OPERATION STRONG WIND

FORT LEE'S RESPONSE TO A LOCAL TORNADO DISASTER

6 AUGUST 1993

by

Dr. Lynn L. Sims

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6 AUGUST 1993

by

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Command Historian
Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia
November 1993
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Foreword

This monograph records the actions of soldiers and civilians at Fort Lee as they helped the Tri-City area after a tornado touched down, Friday 6 August 1993 at about 1330. An increasingly important military role is Operations Other Than War, (OOTW). Hopefully this monograph will be used for lessons associated with OOTW.

Monday following the Friday tornado, COL Larry Fulbright, the Combined Arms Support Command's Chief of Staff and my boss, suggested I write a history of the Army's role in the clean-up effort. That is the kind of guidance I enjoy getting. That same day I conducted several oral history interviews with principal players. Tapes used in this monograph are my office.

All together I interviewed 21 people and read the after action reports, news stories, and talked informally with those who had first-hand perceptions about the Army's role.

I completed a rough draft in early October and sent it to 16 people for comments. I also talked with the fire departments involved, the staff of the "Traveller," the "Progress Index," the State Police, and the National Guard Bureau.

Of special help getting documents were CPTs John J. Johnson and Jimmy D. Hedgepath, Jr. of the Fort Lee Emergency Operations Center. They also put me on to people who could help.

The writing part of this study came at a time when I had other important work in progress, and there were days I was not able to work on this. I did the writing on my desk word processor and printed the final copy with help of Pat Hoy.

Helping me gather photos were SSG M. E. Venema of the "Traveller" staff, and Mary Evans, Public Relations Specialist with the Department of State Police.

I appreciate the help people gave me. Of course any errors of interpretation, commission or omission are mine alone.

Lynn L. Sims
CASCOM Command Historian
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OPERATION STRONG WIND

Introduction

On 1 September, less than one month after Fort Lee responded to a tornado that touched down in the Tri-City area of Petersburg, Hopewell, and Colonial Heights, General Colin Powell said in a news conference:

...we have a value system and a culture system within the Armed Forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the nation's wars. That's what we do.

Why do we do it? For this purpose: to provide for the common defense. And who do we do it for? We do it for the American people. We never want to lose sight of this ethic. Now at the same time, because we are able to fight and win the nation's wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these new other missions that are coming along--peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief--you name it, we can do it.

And we can modify our doctrine, we can modify our strategy, we can modify our structure, our equipment, our training, our leadership techniques, everything else to do these other missions. But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces--to fight and win the nation's wars.

Fort Lee's response to the call for help was fast, ample, flexible, and caring. When the civilian community had mustered their forces to deal with the situation, the Army left. Fort Lee troops and most equipment retired from the scene within 34 hours, all Army equipment was recovered within 21 days. According to General Colin Powell that's the way it should work.
Background

This section provides a setting to help the reader understand the Army's response to local disaster, the subject of this paper.

This background information comes from the Richmond "Times-Dispatch" for 7 and 8 August, 8 October, and the first published issue after the event of the Fort Lee Post paper, the "Traveller," 12 August.

The Tri-City area of Petersburg, Hopewell, and Colonial Heights had not had rain in quite a while and people anxiously were looking for some, so when the sky became gray on Friday 6 August most people were pleased. Earlier thundershowers had formed over Blackstone, VA, near Fort Pickett, 20 miles to the west of Fort Lee, and that storm was moving east about 20 miles per hour.

Central and Southeast Virginia are not covered by Doppler radar which can detect not only wind motion but speed. Local officials did get calls from the Blackstone police about the approaching storm and from a pilot flying in the area. The whole state of Virginia experiences about five or six tornadoes a year and they usually have winds less than 100 miles per hour.

By the time the storm reached this area it had formed into several tornadoes and covered about a 13-mile path. One tornado took no more than two minutes to pass over the Tri-City area, then moved further east where it did more damage before dissipating over the Atlantic Ocean. Twenty thousand people in this area lost power due to the storm which had a F3 rating, (winds from 158 to 206 miles per hour), on the Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale.

Two areas were the heaviest hit. One was in Petersburg in an area including the historic district, renovated warehouse district, mini mall, and flea market, collectively called Old Towne. It is a trendy area which was in the process of making a strong economic statement. Next to that area was an historic black community on Pocahontas Island in the Appomattox River. Homes there are modest, and constructed of wood.

The second area heavily hit was Southpark mall in Colonial Heights, adjacent to Interstate 95, and less than a mile from Old Towne and Pocahontas Island. Most destruction happened at Wal-Mart's 110,000 square foot store which employed 400.

That store had opened in January 1990 and paid the most sales tax of any business in Colonial Heights. Historically, Friday afternoons, when the tornado hit, was the busiest day and time of the week for Wal-Mart, the must-shopped store in the mall. Two Wal-Mart cashiers and one customer were killed.

Across the large parking lot from Wal-Mart was a K-Mart store, 104,000 square foot with 125 employees, which had been opened two years. It did not take a direct hit but suffered significant damage and had three customers and one employee...
injured. A total of 150 people were injured in all locations.

In Petersburg, people who were in the area helped those injured. At Southpark mall, beside people helping people, civilian disaster elements set up a staging area near the Sears store. Colonial Heights Fire Chief John E. Snyder was one of the first responding to the disaster.

The almost immediate failure of cellular telephone communications was blamed for the initial breakdown in organization. The cellular phone system was not able to handle the many calls from tornado-stranded motorists, the normal traffic, civilian emergency teams, and the news media. During the two-hour period after the tornado struck, cellular subscribers historically make 5,000 "tries." On this day callers made 26,000 tries on a system which can carry 13,000 tries maximum. Especially disrupted was the regional plan to distribute the injured equitably to the area hospitals.

As a result of this experience, the local cellular company, Contel, is looking at developing software that will give priority to emergency vehicles. That would be breaking new ground for cellular phone services.
Reactive Organization

On Fort Lee, MAJ Victoria Spinelli, acting commander of the 49th Quartermaster Group (Petroleum) recently formed, 4 June 1993, first heard about a tornado at 1340 when she called COL Warner Ferguson, Assistant Commandant of the Quartermaster School, about another matter. She was on "hold" and heard the local radio station broadcasted into the phone, say a tornado had hit. While still on hold she shouted to SGM Elijah Ross to get everyone under cover.

Prior to knowing about the tornado, electrical power had gone off in Group Headquarters at 1330. Within ten minutes the Group had guards on standby and informed the Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS) of that. DPTMS informed the 49th that a mission was pending and by 1355 Group had instructions to form a 100-person detail for duty at Southpark mall where the tornado had touched down.

After the phone conversation with COL Ferguson, MAJ Spinelli drove to his office in Mifflin Hall about 1355, and met with him and COL Barry Bates, the 23d Brigade Commander. That was when she heard from COL Ferguson that Fort Lee had been asked to help the civilian authorities with ambulances and military police.

She told COL Ferguson DPTMS had already instructed them to get 100 soldiers together for a detail. COL Ferguson realized there needed to be a central point of contact and told MAJ Spinelli all taskings would come to her through his office. COL Ferguson told her to alert the 54th QM Co but hold it in reserve.

She was back in her office by 1510, gathered her staff and told them they were on alert and to hold the soldiers in their duty sections.

The Petersburg city attorney had called LTG Samuel N. Wakefield, Post Commander, about 1440, on behalf of the city manager, Ms. Valerie A. Lemmie, asking for some help with the aftermath of the tornado. LTG Wakefield called the Fort Lee Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 1445 and directed the post give all the support it could to Petersburg and Colonial Heights.

According to the local civilian authorities there was nothing unusual about this operation except for the short time it took for Federal troops to get involved. What was supposed to happen was Petersburg should have asked the governor that he request Federal troops. The governor in turn would have called the Federal Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA), who would have evaluated the request. If the National Guard could not fill the request then it would go to Federal troops. In reality Fort Lee, (Federal troops), went right in when the local community requested help.

As it turned out Fort Lee's greatest effort was in Colonial Heights, not Petersburg. CPT John J. Johnson, duty officer at the Emergency Operations Center, (EOC), returned the call of the Petersburg city attorney just after 1500, and found out no assistance was needed there then, but probably later they would
generator for its EOC. Everyone was reacting to requirements.

The 49th Group called in more of its people, as they were getting a lot of phone calls for help. Then they found out Old Towne in Petersburg also had been hit hard by the tornado.

In the CASCOM Command Group, CSM Fred Luttrell and CASCOM Chief of Staff, COL Larry Fulbright heard that a tornado had touched down in the Southpark mall. The mayor of Petersburg called to ask LTG Wakefield for help, but the CG was in a meeting. COL Fulbright took the message then left for the scene with CSM Luttrell and SFC Everett W. Green. They got to the scene by following a fire truck into the parking lot. They were relieved to notice Chi-Chi's restaurant, where LTG Wakefield's son worked, was untouched.

At the site COL Fulbright talked by phone to CPT Johnson and LTC Lee Duffy at the DPTMS EOC, and told them to get someone out there. CPT Rene Brown arrived and he and COL Fulbright went with Fire Chief Paul Mauger, of the Chesterfield Fire Department's Emergency Operations Division to check the site. By that time there had been at least two civilian command posts established on site, and no one really knew who was in charge.

On post, busses reported to the 240th's area about 1430 and the first soldiers of the 49th Group rolled out of post. A couple other military vehicles followed the busses. When they arrived at the site twenty minutes later, they set up radio communications with the 240th's EOC, and the 240th also had telephone contact with them. 49th Group had communications through the 240th in about an hour.

At 1600, about 90 minutes after the busses left, CPT Michael Bird, Commander of the 54th Mortuary Affairs Company traveled to the site with about 30 soldiers. CPT Bird assessed the situation and returned with his report within two hours while his troops remained at the mall with ILT Steven Van Brackle under the command of CPT Cox. LT Van Brackle and CPT Bird's soldiers returned about midnight when the requirement was better known. They were replaced by four soldiers with mortuary affairs skills.

Other officers who would be involved found out about the tornado in various ways. ILT David Roath from Mortuary Affairs heard about the tornado's touch down at 1500 from the radio. He checked on his soldiers, who were all right, then waited for instructions. Because the power was out, he knew something big was up.

LT Roath happened to be post duty officer that night and when he reported for duty he saw the activity to get troops from the 49th Group to go to the Colonial Heights mall. He was in DPTMS building, #8040 on "C" Ave, when he found out there were soldiers from the 54th and 16th Field Services Company waiting to load busses at the 240th's parking lot. CPT Johnson saw LT Roath, and told him to hook up with the 54th and go to the site.

1LT Chris Konicki, Executive Officer of 49th Group HQ Company, learned about the tornado from his soldiers who had heard it on the radio. CPT Renee Roberts, Petroleum Plans Officer, first realized something was happening when some of her soldiers were
need some soldiers for clean-up and security roles.

MAJ Chris Iskra, Executive Officer of the 240th Bn, unofficially heard about the tornado right after it happened at 1330, when the power went off. Then rumors began. The 240th began taking calls from people all over post, mostly they wanted to borrow generators for electrical backup. People also began stopping by without prior coordination to pick up things.

The first tasking the 240th got, at about 1355, was for 100 people to go to Wal-Mart. That call came from the DPTMS EOC who also gave the uniform requirement for the 100 soldiers, sent buses over, and said in lieu of detailed information, "Go support." During this period the 240th established their EOC and all requests began to go through CPT John H. Sutton, S-3 of the 240th Quartermaster Battalion.

MAJ Spinelli called MAJ Chris Iskra and relayed COL Ferguson's guidance. The 240th Quartermaster Battalion, part of the 49th Group, had already held a formation to get 100 soldiers to go to the mall, but some 54th soldiers, part of the 240th, had been in the formation, so they were pulled off the bus to be held in reserve as a unit.

MAJ Spinelli then established the 49th's EOC, and told the staff to take tasks only through the Mission Support Office (MSO). DPTMS had buses at the 49th's parking lot and the first troops left for the Southpark mall disaster site at 1530 about 45 minutes after the initial request.

MAJ Charles Coan, S-3 for the 49th Group first heard of the tornado about 1330 when the 49th began to react to requests due to the power outage on post. When power goes out, the 49th Group has the mission to provide a ten-man reaction force to secure buildings with electric alarm systems, such as the ammunition supply points.

MAJ Coan called the post EOC and spoke to CPT Johnson when the power went out. There was still some power through backup systems, but MAJ Coan found out there was a mission where the tornado touched down off post. The 49th Group did assemble a reaction force, and called the 240th QM Bn S-3, CPT Sutton, so he could alert the companies in the battalion. At this point MAJ Coan thought the 49th Group was on standby status. MAJ Coan stayed in the 49th Headquarters throughout the emergency.

After talking to CPT Sutton, CPT Johnson called back and said the 240th had to send 100 soldiers to Wal-Mart. There was some concern for public safety but no one knew exactly what the situation was, so everyone planned for the worst case. By this time the Quartermaster Center had a liaison officer in the DPTMS EOC. That position rotated by a duty roster until the EOC closed.

MAJ Coan called CPT Sutton and asked for 100 kevlar helmets, water points, rain gear, generators, lifting equipment, and trucks, so the 240th began identifying and gathering those things. At the same time the 49th was looking for generators for the post commissary, and for the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) Command Group, so it could power-up the communications
pulled away to load on the busses going to the site.

Another person to be involved in the disaster relief was the post Public Affairs Officer (PAO), Ms. Mari K. Eder, who heard about the tornado while shopping in the commissary. When the lights went out, she left for her office. There she found her people knew about the tornado from radio reports. They also had heard traffic information from a reporter's spouse who had monitored a police scanner. She called her people, even those off duty to ensure they were all right.

While the lights were out the PAO began getting calls. Ms. Eder sent two of her people to photograph the MPs working traffic intersections. After the reporters covered the MPs, they drifted to the mall to cover events there. The MPs had called in their off-duty troops and at the end of the civilian work day on post slowly released the usual Fort Lee traffic leaving post into the traffic flow. From 1600 to 1830 MPs rerouted some community traffic through the post to ease congestion on civilian streets.

The post EOC called the PAO saying they had deployed 100 troops to the Wal-Mart area to look for victims. The EOC followed the standing operating procedure (SOP) by letting the PAO know what was happening. The post SOP calls for the PAO to be at a disaster site, but Ms. Eder was still trying to find one of her staff members whose husband and three children were in Wal-Mart when the tornado hit.

The PAO received a call that the husband and kids were at Southside Regional Medical Center, because the oldest boy needed 18 stitches in his head. When power returned Ms. Eder saw her unaccounted for soldier, mother of the boy at the hospital, on television at the site acting as a spokesman. Ms. Eder was disappointed she did not know her soldier was there, but the soldier was doing her job making the only two points she could make: Fort Lee is here, and Fort Lee is helping. The PAO kept a full staff on duty until about 1830.

The chaplain for the 49th Group, CH(MAJ) John Ghee, and CH(CPT) Peter Lee of the 240th Bn were traveling back together from visiting some of their troops supporting the National Boy Scout Jamboree at Fort A.P. Hill, 60 miles north of Fort Lee. They heard about the disaster on the car radio but were caught in the traffic jam on southbound I-95, so were not able to report to post until 1800. Chaplain Lee was not worried about the troops as he had been with these same soldiers as they worked in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in Florida, and also with them in Somalia. The troops would be fine until the chaplains arrived.

SFC Russell Datts of the 49th Group became involved in an accidental way. He was in uniform on his way to the mall to pick up his wife when he noticed the traffic lights were out.

SFC Datts's wife worked around the corner from Wal-Mart and he was trying to get to her, but all the streets were blocked so he knew something serious had happened. He resorted to riding in the parking lane on I-95. When he got to the mall turn off a policeman said, "Oh, you're going to help at Wal-Mart." and sent him through. SFC Datts didn't say anything to the contrary, and
continued. He reached Hardees where his wife worked, saw she was all right, and then saw the Wal-Mart debris and went toward it. Hardees told him, if anyone needed any food to call back and they would send over some.

As he approached the mall CPT Rene Brown, who had been sent out by the S-3 of the 240th to assess the situation, recognized SFC Datts, flagged him down, and pressed him into service.

CPT Brown, was the first from the 240th on the scene. He had been sent out, after COL Larry Fulbright directed through the post EOC to the 240th EOC, to get someone out there to assess the situation before troops and equipment arrived in any number. CPT Brown had driven his own car to the site and had a cellular phone. Off-duty soldiers and Army Reservists in civilian dress, as well as soldiers in uniform, began approaching COL Fulbright and CPT Brown asking what they could do to help.

Before the first bus load of troops arrived, SFC Datts had orders from CPT Brown to set up three tents; one for operations, one for medical, and one for the soldiers to gather when they arrived. CPT Brown said they were going to be working in eight-hour shifts. SFC Datts found out people like himself and CPT Brown, were going to need kevlar, (helmets), in lieu of hard hats if they planned to go in the rubble. He used the police phone to call the 240th and told them he needed tents, kevlars, and goggles, and in return was told they would be on the first vehicles coming out, and to stay in touch.

While equipment was on the way, SFC Datts became the Army's liaison for civilian medical and fire personnel. SFC Datts also identified himself to the Virginia State Police Liaison Officer, who CPT Brown was taking orders from.

Civilian leaders immediately came up to CSM Luttrell and COL Fulbright asking for the Army's help to move the debris and search for bodies. CSM Luttrell saw the PAO sergeant doing a good job talking to the media and consulting with COL Fulbright about proper things to say. Right behind fire and rescue people comes the media because they listen to emergency communication nets. They will take over if not properly handled.

Also CSM Luttrell saw LT Timothy Frazier, a nurse from Kenner Army Hospital, with his ambulances and small team of workers already at work in the triage area they had established.

Kenner received a call from the State Police about 1410 requesting help and immediately Dr. (COL) Macasaet, acting hospital commander, initiated Kenner's mass casualty plan. LT Frazier did not hesitate to leave for the scene. He was on the first of two ambulances with four other medics total that traveled together to the mall. The ambulances went down Temple Ave before the traffic got bad, but had their loudspeakers on telling people to pull to the side as the ambulances traveled down the middle.

On the way they stopped to check an over-turned vehicle and also checked the Red Lobster restaurant as ethically they can not pass anyone needing assistance. At the scene it was obvious to LT Frazier the thing needed most was organization, and the Army is good at that.
After looking at a couple patients, LT Frazier realized that all rescue squads responding were completely mobile, driving in and out of a patient and driving away, and they remained that way for the first two hours. To establish a base, LT Frazier kept one Army ambulance on the scene as a resuscitation vehicle and it was the first permanent medical presence at the scene.

