REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS HAVE HAD SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON MILITARY THINKING AND THEORY. THIS STUDY EXPLORES THE NATURE OF WAR, OPERATIONS "OTHER THAN WAR," AND THE CONNECTING THOUGHT BETWEEN THE TWO. IT ARGUES THE POINT THAT WARFARE ITSELF MAY NOT BE CHANGING, BUT RATHER THE WARS OF THE FUTURE SUGGEST THAT THE HUMAN CONCEPTS OF WAR MAY BE IN REVOLUTION. THE PAPER CONNECTS PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY WITH TRAINING, MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND EDUCATION. IT RELIES ON CURRENT AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL SOURCES TO ILLUSTRATE POINTS ABOUT THE THINKING THAT GOES INTO THE APPLICATION OF FORCE TOWARD POLITICAL ENDS.
USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

THE PUZZLE OF WAR AND "OTHER THAN WAR"

An Army Awakening?

by

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ABSTRACT

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Revolutionary changes in political affairs have had significant impact on military thinking and theory. This study explores the nature of war, operations "other than war," and the connecting thought between the two. It argues the point that warfare itself may not be changing, but rather the wars of the future suggest that the human concepts of war may be in revolution. The paper connects philosophy and theory with training, military intervention, and education. It relies on current as well as traditional sources to illustrate points about the thinking that goes into the application of force toward political ends.
The col5 passed reluctantly from the earth, and the retiring fogs revealed an army stretched out on the hills, resting. As the landscape changed from brown to green, the army awakened, and began to tremble with eagerness at the noise of rumors...

-Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage

Thinking about war is in the midst of a revolution. This paper hopes to enhance and clarify connections between war and the application of force toward political aims. To understand and lend clarity to "operations other than war," an examination of the thinking behind war itself is instructive. One step toward clarification is understanding the theories and ideas that underlie war, warfare, and the tools of war. How does the Army relate to revolutionary changes? Is the Army a blunt or precision instrument, or does it more resemble Crane's characterization, with human, as well as physical qualities? The revolution is how we construct ideas about the application of force.

Involvement of the military profession in the intellectual debate over what constitutes the nature of warfare is usually limited. But to build future military capability, philosophy and theory rapidly move toward concrete terms. Deciding the nature of a conflict, followed by judgments about applied capability are essential parts of strategy. Ideas and capabilities can either enhance or limit clarity. The epistemology of war, the method and grounds of knowledge, including limits and validity is in need of review. The revolution in military affairs may not be in the nature of war, but in how war is conceived.
War and the Mind.

Traditional concepts visualize war as distinct from the instruments of war. Is there an unmistakable character, a "fingerprint" that defines war? If so, that character should illuminate something of other operations. Many descriptions of war such as violence, killing, and the classical "test of wills" apply to dynamics other than war.

Legal concepts of war involve the governments of sovereign States. Paradoxically, war's legal and orthodox meaning will become increasingly important as conflicts around the world continue to grow where people have had virtually no connection to writing international law. The Dictionary of International and Comparative Law states that war is,

...the formal state of hostilities between nations governed by the rules of war and neutrality. 2

Further legal descriptions involve either international relations between sovereigns or civil wars within them. The Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy summarizes how most agreements consider war,

Some text writers define war as an armed conflict between States; others regard war as a state or legal condition in which the contending States may pursue their rights by force. Under the second theory there may be war between two states even when there is no actual fighting....on the other hand, there may be fighting between two states and no state of war exists... 3

The most important characteristic of war may be that it is a human concept. Richard Gabriel makes a compelling argument that
war is not natural or biological, but learned. Man has three characteristics in common with other primates: hands, stereoscopic color vision, and upright posture. The evolution of the primate to Ramapithecus, the direct ancestor of man, Homo habilus moved through about three million years to produce tools. The species then begins to behave in a specific, territorial fashion, a fashion that distinguishes the human species from other primates.

Man shares aggressive behavior with other animals. A distinction, though, is that animals use aggression for defensive instincts: the protection of food, territory, and mates. Humans, by contrast, exceed instinctive aggression and use abstractions of the brain to overcome the inherently defensive, survival instinct of aggression. For a group of people to make war, they must first develop the idea to connect killing to an abstract purpose. To the extent that humans plan killing, they depart from instincts and instead rely on forms of psychology.

