The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) examines global, regional and transregional issues and trends, and identifies research themes that will be critical to the Army's strategic role in support of national military strategy. SSI's regional and transregional assumptions, trends, issues, and research themes that are derived from them may be helpful to many who are also responsible for long-range research and planning.
Special Report

STRATEGIC RESEARCH DURING CHANGING TIMES

A PRIORITIZED RESEARCH PROGRAM, 1994
STRATEGIC CHALLENGE
DURING CHANGING TIMES

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FOREWORD

Each year the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) examines global, regional and transregional issues and trends. From these trends, SSI identifies research themes that will be the most critical to the Army's strategic role in support of national military strategy.

SSI's regional and transregional assumptions, trends, issues, and the research themes that are derived from them may be helpful to many on our distribution list who are also responsible for long-range research and planning.

We are distributing this Special Report on a selective basis, and hope that you will find it helpful. Your comments and suggestions are welcomed.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
Introduction.

This research program grew out of the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assessments of domestic and global trends that are most likely to determine the state of the world during the coming decade. The specific study proposals are derived from those trends and SSI judgments concerning the relative priority of requirements for maintaining America’s Army as a strategic force during this time of international change and uncertainty.

Eight major determinants are assumed to have a dominant influence on U.S. interests, the national military strategy, and the Army’s posture:

- U.S. national priorities driven by fiscal constraints, domestic issues, and a growing linkage between domestic and transregional economics. These trends will drive defense resources down, demand economies of force, and perpetuate the ongoing debate over roles and missions.

- The U.S. role in increasingly controversial U.N. peace operations and the strategic implications for the Army.

- The diffusion of political, economic, technical and military power in a multipolar world. Small states are gaining unprecedented strategic military capabilities.

- Ethnic and religious nationalism are replacing ideology as social forces most likely to promote violence and regional instability. These forces will increase pressures on collective security institutions, and may require redefinition of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. These pressures will, in turn, require U.S. leadership and collective engagement.

- The increasing challenges attendant to changes in the states which recently comprised the Soviet Union, especially as they affect the issues of nuclear proliferation and stability.

- The continuing issue of European security posed by European integration and Balkan instability.

- The volatility of the Middle East where the United States will continue to play the leading external role as guarantor of regional stability.

- Growing requirements for an Asian regional security and economic accommodation, especially among the United States, Japan, North and South Korea, India, and Russia.

The world of 1994 is radically different from the world of only five years ago. It is far less predictable and more violent than anyone might have predicted when President Ronald Reagan
and Premier Mikhail Gorbachev began the process that ended the cold war. Defending and promoting U.S. interests remain a national priority even as new opportunities to promote those interests, and new challenges that threaten them, appear at unexpected and irregular intervals.

The new world is in flux as disorder spreads across the what was once the southern and southeastern fringes of the Soviet Union. Russia itself is struggling to define its political and economic future amid growing uncertainty and apathy, if not antipathy, among the general population. These diverse challenges, regional and transregional in nature, demand careful consideration as the United States finds itself involved in many of the events that alter and illuminate our times. Furthermore, declining budgets and fiscal priorities based upon domestic considerations have led to projected declines in defense spending which outpaced most predictions of a year ago. Coping with the dramatic changes in defense priorities, roles and missions demands careful consideration and coherent, comprehensive strategic planning. Simultaneously, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) fosters new technological capabilities which must be factored into our strategic equation.

The uncertainties of the next few years will continue to challenge Army senior leadership. SSI proposes to reduce those uncertainties through its broad-based, annual study program examining the mid-term strategic context and its links to transregional, domestic and strategic requirements. The focus on the strategic level of analysis is, in SSI's judgment, essential because events and trends in that arena will drive military strategy, roles and missions, doctrine, and force structure requirements into the next century.

Organization And Structure.

The 1994 Study Program anticipates trends and issues in nine areas and describes the major research themes derived from those trends most likely to affect U.S. interests. Those areas to be examined are:

Section I: Transregional Security Concerns
Section II: Europe
Section III: The Middle East
Section IV: Asia-Pacific
Section V: Russia and Eurasia
Section VI: Latin America
Section VII: Africa
Section VIII: Futures
Section IX: Army Issues

A total of 51 research topics are identified. Section X contains the 20 most important research themes for 1994. These will be pursued as our core study program for the year. The themes are listed by region and category, not order of priority. Subjective discrimination among studies quickly becomes meaningless once a consensus is reached on a core program. Indeed, new projects may be added or currently anticipated projects dropped as events unfold throughout the year.

Appendix A lists SSI studies published from January 1993 to January 1994.

Appendix B lists those studies from the 1993 program which will be carried over into 1994 or which, for a variety of reasons, will not be published.
SECTION I

TRANSREGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

Regional Challenges, Global Issues.

When American strategists first grappled with the end of the cold war, they became obsessed with the notion of "regionalism." This was an overdue adjustment in strategic perspective. During the superpower struggle, we had been forced to overlook regional problems and concentrate on the global threat from the Soviet Union. American strategists considered regional conflict simply the cold war in miniature, fought by proxies in obscure and confusing places. With the demise of the Soviet Union it was clear that this perspective was obsolete, so strategic thinkers focused on regional variegation. To an extent, this was healthy. Taken to extremes, it led to a view of the world just as skewed as the rigid globalism of the cold war.

Now the rush toward regional thinking has slowed somewhat, with a more balanced perspective emerging. We are again recognizing that similarities and linkages between security problems around the world are as significant as their differences. It was not the Soviet Union or the various communist initiatives throughout the world that linked regional security problems, but deeper, more significant, and persistent connections. The strategists of the next decade, then, must balance regional sensitivities with awareness of the connectivity of security problems. They must recognize that these are not regional problems, but global issues.

Global security issues derive from three forms of connectivity. The first is economic. Today, there is truly a world economy. Markets are global while capital, technology, information, and labor move fluidly across national borders. This simple fact carries profound security implications. For example, in the modern era, states are held responsible for the economic well-being of their citizens. But many states, especially small ones, do not fully control their own destiny in the global economy. Political, economic, or military decisions made far away can affect the economies of small states, destabilize them, and create security problems. This vulnerability to outside decisions exists for even the more developed nations since unwise economic policies in the Third World often generate economic refugees which, in turn, spawn security problems for developed nations. Economic connectivity has other security implications. For many nations, arms sales are seen as a cure for domestic economic problems. Thus, the inability of a nation like Russia to compete globally in commodities other than arms leads to intense pressure to sell arms. This, in turn, can intensify regional security problems. Regional security problems, in other words, are shaped by global economic issues.

A second form of global connectivity is informational. Today, there is instantaneous and immense global communication. This erodes the ability of states to control what their citizens (or those of other nations) hear, read, see, know and believe. How does this affect security? One obvious way is by stoking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Global communication ended the great powers’ monopoly on the knowledge needed to manufacture weapons of mass
destruction. Today, only the lack of access to nuclear fuel and some necessary tools prevents uncontrolled proliferation. Even this impediment is rapidly eroding. Informational connectivity also serves to focus world attention on regional conflict. There are no isolated events in the world; no state is free from the prying eyes of global public opinion. This increased access, in turn, augments the potential importance of global organizations such as the United Nations and of the international media. Global public opinion has become a factor all strategists must consider. Finally, informational connectivity sparks contagion. As groups in one part of the world successfully challenge stability, global communication makes possible the almost simultaneous rise of "copy cats" in other areas. Exerting some form of control on global information flows is thus becoming an element of national security strategy.

The third key form of connectivity is ecological. All citizens of the world share a need for air and water and all are subject to the weather. This creates the potential for ecological terrorism, even ecological warfare. This is certainly nothing new—Roman soldiers plowed the site of Carthage with salt. Poisoning wells and other water sources has also been a part of total warfare. But today the ability of a relatively small group or state to create immense ecological damage far surpasses the capacity of ancient armies to devastate the territory of their enemies. Ecological disasters can also structure the movement of people, generating refugees which, in turn, spawns international security problems. Furthermore, the potential ecological effects of a truly major war, whether nuclear winter or some catastrophe, globalizes concern with preventing major conflict.

What, then, does this synthesis of regional problems and global issues mean for the security analyst? At least two things. To be useful and coherent, all strategic analysis of regional problems must delineate and dissect linked global issues. This relationship runs two ways. First, the analyst must specify what global issues affect specific regional problems as well as how regional problems will affect global issues. Second, the rise of global issues will increase the importance of comparative, cross-regional analysis. Regional sensitivity must be married to concern for global issues. As our understanding of the post-cold war world takes on greater precision and coherence, this balance between regional and global perspectives is a dynamic one demanding constant adjustment. The 1994 study program of the Strategic Studies Institute is an attempt to contribute such a balance.