LT Frazier did triage people to go to Kenner but because of no radio communications with Kenner, rescue squad drivers did not drive to post. Only military ambulances carried people to Kenner, but they also took people to Southside Hospital in Petersburg.

When the Kenner ambulances first arrived injured people were all over the parking lot where friends had carried them, or they had walked trying to get to their cars. Most cars were wrecked, piled on top of one another or overturned, and the parking lot was a mass of confusion. Civilian rescue vehicles were weaving in and out of piles of wrecked cars and knots of people comforting the injured. Some injured who were taken to hospitals first, were not the most serious cases, they just happened to be the ones the rescue vehicle first saw. Army medics did treat a lacerated liver, the person later died, a closed chest wound, an amputated foot, and innumerable lacerations and broken bones.

A civilian group had organized a triage area some distance away from Wal-Mart by the Sears store, but after the medics set up at the Wal-Mart the civilians relocated to the Army's position. At the triage area, medics and volunteers formed a litter line to get the injured to triage, then they organized a route for the rescue vehicles to approach the triage area, load the injured, and another route for the vehicles to leave. After that was done the organization and discipline was awesome. A line of ambulances developed and after the first hospital run, military ambulances just fell in line as part of the cue which had as many as 42 rescue squad vehicles at one time!

All this was done before state and federal officials arrived. When they did arrive the Army began to back off from what had been a very aggressive response to an organizational void and medical need. LT Frazier told state representatives the military was there to support the soldiers, there being no more injured civilians by that time. LT Frazier and a crew of three medics stayed at the scene all the time involving themselves in preventive medicine, insuring the quality of the water in the water buffaloes and the food brought out by restaurants, and keeping track of heat categories.

After three hours or so, and after the injured had been moved to hospitals, a "space ship" rescue vehicle arrived from Norfolk with "everything" on it, including a mobile surgical unit. They had stayed in Norfolk until they were sure they would not be needed there. When they arrived the Army ambulance was truly outclassed, but timeliness does count for something.

Cooperation between the medics the civilian medical groups was excellent. LT Frazier and some medics previously had practiced with the civilian rescue people so they saw people they
knew. Soldiers stand out in BDUs and people were drawn to them and they became the center of the medical activity. After about three hours a military ambulance went to Old Towne to evaluate the situation there, but determined they were not needed there.

After CPT Cox arrived LT Frazier met him and pointed out his location if any soldiers were injured. Also by this time state officials had arrived, and LT Frazier's mission shifted 100% to supporting the soldiers.

CSM Luttrell used the State Police radios to keep in touch with the DPTMS EOC. Looting had begun but State Troopers moved in quickly and secured the area. When the busses of soldiers arrived they began to set up tents for shelter as the weather was still rainy and threatening.

Volunteers, active Army, Reserves, and civilians, helped with various aspects of triage and some military were used in the first sweep of the fields looking for bodies behind the Wal-Mart. For the military on the scene it was frustrating to see no one take control. It seemed like a very long period of time before anyone systematically began to look for people under the collapsed Wal-Mart walls and roof.

CPT Bruce Cox, commander of the 16th Field Services Company, was coming into his office on his day off to do some paper work, and passed through Southpark mall right after the tornado hit. Once in his office he changed into a spare uniform and then, along with CPT Michael Bird, commander of the 54th QM Company called the first formation of soldiers from every company in the 240th.

While in formation, CPT Cox briefed the soldiers on what to expect, and warned them not to steal from the buildings. After the troops from the 54th QM Company were culled out to be held in reserve, he was about 20 troops short of the requested 100, but went anyway. He had about 70 enlisted and ten officers on the first busses.

LT Van Brackle, with the first troop movement, took the busses out the front gate, turned right, then left through the training areas, left on Temple Ave, and straight to the mall. There was no problem traveling, the police had cleared the roads.

MAJ Spinelli from her office talked to the 240th by telephone, and they in turn had FM communications with CPT Cox on site. CPT Cox commanded the first troops at the mall and established the operational site. MAJ Chris Iskra came to MAJ Spinelli's office about 1630 and they stayed in communication all through the operation.

At first few realized Old Towne, and Pocahontas Island in Petersburg had also suffered losses. So the post reacted in strength at the mall and sent nothing to Old Towne, or Pocahontas Island. Once the EOC realized there also was damage there, MAJ Spinelli was told to have another 100 soldiers on standby ready to go to Petersburg. At this point she began to cancel passes and leaves, to get the second 100 soldiers. The 49th did gather the second 100 and had them ready, but they never were called to go.
When the chaplains on post heard of the disaster, four of them went to Kenner Army Hospital. Only five injured people were transported by Army ambulance to Kenner because the phones at the hospital were out. It is normal policy for civilian rescue squad drivers not go where they have no phone contact, and they could not contact Kenner Army Hospital. Kenner did not consider this normal, and expected more injured than they received.

A 267th off-duty soldier, SPC Jackie Williams was shopping in Wal-Mart when the tornado hit and was injured. CPT Brown arrived on the scene just after she had been removed from the debris. Later he found her identification card in the rubble. She was taken to Southside Hospital in Petersburg, treated for bruises and released.

When Chaplain Lee arrived on post, he went to the hospital as he was the hospital duty chaplain. There were other chaplains already at the hospital so CH Lee went to his assigned unit, the 240th Battalion, and while there found out about SPC Williams who had been treated off post. He went to the barracks to see her, and thought she was still in shock, so took her to Kenner where a doctor checked her. CH Lee then took her back to her barracks.
Once CPT Cox arrived at the disaster site, followed by busses of his troops, he was in charge of the Ft. Lee effort. At that time CPT Brown who was there to assess the situation, returned to the 240th EOC. SFC Datts remained the senior NCO at the site and continued to act as a liaison. All other Army officers who came to the site had specific jobs to do. The four shift OICs, CPTs, Bruce Cox, Treasa Galgano, Stan Olson and Michael Bird were in charge as they replaced one another.

On post MAJ Spinelli alerted the dining facility to remain open to feed CPT Cox's troops returning at 2400. As far as anyone knew they would not have eaten, even though each soldier had taken a MRE on the bus. As it turned out, the local civilian restaurants and grocery stores set up excellent food lines at the mall and no troops returned hungry. Those troops who went out with later shifts ate at the site. The head count at the post dining hall that day was 17; usually it is about 200. MAJ Spinelli later ordered the 240th to stand down the cooks.

SFC Datts told the people who brought food, where to set up. There were people from Burger King, Hardees, Pizza Hut, McDonalds, Sonic, Ukrops, Food Lion, and more. There were eight or nine food tents functioning in that one parking lot. When Ukrops arrived, troops unloaded their truck, and from time to time two or three soldiers would do quick odd jobs for the providers of the food.

Liaison between the 240th EOC and the 49th Group's EOC worked well. About 1500, 1LT Konicki, 49th Group HQ Company Commander, got his field gear and went to the 240th, not sure exactly what his mission was to be. He reported to CPT Sutton, the 240th S-3, and found out he was the liaison between Group and the 240 QM Battalion. They set him up in an office and he relayed information to MAJ Coan or CPT Roberts over a dedicated telephone line. LT Konicki knew the 49th's assets and knew where he could get other things the 240th might need.

Anytime the 49th had something for the 240th, the message came through LT Konicki to CPT Sutton. LT Konicki had a runner with him, ROTC Cadet Joseph Hughes from Lycoming College, who was on duty with the 49th.

There were times LT Konicki could not get through on the phone, so Cadet Hughes ran messages the 200 meters between the 49th and 240th EOCs. Occasionally when LT Konicki was in a meetings, Cadet Hughes took calls from the 49th's EOC. Cadet Hughes also went out to gather data while LT Konicki relayed information. LT Konicki stayed at the 240th EOC until he was relieved at 1830.

The 49th Group had the big picture, both at Wal-Mart and Old Towne. The 49th made sure the right number of tents went to Wal-Mart, while enough remained if requested by Old Towne.

Between 1700 and 1740 the post EOC requested two UH-1Hs to be on stand by at Fort Belvoir, 110 miles to the north. They
also confirmed that Hopewell needed no military assistance, and the Chesterfield County EOC canceled its request for support. At 1800 the post EOC received a call from Washington D.C. saying Virginia Senators Warner and Robb may be arriving the next morning, Saturday. Delegate Norman Sisisky, D-4th who represents this area in Congress, was on hand.

The most immediate task for the 49th at this time, was getting the EOC set up and keeping up on what was happening and where people were going. Due to the newness of the unit, having been formed less than two months earlier, the 49th did not have an EOC SOP to consult. The frustration level was high because most people knew what needed to be done, but not always how to make it happen. Meanwhile on main post, the fire department called in a second crew for standby, but they received no calls.

CPT Bird got the status of his female soldier, SPC Williams, who had been injured in Wal-Mart through the post EOC. Initially CPT Bird believed she had died. This was the same soldier treated in Petersburg and the one CH Lee had looked after.

When CPT Cox first arrived on site he was introduced to Battalion Chief Paul Mauger of Chesterfield County. Before CPT Cox arrived, he was told to meet Fire Chief Moore from Colonial Heights, but CPT Cox never saw him and thought at the time there had been confusion in the names, and Mauger was Moore. That turned out not to be true, they were different chiefs from different companies. The incident commander was Deputy Chief Snyder from Colonial Heights, Chief Moore was the chief of Colonial Heights but did not take an active part at the site. Chief Snyder asked Chief Mauger to work with the military and assign them tasks.

CPT Cox talked to three or four fire chiefs from different jurisdictions who were all working under Mauger. CPT Cox followed the orders of Chief Mauger. That decision came after CPT Cox marched his troops, at the request of different people "in charge," between the Wal-Mart and K-Mart stores, about 500 meters apart, several times without accomplishing anything.

Chief Mauger was impressed by the patience and willingness of the soldiers to "hurry up and wait." He said he only had to ask once that something be done, and the soldiers were very "gung-ho" and easy to work with. The Chief also said COL Fulbright was especially helpful and willing to do all in the Army's power to help.

At the scene it was obvious there was confusion about who was in charge. Once CPT Cox got his mission from Chief Mauger, he stayed busy with his troops, hoping the civilians would have time to decide who was in charge, and how the work requests would flow, that happened at 2030 that evening.

Later that afternoon tents, cots, and lights started arriving from the battalion. The 49th also sent out soup and coffee before they realized there was an abundance of food from civilian sources, which began to arrive on site within 90 minutes of the tornado's touch down. Group also sent out extra kevlars for VIPs and soldiers already on site.
The first mission Chief Mauger gave CPT Cox was to go to Wal-Mart and start looking for casualties. CPT Cox immediately sent half his troops to the Wal-Mart and the other half to put up the command post tents that had just arrived. The soldiers who went to Wal-Mart waited for the structural engineers to OK the buildings which took time, so the tent details had completed their work and rejoined the main body by the time they were allowed to enter the wreckage. CPT Cox had personnel from the 109th, 16th, and 267th companies to set up the command post. It was a good combined effort, and CPT Cox did not have to call back for anything.

At the request of Chief Mauger, LT Roath formed a skirmish line with 40 soldiers and went through the fields and woods looking for casualties. They swept from the I-95 turn off and came around the ponds behind Wal-Mart to the Red Lobster restaurant. CPT Cox with the remaining soldiers search across the I-95 interchange. They thought some victims might have been blown out there by the tornado. The soldiers found a lot of debris but no bodies. It took 45 minutes to do that sweep twice, going and coming, in an area about half a mile in radius.

CPT Cox then rested the troops and LT Roath with three people from CPT Bird's company, went to Wal-Mart where he met people from Richmond out of the state Medical Examiners Office. They asked him and his detail from the 54th to provide mortuary affairs support. LT Roath and the medical examiner knew each other because soldiers from the 54th normally work in rotation in the medical examiners office for hands-on-training. LT Roath set up an area with litters and human remains pouches near the front of Wal-Mart. The Army had brought 100 human remains pouches and some litters.

Rescue dogs had located two bodies by 1730 but they were under heavy debris, so the 54th had to wait for the rubble to be lifted. Some thought there might be another body too so searching continued all during CPT Cox's shift. He diverted teams of troops to the K-Mart and smaller stores that had been destroyed, specifically the Fashion Boutique, because dog handlers thought the dogs had found someone in another spot. For a while CPT Cox operated a split operation.

Civilian officials used a crane owned by a private company doing work nearby, but had to cut through reinforcing bars in the concrete to lift the fallen walls. The 54th team did the actual body recovery, and took the remains outside the debris at about 2030 and turned them over to funeral directors for transportation to the medical examiner's office.

Removal was a slow process because safety was paramount. No one wanted a bad accident to happen recovering dead people. The easy mission proved to be getting out the two sets of remains. After that soldiers, and the Virginia Beach Rescue Squad, blocked and braced walls that were left standing before troops went in to search under the rubble.

The PAO watched Fort Lee soldiers from the 54th bring the second body from the rubble. One PAO soldier went into the ruins
with gloves, a kevlar, and a camera to help search. She took three rolls of pictures. None of the other soldiers had cameras, however some of the rescue people did.

Once they recovered the two sets of remains that had been identified, the medical examiner made the decision to leave. He asked LT Roath to take charge with his three mortuary affairs personnel, and handle any more remains, getting them to the medical examiners office in Richmond.

At 2030 Friday night the 54th QM Company had a request from the EOC for six personnel, 57Fs, to go the medical examiners office in Richmond at 0700 Saturday morning to assist in processing the remains from the tornado, plus there was a body from a murder in Petersburg. Altogether there were six bodies to prepare.

The 54th has had a training program in place for about two and a half years, for the 57Fs. Four soldiers at a time go to work in Richmond in the medical examiners office for a week, but not on weekends. Now they were asked to help on a weekend because this situation created a heavy work load.

First-call vehicles from funeral homes lined up to give assistance. Also the owner of a large funeral chapel in Mechanicsville, thirty miles north of Fort Lee, came and set up a mini morgue. This was the same group of morticians LT Roath had worked with at a mass-fatality workshop on Ft. Lee for the National Foundation for Mortuary Care in October 1992. The professionals knew each other which facilitated working arrangements.

Before she traveled to the disaster site the PAO, Ms. Eder, had answered media queries from the local Petersburg "Progress Index," "Richmond Times-Dispatch," Reuters News Service and the Associated Press. The radio media consistently and frequently announced the National Guard had been activated and they were the ones searching the debris, and recovering bodies.

The National Guard were poised ready to respond but their ground assets were never called by the State Department of Emergency Services, the organization that coordinates all state assets in an emergency. They did have helicopters on standby in Richmond.

The day after the tornado, the Guard began flying state VIPs, state and federal elected officials, and FEMA's Disaster Assessment Team (DAT) over parts of the state that had been hit. The victims of Hurricane Andrew did not have a good assessment and they experienced trouble getting federal emergency funds, but such was not the case here due to the Guard's efforts.

At 1530 Ms. Eder arrived at the disaster site riding with LTG Wakefield. Once there she saw her missing NCOIC and sent her to the emergency room to check on her family.

There were two command vehicles on site, one from the State Police and one from the Chesterfield Police. There were cellular phones but they had been jammed due to heavy traffic, ever since ten minutes into the operation.

Ms. Eder located the command centers but did not find the State Police spokesman, Mary Evans, until 2000. By 1530 the
civilian authorities had moved the media far back from where the troops were working. The parking lot was a mass of wrecked cars, and emergency vehicles were arriving from as far away as Virginia Beach, 100 miles.

The local Richmond television channels, 6, 8, and 12 were arriving and the print reporters were there. Channel 12's helicopter was circling overhead. Channel 12 is the only local station that can go live from its helicopter, and they sold their footage right away to NBC Nightly News. When it went national, CNN picked it up. By 2000 the PAO had talked to all the local media plus Fox News, out of Washington, D.C., the "Washington Post," channel 10 from Roanoke, channel 13 from Virginia Beach, channel 5 from Fayetteville, NC, and channel 10 from Charlotte, NC.

Local reporters directed others to the Fort Lee PAO, as she divided her time between the troops working and the command vehicles. She continued to talk to the media but could be a spokesman only for Fort Lee. Someone said National Guard medics returning to Richmond from training, were diverted to the disaster. Guard Headquarters could not verify that happened.

Army helicopters eventually landed in the parking lot. They had been requested by the post EOC at 1545 from Fort Pickett. They had been directed to report to Kenner Army Hospital and their landing at the site was a mistake, as they were too late for evacuation and stirred up a lot of debris to everyone's discomfort.

At about 2000 Fort Lee's PAO found Mary Evans, spokesman for the State Police. Ms Evans became the media's main point of contact and the Fort Lee PAO's job was completed for the day. The media knew what the Fort Lee troops were doing.

LTG Wakefield had a tour of the disaster area and left with COL Fulbright and CSM Luttrell. After their departure, no one from Fort Lee was at the site except CPT Cox, and his troops who were working in shifts clearing the rubble so search and rescue squads could operate. The medics also remained on the scene.

LTG Wakefield's comments about the scene when he first arrived were interesting because he had seen the positive things, and not focused on the confusion and apparent leaderless people milling about. The General commented that the situation was better than he had thought it was going to be, as far as organization and work being done. LTG Wakefield said it takes time to make heads or tails out of something like this and then it takes time to get organized. Given the suddenness of the disaster, and the response of so many jurisdictions, the scene was not that confusing.

The general's experienced eye saw help had arrived, leadership was on hand, and actions were being taken. He was pleased with the Fort Lee troops' reaction.

There is an Army maxim that if you take the worst plan for a combat engagement from a group of brand new second lieutenants, and you screw it up ten times, you have yourself a well-organized fire fight! LTG Wakefield was well aware of how bad the response
could have been, but saw a well-organized response.

CPT Cox positioned himself where his troops were working and only occasionally walked the 250 meters to the command tent. The tents served as a rally point but originally had been erected for shelter in case of continuing inclement weather.

Rescue dogs had been through the area before the soldiers began to clear the debris. Most injured civilians already had been evacuated from the rubble before the troops arrived. Cranes lifted out the big pieces of the walls and the roof, which was now on the floor, so the soldiers could look under, and move through the wreckage. It was slow going, cinder block by cinder block, and tearing apart the tar paper from the fallen roof took time.

On orders, SFC Datts organized the soldiers into ten-person teams with a NCO in each team. Teams went in and moved rubbish by passing it from soldier to soldier to a pile at the corner of the Wal-Mart building. An earth mover then scooped it up into a waiting dump truck.