When aggression combines with concepts, the energy to create destruction seems boundless. Gabriel's point is arresting,

...most of man's evolutionary vulnerability comes not from some set of primitive animal instincts that we shared with other carnivores, but from his own advanced brain. Indeed, if we were moved to aggression for the same means as do animals, then the problem of war would not exist. Animals have built in mechanisms to limit aggression and killing. It is precisely man's brain, which makes him human and unique, that makes possible such large scale and systematic destruction of the species. We don't kill one another because of animal impulses. We kill one another because we lack the aggressive impulses of animals. We kill precisely because we are human.
Richard E. Leakey and Roger Lewin have pursued anthropological theses about man's behavior with similar conclusions. In their study, *The People of the Lake*, they illustrate the difference between culture and instinct.

War in human terms is an effective and successful means of enhancing and extending control over material resources in a highly organized society in which possessions are important. If it were not so successful, bloody combat would not have developed so intensively and become so influential in shaping human history. But this is not to admit that it is biologically based, that war is an inseparable part of being human. War is a cultural invention. It is not a biological inevitability.7

From ideas that explain human instincts and culture, one can move to explanations of how governments act; how they convince people to fight. Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war accounted for relationships between "the people, the commander and his army, and the government" is founded in the behavior of sovereign States.8 His point that precedes the trinity is even more important for the strategic thinker.

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions.9

These judgments imply clear understanding of both capability and theory. This is at the crux of civil-military relations. Some argue that traditional use of force is rapidly approaching marginal utility because the nature of conflicts render
many high technology instruments of little use. Furthermore, the role of the State can be of little help, as Robert D. Kaplan argues in "The Coming Anarchy."

...Clausewitz's ideas...were wholly rooted in the fact that, ever since 1648, war had been waged overwhelmingly by states." But, as Van Creveld explains, the period of nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict is now ending, and with it the clear "threefold definition into government, army, and people," which state-directed wars enforce. Thus, to see the future, the first step is to look back to the past immediately before modernism--the wars in medieval Europe which began during the Reformation and reached their culmination in the thirty Years War.\(^\text{10}\)

Martin Van Creveld's *The Transformation of War* sees future wars originating more from social and psychological forces than from State direction. His treatment of the Middle Ages illustrates how thinking can fall short of answers.

In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs...Many of them paid but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf....Engulfed by war, civilians suffered terrible atrocities.\(^\text{11}\)

Conflicts similar to those of the Middle Ages defy analysis in Clausewitzian terms. Monarchies of that age tried to create standing militaries, but their armies became irrelevant to political aims as they became too expensive to sustain, and power devolved to "military entrepreneurs."\(^\text{12}\) The extent to which State on State relations is rejected would make the return to such conflicts more likely. Whether conflicts are state centered or not,
capability should be eclectic, with forces selected from what is most effective among various doctrines and methods.

However revisionist Van Creveld's work may be, some conclusions support the idea that war remains a concept. His revolutionary idea is in how to think about future applications of force. Van Creveld writes that to explain war, "no other objectives are necessary other than war itself." If wars are fought for their own sake, then existing conceptual frameworks lack utility. Thus, conventional strategic wisdom must be turned upside down. There exists a sense in which war, more than any other human activity, can make sense only to the extent that it is experienced not as a means, but as an end. However unpalatable the fact, the real reason that we have wars is that men like fighting, and women like those men who are prepared to fight on their behalf.... the true essence of war consists not just of one group killing another, but of its members' readiness to be killed in return if necessary. Consequently, the only way to bring about perpetual peace would be to somehow eradicate man's willingness, even eagerness, to take risks of every kind, even death.

The social psychology that accompanies Van Creveld's view is certainly not proven, but it appears that each ethnic war adds credibility to his conclusions. Because the military holds quite a different view of war in its orthodox models, this philosophical outlook is another significant point for civil military relations. The differences are not so much rooted in policy as they are reflections of theories that can no longer explain many workings of the world. If there is no meaningful distinction between the military and the people, the nature of a conflict may be very
different from how the government and the military of the United States views the conflict. To bridge the gap between theory and practice requires a modified theory or a complete questioning of models that are based on assumptions no longer valid.

