THE IMPACT ON THE PACOM REGIONAL COMMAND STRATEGY OF THE EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

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Abstract of
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Conclusions and recommendations of the impact the evolving national security strategy may have on the PACOM regional command strategy are presented. The conclusions and recommendations are based on a survey of the January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States presented by the outgoing Administration and the impact that the evolving strategy of the Clinton Administration is having. These conclusions and recommendations are also influenced by current events surrounding the activities and policy debate centered on the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea.

The conclusions drawn are that the objectives of national security are timeless and consistent from Administration to Administration, even when the party changes. The divergence occurs in emphasis and priority. Several impacts on the PACOM regional command strategy are identified as a result. The regional command strategy defaults to a worst case scenario in matching military means to national ends, resulting in a strategy of deterrence. To break the reliance on this strategy requires refocusing of the priority from the global-international level to the regional level.
The recommendation is made that the Administration should de-link the military considerations on the Korean peninsula from the international debate over the DPRK nuclear program. The PACOM regional command strategy should emphasize modernization and readiness through exercises, and promote openness and regional dialogue with the DPRK rather than confrontation through deterrence.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Issue: The Administration of the United States changed in January, 1993. For the first time in twelve years, the Democratic Party returned to the White House. The predictable result has been a year of second-guessing and "what if-ing" the issues being faced. This paper will address one of these issues, the evolving National Security Strategy of the Administration, specifically, as it applies to the Korean peninsula.

The Context: The Korean peninsula has received significant attention following the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (hereafter the DPRK or North Korea), threatened withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and threatening the security relationship of the East Asian Region. Reports are available daily in the national press. Journal articles proliferate various responses, interpretations and "hand wringing" over what American policy should encompass. Weekly, the subject is addressed on the political talk shows with current and previous Administration officials and Congressional members of both parties. The only consensus thus far is that the Korean peninsula, specifically the DPRK
is a security concern. Otherwise, positions abound, changing and evolving with each passing event.

U.S. policy toward the DPRK is guided by the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). This overarching strategy has been tailored for this region by a Presidential report to Congress, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim. From these broad strategies, the Combatant Commander formulates a regional command strategy. This formulation must have sufficient flexibility to enable successful matching of the military means to national security ends.

The Development: The current NSS was presented in January 1993. This document was developed and published by the outgoing Bush Administration. It provided depth and sufficient flexibility to warrant not having been updated in the following year by the Clinton Administration. The Clinton Administration has, however, not been quiet on the subject of foreign policy and national security. Specifically, during September 1993, key officials including the President, provided a coordinated presentation of their priorities with emphasis on foreign policy and national security.

By reviewing the NSS of January, 1993, and the impact of the September speeches, the regional command strategy for East Asia and the Pacific, as it applies to the Korean peninsula, can be assessed. The actions of the DPRK have
had an impact on the regional command strategy as well. DPRK activities will not be addressed in detail.

The Result: Review of the national security objectives, the emphasis that the evolving strategy places on various aspects of this strategy and how the Combatant Commander matches means to ends will provide sufficient conclusions. This will enable recommendations for the relationship with the DPRK to be presented.
CHAPTER II

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The National Security Strategy of the United States, (NSS), is developed and published by the Administration as a broad statement encompassing all aspects of national security. The current version was presented by President Bush in January, 1993, shortly before leaving office. Security strategy in this context is not a partisan issue. It can be safely assumed that prior to publication, the document was coordinated with the Clinton Administration transition team, perhaps the President-elect himself. The fundamental aspects of U.S. national security are timeless and will not significantly change from Administration to Administration and in this case from Republican to Democratic Political Parties. Hardly a citizen could be found who could dispute the formulation:

[T]he United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions and people. This is a sovereign responsibility which we will not abdicate to any other nation or collective organization.1

This fundamental principle underlines the strategy developed to achieve "a vision of the world ... of freedom, respect for human rights, free markets and the rule of law."2 To achieve this vision and promote this fundamental principle, the NSS prescribes a strategy of "engagement and leadership." The strategy of engagement and leadership
contains four pillars which are developed and expanded within the NSS. Each of these four pillars have subsections which apply more or less to the specific topic of security in East Asia and the Pacific Region, and in particular, to North Korea.

