complex and expensive, it is likely that it will take the full period (until 2003) for both the U.S. and Russia to reduce to the levels agreed to in START II. These levels must be reached before any further arms reduction agreement could begin to be implemented.
Any further reductions may need to involve the other major nuclear powers: China, Britain, and France. It would take great time and effort to set up and conclude a multi-sided negotiation of this magnitude. The result is that the U.S. and Russia are currently experiencing a lull in nuclear arms reduction negotiations. This slowdown creates a problem for both countries in that it threatens the desirable momentum they have worked so hard to build with the three disarmament agreements. The U.S. and Russia are faced with the question: How can they sustain this momentum toward a safer world without being able to negotiate and announce nuclear arms reduction measures?

It seems that both countries have found the answer in the disposition, or posture, of their nuclear forces toward one another. During the Cold War, nuclear forces on both sides were kept on a high state of alert and were ready to be fired at a moment’s notice. It was believed that this posture best ensured deterrence because each nation could be reasonably sure that a first strike initiated by them would be able to prevent the other side from striking back in retaliation. This high state of readiness was known as the nuclear 'hair trigger.' The hair trigger was problematic in that an accident or miscalculation could begin an escalation that would be difficult or impossible to stop. In addition to this, the high state of readiness that contributed to deterrence could also be perceived by the other side as a very aggressive way to posture one’s nuclear forces, perhaps in an effort to launch a preemptive strike.

As it became apparent that the Cold War was drawing to a close, and relations warmed between the U.S. and Russia, many began to question the desirability (and sanity) of this hair trigger situation. They felt that recent events had created room to deposture each country’s nuclear forces, meaning that they could decrease their high state of readiness in an effort to lessen the perceived aggressive nature of their nuclear arsenal. Not only did this make sense in light of the improving relationship, but it also allowed the U.S. and Russia to keep building the momentum between them. This momentum was expanded, however, to include deposturing along with disarmament. It became what I call the disarmament / deposturing momentum.

In January 1994, U.S. President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin announced that the U.S. and Russia would no longer aim their nuclear missiles at each
Although regarded as a insignificant change militarily, the announcement publicly reinforced the disarmament / deposturing momentum.

Many more options for deposturing have been suggested. These options range from relatively small steps such as allowing increased inspection of strategic forces to storing our nuclear missiles away from their silos. There is every reason to believe that both countries will continue to seek agreements to implement some of these options in an effort to sustain and build this momentum even more. If these agreements do nothing else, they'll be good politically for the leaders of both countries, and this alone is probably enough to ensure that public officials will be pressured to make some type of deposturing agreements.

As the primary military voice for all matters impacting the country's strategic nuclear deterrent, the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) bears a great responsibility in the deposturing process. It is charged with evaluating the possible alternatives for deposturing our forces. In order to rationally consider all of the different options and sets of options, USSTRATCOM is developing an analytical framework to best evaluate deposturing alternatives in the current world context.

USSTRATCOM must include political feasibility in its evaluation, as it will quickly lose its credibility with the President, the Congress and other officials if it only recommends options that aren't politically feasible. As Albert Carnesale has said to me, "The great lesson of the McNamara / Whiz Kids days at the Pentagon is that an 'optimum' policy that cannot be implemented politically is not an optimum policy."

In order to effectively think about political feasibility, U.S. public opinion must be taken into account. The purpose of this PAE is to consider current U.S. public opinion and make recommendations on how it should be weighed into USSTRATCOM's evaluation of deposturing alternatives.
Appendix 2
Threat of War Decreased

Americans perceive that the threat of war, and especially the threat of nuclear war with Russia, has decreased greatly since end of the Cold War. Very few of them believe that international tensions and/or the threat of war is the major problem facing the United States today. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the thawing of relations between the U.S. and Russia have ushered in an era where U.S. citizens consider domestic problems such as the economy, crime, and health care more pressing than possible wars or conflicts.