SFC Datts's people had three missions; one was to find bodies, then make a path toward the gun and ammunition section of the store and put those items in a Wal-Mart executive's truck, and the third was to get the cash registers. To get the cash registers SFC Datts people cut their power cords, and passed them to the police who gave them to a Wal-Mart representative.

SFC Datts would have liked to have had FM communications that night as the cellular phones were still jammed. The military got along well with the civilians at Wal-Mart. Soon all realized if there was a task for the Army to do, it should go through the State Police control vehicle who would then notify Chief Mauger to tell CPT Cox, and SFC Datts would make it happen.

The dogs sniffed out places where bodies were supposed to be and the troops cleared paths to get to those areas. When the dogs found something they pawed at the debris. If a body was found, then the Army mortuary affairs people put it in a remains pouch, lifted it on a stretcher, carried it to a roped-off area, where it was photographed and tagged it before evacuation to the medical examiner's office.

So much donated food arrived at the site so quickly, that volunteers carried boxes of food and drinks to the soldiers as they worked through the night. The Red Cross had no food role at this site and concentrated their efforts in Petersburg. Wal-Mart donated goggles, and blankets. The electricity at the site had been cut off, so there was no danger from that, but there was still bottled propane on the store shelves. No soldier was hurt in this operation.

Both Chaplains Ghee, and Lee got to the site about 1930. Things seemed confused to them, and CH Ghee saw civilians ask soldiers to do tasks, but were directed to the officers, so that request process soon straightened out. The NCOs did well handling the troops. There were civilian chaplains there too, and some of them saw the cross on the chaplains' uniforms and introduced themselves. There were three police chaplains ready to
notify next of kin. If they had found a deceased military person Chaplain Ghee or Lee would have gone along as the police chaplains notified the family.

CH Ghee realized many soldiers thought they were sitting around wasting time. The chaplains moved around, found out what the delay was and relayed that to the troops, which made the troops feel better by knowing a little more. By early Friday night, the chaplains had planned for Sunday services on site. They planned a Protestant service while both shifts were there, to serve as many as possible. They could not get the Roman Catholic chaplain on site Sunday due to the heavy Roman Catholic commitment on post and only one Catholic chaplain assigned.

CPT Cox and his shift worked two areas until CPT Teresa Galgano's shift took over. At 2400 Friday, CPT Cox's troops were still moving debris to get back to the gun section of Wal-Mart. The second shift finished that job.

CPT Cox thought his shift was not especially stressful, but it had been frustrating at first, due to the many civilian agencies involved, and no one person clearly in charge. Things moved too fast for stress. The Army had no military heavy equipment on site. The Army's mission to clear away the debris was one of manual labor, but the soldiers knew they were needed and they worked willingly, which made their job easier and impressed onlookers.

One of CPT Cox's lieutenants was in Somalia, and his wife worked in the Fashion Boutique which had been destroyed by the tornado. When CPT Cox arrived on site the lieutenant's wife came up to him so he was greatly relieved she was all right. She had been standing by a wall when it fell and injured two people, so she had led rescuers right to them. CPT Cox's wife called battalion and asked them to get word to the lieutenant in Somalia that his wife was all right. By the end of CPT Cox's shift the husband in Somalia had been notified all was well, but not before he had seen news coverage of the tornado on CNN.

The transition between CPTs Cox and Galgano was smooth as both groups were there at the same time for a while. SFC Datts who was assisting CPT Cox helped brief CPT Galgano's troops before they began work.

MAJ Spinelli was at the shift change and CPT Cox briefed her about 2400. Initially she had planned for three eight-hour shifts of 100 soldiers each. Not all of the troops with CPT Cox had had a chance to search the rubble and some wanted to stay and help do that.
Support

Back on Fort Lee CPT Teresa Galgano's shift had gotten everything ready to go by 1900 Friday. She then told her troops to rest because the shift would start at 2400. Her troops, about 84 all together, went out on busses with two command and control vehicles.

CPT Galgano went to the site to talk to CPT Cox about an hour and half before her troops came. She arrived about 2030 and CPT Cox introduced her to Chief Mauger who was still in charge. CPT Cox gave her a good briefing so when her troops arrived she knew where to send them and what her tasks were.

Chief Mauger was in charge for about a half hour after CPT Galgano arrived, but when she went to ask about something, she was introduced to Mr. Twigg from Virginia Emergency Services (VES) who was then in charge. Chief Mauger had left.

Mr. Twigg had recently arrived and his foremost concern seemed to be getting colored smoke to mark a landing zone for the Congressmen's helicopters due to arrive at 0930. He suggested to CPT Galgano that that should be her prime mission. That request went to DPTMS and eventually the Congressmen landed at Fort Lee's helipad and traveled to the site by car. Between midnight and 0800 the chain of command at the disaster site changed, but no one ever told CPT Galgano of any change. To her it seemed like a power struggle.

VES took over after Chief Mauger left, then the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) came in and began arguing with VES and others, and nothing got done. FEMA finally said they were through and left, which left VES in charge, but then they also left. Colonial Heights Fire Department took charge until the early hours of Saturday, when control passed to the Chesterfield Fire Department.

The number of civilian workers at the site probably remained consistent but by the time CPT Galgano left they were more organized so they seemed to be fewer in number. The soldiers had their tasks to do and the police kept everyone else away.

There were plenty of flood light sets operating so there was no trouble seeing to work. CPT Cox's shift had pretty much done the heavy labor at the Wal-Mart area.

CPT Galgano had troops working at K-Mart and about 0200 her troops also restarted work at Wal-Mart; securing the ceiling so soldiers and the dogs could go in and search the rest of the building. The dogs had missed about half the area because the ceiling had collapsed and covered everything.

MAJ Spinelli was at the site early Saturday, and stayed until 0330 when she returned to the 240th EOC. She then stopped by DPTMS's EOC, went to her office, then about 0430 went home for a little sleep, only to return at 1200.

Saturday morning at 0353 the Red Cross asked the post EOC to feed 900 volunteers. At 0530 the EOC contacted COL Ferguson who told them to get the exact requirements of the feeding mission.
At 0720 LTC Duffy made the decision not to fill that request, given the excellent food support provided by the local businesses, and because Fort Lee was not geared up to do that. Sometimes it was hard to judge what the Army should or should not do. People asked "Can you help unload a truck?" "Yes, sure we can, but that's not why we are here." If our troops had done everything asked of them, they could not have done their assigned missions in a timely manner.

When MAJ Spinelli was on site Saturday, soldiers were standing around. Wal-Mart officials were there, plus civilian authorities. The soldiers had tunneled to the back of Wal-Mart, completed their last mission and MAJ Spinelli wanted to be sure the troops were still needed.

At this point Fort Lee's mission was still to assist in the search and rescue of people thought trapped under debris. Secondly we were to have mortuary affairs people nearby to handle any remains.

The soldiers finished their search of three places by 0100 Saturday but continued to search Wal-Mart until 0500. By then the Virginia Beach rescue crew and the soldiers knew there were no more bodies in the building. The civilians worked 45-minute shifts, and rested 15 minutes, which was a good plan.

Fort Lee troops physically had been in the rubble crawling around with gloves, goggles, and their BDU jacket sleeves pulled down. Debris was 5 to 6 feet deep in some places, but anyone still trapped under the rubble would have been dead for 10-12 hours, crushed to death. Crushing causes the body to purge and with the heat, the smell would have indicated if someone was under the rubble. There was a lot of blood inside, but no strong smells. As long as soldiers had no cuts or open sores they would be all right. The soldiers involved will follow up with HIV blood testing for three months.

By Saturday morning all damaged autos, about 50, had been towed to the Colonial Heights Junior High School yard, which had been designated as the car holding area. Only one tapped off area remained at the site.

The hard facts are, if there had been more dead, the media would have remained longer. Channel 6 had a half million dollar truck there with a dish on top. The Fayetteville truck quickly left Saturday morning when they got word a Fort Bragg soldier, SGT Kenneth French, had gone crazy killed four, and wounded seven others in Luigi's, a Fayetteville restaurant. He was protesting the President's "gays-in-military policy." The Charlottesville truck also left Saturday morning.

Fort Lee's PAO, Ms. Eder arrived back on the scene at 0830 Saturday because she had arranged the night before to give an interview on channel 12 at 0900. The on-site media has constant pressure from their news rooms to go on camera live with some new development before the other channels. The media does not worry about exactly "who" does "what," nor are they precise in numbers as that type data always can be updated.

Saturday morning Ms. Eder did long interviews with the media
still on site. Her message was, "Our neighbors rallied around Fort Lee to help fend off the Base Realignment and Closing Commission, (BRAC,) hearings earlier in the year, and now we have a chance to help them." That angle was new and the media picked up on it and reran it a lot. Ms. Eder did updates on Kenner Army Hospital, where they treated five casualties but only admitted one. This was the first day the Richmond "Times-Dispatch" FM radio program broadcasted on National Public Radio, and Ms. Eder was interviewed on the premier program.

The PAO talked to the soldiers while they waited between jobs. They looked very relaxed, sitting in lawn chairs that had been blown about and donated by Wal-Mart. Realizing such a scene could be misinterpreted, the PAO asked the media not to focus on the resting soldiers, or have them in background shots because that was not the image we wanted to show. The media cooperated. The PAO's mission ended at 1400 on Saturday about 24 hours after the tornado had hit.

There was still a lot of food available as food tents were manned and operated all night. The next morning Ukrops Market brought out fresh donuts. Saturday the temperature was in the 90s whereas the night before it had been in the 60s. CPT Galgano's shift ended 0800 Saturday.
CPT Olson went to the site at 0700, an hour before his shift began. CPT Galgano's troops were waiting for heavy equipment to tear down the building rubble so they could go in and complete the search, but they had not done much toward removing the wall. CPTs Galgano and Olson had a smooth shift change. The focus now was just at Wal-Mart, not K-Mart, and the mission was simply to search and recover bodies, nothing else. Not all of Wal-Mart had been searched. CPT Olson was on site to meet his 76 troops who arrived by bus.

About 1135 on Saturday interest shifted to Old Towne. SGM Elijah Ross of the 49th was at Wal-Mart and received a request from the post EOC for 50 cots and soldiers to pitch a tent the Red Cross had borrowed from a funeral home.

SGM Ross told SFC Datts to take care of the request. SFC Datts returned to post to get the cots then went back to Wal-Mart to get a detail to set up the cots and tent. SFC Datts met the Petersburg Red Cross representative, Wendy Dyer, at Wal-Mart and they left together for Pocahontas Island. The nine person detail pitched the one tent next to other Red Cross tents. SFC Datts left Pocahontas Island and took the detail back to Wal-Mart, then went to the 49th's EOC. The Red Cross representative, Ms. Dyer was responsible for the cots to the unit officer who was signed for them.

A lot of homes on Pocahontas Island were destroyed, and local authorities were trying to get the people, mostly black low-income families, to move. Most did not want to leave the island and their now-ruined homes. The tent and cots gave the people a place to stay and be near their homes.

When MAJ Spinelli went out to the Wal-Mart site at about 1215, she found out soldiers had done little all day. She met LTC Duffy there, and after talking to Chief Snyder, who was in charge then, and taking input from CPT Olson, LTC Duffy, decided to cut back personnel from 100 to 30 on the next shift.

CPT Olson's soldiers searched the field behind Wal-Mart again. About 1300 they went around the side of Wal-Mart where crane operators had a "pancake," hooked on the crane, to collapse the roof. By 1500 CPT Olson searched the building rubble with about 20 people. The Chesterfield Fire Department was in charge and remained so for CPT Olson's entire shift. Chief Snyder was the point of contact. CPT Olson spent his whole shift on site until relieved by CPT Michael Bird's people at 1600, Saturday.

CPT Bird came into the 49th's EOC and found he was going to take only 30 troops to the site. CPT Bird was on site by 1400 when they were using the crane to lift the roof so CPT Olson's soldiers could search inside. Even though there were many civilian medical units, and rescue squads on site, post EOC made the decision to keep the Army medics there to support the soldiers.

After CPT Bird relieved CPT Olson, there were more collapsed sections to lift so CPT Bird split his people into two 15-person
teams and they alternated shifts. The crane raised sections of
the roof about five feet and CPT Bird's troops went under and
looked around, and cleared aisles down to the floor, through
layers of crushed merchandise. CPT Bird asked if there were
areas that had not been searched, and his troops, knee deep in
shoes, did search the shoe department for the first time.

MAJ Iskra came out and asked Chief Mauger how he knew what
had been searched. No one really had kept a good record of that,
and Chief Mauger went and got a floor plan from a Wal-Mart offi-
cial. It seemed the Chesterfield Fire Department had been satis-
fied with the Virginia Beach dog search. Supposedly the dogs had
walked by areas where bodies had been recovered later.

Chief Mauger marked his floor plan to show whether an area
had been searched by dogs or soldiers. The heavy equipment
operators pushed "in" sections of the wall that weren't stable,
rather than pulling them "out," so first the troops had to move
that new debris before they could search. At 1920 all soldiers
broke for a meal.

About 2030 Chief Mauger and Chief Snyder told CPT Bird they
were confident there were no more bodies and the troops could
leave. CPT Bird then contacted the 49th's EOC by FM radio and
relayed that message. The 49th then contacted the Fort Lee EOC
who, in turn got approval from the post Command Group to bring
back the soldiers.

CPT Bird then set about to organize the military equipment.
At 2215 LT Frazier reported the closure of the medical activity,
and busses with personnel convoyed out at 2330. The last sol-
diers and vehicles out of the area were the medics in their
ambulances at the end of the convoy. The post EOC closed at
2240.

It took CPT Bird until 0030 Sunday to recover the water
buffaloes, light sets and other equipment. CPT Bird then turned
in a closure report to his EOC showing all troops and equipment
were accounted for.

When the 49th Group first realized the tornado had hit
Petersburg as well as Southpark mall, no one knew if they would
have to send troops there too. No one saw any National Guard
soldiers at Wal-Mart, although everyone believed they had been
activated due to the persistent news reporting of that "fact." Most
assumed the National Guard were working at Old Towne and
that was the reason Fort Lee had received no missions from there.

Chaplain Ghee did talk to some blue-collar people at the
Wal-Mart site who had seen the destruction at Old Towne. He
found there had been little if any help for those victims. The
49th realized if we were called to send troops to Old Towne, and
had none ready, or if they were late arriving, it might look like
the Army responded well to one community and not to another.

MAJ Spinelli did organize a hundred-soldier stand-by force.
So, if called, we could have given the same support to Old Towne
that we had given to Southpark mall. CPT Galgano said they were
on stand-by for Old Towne until about 2100 Saturday when our EOC
was taken off that possible mission.
However, LT Chris Konicki took a call Sunday at 1740 from the Petersburg City Fire Marshall requesting three tents for Pocahontas Island, and LT Konicki spent three hours filling that request. At 1230 we sent three tents to Pocahontas Island, making four sent there with 50 cots. LT Konicki found it was difficult getting the tents to Pocahontas Island Sunday night because the EOC had closed and the troops had stood down early Saturday.

Monday morning the CASCOM Historian, Dr. Lynn Sims, began gathering oral histories and documents from the participants. By 0900 on Tuesday, 10 August the post had its after action review completed and presented it to the post staff at 1315. Later that afternoon Garrison Commander, COL William Sloane decided all future help from the post would be volunteer.

At 1700 Fort Lee pulled back most of their equipment, tents and water tankers but it was not until 27 August, three weeks later that First Sergeant Lynn Lavallies and a detail from the 267th Quartermaster Company retrieved the last tents from Pocahontas Island, as only then people had finished using them.
Volunteers

After the crisis had passed and the disaster areas had been secured by civilian agencies, Fort Lee troops returned to post. Tuesday at 0800 the post went into a volunteer mode.

Ms. Wendy Dyer, the Red Cross director for post became the center for the volunteer effort. Units and individuals began to ask what they could do. The commander of Headquarters Garrison called and said while in formation troops asked how they could volunteer to help. Because the volunteers went down during off-duty hours no special permission was needed from the post. Ms. Dyer called the agencies at Old Towne and Hopewell where there also had been damage, and found out when and where people were needed and got that information back to the units.

On the Monday afternoon following the Friday tornado, Garrison asked for 8 to 10 volunteers to man three collection points for the next two days. Collection points, in the form of a truck and volunteers, were in front of the Post Office, the Commissary, and the Army Community Services building by 0800 on Tuesday. The items collected were delivered to the needy late Wednesday.

Also quite a few Fort Lee civilians donate their time. The Red Cross did not keep records of how many helped, but were pleased with the turn-out. For instance one person would call and find out where and when help was needed, and he and half dozen of his buddies showed up to work. There were sign-in sheets at the disaster areas, but it was by name not address.

Ms. Dyer coordinated with organizers from the local governments, fire departments, police departments, housing authorities, and churches who sent people to help with the clean-up and rebuild efforts. She also talked to the Petersburg Red Cross and the president of the Pocahontas Island Civic Association.

The Army Community Center on post became the main site for accepting goods, mostly clothing and food. The post collected a full pick-up truck load of things. Cash gifts came through the Post Red Cross office, and that total reached $4,700. Also the 23rd Brigade gave another $2,000 through the tornado relief fund which did not come through the Red Cross.

Collection points stayed open for a week, but even after they shut down, people still dropped off things at the Red Cross office. There were many smaller collection points on post in units such as the MPs, but everything collected at those, eventually came to the Army Community Center.

Groups on post did car washes and similar events to raise money. SGT Carlos Ramos worked the Friday of the tornado at his military job, came down to Pocahontas Island Friday night and worked all night then he worked all day and night Saturday and Sunday and went to work Monday. No one realized he had had little or no sleep all this time. He came back to the disaster site and worked Monday night, then worked his job Tuesday and back to the disaster area that night. He fell asleep on Wednesday, and that's when his office found out what he had done.
Conclusion

The June 1993 edition of FM 100-5, the basic Army's field manual, has at least two passages that speak to a situation such as this. In Chapter 12 entitled "Logistics," on page 12-7 there is the following quote in the section Supporting Operations Other Than War: "In some cases, ... CSS (Combat Service Support) units may be the only units involved in operations other than war... The level of support, however, should not overwhelm indigenous forces or cause them to become solely dependent on Army resources." Again, in Chapter 13, "Operations Other Than War," this appears, "...domestic disaster relief efforts are generally under the direction of FEMA, although immediate [Army] response is permitted to prevent loss of life and property." That chapter also says the Army's "Humanitarian relief and nation assistance should not promote dependency on aid from outside sources." And "Army forces must work competently, while properly subordinating military forces to the agencies in charge."

