Best Available Copy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTRIBUTION OF THE W.E.U. IN U.N. PEACE MANAGEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHILIPPE MEYER LCL, FRANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIR WAR COLLEGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325 CHENNAULT CIRCLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAXWELL AFB AL 36112-6427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unnumbered AWC research paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAPER IS WRITTEN TO FULFILL ACADEMIC RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IN-RESIDENCE SENIOR SERVICE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTIC ELECTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUN 23 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution, W.E.U., Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. PRICE CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCLAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTRIBUTION OF THE W.E.U IN U.N PEACE MANAGEMENT

BY

LCL PHILIPPE MEYER
FRANCE

A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

ADVISOR: DOCTOR STEIN

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 1994
CONTRIBUTION OF THE W.E.U IN U.N PEACE MANAGEMENT

"We had decided that the suffering of people belonged to the people and not to the governments who sheltered and put a mask on them. The interference had conquered the right to exist. It will become harder to murder freely inside his borders."

B. KOUCHNER

At the turn of the decade, there were unabashed hopes that the United Nations (U.N) would be able to bring about and maintain international peace as its "founding fathers" had envisioned. Expectations began to rise when the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to U.N peacekeepers in 1988 and continued to rise for the next three years. However, since 1991, and despite the relatively successful operation in the Gulf, clouds have begun to pile up in the horizon. In December 1993, the failure of operations in Somalia or in Yugoslavia have revived the old devils of isolationism in most of the Western countries. And if, after all, we had been wrong to believe in the capacity of the United Nations to create this new world order so long waited; and if, the price in terms of human national lives and in economic spending for relieving a few pains in the world, was too high to pay in a period of recession! Is the life of a Somalian kid worth the life of an American or a French peacekeeper? If the Somalis themselves
don’t want to be helped, let them suffer their faith! Here is the common trend today of the public opinion and, consequently, among most of the governments. Should I be the last one in my country, not sharing this machiavellian tendancy, agreeing in that way with the views of the one who formalized this new concern of “duty of interference”, Bernard Kouchner, when saying at Sarajevo: “the duty of non interference stops when the risk of non assistance is born”. How and not why, can we help efficiently, in 1993, people and countries who suffer from natural or imposed calamities are the questions that we must consider now. To approach the answer, we shall establish as premise that the United Nations is one of the only organisms existing nowadays, with a potential or credibility, which can operate worldwide. So, my concern will be to see how the U.N could be more efficient and not to find what could replace it. Keeping that in mind we shall analyze, first, why and what are the current missions of the United Nations and the reasons for their failure. Then, we shall develop a new strategy, that we shall call:” the Peace strategy“ and see how this strategy could be implemented through the regional organizations existing nowadays, and among these, we shall study how the Western European Union (W.E.U). How can the new W.E.U, post Maastricht, be able to succeed where it previously failed? This question will constitute the core of this essay.

History of the concept of human rights:

Are humanitarian interference, duty of assistance, corridors of tranquility or international rights some real new considerations in the history of Humanity? Obviously no! If we want to resume the evolution of the humanitarian international right, we could say that the...
attempts to humanize and rule war have continued since antiquity. These principles have been implemented with the triumph of Christianity and systemized in efforts like “peace of God or the truce of God.” At this time, our ancestors only took care to define in what conditions a war was just. The real protagonists of humanitarian rights will appear during the enlightened century, with some philosophers like J.J Rousseau, Grotius or Kant. More recently, the instructions for the government of the U.S forces in the field written by the president Lincoln during the Civil war can be seen as attempt to codify the right for making war. More recently still, the conventions of La Hague and Geneva will be the first interstate documents establishing the use of strength and the conduct of hostilities in the first case and the protection of the persons and the international humanitarian right in the latter. After the second world war, the charter of the United Nations elaborated at San Francisco prohibits the resort to war in the international relations: war becomes illegal and the convention of The Hague looses its interests on behalf of the convention of Geneva. Interference, that some people consider as new in 1993, is already a concept written in the four conventions of Geneva in 1949. The two additional protocols in 1977 will codify the humanitarian right and the right to humanitarian assistance, which is in itself a form of interference. It is on these foundations, upon the jus in bello rather than the jus ad bellum, which we have demonstrated are not really new, that the United Nations is going to act up to the end of the cold war. The twelve operations of peace maintaining and their nature, except the one in Korea, were only a way to assume the gestation of the order established between East and West. Peacekeeping operations during this period had been largely military in task and composition. Their goal was to help both enemy sides stop fighting and to prevent any resumption of the hostilities. All these operations of peacekeeping were conducted upon the following principles: need of the consent of the parties; impartiality between the parties; only
national armies and police forces available for the uniformed personal of the United Nations; restriction in the use of force by U.N peacekeepers and these operations were U.N operations. Since 1988, the emphasis on the military has changed due to the fact that the U.N is more often involved in internal conflicts. Current operations now contain more civilian elements. "Presently, peacekeeping operations still include military personal but now, civilian have a more important role to play" Boutros Boutros Ghali said in 1993. Since this date, the revival of peacekeeping has officially seen the establishment of thirteen operations so far.