A general question often asked by different polling agencies is “What is the most important problem facing our country today?” Polling agencies ask this question to find out which problems people are thinking about most. Figure 2-A shows the aggregate percentages of Americans answering this question with war, the threat of war, national security, international tensions, and other similar answers. The percentages of people worrying about war and/or international tensions rose to a high in the early to mid-80's, then dropped sharply in the late-80's. Since that time, the percentages have stayed low with the exception of a sharp spike during the Gulf War.

In the first graph, the respondents were asked to name only one problem. In Figure 2-B, two (or in one case 'two or three') answers were encouraged. It's interesting to note the similarity of the two graphs.

As the threat of war has significantly decreased as a pressing problem in Americans' minds, domestic problems such as crime, health care, the economy, the economy,
unemployment, and the budget deficit have risen to take its place. This can be clearly seen in the recent Gallup and Harris polls shown in Table I below.

**TABLE I.**

Gallup: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"³

Harris: "What do you think are the two most serious problems facing the country?"⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gallup</th>
<th>Gallup</th>
<th>Gallup</th>
<th>Gallup</th>
<th>Harris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 91</td>
<td>Mar 92</td>
<td>Jan 93</td>
<td>Sep 93</td>
<td>Feb 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime / Violence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Budget Deficit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War / Int'l Tensions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Americans place less importance on war / international tensions as a problem, they also appear to think that the likelihood of war in general and nuclear war specifically is decreasing. Figure 2-C shows the percentages of Americans who have answered that they thought there was a 50% or greater chance that there would be a world war within the next ten years.⁵ Notice the spike in the trend line during the Gulf War. It's interesting to note that I've not been able to find this question asked again since the Gulf War, which indicates to me that polling agencies probably don't think this is a big issue anymore. Figure 2-D is similar to 2-C except that the question concerns nuclear war only.⁶ Americans' perceptions about the chance of nuclear war seem to have dropped significantly.

---

³The hollow triangles in Figure 2-D represent polls taken only in the Houston area and gives the percentage of those saying that a nuclear war is 'very likely' (as opposed to 'somewhat likely and 'not likely at all'). The hollow hourglass represents a poll taken only in Wyoming.
I don't want to imply that Americans no longer think war is possible or that they don't worry that the U.S. could become involved in war somewhere around the world. What the data suggests, however, is that there has been a fundamental shift regarding how U.S. citizens view the threat of war and its consequences on daily life in the U.S. I believe that the major cause for this shift is the reduction in tensions between the U.S. and its traditional nuclear adversary, the Soviet Union / Russia. This warming of relations has made it possible for Americans to worry less about the possibility of nuclear war impacting their daily lives.

People were quite willing to list the threat of war as the most important problem facing the U.S. when relations with the Soviet Union were poor. People honestly believed that these poor relations coupled with unthinkable nuclear arsenals on both sides made for a situation in which there was a real possibility that they, their families, their friends, and their homes could be annihilated in a matter of minutes. The fundamental change since the Cold War is that the sense of urgency regarding the threat of nuclear destruction has greatly diminished. As people think that war is less likely due to events in the former Soviet Union, they have turned their attention inward to problems that are affecting them, their families, their friends, and their homes. These problems (crime, the economy . . .) have surpassed the threat of war as the most pressing problems in the minds of U.S. citizens, and they will continue to do so until U.S. citizens again believe that possible threats of war could affect them, their families, their friends, and their homes.
What's Our Biggest Problem?
Answer: Threat of War / Int'l Tensions
What's Our Biggest Problem?
(Two or More Answers Encouraged)
Figure 2-C

World War in Ten Years?
Percent Answering > 50% Chance

Date
Feb-82 Jul-83 Nov-84 Mar-86 Aug-87 Dec-88 May-90 Sep-91

Percent
50
45
40
35
30
25
Figure 2-D

Nuclear War in Ten Years?
Percent Answering > 50% Chance

Date
May-79 Feb-82 Nov-84 Aug-87 May-90 Jan-93
Appendix 3
High Confidence in the Military and Its Leadership

Throughout the 1980's, the confidence the U.S. public placed in the military and in military leaders was quite high. In fact, the public consistently had more confidence in the military than in any other government institution. The success of the Gulf War seems to have boosted confidence in the military even higher. In the period during and after the fighting, confidence jumped to record levels (in one poll it stood at 91%). Since that time, confidence levels have returned to more reasonable levels, but it appears that the success of the Gulf War has given the military a semi-permanent boost, strengthening further its already strong ratings.