In the early years of the cold war, momentous changes in thinking found policy and theory to explain military and political action wanting. The value of T.R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War: Korea - A Study in Unpreparedness*, is in its paradox. The book clearly illustrated a new character of war which suggested that total victory was not in the nation's interest. But the United States had not yet accepted the concept of limited war.

In the Korean War, Americans adopted a course not new to the world, but new to them. They accepted limitations on warfare, and accepted controlled violence as the means to an end. Their policy—for the first time in the century—succeeded. The Korean War was not followed by the tragic disillusionment of World War I, or the unbelieving bitterness of 1946 toward the fact that nothing had been settled. But because Americans for the first time lived in a world in which they could not truly win, whatever the effort, and from which they could not withdraw, without disaster, for millions the result was trauma.¹⁵

Throughout the cold war, military tactical and operational thinking became dynamic, while strategic thinking was tied to static relationships of balance with the Soviet Union. Now it is thinking, rather than the nature of war, that is in revolution. How to stop, limit, or otherwise control some level of violence, as well as how to deter certain threats in certain regions is the question. Now the strategist must judge how to design a plan to change a conflict, or to accept the character of the conflict and
decide how to prepare a force to control or win it. Once that is settled, intervention with military forces must be tied to clear interests that the American people will understand and support.

Elements of analysis to assess the nature of war should include: (1) belligerents and their aims, (2) defining the conflict itself, (3) levels of war, (4) intensity, and (4) instruments of war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Other Than War</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) State on State</td>
<td>-States and Non States</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Physical and &quot;Moral&quot;</td>
<td>-Physical, psychological, Economic, Social, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Tactical, operational, strategic.</td>
<td>-Compressed framework, less delineation</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) All levels of intensity</td>
<td>-All levels of intensity</td>
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<td>(5) All instruments</td>
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Frameworks of thinking should not design any calculus that presumes any escalation of violence. Indeed, this may explain the psychology of why a national security strategy has not found consensus only recently. The strong reluctance within the American culture and history to buy into any strategy that might lead to plans for war may be at least as wise as any particular definition of how to commit force to policy. Military leaders have been writing and encouraging ideas in finding ways to connect the armed forces to the people. Debate and discussion about the nature of conflict is one vehicle.

For example, doctrine now recognizes that combat actions occur within "other" than war settings. The essence of combat actions, though, must involves analysis of a thinking enemy. A timeless fact of war, it seems, is that every strength has an inherent
weakness, for war remains a human contest. The playing field is never really level, and though a combatant may not begin by targeting the resolve of the United States, if he is organized into any sort of articulated, hierarchial society with a military organization, he will apply judgment and direct at least part of his military, psychological, or other form of effort toward any vulnerability.

This is qualitatively different from actions that do not involve human adversaries, such as disaster relief. As long as the introduction of forces require making judgments about what to do with force, then there is a contest. The role for an intervening state, especially the United States must be evaluated in relation to an expectation of the social psychology, as well as the military capability, of what the human reaction might become. It is only after such an analysis that the litmus test of U.S. "interests" can be applied, for there seems to be no other way to visualize an outcome, short or long term, to these scenarios.

Application of Force.

From 1945 to 1990, the United States military conducted more than 250 contingency operations, about 200 of which led to warfare, and about 50 of which held forms of combat. Very few resembled the military thinking of their day. In these operations, the National Command Authority applied military judgment to solve policy problems. Most future applications of force will continue to occur in what is now referred to as "other than war."
In 1956, the United States military found itself trying to execute the Eisenhower Doctrine. The policy was a promise to support any nation in the Middle East to maintain control and sovereignty in the face of insurrections from outside. Plans for intervention in Lebanon, initially visualized combat actions in support of the politics of the promised help.