**The current missions of the United Nations**

Having developed how the notion of human rights evolved during the last centuries, let us try to define what are the four missions that Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary general of the United Nations outlined for the organization, in the agenda for peace, released in 1992.

These are:

- preventive diplomacy
- peacemaking and peace enforcement
- peacekeeping
- post-conflict peace-building

Let us analyze each one of these missions according to the U.N definition.

1. **Preventive diplomacy**; This mission is supposed to be the most desirable since it supposes to ease tensions before they degenerate into armed conflicts. Linked with preventive
diplomacy the Secretary general proposes the creation of demilitarized zones in a preventive conflict. If conflict cannot be prevented, the next goal will be to find a peaceful resolution.

2- **Peacekeeping**: This mission, which tends to be the first one since the end of the cold war, happens in a situation where a ceasefire has already been agreed by both warring parties. Peacekeeping helps provide for short term stability and requires talents of civilian political officers, electoral officials, and other specialist of the humanitarian aid. It requires, too, a lot of logistics, personal, equipment and finance, often supplied best by trained military units.

3- **A- Peacemaking**: This mission tasks the United Nations to bring enemies to agreement by peaceful means in accordance with the chapter 6 of the charter. If civilian means don’t succeed, then military peacemaking efforts could be employed in accordance with the chapter 7 of the chapter.

3- **B- Peace enforcement**: this mission supposes military forces which can restore failed or non-complied cease-fires. These troops, upon the opinion of the Secretary general should be made of volunteers, well trained and more heavily armed than peacemakers.

Despite this distinction, the Secretary general does not see the need to divide these two types of missions.

4- **Post conflict peace-building**: Following the idea of a successful peacemaking or peacekeeping operation, Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali emphasizes the need to establish the foundations for a lasting peace. After the first step, the United Nations must disarm the
belligerents, help repatriate refugees, monitor elections and help the political reform of the government. This mission is seen as the counterpart of the preventive diplomacy and the latter attempt to avoid a crisis while the peacekeeping tries to prevent the recurrent of the crisis. 

It is upon these definitions that the United Nations is conducting its operations of peace management, or what could be more accurate, of conflict management: 16 current operations dispersed in the whole world and some of them lasting since 1964 (Cyprus); 12 proposed operations, a number which is certain to increase over the next few years. Despite the huge amount of money spent at the present day on these operations (4.5 billions estimated 1993 cost) (and now 2.8 billions annual). The number of dead among the peace soldiers (733 dead among which 166 in the UNIFIL at the 4/01/89). The record of the U.N is qualified as mixed by the more optimistic and as unacceptable by a great majority of people in the Western countries. The U.N would be a bottomless pit and a bad answer to the growing request in the world for humanitarian help as for peace or security. Let us now analyze, in November 1993, what are the main reasons of this declared failure at the different levels of the organization.

The reasons of the failure

1- At the conceptual level:

- One of the main problems for the U.N is to establish where is the border between assistance and intervention. The latter can take place only to some variable perceptions. Where ingerence will begin and where does it end? This differentiation however is important, because ingerence is systematically the expression of an order and becomes political. Only the fact that
all the operations of the U.N must be decided by the security council implies they are the
product of a compromise, in which each one of the members follows some national interests. In order to have humanitarian and politics well separated, it would be necessary to dispose of a
world unified government, opposite to the current principle of the sovereign states. Humanitarian intervention has consequently two faces: (1) it is the emergence of mankind ready to help but also (2) frequently humanity as bearer of an imposed order.