The first pillar is that the U.S. seeks: "Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress." This pillar is directly impacted by the activities of the DPRK. U.S. attempts to strengthen and fulfill this vision may have a reciprocal impact on the DPRK. The DPRK is a regional threat to stability and its activities run counter to peaceful change and progress.

Within this pillar, the U.S. has four goals guiding its security efforts. The first goal is protection of U.S. citizens from attack; secondly, is strengthening and honoring alliances; thirdly, is "ensuring that no hostile power is able to dominate or control a region critical to our interests;" and fourthly, limiting proliferation. The activities of the DPRK over the course of 1993, have had both direct and indirect impacts on these stated U.S. goals.

The second pillar seeks: "Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide." Any overt act of aggression by the DPRK against the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK or South Korea) would challenge this aspect of U.S. security strategy. The third pillar, "[a]n open international trading and economic system which benefits all
participants," would be impacted by conflict in the region. The economic isolation of the DPRK is self imposed and is part of this impact.

The fourth pillar is the U.S. position for crisis response. The U.S. "can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises." The U.S. has assumed this leadership role with respect to the activities of the DPRK in 1993. First and foremost, the U.S. has negotiated with the representatives of the DPRK to provide a means by which withdrawal from the NPT could be forestalled. Secondly, through bilateral agreement the DPRK entered negotiations with the IAEA to establish anew inspections of nuclear facilities. The results of these negotiations has yet to be determined, but the U.S. continues to provide key aspects of leadership to ensure that the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, (NPT), are respected and a protocol for inspections is established.

Reflecting the broad principle of national security and supported by the four pillars is the conclusion that regional solutions are required for regional problems. The role of the U.S. is not to be the world's "policeman," but to be a "catalyst, an honest broker and a full partner" in the process of "bringing adversaries together to resolve their differences peacefully."

The unique challenges of different regions of the world mandate that the U.S. derive a tailored strategy. In the
NSS, a five-fold agenda is presented for Asia. The first is to maintain a strategic framework which recognizes the U.S. as a Pacific power; the second is to promote expanding markets; third, is to support, contain or balance the emergence of China; fourth, is to "play a critical role in the peaceful unification process on the Korean peninsula;" and fifth, is to encourage the normalization of Indochina. Balanced pursuit of each item reflects the commitment of the U.S. as a Pacific power and the importance of this region to U.S. security and prosperity. Pursuit of this regional agenda for Asia encompasses the full range of available means.

The defense strategy outlined in the NSS shifts in concert with the developing world from that of a global threat to a world of regional "challenges and opportunities." The threats to national security which are identified include aggressive nationalistic tensions, proliferation, terrorism and the drug trade. The DPRK, as the focus of this overview, embodies two of these threats, nationalistic tension and proliferation.

Countering these identified threats forms the fundamental basis of a national defense strategy. The elements of this strategy are strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. Strategic deterrence and defense as well as reconstitution cut across all regions and are global in
focus. For East Asia and the Pacific, and specifically Korea, the emphasis is on forward presence and crisis response. This is the foundation of the Combatant Commander's regional command strategy.

Promoting U.S. national security through a strategy of "engagement" enables the U.S. to be in a position to lead emerging relationships both globally and regionally. The regionally focused defense strategy is one of the principle approaches to influencing the future. For East Asia and the Pacific, promoting regional stability is the overall objective. Within this objective the NSS specifically states: "support North and South Korean bilateral treaties and normalization of relations." Elsewhere, as previously quoted, the NSS states: "we must continue to play a critical role in the peaceful unification process on the Korean peninsula."

These seemingly contradictory statements are part of the dilemma which must be faced in the actions or relationship of the U.S. to East Asia. Does the U.S. support North and South Korea as partners in security arrangements; or does the U.S. support the unification of Korea? Are the two positions mutually exclusive in either the short or long term? Prior to addressing this issue, it is necessary to review the evolving security strategy of the Clinton Administration.
CHAPTER III

AN EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

After one year in office, the Democratic Administration has yet to publish an update to the National Security Strategy of the United States, (NSS). This should not be an overriding concern. The world has not significantly changed since the last update; nor have the challenges or threats which are faced. The fundamental principle remains the same and the document was written with a sufficiently broad perspective so as to accommodate a wide range of priorities and emphasis. The Clinton Administration has, however, provided a coordinated presentation of their foreign policy agenda and a tailoring of their approach to national security.