Trends and Issues.

• With a few exceptions, there is a continuing global decline in the resources devoted to military forces.

• Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become an important element of national security strategy.

• Military power plays an increasingly vital role in post-combat conflict resolution.

• In lieu of substantial reform, a resurgent United Nations has perhaps reached the limits of its effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security.
- The advanced nations are grappling with a historic revolution in military affairs.

- The informational component of national security strategy is increasing in importance.

- "Failed states"—nations with a complete breakdown of their political, economic, and social systems—pose serious security problems.

- Conflict and security relations are shaped by primal identities such as ethnicity, nationalism, and religion rather than by ideology.

- Continued global economic integration affects all dimensions of security.

Study Proposals.

1. American Engagement in Third World Conflict: Redefining the National Interest in the Post-Cold War World. During the cold war, the United States developed amorphous but relatively effective strategic rules of engagement for intervention in Third World conflict. The foundation was a definition of the national interest based on containment of communism and access to a few vital raw materials, especially petroleum. In the post-cold war era, the United States may still intervene in the Third World, but does not have a clear sense of the rationale for such intervention. New concepts such as "humanitarian national interests" and "enlargement of the community of market democracies," while not fully developed, are used to justify policy. The result is strategic confusion and little public consensus. This can easily lead to strategic overextension if we redefine the national interest broadly, or conversely, to total disengagement if the national interest is defined narrowly. This study examines the various rationales for engagement in Third World conflict which have been proposed and recommends a rationale to undergird future policy.

2. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Operations Other Than War. The "revolution in military affairs" receives much attention, but nearly all of it concentrates on conventional applications of military force, especially regional war. RMA also has serious implications for military operations other than war. This study uses "red team" analysis to assess ways that opponents of the United States in operations other than war might attempt to counter our technological advantage. It then suggests necessary changes in strategy, doctrine, and force structure.

3. The Future of Counterinsurgency. Insurgency will remain a source of instability in the post-cold war world, but its nature and manifestations will change. Current U.S. strategy and doctrine for counterinsurgency reflect an outmoded form of insurgency: Marxist rural "people’s war." U.S. strategy and doctrine should, in contrast, be forward looking and attempt to capture future trends in insurgency rather than past patterns. This study builds on an earlier monograph entitled "The Future of Insurgency" to offer recommendations for the continued development of counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine.
4. The Reconstruction of "Failed States." With conflict in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia, the phrase "failed states" entered the strategic lexicon to connote nations experiencing a total collapse of their political, economic, and social systems. Such failed states are likely to remain a source of danger and instability for the coming decade, but the United States has yet to discover the most effective means for dealing with them. Clearly the U.S. military can make a vital contribution to the reconstruction of failed states, but has not fully developed procedures and doctrine for doing so. This study uses case studies of failed states to suggest the appropriate role for the U.S. military.

5. From "Low Intensity Conflict" to "Operations Other than War." By the early 1980s, the psychological wounds of Vietnam had healed sufficiently to allow new interest in low-intensity conflict among American strategists and national security professionals. While never a dominant force in the military, students of low-intensity conflict developed an impressive literature and, eventually, sound and coherent doctrine. After the cold war, "low intensity conflict" evolved into "operations other than war." What is not fully clear is whether this semantic change reflects a true alteration of the way we understand conflict and the role it plays in American security strategy. This study compares the conceptual underpinnings of "low intensity conflict" and "operations other than war" to assess the extent to which our current thinking reflects the realities of the post-cold war security environment.

6. The Economic Transformation of the Third World: Winners and Losers. Much of the Third World is moving from socialist economies toward free market oriented economies. This study will analyze why some countries such as Mexico are winners in this transformation and why others, like Brazil, are losers. Hopefully, a clearer understanding of this difficult transformation process will help those countries (such as India) that are just beginning economic reforms avoid unnecessary pitfalls and ultimately enjoy the economic promise of a free market oriented economy. Finally, the study will discuss how the failure at economic transformation can produce economic and political instability, which in turn can lead to military conflict.

7. Military Bases and the New Strategy: A Model. In the past, efficiency was not a major criterion for U.S. military bases. The network was so extensive that every service had more than enough locations and space to develop sprawling, inefficient bases. Now just as the military force itself needs to be more efficient, so too will our shrinking network of overseas installations. This study will develop a generic model of an OCONUS military base used to implement forward presence and crisis response in a resource constrained strategic environment. Since there will be fewer OCONUS bases, efficiency and political palatability should be major criteria. This means that the future base should be joint, rapidly expandable, combined, interagency, linked to a region-wide system, and, in some cases, physically isolated.

8. "The Right Man for the Job": Profiles of Multinational Force Commanders. Nearly every discussion of multinational peace operations mentions that it is vital to find the right force commander. Such a job requires extraordinary diplomatic skill and a range of other characteristics not always present in senior military leaders. What has not been done in any rigorous way is delineating what the specific features of a successful multinational force commander are, and what sort of military institution is likely to produce them.
9. The Evolution of Regional Security Apparatuses for the Enforcement of International Law and Order. In the post-cold war world, the established institutions for ensuring interstate security, i.e. armies, navies and air forces, are often not suitable for coping with the new disorders. New collective security mechanisms will evolve with the purpose of controlling or limiting perennial crimes between opposing sub- or supra-national factions. High intensity warfighting and high intensity crime reduction are fundamentally different from deterrence or "fighting outnumbered and winning." They require different mindsets, equipment and training.
Regional Assessments.

The outlines of a European security environment are a little clearer. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire continues and conflict has yet to spill over its previous Imperial borders. Democratic institutions continue to develop in the former-Soviet Union, however, at a very slow pace, and not without spates of violence. Considerable instability and conflict surround Russian borders and Russian efforts to cope with violence are not always comforting to other Europeans.

War continues to rage in the former Yugoslavia, but has yet to spread beyond the defunct Federation’s borders. That said, tensions are rising as relations between Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey are strained over ethnic minorities and irredentist claims.

Instability in Eastern and Southwestern Europe reverberates throughout Central Europe. The Visegrad countries continue to struggle to find their niche between Russia and Western Europe. Not content with their status as orphans of the end of the cold war, they continue to press for association in Western/Transatlantic organizations to legitimize their disassociation from the east. Their efforts have met with mixed success.

Western Europe struggles. Germany will hold 19 elections in 1994 and the Presidential elections in France will be held in April 1995. Consequently, resolution of difficult issues in European economic, security and political affairs are being deferred. Despite ratification of the Maastrict Treaty, further integration is proceeding slowly and not without acrimonious debate. Germany continues to struggle with the burdens of unification and Europe has yet fully to come to terms with a united Germany. The crisis in the Italian governing structure continues unabated and shows no sign of early resolution. Indeed, the survival of the “state” is under increasing assault.

Ethnicity and concomitant nationalism have reemerged as powerful political forces in Europe following the end of the cold war. This is a two-fold problem: ethnic conflict and the ensuing results of such conflict—emigration to developed European countries with already stretched social welfare systems and post-war high unemployment.

Trends and Issues.

- Russia will continue on its difficult path toward democratic institutions and a market economy. The West should expect numerous fits and starts and an occasional setback.
The Yugoslav conflict now hovers between a possible settlement or continued fighting. Human and economic exhaustion may limit the level of violence. Should the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina stabilize, renewed violence between Croatia and Serbia is a possibility. The situation in Kosovo and Macedonia will continue to hold the potential for broadening the conflict beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.

Western European integration under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty will proceed, however, slower than many initially anticipated.

There will be a continuing tension between European security organizations as France sorts out its relations with NATO.

NATO will continue to implement the New Strategic Concept and assess changes in the strategic environment. This will undoubtedly include review of command and control arrangements and force structures, as military force levels, particularly in Central Europe, continue to fall.

Resource constraints for defense activities will grow stronger.

Study Proposals.

1. Ethnic Conflict in Europe. With the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic animosities have reemerged in Central and Eastern Europe after a considerable period of absence. And, as the ongoing conflicts in Yugoslavia, Moldova, and Transcaucasia clearly indicate, animosities easily lead to conflict that involves U.S. and European security interests. Increasing immigration (particularly from North Africa, Turkey, and Eastern Europe) is already sending shock waves through Western Europe. This study will identify potential areas of ethnic conflict, analyze the bases for ethnic animosity, and assess the security implications for the United States.