- U.N supposes that all the parties conflicting will accept easily the order it imposes because of the human rights or the rights of the people. But, what means the rights of mankind in situations like in Yugoslavia, for fighting people who seem to have forgotten any trace of mankind? The military intervention, if it results from a very laudable indignation, is not to be efficient nor able to restore peace. That's why, very often, operations like the one in Congo or Lebanon are expected to accomplish their objectives in a matter of weeks and are initially carried out with a small number of soldiers.

- The missions, as defined in the "Agenda for peace", are not in a linear continuum and very often move from one side of the spectrum to the other side (example of Somalia in 1993). But this shift is not only a semantic difference. There is a significant jump from peacekeeping to peace enforcement or peace-building. In one case, both sides have agreed to a cease-fire that they see in their mutual interest. In the last cases, one of the parties sees its interests in the continuation of the fight.

A tendency of the U.N has been its inability to perceive that the root causes of any fighting will always ultimately require a political solution. The introduction of force is only to create a
ceasefire, not to produce a political solution. That's why, most of the time, the military units sent on the U.N operations were provided vague objectives and guidelines, when these objectives are shared between the nations providing the soldiers and an U.N authority. This appears not to have been the case in Somalia between the U.S.A and U.N leadership.

2- At the military level:

Most of the following facts have been directly observed in the various theaters where I have been lead to operate on behalf of multinational organizations (Apronuc ; Mfo) as chief of air operations:

- The difference in the nature of the missions has of course a direct influence over the required equipment doctrine and number of troops deployed. Peacekeepers, whose mission can be compared to national police forces, may be lightly armed for purely self defense because they are seen as neutral parties. The peace-enforcement units, on the other hand, which are not seen as neutral, should be combat units and consequently be armed with heavy material. Unhappily, this has not been the case in Somalia and this fact has generated heavy losses among the U.S troops. The U.N has not, until now, clearly understood that some of the missions it assigns to its soldiers are war missions. What follows is that the missions seem most of the time to suffer from poor or too late planning, made by too few U.N staffers and decided without a good military knowledge of the situation.

- On a tactical standpoint, a lot of operations are marked first by poor intelligence (exemple of Kataganese resistance strongly underevaluated in Congo or difficulty to locate General Aidid in Somalia in 1993). Very rarely, does the situation conform to the one given to the military leaders. In Cambodia, for instance, it appeared that the diplomatic need to supply the logistics
needs of one of the parties made the civilian authorities neglect the threat that this party represented to the U.N aircrafts and soldiers.

- Most of the operations are marred by serious command and control difficulties. In Cambodia, some of the nations had a very restrictive conception of their role in the plan of action and reported first to their national governments for guidance. If we add the difference of understanding between civilian and military leaders, we understand why General Loridon was dismissed in 1992 of his functions as deputy military leader from Apronuc: that is he had shown publically the weakness of the chain of command.

- The military units sent on the U.N operations are often provided vague objectives and guidelines for missions and, a fact more serious, are constrained by very strict limits on the use of their arms. In Somalia, for instance, the UN commander applied the rules of self-defense when some rules of real engagement would have been appropriate.

- Finally, the difference of training, of habits and military culture among the different contingents taking part in an operation, can sometimes constitute a brake to efficient action. For some relatively poor countries, the involvement in UN missions is an opportunity to have its soldiers fed, dressed, and well paid; UN supplying very advantageously for their support, most of the time, soldiers of these countries feel their involvement in an UN mission more like an economical chance rather than a moral or economical concern.

In summary, it looks obvious that a lot of improvement must be made today over past UN practice, as Secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali himself recognized in the “Revue des deux mondes” in 1993: “The world is yet at the stage of middle age concerning the organizations...
and international cooperation. Above the nice speeches of intention, time has come to look at ideas like plans of action. Now, we are going to demonstrate how this renovation is partly taking place and the role that could play the regional organizations in an improvement of the UN process.

The UN renovation and the role of the regional organizations

First, the Secretary general recognizes the need to reform the UN and its specialized institutions from inside, for instance by the reform of the C.A. coordination administrative committee, or the secretariat itself. We shall not develop this aspect of the necessary change in this essay but this takes part of course of the deficiencies formerly mentioned.

