The SEARCH for
EACE in EUROPE
The Search for Peace in Europe
The Search for Peace in Europe
Perspectives from NATO and Eastern Europe

Based on a Conference Co-sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies

Edited by
Charles L. Barry

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To Leo and Pat Barry,
loving parents, patriotic Americans, and people of peace
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Foreword

The just and stable settlement of Europe that has eluded us twice before in this century will now require two things: (1) the utter obliteration of the post-World War II divisions between East and West; and (2) the control of the resurgent national and ethnic hatreds that have lain frozen for four decades in the ice of the Cold War. Accordingly, Europeans will eventually have to establish both balanced defense forces and new security structures to manage a political landscape that appears to be shifting by the hour. These forces and structures will emerge and endure only if an all-inclusive concert of like-minded democratic nations creates and supports them. It is in nurturing young and still vulnerable democracies and in helping to build appropriate defense forces and institutions that the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies will make its contribution to peace and stability in the European-Atlantic community.

The Marshall Center intends to recruit an international faculty of scholars, analysts, diplomats, and statesmen, not only from the North Atlantic Community, but from the former Warsaw Pact countries and the burgeoning republics of the former Soviet Union as well. The faculty will teach a wide range of subjects to the students and conferees concerning democratic defense organizations and processes. As part of the process, they will teach military history and strategy with a strong emphasis on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. They will analyze defense conversion and regional and international affairs. Above all, the Center will concentrate on those specific defense procedures and planning processes which are appropriate to democratic societies with free market economies. It is our hope that the students and the conferees who come to the Marshall Center will be important civilian and military members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Councils (NACC), defense ministries, and branches of the NACC’s legislatures who are—or who will be—charged with political defense-making, decisionmaking, and oversight.
The inaugural Marshall Center conference which precipitated this volume in many ways reflects some of the central issues that will concern those who remain behind in Garmisch to establish the Marshall Center. Our conference and these proceedings were designed to be didactic because our aim is to educate both ourselves and our audience about two major issues. First, we want to examine new and foreseeable challenges to future European security in this new, post-Cold War era. Second, we would like to know how the various security structures in Europe and in the North Atlantic community might cope with or, better still, preempt the threats to the security of the continent. These are the questions we put to the panelists whose contributions you may now read.

We established panels to look at threats to security region-by-region. First, we aimed to set out the various Western European perspectives on the issues. We also invited analysts to present the views of Eastern Europe. We gave prominence to what is now occurring on Europe's southern flank and, finally, analyzed the implications of the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia from the perspective of Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors. Many of the experts from the regions and states immediately concerned are analysts who could address the issues from the perspective of their state leaders. However, we asked them to speak for themselves—no author should be seen as an official government spokesman. We hand-picked scholars and analysts whom we knew to be original thinkers. We asked them to provide the reader with their perspective on the threats as they saw them, and asked them to advise us about how they believe the various security structures which exist or are emerging in Europe might act to deter, allay, or eliminate those threats.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), the Joint Staff, and the Marshall Center, the co-sponsors of the Conference, are especially proud of the authors assembled for this book. The European specialists at the Institute for National Strategic Studies had previously established close relations with the various strategic studies institutes in Western Europe. With
the emancipation of the member states of the Warsaw Pact and with the creation of the CIS, these INSS specialists quickly extended their network of contacts to countries in the Visegrad Group, Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic republics, and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. In all these countries, INSS analysts became acquainted with a plethora of extremely talented and dedicated foreign policy analysts and spent a good deal of time sharing ideas and, in many instances, forging close personal friendships. In some cases, formal Memoranda of Understanding were signed between INSS and the authors' institutes in preparation for joint research projects. From those contacts, we gained many of the authors from Western, Central, and Eastern Europe who share their views in the text. I am confident you will be reading from some of the most thoughtful, open, well-informed, and insightful members of what has become the extended community of INSS.

Dr. Alvin H. Bernstein
Director
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Acknowledgements

That the inaugural conference and dedication of the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany took place 3-5 June 1993 was not by chance: it was the 46th anniversary of Secretary of State George C. Marshall's address at Harvard University, which proposed what later became known as the Marshall Plan. In dedicating the Center, Secretary of Defense Aspin noted that Marshall's vision for "a Europe whole and free" had been only partially fulfilled. The mission of the Marshall Center, the objective of the conference, and the focus of this volume have a common purpose: to assist in extending Marshall's vision to "the rest of Europe," in particular, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In order to help the reader appreciate the direct link between Marshall's initiative and the Marshall Center concept, both Marshall's 1947 speech and the Center dedication addresses are appended to this text.

Many people shared a common endeavor in creating this book: to contribute to the search for peace through the exchange of earnest, thought-provoking ideas. Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, the President of National Defense University, and Dr. Stuart Johnson, the Director of INSS, supplied the requisite environment of confidence and enthusiasm by their positive guidance and open support of editorial freedom. Major General (retired) John Sewall, Chief of the INSS European Group, provided the opportunity for this undertaking by trusting a new Fellow with the Marshall Center project; yet he pitched in quickly when the plate got too full or the obstacles too great. Dr. Al Bernstein, the first Director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, gave ready advice and provided the concept for a joint INSS and Marshall Center theme for these proceedings as a means of furthering the work of both institutions in Europe.

Great appreciation goes to all those who attended the lively, spirited Garmisch Conference (entitled "European Security Challenges") and particularly those who sat on panels to present
new ideas or argue the continuing merits of old ones; those presentations spawned this book. Sadly, the editorial realities of space and limited resources meant choosing from among many outstanding papers and necessarily editing even further to arrive at a manageable volume. Nonetheless, all presentations and discussions have found their representation in the concepts you will read in the pages that follow.

Special recognition is due the Joint Staff Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) and the United States European Command, without whose support neither the conference nor this publication would have been possible.

Besides the authors whose names appear elsewhere in this work, Colonel Ernest Bienhart, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel Eric Hammersen, USA, are credited for providing the piece about the Marshall Center. Ms. Susan Lemke and Dr. Forest Pogue are thanked for their great help in researching General Marshall’s work and his words. Appreciation is also extended to Ms. Mary Quintero and Ms. Ann Sullivan for their generous help in library research. Finally, Mr. Alexander Contreras, Chief of Graphics and Photography and Mr. Juan Medrano, Visual Information Specialist are thanked for their enthusiastic work on the cover design.

Editing is hard work, at least in the beginning, and it is essential to have plenty of expert advice. Special thanks for excellent coaching is extended to Drs. Jeff Simon and Pat Clawson and to Mr. Jim Graham—all veteran editors who freely gave of their time to teach, guide and warn of impending pitfalls. Many others at INSS had a hand in publishing this book, including Colonel Vic Stamey, USA, (Retired); Mrs. Joyce Alston; Mr. Jim Brusstar; Mr. Josh Spero; Colonel Paul Rapalski, USAF; and Captain Obie O’Brien, USN. Thanks also go to Ms. Rose Cuirins of the NDU staff.

A very special thanks to Commander Donna Lackman, USN, of the Marshall Center, who reviewed all of the conference proceedings and edited each of the papers. Her advice and
contribution by way of very hard work over many weeks were invaluable in producing this publication.

The greatest recognition of all is reserved for Mrs. Delonnie Henry, without whom this book would not exist. Her perseverance, dedication, knowledge, and editing expertise were the most effective assets in our arsenal. Delonnie is rightfully sought out for her superb writing, editing, and organizational skills. The highest praise indeed is extended to this outstanding colleague.

While many supported this project, clearly the responsibility for errors and omissions, as well as for the selection of papers and editing decisions, is mine alone. In the introduction, I have represented as faithfully as possible the security challenges for Europe, and especially for the United States European Command, as articulated at the Conference. The suggestions for future U.S. policy and strategy in the region, set forth in the final essay, are the result of studied consideration of the Conference proceedings and much thoughtful analysis among INSS colleagues in subsequent months. Any recommendations are unofficial and do not represent the views of any U.S. agency or department; they are offered to spur further thinking and to help keep the search alive for a more lasting means to manage peace.

Charles L. Barry
Washington, D.C.
The Search for Peace in Europe
European Security
Challenges in Review

Charles L. Barry

The first half of this summary is a discussion of the task of restructuring for future peace protection. The second part summarizes the challenges to peace that a new system for European security will have to address.

The risk of imminent war between major powers fell to zero on December 25, 1991 when the Soviet Union closed its doors for good. After forty-five years of peace-by-confrontation, and a world sometimes poised at Armageddon, the true peace purchased at the cost of millions of lives both during and since the Second World War was delivered at last. War, in the terrible way it swept the continent in the first half of this century, is generally accepted as not a present concern. It is no surprise then that many believe that the search for peace in Europe is over. Peace has arrived.

But peace, like war, can never be left to chance. Waging peace requires objectives (the popular descriptor today is “vision”), a grand strategy, adequate organizations and sufficient resources. The search for peace is, more accurately, a search for the means to ensure peace. Europe and the world seek more than just another Cold War-style peace. Peace with prosperity, as John Kennedy argued, must be more than the mere absence of war.1 The United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and a host of other international cooperations have served the world well as keepers of the peace in vexing times. Now, in a new era, there is both the necessity and the opportunity for building a new, more capable system for managing peace.
The necessity for restructuring Europe's peace mechanisms is obvious: the old system is suddenly obsolete. The Soviet Union, a key part of that system and the keeper of a Pandora's box full of ethnic hatred and internal strife, is no more, and there are no heirs apparent to contain crises across vast parts of Eurasia. The old balance of power equation is now badly out of balance. The dangers of this situation are readily apparent. Old structures will have to adapt to the needs of new regions of instability, or fresh power centers will naturally emerge.

The opportunity to provide a more genuine peace, and perhaps to expand its reach, arises from the historic success of the Atlantic Alliance and the broad acceptance of its guiding principles. If an institution like NATO can manage peace for sixteen nations for a period that has become a record in modern times, why not now find ways to extend both the tenure and the territory of peace? Properly designed, a future security architecture would keep Europe away from the precipitous edge of war. It would be more capable of foreseeing the conditions which could lead to war and of bringing the political, economic and military resources to bear to resolve crises short of conflict. As with NATO, any future system will require the capacity to re-acquire peace by military means where there is no alternative. There is a great deal to achieve, but it can be done. Masterful statecraft will be required. Plato's time-worn quip, "Only the dead have seen the last of war," can no longer deter the search for ways to make peace permanent. Man's values evolve, and he has conquered other social ills since Plato's time. We should not give up hope of a vaccine for war.

On the premise that the task in front of us is to devise methods to protect peace, the first requirement is to ascertain what challenges stalk the territory which is Europe. The Garmisch conference tried to better understand the de-stabilizing conditions germinating across Europe's socio-economic-political spectrum. For the conferees, four sources of instability, depicted in the art work on the cover of this book, were of immediate concern: the uncertainty over Russia's future persona; the
potential of conflict in the former Yugoslavia to ignite a wider war of unknown bounds; the latent threat borne by nuclear proliferation; and the ethnic conflicts between nationalist extremism and expatriate minorities, especially the nascent strife in Western states. For the many authors from Central and Eastern Europe, by far the most predominant fear remains that of a neo-imperialist Russia. Their second recurring nightmare is the cyclonic turmoil emanating from former Yugoslavia.

Two underlying theses permeated the panel discussions about sources of instability. First, much like a commodity declining in value, Europe's stability continues to steadily erode. New hot spots or worsening old ones are regularly broached in European headlines, documenting a worrisome trend. The further to the East, the more numerous and internecine the crises are. Arguably, collective efforts to date have averted worse problems; however, the dangerous deterioration of stability in the East has not been arrested, much less reversed. The worst situations flare in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, in what is, at least for now, the peripheral regions of European interest. Closer in, interstate tensions remain high between Russia and the Baltics and Ukraine, while Slovakia and Hungary, near Europe's center trade propaganda on expatriate ethnic minorities. In Poland and Hungary, where experiments in democracy and free market economies are considered success stories, the strength of political and economic institutions remains anemic. All of this says that it will be a long, long time before the West can safely turn its attention away from the East.