Fort Lee did all that. It was a good effort, it was a model undertaking.
Wal-Mart damage with helicopter, and Army ambulances and soldiers at upper left in lot
Military Police direct traffic at 6th Street Gate

Soldiers from the 49th Quartermaster Group prepare to set up a tent
Staging area for Fort Lee Soldiers
Medics checking through supplies

Soldiers fan out behind Wal-Mart looking for casualties in field
Volunteers pass out donated food to workers

Waiting for permission to search in rubble
Bringing up a stretcher to remove fatality

Soldiers from the 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) remove a fatality
Senator Warner and Congressman Sisisky talk with a soldier
Friday's devastation in the Tri-Cities area was caused by two tornadoes, according to the National Weather Service.

- One tornado started west of Petersburg. It struck the Old Towne section about 1:30 p.m., moved to the Southpark mall area in Colonial Heights around 1:35 p.m. and hit Hopewell about 1:45 p.m. This tornado traveled about 30 mph and had a diameter of 200-300 yards. Its winds were blowing about 200 mph when it initially touched down. It traveled 10 to 12 miles.

- A second tornado struck the interstate 295 bridge over the James River about 1:45 p.m., overturning trucks. It was half a mile in diameter with wind speeds of 75-90 mph. It traveled at 30 mph for 2 to 3 miles.
1. The 49th Quartermaster Group's mission was to assist civilian authorities in the search and rescue of casualties at the Walmart in Colonial Heights. Implied mission was to provide graves administration services as necessary. The Group was put on alert status at 1530 hours, 6 Aug and remained such until approximately 1435, 7 Aug. The unit continued the mission until 2055, 7 Aug. EOC remained in place until 0010, 8 Aug. At 1205, 7 Aug, the Group received an additional mission to provide emergency shelter and cots to Pocahontas Island in Petersburg. This mission was executed at approximately 0200 hours, 8 Aug. The Group continues to support at Pocahontas Island with 4 GP medium tents, 50 cots and one water trailer.

2. Observation: Communication/Coordination poor throughout

   a. Discussion: Communication was not set up through HQ's channels. 240th QM Bn was tasked to provide DPTMS EOC with FM communication. Group was unable to communicate to 240th and site via radio.

   b. Lesson Learned: Group HQ's needs FM communication set up now.

   c. Recommended Action: Task 240th to provide FM communication immediately. Advise DPTMS that communication may not always be available from Group Assets due to unit involvement in overseas deployments, exercises, and involvement in relief effort.

3. Observation: Taskings came in from everywhere. Unclear guidance as to who, what, when, where, and why.

   a. Discussion: Establishment of Command relationships and channels wasn't coordinated. While MAJ Spinelli was being briefed by COL Ferguson, DPTMS was calling MAJ Coan with taskings. Need to know "why" to help identify tasking.
b. Lesson Learned: Installation (DPTMS) taskings should go to MSO. MSO should establish EOC and co-locate representatives of 23d and 49th.

c. Recommended Action: Review current policy with effort to eliminate levels of communication. Consolidated EOC with players from BDE/GP MSO. Tasking should be sequentially numbered perhaps with a key to identify where it was directed from, time received, etc.

4. Observation: Soldiers at the site were given orders, receiving requests and fielding questions from everyone. Procedures for channeling these issues were unclear.

   a. Discussion: No chain of command established on site. No perceived contact with Ft Lee. COT was being pulled in several contrasting directions. Civilian authorities were just as confused.

   b. Recommended Actions: Senior Army leader present must take control. Appoint civil commander, gather and account for all Army personnel and property present. Report should be made to DPTMS EOC as to current situation, mission, personnel and equipment on hand. All guidance should be EOC directed and listed by task number.

5. Observation: FORSCOM units were tasked to both execute and support the real mission and to support the support mission.

   a. Discussion: While we were gearing-up and establishing our EOC, we were being tasked by DPTMS and MSO to support their EOC's. See paragraph 7. While we were trying to muster soldier to execute search and rescue mission and gather equipment to support that mission, we continually had to provide equipment and personnel to DPTMS and MSO. The Group EOC was without FM communication because we were tasked to provide FM communication to DPTMS EOC.

   b. Recommend Actions: MSO and DPTMS should be both staffed and equipped to support their EOC's. Tasking for things such as bus drivers, forklifts, bulldozers, cranes, and generators should be handled by installation agencies. Tasking to executing units should be minimal, and only after every effort has been made to obtain the items from DOL, DEH, and DOIM.

6. Observation: FORSCOM units tasked for equipment that was on hand but not mission capable in DS/GS maintenance or awaiting parts in organizational maintenance.
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SUBJECT: Operation Strong Wind After Action Report (AAR)

a. Class IX parts and equipment in DS/GS maintenance should receive priority from the DOL as a matter of routine. When the extent of the situation was unclear, we were constantly hampered in our efforts to support a major operation by deadlined equipment. Personnel readiness shortage of maintenance supervisor, SGM, at group level downgrades readiness.

b. Lessons Learned: 240th BMO, S-4 and Group S-4 need to become more involved in managing and supervising, maintenance program, both in house and at DS/GS level.

c. Recommended Actions: Installation maintenance priorities should be established or changed to give FORSCOM units first priority. The Adjutant General needs to establish priority fill on FORSCOM critical personnel shortages.

7. Support Provided:

a. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE/TIME</th>
<th>QTY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 AUG/1600-2400</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>WALMART</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 AUG/CONTINUOUS</td>
<td>2 (CHAPLAINS)</td>
<td>WALMART</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>80</td>
<td>WALMART</td>
</tr>
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<td>7 AUG/0800-1600</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7 AUG/1600-2400</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>WALMART</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 AUG/2300-0200</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>POCAHONTAS ISLAND</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10 AUG/1400-2400</td>
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b. Equipment

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<tr>
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<td>FM RADIO &amp;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>DPTMS EOC</td>
<td>DPTMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 9 AUG</td>
<td>ANTENNA</td>
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**AFFL-GC**

**SUBJECT:** Operation Strong Wind After Action Report (AAR)

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<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>MSO</td>
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<td>6 AUG/1500</td>
<td>10KW GEN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DPTMS EOC</td>
<td>CASCOM COMMISSARY</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 AUG/1600</td>
<td>POUCH, REMAINS 200</td>
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<td>WALMART</td>
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<td>FLOODLIGHTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>WALMART</td>
<td>INTERNAL</td>
<td></td>
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<td>TENTS, GP MED</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>INTERNAL</td>
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<td>LIGHT SET</td>
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<td>GENERATOR, 3KW</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>COTS, SLEEPING</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>GOGGLES/SAFETY</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>GLOVES/HVY DTY</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>TRK, 2 1/2 TON</td>
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<td>TRAILER, S&amp;P</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600 GAL</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 AUG/1640</td>
<td>POUCH, REMAINS 200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>KENNER</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>7 AUG/2300</td>
<td>TENTS, GP MED</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>POCAHONTAS</td>
<td>MSO</td>
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<td>TENT, GP SML</td>
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<td>TRAILER, TANK</td>
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<td></td>
<td>600 GAL</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
AFFL-GC

SUBJECT: Operation Strong Wind After Action Report (AAR)

8. Unprogrammed Costs Incurred: 24 hour Dining Facility Operations commenced 1600, 6 Aug and remained in operation until approximately 0830, 7 Aug. Failure of anticipated personnel to subsist accounted for ration losses of approximately $350.00.

9. The success of the operation cannot be overshadowed by the lessons learned. The response of the officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers in the Group and the Battalion was commendable.

10. POC for this report is MAJ Coan, Group S-2/3, X4-6526 or the undersigned, X4-6084.

11. "Fueling the Force!"

Encls
1. AAR, 49th QM Gp Chaplain
2. Edited DA Form 1594, Duty Log, 49th QM Gp EOC

CF:
CDR, 240th QM Bn (w/encls)
CDR, CASCOM, ATTN: Chaplain (w/o encls)
061330 - Power lost at Gp HQs
061340 - Gp S-2/3 Alerts 240th to standby ASP Guards
061340 - Gp Passes Tornado Warning to subordinate units
061345 - Gp S-2/3 contacts DPTMS to inform them ASP Guard on standby
061347 - Gp alerted by DPTMS that mission pending
061355 - Gp Acting Commander (AC) notified to 100 person tasking
061400 - Gp AC departs for Assistant Commandants Office
061400 - DPTMS EOC Activates
061400 - 1500 - Taskings received from DPTMS & Billeting
061500 - Gp AC returns with Assistant Commandant’s guidance
061510 - Gp AC calls Battalion Commander, 240th to pass guidance
061510 - Gp HQs key personnel receive guidance
061530 - Gp EOC activates, CPT Roberts and SFC Mize report for duty. The 240th is notified to activate. LT Konicki was sent to 240th. 104 soldiers departed for Southpark Mall. CPT Cox is COT, CPT Brown and SFC Datts are on site.
061600 - CPT Bird and 30 soldiers sent to site to access required support.
061630 - 240th Bn Cdr reports to Gp HQs. Received current SITREP, Guidance, Updates Gp.
061635 - SGT Sharma, 49th Gp, sent to DPTM EOC as liaison. SGT Datts call 240th EOC for tents
061640 - Water trailer, floodlights, tents, cots, litters, generators, CUCV with radio, motorola radios and cellular telephones, were sent to the site per COT request.
061640 - 20 Burial pouches sent to Kenner Army Hospital
061700 - CPT Cox and CPT Bird report situation to Bn EOC. Bn EOC Bn EOC phones Gp Acting Commander. Situation stable; internal req'ts satisfactory. Casualties less than first thought. Details sketchy from civil authorities.
061700 - 240th reports one soldier injured at Walmart from tornado. Williams, Jackie SPC. She was treated and released by the Southside Regional Medical Center. Soldier had a day off.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Activated E.O.C. because of</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reported tornadoes in Colonial</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heights and Petersburg, and</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hopewell.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>Initial support requirement</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for Ambulances, MP's</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Power on Fort Lee out</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>due to Tornadoes - expected</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to be out for approximately</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 hours</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>Call from LG Wakefield</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to provide support as</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>required/available to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Petersburg Colonial Heights.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>Contacted all installation</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support agencies - asked them to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be prepared to provide</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Notified 49th PA group (March Cln)</td>
<td>Logged</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to get</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Standby's for Guard</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Force duty and Emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations.</td>
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</table>

**Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Officer on Duty:**

John J. Johnson, Capt

**Signature:**

John J. Johnson
# Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log

### Organization or Installation
Emergenc Ops Center

### Location
BLDG 8040

### Period Covered
**From:** 1500 6 Aug 93  **To:** 1550 6 Aug 93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
<th>InL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>Contacted Petersburg City Attorney - Mr. Packer (733-2305) No assistance required at this time. Might need soldiers to assist in security of area.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>1515</td>
<td>Contacted 40th to get data on Emergency generation and lighting capability</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>Buses reported to 240th area to transport soldiers to well dock. Per request from Col Fulbright.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>888</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Mr. Zawislak coordinated W/ DTH for additional Generator lighting support</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Medevac Helicopter requested from Fort Pickett. Directed to report to KACH.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Soldiers from 19/240th departed towards South park Bldg.</td>
<td>Requested.</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
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**Tyed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty**: John J. Johnson CAPT EM OPS

**Signature**: [Signature]

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*This form is obsolete.*
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<td>13</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>EOC from Chesterfield called (Dispatcher Hiebert) 751-4967 Requesting assistance for cats, tents, food, drinks; notified QM's to determine availability, also spoke with Doc.</td>
<td>Logged (Log Cancelled)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Post opened to route traffic to ease traffic from Hopewell - Petersburg</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Updated TRADEOC on Support, provided thus far and future actions</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>Notified that all duty SM Lt Williams, 117-08-7073 was injured at Wal-Mart. Chain of Command notified, SM in stable condition</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>Commanding PAO, CPT McDougall called to check on status of Fort Lee - informed CSM</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Briefed Col Strock on current Status and future actions</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signature:** John J. Johnson, CAP, OM, Opns
## Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log

**Organization or Installation:** FORT LEE EOC  
**Location:** BLDG 8040

### Period Covered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 AUG 93</td>
<td>6 AUG 93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Item No. 19

- **Time:** 1700
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Contacted Davidson AAF and placed two UH-1H's on standby until 0600 7 AUG 93
- **Action Taken:** Logged

### Item No. 20

- **Time:** 1715
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Cpt Easteen, LTC Bauso departed to check disaster site
- **Action Taken:** Logged

### Item No. 21

- **Time:** 1730
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Requested radio & crew for EOC to establish comm.  
- **Action Taken:** Logged

### Item No. 22

- **Time:** 1735
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Confirmed support requirements for Hopewell Infirmary.  
- **Action Taken:** Logged

### Item No. 23

- **Time:** 1735
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Chesterfield EOC called  
- **Action Taken:** Canceled its request for support needs. Asked if they might need lighting. No further requirements.

### Item No. 24

- **Time:** 1750
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Updated THADEOC const situation
- **Action Taken:** Logged

### Item No. 25

- **Time:** 1800
- **IN:**
- **OUT:**
- **Incidents, Messages, Orders, Etc.:** Call from D.C. LTC Bill Lopez & Senator's Robby Berwanger may be coming here on Sat.  
- **Action Taken:** DSN 335-1697, 96 Rome (203) 525-1033

---

**Signature:**

**John J. Johnson CAPT ARM Corps**

**DA:** 1594  
**NOV 48**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
<th>INL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Col. Sloane (LTC Duffy returned from South Park. Required additional tents be sent)</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>Gen. Wall called to provide support. Things seem to going well.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>courtesy of traffic through Fort Lee terminated.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>LTC Duffy / MRZ departed EOC</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Command checks / Mission of EOC</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Call from Col. Sloane about concerns for Chaplains support and leadership change. Command notified Dr. Wilcox &amp; 49th.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>Call from LTC Duffy checking in.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>Call from LTC Leather support requirement for 572s passed to 49th.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: FORT LEE EOC
LOCATION: BLDG 8040
FROM: 1800 6 AUG 93 TO: 2030 6 AUG 93

John J. Johnson
CAPT

DA FORM 1594 - Previous edition of this form is obsolete.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
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<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
<th>INL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requesting availability of field jackets from Red Cross Volunteers. Checked HOC - none on stock.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td></td>
<td>Request for Medical and Surgical Gloucester 240th. Contacted HOC, DEH, MSO, and MEDDAC. Agencies have provided support.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contacted Davidson AAF and terminated on-call requirements.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drivers and bus enroute to 240th to take people</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>2330</td>
<td></td>
<td>The got Gallops they are still looking for one more body at Walmart</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>0015</td>
<td></td>
<td>Call from Col. Maxwell at Pentagon - checking on situation - update.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0045</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manager's orders complete</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty:**

**Signature:**

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<table>
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<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>report and relieve Sgt. Johnson</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SRC James and Sgt. Mahoney.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>0353</td>
<td>request ICS called Cross through</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>240th for more support for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>901 volunteered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and requirement to OMCS.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>0640</td>
<td>LTC Duffy reported and went</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to Southpark.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>NR 2 reported and briefed and</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>then went to Southpark.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>0720</td>
<td>LTC Duffy called, decision</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>made not provide more support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>SSG Macatee of TRADOC called to</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>update.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>0735</td>
<td>COL Sloane called to check</td>
<td>Logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>situation - updated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>0904</td>
<td>COL Sloane called to check</td>
<td>Updated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>situation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>COL Sloane called to ask if heli-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>copters from Davison AAF had been</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>release - told him they had been</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>if he medicine that was on the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ground would had been released.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>said that he would check and let</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty:**

**Signature:**

---

**FOR USE OF THIS FORM, SEE AR 260-19: THE PROPER OFFICIALS AND DUTIES.**
<table>
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<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
<th>INL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>0915</td>
<td>7A</td>
<td>8A</td>
<td>Called Petersburg EOC 732-4222</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to see what their requirements may</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be - None at this time. Hop well asked</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>if we have chippers or mulchers. Called</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Royster at DEH to check. Called</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>On call DEH. DEH has no chippers or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mulchers. Only one is a very small</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one used at the golf course. Called</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Royster back to tell him that we have</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>None available. I asked if there was anything else that they needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nothing at this time. Logged</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Cradford from the Richmond Times called. Ref: Casualties. Called</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAO on call - Mrs. Walker and gave her</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>his phone number to reattend his call.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>1107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SGT Rivera from MP desk called to</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tell us that the training site they were</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>directed to check was okay. Logged</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wendy Dyer, of Petersburg Red Cross</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Called and requested 40-50 cots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and 3 or 4 people to put up a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty: Jimmy D. Hedgepath, Jr. CPT, Am

Signature: [Signature]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
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<th>INL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>Funeral tent. The have the tents 768-95/14. CPT Called mso to work. Hatch Standing by.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>Chief murdock - Ft. Lee Fire Chief yesterday, at 1700 hrs, he called in an additional crew for standby. He called Prince George, Colonial Heights, and Petersburg chiefs; they have no request. Chief Ft. Lee chief is now releasing his additional crew and is returning to a normal schedule.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>Contacted Wendy Dyer ref Item 3, 53. Requested that she contact the P'dung EOC and have them request the cts to keep a central PCC. Haven't heard from them as of this time.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>Wal Mart EOC - CPT O'Meara called. The troop requirement for tonight has decreased from 80 to 40 personnel. We are going with his recommendation. Called CPT. Baked 49th Grp. and he will relay the information to 240th.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>LTC Duffy called. The leadership on site.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM NO.</td>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>Reduced the troop requirements to 30 troops per rotation. Called DEP.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Role 1414th Rapp; he will paralong to 2404.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>1417</td>
<td>Mr Eberhart of Petersburg EOC called to ask if we have crane capabilities of 4 or 5 floors and clam shell bucket. Called DEP on call rep. He called back and said they have a crane that will reach about 110 ft, but no clam bucket. He will advise the contraction people if they need it.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>Called MR. Eberhart to ask about cats. He said Chief Widdriss and asks us to hold off. They are trying to get the people that would use these to an area hotel.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1614</td>
<td>54th Cdt called on Emendorf and reported that a section of roof had been sheared up and they were about to do another search.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>54th Cdt called and said that they probably didn't need the Army medics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN</td>
<td>INL</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>That are supporting them, because the</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>were plenty of civilian medical personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>but he wasn't sure if the civilians</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>could support the Army. Recommend</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>that the Army medical training in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support of our soldiers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>MG guest stopped by EOC. Briefed him on current situation.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>TRADOC EOC called for update.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Briefed. He asked if National Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>was on the scene. I told him that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>according to the media, the National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guard was on standby.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>54th CDR called to report that they are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>now 90%60%. Suspected because the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>list of names of personnel in NAM part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>is not accurate and that previous sites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>may not have been properly marked.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>1834</td>
<td>COL Slade called to see if everything</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>was okay. I briefed him on items 63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and 64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>54th CDR called 90%60% to report that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>they had just completed sector search</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty**: Jimmy D. Hodges, Jr., CPT, OM