Then Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali considers the problem of peace operations and the eventual creation of a military staff in New York, what constitutes a kind of cultural cooperation. Today, the team of the military adviser assisting the deputy secretary general, Mr Kofi, is restricted to seven officers. They must follow all the current operations. The project of restructuring elaborated in May 1993 foresees the creation of seven cells, including 71 military people, among which there would be three generals. Two new developments, the situation room and the planning unit will permit the UN to examine the information coming from the different missions and to prepare future ones. This preparation will include recognition, planning, organization, command, necessary equipment, sharing of the duties among the contingents and the creation of the staff likely to be deployed. Furthermore, the "stand by forces management team" is checking presently the volume of the forces that each country promises and will have
subsequently to check the level of training of these forces. This project of restructuration, if it is approved by the general assembly, will permit some of the gaps which we have identified to be filled. At the same time, a new strategy for the use of these forces is going to be implemented: “The UN must be able to impose the cease fire. Military people involved in this kind of operations should be authorized to use the force, be trained, armed and equipped consequently.”

Is it not possible that the forces operating on behalf of the various already existing organizations respond quite well to the requirements we mentioned earlier? This is the question that merits to be asked and for which Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali answered on his part on a favorable manner, saying: “We should better think how useful could be the regional organizations and how to better use them.” Here may be the future instruments of the next crisis settlements in a new peace strategy.

The future crisis will inevitably include; (1) on a political and administrative standpoint a disorganized country with a lot of intervenants claiming for the statute of interlocutors; (2) on a military standpoint, an internal conflict like civil war with many violent armed components; (3) finally on a civilian standpoint, many demolitions carrying away the public services, of food and health care supplies. The agenda for peace, following chapter 6 of the UN charter, insists on the role of the regional organizations, because the end of the cold war has given to the security counsil more latitude than it had before to choose the best way to respond at a particular need and because these organizations exist on all the continents. They are either political entities (Nato; Csec; Cei; Oua; Asean; Arab league) or economical (Cee). They are, as regional
organizations or coalitions of nations, more directly interested in restoring order and stability in their part of the world. All of them are likely to know perfectly the historical background of the conflict and can feel the evolution of threat in the "hot" area where they operate. Furthermore, as their own security interests may depend on the issue of the conflict, they should be more favorable to sustain a long term commitment. Finally, some of them (Nato, Cei) dispose already of the military assets and of the trained people with good leadership, able to cope with the missions assigned in the agenda for peace and are able to operate in a war environment.

But despite the arguments which have just been developed, some people argue against this solution:

"most regional organizations are not fitted for the task of collective security. The theoretical advantage of the national approach, i.e. familiarity with the parties and the issues are offset by the practical disadvantages of partisanship and local rivalries."

The arguments very often put forward are: history with the failure many times of such organizations; The fact that the conflicting parties may feel the intervention of neighbors as an aggression and veer against the invader; The difference existing in the value of the military strength among these entities and the fact that they are not a moral authority representative of any kind of international order. However, most of these arguments can be answered and some of them are inadequate in the post Cold War. First, if it is correct that some regional organizations failed in the past years, (Arab league in Lebanon from 1976 to 1979, CEE at the beginning of the Yugoslavian conflict), there has been some success too (like in Salvador with the help brought by the neighbors of this country or C.S.C.E in Haut-Karabah), and the number of UN failed missions must remind us that the main reasons of the failures are certainly not laid in the regional aspect of these organizations. In other respects, many
Yugoslavian people have regretted the weak involvement of W.E.U in their conflict and no doubt that many ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe should be very takers of an European participation in an hypothetical internal conflict appearing in their region. As for the moral authority, this limit could be easily overrun as soon as the regional organizations received their mandate from the UN (same as today the mandate given in Somalia to the USA as leading country). If necessary, the creation of a “Conseil des ententes regionales “, acting in coordination with UN (as advocated by Mr Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1994) would be an appropriate solution. The final argument, on the military weakness of certain organizations must be taken into consideration due to the evolution in the spectrum of conflicts of the new missions assigned to the peace-operating units. That’s why, as we defined it formerly, these units must be professional one, with a lot of joint and combined experience and belong to organizations able to cope with the future nature of the crisis.

Has the Western European Union, which awakened after the signature in February 1992 of the Maastricht treaty, a chance to succeed in this mission? What should it have to do or avoid to succeed in the future peace-missions? How could it become a model for U.N? Here are some of the questions that we may realistically consider now after the rebirth of Europe.

**WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION PEACE STRATEGY**

Europe, before the advent of Maastricht, was no more than an economic organization. Some countries, like France and Germany, had tried to demonstrate to the ten other nations of the
C.E.E. that our common history and the trends of history implied the necessity to join together in a more comprehensive organization W.E.U (created in 1954 and regrouping the twelve C.E.E countries minus Danemark, Ireland and Greece), during this period, was supposed to be the armed arm of an entity but without any common foreign or security policy and consequently was often dubbed as the sleeping beauty. After Maastricht, some fundamental steps concerning W.E.U have been got over:

- First, Maastricht calls for the creation of an union with a common foreign policy and with a future common defense policy.

- Second, this treaty consecrates the role of W.E.U as the defence component of the European Union (ex C.E.E.) and will formulate a common European policy.

In this perspective, many decisions have been taken to increase the operational capabilities of the W.E.U: (1) transferring the secretaryship from London to Brussels; (2) creation of a planning cell; and (3) establishment of a tighter cooperation between the nine members and between their chiefs of staffs. Furthermore, the creation of an European brigade, decided by French president F. Mitterrand and the German Chancellor H. Kohl in May 1992, endowed W.E.U with an autonomous military capacity.

Now and henceforth, and after the W.E.U Petersberg declaration of June 1992, three categories of missions have been identified by the military planning cell, leaded by Gal Caltabiano, as being of W.E.U interests:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks
- Peacekeeping tasks with the agreement of the parties concerned
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
In summary, the Western European Union seems able to play a major role in the European continent. It has the will to establish a common policy that disposes of some consequent resources in terms of people, military assets, military planning cell and the great lines of its missions are relatively well defined. Let us quote what Dr William Van Eckelen, secretary general of W.E.U wrote in 1993:

"W.E.U wants to concentrate on our three missions: humanitarian, peacekeeping, with the agreement of the parties concerned and, the most difficult but also the most interesting, providing combat forces for crisis management."

Is it sufficient to define, understand and make a valid strategy according to the Snyder’s model? And if not, what strategy has to be defined for crisis management?

On the strategic level, we must first think about the nature of peace maintaining before looking at the use of military units in such operations of support to the process of peace. Indeed, the notion of peace maintaining is not restricted to only the military aspects of the problem. Maintaining peace between civilizations, nations or countries affects all the components of our societies and also the nine European countries. Before any intervention, we have first to look at all the possible reasons for the conflict. They can be globally political, economical, religious, historical, ethnical or sometimes military. But this last case, if we look at the current U.N operations is not the most frequent (Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia to quote three current ones are not in this domain). Once the real causes are determined, the surest and more economical way to maintain peace consists in acting upon these causes before they get transformed in a military dimension and become violent. If we look at the Somalia conflict, and if this approach
has been made, maybe all the peace forces would have been called back when the mission of food relief was accomplished and before it degenerated to a military struggle.

For W.E.U, it must be clear that the military part of peace maintaining is far from being exclusively military and it must convince the U.N to have this approach before taking up the mission. Most of the time, when this occurs, it means that prevention or dissuasion had failed. For Europe, it means that we must not consider peace as a temporary or circumstantial mission but as a permanent mission of our union. This means, on the military side, that we must, to be able to maintain peace, preserve anywhere and anytime the strength and power balance.

Three principles will have to be respected for the commitment of W.E.U forces:

- Once the launching, deployment and assignment to W.E.U will have been decided by the United Nations, U.N security council will have to delegate its authority to W.E.U for the execution and to work closely with it.
- The change of the mission in Somalia, without the consent of the forces in the field has been a tragedy for 18 American soldiers. This could not happen in applying this first principle.
- The military operations should always been seen as a step and not the ultimate goal for the resolution of the conflict. What happens in Cyprus with UNFICYP since 1964 is not obviously a success and this case is not isolate. The mandate given by the UN will have to be precise as for the nature and the limits of humanitarian action. As stated before, W.E.U is already able to assume missions as return to peace, observation, protection of people, establishment of an electoral process, the return of refugees and accompaniment of humanitarian convoys. This step, however, must be concomitant with the deployment of political and diplomatic initiatives, expected from U.N or W.E.U leaders.
The peace operations done without the consent of conflicting parties, could be forecast by the U.N because it could certainly happen in a lot of Eastern European countries pretty soon. However, these operations should have to be seen as a crisis or even more as war operations. That is what Gal Mackenzie, formerly commander of U.N peacekeeper in Sarajevo wrote in 1993:

"Peacekeeping is a growth industry in which we require combat soldiers in proper equipment to do the job. This is the reality."