Figure 3-A shows the public's confidence in the military relative to its confidence in the White House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. This graph clearly illustrates that the public has consistently placed more confidence in the military than in other major institutions in government. One other item of interest on this graph is the significant drop in confidence from 1993 to 1994. Humphrey Taylor of Louis Harris & Associates speculates that this drop may have been caused by troubles in Somalia and Bosnia. It may also be significant that confidence in both the White House and Congress dropped during this period as well.

Figure 3-B shows the trend in military confidence since 1980. The solid markers show the aggregate percentages of those answering that they had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military or in its leadership. (The other choices were "only some" and "hardly any." ) The hollow markers represent polls where a similar question was asked, but the respondents could only choose from "a great deal," "only some," or "hardly any." These markers indicate the percentage replying "a great deal." This graph clearly illustrates both the steady increase of confidence in the military since 1980 and the sharp increase in confidence during and immediately after the Gulf War.

*The polls represented in Figure 3-A all come from one agency: Louis Harris & Associates.
Figure 3-C shows the trend in public confidence in the military since 1980, but is different in that it takes percentages for all answers (a great deal, only some, etc.) into account. To do this, the percentages are 'normalized' in a confidence index using a mathematical formula.* The important thing to remember about this index is that a value of 1 would mean that everyone had a great deal of confidence in the military, whereas a value of 0 would mean that the public had hardly any confidence in it. As in Figure 3-B, this graph clearly illustrates the 'spike' during and after the Gulf War, and it shows that a portion of this boost seems to have been sustained since that time.

*For questions where three choices were presented, this formula is:

Confidence Index = [proportion answering 'a great deal' · 1] + [proportion answering 'only some' · 0.5] + [proportion answering 'hardly any' · 0]

For questions where four choices were presented, the formula changes slightly:

Confidence Index = [proportion answering 'a great deal' · 1] + [proportion answering 'quite a lot' · 0.75] + [proportion answering 'only some' · 0.5] + [proportion answering 'hardly any' · 0]
Figure 3-A

Confidence in the Military
Compared to Other Institutions

% Answering "Great Deal of Confidence"

Date
May-79 Feb-82 Nov-84 Aug-87 May-90 Jan-93

Legend:
- Military
- White House
- Congress
- Supreme Court
Figure 3-B

Confidence in the Military

% Answering Great Deal or Quite a Lot

Date
May-79  Feb-82  Nov-84  Aug-87  May-90  Jan-93
Figure 3-C

Confidence In The Military
Index Trend: 1980-1993

Confidence Index

Date

May-79 Feb-82 Nov-84 Aug-87 May-90 Jan-93
Appendix 4
Favor for Military Spending Decreases

Americans' willingness to spend money for defense has dropped significantly and steadily since 1980.

Figure 4-A summarizes the U.S. public's views on military spending since 1980. During this period, people were repeatedly asked whether they favored increasing the amount spent on the military, decreasing this amount, or continuing current levels of spending. The results were reported as three percentages or proportions (increase, decrease, or keep the same). This graph summarizes all three proportions by 'normalizing' the results on a scale of 0 to 1 using a mathematic formula.* A value of 1 for the Sympathy for Increased Spending index would indicate that everyone in the population favored increasing defense spending, while 0 would mean that everyone wanted to decrease this spending.

The trend is clear: Public support for military spending dropped rapidly after the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and has continued to drop ever since. The only exceptions to this trend were noted by a few of the polling agencies around the time of the Gulf War, but favor for defense spending seems to have continued its decrease since that time.