The other thesis, evident in presentations from both East and West, was a growing doubt about the major Western powers and regional institutions capacity or political will to effectively counter crises before they breach the West's own frontiers. Several important but irresolute aspects of West European-U.S. relations create persistent ambiguity over where the East can really turn for its future security. To illustrate, the five most serious issues were:
First, continued reluctance to chart a path toward eventual membership in NATO, sought by most, leaves open a fundamental question for every newly independent state: collective defense or re-nationalized defense? If collective defense, with whom? Against what threat?

Second, the failure to halt the conflict in Yugoslavia—a conflict whose roots are similar to other brewing crises—is unsettling to those who had hoped the West might somehow help prevent, or act to end state-busting internal conflicts for fledgling democracies.

Third, interminable debates over future security structures, especially the dysfunctional competition between NATO and WEU, are weakening the one organization the east sees as the only possible foundation of any future structure, the Atlantic Alliance.

Fourth, inconsistencies between U.S. words and actions raise doubts as to the depth of America's commitment to Europe's security and to world leadership in general. Some perceive that the United States still needs to decide what role it intends to play on the world stage.

Finally, the West is seen as having turned alarmingly inward to nurse internal problems, from recessions to social unrest to changes in governments and other domestic agendas.

U.S. engagement, including a meaningful symbolic military presence, are vital to both U.S. and European interests. Nonetheless, many European thinkers conclude that the United States will have to be convinced by Europeans to stay truly engaged in trans-Atlantic security. There is an underlying unease that the U.S. commitment will be steadily reduced to levels inadequate to broker stability. From both East and West come calls for greater leadership, unity, vision and action. There have been calls to vigorously re-kindle efforts to find a future European-Atlantic security order; and apprehension that the opportunity to craft a new order may soon succumb to incessant demands of crisis response.
The first four parts of this volume examine the challenges to Europe's security and stability from the perspective of authors living among them every day. The final part reviews the situation from a U.S. perspective and suggests policy initiatives in the hope of furthering discourse on future United States relations with Europe.

In Part One, NATO representatives give universal support for the Alliance as central to future European security. However, the Alliance must change still further in order to be relevant. Philippe Mallard offers insight into French thinking on the role of each of Europe's major security institutions, with particular focus on the capabilities and limitations demonstrated by each in the Yugoslav crisis. Mallard writes that, while the UN and EC have understandably fallen short of the mark in former Yugoslavia, NATO may now be the best hope to stop the carnage, simply because of the evident need to increase military pressure is at last gaining acceptance. To preserve the Alliance, it is critical that current U.S. force plans calling for 100,000 troops in Europe be maintained as an important symbol of U.S. commitment. There has been a rapprochement between France and NATO, as witnessed by increased participation in military matters and the agreement on employment of the EuroCorps under NATO, yet Mallard insists there can be no deal whereby France re-joins the integrated military structure.

NATO is not the only essential venue for addressing security challenges in the French view. For Mallard, a European security system would include a Western European "security magnet" in the WEU, a NATO-anchored trans-Atlantic link, and an all-European dimension built on CSCE. Nonetheless, there are inherent limits to interplay between organizations, and Mallard observes that it is useless to attempt a perfect ordering of a new institutional system.

Josef Joffe, an Atlanticist, argues methodically that NATO, as an historic anomaly among alliances, persists because it offers insurance against growing uncertainty; because there is no competition for rendering both security and capable military
power; and because it is the one means by which America, Europe's patron and pacifier, is tied to Europe. Joffe contends it should be no surprise that the demise of bipolarity spawned a rebirth of sub-regional conflicts and civil war. Saddam Hussein could not have attacked a vital asset of the United States (oil), and Yugoslavia's republics would have stayed orderly under Belgrade except for the absence of the old Soviet dictate over its client states. For Joffe, the end of the Cold War has "made real peace impossible," and there should be no doubt that a capacity to deal with crises of the Bosnian genre will be a continuing requirement. Analyzing the WEU, Joffe sees scant reason to consider the EC-WEU team functional in the security arena unless the Twelve (or the many) become One. Strong national interests still veto common political action on tough issues, and, without a military arm in the WEU, the EC can have little impact on regional security. Equally pessimistic is Joffe's analysis of the CSCE and the concept of collective security. Previous attempts at collective security in this century, the League of Nations and the UN, have been dismal. The CSCE has done no better in preventing the many conflicts in its region since the Cold War and is unlikely to move beyond its role as a consultative forum.

Theodore Couloumbis briefly retraces the nature of global security patterns before and after the events of 1989-91 from a North-South perspective. While the North lived "under the Damoclean sword of balanced nuclear terror," Third World conflicts cost 25 million lives between 1950 and 1990. Couloumbis asks whether such conflicts will become the security concern of a new era. A new architecture should be designed, one based on a fundamental consensus among the major powers which is shared as well as among many smaller states. Couloumbis underscores the point that interlocking security institutions means political and economic cooperation. He argues that NATO should be at the apex of such a system, but he warns that there must also be a set of complementary, overlapping structures. There cannot be a Euro-Atlantic security island
"surrounded by a sea of disorder" that results in a global confrontation between "haves" and "have nots," both with nuclear weapons. The task for Greece, Couloumbis explains is to broaden and deepen its ties to NATO, the EC and the WEU. The Greek role in the Balkans is to further peace and stability through universal bilateral diplomacy, and through the promotion of an EC package of socio-economic assistance aimed at the amelioration of the causes of conflict and mass dislocation of people. According to Couloumbis, the greatest threat to the West is the dissolution of NATO.

Giuseppe Cucchi emphasizes the differences rather than the similarities between Italian and European approaches to security issues. For Cucchi, an "arc of crisis" surrounds Italy: the East, the Balkans and the Arabic world. And, beyond these concerns, Italy finds a "fourth world" of global poverty, hunger and burgeoning population. But, Cucchi goes on, current crises are not Italy's only concerns. Internally the country is divided much like Europe's industrialized and modern West (Italy's North) and the impoverished and chaotic East (Italy's South). The divide runs deeper: the "European soul" of the North must find common ground with the "Mediterranean soul" of the South. Cucchi senses that his country's old fears are coming back in the form of German economic and political dominance of Europe in the new era, and he suggests Italy might try to "hamper the birth of a new Franco-German core at the heart of the continent." As NATO's evolution results in a more equitable trans-Atlantic bargain, Italy fears being drawn into a European polity directed toward German interests in the East versus Italian interests across the Mediterranean. Cucchi asserts that one of the great shortcomings of the Western security structure is its failure to join with the Arabic world, a world that has become a source of growing immigration and potential confrontation for Europe.

Omur Orhun begins by concluding that we carried our hopes too far in the initial optimism prevalent after the Cold War ended. Orhun simultaneously sees that the military security we have built is not well suited for challenges ahead—challenges that
require a security capability expanded to encompass the political and economic realms. The foremost security challenge, according to Orhun, is the outcome of the political struggle within Russia—and how the solution will impact Russian foreign policy. Orhun also cites aggressive irredentism, or "micro-nationalism," and the economic differences between east and west, north and south as major challenges to Europe's stability. Turkey's international role is an amalgam of regional roles in Europe, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and other areas. Turkish policies are driven by a set of constants and variables: constants which Turkey must foster and variables she aims to influence. Turkey's priorities in the Yugoslav conflict are to stop the bloodshed, provide international assistance, and negotiate a just and durable solution. Orhun argues that the international response to date has been irresolute and lacking in political will. For historical ethnic and religious reasons, the Turkish public is sensitive to the religious bifurcation of the conflict. The plight of Bosnia and the weak international response has strengthened radical factions in the Moslem world. Orhun notes that it is not too late for international action, and he recommends renewed commitment to the UN process.

In Part Two, Vladimir Shustov begins with a sobering description of Russia's own view of her future political and military influence in the area of the former Soviet Union, now referred to as Russia's "near abroad." As the most powerful successor state, Shustov writes, Russia has taken the initiative in "redistribution of the Soviet military and strategic legacy," up to 70% of which will come to Russia itself. In the negotiations over re-distribution of military equipment, some "intransigence" has cause difficulties, notably with Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet, the Baltics over withdrawal timetables and the unilateral seizure of equipment in other republics. Yet Shustov notes an impressive array of agreements, bilateral and multilateral, which have been worked out among the former Soviet republics. According to Shustov, the military and strategic legacy Russia has inherited "opens vast prospects for ensuring Russia's
interests." The key to Russia’s security strategy is the creation of the "near abroad," a concept of special military and political relations with former Soviet republics, both within and outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). "The prime objective" Shustov explains, "is to create a belt of 'good neighborhoods' and stability along the perimeter of Russian borders." Another objective Shustov proposes, is "to establish a system of collective security" in a defense community concept that could join with similar organizations such as NATO or the WEU. The "near abroad" initiative is less enthusiastically supported by some of Russia’s neighbors (see Lejin’s essay), however it appears to be taking hold, and when complete in areas such as doctrine, technology and control of nuclear weapons, it may closely resemble the military of the old Soviet Union.

Ihor Kharchenko contends that the primary security challenge for Eastern states struggling to give democracy a foothold is the lack of any mechanism to provide fundamental security assurances. Ukraine’s problem is precisely that it is independent -- a sudden removal of Soviet security has caught them without a military or defense organization. Kharchenko describes the large existing investment Ukraine has in military-industrial infrastructure which must somehow be reduced and re-focused on still emerging national priorities. Catalyzed by its need for direction and tensions with Russia over residual Soviet military assets, Ukraine intends to pursue a national security doctrine based on four pillars: a national armed force, cooperative bilateral relations with neighbors, participation in a regional security system and national security guarantees from the UN and nuclear powers. Kharchenko leaves little ambiguity that Ukraine’s primary security concern is relations with Russia, noting that “for Ukraine, Russian perspectives are of the greatest importance.” Ukraine also watches carefully the crises in Moldova and former Yugoslavia (where Ukraine has already suffered casualties), for security implications which could reverberate in Kiev.
The Baltics bring significant historic perspectives to their assessment of national security. Atis Lejins begins with a brief history of Baltic freedom and subjugation since World War I and a detailed account of strained Latvian-Russian relations since the demise of the Soviet Union. He leaves no doubt "that the Baltics see the greatest threat to their security emanating from Moscow." With approximately 50 percent of Latvia's population of Russian heritage, the fear of internal domination has resulted in tense debate over citizenship, key government positions and official language. Lejins is suspicious of the "near abroad" concept and claims it is an attempt to gain international recognition as the arbiter of peace and stability in the territory of the former USSR. Latvia aims for NATO, WEU and EC membership, but today it focuses on the one organization in which it has a bona fide seat, the CSCE. Lejins claims the Baltics are frustrated by the blandness of the NACC and WEU Consultative Forum, and they have suggested a NACC sub group for the "have nots." The lack of security guarantees, coupled with the shadow of Russia, has caused the Estonians to seek arms from Israel, and Lejins asserts Latvia is weighing its options.

In Part Three, Zoltan Szabo opens the discussions on Central Europe by noting "we are still far from a Europe whole and free." The perspective from Hungary is that the probability of local conflicts growing into larger wars has actually increased in the last two years. Szabo sees a primary culprit in the unbridled assertion of the right of self-determination, which can "lead to destructive conflicts among nations and nationalities." The issue of minority rights has clearly moved beyond purely legal or humanitarian concerns and become a major security challenge. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrates this point only too well, according to Szabo, who believes that if the "Balkans are not Europeanized, Europe will be threatened with Balkanization." A related issue, and likely to be one of broader concern, is this rising tide of immigrants. Hungary is a particularly vulnerable haven for attracting Croats as well as Muslims. Being a refugee "target" is an unexpected burden for
a country more accustomed to being a refugee "producer." Analyzing the potential solutions to these challenges, Szabo comes to the same conclusion as his counterparts—that cooperative international effort is the key. Hungary has had positive bilateral experiences with Slovenia and Ukraine. Collective initiatives such as the Visegrad Group add another layer of problem-solving. Hungary, however, subscribes to the view that gradual integration into the more established Western organizations like NATO and the EC will provide truly lasting solutions to their security problems.