...a powerful and complex military organization had been built for use in the Middle East. Beyond that, little attention had been paid to what specific missions the force might be called to accomplish. All the plans made the assumption that deployment meant combat, but early in the year, Admiral Holloway was asking his planners to consider something decidedly less - the restoration or maintenance of governments. Political judgments on whether a government could - or should - be sustained by the deployment of an American task force were quite beyond Admiral Holloway's purview, even though some judgments might conceivably have affected both the composition and the mission of his force.17

The military problems of "Operation BLUEBAT," code name for the theater level contingency plan for the Middle East, were something quite different from the thinking of the day. The Army's part of Operation BLUEBAT was called "SWAGGERSTICK." Major General David W. Gray, the Army commander of the operation, was on the Department of the Army staff in 1956 when he first learned of the concept for operation "SWAGGERSTICK."

Frankly, I could never understand how it would work, and I jokingly remarked that the only solution was to call a cease fire, air drop on the line of contact between opposing forces, and defend in both directions.18

The Army organized 3,200 soldiers into three Task Forces, who
joined approximately 10,000 Marines in Lebanon. They kept the peace for 102 days, with but one casualty to hostile fire.¹⁹

Capstone doctrine of how the Army fights emerged in 1976 with General William DePuy's revolutionary approaches. The 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations stated the first purpose was to fight. The major thrust was to focus thinking around winning the first battle, with a clear priority on Europe, almost to the exclusion of all other forms and places of conflict. Paradoxically, all future editions of the manual held deterrence, not battle as the first role of the Army. DePuy's major contribution then, appears to be how he began rethinking how to think about battle. The 1976 version was contentious.²⁰

As thinking behind the use of force continues to shift, the Army will be assigned new or additional roles. Under Title X, US Code, services organize, train, and equip forces for particular roles. Combatant Commanders are assigned missions. Political and social forces will continue to require the Army to translate unclear conditions into clear enough operational focus to prepare for its primary role, that of land combat.²¹ What complicates the matter, of course, are the contentious issues of "capability" and function, fueled by technologies and budget reviews. But reviews of only capabilities and functions alone masks the critical issue: division of resources.

The Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the Secretary of Defense highlights three broad missions for land forces: Power projection and forcible entry, combat operations on
land, and operations other than war. Examples of "other than war" missions include,

...assistance to foreign nations, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, assistance to law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and counterdrug operations.

Joint and Army doctrine visualize combat actions within other than war settings. In the application of force to policy, there are concepts that can mix force with war in the notion that a certain force capability might change the nature of a conflict. No matter the grouping of missions, there are missions that involve belligerent who think and act, and there are missions that do not. One critical point of judgment, it would seem, is how intervening forces assess the people, and how they assess us. The way the nature of a war may change is if a civil war with two sides transforms into a three sided affair with the intervening force as a target. This condition may not necessarily negate the intent of the peace enforcement policy, but it does change the equation of policy, and it would demand agreement on all parties about what theory of conflict is at work.

To focus part of the force on operations other than war would enhance the assessment of readiness for all missions. Brigade or battalion sized formations with mission focus on operations other than war for a region of the world would not be specialized organizations. The purposes, tables of organizations and equipment would remain designed for warfare. They would receive training guidance and resources to put clear priority on the combat and non-
combat skills associated with missions "other than war" within a region.

There are objections to such an idea. One is that it would take more units than those assigned, because of the transitions between mission responsibilities, especially if some units are called to deploy. This argument reflects the fourteen years of experience rotating units to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. Another argument is that it risks lower readiness for war. During a period when the numbers of combat formations and the fiscal resources for training are already scarce, such a split focus seems to be exactly the wrong direction.

The answer to each issue involves the art of focus in training and preparation. The first issue, the one of rotating missions, is a matter of how many formations to commit to what parts of the world for priority focus on combat and non combat tasks of other than war. The assignment of such priority does not negate preparation for other tasks. It puts a premium on thinking about how to resource various likely contingencies within a region. Most importantly, it clarifies the communications and references mission essential tasks for selected units for selected time frames.