I don't think that this result indicates that Americans aren't willing to spend money on disarmament and deposturing initiatives. On the contrary, I think the result of the following question released by Gallup in April of 1993 indicates otherwise:

---

*This formula is:

\[
\text{Sympathy for Increased Spending} = (\text{proportion answering 'increase'} \times 1) + (\text{proportion answering 'keep the same'} \times 0.5) + (\text{proportion answering 'decrease'} \times 0)
\]
Would you favor or oppose increasing financial aid to Russia for each of the following purposes: To provide food and other humanitarian aid; to set up private businesses; to clean up the environment; to dismantle nuclear weapons.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantle weapons</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private businesses</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lesson we should draw from Figure 4-A, however, is that politicians face great pressure not to increase the amount of money being spent for military purposes, because the general consensus is that the defense budget should not go up. If depositions initiatives are financed through the defense budget, it is going to be difficult for politicians to support initiatives that increase that budget. It's possible that politicians could support depositions initiatives that increase the budget if they could cut other aspects of defense spending to pay for them.
Figure 4-A

Military Spending

Date
May-79  Feb-82  Nov-84  Aug-87  May-90  Jan-93

Sympathy for Increased Spending
Appendix 5
Americans Warming to Russia, But Still Cautious

Since the end of the Cold War, Americans' perceptions of Russia have warmed considerably. Where once the Soviet Union was viewed as the #1 enemy of the United States, a majority of U.S. citizens now view Russia in a positive light. The current attitude can best be described as a cautious hope that the 'thawing' trend between the two countries will continue. Americans still appear hesitant, however, to trust the Russians on vital issues.

The top of page 34 shows the striking change in the public's attitude concerning the infamous characterization of the Soviet Union as an evil empire. The bottom of the page presents two recent polls concerning the current view of Russia. The result of the question from the September 1993 Gallup poll concerning a possible new Cold War provides reinforcement for the conclusion stated in Appendix 2; Americans no longer consider war or the threat of war as one of the nation's most pressing problems because, at least in the near future, they don't perceive the chance to be very high that war could threaten what they care about.

Figure 5-A summarizes the warming trend towards the Soviet Union and Russia using a Favorability Index.* The higher the value of the index, the more favorable Americans' views toward Russia, with 0 being neutral. Two important conclusions can

*The triangles in Figure 5-A represent answers to a question about U.S. citizen's disposition toward the Soviet Union / Russia on a scale of -5 to 5 (with 0 omitted). The Favorability Index for these polls was calculated in the following way:

\[
\text{Favorability Index} = (\text{proportion answering } +5 \cdot 5) + \\
(\text{proportion answering } +4 \cdot 4) + \\
(\text{proportion answering } +3 \cdot 3) + \\
(\text{proportion answering } -5 \cdot -5)
\]

The squares and circles represent the results of similar questions, but the responses were limited to 'very favorable,' 'somewhat favorable,' 'somewhat unfavorable,' and 'very unfavorable.' These were weighted as follows:

\[
\text{Favorability Index} = (\text{proportion answering 'very favorable'} \cdot 4) + \\
(\text{proportion answering 'somewhat favorable'} \cdot 2) + \\
(\text{proportion answering 'somewhat unfavorable'} \cdot -2) + \\
(\text{proportion answering 'very unfavorable'} \cdot -4)
\]
be drawn from this graph. First, the public's attitude toward the Soviet Union / Russia has improved significantly since the height of the Cold War in the early 1980's. This change roughly coincided with events like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s. Since that time, however, the public's disposition with respect to Russia has remained fairly constant, and this disposition can best be described as only slightly favorable.

Pages 36 and 37 present the answers Americans have given regarding the amount of trust they felt could be given to the Soviets. Through the 1980s, Americans believed that it was unwise to trust the Soviets. Only the 1991 CBS/NYT poll indicates a changing view on the trust issue.