These principles determine four kinds of operations that could be performed by W.E.U:

1. pure humanitarian
2. peace maintaining
3. interposition
4. peace building

A- For humanitarian: Their objectives and needs can be very various:
- assume a medical help
- establish the conditions for implementing security and sanitation
- procure help to refugees
- assume protection and security to the threatened people with combat units

B- For peace-maintaining: These missions may have two objectives
- observation of the conflicting theater (to supervise a ceasefire or the withdrawal of forces of the right application of an agreement)
- control of the areas of potential conflicts by the way of numerous units dispersed in the theater. However, unlike the interposition missions, these operations should be deployed with the agreement between the two parties. The main role in that case is in the hands of U.N, to encourage the parties in finding a peaceful solution and to prevent the beginning of a conflict. The W.E.U forces could be lightly equipped and protected since their role and mission are
symbolic. This operation must have the political and material support of the states hosting the W.E.U forces.

C - For interposition : This operation is deployed after the outbreak of hostilities, between violent adversaries, armed and that the forces have to separate so as to consolidate or lengthen a ceasefire. W.E.U must require for its interposition force to get the means, weapons and protection depending upon its mission and the assets of the adversary. The force of interposition must, by the tactical deployment of its weapons, control and get the mastery of the buffer zone between the adversaries and be free to define its own rules of engagement. The interposition forces constitute some heavy apparatus, with armed battalions and armored elements intended to prevent the resumption of the hostilities. This mission could be extended to demining, disarmament of the factions and control of the regrouping of the heavy armaments.

Peace maintaining and interposition forces will have to be seen by W.E.U leaders as two radical different things because, by the definition we gave, the first one is very vulnerable. Good leadership will be required not to confuse them.

D - For peace - building : The uncertain future of Europe for instance makes foreseeable a lot of missions of this type during the next years. W.E.U will have to be very careful in the planning of the mission and to take it for what it is: a war mission with all the military options necessary. I advocate that the first aim of the military leaders will be to save the lives of their soldiers and to make this clear to any opponent.
W.E.U PEACE MANAGEMENT

Once the principles and the missions with their characteristics have been defined, we may look at the desirable evolution that W.E.U could implement.

Four actions appear to be appropriate among which two are on the operational standpoint:

a) A better planning and preparation of the operations
b) A better command and control of the operations
c) Practice of common training between European units
d) Creation of an European military "Peace - school"

1- Planning and preparation of the operations:

Planning of the U.N missions has often not been done with all the care that is required for a military action in which lives of soldiers are going to be engaged. Done at the last minute, the planning or we should say the absence of planning, has led to some disastrous situations. Recent U.N missions have very often suffered from too much last minute planning.

The operations of the W.E.U will have to be prepared in conjunction with the situation room and military division of the U.N. This means, for W.E.U countries to assign to this cell and to U.N the best officers, able to plan a military operation in a combined environment. The fact that W.E.U nations are already nations with a solid military culture and background is likely to greatly simplify this task. As the U.N now, the W.E.U will have to develop a crisis cell able to
quickly react and to take the appropriate solutions. With this goal, it seems desirable that the union forces be under the hierarchical control of U.N and the operational command of W.E.U leaders. If it seems useful to design a special representative of the secretary general to coordinate the actions of the different components of U.N (civilian, military, humanitarian). The role of this representative should absolutely not be a kind of operational control, but only a political control. W.E.U should never agree to support what happened in Cambodia with Gal Loridon.

Furthermore, to respond in the very short delays that humanitarian urgency implies sometimes to U.N, W.E.U must be prepared to send forces in short delay. The Eurocorps takes part of this strategy - Germany is ready to revise its constitution and already is involved in Bosnia - but other countries must be ready to assign some of their units to these kinds of missions, under the W.E.U command.

Finally, and this is where many times the U.N is deficient, logistics is not ready due to the short delays. Here again the W.E.U will have to work on this concern to be fully efficient. The file of the necessary materials and people, where it must come from and under which delays, depending to the kind of mission to accomplish, will have to be regularly reactualized.

**2- Better command and control of the operations:**

Because of the downsizing trend in all of W.E.U, it would be unthinkable to assign permanent forces to this kind of mission. However, the forces which each country will have
designed, should be put under a peculiar alert system permitting to intervene rapidly. Once in the field, military leaders will have to know the situation's intelligence so as to evaluate the rules of engagement to be applied by their soldiers. The research of this intelligence must be a common work between the U.N and the W.E.U. However, to eliminate the deficiency already observed in the former U.N mission in the domains of command, control and communications, it will be necessary that all the W.E.U units report only to the mission commander chosen by W.E.U with the agreement of the U.N. This commander must have the same prerogatives as the one of Gal Schwartzkopf during the Gulf war and give all the contingents the exact definition of the mission.