**Signature**: [Signature]

**DA FORA**: 1 Nov 93 1594

**Previous Edition of this Form is Obsolete**
<table>
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<td>66</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>At 9:00, they were shown the area. They were shown around the area and break to eat.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Capt. Johnson and Mr. James arrived at the location.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Jay Whitmore called for update.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Notified by Capt. Blodgett that Mr. Bean notified the troops that Mr. Bean held an agreement with Mr. Bean and Mr. Turner.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Base departed to pick up supplies.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Medics were free to assist in the debris.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Closed out the EOC operation.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>Any installation staff busy contacted by Petersburg City Fire Marshall requesting a GP Med. Tent, Vomac equipment and availability.</td>
<td>Logged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log

**Fort Lee, Va.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Aug 1990</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>Received request from Mr. Rick Franklin (732-2544) for tarps to cover damaged historical buildings. Contacted DOD and DSC about availability. DOD has more available. Logged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Aug 1990</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8 Aug 1990 | 1620 | Informed DGSC about plastic for Petersburg. Additional. Contact of Major Detole (8-695-5460) of DGSC. 
Awaiting guidance. |

**Signature:** John J. Johnson

**Type:** DA Form 1594

**Note:** Previous edition of this form is obsolete.
# Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log

**Organization or Installation:** Fort Lee, EOC

**Location:** Bldg 8040

**Period Covered:**
- From: 1700, 10 Aug 93
- To: 1900, 10 Aug 93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 80. 1700 | Prop about fluc daily
<p>|         | Alt rep requirement. Cont. |
|         | Made a hr. notified we about plan to complete on 11 Aug 93 |
| 81. 1710 | Noticed by Mr. E that all volunteer support to be |
|         | coordinated through PaO |
|         | Also received requirement for 5 people to Pochonita Brand at 0730, 11 Aug. |
|         | Osrated to Gp. Amel, Med. |
| 82. 1830 | Call from Chief Cal inson |
|         | about returning water regulators to Che. |
|         | To ensure coordination with Maj. Smith. |
|         | Col. Ferguson approved. |
|         | Then notified Mr. E. |
| 83. 1950 | Call from Wp. Smith about plastic sheeting |
|         | Well call again on Fri. |
| 84. 1900 | All equipment tent, water tank. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>IN</th>
<th>OUT</th>
<th>INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>0710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pulled back from Presidentiels</td>
<td>Logged 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NNC Gained Access was</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To volunteer at Presidentiels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>0740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor Atkins from 6C called</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>about plastic sheeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High coordinate with 6C/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For approval (94 to each)</td>
<td>Logged 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>0755</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Notified ORO of updated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support at Presidentiels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>0815</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Call from Mayor Atkins</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That we couldnt get the</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>plastic on file value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>0820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Davis pulled TRACTO</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contacted by Col. Thomas of</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>forms that For Lee refused</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluate cost rate in</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Providing future support</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Notified Mr Z.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>0920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr Z called by TRACTO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lsc came about same</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>published at item 89</td>
<td>Logged 820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AMCs proposal from TRACTO/refs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Item 89 also</td>
<td>Logged 820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Typed Name and Grade of Officer or Official on Duty:**

**Signature:**

---

**DA FORM 1594 1 NOV 53**

**Previous Edition of This Form Is Obsolete.**
12 Aug
0830 Call from Gap about Volunteers
1435 Call from Mr. Slicker's office
1545 Call from Mr. Z - contact Chief Pattern about single ROC for volunteers. No private citizens calling; let him know PRC is paying ROC for Fort Lee
MEMORANDUM FOR Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security, ATTN: CPT Johnson, Operations Branch, Fort Lee, VA 23801

SUBJECT: Operation Strong Wind (Tornado) Support After Action Review (AAR)

1. Reference your PROFS note dated 9 Aug 93, subject as above.

2. As requested, the following information is provided for the AAR:

   a. Observation: Kenner Army Community Hospital (KACH) was prepared to receive up to 50 patients; however, only five arrived.

   b. Discussion: Kenner Army Community Hospital lost its' base station (Hospital Emergency Ambulatory Response System (HEARS)) during the storm which prevented communications with local ambulances. Civilian emergency squads are taught to transport patients to a hospital only after communication has been established. Kenner maintained communications only with our three ambulances on site.

   c. Lessons Learned: Communications are essential.

   d. Recommended Actions:

      (1) Ensure the HEARS is on an emergency power system with an uninterrupted power source.

      (2) If KACH ambulances are on site, notify them to transport regardless of communications.

   e. Support Provided:

      (1) Three ambulances

      (2) 29 staff members (with four remaining on site for a period of 32.5 hours)

   f. Unprogrammed Cost Incurred: $243.68 - various medical supplies
3. Point of contact is the undersigned at X-49581/49591.

DESIREE MERRITT
CPT, MS
Chief, Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security Division
MEMORANDUM THRU Deputy Commander for Administration, USAMEDDAC, Ft. Lee, Virginia 23801-5260

FOR COMMANDER, USAMEDDAC, Fort Lee, Virginia 23801-5260

SUBJECT: After Action Review-- Old Dominion Emergency Medical Services

1. On Tuesday, 10 August 1993, an After Action Review on last Friday's tornado incident was conducted by Old Dominion Emergency Medical Services at Southside Regional Medical Center in Petersburg, Virginia.

2. Representatives were present from the various hospital and pre-hospitals, the Virginia Emergency Medical Services and the support agencies which support the Central Virginia Disaster Plan.

3. Major Concerns Addressed:

   a. Communication: Several agencies experienced difficulties, both internal and external, in the communication network. HEARS system at the hospital was down for a period of time so the decision was made at the disaster site not to send patients to Kenner Army Community Hospital. Cellular phones locked up approximately 10 minutes into the operation at the site. A CONTEL Cellular phone representative showed up at the site with 12 cellular phones programmed on a dedicated EMS line. Other units indicated their mobile radio frequency span did not allow them to communicate with the disaster site.

   b. Patient Distribution: There was an unequal distribution of patients to medical facilities as outlined in the Central Virginia Disaster Plan due mostly to communication problems and also because of the proximity of Southside Regional.

       Southside Regional treated 132 Patients
       John Randolph treated 38 Patients
       MCV 12 Patients
       Kenner Army Comm. Hosp 5 Patients

   c. Colonial Heights EOC: In retrospect the EOC should have requested a Fort Lee liaison remain stationed within the EOC at the site. However, Fort Lee personnel did come by and check in frequently with the Colonial Heights EOC at the disaster site.
SUBJECT: After Action Review—Old Dominion Emergency Medical Services

d. Helicopters: Welcomed assets, but hindered progress at the site with flying debris and supplies as they tried to land within the Mall site.

e. CVD Plan: The Central Virginia Disaster Plan and training focused on only one specific disaster site and not multiple disasters occurring simultaneously.

f. State Police: Did a good job with traffic control points and security to minimize theft. However, onlookers did cause some congestion. State Police thought they could have done more, such as pick out a landing zone for helicopters if an EMS liaison would have been made available to coordinate EMS needs.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

   a. Implement a relay communication system with greater range of communication.

   b. Refocus Central Virginia Disaster Plan to incorporate more than one disaster site.

   c. Consider an EMS liaison representative to work with State Police for a more coordinated effort.

   d. Politically good timing to request additional state funds for disaster preparation and training.

5. Overall, the committee concurred that the response to this disaster was done well and with great professionalism which resulted in very few fatalities and long term disabilities.

6. For further information please contact CPT Merritt, at 49531, FTM&S Division.

DESIREE MERRITT
CPT, MS
C, Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security Division
MEMORANDUM THRU Deputy Commander for Administration, USAMEDDAC, Ft. Lee, Virginia 23801-5260

FOR COMMANDER, USAMEDDAC, Fort Lee, Virginia 23801-5260

SUBJECT: After Action Review - MASCAL OPERATION STRONG WIND, 1
Support to Tri-Cities Area, 6-7 Aug 93

1. The MEDDAC was part of MASCAL OPERATION STRONG WIND, 6-7 Aug 93, when the Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) was put in effect due to tornados and high winds in the area. The MEDDAC operated in conjunction with the Central Virginia Disaster Plan. It involved the following areas:

   a. Appendix 2 (Staff Recall Plan) to the FL-MEDDAC-EPP.

   b. Annex B (Mass Casualty Management Plan/External Disaster Plan) to the FL-MEDDAC-EPP.

   c. The Central Virginia Emergency Medical Services Plan for hospital, pre-hospital and support agencies.

2. Incident: Tornados and high winds hit the Tri-city area causing devastation and activation of the Central Virginia Disaster Plan.

3. Sequence of Events:

   a. The ER received a call from the VA State Police at approximately 1413 and the acting Cdr was contacted.

   b. The acting Cdr declared a MASCAL. The Staff Recall Plan and the Mass Casualty Management/External Disaster Plan were implemented.

   c. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated in the Resource Management Division, Kenner Army Community Hospital.

   d. Triage area was set up and two ambulances were dispatched to the disaster site.

   e. The Kenner ambulances arrived approximately 1420 at the disaster site reported that part of the WalMart had collapsed. The crews with help of a Kenner physician assistant civilian, set up staging, triage area and started treating patients.
f. KACH received five patients total, admitted one and treated and released four others. All were in the delayed category.

g. The EOC operations at KACH were terminated at 1800.

h. KACH and other Fort Lee soldiers continued operations at the WalMart, working with the Colonial Heights Rescue EOC on site.

i. KACH staff at the disaster site were debriefed and dismissed after the final search at 2345, 7 Aug 93.

4. An after action review was conducted on 11 Aug 93 for key personnel to share their concerns/recommendations. Comments have been summarized below:

   a. Communications was the greatest area of concern.

      (1) HEARS radio used to communicate with the Central Virginia Control Center, other hospitals and ambulance crews was not operative for about two hours of the incident.

      (2) EOC did not have a portable radio, which made the use of runners necessary to communicate with the ER.

      (3) No radios were available for crowd control in the hospital, at the entrance nor at the entrances to the ER.

      (4) PAD had no portable radio which made completing their assignments more difficult.

   b. Power went out at 1330 in the hospital causing the following difficulties.

      (1) HEARS communication system was inoperative due to power being out. The emergency power system came on but the HEARS system remained inoperative.

      (2) People were on the elevator between floors, DEH had to be called for assistance. Also the telephones did not work on the elevator, causing people to scream for help.

      (3) PA system could not be used to notify staff of the MASCAL due to not being on backup system for power.

      (4) Logistical Division, Materials Branch, warehouse had no power. Both lights were out and their computers were down. Personnel used flashlights to operate forklifts to get supplies. Fortunately, no injuries occurred.
c. Civilian employees stayed and assisted throughout and were a tremendous help. But it was noted that the civilians needed to be included in EEP training.

d. The two Black Hawks arrived in a timely manner even though there were problems, verifying who requested them and locating grid coordinates for the LZ. The LZ at the WalMart site was too close to the destroyed buildings so that when the helicopters began descending, debris and other materials were scattered.

e. A physician had difficulty at the disaster site finding out what jobs had been assigned, due to no identifiable tags worn by the KACH medical team.

f. There was a lack of control with the manpower pool at first, as the unit roster was not initially brought to the dining facility. A loss of personnel occurred initially but was soon corrected.

g. There is a concern that some soldiers, family members, civilians may need professional counseling.

5. Recommendations/Conclusions:

a. Recommendations:

   (1) Complete review of backup power to include all needed areas. This includes battery power for the radio system to avoid loss of frequencies, backup for the PA system and emergency power for lights and computers in Logistics Division, Materiel Branch warehouse.

   (2) Civilian employees training and being involved in drills and EEP. The civilians are key.

   (3) An elevator key to be kept in the hospital in addition to being kept solely in DEH for when the elevator jams.

   (4) Kenner ambulances only take patients to KACH and not to other hospitals when the communications system is inoperable.

   (5) Site team stand-out ID through the use of hats that indicated what job has been assigned.

   (6) PSYCH Team needed to operate on site and a need to advertise for MEDDAC and other soldiers involved if services are needed after the incident.
b. Overall indication is the MEDDAC's performance during the MASCAL was excellent. All MEDDAC personnel (military and civilian) worked as a team and showed what team effort can do. It is recommended however, that a MASCAL exercise be scheduled in the next quarter so that the new personnel can become more proficient.

6. For further information please contact CPT Merritt, at 49581, PTM&S Division.

Desiree Merritt
CPT, MS
C, Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security Division
AFTER ACTION REPORT

SUPPORT OF THE DISASTER AT THE COLONIAL HEIGHTS WAL-MART

1. At approximately 1410 on 6 August 1993 the state police contacted the emergency department at Kenner Army Community Hospital to inform us that a tornado had struck the Colonial Heights Wal-Mart. Immediately two ambulances were dispatched, one BLS with two medics and one ALS with two medics and an Emergency Department Nurse. Upon arrival to the scene patients were scattered over the Wal-Mart parking lot. The middle section of the front of the building was destroyed and the ambulances at the scene were seeing patients but not in an organized manner. It was determined that the medics would do transport while the Emergency Nurse, ILT Frazier, would organize the effort. At the scene there were several Army medics that were on there own time and one PA, Mr Odair, from the TMC. Mr. Odair was already working in a quickly set up triage area and was assigned to remain there with several civilians and two medics to assist him. Two more medics were assigned with several other civilians to form a staging area directly in front of the damaged building. It was coordinated with the civilian EMS for the transport area to be at the far end where the vehicles could line up and exit with the least confusion. The order of flow was staging, triage and transport. This set up was needed because patients were scattered in the rubble and parking lot and could not be taken directly to triage. LT Frazier continued to monitor the flow, help organize new help arriving and assessing the most critical patients. The medics continued to do transports with up to four Kenner ambulances on the scene. Once the flow started the patients accessible to the EMS crews were evacuated very quickly, the more critical were out in under an hour and the others within two hours. It was still left to find out who was in the rubble and how seriously they were hurt. As things settled an ambulance an hour was sent back to Kenner until two were left. For the duration Kenner supplied one ALS and one BLS unit.

2. The next step was to summon more help from the Army in the way of helicopters. The civilian helicopters could only transport one patient at a time. Spc Carridine was at the scene on his own time and was utilized to secure commitments for air support. The results were helicopters from Ft. Bragg and Ft. Pickett. Then the treatment area was beefed up for resuscitative efforts, mainly ACLS and ATLS, with equipment from Kenner and other units. When the rain started one of Kenner’s ambulances, F-1, was turned into a permanent trauma room with two civilian ALS units parked next to it for transport. This remained until the portable surgical unit from Norfolk arrived.

3. As the state took over control it was communicated that the military medical support was for the soldiers tasked from Ft. Lee and that we would only assist the civilians if asked. Majoriskard from the 240th was contacted and he agreed that medical support was needed. Col. Ellis was then contacted and he supported the idea.
It was explained that we could set up an aid station with one Nurse and three Medics. We would all rotate sleep shifts and then utilize volunteers from the Meddac (there were many). In this manner we did not disturb the function of the Meddac anymore than needed. We then set up the aid station using F-1 as the base. Three medics were chosen to be permanent staff, SGT Kilpatrick-operations NCO, Sgt Lear- Commo and supply NCO and Spc Jones J. as treatment NCO. All three individuals had experience pertinent to the situation. The length estimated was 48-72 hrs. SGT Kilpatrick made the coordinations with the 240th as far as tent space and equipment, SGT Lear secured two cellular phones from a Contel representative and obtained supplies needed, Spc Jones helped set up the Aid station and aided in treatment of minor injuries and illness. One of the volunteers, SPC McLaughlin a military food inspector, worked with the Red Cross to inspect food and set up hand washing facilities. The rest of the night was uneventful with only minor treatments needed by rescue workers.

4. The next morning, 0400, the state and local EMS were surveying the assets at the site, we maintained ALS ability. SGT Kilpatrick noticed at approximately 0500 that the soldiers had trashed the area they were in during the night. He got with the First Sergeant of the 240th and the soldiers policed up the area so well that the civilian reporters were shocked the next morning. The rescue efforts were delayed due to disagreements among the engineers over how to secure the structure to make it safe for workers to look through the rubble. As the day went on it became warmer than expected and the engineers had still not agreed. Spc Jones did hydration counseling and got the soldiers moved into shade to avoid heat casualties. They were in full gear due to loose fiberglass and insulation. SGT Lear secured supplies from Kenner to treat heat injuries. A lean too was erected to provide shade by using and old tarp and swing set found at the site we then set up cots. For the rest of the day we treated minor injuries and helped out where we could. When they finally ok'd the final search we prepared for the worse but thankfully no one else was found.

5. At approximately 2100 we got word that the Army troops may not be needed any longer. It was coordinated that we would leave in convoy with the troops from Ft. Lee to assure safe arrival back to post. At 2220 LT Frazier informed CPT Johnson at the EOC that our mission was complete. Colonel Ellis was contacted at 2225 and informed of the same. All staff members were then debriefed and a final list of those who assisted was put together. All were dismissed at 2345.

Timothy L Frazier
1LT, AN
ED, KACH
LIST OF INDIVIDUALS AND RECOMMENDED AWARDS AFTER PARTICIPATION IN THE EMS EFFORTS AT THE COLONIAL HEIGHTS WAL-MART.

SGT Lear ARCOM At site as communications NCO.Handled all supply and communication needs for effort to include providing initial contact with Kenner, coordinating supplies needed with civilian authorities and securing cellular phones. He also performed valiantly as a medic and transferred several of the more serious patients.

SGT Kilpatrick ARCOM At site as operations NCO.Handled all coordination with the 240th and other Fort Lee units at site. Secured tent space, cots, coordinated with company first sergeants for assuring that the military presence was presentable, and informed them of services offered.

SPC Jones ARCOM At site as treatment NCO. Helped set up ambulance as aid station, helped treat minor injuries throughout the night and counseled soldiers and First Sergeants on hydration and avoidance of heat casualties. No heat casualties were treated.