The above results seem to indicate that Americans are cautiously optimistic in their view of Russia. They would like to see better relations between the U.S. and Russia, but they can't be sure that those better relations are possible due to immense uncertainty about Russia's future coupled with bad memories of Russia's past.
Is the Soviet Union an Evil Empire? 1984 vs 1991

In 1984:

The Soviet Union is like Hitler's Germany, an evil empire trying to take over the world.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>56%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1991:

When Ronald Reagan was president, he said that the Soviet Union was an evil empire and the focus of evil in the modern world. Would you agree or disagree with that statement today?3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>24%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The current view of the Soviet Union:

In 1993:

Do you think it is likely or not likely that there will be a new cold war between the United States and Russia in the next few years?4

| Likely | 27% |
| Not likely | 66% |
| No opinion | 7% |

Which one of the following countries or regions in the world do you think the United States had better keep the closest relationship with in the future?5

| Japan | 25% |
| Russia | 22% |
| Canada | 12% |
| Europe | 11% |
| All others below 10% | |
View of the USSR / Russia

Favorability Index

Date
May-79 Feb-82 Nov-84 Aug-87 May-90 Jan-93

← unfavorable → favorable

In 1982:

The Soviet Union has said that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Do you believe the Soviet Union?6

Yes 14%
No 83%

In 1984:

Do you agree: The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty and agreement they have ever signed.7

Agree 61%

Do you agree: The Soviets are constantly testing us, probing for weakness, and they're quick to take advantage whenever they find any.8

Agree 82%

In 1985:

If the United States and the Soviet Union were to sign a new agreement to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would live up to its share of the agreement?9

Yes 24%
No 59%

Do you agree: The Russians cannot be trusted to keep their word on agreements made in a summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.10

Agree 64%

In the past, the United States and Russia have had a policy of trying to reach agreements to relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements, or don't you think so?11

Can Be Trusted 14%
Cannot Be Trusted 74%
Suppose the United States and the Soviet Union did come to an agreement to limit nuclear weapons. Do you think the Soviet Union would try to cheat on a nuclear arms agreement and get an advantage over the U.S. or not? 

- Would Cheat: 79%
- Wouldn't Cheat: 17%

If the United States and the Soviet Union were to reach an agreement on nuclear weapons control, do you think that the Russians could be trusted to keep their part of the bargain, or not?

- Could Be Trusted: 24%
- Couldn’t Be Trusted: 66%

Do you think we can trust the Soviets to keep a possible summit agreement?

- Can Trust: 23%
- Cannot Trust: 66%

In 1988:

Do you agree: The Soviets lie, cheat and steal — they’ll do anything to further the cause of communism.

- Agree: 64%

In 1991:

Percentage who agree/disagree with the statement: "The Cold War is not really over and you cannot really trust the Russians."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General Public</th>
<th>Senior People Knowing International Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree Strongly/Somewhat</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree Strongly/Somewhat</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the United States and the Soviet Union were to sign a new agreement to limit nuclear weapons, do you think the Soviet Union would live up to its share of the agreement?

- Yes: 50%
- No: 35%
Appendix 6
Strong and Consistent Support For Arms Control and Disarmament

Americans consistently answer that they strongly favor nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. This is true both for measures already agreed to by the U.S. and Soviet Union / Russia as well as for almost any proposal for the future.

Pages 39-41 present the responses to various questions asked about nuclear arms control and disarmament between 1981 and 1993. It's especially interesting to note the high percentages agreeing to the importance of arms control and disarmament and favoring various proposed measures. Page 42 shows the responses to the specific proposal of a nuclear freeze in the early 1980s. This proposal was heavily favored, even among those who thought verification of a freeze wouldn't be possible. Page 43 shows the public's strong approval for the INF and START I agreements.

This strong and consistent public support for nuclear arms control and disarmament is important for deposturing, because it's reasonable to assume that the public will view deposturing initiatives through much the same lens. It is likely that U.S. citizens will strongly and consistently support deposturing efforts, as these efforts represent an effort to 'do something' about the problem of nuclear weapons. As can be seen in the following pages, Americans strongly and consistently favor anything that has a chance of lessening the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the things they care about.
Arms Control and Disarmament
U.S. Public Opinion 1981-1993

In 1981:

Do you think the United States should or should not meet with the Soviet Union this year to try to reach an agreement on nuclear disarmament?¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should</th>
<th>80%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should Not</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not to build any more nuclear weapons in the future?²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>72%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you approve or disapprove if President Reagan made a proposal to the Soviet Union that both countries reduce their present stock of nuclear weapons by 50%?³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>76%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1985:

How important is it to you that the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement to limit nuclear weapons — very important, somewhat important, or not very important?⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>74%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Important</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Important</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1986:

How important do you think it is that the United States and the Soviet Union sign an arms control treaty within a few years from now?5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unimportant</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Have you heard or read about the reassumption of arms control talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States?5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asked of the aware group: Do you think such arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have increased or decreased the chance of a nuclear war? Or doesn't it make any difference?7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Difference</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1988:

Regardless of who is elected in November, there are a number of important issues the next president will face. For each of the following issues, please tell me whether you think it is very important and should be a top priority for the next administration, it's important but not a top priority, or whether it should not be considered at all:

Negotiating further arms reductions with the Soviet Union?8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Priority</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Priority</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Priority</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Only reducing the budget deficit and protecting the environment were ranked higher.)
In 1991:

Suppose the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons — and get other nations that have them to do the same. Would you approve or disapprove of the elimination of all nuclear weapons? 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>87%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know/No Answer</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do you think it is possible in the foreseeable future to eliminate ALL nuclear weapons or is that not a realistic possibility?

| Possible | 25% |
| Not Realistic Possibility | 70% |
| Don't Know/No Answer | 5% |

In 1993:

Would you favor or oppose increasing financial aid to Russia for each of the following purposes: To provide food and other humanitarian aid; to set up private businesses; to clean up the environment; to dismantle nuclear weapons.

Financial aid to Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Favor</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantle weapons</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private businesses</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nuclear Freeze: U.S. Public Opinion in the Early 1980's

In 1982: Would you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for an immediate, verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons?12

- Favor 71%
- Oppose 20%
- No Opinion 9%

Of those who think it would be possible to verify whether the Soviet Union is conforming to a nuclear freeze agreement:

- Favor 85%
- Oppose 11%
- No Opinion 4%

Of those who think it would not be possible to verify whether the Soviet Union is conforming to a nuclear freeze agreement:

- Favor 65%
- Oppose 30%
- No Opinion 5%

Of those who think the United States is stronger in nuclear arms:

- Favor 68%
- Oppose 24%
- No Opinion 8%

Of those who think the Soviet Union is stronger in nuclear arms:

- Favor 68%
- Oppose 29%
- No Opinion 3%

Of those who think the United States and the Soviet Union are about equal in nuclear arms:

- Favor 81%
- Oppose 13%
- No Opinion 6%

In 1984: The same question was repeated . . . 13

- Favor 78%
- Oppose 18%
- No Opinion 4%

The INF Treaty:

In 1987:

Next week President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev are scheduled to sign a treaty that would eliminate all short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe and the Soviet Union. Do you approve or disapprove of this treaty?14

| Approve | 76% |
| Disapprove | 13% |
| No Opinion | 11% |

START I:

In 1991:

Have you heard or read about the proposed nuclear-arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union?15

| Yes | 73% |
| No | 27% |

Asked of those who replied in the affirmative: Everything considered, would you like to see the U.S. Congress vote in favor of the proposed nuclear reduction treaty, or not?16

| Yes, vote in favor | 84% |
| Don't vote in favor | 10% |
| Don't know | 6% |

Do you approve or disapprove of the reduction in U.S. nuclear arms that President Bush announced last week?17

| Approve | 71% |
| Disapprove | 20% |
| No Opinion | 9% |
Appendix 7
If One Wanted To Do A Poll, What Questions Should Be Asked?

In order to better understand what people think about deposturing nuclear forces, a poll could be conducted that specifically asked questions about deposturing issues. If this were done, I would recommend asking questions in the following three areas (listed by order of importance):

First, to better define the boundaries which constrain public officials on this issue, I would ask . . .

- a question that forces the public to deal with a tradeoff between defense spending and deposturing. (For example: "Would you favor agreements with Russia to soften the aggressive nature of each other's nuclear forces even if it meant that we had to spend more defense dollars? A lot more defense dollars?)