Henryk Szlajfer comments that Poland’s post-Warsaw Pact situation is threatened by the internal neglect of the military, whose expenditures have declined over 50 percent in the last six years. Yet his real concern stems from Russia, which he sees as having replaced control with influence with respect to its sister republics and former allies. Szlajfer explains that the oft-mentioned Vancouver to Vladivostok space has always been a myth, and that a fundamental divide exists between Europe and Asia—a divide incongruously straddled by the Russian Federation. Szlajfer contends that the Western values of democracy are inconsistent with the Asian influence on Russian history and cannot be reconciled in a common body politic. The extension of the CSCE and the NACC to Central Asia does not alter this reality. The importance of this argument for Poland, and Central Europe, is the need to define the Eastern boundary of Europe and the need to secure haven within Western organizations. To remain "in the open" is to create too great a temptation for Russian imperialism. Reviewing the performance of Visegrad and the Central European Initiative (ECI, the former Hexagonale), Szlajfer argues that neither of these are sufficient to provide security and that, in fact, they are weak. The "liberation of East-Central Europe," he concludes, like the unification of Germany, must be made "irreversible." In a final argument, Szlajfer observes that the intensifying quarrels among the NATO allies over the nature of a new balance of burden- and
decision-sharing is "one of the chief sources of the security deficit and tensions in Europe."

Ladislav Kadlec, analyzing Slovakia's security, notes bluntly that Slovakia, still emerging as a sovereign republic, has no experience in facing its new challenges. Kadlec re-traces the history of the Slovak people, leading to the assertion that "Slovakia, too, belongs to the West." As the smallest and newest country among its neighbors, and having completed a relatively uncontested divorce with the Czech Republic, Slovakia has few immediate international tensions. There are unresolved issues with the Czech Republic and, more worrisome, long standing ethnic issues with Hungary. However, Slovakia is nervous, along with every other state in the region, about Russia. Historical experience "makes Slovakia move cautiously and observe diligently each political, economic and ideological development in Russia." Slovakia, as with the Czechs, remembers the violent repression of 1968, and Slovakia is keenly aware that it is the weakest and most physically exposed of the Visegrad countries. Not surprisingly, Slovakia's security objectives include early admittance to Western organizations such as NATO. Kadlec depicts Germany as another, albeit more benign, hegemon in Central Europe. Kadlec traces the present and historic German influence in the region, and he believes German assistance is essential to economic survival. He nonetheless notes his concern for a new Mitteleuropa under overwhelming German influence. Slovakia is determined to resist domination or assimilation by any power.

The former Yugoslavia, writes Adem Çopani, will remain explosive even if a settlement is reached in the Bosnian war. Far from being a side show for Europe, stability in the Balkans is essential to regional stability. Fundamentally the issue is a dilemma between the right of self-determination and territorial integrity of a state. The issue would be less contentious if the underlying problems of minority rights and cultural, ethnic and religious difference could be effectively addressed. Çopani postulates that the theoretical solutions of establishing and
deepening democratic institutions, and of creating a nonexistent economic vitality, offer little hope of peace in the near- to mid-term. Çopani wonders how Europe can tolerate apartheid amidst its own territory even as it succeeds in abolishing the practice in South Africa. For weak Albania, however, the prospects of a war with Serbia over Kosovo are not appealing, and Albania must balance internal pressures with external realities. Therefore, Albania's policy is to support international pressures on Serbia, and non-violent resistance in Kosovo by the two million Albanians who account for 90% on the population. To contain the crisis and stop the suffering will require the best auspices of each of the other Balkan countries and of international organizations.

Mikhail Srebrev believes the source of the Yugoslav conflict can only be understood in light of marks left by history on individual counties, marks which are in some cases, warnings for the future. In tracing the events which lead up to the current crisis, Srebrev points out that the country had never truly been unified, and with the death of Tito in 1980, worsening economic conditions and a weakened central government produced bids for independents. These internal factors collided with external disintegration of the communist world, and the chase was on for autonomy. The marriage of convenience was over. With the war in Bosnia nearing resolution by force of arms, all indicators point to Kosovo as the next center of conflict. Bulgarian policy is to support international efforts toward a settlement, including the imposition of sanctions. At the same time, Bulgaria looks to the EC to help alleviate the twin burdens of lost revenue and transitioning toward a market economy. Srebrev's thorough analysis raises two other factors to take into account in assessing the potential for a military solution: the severe operational environment and the "freedom-loving" national psychology of the Serbs. Bulgaria intends to maintain her policy of strict non-participation in any military operation, including peace keeping.

Ioan Pascu tells of Romania's concern that the break-up of Yugoslavia, and of Czechoslovakia, both created by the Treaty of
Versailles, increases criticism of the Treaty in Central Europe. Under Versailles, Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina were reunited with Romania. Pascu contends that it is the dangerous precedent of internal armed conflict which makes Bosnia a special case. Yugoslavia has been Romania's most secure border until the conflict. Now, however, relations are deteriorating across the region. Pascu opines that should Kosovo or Macedonia, erupt the prospects increase for a general Balkan war. Besides being a very bloody war, Pascu warns that it will be difficult to insulate the conflict from Muslim fundamentalist involvement. In the face of the sobering situation next door, Romania finds the consultative role of the NACC reassuring even in the absence of NATO security guarantees. The greatest concern Pascu sees in the international response to the Yugoslav crisis is the unity of the West, especially the "competitive course on which NATO and the WEU have engaged," and the difficulties encountered recently in Western integration. Western institutions can not succumb to temptation to take one side in a conflict, rather the West must stick to "strict equality of treatment" with all former Warsaw Pact countries.

Simon Serfaty begins Part Five with a fresh perspective on the turbulence which has become a trademark of Europe's transition to a new era. Serfaty points out that winning and losing soon become academic, even in war. Europe's turmoil is unfamiliar because it does not match the easy frame's of reference: the Second, and less so, First World War's. The Cold War's abrupt end is unlike the "hot" world wars, where the end could be foreseen and planned for. In 1947, the United States was then faced with a clear ultimatum to lead the world against a definite threat to clear national and collective interests. Today things are not so clear, and the fusing heat of an external threat may have been removed before the cooperating parts, even after 45 years, were permanently melded into a whole. In reviewing the international community's response to the Yugoslav crisis, Serfaty methodically points out, in hindsight, the mistakes which have been made. He especially underscores two points. First,
recognition aside, Bosnia never really existed in fact, and second, the world powers seem to ignore the ingredient to the equation most obviously missing, namely the use of force. Serfaty admonishes that the Yugoslav tragedy may yet be helpful if it improves crisis management and causes allies to "stop treating each other as if they are rivals. He also argues that "more room must be made for the European idea in NATO and for the Atlantic idea in the EC." These ideas are complementary, Serfaty asserts, and together NATO and the EC can fulfill the objective of stability, security and affluence to all European-Atlantic states.

William Taft proposes that any security strategy and force structure for Europe should address three risks: first, the remote but real possibility of nuclear power confrontation; Second, the possibility of conventional conflict, major or minor, among states near NATO; and finally, the danger that cooperation among allies might weaken, causing their ability to act together effectively to be lost. Taft postulates that the forces needed to address these risks includes a viable integrated military structure, a 100,000-man troop level from the United States and sufficient allied forces, perhaps by role specialization where appropriate. NATO's future missions will center on deterring conflict, peacemaking and peace keeping, and "assuring that the allies adhere to patterns of cooperation in security matters that will enable Europe to continue on its course to political and economic union." The emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is consistent with the Alliance, according to Taft, and along with the concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) should be developed within the framework of the Alliance. What is important is that the Alliance not be relegated to a sort of catastrophic security insurance, which would only be activated when the situation is the most dire. Instead, Taft recommends the formula from the Copenhagen Communique of 1991, i.e., that the Alliance is the first forum for consultations and agreement among allies on European security policy.

Charles Barry wraps up Part Five with a treatment of the future of U.S. global leadership, and some policy
recommendations for addressing U.S. interests in Europe. Barry asserts that U.S. leadership requires engaging the American people in the decision to take on a globalist versus an isolationist national security policy. By refreshing its own perspective and moderating the world's expectations, the United States can strike an appropriate balance between too much (the world’s policeman) and too little (a leaderless world) leadership. The United States should propose a bold new trans-Atlantic partnership, one that accommodates both a significant ESDI role and new NATO members. Neither of these thresholds can be delayed for long, and both must be crossed with care not to threaten Alliance consensus-building. A special relationship will be necessary for Russia. In all likelihood this will not lead to NATO membership, however it will accord recognition of Russia as a power of major regional influence. NATO need not fear Russian reactions to policy decision toward Central and East Europe. Barry argues that in the former Yugoslavia, a policy of nonintervention by external combat forces is the right approach, and that any peacekeeping operation should be undertaken carefully and sparingly. Barry concludes with some insights on the 1994 NATO Summit’s meaning for Europe and the United States.

Notes


2. Before NATO's inception, the modern record during which western Europe lived in general peace (no major power wars) was 38 years, 9 months, 5 days: 22 June 1815 to 27 March 1854 under the peace management of the Concert of Europe. NATO surpassed this mark on 15 May 1984 (Paul Schroeder, "Does Murphy's Law Apply to History?" Wilson Quarterly 9, no.1 [1985]: 88).

Part I

From Europe's Strength:
the West
A View of Institutions and Security Building in Europe

Philippe Mallard

Has the concept of interlocking institutions been validated by the already two-year-old war in the ex-Yugoslavia? One should not look upon the Bosnian affair as a typical example of Europe's future challenges. Each crisis has its own dynamics, and it is always misleading—though a natural temptation—to expect that the next war will look much like the previous one. Still, many lessons may be learned from the Yugoslav tragedy.

One can describe the crisis as having gone through three phases, each corresponding to a leading role by one or another international institution. It can be said that 1991 was the year of Europe. Indeed, when then-chairman of the European Community (EC) Council Jacques Poos arrived in Zagreb with the so-called troika mission in June of that year, he stated that "Europe’s time has come." But mediation efforts quickly proved insufficient. One can then describe 1992 as the year of the United Nations (UN). The center of gravity of diplomatic efforts slowly moved throughout the year from the EC capitals—Brussels, The Hague, London—to the UN buildings in New York and Geneva. A massive peacekeeping and humanitarian relief effort was undertaken, and a blueprint for a Bosnian peace plan was patiently and painfully devised by Messrs. Vance and Owen. One is tempted to say that 1993 will be—and is already—the year of the Alliance. As the need to increase military pressure has been gradually accepted, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the obvious vehicle for most of the effort, including deployment of the Standing Naval Forces, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), use of NATO Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS),
transfer of elements of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) headquarters, enforcement of the no-fly-zone set up by the UN, and preparations for broader military efforts. This was the second time in history that the Alliance was committed to an actual crisis.

In trying to divine what institutions are most useful for this kind of work in the future, it is instructive to review the roles played by these institutions in the current crisis and the lessons learned.

The European Community

It has become conventional wisdom to characterize the European Community’s initiatives in the Yugoslav crisis as failures. Of course, Mr. Poos’ above-mentioned statement probably overestimated the political impact of the first direct EC involvement in an international crisis. But who could blame him? It had come as a pleasant and unexpected surprise to everybody that the EC actually could play some sort of role in Yugoslavia when Community leaders were still in the process of designing mechanisms for a common foreign and security policy. The EC in Yugoslavia was, as an insider said, "ten years ahead of itself." Therefore, only those who had exceedingly high expectations about the Community’s involvement could be disappointed. This crisis was a true learning process for the EC and its efforts were useful. There were two benefits in particular. First, the conference chaired by Lord Carrington provided the only forum where all parties to the conflict could meet and talk, although it suffered from poor management and lack of financial support. Second, the monitoring mission provided first-hand information to Carrington’s conference, contributed to defusing tensions in Bosnia in 1991, and was a live experiment for European military and civilian personnel to work in the field implementing a European security initiative.
The United Nations

As the EC efforts lost momentum and the crisis deepened in 1992, the UN emerged as the conduit of global concern. There was a need for an undisputed legitimate authority, and it was clear that only the UN could meet the requirement. Cyrus Vance, the former U.S. Secretary of State, joined Lord Owen, the EC’s negotiator, in an attempt to stop the fighting. Mr. Vance’s nationality probably helped considerably in leveraging a ceasefire. The UN was eventually able to deploy peacekeepers because there was then a peace to keep after the international recognition of Croatia. Then, as the Bosnian war escalated and further sanctions were envisioned, resorting to an existing international military apparatus proved to be the only practical way. But, the UN, like the EC, did not fade away completely. A permanent consensus emerged that any major step toward Western involvement had to be authorized by the United Nations. UN Security Council resolutions continue to form the basis of the so-called new world order as applied to the former Yugoslavia. But events in April 1992 showed us how fragile this legitimization mechanism can be: based fundamentally on consensus—which is sometimes only tacit—among the five permanent UN Security Council members, its longevity should never be taken for granted.