2. Evolving French Policy Toward NATO: What Is Acceptable and What Isn’t. Paris is slowly changing its official attitude and policy toward NATO. Currently, two opposing schools of thought are emerging concerning France’s new political and military arrangements with NATO. While acknowledging the value of French participation in more NATO activities and structures, it is necessary to ascertain what U.S. and NATO policy should be toward making concessions to Paris for its return to certain Alliance fora.

3. The Changing Nature of German Defense Structures (Joint Strategic Outreach [SOI]-Royal Institute of International Affairs Project). Germany continues selectively to "normalize" its defense structures. Reduced financial resources and increasingly ambitious restructuring plans could have severe implications on the structure and capabilities of the Bundeswehr. This study will focus on the longer term implications of these changes in German defense policy.
4. Post-NATO Summit Assessment. The NATO summit held in January 1994 generated a number of unresolved issues: the extent and pace of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program, Combined/Joint Task Force (C/JTF), and the pace and scope of French cooperation within the Alliance. This study will examine outstanding current issues and anticipated problem areas and how the Alliance should confront these challenges.

5. Select NATO Nations' Command and Control Reorganization (SOI Project). Following the end of the cold war and reduction in national force structures, some NATO nations are reorganizing their national command and control structures. This project will assess how and why these reorganizations have taken place and examine their implications for NATO command and control restructuring. The nations which are being assessed are: Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Norway, and Canada.

6. Political Upheaval and Strategic Transmutation in Italy. Currently, a political metamorphosis is taking place in Italy, a country which, since the end of World War II, has established itself as one of Washington’s most steadfast allies. Italian strategic thinking is also evolving toward establishing new national security interests and priorities. Concurrently, the Italian armed forces are undergoing a massive reorganization and restructuring, while being increasingly employed in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. For these reasons the political trends in that country and its defense reorganization should be assessed.
SECTION III

THE MIDDLE EAST

Regional Assessments.

As events in the Middle East continue to progress along parallel lines, the focus of this year’s study effort will be to ascertain, to the extent possible, what in fact is happening and the strategic implications for the United States and the U.S. Army. The areas of vital concern are two: the economics of making peace and the rise of extremism.

The decline in oil prices and the overabundance of petroleum on the world market will exacerbate the economic situation throughout the region. A diminishing pool of available capital will adversely affect relations between the more wealthy Arab nations and the poorer ones. This could have strategic implications for the United States, as well as for the ongoing peacemaking process within the region, because nations like Syria depend on Saudi and Kuwaiti financial support. While Lebanon is trying to rebuild after its horribly destructive civil war, some of the more radical elements operating there are unwilling to accept any decrease in funding from the Gulf states. Increased attacks on Israel will invite the kind of retaliation which always holds the potential for derailing peace talks with Syria, which itself looks to Saudia Arabia for financial support.

This presents the House of Saud with difficult choices since it cannot finance every group or state seeking aid. Groups or states which feel slighted are capable of actions potentially detrimental to the peace process to which President Hafez Assad committed Syria during his mid-January meeting with President Bill Clinton.

The impulse toward extremism is increasing among the more prominent religiously-oriented groups. Research will focus on the militant Hizbullah, the Shiite Lebanese, Iranian-backed "Party of God," and the Hamas, the most prominent Palestinian group to take up the cause in the wake of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) efforts to reach an accord with Israel. These groups would wreck the peace efforts being made by Israel, the PLO and Syria. In Egypt, the more radical factions of the Muslim brotherhood harbor the potential to destabilize the government and warrant further investigation.

Currently, very little is known about these groups, and much of what is known is speculative. How are they structured? What are their various ideological foundations? To what foreign powers do they answer? A rigorous, authoritative assessment would greatly benefit the Army as well as the larger defense and intelligence communities.
Trends and Issues.

- Iraq and Iran will continue their rapprochement to effect a united front against the United States.

- Turkey's problems with the Kurds may increase if the Turkish army pursues a repressive policy in southeastern Turkey.

- The Kurds of Iraq will grow increasingly restive. With no sign that the West is willing to support their demands for a separate state, Kurdish leaders will become more and more alienated from the United States and Europe. Kurdish leaders may decide to reopen negotiations with Baghdad.

- Syria may supplant the PLO as the main Arab player in the peace process. Both Syrians and Israelis are maneuvering for advantage.

- The religiously-oriented militias in Lebanon and the occupied territories are moving to take over the resistance movement from the Palesine Liberation Organization. It is unlikely that substantive progress will result from the PLO's "breakthrough" with Israel. The reduction in real power enjoyed by the PLO may make the militias the significant actors in the area.

- While the official Egyptian position is that extremism is waning, nevertheless, violence could escalate. The greatest challenge for President Mubarak, however, may be his relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He may resist making further economic concessions and that could complicate his relationship with Washington. Egypt might be a trouble spot for the next few years.

Study Proposals.

1. Religiously-Oriented Militias. Who are the militias? What is their organizational makeup? Who finances their activities? Do these groups constitute the next major threat in the Middle East? This study will focus on the Hizbullah and Hamas.

2. The Salience of Syria. President Assad may try to repeat Sadat's feat of recovering lands previously lost to Israel. A tough bargainer, Assad faces opponents in Tel Aviv who are just as determined. This study will anticipate an Israeli-initiated move to foster U.S. guarantees in any settlement. That could mean U.S. troops on the Golan Heights.

3. Iran and Iraq: The Odd Couple Alliance. What are the security implications of the growing rapprochement between two ancient enemies? What strengths do they have to complement each other? Are they capable of devising a unified approach to opposing the U.S. presence in the Gulf? What is the likelihood of their reviving the terror war of the 1980-90 period? What U.S. assets might be targeted?
4. The Rise of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK). Who is the PKK and what motivates this group? Indications are that internal security in Southeastern Anatolia is breaking down. Concomitantly, the power of the PKK is increasing. What will be the strategic implications for regional security and for Washington and the West?

5. An Eye on Egypt. During the next year it would be wise to monitor developments in Egypt. Events there may propel Cairo to the forefront of U.S. interest very rapidly. Problems with the IMF could complicate economic relations while Islamic fundamentalists bode ill for Egypt’s internal security.
SECTION IV

ASIA-PACIFIC

Regional Assessment.

**East Asia and the Western Pacific.** East Asia and the Western Pacific remains a region of high economic growth and relative stability, except for the Korean peninsula. The most critical near-term regional security issue for the United States, South Korea and Japan is North Korea. Pyongyang has already tested a missile capable of reaching Japan and is probably developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, with 70 percent of its conventional forces deployed along or close to the demilitarized zone (DMZ), North Korea poses a serious conventional military threat to the ROK and U.S. forces within South Korea.

The most impressive economic record of the past few years belongs to China, where economic growth rates have reached very impressive levels—11 percent in 1992. The next most impressive engines of regional growth are Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The "miracle economies" of the 1980s, those of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, continue to prosper. Vietnam and Laos languish in the economic doldrums of Marxist/Leninist regimes, but the potential for dynamic economic growth in Vietnam, at least, is great. In spite of the recession in Japan, the region is the United States' most valuable market for exports, and an important source of foreign investments in the United States.

Although there are also other disputes in the region, most involving territorial claims by China and its neighbors, apart from the Korean peninsula the major security concern among regional powers is that the United States will reduce its military presence significantly, and that China and/or Japan will project themselves into the void caused by the U.S. withdrawal. This apprehension persists despite repeated assertions by U.S. leaders that America will remain engaged militarily, and in other ways, in East Asia and the Western Pacific. It is one of the stimuli supporting the expansion of regional security consultation, focusing thus far on the annual Post Ministerial Conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the new ASEAN Security Forum, which will include all of the major actors in the region. The United States supports the emphasis on multilateral security cooperation and consultation within the region.

**South Asia.** In comparison to East Asia and the Western Pacific, South Asia's economic growth has been modest. India and Pakistan are implementing economic reforms which suggest promise, but all nations of the region have suffered from natural disasters and political instability and South Asia as a whole has not experienced increasing prosperity. India-Pakistan relations remain the most troubling of the area, involving the potential for nuclear conflict and a seemingly intractable dispute over Kashmir. There is concern among all its neighbors that India, which has expanded the force projection capability of its armed forces and appears determined to control the Indian Ocean, will attempt to assert hegemony over the entire region.
Trends and Issues.

- Relations between the United States and the nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific will become increasingly important in the coming decade as a result of the growing economic strength of the region.

- As China modernizes its economy, it will also modernize its military forces with technologically sophisticated hardware to become increasingly capable of force projection throughout the region.