Key Administration officials of the national security/foreign policy team presented a series of three speeches leading up to the Presidential address to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Together, the speeches cover all aspects of the national security agenda.

The first speech was delivered by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. In a wide ranging address titled "Building Peace in the Middle East," two points were made relevant to the evolving security strategy and foreign policy agenda. The first is that the U.S. will continue to
pursue an activist foreign policy; there will be no retreat to isolationism. The second point is that to protect our vital interests abroad, America will act both unilaterally and multilaterally.

Establishing these two points reinforces the U.S. commitment to internationalism which is consistent with the NSS of January, 1993. Furthermore, the Administration views the position of the U.S. as having a continuing responsibility and unique capacity to provide leadership.

Remaining engaged internationally is a prerequisite and a requirement for leadership. Remaining engaged also promotes U.S. global economic interests. An activist foreign policy is also the departure point for consideration of a national security strategy. "America is viewed as the fulcrum on which peace and security rests."13

The second issue addressed is of exercising power alone or with others. This is not viewed as an "either-or" proposition. The central purposes of the policy is to ensure U.S. security, economic prosperity and to promote democratic values; when the purposes are threatened our vital interests are threatened. And, "we retain the option to act alone when that is best for us. Let no one doubt the resolve of the United States to protect its vital interests."14

The value of collective action is also stressed. It is viewed as a means, not an end in itself, and does not
exclude unilateral action. Collective action is particularly required for efforts concerning proliferation, barriers to trade and protection of the environment.

With regard to an evolving security strategy for East Asia and the Pacific with emphasis on Korea, the Secretary of State has remained consistent with the published NSS. An action by the DPRK which threatens U.S. security, our protection of democratic values, our economic prosperity, will be dealt with either unilaterally or collectively. With regards to the DPRK as a state currently engaged in the proliferation of advanced weapons, the Secretary’s statement is also consistent with the NSS. The NSS states, as one of the four principles of a non-proliferation policy, that the U.S. will: "Seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while reserving the capability for unilateral action."15

An activist international policy of engagement which establishes the validity of both unilateral and multilateral response is developed further by the speech of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Anthony Lake. The speech proposes a strategy of "enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."16 The strategy has four components.

The first two components focus on economics, but include a military aspect as well. Together these two components are strengthening the major market democracies and the need to foster and consolidate new democracies and
market economies. These two components, including the military aspect are presented in terms of Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union and a future role for NATO. With regards to the Asia Pacific region, Japan, as a major market democracy, and the conception of a New Pacific Community as previously outlined by the President are included.

The military has a specific role within the third and fourth components. The third component of an enlargement strategy is to counter aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets. The DPRK, based on centralized power, control of the military, xenophobia and irredentism is a hostile state.

Our policy toward such states, so long as they act as they do, must seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically and technologically. It must stress intelligence, counterterrorism, multilateral export controls ... apply global norms regarding weapons of mass destruction and ensure their enforcement. While some of these efforts will be unilateral, international rules are necessary.

With respect to the January, 1993, NSS, this position represents the most significant departure.

The NSS, unlike the position put forth here, does not outline steps to counter hostile regimes. The Administration's position does reflect the steps which have been progressively applied to North Korea over the course of the past year. These steps have had the effect of limiting the scope of U.S. response to the actions of the DPRK.
The fourth and final component of a strategy of enlargement addresses the humanitarian agenda. This agenda item, in addition to covering the provision of aid, includes working to help democracy and market economics develop in regions of greatest humanitarian concern. For the PACOM AOR, humanitarian responses are not limited to disaster relief and other traditional projects. Initiation of efforts for education, nutrition and promoting health concerns will be given new priorities. The PACOM regional command strategy should promote this initiative.

Having presented foreign policy goals and provided an outline of an evolving national security strategy, the Ambassador to the United Nations addressed the "Use of Force in a Post Cold War World." The speech echoes the positions previously presented with regards to the threats and the four goals of enlargement.