The Alliance

Finally in 1993, NATO came into play to try to implement UN resolutions. Ironically, the Alliance never fought the war it had prepared for; but in the two-year time frame following the collapse of the Communist empire, NATO has contributed significantly to the management of security in what used to be called the "out-of-area" two times: first in the Middle East, and now in the Balkans. One can only conclude that, contrary to what some hastily predicted when the Berlin Wall came down,
the Alliance is relevant in the new international context and is adapting to an emerging new order. To be sure, a major turning point was reached in this respect when all sixteen Alliance members agreed in Oslo in June 1992 that NATO could be involved in peacekeeping missions. Then, six months later in Brussels, ministers agreed that the Alliance was ready to support implementation of UN resolutions in a broader sense, including potential peace-enforcement operations. One could discuss at length whether or not NATO per se is actually involved in a particular operation. The fact remains that NATO procedures, NATO assets and NATO facilities are being used, and that therefore NATO is proving to be useful. Politically speaking, there is another advantage in resorting to NATO: the Alliance is probably the best vehicle for U.S. involvement in multinational UN-controlled operations, an involvement that can only be welcomed by Europeans.

Does this mean that for the foreseeable future NATO will remain the main instrument of Western military action? This will depend to a large extent on its capacity to further adjust to the new environment. Of course, as the Americans like to point out, "If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it." But in at least three areas, one can identify potential problems for Alliance crisis management.

First is the question of articulating the difference between the conduct of NATO operations and the overall political control of decisionmaking. In the framework of operations conducted under UN (or, maybe one day, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)) auspices, it is critical that Alliance political authorities retain full control at all times. For we in the Alliance are not faced with obvious, well-identified common threats to our security in the current crisis (nor will we, in all likelihood, in the future), but we are faced with a very complicated network of political and military forces. The political sensitivity of these operations is much more acute than that of a full-scale war against the Warsaw Pact.

Second, and not entirely separated from the first issue, is the question of U.S. involvement. NATO is particularly useful as a
vehicle for U.S. participation in Europe's security. But we may encounter problems if we want to use the NATO apparatus in an operation where the United States does not wish to be significantly involved (meaning, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the deployment of several thousands troops on the ground). As the primary military power of the Alliance, the United States is a major factor in the politico-military planning and decisionmaking process in NATO as it works today—this may pose problems when the United States is not really involved.

Third is the problem of creating flexibility in NATO structures so as to adapt to the participation of non-Alliance members in NATO-run operations or, conversely, to adapt to the absence of some Alliance members in an operation due to particular political sensitivities. There are serious doubts (as recent examples show) whether the NATO structures are flexible enough to accommodate these needs.

Clearly, these three institutions—the EC, the UN and NATO—have played the major parts in the international community's efforts at dealing with the Yugoslav crisis. But one should not forget the roles played by the Western European Union (WEU) as well and, to a lesser extent, the CSCE. Both organizations have made highly useful contributions, even though in limited ways.

Like the European Community, the WEU found itself in the situation where expectations concerning its role exceeded what was practical or feasible at the time. Only in December 1991, in Maastricht, did European heads of state and governments agree that the WEU could be both the European pillar of the Alliance and the instrument of a common security policy. Six months later, in June 1992, the Petersburg Declaration gave the WEU the means to play an operational role in the future.

Therefore, its achievements in the current crisis, given the context, are far from being small. WEU members initiated a common action in the Adriatic to monitor the embargo, an option subsequently also taken up by NATO. Subsequently, the WEU helped the Danube riparian countries implement the UN sanctions
by organizing a police operation. The WEU also organized a European concert on the concept of "safety zones" designed to offer protection to endangered populations. Finally, the WEU set up plans for a protected area around Sarajevo to be implemented within the broader framework of a peace plan for Bosnia.

Though the so-called "duplication" of efforts by the WEU may have had a political legitimacy, it became clear that due to the complexity in scope and the scale of military operations, other requirements arose. It became necessary to reconcile political and military interests—which do not always coincide. Therefore, the Alliance had to redesign arrangements in the Adriatic, unifying the operation while keeping a true role for the WEU. Most Alliance partners also realized that it would hardly be practical to have a separate WEU involvement in Bosnia if the military apparatus of the operation was essentially drawn from the NATO-integrated structure.

Along with other organizations, the CSCE was also involved in the management of the crisis. However, compared with the aforementioned institutions, it was essentially disengaged. Initiation by Austria of the unusual military activities mechanism when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) moved towards Slovenia in June 1991 elicited a formal response from Belgrade. Later on, the CSCE embarked on a fresh course by excluding the rump of Yugoslavia from the Conference, according to a newly-established procedure to which the (strange) name of "consensus-minus-one" was given. For the rest, you saw a few young sanctions-assistance monitors wearing CSCE tee-shirts on the Danube. Hardly what one would call a forefront role for an organization whose members expected to take the lead in conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

What conclusions may be drawn from these various institutions' involvement? First, we can say that the interlocking of institutions is a process that developed as the crises have unfolded and corresponds to the reality of international politics. Second, while all of these institutions supposedly were reoriented and given new tools to deal with the changing environment, it
seems that pragmatic approaches remain unavoidable. Third, while some degree of confusion is probably unescapable in any interlocking process, the overlap of missions in the Yugoslav crisis certainly has not helped clarify the post-Cold War alphabet soup.

Institutions and Security-Building in Europe: Three Dimensions

There appear to be three courses of action available to France to improve its relationship with NATO in the future. To begin with, France must accept that there are inherent limits in an institutional approach toward European security. Institutions may have a life of their own—but they are in essence what their members make of them. In the defense and security area, the achievements and failures of institutions are based on choices that are a matter of national sovereignty. For this reason, it should be clear that there is not a magic recipe for adapting old institutions to the new environment. Likewise, a perfect ordering of the institutional system is in all likelihood a fantasy—there will be no grand soir of the European security architecture.

That being said, the security of the continent will require at least the Western powers to continue their efforts in the following three directions—all of equal necessity for harmony in future peace- and security-building.

The WEU: A Western European Security Magnet

The first course of action involves the creation of a Western European security magnet in the form of the WEU. The Maastricht treaty, which most in Europe hope to see swiftly enter into force, gives a dual role to the WEU. The WEU will be the European pillar of the Alliance as well as the defense and security component of the union created in Maastricht. This was
a compromise, as most major European decisions are. This dual function is precisely what will put the WEU at the core of the European security architecture in the future. For each function, different sets of responsibilities correspond. As the European pillar of the Alliance, the WEU will coordinate European efforts within any broader Alliance or other U.S.-led action. This will obviously require close relations between the two organizations, including between the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the recently operational WEU Planning Cell. In this respect, transparency must be a two-way street. Then, as the defense component of the European Union, the WEU will translate autonomous security initiatives into action—for instance, protection of European vital interests overseas, and humanitarian efforts in Africa or elsewhere. Beyond that, ensuring that Europe will be able to undertake major military commitments by itself will require that we in the Alliance stop the current decline in defense spending, especially at a time when our resources are already overstretched by the multiplication of UN peacekeeping operations around the globe. On the contrary, we now need to invest in long-term projects that will help us ensure our strategic autonomy—such as the fields of intelligence and mobility.

Far from being contradictory, the WEU’s two roles, like two facets of the same coin, will ensure its success. The European pillar at work will foster solidarity among the European Union’s members. This will allow what was once the "theater" to become a sort of "security magnet" at the center of the Euro-Atlantic community, like the Community is an "economic magnet" today.

NATO: The Trans-Atlantic Link

The second course of action involves the trans-Atlantic link. Clearly, a significant U.S. military presence on the continent will continue to be an important factor of stability for all European countries for some time. It is critical that the U.S. does not
withdraw its force of 100,000—a number of symbolic importance—since governments and public opinions in the eastern part of the continent heavily support this presence. In fact, it is clear that the U.S. forces provide continuing reassurance to Europe as a whole. Those in the U.S. who argue that the permanent American military commitment in Europe has lost its raison d'être should realize that the U.S. presence is beneficial to a larger number of countries today than it was at the time of the Cold War.

That being said, we should not let ourselves be blinded by comfortable slogans praising "NATO's unparalleled success in History." The Alliance, if it is to retain its relevance, will have to further adapt, and probably become more flexible to adjust to future changes. Also NATO will have to face the unavoidable question of enlargement—if the Alliance ultimately rests on a community of values, then it will be more and more incongruous in the future to keep its doors closed.

CSCE: The All-European Dimension

The third course of action necessary to an institutional effort involves the all-European dimension. The CSCE has been remarkably, and unfortunately, absent from crises management in the new context with the exception of the peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh—which could lead the CSCE to undertake its first self-organized peacekeeping enterprise. But, reality lies in a sobering fact: when Hungary and Slovakia sought to solve their dispute over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam, they considered that the EC, not the CSCE, could provide the more useful mediation.

However, within the framework of the Security Forum which opened in Vienna last fall, an important task has been undertaken which will in time be beneficial to Europe as a whole. We should all strongly support the effort of harmonizing and codifying rights and obligations that have been developed since
the end of the Cold War and ensure that there will be no unequal zones of security on the continent.

Europe must be prepared to go further. Beyond the Charter of Paris and the Concluding Document of the Second Helsinki Summit, there may be a need for an overarching set of principles that would encompass old as well as new commitments. These principles would reaffirm a common will to strengthen stability on the whole continent, including those remote parts of the European land mass that threaten to become a playground for dangerous power games at best, or at worst to drift slowly into chaos. The question of security guarantees would probably have to be addressed from this perspective. It would be a test of the EC members’ ability to design a common foreign and security policy as well as answer the expectations many of the new democracies have for a European security treaty. Ultimately, the idea of some form of a European security council may have to be considered. Such a forum could help, for instance, to legitimize a peacekeeping operation on the continent if, for one reason or another, the United Nations becomes paralyzed (for example, in the case of a Chinese veto).

In the final analysis, the future of the CSCE is closely linked to that of the European ideal. One possible concept of the “European identity” corresponds to each of the institutions mentioned (the EC, the Alliance, the CSCE). Others can be imagined, like the confederation imagined by the French President of the Republic. The final shape of the institutional architecture will, ultimately, reflect and reconcile these separate visions of the European ideal.

France and the Future of the Alliance:
Prospects for a New Relationship

Since the end of the Cold War, French-Alliance relations have been through many ups and downs. But it is clear that despite occasional disagreements about the way the Alliance should go
forward, there certainly has been a rapprochement. In 1991, France participated in the strategy review process that gave birth to the New Strategic Concept, agreeing in its entirety with the exception of a few paragraphs. France fully supported the Alliance taking part in peacekeeping operations per se. For that matter, French military representatives will now take part in Military Committee discussions when considering planning new missions. More recently, events of considerable importance have taken place such as the agreement between General Shalikashvili, General Naumann and Admiral Lanxade governing the relations between the Eurocorps and NATO’s integrated military structure. Under this agreement, the Eurocorps would be fully available in defense of the Alliance and would come under Supreme Allied Command, Europe’s (SACEUR) operational command should the requisite political authorities so decide. France also participated in the UN-sponsored operation of enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina, which drew heavily on NATO assets. These events are a testimony of France’s willingness and readiness to play a significant role in Alliance operations when the time comes to do so and when it makes political as well as military sense.

So, critics argue, why not then go a step further and become a full participant in the NATO structure? It is said, in particular, that it would be a way for France to increase its political weight in the Alliance. But the question is not that of France’s power in NATO. In fact, what is called for is a rebalancing of the Alliance’s planning and decisionmaking machinery that would take into account the transformation of the international environment, the changing force posture, the new peacekeeping missions, and the fact that in the post-Cold War era, NATO will not be the only tool for security-management in Europe.