- a more specific question concerning trust in Russia. (For example, before we announced the agreement on detargeting, a good question would have been: "Currently the U.S. is seeking agreements with Russia to aim our nuclear missiles away from each other. Do you think we can trust the Russians to live up to their end of the bargain, or not?")

- a question that further explores the public's attitude toward military leadership vs. politicians on the deposturing issue. (For example: When considering agreements about nuclear weapons with Russia, whose views do you think are most accurate: those of the President, military leaders, or members of Congress?)

Next, in order to better define the importance of nuclear deposturing to the American people relative to all the other problems our country faces: I would ask . . .

- How important is it that we reach agreement with Russia concerning the disposition of our nuclear weapons? Very important, somewhat important, or not very important?

- I'm going to give you a list of issues facing our country today. I would like for you to rank these in order of importance. ('Reaching agreements with Russia on nuclear forces' would be an issue along with, 'Unemployment,' 'Health care,' 'Crime,' 'Education,' etc.)
How much time do you think the President should be spending in an effort to reach agreements with Russia on nuclear weapons? All of his time, a lot of his time, only some of his time, or hardly any of his time?

Finally, in order to better define the public's support for deposturing measures, I would ask specific questions that briefly explain a possible option and ask for the respondent's reaction.

- "Would you favor an agreement between the U.S. and Russia to stop aiming their nuclear missiles at each other?"

- "Would you favor an agreement between the U.S. and Russia to take all land-based nuclear missiles out of their silos and store them in separate places?"
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank these people for their help. I couldn’t have completed this project without them . . .

Capt. Lynn Baldrighi
Albert Carnesale
Jim Cooney
Mickey Edwards
Ted Hartebeck
Myra Hinote
My IAS-150 Classmates
Kerry Kelley
The J533 Office
Maj. Gen. Robert Linhard
Stu Maas
Pat McKenna
Ray Valek
Endnotes

Memorandum: Nuclear Deposturing and U.S. Public Opinion.


2. I first heard of the concept of a 'disarmament and deposturing momentum' from Major General Robert E. Linhard during a visit to USSTRATCOM in early January 1994, while he held the J5 position. As the concept became the starting point for this analysis, I owe much to the general for his explanation.


Index I


5. I'd like to thank Pat McKenna and Ray Valek at USSTRATCOM / J533 for introducing me to the concepts behind deposturing.

6. Again, I want to acknowledge General Linhard's contribution regarding this concept.

Appendix 2

1. The markers in Figure 2-A represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- Time
- CBS / New York Times
- NBC / Wall Street Journal
- Cambridge Research Institute

2. The markers in Figure 2-B represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
- Louis Harris & Associates
- The Cambridge Research Institute


5. The markers in Figure 2-C represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- National Opinion Research Center (derived from the General Social Survey conducted by the Roper Center) and direct GSS findings

6. The markers in Figure 2-D represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- CBS / New York Times
- Rice University, Department of Sociology
- University of Wyoming, Department of Political Science

Appendix 3


2. Figure 3-A contains data reported in *The Harris Poll 1994 #5*, 7 March 1994.

4. The markers in Figure 3-B represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- National Opinion Research Center (derived from the General Social Survey conducted by the Roper Center) and direct GSS findings
- CBS
- Louis Harris and Associates
- The Los Angeles Times

5. The markers in Figure 3-C represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- National Opinion Research Center (derived from the General Social Survey conducted by the Roper Center) and direct GSS findings
- CBS
- The Los Angeles Times

Appendix 4

1. The markers in Figure 4-A represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- National Opinion Research Center (derived from the General Social Survey conducted by the Roper Center)
- CBS
- Louis Harris and Associates
- The Cambridge Research Institute
- Time/CNN
- NBC


Appendix 5

1. The markers in Figure 5-A represent polling results from the following agencies:

- The Gallup Organization
- The General Social Survey conducted by the Roper Center
- The American Institute of Public Opinion
- Louis Harris and Associates


Appendix 6

1. and 2. Gallup Survey #173-G (5/8-11/81)


17. Gallup GO 222018 (10/3-6/91).