To answer the second issue, minimizing readiness for war, is a deeper question and a dilemma for the military professional. It requires judgements between risks of low readiness for war versus other than war missions. If state on state violence is the presumption of the training, then judgments about readiness should
be rather clear and familiar. On the other hand, if the assumptions of conflict involve non-state violence and confusing scenarios, then the only clear preparation for the mission is in the same skills and battle drills of soldiers. The synchronization of actions by commanders and staffs will continue to face challenges quite different than war scenarios. Judgments and thinking must adjust, but effective adjustment demands a revisit of the theory of conflict and war.

The following brief discussion offers part of a framework for thinking in how war and other operations can be viewed. Training, military intervention, officer education and development, are but a few threads that deserve significantly greater study and dialogue to resolve whether professional thinking is moving ahead.

**Training for Contingencies**

Consider the following scenario: A battalion task force is in the fourth week of a six month deployment to the Sinai on the peacekeeping mission with the Multinational Force and Observers. One routine task is to conduct squad sized "temporary observation post" patrols that extend the vision of the fixed sites in the sector between Egypt and Israel. A platoon leader positions a patrol on a ridge astride a very large wadi. This particular wadi has been the location of many axes of advance, defenses, and actual battles during the 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars.

There is no accurate count of the land mines in the southern Sinai, but some estimates are in the hundreds of thousands. The
mines "float" in the sand, especially in the larger wadis that take on the characteristics of large bodies of water. Windstorms are severe in the winter, and there is no accurate predictor about where mines may move in deep sand.

The lieutenant has lost his bearings in the terrain. He sees a marker for a mine. Neither condition is remarkable. His training has been comprised of many sets of individual and collective modules of critical skills. These included how to navigate when confused by this terrain. The standard call for the leader to safely find his way out of the confusing dunes, get to the coastal highway along the Red Sea, and fix on several known positions from there. He is to note the mine marker, but follow the fresh tire tracks of a vehicle that recently travelled through the wadi successfully, as that is the surest way to avoid danger. He does all of this right.

About 500 meters later an antitank mine explodes up through the vehicle engine. The force of the explosion blows the windshield, intact, about 100 meters from the vehicle. The lieutenant's feet are seriously wounded. So is one side of his face. The driver is not injured. The soldiers in the back of the vehicle are armed with small arms and ammunition, including M203, squad automatic weapon, and several pyrotechnics. All are wearing kevlar helmets rather than the usual peacekeepers beret, because they are on patrol. All are wearing kevlar vests. They are all thrown out of the vehicle, unhurt but for scrapes.

The corporal fire team leader takes charge and collects the
men. There is no confusion. The team leader carefully crawls to the officer with the soldier who is a trained Combat Lifesaver. They slow the bleeding and treat for shock. The bleeding will not stop until the lieutenant is in a decompression chamber at a trauma treatment center in Eilat, Israel, some hundred miles away.

Two soldiers carefully work their way out of the sand, on to rocks, and run to the tops of a hill with a radio until they can gain communications. They reach the sector control center and the Task Force operations center, which has an integrated procedure of liaison, aircraft operations, medical, and others to address crises.

The Task Force operations center talks the soldier on the radio through a resection solution on the map, injuries are assessed and medical advice given over the radio, and the fully equipped evacuation ship reaches the site in about thirty minutes. The lieutenant's life is saved. Dozens of aspects of training and operations are highlighted for the force.

What is the point of the vignette? First a practical one: the injury that happened was critical, but hardly unique on missions of peacekeeping. Such scenarios face all peace forces every day that deal with mines, usually with many more civilians than soldiers in trouble. Such has been the case in the Sinai, for example, since the beginning of the mission.

The major point, however, is in the theory behind training and preparation. Training for combat is the best way to account for peace operations and other operations. Possibly, but there is more
to the picture. The real key to the success of the story is in the focus of the training, not the kind of training. The focus in this case was not on the training to standard in collective skills, but it was clearly on the individual and small unit specialized skills such as patrolling and reconnaissance tailored to the mission.

This point applies to all training. Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, calls for three stages of training: Initial, Refresher, and Sustained. Initial training means that tasks can be performed in sequence and that they are sufficiently learned under a controlled environment. The idea is to develop enough of a mind-muscle connection to form the basis of future training and recall. Refresher training means that tasks and skills can be done to commonly understood standards. Work is done as small units or crews, and leaders begin to increase the complexities. The sustainment stage of training means that intensity and complexity are increased and the tasks are trained to a high enough stage to ensure the skills are done to standard under more difficult conditions, such as distance, speed, weather, visibility.