That said, France is aware that its current position may not necessarily meet either the Alliance’s needs or France’s own interests in all circumstances. Therefore, French policy vis-a-vis the Alliance is currently under review. There are theoretically three options open to French leaders. The first is a rather
pragmatic approach along the lines they have followed so far, allowing France to adjust its position insofar as it is needed, but no more—a good example of this approach is the current French relationship with the Military Committee. A second option is close to what some call the "Spanish model," i.e., full participation in the NATO bodies without committing French forces to the integrated military structure. Finally, a third option is for France to participate actively in a new Alliance in which the NATO structures, concepts and decisionmaking process are revamped.

But it should be clear that in all circumstances, there can be no question of a "deal" where France would make a "great comeback" after the conditions it puts forward are met by the Alliance. But NATO has not finished its adaptation to the new environment. Its goal should be to become a more flexible Alliance, taking into account the wide range of possible missions, and being ready to adjust to various forms of operations, including politically and militarily acceptable ways to accommodate the participation of non-NATO members.

What sort of relations would this new Alliance have with its so-called cooperation partners? First, Allies belonging to the integrated military structure could give formal security guarantees. This seems hardly feasible at the moment, given the absence of a common threat, and the fact that NATO does not necessarily share its vital interests with many of the countries represented in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

Second, the relations could be similar to those of a "gentlemen's club." The North Atlantic Cooperation Council may have a useful role to play in this respect, on the condition that it clarifies its relationship with the CSCE. Indeed, many items in the NACC's work program could be—or should have been—tackled under CSCE auspices. It surely does make sense for NATO to help the former Warsaw Pact countries restructure their defense apparatus, and to foster the development of a common strategic culture. But on the other hand, does it make sense today to exclude Austria, for example, from discussions
about peacekeeping in Europe when countries such as Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan are represented? Therefore, a formula where NATO would provide the backbone for joint *ad hoc* operations ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, legitimized by the UN or the CSCE, would probably be optimum. It would not, of course, preclude operations undertaken by the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

NATO has already realized and acted upon the conclusion that the continued existence of heavy military machinery that was created to deal with a massive threat does not reflect the sea change that has taken place in Europe since 1989. Yet another task facing NATO will probably be the revision of the Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 in order to insert peacekeeping missions with precise definitions and concepts in its framework. NATO has proved its relevance so far in a totally different environment from the one that gave it birth. It is the responsibility of all its members to ensure that it will remain relevant in the ongoing crises that are tearing up the continent's reborn nations—otherwise, as U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton recently said, it will just become "a club for retired generals."

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The Future of European Security: An Atlanticist Perspective

Josef Joffe

Alliances After the Cold War

History and theory suggest why alliances succumb after both defeat and triumph: because their reason for being and their functionality expire in both cases. This explanation certainly holds sway in the case of the Warsaw Pact which was unceremoniously disbanded in 1991, and rightly so. In the previous year, the Soviet Union had handed in its de facto capitulation in the Cold War when, on July 16, Mikhail Gorbachev conceded to West German chancellor Helmut Kohl what his predecessors since 1945 had fought tooth and nail: a reunited Germany in the West. To give away the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the strategic brace of the Soviet Empire, was to give away the rest. For it was the possession of the GDR, where 400,000 of the best Soviet troops were stationed, which allowed Moscow to contain and encircle its unruly satrapies in between. That was the beginning of the retraction of Soviet power from Central Europe. And since it had been precisely the forward projection of Muscovite might all the way to the Elbe River which had unleashed the Cold War, Germany’s reunification in the West signified Soviet Russia’s surrender. Naturally, that was also the end of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe.

But the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has reached sturdy middle age in spite of the Soviet Union’s demise, celebrating its 44th birthday in 1993. This certainly poses a paradox. For the analysis of the fate of victorious alliances suggests that NATO should have gone the same way
as the World War I Entente and the Soviet-American anti-
Hitler coalition of World War II. The demise of the Soviet
Union has robbed NATO of its original reason for being, and
history tells us that alliances do not endure when the threat and
the foe disappear. Why does NATO persist while its rival, the
Warsaw Pact has ended up on the ash heap of history?

That NATO should not have collapsed simultaneously with
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was to be expected.
It was, after all, a voluntary compact, freely chosen by its
members and not imposed on them like the WTO. For Poland,
Hungary et. al, breaking up the Pact was an act of
emancipation, part and parcel of the "velvet revolutions"
throughout Eastern Europe which dispatched unwanted regimes
along with their Soviet lifeguard. Democratically elected
Western European governments, by contrast, did not depend on
the United States for their survival. Nor did NATO's founder
and patron, the United States, commit suicide as had the Soviet
Union when it abolished itself on December 25, 1991. NATO,
in short, had a legitimacy the WTO never had.

But these are by no means the only, let alone the decisive
reasons. The key reason for NATO's survival after the
disappearance of its original raison d'être, the Soviet Union,
was the intrusion of a more subtle and remote threat:
uncertainty and a diffuse sense of insecurity. That foe was
bound to bestride the stage the very moment the Soviet Union
was taking its bow, and it appeared in many guises.

On August 2, 1990, just two weeks after Moscow had
uttered its capitulation in the Cold War (by granting German
reunification under Western auspices), Iraq invaded Kuwait.
That lunge reminded the West Europeans of their vulnerability
at one step removed. The invasion spelled out a triple threat
of considerable dimensions: to Europe's energy resources, to a
strategic region just on their door steps, and even to their
physical safety as evoked by Saddam Hussein's sustained
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction coupled to long-range
delivery vehicles.
Another reminder of post-Cold War insecurity was the war in Yugoslavia which broke out in the summer of 1991. Though the locale harbored neither strategic resources like oil nor Saddam-type dictators bent on projecting their power beyond the immediate region, the Balkans were too close for comfort. Indeed, the Balkans are Europe, just a hour by plane away from Milan or Munich. And small wars in that region have a nasty habit of attracting the great powers and turning into big ones—as the century prior to 1945 so richly documents.

A third reminder of instability emanated from the wider periphery. The collapse of the Muscovite Empire spawned an entire array of local conflicts: an international war between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and civil wars in Tajikistan (between Muslim fundamentalists and old-style communists), Moldova (ethnic Romanians vs. Slavs), and Georgia (majority vs. Abkhazian minority). Other conflicts might still break out—for instance, between Uzbekistan and neighbors or even between Ukraine and Russia. In general, the area east and south of the Oder River (the Polish-German border) is earthquake country. Stretching to the Caucasus and beyond, that vast expanse contains nary a border that is not contested and nary a nationality that does not labor under a powerful historic grievance.

The Death of Bipolarity and the Rebirth of Conflict

It is hardly an accident that a new, though diffuse and less-than-existential threat should have begun to haunt Europe just as history was supposed to have ended. The end of bipolar conflict was of course the end of bipolar order. That order had three mainstays.

First, vast concentrations of ever-ready nuclear and conventional forces reminded both antagonists of the classic precept of the bipolar age: whosoever shoots first will die
second. Hence war, whether preemptive or preventive, was out of the question, and so ultra-stability prevailed over deadly fear or murderous ambition. As a result, politics became frozen wherever the balance of terror ruled—and that meant virtually the entire northern hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok. No matter how contested, borders remained cast in concrete; no matter how fiery, national ambitions remained in check.

Second, bipolarity spelled control. Precisely because a war between great powers implied mutual extinction, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had to make sure around the clock that unruly allies would not drag them into war. Even war between informal allies—above all, in the Middle East—was quickly contained and squelched by the two superpower for fear of being sucked into the quarrels of the small.

Third, bipolarity made for stability within blocs and nations. Beholden to the security extended by patrons, clients took care not to affront or alienate their protectors. Running on a short leash of dependence, lesser allies accepted the discipline meted out by the strong. Amongst themselves, dependents remained on their best behavior because of an overweening security threat from without. The rigorous integration of military forces repressed whatever temptations may have riled the soul. (The key exception was the war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in 1974). In the case of the WTO, deviation was swiftly suppressed by invasion. Even internally, within states, discipline prevailed among unhappy nationalities, given the centralizing pressures exerted by the Cold War.

Hence, it was no accident that the collapse of the bipolar system gave birth to post-Cold War conflict. In the bipolar world, Saddam Hussein, a Soviet client, would not have dared invade Kuwait, a mini-state firmly ensconced among America's possessions. For a key rule of bipolarity has been: neither attack, nor allow your clients to attack, a critical asset of your mortal rival. Washington and Moscow absorbed well the
lessons of past alliance politics when unruly junior partners (like Austria-Hungary) dragged the principals (Wilhelmine Germany) into war. But with Soviet might melting away, so was Moscow’s control over its satraps. Alternatively, if Soviet power had still been undamaged in 1990, the United States, taken by surprise, surely would not have fielded half a million troops so close to Moscow’s underbelly. The U.S. would have drawn a line in the Saudi sand (and no more) to deter a second Iraqi thrust, but to unleash a full-scale war on the edge of the USSR? The risk of an clash would have loomed too high.

In an intact bipolar world where Communism was still a potent force, the war in Yugoslavia would not have erupted either. After World War II, this strange concoction of six republics and two autonomous provinces labeled the "Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia" was held together by the sheer force of Communist power. Tito and his Partizani had prevailed in the internal war against Serbian Cetniks and Croatian Ustashi. The aftermath was a Soviet state. The economy was nationalized, and power in this pro forma federal construction was centralized in the Communist Party.

It was thus no accident that Yugoslavia exploded precisely in the summer of 1991. What could have symbolized the collapse of bipolarity better than the green light a tottering Soviet Union gave to U.S. intervention in the Gulf in 1991? No longer a "pole" in world affairs, Moscow turned into a supplicant, doing Washington’s bidding in the UN Security Council and begging for money during the London Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in the summer of 1991. Little wonder, then, that the labile tectonics of the Yugoslav erupted into an earthquake.

The Serbs had been running Yugoslavia since the end of World War II. Belgrade was the power center, and Belgrade was Serbia. The Serbs dominated the officer corps, the bureaucracy and the secret police. Yet as always—some say since the Battle of the Kosovo in 1389—the Serbs felt slighted and demeaned, robbed of their deserved status and patrimony.
They had after all bled more than any other nationality during World War II, or so they told themselves. Instead of rewarding them, Tito punished them. To curtail Serbian dominance, Tito amputated Serbian territory in the north (Vojvodina) and in the south (Kosovo). And now, as the other republics moved to strike out for independence, the Serbs saw themselves in the role of the ultimate loser. Their brethren made up 30 percent of the population in Bosnia, 17 percent in Croatia, and 55 percent in the Vojvodina—an irredenta destined for oppression by the lesser races.

Tito was gone, and so was communism and the Cold War. There was nothing to hold the Federation of the South Slavs together. What could the Serbs appeal to in order to maintain their dominance in a unified Yugoslavia? The Soviet threat in a world without the Soviet Union? Non-alignment in a world no longer bipolar? There was only one weapon left: brute force, and of that the Serbs had aplenty. When Slovenia and Croatia absconded in the summer of 1991, the die was cast. If Yugoslavia could not be glued together by ideology or by an external enemy, then "Greater Serbia" was the second-best solution. And that required carving out a large chunk of Croatia and dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina between Croatia and Serbia.

WEU, CSCE and Post-Bipolar Security in Europe

Instead of ending, history returned with a vengeance in 1990/91—like a film stopped for 45 years which then suddenly resumed. And the aftermath is a paradox. During the Cold War, the ever-present possibility of cataclysmic conflict rendered real war impossible. After bipolarity, the removal of the cosmic threat made real peace impossible. Indeed, the end of the latent war spawned real war.