3- Practice of common training between W.E.U units:

One of the major deficiencies during past U.N missions has come from the unequal training of the units among the coalition and the difficulties to communicate in the same language.

The first of these problems, as we stated before, should not be rally a great difficulty for the units at least chosen by France and Germany for the Eurocorps because they are some very well trained units or professional. However, to be able to play the role that we forecast for the W.E.U, at least two other units of the same constitution should be necessary if we admit that a fourth force could be constituted by a mixed W.E.U aeronavale force. France, Great-Britain, Spain and Italy, to quote only these countries can align 8 aircraft carrier, 11 amphibious ships and two
health ships. Very often in the past, the use of naval component has been required by the U.N, like in Lebanon or for establishing a blockade or in humanitarian relief like recently in Asia.

All these units should receive the particular training that is required for these missions and see how the procedures are compatible between them (fuel, equipment, spare parts) so as to define the best and more economical logistics to build. This problem seems never to have been the concern of the U.N and we could see formerly some wastings of money due to contingents which were too happy to get all they couldn’t dispose in their country and which were requesting what was not needed. Good training and planning permits to avoid a part of these wastings.

4- Creation of an European military peace-school:

In the United States, a great effort has been developed in each of the separate U.S war colleges in studying international peacekeeping. For instance, the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama consecrates a lot of hours dealing directly or indirectly on this subject. Furthermore, a three day seminar held in October 1993 in this college permitted the meeting of a lot of specialists, civilian and military, sharing their ideas, critics and propositions about a reform of the way of doing business by the United Nations. Other services in this country have chosen to create a peacekeeping institute to serve as a center of information on this subject. What is true in an unified country becomes obviously more necessary in an union of many countries, some of them having only a little experience in the domain of peace-keeping.

What should be the curriculum of this school requires first to define who should be the students. I believe that this school should be opened to all future commanders, all medium officers and civilian of the countries of the W.E.U likely to participate in an U.N mission.
As for the curriculum, it will need first to make understanding the both organizations: United nations and Western European union and teach the chain of command. Then, it will have to develop the type of missions, with their characteristics that each of the participants will be likely to perform. Following that, some concrete cases will be useful to understand why some missions succeeded and why some others failed. The accent will have to be stressed on the impact of human relations with the local population and on the main features of a joint and combined operation. A lot of lectures should have to be required from U.N officials or previous missions commanders, so as when arriving on the theater of operation, people know already what they are going to face. One month seems, face to the number of people to train and the core of the course, a realistic proposition. As for the teachers, the good knowledge of the U.N missions and of combined operations should be requested. In regard to the great amount of experience acquired by France in the U.N missions, this school could be opened in Paris with a multinational board of instructors.

**SUMMARY**

Considering that the U.N is the most important organization existing nowadays with such authority and representative of most of the countries in the world, we have tried to improve the institution existing rather than rebuilding something entirely new. The weaknesses of the organization in the humanitarian missions it performed during fifteen years have been analyzed and we have tried to demonstrate that it would be better to look at the peace missions, more in terms of conflict management or armistice keeping. This semantic differentiation reminds us that peacekeeping is becoming in our world a dangerous enterprise that needs to be considered as a
military operation with the subsequent consequences. One of the future wishable solution is to get more involved the regional organizations, to deal with this kind of missions, more favorably on their continent but with a possible extension in the whole world if requested by the U.N. The W.E.U, which revives from its ashes after the Maastricht treaty is one of these organizations. It represents, moreover, a continent with an appreciable background in terms of reflection, about the way to look at our civilization and fits the military and economical support to meet the challenge. However, to succeed when the U.N fails today, leaders of the W.E.U, civilian and military, must improve that actual process from the initial phase in peacetime by planning, programming, training to the extent of the conduct of the operation on the field, by an appropriate global command and control of what’s happening there. The W.E.U has already partially done it in some recent operations in which it has been involved, sometimes with success and sometimes without. To get all the chances to succeed, the W.E.U will have to overcome one of its main weaknesses: political diversity. Very often, this drawback in other arenas has played as a brake towards the establishment of a clear strategy. Without being the core of this essay, we must remember that these divisions can play against what we have put as first requirement: define clearcut objectives and strategy. What we see today in Europe with the implementation of the Maastricht treaty can make us optimistic anyway.