Achievement of these goals requires a flexibility in making choices between unilateral and multilateral responses within a global or regional context or via force or diplomacy. The U.S. "remains committed to the cause of peace and to the principle of resolving conflicts without violence whenever that is possible. ... Diplomacy will always be America's first choice, ..." This characterization of America's response does not apply to the Constitutional responsibility to protect U.S. territory, its people and their way of life. The military must retain the
capability and capacity for effective employment, along with the political will of the government to use force.

The debate over the use of force centers on defining a checklist and the scope of America’s concerns and interests. In response, the "Administration has wisely avoided the temptation to devise a precise list of the circumstances under which military force might be used, ..." 21 Establishment of a precise decision matrix impacts the flexibility and could preclude available options. Sometimes the response may be multilateral, sometimes unilateral, dependent on which circumstance best suits America’s interests. Rather than a checklist of criteria to meet, the approach is to define limitations which must be resolved before the decision to use force can be taken.

The Administration’s position can be stated as:

fashioning a new framework that is more diverse and flexible than the old- a framework that will advance American interest, promote American values, and preserve American leadership. ... implement this framework on a case-by-case basis, relying on diplomacy whenever possible, on force when absolutely necessary. ... Recognizing that global solutions are required to global problems. 22

This summary is descriptive of the way in which North Korea has been addressed over the past year. The relationship to North Korea has relied on diplomacy, force has not yet been necessary since in a flexible definition of the issues, North Korea has not impacted our ability to advance American
interests and values nor have they threatened our vital interest in a measurable or quantifiable way.

These three speeches preceded and laid the ground work for the Presidential address to the United Nations General Assembly. His speech reiterates and refines the points made concerning the threats and opportunities which are faced. His description of America in the future is of an engaged leader who "will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot for peace." 23

The evolving national security strategy of the Clinton Administration, based on these September speeches, reinforces the basic tenets and principles of the NSS of January, 1993. The evolving position diverges in a strengthened reliance on diplomacy as a foreign policy tool of first choice, but this diplomacy is backed up by stronger statements concerning the willingness for action when required. This action will be multilateral if it serves America's interest, or unilateral when required; this also is consistent with the NSS.

One key to the evolving strategy appears to be the abandonment of the checklist approach to the use of force, and its replacement with reliance on a case-by-case evaluation of the limitations of the situations. This divergence may impact the regional command strategy of the Combatant Commanders, specifically as it is applied to North Korea.
CHAPTER IV

PACOM REGIONAL COMMAND STRATEGY AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The regional command strategy of the Combatant Commander is a methodology for matching the military means to the national objectives. This strategy provides a unifying basis for regional policy development and planning within the staff, evaluation and explanation of the military role within the region and a basis for action and activities in the local command area. The strategy is also the basis of congressional testimony and interaction with the public in explaining what is being done and what will be done.

The regional command strategy is derived from the National Security Strategy and is tailored to accomplish the military objectives by the National Military Strategy. Within the PACOM AOR, this process is further refined by the Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, a Presidential report to the Congress. Because of the changing of Administrations and Political Parties, additional refinements to foreign policy and national security priorities have been put forward in the form of speeches by Administration officials. From this plethora of guidance, USCINCPAC developed a regional command strategy of "Cooperative Engagement."
This strategy has three objectives:
- engagement and participation in peace,
- deterrence and cooperation in crisis,
- unilateral or multilateral victory in combat.  

These objectives are pursued by the military in three ways; forward presence, bilateral relationships and alliances, and through coalition training, exercising and positioning.  

These objectives and methodology are consistent with the NSS and the evolving strategy of the Clinton Administration.

The PACOM regional security strategy also provides for continuing to maintain the stability in the region to promote continued economic growth. This growth, in turn, promotes greater regional stability and security. The strategy accounts for the importance of bilateral and multilateral defense oriented treaties and agreements in the region. But the strategy identifies a number of challenges that the strategy must address. These challenges parallel those developed in the NSS and in the evolving strategy of the Administration.

In the regional command strategy, these challenges are refined to the country level. In Korea, USCINCPAC faces the challenge of continuing "to transition from a leading to a supporting role." This transition is based on Phase I of the previously designed "East Asia Strategy Initiative," which was part of a Presidential report to Congress. This initiative included changes to the command structure in
Korea by placing the ROK in leadership roles with the U.S. in support. Phase I also initiated U.S. troop reductions in Korea.