This quixotic turn of events is one of the fundamental reasons why the Atlantic Alliance endures: it remains a
mutual insurance association in the face of mounting instability and uncertainty. And more: it is also the only functioning military asset in Europe, with a well-oiled logistics machinery, a functioning command structure and a well-established tradition of military and political cooperation. The Gulf War of 1990/91 illustrated the point. Though the heaviest burden was shouldered by the United States, and though it was not NATO as such but individual members which came together in an ad hoc alliance, the efficiency of the operation depended on NATO. Force integration, command structures, friend-foe identification systems, logistics and interoperability all carried the NATO imprimatur. Should the West ever intervene in the Balkan war, the UN Security Council might furnish the mandate, but it will be NATO that will provide the forces, the wagon train and the organization.

Another reason, indeed the most profound one, for NATO's persistence past the disappearance of its original raison d'être is the failure of the competition. When the Cold War faded at least two other institutions came forward to claim the prize: the Western European Union (WEU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Neither has succeeded, and in that tale lies a remarkable moral for the future.

The West European Union is the military arm of the European Community (EC), so to speak, because all of its nine members are also members of the EC. By treaty law, the WEU is a much "tighter" alliance than NATO because its members are bound to furnish automatic military assistance to each other in case of an attack, whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are pledged merely to "consult with a view to taking appropriate measures." In practice, however, the WEU has remained a consultative and debating forum, a military "Sleeping Beauty" that has resisted the rousing kisses of many princes who have tried to turn the association into a real fighting organization. In the past, the reason for the WEU's somnolence was obvious. No West European state,
not even avowed "Europe-first" advocates, ever believed that Western Europe could assure its security against the Soviet Union without the United States. There was no security in Europe that was not Atlantic security, and there was no balance against one superpower without the weight of the other in the scales.

In theory, that could have changed once the Soviet Union self-destructed. In fact, when the Yugoslav crisis turned into open conflict in 1991, the EC bestrode the stage, declaiming to the United States that this was "our crisis." A few months later, though, the Community had tried and failed, and the lesson could hardly be gainsaid: great economic power makes neither for a community of purpose nor for military potency. The Twelve can add up to a Common Market, but they do not add up to a common master of Europe's destiny. Nor should anybody have expected the Twelve to turn into One where national sovereignty claims precedence most insistently—in matters of foreign and military policy. Behaving as nation states are wont to do, the Twelve could not agree on a common (recognition) policy vis-à-vis the break-away republics of Yugoslavia for sanctions with real bite or agree on military action. If agree they did, it was on negatives—not to intervene or to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The warring parties in Bosnia soon got the point. EC-sponsored armistices were broken even before the Croat, Serb, and Muslim emissaries in Brussels had signed on the dotted line. Lord Carrington, the EC mediator soon quit in frustration, and his successor, Lord Owen, was forced to look on helplessly as his voice was drowned out by the artillery in the Bosnian theater. To paraphrase the great English realist Thomas Hobbes: diplomacy without swords is just words. Of words, the EC had plenty. But there were no swords because there was no common purpose. Nor will there be until and unless the Twelve become One, a true e pluribus unum.

Also in 1990/91, the CSCE tried to claim succession to NAO as the future guardian of security in Europe. Yet its
reach never measured up to its grasp; indeed, in the Balkan war, the CSCE’s main contribution to security was the dispatch of white-clad observers into the theater. In theory, this institution should have been ideally positioned to inherit the task. With its 53 members (all of Europe, the United States, Canada and successor states of the USSR) the CSCE is the most inclusive of all European institutions, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. But it is precisely its universality that turns its apparent strength into real weakness. When it comes to will and purpose, numbers are the bane of action. What do Luxembourg and Latvia, Ireland and Rumania, Portugal an: Poland, Norway and Kazakhstan have in common? And how can they act in matters of war and peace if unanimity is always required? The CSCE’s fundamental problem is the problem of all collective security systems. The concept, first enshrined in the covenant of the League of Nations (Article 16), is both lofty and simple. No longer will nations seek security through arms racing or alliances. Instead, they will band together like the Three Musketeers and live by the motto: "All for one, and one for all." Unlike "collective defense," (i.e., alliance), "collective security" knows neither blocs nor enemies nor "enemy images." Instead, all members of the system will live together in peace until that day when one (or more) among them decide to disturb the public tranquility. The rest will then condemn the aggressor(s) and apply sanctions—from diplomatic disapproval via economic punishment to, ultimately, collective military action.

One calamitous flaw of the idea is that it has been tried before—and it has failed miserably in each case. The most notorious instance is the attack on Abyssinia by Fascist Italy in 1935. Emperor Haile Selassie then traveled to Geneva where he tried to plead his case against Italy. Yet nobody put together an army against the aggressor, and the economic sanctions of the League amounted to a pseudo-blockade. The point is that the principle of "one for all, and all for one" requires all members, at least the great powers, to treat
aggression or its threat as the supreme evil, the battle against which all other values are dwarfed.\textsuperscript{5}

Nations, however, follow interest; they do not elevate the punishment of wrongdoers above all other values. Britain and France were hesitant to turn their full wrath against Mussolini, while still hoping to draw him into an alliance against Hitler. And Hitler, also looking for allies, was only too happy to furnish Mussolini with all the materiel he needed. Hence, Italy ended up by annexing Abyssinia in 1936, while Haile Selassie went into exile and the League went on to its unheralded demise.

After World War II, the UN tried to improve on the sorry record of the League, adding military teeth to the collective security provisos of its charter. Yet again, nations did not live up to their obligations. Instead of bringing the world’s weight to bear on the aggressor, three problems regularly stultified the exercise. First, the world community could never agree on the key question: Who is the aggressor? Second, instead of acting in common, the world "bipolarized," lining up behind one or the other belligerent. Finally, as a result, war took its course, and its outcome was determined by the usual factors—national strength and support from allies, be they tacit or explicit.\textsuperscript{6}

But history proves nothing about the future. If something has not worked in the past, that does not necessarily mean that it will fail in the future—especially under different circumstances. Thus it might be argued that collective security in the 1930’s failed because both the Soviet Union and the United States (the possible guarantors of the peace) were outside the system and so was Nazi Germany (the most determined challenger of the status quo). Today, in a pan-European system, all the major powers would be on the inside. Unlike Italy and Germany, all the great powers are committed to the peace, and thus the system might finally work.

This argument appears persuasive, but only at first sight. On closer inspection it boils down to a tautology, i.e., "there
will be peace when everybody wants peace." This is indubitably true: a common front against violence and its surrogates, like pressure and blackmail, requires a communality of interests among the major powers. But to argue thus is actually to deliver the most telling point against the idea of collective security. Collective security presupposes a communality of interest; it cannot create it. When that convergence is given, then there is stability, with or without collective security. Synonymous with a sturdy status quo, collective security is a state of affairs, not a mechanism that brings it about.

Yet a real insurance policy must be designed to deal with real trouble—burglars, floods, fire. Similarly in the international arena, stability depends on guaranteed countervailing power, which in turn is based on particular interests—that this aggression by that nation shall not succeed there. An international posse comitatus is based on the cold-eyed calculus that the costs of action does not exceed the cost of neutrality. This is hard enough for nations in alliance; it is even harder for nations called upon to ignore all other interests for the sake of the general good. In short, collective security requires nations to behave in ways that make collective security unnecessary. The ultimate paradox is that collective security works only when it need not work.

To argue that the future need not be like the past is to ignore the many armed conflicts that bedevil the present—from the Balkans to Nagorno-Karabakh. While the 1990's offer one of those rare moments in history where great power conflict has abated, the CSCE has not even managed to contain, let alone suppress, the small wars that have flared up all over the Eurasian map. Now assume a war between, say, Ukraine and Russia. If Europe's collective security gears did not mesh in the case of Bosnia or Armenia, they will fall apart completely when larger antagonists are involved, confronting the members of the would-be posse with vast, unacceptable risks.
Indeed, the example of nuclear-armed Russia raises a larger conceptual point. Those who argue that the 1990's are not like the 1930's tend to ignore the most decisive difference of them all—nuclear weapons. Even if collective security could be resurrected in a post-bipolar Europe, how would it work in nuclear conditions? The presumed costs of collective security were high enough to discourage Britain and France in 1935. How much more will nations hesitate under nuclear conditions when the price of obligation rises to mega-death levels? In other words, the nuclear age has added an existential risk that will reduce any collective security system to a grandiose nothing.

Europe, the United States, and the Future of Continental Security

To sum up, NATO has survived by default—for lack of any serious rivals that could take its place in the business of European security. This suggests a functionality WEU and CSCE do not have, and this functionality is underlined by the fact that nations like Poland, the Czech republic or Hungary would rather join NATO today than tomorrow. But does it also suggest a future for the oldest freely chosen, multilateral alliance in the history of the state system?

On a very literal level, NATO as we know it no longer exists. The organization founded and maintained to deter or defend against an attack from the Soviet Union has truly lost its reason for being—at least for now. For the time being, there is no great power threat that would justify the persistence of the Atlantic Alliance.

But on a deeper level, NATO retains four key functions: first, it is the only reservoir of ready, useable military power; second, it provides a functioning insurance against the resurgence of a Russian threat; third, it is the only military institution that couples American security to European security;
and fourth, it offers a hedge against the re-nationalization of European security policy. By defining the Alliance's functionality in these terms, we can readily see that the present is not that different from the past. Let us take a closer look at each Alliance function.

*Function One* is another name for deterrence, the most economical way of inhibiting armed conflict. For to deter is easier and cheaper than to fight. And it must be plausibly assumed (though it is impossible to prove why something did not happen) that the very presence of NATO with its ready-to-use panoply impinges on the calculations of restless actors on the European stage. Whosoever is engaged in military conflict (like Serbia) or contemplating it must feel the inaudible, implicit threat emanating from the forces-in-being that are NATO's.

Existence is deterrence. Remove NATO from the European equation, and worse is likely to happen. Moreover, if West European and the North American nations ever decide to intervene in local conflicts such as those in the Balkans, it will be NATO—as in the case of the Gulf—which will provide the wherewithal: from Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to satellite intelligence, from logistics to command structures, from aircraft to ammunition.

*Function Two* is the extension of the Alliance's original reason for being into a still indeterminate future. Russia, the largest country on earth with the largest nuclear arsenal, remains a latent problem of European security by dint of size and clout, not to mention the uncertainties of its internal evolution. Though much diminished by economic collapse and social dislocations, Russia will remain armed with nuclear weapons, and its best intentions may come to naught as its many travails turn into turmoil and thence into the temptation—as Shakespeare's Henry IV put it, to "busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels."

Just to have an insurance policy that can pay on demand is likely to give pause to those in Russia who would re-create an
authoritarian regime or restore yesterday's imperial glory by reconstructing the Soviet Union under another name. Surely, the very presence of a functioning Western alliance serves as a check on such retrograde ambitions—and as reassurance for the former members of the Warsaw Pact. In case of a rearming of Russia, NATO would provide vital reconstitution capabilities—like a brigade-sized cadre that could evolve into a fully-manned division.

*Function Three* is also an old one that bridges the past and the future. If 20th century history has any lesson worth harking, it is the impossibility of European stability minus the United States. Three times in this century, the attempt by a would-be hegemonical power (Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union) could be checked only by the intrusion of the United States—twice by actually fighting, and the third time by America's lasting insertion into the European security equation with massive deterrent capabilities. When, conversely, the United States turned its back on Europe as it did in the 1920's and 1930's, Europe soon deteriorated into war. Somehow, for all its aggregate strengths, Europe has not been able to manage its own order by itself in this century. To restore the balance, an external co-balancer was indispensable.

Of course, the 1990s are not like the 1910s, the 1930s or the decades of the Cold War, circa 1947-1990. The key difference is the absence of a great-power challenger to the European balance, as was Germany in the first half and Soviet Russia in the second half of the century. At this point, there is no actor on the stage who has either the ambitions or the accoutrements to overturn the European order. On the other hand, there is also no nation that could rally, lead and sustain the camp of the status quo powers in the face of a determined adversary—neither France, Germany nor Britain. Singly, each of them is too weak. Together, they could surely measure up to the task, but their failure to pick up the gauntlet in the first post-bipolar war in Europe—in the Balkans—just as surely spells out a message of doubt: in Europe, the whole is less
than the sum of its parts because the parts stubbornly resist the call of the whole. In spite of the EC, the Single Market and the Treaty on European Union (better known as "Maastricht"), the nation state remains alive and well in Western Europe—with separate pasts, identities and visions.