One key to preparation of any unit, but especially one that transitions between different missions is to develop an assessment plan the critical skills, both individual and collective, associated with the mission, and then to develop an assessment plan for the soldiers and leaders against those skills. The training process is the same, except for one major point at the beginning. Units must have a focus. In order to achieve a level of sustained proficiency in critical skills for such missions, it must focus on
those skills. The scenario illustrates that without the focus on individual and team skills, the outcome of the day might have been very different. The focus of the training modules all pointed at the unique mission requirements, not at the collective combat skills for the battalion combat mission.

Leaders decide upon critical skills, assess those skills, and decide upon objective stages of training for each. This applies to individual and collective tasks. The distinction between war and other than war preparation is mainly in the selection of where to put the focus. In short, experience validates that it would not be wise to separately organize any sort of unique capability for peace keeping, peace enforcement, or any other mission. Rather, the solution is to focus using the principles and techniques of the Army training doctrine.

The core skills applicable to most missions need analysis for particular missions. At collective and staff level of training, the following main points need evaluation: unit rotation plans within sectors, base security, quick reaction forces capability, reserve forces control, refresher training, recreation, cohesion of subordinate units, the leadership challenges of platoon leaders, relationships and control of non governmental organizations as well a interagency organizations, repatriation authority, medical training, medical evacuation, and communications are among the skills.

All training deals with the continuum of instinct versus reason. Soldiers are trained to overcome some instincts while they
develop others. For example, the instinct under fire is to not move, and to move away from the danger; the instinct in unfamiliar terrain is to move on the natural line of drift, to choose a road, trail, or ridge. Each makes sense to the instinctive person, but each are very wrong instincts for trained soldiers. Training reverses some of those instincts.

The soldier must be trained to think in relation to a thinking enemy. The premise of all tactical training is that the capable enemy can turn every strengths into a vulnerability. Therefore the constant challenge is how to develop skilled, disciplined, motivated soldiers, who will always think and apply judgment.

Military Intervention

How may an intervening party to a war change the nature of the conflict? It adds at least one more player to the game. Even if neutrality and impartiality are theoretically at work, if war has any human character at all, the human judgment causes a different set of interactions when a third party enters any conflict. The application of force to solve the problem of war has frequently defied analysis. In a study of human dimensions of battle Roger Spiller reminds,

During an army's campaign, so the argument goes, few days are spent in actual battle and those who do the actual fighting are only a small part of the vast numbers required to sustain an army in the field. Mathematically correct, of course, this proves once again that the ability to count is not necessarily evidence of higher learning.
An example of the thinking challenges presented by the role of the Army in operations other than war is the programmed proportion of combat, combat support, and service support capabilities and actual requirements. Proportions of type units are quite different from how capability is programmed into the force. The Army finds itself in a dangerous paradox. Actual requirements for forces in "other than war" operations will, in all likelihood, continue to exceed the structure, which continues to rely on orthodox war formations as the calculus.

How is a unit to prepare for both war and other operations, especially if the scenario into which they move begins as "other," and leads to a kind of war? Part of the answer is deeper and resembles other periods of great change in the Army, changes in scale and size, as well as in content.

**Education and Development**

Thinking about the application of force to any problem is always difficult. In 1986, while advancing the ideas of AirLand Battle doctrine, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Huba Wass De Czege designed a course for the School of Advanced Military Studies called "Understanding and Developing Combat Power." He related combat power to how we think.

Many of the analytical tools we now use to make decisions hinge on assessments of combat power and are much more crude than most officers realize. In some cases the analysis of combat power has become a cliche ridden exercise. In others there is a tendency to attribute more to the results of the war games than they warrant...In practice, US Army
officers often tend either to rely on intuition and experience to place values on factors contributing to the combat power of the other side, or they engage in a deceptively simple counting exercise of things which they can count...  