Because of the significant challenges posed by North Korea's activities, specifically the nuclear weapons program, the troop reductions were suspended. The North Korea nuclear program has been characterized as a "challenge to world peace." The PACOM regional command strategy of "Cooperative Engagement" accounts for countering this challenge by providing a strategic framework "organized into three tiers of forces: forward stationed, forward based and continental U.S. based." These forces are tailored to meet specific challenges and, in peacetime, to promote engagement and participation with friends and allies in activities ranging from major exercises to construction projects. This peacetime preparation ensures a ready fighting force and experience with potential allies and friends. The training process ensures that the U.S. forces are ready to respond unilaterally if required or multilaterally if that is in support of U.S. interests. This strategy is consistent with the NSS and supports the evolving strategy of the Administration.

Within the Presidential report, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, one of the tailored objectives is
to maintain deterrence in Korea. An enabling factor of meeting this objective is:

to assist the ROK military in force improvement, while at the same time adjusting coalition structures and capabilities to match 'leading to supporting' objectives. One example is through training and frequent combined exercises, such as TEAM SPIRIT, ... Another is to help the ROK purchase or produce military systems that improve its military capabilities in critical warfighting functions.

To meet this objective, it is essential that the forces in Korea conduct scheduled exercises and continue modernization and upgrading of equipment separate from the political/diplomatic environment. This objective is consistent with the NSS, the evolving Administration strategy, and the NMS.

Preparing these forces is essential to meet the "win-win" strategy of the "Bottom Up Review" anticipated as the basis of a forthcoming National Military Strategy. The "Bottom Up Review" stressed the criticality of allied cooperation and the need for "capability enhancements." Consistent with the "Bottom Up Review," this could include the positioning of "more Army heavy brigade equipment sets ashore overseas ... one or two in the Pacific," Other modernization and force tailoring initiatives which would ensure the combat capability of the forces in Korea should also be evaluated as refinements to the PACOM regional command strategy.
The regional command strategy focuses on matching the military means to achieve the national objectives by addressing the specific challenges of individual states. For the DPRK, this has resulted in defaulting to the worst case scenario of deterring potential aggression. Actions directed by the regional strategy supports this matching; it reinforces the alliances with South Korea and Japan, it builds cooperation with other Asian-Pacific nations and it prepares U.S. forces to act both multilaterally and unilaterally to protect or promote U.S. interests. There is a need, however, for refinements based on the conclusions which can be drawn from the discussion of the evolving national security strategy.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The National Security Strategy of the United States as presented in January 1993 identifies an approach to meeting the national level security objectives. The combatant commander's regional command strategy translates this guidance into an approach of matching military means to furthering those objectives. The objectives are timeless and relatively consistent, even in this case where the political party of the Administration has changed. The divergence comes in the difference of emphasis, priority and approach. This divergence is amplified as the focus narrows from the national-global context through the regional level and finally to an individual country and security issue.

With respect to the issues surrounding the DPRK, this is particularly relevant. At the national-global level, the DPRK must be considered as a threat to stability based on the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and as a state engaged in proliferation. As such, the DPRK is countered across the entire spectrum of responses. The outstanding question in the debate is what is the appropriate response at the regional level? And, secondly, can the regional level be de-linked from the global-national level.
At the regional level, the focus and actions are the narrowest and perhaps most volatile. Based on the strategy guidance, the combatant commander developed a regional command strategy that defaults to the worst case. The strategy is based on the deterrence value of forward based forces and should that fail on the capability to act, either multilaterally or unilaterally. This strategy draws on a three tier level of forces, forward based, forward deployed and continental U.S. based.

Within the available guidance, inclusive of the evolving strategy of the Administration this is the only acceptable option. As the only option, several recommendations for refinement can be made. First, all modernization and "force multipliers" should be made available to the forward based forces. Second, these forces should be at the highest level of readiness. Modernization and exercises should not be hostage to the national-global debate. The currency for negotiation at the international level of diplomacy should not be the military force. At this level the debate should center on the diplomatic-political initiatives available. Reliance on diplomacy is one of the stated stratagems of the Administration.