- Regional stability will continue to depend greatly on U.S. engagement, including a credible military presence.

- Continued emphasis will be placed on multinational security consultations and collaboration in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

- The threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will increase in the coming decade.

- As India increases its military capability, it will have the capacity to influence security relations in East Asia and the Western Pacific as well as in South Asia.

- Assuming the absence of conflict or unification, the economic disparity between North and South Korea will continue to widen.

- Widespread perceptions of potential instability and the existence of territorial disputes will support moderately expanding military forces among the states of Southeast Asia.

Study Proposals.

1. Japan and the Stability of Northeast Asia. The perception that the Japanese may once again become a military threat is widespread. These perceptions appear to be influenced by deeply embedded historical memories, but they are also partly based on understandings of Japan's defense policy and military capabilities. This study will describe and analyze these latter factors to confirm or refute the perceptions of Japan as a potential regional threat.

2. Potential for Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Asia-Pacific. This study will examine the region for the threat of WMD in the coming decade. It will focus on locating capabilities for the production or acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems, and the probable incentives and disincentives for their acquisition and use. The study will also consider the implications of proliferation for the United States.

3. U.S.-China Security Relations. Security relations between China and the United States are being reestablished. Given that China's strategic significance to the United States has
changed since the end of the cold war, it is important to identify objectives which the United States can achieve from security cooperation with China and the appropriate activities which will support those objectives, as well as the risks which could be associated with some forms of cooperation.

4. ROK-Japan Security Cooperation. Direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea has historically been limited to superficial activities, although some coordination was achieved indirectly using U.S. channels for communications. The lack of direct cooperation was normally accounted for by historical animosities on both sides. This study will determine if there are incentives for Korean-Japanese security cooperation in the post-cold war era which were absent before, and whether animosities are as much a barrier to cooperation as previously. The possible advantages and disadvantages of ROK-Japan security cooperation to the United States will also be considered.

5. Modernization of Military Forces in Southeast Asia. Most governments in Southeast Asia have increased defense spending and begun modernization programs in the last few years. This study will examine these programs to determine if they threaten or support regional stability and do or do not conform to U.S. regional interests.

6. U.S. Interests in South Asia. South Asia has not been a region of strategic priority for the United States, especially since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This study will identify U.S. interests in the region in light of the new security environment, and suggest how they might be reflected in military objectives and partially achieved through the execution of strategic concepts.

7. The Spratly Islands Dispute and U.S. Interests. The most contentious of many territorial disputes in the South China Sea at present involves the Spratly Islands, a group of sandbars and inlets which may sit above petroleum and other resources on and under the seabed. Five nations claim part of the group—China reiterating its claim to all of them and the rest of the South China Sea in recent legislation. This study will explore what U.S. security interests may be involved in this dispute, and how the United States should respond to it.
Regional Assessments.

Events in 1993 such as Yugoslavia's unrelenting wars, ethnic conflicts all along Russia's southern periphery, coups and counter-coups in Russia, Ukraine's political and economic paralysis, the lack of a political resolution of the Baltic issue, and Russia's efforts to reintegrate its former empire even though it is beset with serious political and constitutional problems all point to one conclusion—the state system from Germany's Eastern border to the Pacific Ocean remains unstable and profoundly insecure. No viable security architecture or functioning institution has arisen that can provide legitimacy and security throughout this expanse of territory. And as wars rage in the former Yugoslavia and on Russia's periphery or states like Russia experience profound uncertainty and unrest due to malfunctioning economies and governments, continuing unrest and the prospect of even wider wars or more of them remain acute. Thus, Central and Eastern European security in 1994 and beyond cannot be taken for granted; quite the opposite.

Central and Eastern European states have pursued security integration with both NATO and the EU (European Union—the successor to the EC) to no avail. Furthermore, they cannot collaborate regionally, as was hoped, in pursuit of the common good. Rather, there are growing signs of unilateral pursuits of security and prosperity by states, a trend that will only intensify the vacuum in the area. At the same time, this analyst believes that Russia is pursuing an increasingly overt strategy, employing both economic and military pressure (including overt and covert operations) that also utilize "peacekeeping operations" to restore Russian hegemony over the former USSR. This Pax Russica, or Russian "Monroe Doctrine," is intensifying distrust about Russia's aims, even under Boris Yeltsin, throughout Europe and Turkey.

At the same time, Russia's Pacific or Asian politics still appear to gravitate towards an alliance (their word) with China and cooperation with South Korea, the logic of which points to difficult if peaceful relations with Japan. However, this short-circuits economic aid to Russia, especially in the Asian parts of Russia, and materially affects the structure of overall relations in Northeast Asia.

Finally, and most disturbing for any future Russian democracy, are signs of an inability to realize viable democratic institutions or make them work. These signs are quite visible in Yeltsin's post-coup decrees and in the process of election and party formation that is now taking place. But perhaps the most important question is the nature and degree of civilian control over the armed forces. Despite complacency or optimism on the part of numerous analysts that the armed forces have been "politicized" and that this is a good thing, there are too many signs of less than perfect control over the military and increasing acceptance of its political role and of submission to its agenda, e.g. the reintegration of the empire.

For these reasons we see the following trends at work.
Trends and Issues.

- It is clear that neither in economics or in terms of political institutions are many of the post-Soviet states able to make progress towards viability, let alone democracy. In economics, this is particularly visible in energy affairs, where they depend on Russia and are being forced to pay the price. Politically, this economic failure leads to intensification of ethnic animosities and violence, and then to wars or the prospect of them.

- Western Europe and the United States are still resisting Central Europe's membership in EC and NATO despite those states' constant pressure on them. Though surrogates for membership, like the Aspin initiative of October 1993, have been advanced, they are regarded as much delaying tactics as anything else. Thorough analyses of the arguments on both sides are needed lest the present vacuum in the region grow further. Another reason can be found in the implications of Yugoslavia's wars for European security.

- The implications of Yugoslavia for European security are essentially threefold: The security of the Balkan region is once again up for grabs and evidently outside the sustained interest of the Western Alliance. As long as war and its legacy of bitterness and hatred continue, other states and territories will be drawn into either political and ethnic rivalry for local primacy or into actual fighting, with every likelihood of further ethnic unrest and spreading warfare. The second consequence is equally profound and related to the first one. Yugoslavia has decisively divided the Western Alliance. Its most critical impact is that there is little, if any, consensus between the United States and its allies, and among those allies themselves, on threat assessment in Central Europe, or on a response to it. In effect, the regional actors are on their own. Accordingly, membership in NATO may ultimately be irrelevant to the threats that can be construed against these states because the NATO allies evidently cannot, or will not, agree on the nature of those threats or on actions against them. This leads to the third related lesson or consequence of these wars: other nationalist demagogues and aggressors will be encouraged to incite them in the absence of any strong Western response.

- Turning to Russia, we find numerous ethnic and other conflicts along its southern periphery, not to mention possibilities of further strife, especially in the Ukraine. The Russian army is now deeply engaged in what it calls "peacemaking" in these wars. These operations bear watching, not only for their operational content but also for what we might learn about peacemaking. They also are crucial from a strategic-political standpoint because they apparently are the means by which Russia is restoring its hegemonical influence over these areas.

- This imperial restoration or reintegration through peacemaking and the use of economic coercion suggests that, with all its troubles, Russia has devised a relatively coherent national security strategy aimed at that restoration throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Since a military doctrine has been formally accepted recently, Russia's overall national security strategy merits critical analysis to determine whether there is a clear concept or strategy governing policy.
Study Proposals.

1. Energy and Security in the New Eurasia. As a result of earlier studies and prior research, it is clear that control over oil and gas production, refineries, and shipment routes is playing a large role in the security policies of the states adjacent to and within the CIS as well as in the Asia-Pacific region. The policies and trends involved may do much to determine future political alignments in these areas.

2. Weapons Proliferation and the Revolution in Military Affairs. This study will analyze the connection between the proliferation of current high-tech systems and weapons of a generation ago and their use, actual or potential, in conflicts at the higher end of the spectrum, i.e. theater conventional wars or even nuclear wars, or what might be called middle and high-intensity conflicts. The study will assess ways in which possession of these state-of-the-art weapons could be used either to deter war or to carry out military operations. It will examine the effects of proliferation on the recipients of those weapons and on the United States in future wars.

3. Peacemaking a-la-Russe. This study will examine the operational and strategic-political dimensions of Russia's peacemaking activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus to determine Russian doctrine and Russian Army operational art. It also will assess the strategic and political implications of Russian peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in those regions.