Nor is it foreordained that the Many will turn into One more easily now that the Cold War is over. The end of bipolarity spells the end of enforced conformity and a degree of freedom the West Europeans never enjoyed before 1990. Above all, it is Germany, the main victim of bipolarity, which is the main profiteer of the new world. In many ways, its dependence on allies and neighbors drove the European integration venture in the past. For (West) Germany, integration was not so much a loss of sovereignty as a gain in autonomy. The deal was to give away non-existent sovereign rights in exchange for a community that delivered real influence, respectability and protection. These profits have been absorbed while dependence has waned in the aftermath of unity and sovereignty restored. Hence, it might be expected that reunified Germany will not be as enthusiastic an integrationist as West Germany was in the past. In short, Western Europe's impressive collective resources will not soon be married to a single purpose, and hence its capability to master its own fate will be less than it could be. And that raises the value of an Atlantic reinsurance policy underwritten by the United States—as a power in Europe which has it all—great military might, unmatched projection capabilities and the will to use them both.

Which leads directly to **Function Four**: an Atlantic coalition as a hedge against the re-nationalization of European security policy. Here, too, the past has some lessons for the future. As argued in greater detail elsewhere, America served not only as Europe's great protector but also as its indispensable pacifier. With its lasting intrusion into the affairs of the Continent, the United States came to protect the West Europeans not only against others but also against
themselves. This was a momentous turning point in the history of the European state system.

In contrast to the inter-war period, when the fears of the victors and the resentment of the vanquished made for a vicious cycle of repression and revanchism, France and Germany joined hands in the Alliance and the European Community because there was somebody more powerful than both to insure them against the perilous consequences of their credulity. The smaller nations of Western Europe, especially the wary Dutch, swallowed integration with the large because they did not need to fear domination. Even Great Britain ultimately joined the Continental venture because America's presence blunted the hard edge of its traditional rivalry with France and Germany. America's very presence rendered obsolete the rules of the self-help system, where fear breeds conflict and conflict breeds fear. Since there was now a powerful arbiter in the system who provided security to each and all, ancient rivalries lost their existential sting. On that rock bottom of mutual trust did the towering edifice of European integration rise and persist.

Could not that edifice stand on its own after 40 years of community? Perhaps. But assume that the United States, deciding once more that its work was done, withdrew across the Atlantic. Would the other Europeans accept a Europe organized around the fabled "Franco-German axis?" Would Britain submit? Would Germany's eastern neighbors feel more comfortable in the absence of American might? Given the age-old ways of interstate politics, it is more likely that the end of the "Atlantic community" may also spell the return of the self-help system and national security policy. Britain may try to counterbalance the Franco-German duo. France, haunted again by its age-old fears of German supremacy, might play with a not-so-new option by seeking to enlist Russia in a containment game. The Southern nations (France, Italy, Spain) might experiment with a Mediterranean strategy.
The variations of this game are legion, but the essential point is "re-nationalization." For the Europeans, it was easier to accept the military leadership of a powerful outsider like the United States than to submit to the dominance of one of their own. If this can be extrapolated into the future, then the future of the European Community appears shaky, too. For if nations begin to pursue an autonomous security policy, they will be less generous in sharing economic resources and economic control. Lengthening this line of speculative analysis leads to a paradox. Though Europeans frequently perceive the United States as a commercial rival (and vice versa), and though much of EC policy is formulated in response to that perception, it may well be the United States which functions as the ultimate benefactor of European integration. Eliminate the security lender of last resort, and you run the risk of reinstating the pernicious rules of the self-help system which are bound to corrode community.

But speculation need not run wild to underline the centrality of America's position in the European security scheme. Security is a classic "collective good." Collective goods, whether a road or a class-action suit, do not produce themselves. They require leaders and sponsors, individuals who pay the initial costs of organizing and who maintain the organization. The many do not coalesce spontaneously —whether in labor unions or military coalitions. Concretely, the Gulf War would never have been fought unless the United States had generated leadership and assumed a disproportionate share of the burden. Nor would NATO have arisen and persisted in the absence of a powerful organizer. And if the West ever intervenes in the Balkan War, it will be the United States—not Britain, France or Germany—which will sound the trumpet and rally the troops.

The moral of this story is simple enough. For the time being, there is no European nation that can harness the others to a common security purpose. Leadership will either be American, or it will not be. Britain and France are not strong
enough, and Germany will be preoccupied with the consequences of reunification for a long time to come. Even with its economic clout restored, Germany will hardly be a legitimate contender for leadership in Europe, as it still has a history to live down without having found a stable, predictable role for the future. If the United States is wise, it will not abandon Europe. And if the Europeans are far-sighted, they will make it easy for the United States to stay.

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Notes

1. At this point, one should add a word of caution in the year of 1993. That NATO should have endured three years past victory in the Cold War does not prove very much about its secular ability to survive.

2. Trying to stop Ottoman expansionism into the Balkans, the Serbs were badly defeated by Sultan Murad in the Field of Blackbirds. Still, St. Vitus Day of 1389 (June 28) was transfigured into the greatest moment of the Serbian nation. The defeat spawned heroic ballads and sweeping myths—such as the alleged betrayal of the Serbian military leader Lazar by the Bosnian Vuk Brancovic, a memory that fed the Serbian onslaught against Bosnia in 1992. June 28 became a magic day. The anarchist Gavrilo Princip chose June
28, 1914 to murder the Austrian Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand. On June 28, 1921, the newly established and Serb-dominated "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," promulgated its constitution. On that day in 1989, the current president of Serbia—Slobodan Milosevic—had hundreds of thousands of Serbs driven to the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, where he celebrated a "New Serbia."

3. These are Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The three EC members which are not part of the WEU are Denmark, Greece and Ireland.

4. A key problem is Germany, whose Basic Law (constitution) allegedly prohibits all military action save self- or alliance defense. By early 1993, the Christian Democratic senior partner in the Kohl coalition argued that the Basic Law is actually quite permissive, but only to add a kind of "Kohl Doctrine" which, as laid down by the Chancellor, states that German forces, for "psychological and historical reasons," cannot intervene in locales German soldiers conquered in World War II—above all, not in Yugoslavia.


6. One apparent exception to this lackluster record is the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950 which set in motion a "UN Army" to fight against North Korea. It was an apparent triumph only because the war was actually fought by an American-sponsored coalition army—operating under the legitimizing cover of the UN, then dominated by the United States and its Western allies. Ninety percent of all the fighting forces were American and South Korean.

The Gulf War was essentially a repeat performance of Korea. It was not the UN that put together the anti-Saddam coalition, but the United States. It was not the world community that dislodged the aggressor, but the United States, with substantial help from Britain and France and symbolic military assistance on the part of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. The rest of the 28-nation coalition provided token support at best. In short, Saddam was defeated not by the world community, but by the United States at the head of an ad hoc coalition. The international community, in the guise of the UN,
merely provided the legitimizing cover of Security Council resolutions. In all other respects, the Gulf War was prosecuted in the way of traditional statecraft, and then by a handful of states obeying national interests rather than abstract obligations.

Greece and European Security in the 1990s

Theodore A. Couloumbis

The Shifting Patterns of Global Security

During the four decades of the Cold War, strategic analysts—from the East and West as well as the South—had a relatively easy conceptual task. The North was structurally bipolar and characterized by undisguised competitive/adversarial relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Nuclear and conventional arms races were the order of the day, and alternating periods of tension and detente succeeded each other under the Damoclean sword of the balance of nuclear terror and its variable strategic doctrines premised on mutually assured (nuclear) destruction (MAD). Inherent in this bipolar structure, paradoxically, was a high degree of stability. It was a product of the self-limitation of overt conflict, given that even marginal controversies involving members of the two blocs could have escalated into general warfare, threatening to cross over the nuclear threshold.

While armed and suspicious peace was prevalent in the North, the global South remained unstable and conflict-prone during the Cold War. Scores of internal, interstate and great power (proxy) conflicts cost the inhabitants of the Third World over 25 million deaths in the years 1950-1990. Simultaneously, the United Nations (UN) faithfully reflected this state of affairs. The UN remained ideologically short-circuited and blocked by veto, limiting itself to at best marginal peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and Africa. Throughout the Cold War, the global organization served primarily as an echo chamber of
potent and polemical propaganda campaigns, reflecting the inflexible stances of East versus West and South versus North.

The historic events of 1989-93 have fundamentally altered the very core of the international system: the relatively bloodless "revolutions" in the former Soviet Union and in most countries of Eastern Europe; the peaceful reunification of Germany; the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA); the significant progress made in nuclear and conventional arms control; the Gulf War as a response to Iraq's regional aggression, fought under the UN Security Council's legitimizing umbrella; the voluntary divorce between the Czech and Slovak Republics; and the bloody and complex Yugoslav civil/constitutional conflict. All these events are clear indications that the Cold War and bipolarity are conditions of the past.

Most analysts/commentators have accepted the notion that our planet has crossed the threshold of the post-Cold War era. But what kind of profile will this successor era assume? Is our planet on the way to developing a new "World Order" based on the premise of respect for the territorial integrity of states, enhancement and consolidation of democratic institutions, the protection of the human rights of all citizens of all states, and the institutionalization of structures and processes for the peaceful settlement of international and intrastate disputes? Or, are we moving toward a period of atavistic disorder, disorientation, fluidity, ethnic separatism and cleansing, and escalating economic protectionism, all resulting in a higher frequency and intensity of local conflicts? Will the so-called "limited wars" which have been taking place in the troubled South, with the Middle East (and lately the Balkans) occupying the apex of a pyramid of global conflict, continue to plague much of humankind?

In a world where a number of states still possess awesome military capabilities (including weapons of nuclear mass destruction), there is no rational substitute for a system of global order that enjoys the backing of major centers of military and economic power, a system with adequate institutional
mechanisms capable of bringing about the peaceful and tolerably just settlement of disputes. The destabilizing vacuum that is temporarily being created by the rapid disintegration of Cold War bipolarity must not be allowed to drift into global anarchy and chaos.

The new architecture of global security should be based on an implicit, if not explicit, consensus on fundamental premises shared by the world's major centers of power. Needless to say, a great power consensus on the rules of the international game cannot survive unless it is shared by a considerable number of small and intermediate (in terms of power) states. Such a climate is currently extant and every effort must be made to perpetuate it.

If we are to assume the perpetuation of what is today an apparent global power consensus, a series of interlocking international institutions of economic and political cooperation must be developed and sustained. At the very apex of the new global order, it is vital that NATO must be maintained and politically strengthened. However, this great post-war regional security organization must seriously reorient its purposes in order to survive and prosper. Its central function will no longer be to contain Soviet Communism, but rather to maintain and manage the historic partnership between a North American and a European pillar on each side of the Atlantic. NATO can and will progressively shift to the status of a grand organizational experiment—whose main functions will be to prevent the gradual drifting apart of its two strong pillars and to protect conditions of Euro-American interdependence. The organization must be based on the premise of equality and partnership, thus forming a stable core around which global security can be structured for generations to come.

Following the logic of institutional complementarity (concentric, overlapping, adjacent), NATO as a security-producing structure should be enhanced by the process of integration now taking place within the European Community (EC). This community of 12 European states, most of which are
also members of NATO, will invariably emerge as a complex but unified entity, not only in economic but also in political, security and defense dimensions. The EC, whether it eventually absorbs the Western European Union (WEU) or develops new structures for community-wide planning and implementation of common defense policies, will most probably have a highly integrated character by the end of this century.

NATO, with two powerful and equal defense pillars operating on the basis of partnership, interdependence, mutuality of interests and common cultural and economic values, will be able to serve as a stable global platform that will contribute systematically to spill-over integrative processes in other parts of the planet. These processes can be modelled upon tried, tested and successful institutional experiments that have created nearly unbreakable bonds among the states of the Atlantic community.

It must be clearly understood, however, that a solitary global island of stability (a two-pillared Atlantic community) surrounded by a sea of disorganization and disorder will be doomed to a sorry fate, sliding, ultimately, into a global confrontation between the "haves" and "have nots" employing nuclear weapons. Today, therefore, the crucial challenge facing humankind rests on the need to establish a set of complementary and overlapping security structures in areas of potential conflict such as Eastern Europe (especially the Balkans), the former Soviet Union, East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Mediterranean, Africa and Latin America.