SPC Foster SOLDIERS MEDAL At scene on his own time. SPC Foster was at the mall eating when he realized something was happening. Upon his own initiative he ran to Wal-Mart and began treating patients, to include repeatedly putting his own life in danger going into the rubble to give assistance. He was organizing the whole effort until Lt Frazier. When Lt Frazier arrived he gave a complete report and then assisted in organizing the effort.

SPC Carridine SOLDIERS MEDAL At scene on his own time. SPC Carridine was shopping when he noticed commotion. He immediately went to the scene at Wal-Mart where he assisted the medics in any way he could. He repeatedly entered the destroyed building to render assistance, each time risking his life. As time went on he was Lt Frazier’s sole link to Ft Lee early on and was responsible for the air support which he diligently sought over several hours. The resulting air support boosted everyone’s morale in a way not explainable on paper.

SPC McLaughin ARCOM At scene on his own time. SPC McLaughin showed up early on and reported to Lt Frazier. He stated he was not a medic but would help where he could. He assisted in everything from moving patients to setting up the triage and morgue area. When things settled he realized, being a food inspector, that the rescue workers were at risk for dysentery and other
food borne disease. He got with the 240th and set up hand washing stations for both eating and atrine area. He then worked with the Red Cross to insure not food stayed hot and cold food stayed cold.

PFC Beceiro  ARCOM  First at scene with LT Frazier.
Helped treat wounded and was the only medic to physically go into the rubble to assist wounded, risking his own health. He left the inside of the building only after instructed to do so by fire fighter. He had been instructed to go in, though most patients were in the parking lot we knew some were trapped, all who ended up dead.

SPC Woodrum  AAM  At scene on own time.
Arrived in uniform and helped set up AID Station. Left during the night but returned the next morning to relieve assigned personnel so that they could sleep. During this time he helped set up a heat casualty area and accompanied rescue workers in their final efforts.

SPC Cooper  AAM  Arrived on scene from Kenner.
Was assigned to pharmacy, on temporary duty, from the ER. He realized a mass call had been called and struggled with supervisors to get to scene. Once at scene he not only provided patient care but also direction and leadership to the younger less experienced medics. His energy and motivation help keep things going at a rapid but efficient pace.

SPC Jones L.  AAM  At scene on his own time.
Showed up on his own and sought out responsibility immediately. He helped set up an ALS stabilization point, since he had been trained in ACLS and helped move it into F-1 when the weather turned sour.

SPC Hurt  AAM  At scene on his own time
Soldier was on pass and knew that help was needed. Being an EMT on a civilian squad he was an invaluable resource and assisted in procedure as well as patient treatment. His skill, trained in ACLS, allowed him to care for those more seriously injured.

SPC Carlburg  AAM  Arrived at scene 2nd day on her own.
Motivated two other females to join her. Came ready to work, highly motivated and wanted to know what needed done or if any one at the site needed anything. During slow periods she helped the civilians to the point that a Wal-Mart official put her in charge of a semi trailer full of supplies that was going to be down loaded.
PFC Roberson  AAM Arrived at scene on his own. Treated patients, helped set up triage area and do so involved with moving debris that he left late Friday night looking dirtier than even the fire fighters. He brought out clothing for those who could not leave and had gotten wet. He returned Saturday to see if things were ok before he went to work.

PFC Motta  AAM Arrived on scene as EMS. Treated and transported patients in an aggressive manner then when the only patients left were in the rubble he helped move what he could without having a hard hat. He then helped set up the morgue and kept busy until told he had to return to Kenner to work 2nd shift.

PFC WHITE AAM Arrived on scene as EMS. Treated and transported patients in an aggressive manner on his own time and helped move what he could without having a hard hat on. He had to return to Kenner to work 2nd shift.

SSG Curry  COA At scene on own time, helped stabilize victim for trans.

SSG Scott  COA At scene as EMS provider

SGT Battle  COA At scene as EMS provider

SGT Rogers  COA At scene as EMS provider

SGT Hurst  COA At scene as LPN

SGT Harvey  COA At scene as LPN

SPC Harrell  COA At scene as EMS provider

SPC Woodrum  COA At scene as EMS provider

PFC Mitchell  COA AT scene on own time to help where needed

SPC Holleyfield  COA At scene on own time to help where needed

SPC Harmining  COA At scene on own time to help where needed

PFC Cook  COA At scene as EMS provider

PFC Ford  COA At scene on his own time to help where needed

PFC Rotger  COA At scene as EMS provider

PVT Durkas  COA At scene as EMS provider
From: ATZMIC -- LEE1
To: JOHNSONJ--LEE2

From: CHAPLAIN ATZMIC
Subject: Operation Strong Wind (Tornado) Support After-Action Review (AAR)

A. Observation: Fort Lee was prepared for Mass Casualty Operation.

B. Discussion:

(1) Meddac/Dentac personnel provided great support for patients received at Kenner.

(2) Four chaplains went to Kenner and provided comfort to people brought to the hospital.

(3) Two other chaplains from the 49th Quartermaster Support Group went to SouthPark Mall and provided ministry with military personnel on the scene Friday - Sunday, 6-8 August.

(4) Electrical power outage however, for a while prevented communications across post.

C. Lessons Learned:

(1) Plans for large Mass Casualty, Real World, need to be reviewed, and where not in place integrated.

(2) Contact with Operations Branch is necessary to learn of military unit involvement.

D. Recommended Actions: That a post Mass Casualty Plan be reviewed by all envisioned players.

Donald G. Wilson
Chaplain (COL), USA
Installation Chaplain

From: REUBEN B. GREENE
To: JOHNSONJ--LEE2

Subject: 85th EVACUATION HOSPITAL TRANSITION

NAME OF TASC REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL ATTEND IPR IS MR. GEORGE WENTWORTH, X46602.

REUBEN B. GREENE
CHIEF, TASC, DPTMS
MEMORANDUM

THRU Commander, 240th QM Bn, Ft Lee, VA 23801
FOR Commander, 49th QM GP (Petrl), Ft Lee, VA 23801

SUBJECT: After Action Report: 49th QM GP Support At South Park Mall

1. PURPOSE: To provide feedback to the command on observations made by the
49th QM GP and 240th QM Bn Chaplains while providing coverage for the tornado
disaster at Wal-Mart, Colonial Heights, VA 6-8 Aug 93.

2. FACTS: Soldiers from the 49th QM GP and 240th QM Bn were tasked and/or
volunteered to provide support for the search and rescue operation at South
Park Mall, Colonial Heights, VA following the devastation caused by a tornado
on 6 Aug 93.

3. ASSUMPTIONS: 49th QM GP and 240th QM Bn soldiers would assist in the
conduct of a search and rescue mission for suspected casualties trapped in the
affected buildings around the Mall and primarily the Wal-Mart store.

4. DISCUSSION: Chaplain Ghee was informed of the "Peacetime Alert" status of
the unit by MAJ Spinelli, Acting GP Cdr/XO, when he arrived at Gp HQ from Ft
A.P. Hill at about 1800 hrs. She briefed him on the action being taken by the
GP in support of the recovery operation at South Park Mall and asked him to
provide her with a religious coverage plan for the operation. Ch Ghee, 49th
QM GP Chaplain developed a plan in coordination with Ch (CPT) Lee, 240th Bn
Chaplain.

Chaplain Lee was informed of the Peacetime Alert when he arrived at
Memorial Chapel to pick up the pager for his "On-call" duty by his assistant
who had reported back to his unit upon turning in the TMP vehicle utilized to
travel to Ft A.P. Hill.

   a. The religious coverage plan included the following:

   (1) Site Coverage Plan (to provide a ministry of presence):

          1900 6 Aug - 0800 7 Aug, Ch Ghee
          0800 7 Aug - 0800 8 Aug, Ch Lee
          0800 8 Aug - 0800 9 Aug, Ch Ghee

   (2) Worship Service Schedule:

          0700 9 Aug, Protestant service
          0900 9 Aug, Protestant service

* Catholic Mass was not scheduled due to non availability of a priest.

   (3) Provide ministry for any soldier or family member of the 49th QM
        GP injured or killed in the disaster.

   (4) Conduct "Post-operation" Stress management assessment to
determine if a formal session of stress management was necessary.

b. The religious coverage plan was conducted as follows:

   Chaplain Lee (240th QM BN Chaplain) reported immediately to Kenner Army
   Hospital to access and minister to casualties. This was required of him
because he was serving at the time as Installation Duty Chaplain. Finding no casualties at the hospital he then reported to his unit for coordination and began ministering to the soldier from the unit who had been hurt in the incident. When that activity was complete he came to the Mall and joined me with the soldiers there.

Immediately after informing MAJ Spinelli of the religious coverage plan Ch Ghee proceeded to the site of the recovery operation. Upon his arrival there he received an update on the activities from SGT Campbell and SFC Datts. He met CPT Cox who was busy with the coordination of activities. The chaplain’s primary focus was to provide a ministry of presence. One observation here was that the NCOes (SFC Datts and SGT Campbell) seem to have been perceived to be in-charge, and were called on by the civilian agencies when information or help was needed. The NCOes referred the contact persons to CPT Cox when he was in the area and they felt he needed to be involved.

After visiting with the soldiers Ch Ghee coordinated with the Chaplains of the Colonial Heights and Petersburg Police Departments who were on the site. Their mission was to make notifications to nexts-of-kin in the event bodies were recovered from the rubble and identified. Had military personnel or family members been recovered Ch Ghee or Ch Lee would have accompanied the Police chaplain to do a follow-up ministry but would not have made the notification. Fortunately, none of either were discovered.

Chaplains rotations at the site were as follows:

Ch Ghee: 1930 - 2330 hrs 6 Aug
          0700 - 0930 and 1230 - 1630 hrs 7 Aug

Ch Lee:  2130 - 2330 6 Aug
        1030 - 1200 7 Aug

Chaplain Lee would have returned to the site later on 7 Aug but the alert was called off and troops and equipment was redeployed.

Worship services planned for Sunday morning were canceled because of the redeployment.

During post-operation stress assessment it was determined that the soldiers did not need a stress management session. What they seem to have wanted and needed more was to know that their efforts and availability was appreciated by their superiors. Chaplains made a special effort to say thanks to individual soldiers after the redeployment for volunteering to go to the site and for the work they did. Many soldiers, not knowing the response of other soldiers, stated that they were happy the chaplain came by to talk with them because no one else had cared enough to, and that made them feel like they had volunteered for no good reason.

Soldiers were orderly, maybe bored, but orderly. Their tents, water buffalo and vehicles seem to have been convenient and strategically located. Chaplains heard no one complain about the work or type of work they were asked to do. They saw them move debris, unload trucks of foodstuff, ice, a john boat, and etc. The concerns expressed were about things other than the work.

Some of the comments chaplains heard from soldiers were:

- This feels like just another "dog and pony show" so somebody can say we went out there.

- We came out here to work and all we are doing is sitting around waiting.

- Nobody ever comes out and tell us what’s going on we just sit here.

Chaplain Ghee noticed from his first moment on site to the last moment
there that the civilian establishments were available to the soldiers providing them with coffee, sodas, sandwiches, etc. These items were free, in a large variety and plentiful and was certainly a morale booster for soldiers and civilians alike.

There was a significant presence of senior military personnel from Ft. Lee. 49th QM GP and 240th QM Bn maintained a command/leadership presence. The media was present but seem to have been very faithful in staying behind the "yellow lines". The Police, both State and many local departments, were in abundant supply. Fire departments and rescue squads were numerous. Red Cross representatives were there. The Salvation army was there. Wal Mart personnel were also present in large numbers. Chaplains Ghee and Lee met several civilian persons who indicated that they were there to volunteer their assistance in any way they could be helpful. They saw no small children or adolescents at the site at any time.

As far as the chaplains observed, practicing safety was the rule of the day. Traffic control, crowd control, movement and work seemed proper and safety conscious.

As soon as the disaster was announced on Post the Installation Chaplain dispatched a team of four chaplains to Kenner Army Hospital to minister to possible incoming casualties. It appear that all who came through were civilians and were treated and released.

The news media frequent broadcasts on the ongoing work at the site consistently stated that the Virginia National Guard had been activated and were doing the search and recovery mission when in fact it was not the Virginia National Guard, but was the soldiers of the 49th QM GP and the 240th QM Bn.

5. **SUMMARY:**

   a. Soldier volunteers were ready and willing to go, and took on the task of search and recovery with a sense of purpose. As the action developed there were times they felt they were not being fully utilized.

   b. The Installation Chaplain’s response was timely and appropriate.

   c. The Units’ chaplains responded appropriately when they returned from Ft. A.P.Hill. The religious coverage plan was sufficient for the need, but the absence of a Catholic Priest to do a Mass could have been a setback for catholic personnel had the mission not been completed early.

   d. Ft Lee was observably present at the site.

   e. Civilian food service and other helping agencies were on the site and definitely enhanced the morale of civilians and military personnel.

   f. Some form of organizational expression to the soldiers would be appreciated. The soldiers want and need to hear their leaders evaluation of their action to determine in their own minds the degree to which they were effective.

   g. Erroneous information was given to the general public on who was conducting the search and rescue mission.

6. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

   a. All of the procedures be reviewed to develop an SOP for response to local disasters.
b. Installation Chaplain consider revising civilian catholic clergy contract to include responding to civilian disasters with a Mass where appropriate or develop a plan with the civilian community clergy that would include civilian catholic priest responding to local emergencies impacting the civilian community.

c. The Commander or his representative meet with soldiers who participated in this mission to express his thoughts on their activity and the mission.

d. PAO monitor future news broadcasts to insure that correct information is disseminated to the general public where military units are involved.

ENCL 1 TO GROUP AAR

PETE Y. LEE          JOHN L. GHEE
Chaplain (CPT) USA    Chaplain (MAJ) USA
Battalion Chaplain    Group Chaplain
MEMORANDUM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, M.K. EDER

SUBJECT: Operation Strong Wind - AAR

1. As request the following is provided:
   a. Observation 1: No fixed on-site command post for military personnel.
   b. Discussion: Military personnel arriving on scene who either voluntarily found themselves on scene (like off duty medical personnel) or those who were directed to report to the scene (like Cpt Brown, the 49th Group liaison) had difficulty locating the on-scene commander.
   c. Lessons Learned: Military personnel, either on or off duty, who responded gravitated toward anyone in BDUs for direction.
   d. Recommended action: Plant a soldier with a guidon as a temporary Command Post. That way soldiers on or off duty will gravitate towards it and be more likely to get the proper direction more timely.
   e. Support Provided: Directed military personnel to last known location of on-site commander.
   f. Unprogrammed costs incurred: N/A
   a. Observation 2: No official spokespersons for any agencies on scene.
   b. Discussion: Media were on the scene immediately (to include myself and Cpl Halford as reporters for the Traveller - not knowing the full extent of Ft. Lee response, we drove to 6th Street Gate to get photos of MPs directing traffic. They informed us more Ft. Lee response was further down Temple.) Upon arrival, we were unable to locate any supporting agency spokespersons, therefore, Cpl Halford continued in her role as a reporter and I assumed the role as spokesperson for the on-site military commander.
   c. Lessons Learned: Pursue communication with rear for appropriate level spokesperson and continued flow of information for follow-on media calls to rear.
   d. Recommended actions: Become familiar with local and state agency Public Affairs Plans.
e. Support Provided: Acted as spokesperson for military support only. Relayed media's wishes for other agency spokepeople to Civil Command Post.

f. Unprogramed Costs Incurred: N/A

a. Observation 3: No dedicated transportation for PAO

b. Discussion: When it became evident that Ft. Lee was responding to a local disaster, the PAO had no official means of transportation to the scene. The media are always first on the scene — i.e.: Desert Storm; Just Cause; Hurricane Andrew; and the like. PAO used a POV to get to the scene.

c. Lessons Learned: PAO needs fulltime dedicated vehicle support.

d. Recommended Actions: Fulltime official vehicle support be identified to include appropriate magnetic identification door strip and flashing dash light.

e. Support Provided: Soldier used POV to get to scene and relay info back to rear.

f. Unprogramed Cost Incurred: ?

a. Observation 4: No Commo

b. Discussion: Upon arrival on scene, all cellular lines went into overload. Unable to communicate with rear.

c. Lessons Learned: Don't count on normal communications lines.

d. Recommended actions: Initiate workable commo line ASAP.

e. Support Provided: Sent soldier to rear in POV to relay messages.

f. Unprogramed Costs Incurred: ?

a. Observation 5: No official documentation of assistance.

b. Discussion: TASC is proponent for official documentation, Photo/Video. They were not on scene.

c. Lessons Learned: TASC will not always arrive to document.

d. Recommended actions: DPTMS ICW PAO ensure proper
photo/video documentation of Ft. Lee response for use in future briefings, booklets, news stories, etc.

e. Support Provided: Traveller photographer was for publication use which may be suitable for documentation use.

f. Unprogrammed Costs Incurred: ?
Subject: Operation Strong Wind AAR

1. The following input is provided by the PMO:

- Observation: Installation emergency radio systems are not interoperable or on emergency power systems.
- Discussion: When power went out, PMC and DEH lost the ability to transmit effectively. The PMO is equipped with back-up generator power which kicked in immediately, however the base station lost its frequency settings. Frequencies were restored by the contract repair service, but transmission capability was not returned due to lack of power at the repeater. Problem was overcome by providing DEH with an MP radio and using a vehicle mounted radio as the base station.

Lessons Learned: Need uninterrupted power supply for the base station to prevent loss of power until generator starts. Need back-up power source for repeater. Current system of communication between emergency services is inadequate to meet needs in a large-scale emergency.

- Recommended Actions: Short term fix is to procure uninterrupted power supply for the base station and make arrangements for emergency power for the radio repeater. Long term permanent fix is to procure an integrated installation emergency radio system that links PMO, DEH, Fire, Hospital, and EOC. The procured system should be completely interoperable and immune to failures such as those experienced Friday.

- Support Provided: NA
- Unprogrammed costs incurred: None

2. Observation: When electricity was lost, traffic lights lost power and were inoperable.

- Discussion: High traffic intersections on post are controlled by electric traffic lights which quit when power was lost. MP traffic control points (TCP) were required at each of these intersections; this is extremely manpower intensive.

- Lesson Learned: PMO must have an alternate control system for use during blackouts to reduce required TCPs.

- Recommended Actions: Coordinate with DEH to construct temporary stop signs that DEH and MPs can place at intersections during blackouts. These temporary 4-way stops will reduce the TCP requirements. Long term, high cost solution is battery backup of lights.

- Support provided: Manned five TCPs for 3 hours.