This assessment raises the issue of education and the effectiveness of a shared vision of what constitutes intellectual development in a military sense. The officer education and development systems of the day were not able to answer the requirements for tactical and operational thought. Why did the baseline education at the Command and General Staff College need an additional year? Simply put, it was the recognition that the proper practice of war requires the context of military art and history plus the theory that undergirds that art.

Wars require thinking that demands a larger perspective than what is now provided by a normal career pattern and progression. Most people who will make judgments will need negotiation and psychology and counselling skills. Planners for operations other than war should consider how to solicit advice and operational estimates from psychologists, police, educators, and many of the "softer" disciplines as well as from the necessary technologists. Thinking and judging are always in search of enhancements, but what is now revolutionary is that the technical capability to collect data rapidly outpaces the human capacity to analyze and apply it. This is illustrated by Alvin and Heidi Toffler's outlook on the concept of "non-lethality" in warfare.

...non-lethality and the new doctrines emerging from the military are both products of Third Wave societies whose economic
lifeblood is information, computers, communication, and mediatization..."

Toffler rapidly moves from this recognizable and now familiar picture of technologies to the following partial analysis,

In the past, when diplomats fell silent, guns very often began to boom. Tomorrow, according to the US Global Strategy Council, if diplomatic talks fail, governments may be able to apply non-lethal measures...Non-lethality thus emerges not a simple replacement for war or an extension of peace, but as something different - something radically new in world affairs:...an arena for contest in which more outcomes could be decided bloodlessly.

The Tofflers clearly believe that "non-lethal" capability is leading to something "radically different in world affairs." But the concept needs application within a theory that can evaluate war. How to consider the character of the people, as well as cultural and political forces, will continue to work their way into a more central part of military planning. Using all available resources, to include experts in some of the "soft" sciences such as negotiation, social psychology, and public safety, now accepted in the special operations community, will find utility in all military missions.

Theory, Not Belief.

An accepted theory explains what works more effectively than alternatives. It is practical. Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, determines how to validate what we know about a discipline and what we accept as sufficient proof that either confirms or causes questioning of fundamental assumptions. Thomas
S. Kuhn studied how new thought has been accepted in science throughout history. One point in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions holds particular value for the thinking strategist,

...a new theory, however special its range of application, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already known. Its assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact, and intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom completed by a single man and never overnight.\(^3\)

A revolution in thought should not center on identification of military requirements and capabilities, but rather with an examination of the facts as we now interpret them. Namely, what constitutes the nature of war, other than war, and how the generally accepted theories of war and conflict explain the application of force.

A paradigm reflects generally accepted theory. It enhances modeling and communication. David Jablonsky explains,

> A paradigm is a group of fundamental assumptions that form for the scholar a picture of the world...a shared framework. It is both broad and nebulous, certainly broader than a conceptual framework since concepts derive from paradigms...\(^3\)

Concepts that derive from paradigms are usually expressed as models. Models are simplifications of reality so that they simplify enough of the dynamic to practice something. For example, although a flight simulation model serves an excellent training purpose, the model cannot fly. In times of great change, one pitfall of thinking is to move between theory, paradigm, and model
without recognizing the borders. The challenge is to accept and reject certain models entirely and to revisit the assumptions of selected options. Distinctions between theories, paradigms, and models enhance thinking. Blurs between them confuse and misrepresent thinking.

Once models are clearly derived from higher orders of theory, their outcomes can be tested against whatever interests and strategies are at work. It is here that the military-political interface has begun to change. The Chief of Staff, Army has written that there are two paradigm shifts. The first is that preventing the spread of communism no longer serves a purpose. Second,

...refining the understanding of how to use military force....rather than conventional combat defining our terms of "war," we need to find ways to deal with "categories of violence".33

How to use military force in other than war operations is one challenge that is in the midst of conceptual change. Many conceptual models have three components, usually to depict a balanced condition. But the relative strength of Clausewitz' model of "government, military, and people" depends on judgments. Under cold war paradigms, the most important aim was the political context: clear demonstrations of capability and will. The conditions now would suggest that the relationships between the three may have begun to change.