4. Challenges to Central European Security. This study will analyze the broader trends in security affairs currently taking shape in Central and Eastern Europe. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the war in Yugoslavia, and the failure of the CIS to create a true security community, as well as the general economic hardships, if not crises, throughout the region, are likely factors making for a very insecure environment for these states. This study will also analyze the implications of these trends for the region and for overall European security.

5. The New Russia in a New Asia. What is the impact of overall changes in Russian Asia policy and Asia's security structure as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Communist Party policies? What will be the policy implications for the United States?
Regional Assessments.

Threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America come from political extremes and deeply rooted economic, social, and political problems. U.S. national interests in the region will continue to be the promotion of democracy, human rights, economic well-being, and the curtailment of the drug trade and illegal migration to the United States. While most countries in Latin America may be expected to continue the process of democratization, many are under increasing pressure from the resurgence of an authoritarian alternative, especially in those cases where elected governments have failed to meet popular expectations.

A rapidly expanding population and its attendant socio-economic problems create conditions which promote emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and coups d'état. U.S. assistance in reinforcing democratic institutions and building strong economies is the best defense against the authoritarian alternative in the region.

In the Andean Ridge countries of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, thousands of Latin American farmers have entered the lucrative coca growing business and its related and even more lucrative cocaine processing activities. Venezuela has recently become a preferred embarkation point for illegal drug shipments to the United States and Europe. Both it and Brazil may soon become significant producers, as well as way stations. There has been an increase in the poppy crops of both Mexico and Guatemala. The opium poppy has also been introduced to South America—Colombia in particular. Unless a suitable alternative is found, these farmers may well provide the raw materials that support insurgents and/or drug trafficking cartels. The probability is very high that even with U.S. training, equipment, and advisors, Latin American governments will not be able to make more than very limited progress against the supply side of the drug trade. Equally disturbing has been the recent increase in the use of illegal drugs in Latin America.

Continued economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and poor have resulted in significant illegal migration of Latin Americans to the United States, most through Mexico. To these economic refugees must be added those who claim to be fleeing political persecution. Some estimates go as high as 7 million per year. While Central American migration is down, Haitian migration has increased and may well grow much worse in the next year. In addition, the current crisis in Cuba provides the potential for a new "Mariel boatlift" if the country explodes.

The policy answer to most of these concerns is in nurturing democracy, economic opportunity and a viable counterdrug strategy. Some of these issues are addressed in former President George Bush's Enterprise for the America's Initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Andean Drug Strategy. How to turn policy into strategy and executable programs is the real challenge for the United States.
Trends and Issues.

- As Latin American (LATAM) nations continue the process of democratization, there is a risk that authoritarian movements will grow where elected governments do not meet popular expectations. Democratization has probably reached, if not passed, its apex, with the future dependent on economic growth, reduced population growth, and enhanced civilian control over the military institution.

- Threats to democratic governments will increase during the next five years. These threats stem from rampant overpopulation, socioeconomic inequalities, poverty, weak economies, and an authoritarian political culture. These elements will be exploited by:
  - the military
  - unreconstructed Marxist movements
  - drug cartels
  - radical politicians of both extremes.

- In Peru the Shining Path guerrillas will continue to fade, but in Columbia the insurgency problem will grow worse.

- The United States will continue to support democratization but will probably become less interventionist in its approach to internal affairs of LATAM nations.

- Production and trafficking of illicit drugs will expand throughout Latin America, particularly in the Andean region; Central America; Brazil; Paraguay; and possibly Mexico. In general, however, the United States will not intensify its counterdrug efforts.

- Environmental degradation and exploitation of nonrenewable resources will continue.

- Political and economic crises in Haiti and Cuba will intensify. The flow of refugees from both islands will continue, with the possibility of major hemorrhages from one or both. There is a possibility for external military intervention in Haiti and, to a lesser extent, in Cuba.

- Illegal immigration will continue to pose a major problem for the United States.

- The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will open major opportunities for U.S. businesses in Mexico, substantially stimulating the Mexican economy and integrating the North American economies as never before. This will be the initial step in an ongoing effort to create a free-trade zone encompassing the entire hemisphere.
Study Proposals.

1. Mexico: The Challenges and Enigmas of the Future. In the late 1980s, Mexico seemed on the verge of a transformation from a one-party authoritarian state to a multiparty democracy. Since then, however, the economy has revived and the political system restabilized. The question is whether these trends will continue or whether, somewhere down the road, socioeconomic crisis and/or political disintegration will occur.

2. The United States and Cuba: A Strategy for a Peaceful Transition. Sooner or later, the Castro brothers will pass from the Cuban political scene. They may go peacefully or violently. If the latter occurs, the repercussions for the United States (especially in terms of refugees, possible U.S. military intervention, and the costs of reconstruction) could be enormous. To avoid being overtaken and overwhelmed by events, the U.S. Government should begin to fashion a strategy designed to actively foster a peaceful transition in that country. This study would lay out the essential elements of such a policy.

3. Nicaragua: The Continuation of War by Other Means. Though the Contra war formally ended in 1990, the peace is fragile. The struggle between the Sandinistas and their enemies has continued in the political arena and has recently shown signs of reverting to the violent means of the past. This study would assess Nicaragua’s prospects for the future, along with U.S. interests and the policies that are most likely to advance them.

4. Haiti Update. This study would be a sequel to the March 1994 SSI report, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti." It would review the changing situation in that country and its implications for the United States. If appropriate, detailed policy recommendations would be set forth with regard to Haiti’s economic and political development.
SECTION VII
AFRICA

Regional Assessment.

U.S. involvement in Africa will continue to be governed by humanitarian interests, chief among them democratic reform. The shift in U.S. foreign policy emphasis to humanitarian interests has affected some results on the continent. In Kenya, multiparty democracy, although by no means perfect, has been established, allowing the Moi regime to retain power while technically satisfying most of the requirements of donor nations. Other countries such as Malawi, where Parliament has abolished the life presidency and is moving forward to establish multiparty democracy; Mozambique, where the potential for multiparty elections and an end to the civil war are real and plausible; and South Africa, which recently agreed to hold elections establishing a multiracial, interim government; are examples of countries where the democratic reform movement has achieved success.

As is often the case in Africa, where it is one step forward, it may also be two steps back. The strategically important oil-producing country of Nigeria, which was supposed to move to multiparty democracy through free and fair elections in 1993, has now regressed into the familiar pattern of military leadership. In the other major oil-producing country, Angola, long a chessboard for East-West cold war maneuvering, civil war has returned. The poorly funded national elections to create a multiparty government that would unite the warring factions of Unita and MPLA government failed miserably. The losing party, Jonas Savimbi's Unita, reinitiated the guerrilla war with such success that the United States is now providing support to the MPLA forces. In Zaire, President Mobutu clings tenuously to power and has foiled efforts to establish a multiparty democracy that he at one time proclaimed to be imminent. Unfortunately, Nigeria, Angola, and Zaire are strategically important U.S. interests for their minerals, size, and regional influence.

The most significant issue to the United States in 1994 will continue to be Somalia. Because the United States military operation did not fully privatize logistics, it was forced to leave approximately 4,000 troops in Somalia to support the UNOSOM mission of the United Nations. When the Clinton administration changed the objective of U.S. participation from one of supporting the humanitarian delivery of food to nationbuilding, with the requirement of bringing warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed to bay, it changed the nature of U.S. peacekeeping operations in a way that has many implications for the future. First, it has been viewed by developing world leaders as a litmus test of the willingness of the United States to stay the course. When the Pakistanis lost 22 men its resolve remained unchanged and its participation in UNOSOM operations continued. When the United States incurred nearly 20 casualties, criticism in Congress and from the American people caused the administration to change its stated policy and seek a peaceful solution to the conflict with Aideed, largely on his terms. Second, Somalia brought to a head the difficulties in coordinating U.S. and U.N. interests in international peacekeeping operations and severely compromised what initially appeared to be a very productive relationship. Third, if U.S.
participation in Somalia remains less than a top priority of U.S. foreign policy and is poorly managed, it may have very serious consequences for the support of the U.S. military among the American population and could undermine future efforts to use U.S. forces for strategic purposes. Finally, Somalia proves the need for African solutions to African problems, and calls into question the future participation of U.S. forces in peacekeeping efforts that do not reflect what is regionally possible.