- Observation: Provost Marshal manning inadequate to meet emergency needs.

- Discussion: Manpower requirements during this emergency exceeded available personnel. All available MPs were recalled; however personnel relieved of duty pending investigation were pressed into service. Whenever the SS5th MP Company is deployed the pool of available MPs is not adequate to meet emergency needs for any more than short term (1-2 days).

- Lesson Learned: Installation PMO TDA authorization should be raised to allow the adequate manning of three complete shifts of MPs. This will allow emergency manning using lenient 24-hour shifts for an extended period. At the current manning level, only routine operations can be conducted.
END OF NOTE

PF1 Alternate 
PFC File NOTE  
PFS Keep 
PFT Erase 
PFT Forward 
Note 
PFO Reply 
PFT Resend 
PFT Print 
PFT Help 
PFT Next 
PFT Previous 
PFTZ Return

48H

M--PROP

A 25 0 30  8 5P 1 8 144 6/10/93
From: WALKER--LEE
To: JOHNSON--LEE

From: MILFORD T. WALKER
Subject: OSW SUPPORT AAR

THIS IS THE BREAKDOWN OF SUPPORT BY DOL DIVISIONS

MAINT DIV
A-------------------------LIMITED MAINT SUPPORT
B-------------------------2 MAINT PERSONNEL RECD OT
C-------------------------NONE
D-------------------------NONE
E-------------------------1 MAINT EMPLOYEE, 2 HRS OT TO RESTORE JS110S, 1 EMPLOYEE
2 OT TO ISSUE SAFETY SUPPLIES

COST-----91.76

SUPPLY DIV
A-------------------------2 EMPLOYEES WERE CALLED IN AFTER DUTY HOURS
B-------------------------NORMAL OCCURRENCE IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION
C-------------------------DIV WAS RESPONSIVE
D-------------------------NONE
E-------------------------NONE

COST-----259.39

TRANS DIV
A-------------------------RESPONDED TO TRANS REQUEST IN A TIMELY MANNER
B-------------------------KEY PERSONNEL WERE AVAILABLE IF NEEDED DURING NON DUTY HRS
C-------------------------NONE
D-------------------------NONE
E-------------------------34 Pax buses provided, 1 employee called in to bring
44 Pax buses to the closest on-line after the power outage

COST-----65.73

IFAP
A-------------------------LST OF POWER IN THE DF'S
B-------------------------DELAYED DINNER MEAL, MKT'S WERE MADE AVAILABLE FROM THE
SCHOOL, ARRANGED TO FEED MKT'S IF NEEDED
C-------------------------SCHOOL TO USE MKT'S TO PREPARE MEALS FOR THE SOLDIERS
D-------------------------HAVE AVAILABLE LARGE POWER GEN'S SO WE CAN FEED SOLDIERS
E-------------------------MDFA SUPPORT FOR THE 240TH BM BN FOR SAT AND SUN

COST-----393.99

TOTAL COST-----1,146.92

cc: BOWMANB--LEE
    FOLEYE--LEE
    WAGNERR--LEE

BALISW--LEE
MAYES--LEE
CUMMINGS--LEE

END OF NOTE
From: PAMELA BUSCH
Subject: OPERATIONS STRONG WIND (TORNADO) SUPPORT AT

DEH SENDS THE FOLLOWING REPLY:

1. OBSERVATION: IN THIS INCIDENT THE ONLY CONTACT WE HAD WITH THE IOC WAS TO PASS ON A REQUEST FROM THE COL HOTS COMMAND POST FOR BODY BAGS.

2. DISCUSSION: IF FT LEE NOT ACTUALLY BEING HIT, THE FIRE DEPT'S ROLE WAS TO RESPOND TO THE ALARMS CAUSED BY THE POWER OUTAGE AND BE READY TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN.

3. LESSONS LEARNED: AS SOON AS A DISASTER HAPPENS CALL IN OFF DUTY PERSONNEL. THERE WILL NOT BE ANY OUTSIDE HELP AVAILABLE. WITH FRIDAY'S TORNADO HITTING ALL OUR MUTUAL AIDE AREAS, WE WOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMBAT A SERIOUS FIRE EFFECTIVELY. WE WOULD NEED THE PERSONNEL FOR OUR OWN ABILITY TO HANDLE A SERIOUS SITUATION. ALSO, WE NEED A MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY OF THIS SIZE, WE NEED ONE OPERATING FREQUENCY THAT ALL UNITS INVOLVED COULD GO TO SOMEONE AND COULD HAVE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

4. RECOMMENDED ACTION: WE HAVE A DISASTER CONTROL PLAN IN PLACE, BUT, TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A MEETING TO DISCUSS IT. DO A PAPER DRILL-THEN A REAL DRILL TO WORK OUT ANY BUGS. WE NEED TO GET ALL THIS IN PLACE.

5. SUPPORT PROVIDED: WITH ALL OUR MUTUAL AIDE DEPARTMENTS TIED UP, WE CALLED IN AN EXTRA CREW TO COVER FT LEE IN CASE WE WERE HIT WITH A FIRE OR OTHER STORMS WHICH WERE PREDICTED. WE ALSO STOOD BY AT THE HOSPITAL FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT IF THERE WERE PATIENTS FLOWN IN.

6. UNPROGRAMMED COSTS INCURRED: OVERTIME FOR 7 FIREFIGHTERS FOR 26 HOURS.

cc: ADAM.38 --LEE1

BAXER. --LEE1

END OF NOTE
Send to: MON1 (EOCWATCH)
From: LTC LEE F. DUFFY
Subject: DISASTER RELIEF SUPPORT

1. References:
   a. PROFS message, TRADOC, 11 Aug 93, SAB.
   b. PHONCON between Mr. Zavislak, Deputy Director, DPTMS, Ft Lee
      and LTC Lewis, TRADOC EOC, SAB.

2. At approximately 1330, 6 Aug 93, a tornado struck the Ft Lee Tri
   Cities area. There was no damage to Ft Lee, however, the installation did
   lose power for 2 hours.

3. The Emergency Operations Center was activated at 1400, 6 Aug 93, and
   our immediate response was to the City of Colonial Heights where great
   damage and loss of life had occurred. A Wal-Mart store roof had collapsed
   and a large number of people were believed to be trapped in the debris.
   The City’s of Petersburg and Hopewell had also sustained damage but had not
   requested assistance.

4. We responded to the City of Colonial Heights with manpower and other
   life support systems. Later, on 8 Aug 93, the City of Petersburg requested
   support. The tornado had destroyed a small low income senior citizen island
   (Pocahontas) community and urgent humanitarian support was needed. We
   responded with tents, cots, lighting and water.

5. The City of Hopewell damage was considerably less severe and required
   no assistance from Ft Lee.

6. Ft Lee’s support role to Colonial Heights was terminated at 2000,
   7 Aug 93 as soon as the the emergency situation was stablized. All support
   to Petersburg ended at 1700, 10 Aug 93, with the exception of three tents
   and one water buffalo.

7. On 10 Aug 93, the Ft Lee Teen Police established a donation of food,
   blankets, and health items relief campaign for the homeless families of
   Pocahontas Island. This campaign will end on 12 Aug with delivery of donated
   items to the Red Cross.
8. A volunteer program allowing off-duty soldiers and family members to provide labor support to the Pocahontas Island community was established and will continue on a volunteer basis until the need is no longer required.

9. The following is a summary of support by area:

a. Colonial Heights:

   (1) Provided 100 soldiers on a rotating basis, this requirement was reduced incrementally to 80, then to and finally 30. Their mission was emergency search and rescue. A support element of medical and graves registration personnel, totalling 28 personnel also supported these initial efforts.

   (2) Equipment support to Colonial Heights included: 1 ambulance, 1 Medivac helicopter, 3 light sets, 3 tents, and 2 water buffalos.

   (3) All support to Colonial Heights was terminated at 2000 on 7 Aug 93.

b. Petersburg (Pocahontas Island):

   (1) Provided 4 soldiers to set up initial humanitarian relief items. These soldiers were on location about 24 hours.

   (2) The following equipment was initially provided to support this operation: 3 tents, 50 cots, 2 light sets with generators, and a water buffalo. As civilian support increased, the light sets, generators and cots were returned back to Ft Lee at 1700, 10 Aug 93.

10. POC for this action is CPT Johnson, Ft Lee EOC, DSN 687-7608.
From: ATZMAO -- LEE1
To: leekey

From: ATZMAO

Subject: Fort Lee Relief Efforts

The Fort Lee community has been asked to pull together again to help our neighbors. The city of Petersburg has asked for donations to assist the residents of Pocahontas Island, many now homeless in the wake of Friday's tornado.

Soldiers, civilians and family members can bring donations to Fort Lee at Army Community Services, the tornado relief truck in front of the Post Office, or to the Commissary. Due to immediate need and the severity of loss, the drive is taking place quickly. Donations are being accepted on 10 and 11 Aug from 0800--1600. They will be delivered to the Red Cross in Petersburg late Wednesday or Thursday morning.

Needed items include canned goods and other nonperishable food, blankets, toiletries, paper plates, utensils, batteries, and related items.

Cash donations are being accepted at the Fort Lee Red Cross building only. Donations may be delivered or mailed to the Red Cross at Bldg 12000, P.O. Box 5180, Fort Lee, VA 23801.

For more information on Fort Lee relief efforts, contact the Public Affairs Office at 765-3083.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* Please take this note home to your family tonight!!!!!!!!!!!! * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
From: DUFFYL -- LEE1
To: GENTRYE -- LEE1
ZAVISLAH -- LEE1
HALLR -- LEE1
KARNESW -- LEE1
MARTINJ -- LEE1

From: LTC LEE F. DUFFY
Subject: VOLUNTEER SUPPORT FOR FT. LEE DISASTER COLLECTION POINT.

** Forwarding note from EDWARDSJ--LEE1 08/09/93 14:43 **
To: Garrison Staff

From: MAJ JAMES G. EDWARDS DEP. GAR. CDR.
Subject: VOLUNTEER SUPPORT FOR FT. LEE DISASTER COLLECTION POINT.
HQ CO GARRISON IS LOOKING FOR VOLUNTEERS TO MAN THREE COLLECTION POINTS FOR 10 AND 11 AUG. THE COMPANY WILL BE CONTACTING YOU FOLKS FOR VOLUNTEERS. IF YOU HAVE SOMEONE THAT WANTS TO VOLUNTEER PLEASE RELEASE THEM FOR THIS MISSION AND HAVE THEM CONTACT THE COMPANY. THIS IS FOR THE TORNADO RELIEF EFFORT.
WE NEED 8 TO 10 FOLKS ASAP.
PLEASE INFO YOU FOLKS TODAY......
THANKS

END OF NOTE
From: EDWARDSJ--LEE1
To: Garrison Staff

From: MAJ JAMES G. EDWARDS DEP. GAR. CDR.
Subject: TORNADO RELIEF

HQ CO CDR IS COORDINATING VOLUNTEER SUPPORT BY THE HQ CO SOLDIERS. ANY SOLDIERS WISHING TO VOLUNTEER THEIR HELP IN THE TORNADO RELIEF EFFORT SHOULD BE RELEASED FOR THIS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. MISSION IS IMPORTANT BUT IN MANY CASES IS CAN BE DONE ON A TEMP BASIS SOME OTHER WAY, OR DELAYED FOR A FEW HOURS. SOLDIERS CAN BE RELEASED FOR HALF DAYS OR FULL DAYS. MOST OF THEM ARE USING THEIR OWN TIME ALSO. WE NEED TO SUPPORT THIS EFFORT IF WE HAVE SOLDIERS THAT WANT TO HELP.

PLEASE INFORM YOUR STAFF THAT THE SOLDIERS SHOULD BE RELEASED FOR THIS. CALL CPT CRAMER OR THE 1ST SGT IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOLDIER WORKING AS A VOLUNTEER. I HAVE RECEIVED SOME REPORTS THAT SUPERVISORS WOULD NOT RELEASE THE SOLDIER AND THAT MAY BE THE CASE IN SOME INSTANCES BUT FOR THE MOST PART THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY REASON NOT TO SUPPORT THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT.

END OF NOTE
From: LTC LEE F. DUFFY
Subject: Volunteer Clean Up
*** Forwarding note from ATZMPAO -- LEE1 08/12/93 17:07 ***
To: leekey

From: ATZM-PAO
Subject: Volunteer Clean Up

Units, activities or individuals wishing to provide volunteers to assist in the tornado clean up efforts in Petersburg should contact R.J. Bragg at 861-2184 or Herbert Hernandez at 733-2225. Assistance is needed to board up windows, cut down trees, and move and store items. Inquiries can also be directed to the WWBT TV 12 "Call 12" Center which is manned until 2300 nightly. The Call 12 number is 1-800-733-2812. Any questions about the legality of volunteer efforts should be directed to the Public Affairs Office at x53083.

END OF NOTE
From: ATZMPAO -- LEE1
Date and time 08/17/93 07:58:46

To: leekey

From: ATZM-PAO

Subject: Tornado Relief Support

Guidelines for individual or unit tornado relief efforts are as follows:

1. All efforts/activities to provide assistance to tornado victims should be done on a volunteer basis on off-duty time (units can provide passes to

2. Those holding fundraisers or providing labor should be in civilian (i.e., these soldiers have been asked and are there to take charge).

3. Government equipment/supplies/vehicles should not be used as these efforts are unofficial, volunteer activities.

Any further questions about the legality of using Fort Lee assets should be directed to SJA.
American Red Cross Training does pay off

From the moment the call was made, Fort Lee American Red Cross volunteers were ready and waiting.

Are we ever really ready for a disaster? Many question why Fort Lee ARC volunteers would need training in disaster operations since we have the military.

Fort Lee ARC and the military community can be proud! Due to the disaster program being implemented on Dec. 3, 1992, our volunteers and staff were ready. We've only just begun the training, but that didn't stop our volunteers. Meg Duarte reported in to the command center, Petersburg, Va., where she worked tirelessly all night on Aug. 6.

Lena Thacker, hospital chairman reported first to Kenner and then when her assistance was no longer requested there, reported to Pocahontas Island where she became site manager compassion shone through as she fed individuals unable to feed themselves, held hands comforting numerous, and provided emergency needed items for the residents. We had a volunteer staying only a few days in billeting come out and assist.

The station manager, Phillip Harbarger and myself assisted in setting up the shelter at Petersburg High School for evacuees. We assisted in getting the individuals off bases, feeding, and headed to Pocahontas Island to assist with feeding and providing needed emergency items.

Pat Costa joined the team on Saturday and worked endless hours with me through the duration. We opened a service center under the directions of tidewater American Red Cross disaster services to assist the families with further additional emergency needs. Joe Jones, ARC Fort Lee Chairman of volunteers, worked registration on site from Wednesday through Friday with Pat Costa.

Frank James, Fort Lee ARC disaster chairman recently retired from 85th EVAC Hospital reported for duty as an LPN on Thursday and will remain on duty for some time to come to handle the health services side of the house.

Special thanks to the 109th QM Co., 240th BN, 49th Group for their assistance in setting up three tents, a lighting system, providing water and man power all in the middle of a rain storm, to the HQ Garrison, Capt. Cramer and volunteers for arriving on site to assist with repairs, removing of debris and the off loading of truck shipments. To Capt. Johnson, Emergency Operations Center for communicating the needs and getting them filled.

For behind the scenes help, a special thanks to Peggy Green, caseworker for assisting Brenda Glass, secretary in running the Fort Lee ARC operation to allow me to provide further services in the Tri-City community.

Having Fort Lee ARC volunteers and dedicated soldiers volunteering, our community can shine with pride.

Serving on a disaster takes a great amount of stamina both mentally and physically.

Our Fort Lee ARC volunteers have proven to have that and more.

Individuals interested in joining our great team should contact Frank James or Wendy Dyer for additional information at 861-6090/6091.

Traveler Thursday: August 26, 1993
Fort Lee community assists in tornado relief

By Cpl. Amanda Halford

Almost as soon as the damaging winds of a tornado touched down in Petersburg and Colonial Heights, Fort Lee volunteers were on their way to help.

Red Cross assistant station manager, Wendy Dyer, said soldiers showed up at both sites that fateful Friday night, offering their time and talents.

Most people would expect interest to die down after the first or second night, but according to Dyer, if anything, it has increased.

Dyer said members of the total Army family — civilians, family members, soldiers from almost every unit on post and retirees — were there to help.

She there were also several soldiers who showed up out of uniform and donated time over the weekend, she said.

Dyer explained that because the disaster relief isn’t federally funded, the Army can’t send soldiers in uniform to help. But that didn’t stop the soldiers. They just put on their civilian clothes and went to work.

Dyer remembers one soldier who showed up to help. Sgt. Carlos Ramos worked at the Petersburg site all of that first weekend.

Dyer said he came back Monday night and worked all night. He did the same thing Tuesday and Wednesday night.

Finally, on Thursday he was so tired at work, he was stumbling over his feet and kept going to sleep. That’s how his office found out he was helping.

“I think what he did was admirable. And he’s not the only one. A CASCOM employee, Larry Taylor, has a week of leave to take and he is going to spend it on Petersburg,” said Dyer.

Dyer said soldiers not only volunteered themselves, but volunteered their vehicles to haul off debris.

“We were standing around one night talking about the fact that we didn’t have enough flashlights when one of the soldiers suddenly left. He came back a little while later with a bag of flashlights. I don’t even know his name,” said a still-shocked Dyer.

The Red Cross Disaster team was put to use for the first time. The team was established December last year and addresses such problems as food and medical care. It was on the scene immediately.

“I had volunteers showing up and telling me, ‘Here I am. I’m reporting for duty. Where do you need me?’ We even had two ‘volun-teens.’” Hilton Wood, 16, and James Dyer, 10, spent time, among other things, just talking to the shut-ins and the 89-year-old blind veteran, telling them that things were all right,” she said.

Those soldiers who couldn’t give their time to the relief effort, gave their money.

“Whiskey Company, 266th Quartermaster Battalion gave $467.42; the Provost Marshal’s Office gave $41; the Junior National Guard Association gave $100; Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course students gave $257.57; CASCOM employees gave $100 and an ALMC course gave $15. The Golf Course donated $84.81 and the NCO Academy donated $220. Then, $770 was given by individuals,” said Dyer.

The post teen police manned a drop-off point and collected a truck load of much needed supplies.

“All supplies and money Fort Lee collects goes to the Tri-City Disaster Fund. Because so much was donated, there is very little administrative cost,” said Dyer.

Dyer said it’s going to be three to five years before the community is fully recovered but the help the soldiers and the surrounding community gave is invaluable.