Operations other than war may prove to be more a question of new environments of conflict and forms of war than sets of missions
and tasks. The political intention in such operations usually calls for a linkage between political, humanitarian, and military roles. Furthermore, as the 250 previously mentioned contingencies indicate, these types of operations are not new, but the thinking about the application of force and the thinking about whether force and capability can transform a contingency in terms favorable for the United States may be in revolution. Without examination of the theory, the airing of views on what is a war, all parties are almost certain to focus on capability, principally technical capability within a narrow political agenda.

A study of George C. Marshall's fifty years of service hold great value for our understanding of nature of war in all its forms. At the ceremony in Oslo awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1958, three hecklers were calling him "murderer." His answer was a timeless message about war.

There has been considerable comment over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a soldier. I am afraid this does not seem quite so remarkable to me as it quite evidently appears to others...The cost of war is constantly spread before me, written neatly in many ledgers whose columns are gravestones...34

Marshall and thousands of others spent a great deal of their effort on purposes we would now label "other than war." We should not lose sight of the fact that combat and non combat missions are both included under this label. The broader question of how we are to think through the problems involves what we accept as the criteria that distinguishes the character of one conflict from another, and then the application of some capability toward a
possibly unfamiliar end. In essence, this is the same strategic question, but under dramatically changed conditions.

War today may be mutating to some new forms. It may be constant. War is always a reflection of the culture of civilizations, and the courses of the human condition remains unpredictable. There is a revolution underway. It is in how war and theory and capability are being synthesized in concept. These various theories are worth examination in order to determine if traditional views of war stand up to future experience. Evidence that capability can and should change conflict will continue to build, in proposed theories. A critical question, whether open or presumed, will be the underlying assumptions of the nature of war and the use of force.

Part of the solution is to examine expanded frameworks of thinking, understanding where the planned use of force adheres to current models and where it departs. Part of the solution is in the roles and mission discussions, true, but once that has progressed, it is in how we reason the application of force with explainable interests. If those connections cannot be clearly made, then the theory invoked may not be valid. On the other hand, if we collectively revisit the nature of war, the intellectual effort will inevitably produce benefits for how to use the vast operational experience of the armed forces to contribute toward common understanding of policy.
Notes


5. Ibid., 7.

6. Ibid., 15.


9. Ibid., 88.

10. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), 73. Quoting Martin Van Creveld's Transformation of War, Kaplan supports the idea that the era of nations acting as political entities may be fading, and the world again enters a period when international politics will be increasingly shaped by cultural, religious, psychological, and other trends that have little relevance to sovereign states.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 220.

14. Ibid., 221.


20. Probably the best description of the process of the revolutionary 1976 version of Operations (Army Field Manual 100-5) is Paul Herbert's Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Leavenworth Paper Number 16 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), 1988. One of the reasons this was revolutionary was that DePuy took personal ownership of the responsibility of doctrine. The focus was clearly on winning a ground war in Europe. As Herbert's analysis suggests, this was the first step on a long process that did change Army thinking about how to deter, though the words were clearly about how to fight, including many of the mechanics of how to fight.


23. Ibid.

24. Department of the Army, Operations Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 2-1. The chart "Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment" portrays both "Combat" and "Noncombat" Operations in the "Conflict" State of Environment. The purpose of all operations is considered to "Deter War and Resolve Conflict." This is also reflected in Joint Publication 3-0. The missions include "NEO, Peacekeeping,
Anti terrorism, Support to Insurgency, Peace Enforcement, Strikes and raids.


27. In broad terms, operations other than war may be qualitatively different from combat actions in terms how the Army builds the forces. Even when units clearly expected combat, as in Lebanon 1958, force planning differs from combat contingencies. Army Task Force 201, part of Operation BLUEBAT, the US intervention into Lebanon in July-October 1958, was composed of 3,234 soldiers. The only Army combat regiment of the 24th Infantry Division to deploy was the 187th Infantry, which took 1,523 soldiers. This was named "Force Alpha." There were three other "forces" in support. They held 22 combat support and service support units with 1,653 soldiers (the remaining soldiers were part of command elements). See Roger J. Spiller, Not War But Like War. Leavenworth Paper No. 3. (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 51.


30. Ibid., 133.


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