At the regional level, the linkage of the military forces to the international debate has created a volatile circumstance. This linkage was established when: "The United States endorsed South Korea's decision to ease
tensions by canceling the 1992 U.S.-ROK "team spirit" military exercises and worked with North Korea to elicit Pyongyang's attendance at a nuclear weapons conference supported by the United States."34

This linkage was considered a small price for the DPRK finally embracing the IAEA accords. But, the linkage creates a precedent and now, in 1994, the new Administration faces the same issue anew. Does the U.S. pay the price by cancellation of the U.S.-ROK exercise to gain one year of accession to the IAEA accords? Is this to be an annual requirement? Has the DPRK now raised the price to include decisions on the modernization of the stationed forces? The recommendation is to break the linkage by accomplishing both modernization and continuing the scheduled Team Spirit exercise. Once the linkage is broken, then it may be possible to return to the 1991 posture of "seek[ing] to persuade North Korea of the benefit of confidence building measures as a first step to lasting peace and reunification."35 If this position is re-obtainable, this time the military forces of all three participants in the Korean peninsula security equation can come to the negotiation table. Unlike the 1991 strategy, which endorsed stability on the basis of direct North-South talks, stability on the peninsula can only be addressed in a regional context. All regional actors have a responsibility in this security equation. It is recommended that the U.S.
pursue negotiations in a regional forum which includes the two Korea's, China and Japan.

At the global level, there are two issues for U.S. national security centered on the DPRK nuclear program. The first is that the DPRK must accept international norms and the second is that the integrity of the IAEA must be maintained. Both conclusions are consistent with the NSS and the evolving strategy of the Administration. For the DPRK to accept international norms, it is recommended that the Administration continue to engage the DPRK in dialogue and negotiation continuing to pursue diplomacy.

Recent debate has centered on sanctions being applied against North Korea. Sanctions are not recommended for a variety of reasons. "International sanctions might have little impact because North Korea already is one of the world's poorest and most economically isolated nations." Two other arguments against sanctions center on resolving the action to be anticipated against the most likely objectors to sanctions, Iran. What actions could be taken against this nation? Is the benefit of sanctions against North Korea worth the price of a probable crisis with Iran? Is the answer to go straight through escalation with a Security Council resolution against both? Working through the answers to these questions would argue against applying sanctions against North Korea.
The second argument against sanctions relates to the leverage China has over North Korea as the only regional ally. This issue is closely linked with the leverage the U.S. holds against China on trade issues. Is a Chinese abstention on a Security Council resolution for sanctions against North Korea worth de-linking trade issues from human rights issues? For this Administration, I would suggest that this is too high a price.

Sanctions carry a high price when viewed in the context of other global issues. The risks to both regional stability and stability in other areas of the world works to preclude the argument for sanctions. The recommendation is to remain patient. Stay the course and allow the existing economic isolation to continue to pressure North Korea.

Turning to the international issue surrounding the IAEA, again the recommendation is to stay the current course by maintaining the hard line that the DPRK must accept unlimited access by the inspection team. The IAEA cannot be allowed to negotiate a compromise solution. The integrity and independence of the IAEA will best serve the U.S. interest in the long run. The independence of the IAEA served U.S. interest well following the Gulf War. This same level of independence will prove effective in North Korea. In the long run, this same independence will have value in dealing with the future non-nuclear states of Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Compromise should be out of the question on the IAEA issue.

The recommendation is to maintain the standoff. At this point only the DPRK has anything to gain by movement over the inspection regime. A standoff is far worse for them than for the U.S. or other regional actors. Just as the link which the DPRK forged in 1992 with U.S. military exercises has proven to be a detriment to the U.S. negotiating position, so would creation of the same link to the IAEA prove a detriment. The recommendation is to stay the course, maintaining a nearly uncompromising position, while pressing for movement at the regional level.

The key to meeting the third component of the Administration strategy of enlargement, supporting the liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets, can only be found at the regional level. At the regional level, the combatant commander has a unique role to play. The regional command strategy must continue to provide the basis for countering potential aggression and it must also address promoting greater openness and transparency of its purely defensive character. It is recommended that this be accomplished by the regional commander becoming engaged in regional dialogue over security issues with all regional actors.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

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7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 7.


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11. Ibid., p. 8.


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18. Lake, p. 17.


20. Ibid., p. 666.
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22. Ibid., p. 668.


25. Ibid., p. 124.


29. Larson, Defense 93, p. 47.

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