Somalia is not the only African country in which U.S. forces may be called to serve. The U.N. effort to bring peace to war-torn Mozambique has met with success and a U.N. task force, UNOMOZ, has been established. The U.N. leadership is seeking significant U.S. participation for this effort in the monitoring, military construction and nation assistance roles. Liberia, which has historical ethnic ties to the United States, continues to be plagued by civil unrest and any resolution that has the potential of success could require the participation of U.S. forces in some manner. In Zaire, the United States has a history of providing logistical support to French forces attempting to evacuate Europeans in time of violent conflict. It is possible that events in Zaire could become so difficult in the coming year that such cooperative military ventures with the French may be required. It is likely that U.S. support to the Angolan government may escalate beyond providing intelligence data if a peace accord is established.

In 1994, the country of South Africa will elect its first multi-ethnic government and relinquish white rule. Because of its strategic importance and salience to U.S. domestic politics, events that unfold in South Africa will have significant ramifications for the United States. Long thought to be a resilient, economically and culturally strong country able to absorb the social unrest associated with the transition to multi-ethnic rule, South Africa in 1993 demonstrated a disturbing potential for uncontrolled ethnic violence and the inability of existing police and defense forces to contain this violence. The African National Congress, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, was thought to be able to maintain the allegiance of the unemployed black youth of the South African urban areas and unify the country. However, the assassination of Chris Hanni, head of the South African Communist party and the ANC’s military wing, removed from the ANC its primary link to this body of disenfranchised youth. The result has been a resurgence in the popularity of radical black ethnic parties such as the Pan African Congress and an exacerbation of the difficulties associated with negotiating the new form of government. The potential for ethnic violence and disruptive behavior from the radical white right and the Zulu nation, neither of which are participating in the new transitional governmental process, to undermine any future government’s ability to run the country is also substantial. This situation is particularly important for the United States because of South Africa’s strategic minerals production, its control of the Cape route around which flows some 40 percent of U.S. petroleum imports, its nuclear capability, and the importance of the South African economy to the future economic and political stability of the entire region.

Trends.

- Democratic reform continues and is eagerly supported by most of the African population. With fits and starts, democratization can be expected to continue as long as Western donor/lending institutions and governments continue to tie financial aid to reform.
Chronic health issues will continue to undermine the already thin African elite and threaten the ability of emerging democracies to manage their difficult economic and political problems. The HIV virus will continue its explosive spread. This disease is complemented by a resurgence of tuberculosis and the ever-present malaria which, itself, claims over a million lives annually.

Africa will continue to suffer economically. A depressed world economy will keep raw materials prices low, making it difficult for countries to pay off their high external debt. This and structural adjustment will complicate most governments' efforts to maintain their legitimacy with populations that are facing growing environmental problems and an inability to feed themselves.

The chief cause of Africa's poverty and suffering, extremely high population growth rates that average well above 3 percent per year, will continue unabated.

Congress continues its efforts to cut the African Security Assistance Program. This program maintains the military-to-military contact that supports such strategic interests as overflight agreements, basing, and influence with governments that control strategic lines of communication. However, by providing $30 million for the Security Assistance Program Biodiversity and Conservation effort, Congress has demonstrated that it is willing to fund environmental security assistance to African nations. This willingness provides a window of opportunity for maintaining these important military-to-military contacts.

Although Eritrea successfully became independent from Ethiopia during 1993, there is little chance that other African countries will mount a strong effort to redraw the political boundaries artificially imposed by colonial powers during the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. Thus, one must expect continued ethnic violence as newly formed democracies wrestle with the requirement to prove their legitimacy to multiple groups of ethnically distinct constituents.

Proposed Studies.

At present, SSI does not have an Africanist on its staff. It may be possible, however, to arrange for one or more of the following studies on a contractual basis.

1. **Will There Be a Civil War in South Africa?** As South Africa moves closer to Black majority rule, certain elements on the right and the left favor increased violence. This study would examine the dynamics of continuing violence in South Africa and the possible implications a civil war would have for Europe and the United States.

2. **The Legacy from Somalia.** By the end of March, U.S. forces were withdrawn from Somalia. In many quarters, the U.S. effort there under the aegis of the U.N. is viewed very negatively, with something resembling "Vietnamesque" overtones. What implications will this somewhat unhappy experience with peacekeeping/making have for future U.S. operations with the U.N.? What can be learned from our experiences in Somalia that might be useful later?
3. Could There Be A Russian-South Africa Minerals Cartel? Russia and the Republic of South Africa have cooperated in a diamond cartel run by Anglo-American Corporation through its DeBeers subsidiary. Russia is desperate for foreign currency and has demonstrated a willingness to market anything from enriched uranium to the latest MiG fighters. Between them, the CIS and South Africa control a treasure house of mineral resources including 88 percent of the world's chromium reserves, 91 percent of world manganese reserves, and 99 percent of the world's platinum. These are three of the four most important strategic minerals. Neither Europe, the Pacific Rim, nor the United States have significant deposits of those minerals. While other cartels and marketing efforts have failed, there is a great potential for a Russia-South African cartel to succeed, primarily because of the geographic concentration of resources. The question, then, is whether it is possible for such a cartel to be developed and, further, what the implications of such a cartel are for U.S. economic and security interests.
Assessments.

The strategic political and economic environments of the world will continue to become more complex over the next several decades. At no time in the past or the present have world leaders ever perceived these environments as immutable. World leaders today and those of the future are unlikely to change their modi operandi in the future and will continue to create change. Some will have recognized the holistic character of global change, others will not have. Increasingly, over the next 30 years, the concepts and realities of peace and war, rich and poor, love and hate, life and death brought about by change will weigh heavily on those chosen for leadership; less on those who will have seized the power of leadership.

Changes in the strategic global environment have created and will continue to create new situations for the U.S. Army. These changes and the leadership decisions addressing them, e.g., continued reduction in force or increasing needs for joint operations, will have to be assessed. Other changes affecting warfighting that demand assessment likely will include:

- An Army reduced in size must operate closer with the other services to be a more effective fighting force.

- An Army reduced in size must find and develop force multipliers the source of which very likely will emerge from new technologies.

Still more importantly, what most likely will be needed to make the Army a more effective force will be:

- New strategies to fit new missions that can combine with new technologies, or

- New strategies that almost certainly will demand, in turn, modification of the technology or the innovation of new technology or the creation of new strategies and combinations of strategy and technology.

Change over the next three or more decades will continue to impact the Army as it will all modern organizations. Greater demand by government and industry for long-range planners will compete with the Army's need for creating a new Army rather than restructuring the old; and for understanding how to use a reduction in force and the prospects of an austere future fighting force to build a more perfect and successful fighting force. When, over the long-term, has the Army been unable to plan for foreseeable or long-range eventualities, and when has it been successful in that kind of planning? Who plans best: business, industry, academia, government, the Army, the other services and how do they do long-range planning?
Trends and Issues.

- The U.S. military forces very likely will continue to be reduced in numbers well into the long-range future.

- The active U.S. Army very likely will be reduced in numbers significantly in the long-term (15-20 years).

- New and emerging technologies increasingly will offer new missions for the Army.

- Economic considerations and competition between the services for funds and resources throughout the short- and mid-term very likely will encourage and support the restructuring of U.S. military forces.

- The concept and the strategy of applying overwhelming force will increasingly fall into disuse as public support declines, budgetary restrictions increase and manpower reductions continue through 2004.

- The increasing intentional or unintentional worldwide transfer of civilian and military technology will probably encourage the U.S. military to create new warfighting strategies that will use as yet (1994) undiscovered or unapplied technology.

Study Proposals.

1. The Chicken or the Egg? Technology vs. Strategy. This study will examine the issues concerning the order of the development of strategy to the application of technology. Should technology be designed to fit the strategy or should strategy be conceived to fit available technology? Will conflicts and wars of the future be more demanding of strategy and technology? Might there be mixes of technology and strategy that can be winners of conflict situations? These are some of the questions to be considered in this futures report.

2. Demographic Change and the U.S. Army, 1995-2015. This study will analyze what possible influences trends and strategic changes in U.S. demography are likely to have on the U.S. Army by 2015. The study also will consider various strategic issues that might be affected by demographic change, e.g., in what ways might demographic trends change Army staffing? What influence might demographic change have on Army fighting capabilities? In what ways might demographics affect how the Army trains and educates its personnel? In what ways might demographics change the Army’s quality of life? In what ways will the American cultural environment define and redefine America’s Army?