This doesn’t mean however that Europe has the vocation to become the policeman of the world, because this role is betterly appropriate to the United Nations.56

CONCLUSION
There is a tendency in the end of this century to try to give up whenever something seems to be difficult to realize. Nobody would argue that to find an appropriate strategy in the fulfillment of humanitarian missions takes part of these uneasy things. All of us can agree on the point that humanitarian must not become a policy or a fashion and that good feelings are not enough to become an efficient strategy. However, we must take care that this type of reaction doesn’t become the same attitude that we had before in front of the drug issue for instance. Although to me the first commitment that we have on earth is to procure a better world for the next generations, we let by inaction one part of our youth be destroyed, and now we try to cure the problem.

When Mr Kouchner says:

"One human life justifies all the audacity, all the energies and each violation of the international right." we may judge that arguable but it has the merit to make us thinking about the actions to be accomplished. What we saw recently with the death of many scholars in Sarajevo justifies all the audacity from the W.E.U. It is time for this organization to take in charge its destiny. The W.E.U has the resources to contribute efficiently to the future missions of the U.N. But the way to do them will have to be very different of the current one. The history of our continent and our commitment to the other countries is one of our main assets so as to realize this strategy that Albert Camus defined in 1950:

"my conviction is that we can’t any more reasonably have the hope to save everything, but, at least we can try to save the bodies in order that future becomes possible"

I am an European citizen and I want to see W.E.U participate to the edification of this better future.
NOTES

11. B. KOUCHNER was the first president of an association called “doctors without borders” whose aim was to go everywhere in the world where people suffered, even despite the authorization of the governments. He created in fact the modern right of interference.


17. J. J. Rousseau, 1712-1778, one of the most famous philosophers in France, author of “Le contrat social”, “Confessions et reveries d’un promeneur solitaire”. A lot of his work has been dedicated to the relation between Man and Society. His belief was that Man is naturally good.


22. Boutros Boutros Ghali; “an agenda for peace”; preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. International relations vol 11, December 1992, p201-218. This is summarized in his “the 38th floor, an agenda for peace”, chronicles, sept 92, p 2-4.


24. Ibid., p 32-34.


26. Ibid.


35. Ibid., p 23.


37. Ibid., p 24.


38 B.Boutrous Ghali "Les ententes regionales et la construction de la paix", p 18
39 ibid, p 19
40 Charles Jenckins "The economist "Maastricht treaty", march 1993, editor of the E.U.'s West European country
reports an European trends.
41 Framboisette Jarogne "Military affairs", Interavia aerospace world, may 1993 issue, p 66
43 Dr Van Eckelen "Building the European pillar of the alliance", Interavia aerospace world issue, May 1993, p 66
44 " book D.r.a ns 622, p 1, Air war college, (A.U. edition)
46 James S.Corum , secretary of state for defense " The United nations and American experience in peace
enforcement".
47 Malcom Rifkind "Defense and international security", Rusli Journal, issue April 1993, p 1
48 Maj General Lewis Mackenzie "Military realities of U.N. peacekeeping operations", Rusli Journal, issue
February 1993, p 1
49 "Barry Schneider" " Crisis entry criteria and the preparation of U.S forces for future blue helmet peacekeeping ",
by I.S.A conference Maxwell 1993, p 23
50 Igor Mitrojanoff "Eurocorps mode d'emploi " by. Revue Defence nationale, issue December 1992, p 51
51 Admiral Lanxade " The role of the French armed forces in the 1990s " by. Rusli Journal issue February 1993
52 "this is one of the major learnings about the Gulf war; the role assigned to the theater commander (see Gulf
airpower survey edited by Air university
53 J.F Coustilliere " une force d ' interposition aeronavale Europeenne ", Revue Defense nationale, issue August 1992,
p 12
54 Barry Schneider" crisis entry criteria ".
55 Admiral Lanxade " the role of the French armed forces " Rusli Journal, February 1993, p 6
56 F.Leotard "Declaration of French minister of defense. Lecture in front of the I.H.E.D.N., may 1993
by Françoise Union DE L'Estange . Revue des deux mondes, juin 1993, p 114f