In addition, the Material Acquisition Management Course at ALMC presented the president of Downtown Churches United with a check for $600.

The Advanced Individual Training soldiers of the 23rd QM Bde raised $4,129 with a “Operation Relief Dance.” The check was presented to the United Way.

“It really just blew me away how much love there is in this community. The support came from the heart. Everyone wanted to help,” she said.

Editor’s note: Although many other gave money or helped out, the response was too enormous for the “Traveller” to list all individual or unit contributions.

Sgt. Maj. Lee Farmer helps Delia Robinson remove some items from her trunk when she donated them to the tornado relief drive. The drive was one of the many fund-raisers held.
OPERATION STRONG WIND
AFTER ACTION REVIEW AGENDA

INTRODUCTION
TIME LINE OF EVENTS
SUPPORT SUMMARY
OBSERVATIONS
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION
OPERATION STRONG WIND
TORNADO RELIEF EFFORTS

061345 - TORNADO(S) TOUCH DOWN IN TRI-CITIES AREA
061350 - INITIAL CALLS FOR SUPPORT TO PMO
061400 - EOC OPERATIONS INITIATED
061440 - LTG WAKEFIELD CALLED - SUPPORT
061445 - FIRST SOLDIERS AT SCENE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT
061530 - 100 SOLDIERS & EQUIPMENT DEPART FOR SOUTH PARK
061600 - UPDATED TRADOC
061715 - COL SLOANE VISITED SITE
061825 - LTG WAKEFIELD CALLED - CONTINUE FULL SUPPORT

TIME LINE SUMMARY
OPERATION STRONG WIND
TORNADO RELIEF EFFORTS

070015 - BRIEFED PENTAGON ON SITUATION
070640 - LTC DUFFY VISITED SITE AGAIN
070700 - MR ZAVISLAK VISITED PETERSBURG AND HOPEWELL
070730 - UPDATED TRADOC
071130 - COL SLOANE AND LTC DUFFY VISITED PETERSBURG AND HOPEWELL
071250 - TROOP REQUIREMENT REDUCED TO 40
071350 - TROOP REQUIREMENT REDUCED TO 30
071700 - MG GUEST WAS BRIEFED AT EOC
072040 - TROOP REQUIREMENT AND EQUIPMENT SUPPORT TERMINATED

TIME LINE SUMMARY
OPERATION STRONG WIND
TORNADO RELIEF EFFORTS

072240 - CLOSED FULLY STAFFED EOC

081740 - PETERSBURG REQUESTED 3 GP MED'S - SUPPORTED

091100 - CALL FROM MR. FRANKLIN FROM CGRM. SISISKY'S OFFICE LOOKING FOR TARPS & PLASTIC TO COVER ROOFS - WORKING

100800 - INITIATED VOLUNTEER RELIEF COLLECTION POINTS ON-POST

101045 - CALL FROM PETERSBURG LOOKING FOR VOLUNTEERS TO ASSIST WITH DONATED MATERIALS - WORKING

TIME LINE SUMMARY
OPERATION STRONG WIND
SUPPORT SUMMARY

A. PERSONNEL

- SOLDIERS FROM 49TH POL GROUP
  (100 INITIALLY)

- MEDICAL SUPPORT TEAM (4)

- EOC SUPPORT TEAM (6)

- BUS DRIVERS (6)

- 57E'S ASSISTING MEDICAL EXAMINER (9)

- ON CALL PERSONNEL FROM STAFF AGENCIES
OPERATION STRONG WIND
SUPPORT SUMMARY

B. EQUIPMENT

- AMBULANCES
- LIGHT SETS 3 SOUTHPARK 2 POCAHONTAS
- TENTS 3 SOUTHPARK 3 POCAHONTAS
- WATER TANKS 2EA
- GOGGLES AND SURGICAL GLOVES
- 3 ON-CALL VEHICLES FOR DPTMS
- 1 MEDIVAC HELICOPTER (2 ON-CALL)
- 50 COTS FOR POCAHONTAS
OPERATION STRONG WIND
OBSERVATIONS

A. STRENGTHS:

- INSTALLATION STAFF ELEMENTS PROVIDED TIMELY SUPPORT
- SOLDIERS OF 49TH QM GRP WERE MOTIVATED AND SUPPORTIVE
- LIAISON FROM QMG&S WORKED WELL
- MEDICAL SUPPORT FROM MEDDAC OUTSTANDING
- PMO, THOUGH UNDERSTAFFED, COMPLETED ALL REQUIREMENTS
OPERATION STRONG WIND 
OBSERVATIONS

B. WEAKNESSES:

- ESTABLISH DEFINITE POC’S WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES
- LACK OF DEDICATED/FUNCTIONAL EOC
- BACK UP GENERATION CAPABILITIES
- EOC COMMAND VEHICLE AND IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
- NEED TO REVIEW/PRACTICE DISASTER RESPONSE ACTIONS
OPERATION STRONG WIND
OBSERVATIONS

B. WEAKNESSES:

- NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED INSTALLATION
  EMERGENCY RADIO SYSTEM THAT LINKS
  PMO, DEH, EOC, FIRE AND KACH

- NEED FOR TEMPORARY STOP SIGNS (4 WAY)
  TO USE WHEN TRAFFIC LIGHTS GO OUT
OPERATION STRONG WIND
UNEXPECTED COSTS

A. OVERTIME
   - 20 HOURS TO FIRE DEPARTMENT
   - 3 HOURS TO DPTMS
   - 14 HOURS TO DOL
   TOTAL $900.00

B. OTHER
   - FOOD SUPPORT TO 240TH
   TOTAL $1000.00
From: EDWARDS--LEE
To: JOHNSON--LEE

From: MAJ JAMES G. EDWARDS DEF. GARR. CDR.
Subject: LESSONS LEARNED

TORNADO LESSONS LEARNED

OBSERVATION (1): LACK OF POST WIDE WARNING SYSTEM

DISCUSSION: POSSIBILITY EXISTED THAT MANY INJURIES OR MULTIPLE DEATHS COULD HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF LACK OF WARNING.

LESSON LEARNED: FT. LEE NEEDS A POST WIDE WARNING SYSTEM TO INCLUDE SIRENS, LOUD SPEAKERS AND A COMMAND CABLE CHANNEL TO PROVIDE DETAILLED INFORMATION TO THE FT. LEE COMMUNITY.

RECOMMENDATION: DPTM'S INSTALL A SIREN WARNING SYSTEM AND ESTABLISH PROCEDURES. PADDYCOM INSTALL A POST WIDE COMMAND CABLE CHANNEL AND RADIO CHANNEL TO PROVIDE DETAILLED INFO TO COMMUNITY.

SUPPORT/COST: ?

OBSERVATION (2): LACK OF BACKUP POWER FOR EMERGENCY SYSTEMS.

DISCUSSION: THERE WAS A POWER LOSS IN ALL SYSTEMS ON FT. LEE WHICH PREVENTED US FROM GETTING REQUIRED INFORMATION OUT TO THE FT. LEE COMMUNITY, AND LIMITED OUR EMERGency COMMUNICATIONS WITH RADIO BASE STATIONS SUCH AS FMQ'S DISPATCH RADIO SYSTEM.

LESSON LEARNED: WE NEED BACK UP POWER FOR ALL EMERGENCY SYSTEMS TO INCLUDE RADIOS, AND EMERGENCY SIRENS/SPEAKERS.

RECOMMENDATION: RECOMMEND THAT DEH INSTALL BACKUP POWER FOR ALL EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS.

SUPPORT/COST: ?

OBSERVATION (3): THERE WAS NO WEATHER ALERT RADIO OPERATING

DISCUSSION: THERE WAS A POWER LOSS IN ALL SYSTEMS ON FT. LEE WHICH PREVENTED US FROM GETTING REQUIRED INFORMATION OUT TO THE FT. LEE COMMUNITY, AND LIMITED OUR EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS WITH RADIO BASE STATIONS SUCH AS FMQ'S DISPATCH RADIO SYSTEM.

LESSON LEARNED: WE NEED BACK UP POWER FOR ALL EMERGENCY SYSTEMS TO INCLUDE RADIOS, AND EMERGENCY SIRENS/SPEAKERS.

SUPPORT/COST: ?
RECOMMENDATION: RECOMMEND THAT DGM INSTALL BACKUP POWER FOR ALL EMERGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS.

SUPPORT/COST: 

OBSERVATION (3): THERE WAS NO WEATHER ALERT RADIO OPERATING.

DISCUSSION: THERE WAS A TOTAL LACK OF ANY TYPE OF SEVER WEATHER WARNING FOR THE POST. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN A VERY SERIOUS MISTAKE. WE NEEDED TO HAVE SOMEONE ON POST RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE NATIONAL WEATHER WARNING SYSTEM. THIS WOULD ALLOW MORE TIME TO REACT TO THE SITUATION.

LESSON LEARNED: NEED TO MONITOR WEATHER WARNING RADIO.

RECOMMENDATION: DPTMS OPERATIONS SHOULD HAVE A OPERATIONAL WEATHER RADIO WARNING DEVICE MONITORED AT ALL TIMES. POST STAFF DUTY IS REQUIRED TO DO THIS AFTER HOURS.

SUPPORT PROVIDE: POST STAFF DUTY OFFICER

COST: $20-$30

OBSERVATION (4): THERE WAS AN INABILITY TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH CIVILIAN OFFICIALS AT ON SITE DISASTER AREAS.

DISCUSSION: WE DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH CIVILIAN FIRE CHIEF OR POLICE VIA RADIO. THIS IS NEEDED TO FACILITATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AND IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE.

LESSONS LEARNED: FT. LEE NEEDS A SYSTEM TO ENSURE BETTER COMMUNICATIONS WITH OFF POST OFFICIALS IN EMERGENCIES.

RECOMMENDATION: DPTMS OBTAIN RADIOS (BUY OR BORROW) THAT WILL ENABLE COMMUNICATION WITH ALL THE SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS.

SUPPORT/COST: 

END OF NOTE
Tornado aid welcomed

Dear General Wakefield:

On behalf of the City Council and the citizens of Petersburg, I wish to express to you, your staff and the military personnel our deep appreciation for your quick response and for all the assistance given following the disastrous tornado that hit our city on Aug. 6.

Many people and organizations have come to our aid in various ways, but without the manpower, equipment and supplies that were and continue to be provided by Fort Lee many of our residents would be without the bare essentials.

Fort Lee has always been a supportive unit of our community and your display of support was exhibited to the fullest at this crucial time.

Thank you for your personal attention to our need.

Sincerely,

Rosalyn R. Dance
mayor
The real heroes

To the editor:
One week ago, I heard the warning of the tornado that had hit the Wal-Mart store in Colonial Heights. I had not heard of any other damage at that time, and since I was only a very short distance from the store, I went directly there. What I saw was overwhelming, but what happened over the next several hours was so awe inspiring that I am compelled to write in hopes you would publish this as my thank you to hundreds of people that helped me that day.

I have read articles after article, and I have read the reporters’ accounts of those who helped the victims. Now I would like to publicly thank those who helped the rescuers help the victims. On arrival, I was directed into the debris to check on the trapped wounded. After doing what I could, the Colonial Heights deputy fire chief asked me to set up a triage area to assess the injured as they came out of the wreckage and to route patients to the hospitals. I immediately had people descend on me asking me what I needed to help me do what I had been asked. I couldn’t believe the amount of help offered to me. I want everyone who helped me that day to know they have my utmost respect and thanks. I am only sorry I do not know any of their full names, and only a very few of their first names. If you recognize yourself here, be proud. You deserve it more than you will ever know. What I did that day was nothing compared to what all of you did for me and with me.

To all of the wonderful nurses, and there were dozens, who came up and said, “I’m here, what do you want me to do?” I thank you. One of the first was Stacey. I looked for her later, and she was gone without even a thank you. You were terrific. I believe several people owe you for their immediate well being. You and all the others epitomize what nursing is all about.

To the dentist who came up and offered any help we may need, you were great. I spoke to you only a short time, and felt badly, when you told me you were “only a dentist.” You were there, and you pitched in with a zest anyone had to admire. You comforted injured, you helped with care, and you carried patients and equipment. This best part of all, you were there. You didn’t have to be, you were there by choice, and you weren’t even sure your own family was safe at that point. For all the people you took care of, I thank you.

To the gentleman from Sun Colony Buffet who came up to me and told me I could have anything I needed that would help me, I thank you. All I asked for was ice for treating injuries and water for rescuers to drink, and you did so much more. I had all the ice and water we needed, and yet you were still there helping, passing out drinks, and feeding the hundreds that were helping. Others came later to help, but you were there almost before the winds died down. You were wonderful.

To Kenny, who took on the absolutely impossible task of organizing the many ambulances and rescue teams into a functional traffic pattern and made them available for the patient transport, I don’t know how I would have made it without you. You had transport teams ready to the point where I felt like all I had to do was think I needed one and it was there. You were patient with me, and with the entire medical team as they worked.

To the staff of Wal-Mart, after everything you had just been through, I couldn’t believe how much you gave. You went into the store for rugs to lay patients on, sleeping bags to wrap children in, towels to dry the wet victims and rescuers, sheets to wrap injuries in, and all the other merchandise that was so useful that day. On top of it all, and between all the tears, you all dispensed a lifetime of comfort to the injured.

To the injured that we had to force to take their turn in the care area because you wanted someone else to go first, you deserve untold praise. You were all so unselfish. No one cried for their injuries to be treated first. Everyone was willing to let someone else go first. Certainly, I was not expecting this type of reaction. I want to thank one young man in particular. His mother was as calm as if she was waiting for a ride home. She laid him down, because she didn’t want him to see the injury, then she calmly unwrapped his leg for me. I couldn’t believe the ragged, deep laceration I saw. He reassured me he was in no pain, and his mother reassured me she was OK. While I rewrapped his leg, I felt guilty because I should be reassuring them. As I got ready to move on, he thanked me and told me he was a nice man. You will never know what you did for me that day. I hope you remembered what you told me.

If anyone feels I left them out, I apologize. My memories of that day are jumbled mess, but I know one thing for sure. Everyone there was fantastic. The people of Virginia are an incredible bunch. I have always bragged about the people back home whenever I’ve traveled, and you have all lived up to my greatest expectations. You can all be proud, and should be proud. No one did it alone. It was a team effort. The likes of which have never been seen before. Thank God for you all.

I know this letter is probably too long for your editorial pages, but want the people of this area to know what you were doing for complete strangers that day. I want everyone to know what was happening on a smaller scale than the reporters’ cameras were able to show. I want to be sure those that pitched in that day aren’t just appreciated, but were absolutely necessary. And I want all of those people to know, they are the heroes in my book. Every single one.

Alfred W. O’Daire Jr.
Chief, Troop Medical Clinic
Kenner Army Hospital
Fort Lee
Dear Editor,

Please allow me the opportunity to thank the many "miracle workers" who assisted with the rescue of survivors of the Wal-Mart devastation on Friday, Aug. 6 — particularly the men who rescued my son, whose names I do not know.

My three children and I were shopping at the Colonial Heights Wal-Mart Friday afternoon when the lights went out. There was no sound, no immediate cause for concern. After a few seconds they came on again momentarily, and went out again. Melissa (13) and Philip (9) were with me, Stephen (14) was in another section of the store.

Suddenly, in the darkness, there was a sound like 50 men running across the roof. Then an explosion. I grabbed Melissa and Philip and we huddled against a display rack of men's hunting camouflage overalls; debris flew down the aisle where we had been standing a second ago. I sheltered my children and we hid our faces. In seconds the wind and noise stopped. We looked into the darkened store and saw ruin. The clothing rack we hid against was one of the few left standing. My daughter yelled my first concern: "Where's Stephen?"

I had to get Melissa and Philip out first; I prayed that Stephen was safe. Even when we saw the gaping hole in the roof, we still weren't sure what had happened. People were filing out of the store slowly, stumbling and climbing over fixtures, merchandise, ceiling tiles. There was water everywhere. People were dazed, in shock. Many were bleeding.

We finally made our way out of the front of the store, now blown away. After a frantic search I realized Stephen was not outside. I stationed Melissa and Philip in a safe spot, told them to wait for me, and went back inside to find Stephen.

Inside the store everyone that was not injured seriously or was not not directly caring for someone who was, was helping rescue others. I called my son's name and heard no answer. I prayed I would find him safe and alive. I found four men lifting a platform and thought someone was underneath. Then I saw a bundle of blankets and quilts on top of the platform and realized there was someone wrapped in them.

One of the men said, "Don't worry Stephen, we'll get you out of here."

They had found my son, and they were rescuing him. I told them it was my son.

"I'm here, Stephen. I'm here," I told him. He was conscious, his eyes were open, and he reached out to me. He was in great pain. The roof above us was ripped open.

One of the men said the clearest path out was through the garden section. We maneuvered the platform with Stephen out of the store and to a waiting emergency vehicle. Once we set the platform down, the men ran back inside to help others. I never learned their names. At that point, I did not know how badly hurt Stephen was. Others came to assist and I told him, "I've got to get your brother and sister, I'll be right back."

When I returned with my other children, they were shocked to see their brother and began crying. An emergency technician removed the blanket from Stephen's head to apply a bandage. There was a six inch curving laceration on the side of his head. His skull was exposed beneath the cut.

An old woman came to comfort Stephen, who was still alert and able to talk. A Wal-Mart pharmacy employee, Kathy, also came to comfort Stephen. Kathy had been with him inside. Stephen later told me a minister's wife prayed with him inside the store.

Stephen was treated at Southside Regional Medical Center. X-rays revealed no fractures, no internal injuries. The head wound was closed and he was released that evening. The emergency room staff at Kenner Army Hospital provided us with superb follow up care.

The bruises remain, but they will pass. To say that he was lucky would be an understatement. If those men had not found him and if he hadn't received the care ...

I can't explain why that tornado struck where it did, or why anyone had to suffer. Perhaps it was just an act of God that is beyond man's understanding. But God's hand was clearly evident in the acts of selfless courage displayed by all of those who helped other that day. Evident in all of those who pulled people from the debris or lent a hand and prayer of comfort or those who provided refreshments to victims and rescuers alike.

My undying thanks to the health care providers - ambulance personnel, volunteers, technicians, doctors, nurses of Southside Regional and Kenner Army Hospital. You all epitomized grace, poise and profession-alism under pressure.

Their too are the hands of God. My thanks and prayers are with them always. Especially the men who rescued Stephen. I hope he and I can thank you in person some day.

Sincerely,
Richard Venema