3. New Century Force. The purpose of this study is to build a foundation for constructing a U.S. military structure the design of which is based on plausible alternative future concepts of world political, economic, social, technological, and military environments. Analysis will be based

4. **Army Modernization and the U.S. Industrial Base: Trends and the Future, 2000-2020.** This study will compare Army modernization programs to trends in the U.S. industrial base. Research and analysis will determine how changes in the industrial base, such as the movement of heavy industries from the United States to foreign soil and ownership, might force changes in Army modernization and procurement programs and, ultimately, how the Army will be equipped and sustained, and how the Army will fight in the future.

5. **An Anthology of Strategic Visions: A Collection of Futures Studies.** This is a collection of papers addressing the future around the years 2000 to 2020 on a variety of subjects. They were written by students in the USAWC Advanced Course, "Creating Strategic Visions."

6. **Beyond Tomorrow: A Look at America's Army in 2050.** This study will review possible geopolitical, economic, and defense consequences of emerging political trends concerning new regional alignments of nations that very likely will arise throughout the next six decades. Demographic trends to include population growth, aging, and migration are considered. Projections envisioned for each of the next three 20-year periods in medicine, space exploration and utilization, transportation, and others are listed.
SECTION IX

ARMY ISSUES

The volatile, ambiguous nature of a world filled with uncertainties will present U.S. policymakers with a host of challenges. While the Democratic administration has resolved a number of its principal campaign issues, new uncertainties have arisen. The path into the future is still unclear and additional changes will affect the Defense Establishment and the U.S. Army in particular. For example:

- A new Secretary of Defense
- A new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- A surprise Defense budget deficit of significant proportions
- Uncertainty over further Defense reductions
- Renewed controversy over roles and missions
- Growing domestic reluctance to support the U.N.
- A lack of global economic progress giving rise to strident nationalism which in turn generates requests for American assurances, including military.
- Another oil glut which drives the price of oil down but unsettles those who have depended upon Saudi largesse, including American arms industries.
- Any peace settlement with Syrians appears to hinge upon deployment of American troops to police the Golan Heights.

These current issues will affect the Army's future both in determining what will be expected of it and what resources will be available with which to perform missions.

Trends and Issues.

- There appears to be a continuing public confidence in the U.S. military as an institution. But the missions the public expects its military to perform are unsettled in part by changes in the international arena. While most Americans do not demonstrate a strong interest in foreign affairs when issues like jobs are at stake, there is some concern that the turmoil on the international scene is having an impact upon domestic issues.
• The outcome of the Russian elections increases concerns over the stability of the Yeltsin regime and its relationship with the Russian military. The anguish over involvement in Bosnia remains a dividing force within the administration and the public. There is less public pressure to act despite the gruesome video footage that airs on the news. Symptomatic of the shift in public focus is the coverage given by the television networks to violence in America, specifically that associated with assault weapons and youth violence. This could be an indicator that Americans want to turn inward, perhaps harkening back to the nation’s isolationist traditions.

• The highly publicized withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia will be seen as an American failure to achieve all the U.N.’s aims and may encourage other renegade groups to confront directly those U.S. troops engaged in peace support operations.

• NAFTA and General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade (GATT) settlements will eventually result in improvements in many sectors of the American economy, but will likely result in the destruction of others such as the textile industry. Defense contractors may become the only source of income for the domestic textile industry, just as they have been for shipbuilding.

• The continuing appearance of ineptness of the United Nations will act as a brake on administration efforts to permit U.S. military involvement in U.N.-directed peace operations.

• A perceived absence of adequate “Law and Order” may result in increasing calls for military help in the civil community.

Implications for the Army.

• Increasing recognition that U.S. military strength is essential and that the cuts may be too deep could slow further reductions in end strength.

• Strategic lift improvements will continue because they provide defense industry jobs and are a hedge against future crisis situations.

• Congress will assume a more active role in the establishing of force structure.

• Potentially the most formidable challenge for the Army is likely to be the inability to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs to the extent desired. In the tug between funding operationally ready forces and equipping them with the most modern equipment, and the financial demands of domestic programs, funding support for R&D and procurement will suffer. Training readiness is currently affected by the commitment of units and soldiers to far-flung peace operations and a decline of training time and dollars.

• With the addition of periodic congressional pressures, the Joint Staff is likely to continue toward its eclipse of the service staffs in power and status.
• Public concern over the use of American soldiers in ambiguous situations overseas will increase recruiting challenges.

• On the domestic scene, economic issues will continue to dominate the public consciousness. The anticipated "correction" in the stock market will temper consumer confidence and the manner in which it is eventually handled by the administration will be crucial for the country. Job growth figures are improving, but not in ways that indicate a strong recovery in the strength of the economy. Because of major changes in the way in which people work, the traditional measures of economic progress must be revised to be relevant. The consequence of the economic uncertainties will be to raise concern and lower the threshold of violent reaction to otherwise minor crises.

• The nation is seeking clear direction and change at home and sees foreign entanglements as significant detractors from the domestic agenda; thus, it is increasingly likely to turn inward. Although there is little indication that the United States will adopt an isolationist stance, it will take dramatic events clearly tied to American interests to compel significant military involvement overseas. That is likely to be so despite any investment in improved power projection capabilities.

Study Proposals.

1. **FM 100-1, The Army.** This directed project has a summer publication date. The study will integrate the changing world and national security challenges to the Army in a revised strategic statement of the direction of the Army of today and the mid-range future. The FM 100-1 revision is not intended as an update, but instead will provide Army leaders at all grades with a cornerstone manual for their use throughout their career as Army leaders.

2. **The Impact of the Media upon National Security Strategy Decision Making.** The underlying concern is that the information age has so altered the media process that significant events routinely "break into view" with unaccustomed drama, and visual images from these events may have the power to compel premature action. The study will address the factors that condition the impact of "news events"; the degree of impact; and considerations for ameliorating media influence.

3. **Thinking Anew—The Impact of the Reserve Components and America's Army.** Even in the light of the "Bottom-Up Review," the Army today represents a shrunken version of its cold war composition. But, as the Chief of Staff of the Army has stated, "To be ready for today and tomorrow, despite reduced resources and force structure, requires real growth as an institution. The Army must make its own paradigm shift." The Army should, sooner rather than later, face the difficult task of restructuring and reexamining specific roles and missions of each of its components. Its leaders must truly lead in addressing very difficult and sensitive issues and making the hard decisions. The Total Force Concept that became official policy in 1973 has always been more talked about than implemented because, in developing our force structure, we have focused more on improving weaknesses in the Reserve Components instead of capitalizing on
strengths. This study will focus on what strengths the Reserve Components bring to America's Army and how they may be applied.

4. Strategic Role of the Army in the 21st Century. The Army's Chief of Staff has articulated a vision of a trained and ready Army for the next century. The focus of this study will be land force dominance. Each generation of Army planners has worked within an environment that has differed from the previous strategic setting. The Army has always understood its role in national defense as one element of a joint armed force, although at times since 1947, inter-service rivalries have raged with a concomitant decrease in military effectiveness. The 1980s saw the Army regenerated from the doldrums into which it sank during the Vietnam War. By the 1980s, the Army's strategic role was clearly defined in FM 100-5, *Operations*. The Army played its strategic deterrent role soundly and, in doing so, was a significant part of the joint and coalition forces that won the cold war. The sudden victory, coming almost simultaneously with its operationally decisive role in Operation Desert Storm, caught the Army by surprise. Having won the war, the Army finds itself in danger of losing the peace. This study will explore the past strategic roles of the Army and offer one for the 21st century.

5. The Citizen Soldier—How Much Soldiering is Too Much for the Citizen? How far can volunteerism be relied upon to support national strategy and what are the implications of current programs designed to enhance readiness in America's Army? As the Army relies more and more on Reserve Components to accomplish its mission, time demands on those citizen soldiers are increasing significantly. This study will examine at what point, and to what extent, these demands will exceed the capability of the Reserve Components to successfully execute. An examination of the current trend toward relying on volunteers from the RC to satisfy the questions of accessibility will be included. With 52 percent of the Army in the Reserve Components, any reduction in recruiting and retention results, whatever the reason, or uncertainty about their being there when needed, has real strategic implications on the Army's ability to accomplish what is requested.

6. Military Legitimacy of Operations Other Than War. During the cold war the Army and its sister services left unconventional operations to "special operators" while retaining a doctrinal focus on conventional military strategies and operations in support of the "real threat"—the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The threat values have changed radically. This study provides, first, a primer on the new lexicon of Operations Other than War and then explores their historical, legal and moral legitimacy.
SECTION X

PRIORITY RESEARCH PROJECTS
FOR THE 1994 CORE STUDY PROGRAM

The projects listed below represent the collective priority of the Strategic Studies Institute during the calendar year 1994. There is no attempt to differentiate higher or lower prioritization within this list of Top Twenty Research Topics.

Transregional Issues.

1. American Engagement in Third World Conflict: Redefining the National Interest in the Post-Cold War World. The United States developed relatively effective strategic rules of engagement for intervention in Third World conflicts during the cold war. Today, the rules for intervention are less clear. This study will examine the various rationales for engagement in Third World conflict which have been proposed and recommend a rationale to undergird future policy.

2. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Operations Other Than War. The RMA has serious implications for military operations "other than war." This study uses "red team" analysis to assess ways that opponents of the United States in operations other than war might attempt to counter our technological advantage. It then suggests necessary changes in strategy, doctrine, and force structure.

3. The Future of Counterinsurgency. U.S. strategy and doctrine for counterinsurgency must change its Marxist rural "people's war" focus to capture future trends in insurgency patterns rather than past ones. This study builds on an earlier monograph entitled "The Future of Insurgency" to offer recommendations for the continued development of counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine.

Europe.

4. Ethnic Conflict in Europe. Since the collapse of Communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe, ethnic animosities have reemerged. Ongoing conflicts in Yugoslavia, Moldova, and Transcaucasia could involve U.S. and European security interests. Additionally, immigration from North Africa, Turkey and Eastern Europe are causing problems in Western Europe. This study will identify potential areas of ethnic conflict, analyze the bases for ethnic animosity, and assess the security implications for the United States.

5. Evolving French Policy Toward NATO: What is Acceptable and What Isn't. France is changing its attitude toward NATO. While acknowledging the value of French participation in more
NATO activities and structures, it is necessary to ascertain what U.S. and NATO policy should be toward making concessions to Paris.

Middle East.

6. Religiously-Oriented Militias. Who are the soldiers in these militias and what are their objectives? What is their organizational composition? Who funds their activities? Are they the next major threat in the Middle East? This study will focus on Hizbullah and Hamas.

7. The Salience of Syria. President Assad, a tough bargainer, may try to regain lands lost to Israel at the conference table where he would face individuals who are just as determined. This study anticipates an Israeli-initiated effort to foster U.S. guarantees in any settlement, meaning U.S. troops on the Golan Heights.

Asia-Pacific.

8. Japan and the Stability of Northeast Asia. Deeply imbedded historical memories have prompted fears that Japan may once again become a military power. This study will describe and analyze the reasons for these fears to confirm or refute perceptions of Japan as a potential regional threat.

9. Potential for Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Asia-Pacific. This study will examine the threat of WMDs in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade. It will focus on identifying which nations have—or could have—a potential for developing these weapons and on incentives and disincentives for their acquisition and use.

Russia and Eurasia.

10. Energy and Security in the New Eurasia. Control over oil and gas production, refineries and shipment routes is playing a large role in the security policies of states adjacent to and within the CIS. This study will analyze policies and trends which may do much to determine future political alignments in these areas.

11. Weapons Proliferation and the Revolution in Military Affairs. This study will assess ways in which possession of high-tech, state-of-the-art weapons could be used either to deter war or to carry out military operations. It will examine the effects of proliferation on the recipients of those weapons and on the United States in future wars.

12. Peacemaking a-la-Russe. This study will examine the operational and strategic-political dimensions of Russia’s peacemaking activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus to determine Russian doctrine and Russian Army operational art. It will also assess the strategic and political implications of Russian peacekeeping and peacemaking activities in those regions.
Latin America.

13. Mexico: The Challenges and Enigmas of the Future. Mexico seems on the verge of a transformation from a one-party authoritarian system to a multiparty democracy. Will these trends continue or will socioeconomic crises and/or political disintegration occur?

14. The United States and Cuba: A Strategy for a Peaceful Transition. Eventually, peacefully or violently, the Castro brothers will be history. If they go violently, the repercussions for the United States could be enormous, such as a flood of refugees seeking asylum or possible military intervention. This study lays out a strategy to foster a peaceful transition of power in Cuba.

Futures.

15. The Chicken or the Egg? Technology vs. Strategy. Should technology be designed to fit strategy or should strategy be conceived to fit available technology? Will future wars and conflicts be more technology or strategy dependent? What mixes might provide victory under what circumstances? These are some of the questions to be considered in this report.

16. Demographic Change and the U.S. Army, 1995-2015. What impact will the changing demographic dynamic have on the Army by 2015? What are the various strategic issues that might be affected by demographic change? How could demographic change affect Army staffing, training, education and, ultimately, fighting capabilities?

Army Issues.

17. FM 100-1, The Army. This directed project will be completed in June. It is the Army's strategic cornerstone.

18. The Impact of the Media upon National Security Strategy Decision Making. Do visual images presented each night on television have the power to compel premature action in the national security arena? This study will address what is meant by "the media," as well as the degree to which the media affects national security strategy. Finally, it will discuss how that impact might be anticipated, measured, or ameliorated.

19. Strategic Role of the Army in the 21st Century. The focus of this study will be on land force dominance by exploring the past strategic roles of the Army and offering a new one for the 21st century.

20. Coalition Warfare for the 21st Century. NATO and the U.S./U.N. commitment to the security of South Korea were stable coalitions focused on specific threats. Coalitions in the post-cold war world may arise quickly and incorporate diverse and unexpected combinations. This study will explore ways to prepare the Army and its leadership for coalition warfare in the 21st century.
APPENDIX A

SSI STUDIES PUBLISHED
JANUARY 1993 - JANUARY 1994*

*Does not include SOI Conference Reports or SSI Conference Papers

1. Franco-German Security Accommodation: Illusion of Agreement  Jan 93
2. Australian-U.S. Security Relations in the Post Cold-War World  Jan 93
3. The Chivalrous Republic: Intrarepublic Conflict and the Case Study of Moldova  Jan 93
4. Insights into the Balkan Enigma  Jan 93
5. Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace  Feb 93
6. General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-41  Feb 93
7. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order  Feb 93
8. Land Warfare in the 21st Century  Feb 93
11. Domestic Missions for the Armed Forces  Feb 93
12. Strategy, Forces and Budgets: Dominant Influences In Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91  Feb 93
13. The New Freshmen, the 103rd Congress and National Defense: Separating Rhetoric From Reality  Feb 93
14. The Department of Defense Role in African Policy  Mar 93
15. Stability, Security Structures, and U. S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific  Mar 93
16. The Nature of the Post-Cold War World  Mar 93
17. Russia and the Baltic: Is There a Threat to European Security? Mar 93
18. Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy Mar 93
19. The Future of U. S. Sea Power May 93
20. Humanitarian Operations and the Middle East: The Hostility Factor May 93
21. The United States and Cuba: From a Strategy of Conflict to Constructive Engagement May 93
22. Russia, Ukraine and European Security May 93
24. Airpower in the New World Order May 93
25. Twenty-First Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia Jun 93
26. Islamic Terror and the West: A Question of Priorities Jun 93
27. Afghanistan and Beyond: Reflections on the Future of Warfare Jun 93
28. Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order Jul 93
29. Helsinki in Asia? Aug 93
30. How German Unification Mistakes Damage West European Economies Aug 93
31. The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U. S. Policy for the 1990s Aug 93
32. Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian Experience Sep 93
33. Latin America: The Unfinished Business of Security Oct 93
34. Preparing for the NATO Summit? What Are the Pivotal Issues? Oct 93
37. On Negotiating with Castro Nov 93
38. Strategic Minerals in the New World Order Nov 93
39. The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions Nov 93
40. The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward Dec 93
41. The Future of Insurgency Dec 93
42. Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs Dec 93
43. NATO Contributions to European Environmental Security Dec 93
APPENDIX B

1993 PRIORITIZED STUDIES NOT COMPLETED

The following studies included in the SSI 1993 Prioritized Research Program were not published during calendar year 1993. In some areas production milestones were changed as a result of increased research complexity or the inclusion of additional directed studies, and publication will occur in early 1994. (These subjects are included in the 1994 Program and are discussed in regional/interregional sections.)

Completion Planned in 1994.

— FM 100-1, The Army, 1994 Revision

— Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations

— Ethnic Conflict in Europe

— Mexico and the United States: Pitfalls and Prospects for the Future

— Japan and the Stability of Asia

— A New Century Force

In other cases, ongoing research review forced modification of original study concepts and reallocation of analyst effort and research, or studies were not approved for final publication; these subjects will not be published by SSI.

Not Scheduled for Continued Research/Publication.

— The Army's Role in Disaster Relief

— National Service

— Modernization of the Republic of Korea Military

— Arms Control in Europe

— U. S. Presence in Europe