The institutional vacuum that has been created by the disestablishment of East European international organizations is more than likely going to be filled, at least partially, by parallel sets of association agreements between the countries of Eastern/Southeastern Europe and NATO and/or the EC. However, with democratization proceeding at various rates of speed and effectiveness in the old socialist camp, there are a number of new problems (chief among them the challenge of ethnic, autonomist movements) that have crossed the threshold of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet
Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), currently in the process of institutionalization, appears to be slated for a role beyond standard-setting and confidence-building, one which will include conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking. It will also become necessary with the passage of time to develop additional sub-regional economic cooperation and security organizations in Central and Eastern Europe which will mirror and complement the successful institutional models of NATO and the EC.

The Gulf War and the unresolved tragedy of Bosnia have sharpened the sensitivities of global, Middle Eastern, Balkan and Mediterranean powers regarding the need to develop *ad hoc* as well as long-lived institutional mechanisms for the settlement of unresolved disputes—such as the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian dispute and long-simmering questions of states threatened by partitionist movements such as Lebanon and Cyprus. The institutional patterns of the North (especially the CSCE) can hopefully be modified for application to regional settings such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Africa and Central America. The disappointing record of conflict management in the Yugoslav conflagration is a harsh reminder of the inability of global and regional institutions to control or prevent complicated intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts.

Finally, in this cursory review of the post-Cold War international system, we must not lose sight of the great potential for peacekeeping activities available to the UN (through the reinforced role of the Security Council and the Secretariat) now that the Security Council's permanent members (with veto privileges) appear to be converging on fundamental questions involving North-North, North-South and South-South relations. The coalition of diverse powers operating under the legitimizing umbrella of the UN Security Council demonstrated remarkable cohesiveness and staying power when they reversed the clear-cut case of aggression, occupation and annexation perpetrated by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
A small and strategically located country deeply committed to international stability and peace, Greece has the task of safeguarding its territorial integrity and protecting its democratic system and values. Greece can best be described today as democratic, internationalist, Western, "status-quo," free trade and free enterprise-oriented, and always a sensitive and strategic outpost of the EC and NATO in the troubled regions of the Balkans and the Central/Eastern Mediterranean.

To promote its security interests most effectively, Greece needs to aggregate its voice and integrate its policies with those of its EC partners and its NATO allies. Together, these powerful clusters of democratic and industrial states can effectively maintain regional and global stability. The security objectives of Greece can best be served through collective Atlantic/European policies that will facilitate a stable (conflict-free) transition to political democracy and market economy in post-Communist societies in the troubled Balkans and elsewhere.

The task for Greece, phrased another way, is to broaden and deepen its ties with its EC, WEU and NATO partners at a time of admittedly serious centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic alliance and in the face of the strategic and ideological vacuum that has been created following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. For Atlantic solidarity to be maintained, the states concerned must realize that the Western community's effective and durable institutions (such as NATO and the EC) were not only products of the need to contain world Communism, but were primarily structures of cooperation and interdependence entangling advanced industrial and post-industrial democracies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Greece's optimal defense and security profile for the foreseeable future can be compared to a series of concentric circles. The inner core of Greece's security has been and will continue to be served by a healthy and competitive economy which functions under conditions of free trade in an environment
of strong and adequately tested democratic institutions, and which is backed by well-trained and equipped armed forces sufficient to maintain Greece’s regional balances. The next security layer is the remarkable functionalist experiment of the EC which solidifies and supplements Greece’s defensive-deterrent status quo stance. Greece’s potential adversaries will think twice before attempting to challenge its territorial integrity in the sense that they will be challenging the gradually integrating European Union also.

In the case of the WEU, some ambivalence remains as to the future structural fit of this recently resurrected organization. The question still to be answered is whether the WEU will evolve into the future "defense component" of the EC, or will it grow to house a greater number of European states, thus serving as the "European pillar" of NATO. In either case, Greece will be counting on the WEU to contribute to the value of its collective security. In fact, the WEU could assume quite substantive dimensions in the unlikely and undesirable contingency that some future U.S. policymakers may opt for a neo-isolationist stance leading to a dramatic reduction of the American military presence in Central Europe and the Mediterranean.

Finally, the most decisive element of a collective defense is NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance. As we shall see below, the maintenance of the institutions as well as the security and defense functions of NATO will remain the sine qua non for the creation of a post-Cold War order able to usher in decades of global peace and even prosperity for our planet.

A Role for Greece in the
Post-Communist Balkan Transition

What should be the role of Greece as a European Community and NATO country toward its Balkan neighbors during the critical years of post-Cold War transition ahead? Greece, as a country committed to democracy, the protection of human rights,
cooperative and institutionalized relationships and peaceful methods of dispute settlement, can and should contribute considerably to building structures of peace and international cooperation in the Balkan area and Eastern Europe in general.

Greece's policy toward Albania should continue to be peaceful engagement, encouraging the process of transition to genuine political and economic democracy and the protection of the human rights of the Greek minority in Albania. The more advanced, pluralistic and tolerant Albania becomes, the more the Greek minority, as an integral part of the Albanian state, can play the role of a vibrant, connecting link between Greece and its neighbor emerging from a long, self-imposed isolation. In the months and years ahead, Greece should strengthen its trade and investment links with Albania and should take the initiative in identifying joint Greek-Albanian infra-structure projects that can qualify for EC or other institutional support. Issues of mutual concern regarding the flood of economic refugees from Albania to Greece (estimated at between 250 to 350 thousand) should be subject to continuous consultation on mutually approved procedures for refugee reception, rehabilitation and eventual repatriation.

Vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, Greece's interests would have been best served by the maintenance of the Yugoslav Federation, adjusted peacefully to suit the needs and interests of its constituent republics. It would also have been in Greece's interest for an integrated Yugoslavia to move toward the full implementation of political democracy, a market economy and gradual accession to the EC. Given what now appears the irreversible process of Yugoslav disintegration, it is in Greece's best interest to develop good relations with all the new states which emerge and to facilitate their transition to democracy by recommending constructive policies for adoption by the European Community. The issue of recognition of a "Slav Macedonian entity can be worked out, provided the authorities there take into account Greece's concern about the expropriation of the name "Macedonia," which from ancient times (King Philip and
Alexander the Great) is inseparably identified with Greek history, civilization, tradition, culture and, of course, territory. Needless to say, it is becoming ever more apparent to Athens that the continued maintenance of a relatively weak (militarily) buffer state north of its borders—the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)—is a far more attractive contingency than the partition of that state resulting in a "Greater Albania," "Greater Bulgaria" and/or "Greater Serbia." And, of course, it does not require much imagination to visualize that such a "partition process" would involve Greece and Turkey in a dangerous and destructive generalized Balkan war.

Greece's relations with Bulgaria are currently quite good—Greece follows Germany as Bulgaria's number two partner in trade and investment—and there are prospects for further improvement in relations, not only in the economic and political sectors, but also in aspects of defense cooperation. Both countries are facing a potential revisionist challenge from Turkey, which at times appears to have dreams of acting as the protector and sole guarantor of Muslim populations well beyond the sovereign boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, the Cold War taboos limiting defense coordination across old bloc lines are no longer operative.

With respect to Romania, which does not share a border with Greece, present as well as future prospects for comprehensive cooperation are excellent. Greece, as is the case with other Balkan states discussed above, should assist Romania to the best of its ability in its transition process to genuine multi-party democracy and market economy, cultivating the best possible relationships not only at the bilateral and Balkan regional levels, but also facilitating Romanian-EC relations. Romania, too, as is the case with other Balkan states, has the dual problem of calibrating standards for a Hungarian minority in Transylvania simultaneously with expectations for the improvement of Romanian ethnic-affinity populations in neighboring Moldova (the issues of Bessarabia and Bukovina are making analysts shake the dust off their history books).
Greece can and should play an active role in the Balkans of tomorrow. Greece has linked its destiny with the EC, a most remarkable trans-national experiment, but it is also a Balkan and a Mediterranean state. Greece can afford to assume a more energetic role, something that has not been done adequately to date, in the formulation of an EC policy vis-a-vis the Balkans. In this respect, Greece should operate through the expanding mechanisms of European Political Cooperation. The admittedly thin structures of multilateral Balkan Cooperation, dealt a nearly deadly blow by events in former Yugoslavia, could eventually be revived through the participation of Italy in an observer status. Italy’s initiative, the former Pentagonale, would also be enhanced through the involvement of Greece in an analogous manner. Other regional cooperation ventures, such as Turkey’s Sea Initiative also merit further consideration. In order to act in this new fashion, Greece must escape from its pre-war, Cold War and Civil War memories, and must also insulate its policies from corrosive, even if at times unavoidable, calculations for internal (partisan) consumption.

Greece must promote a policy package which commits the EC to assisting the Balkans in its attempt to develop market mechanisms without serious socio-economic dislocations that might result in public unrest and gravitate toward violent conflict. And, needless to say, effective efforts for economic development go hand in hand with the transition to and consolidation of democratic institutions.

New Risks: The Case for NATO’s Perpetuation

It would be a serious mistake for European countries that are members of NATO to continue to engage in a debate juxtaposing the merits and demerits of a "Europeanist" versus an "Atlanticist" choice. It would equally be a mistake for North Americans in the U.S. and Canada to continue to view progress in EC economic, political, security and defense integration as working at odds with the interests and objectives of a post-Cold War
NATO. In fact, both sides of the Atlantic stand to gain from further progress in the integration of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area and EC regions.

In the post-Cold War era, the Atlantic Alliance as a whole will be facing a number of new risks. First is the disturbing atavistic embrace of policies of extreme nationalism, territorial geopolitical revisionism, religious fundamentalism and ethnic exclusivism which has resulted in the neo-genocidal practice of "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and elsewhere.

The rallying cry for a desired Atlantic/European response to forced ethnic separatism should be "no more Bosnias." Indeed, there is no rational argument for the multi-fragmentation of our planet (there are estimated to be 3,000 ethnic groups and just over 180 states) based on a particularized new principle of "ethnic group" as opposed to "national" self-determination. If applied consistently at the micro-level, such a principle could lead to a global system of neo-feudalism whose key actors would be hundreds if not thousands of ethnically homogeneous (pure?) mini-states whose economic and political viability would be, at best, questionable. Clearly, the answer to the problem of long-suppressed ethnic minorities is the introduction of genuine democracy which respects the human rights—individual and collective—of these small groupings. The enhancement of cultural, religious and linguistic pluralism (multi-culturalism) should, however, stop well below outright secession and the bloodshed it would entail in most instances.

The Atlantic and the European communities should remain committed to a set of principles and policies that will aid peaceful conflict resolution in future "Bosnias." The European/Atlantic community cannot afford to become part of the mushrooming problem, but must scrupulously remain part of the solution. Atlantic-wide policies in the future should emphasize "fire prevention" in addition to "fire fighting." These policies should contain a rational mixture of positive inducements (rewards) in addition to disincentives, such as trade sanctions and blockades. "Carrot"-type policies, such as the improvement of
terms of trade, investment and assistance should be promised (and extended) to those countries that consistently seek to solve their internal and international problems peacefully. For example, the mutually agreed and voluntary "divorce" of the two components of former Czechoslovakia offers a less painful alternative to the bloodshed, cruelty and tragedy that has accompanied the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

The Atlantic community will be facing a number of additional risks which have been adequately discussed in the post-Cold War literature of strategic studies. These new risks involve nuclear, chemical and missile/launcher proliferation; narcotics cartels and trafficking networks; international terrorism; population "transfers" (frequently involving waves of homeless and destitute political and economic refugees); and environmental degradation, which is quickly reaching the limits of global ecocide. All of the above risks can best be met through coordinated and collective policies of restraint, regulation, conservation and cost-sharing.

The sets of risks recounted up to this point justify by themselves the urgency of conserving, in fact strengthening, NATO. Particularly disturbing are the potential complications in meta-communist societies, where the process of democratic transition could be interrupted by political/economic convulsions leading to authoritarian "solutions" with the rise to power of populist, fundamentalist, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist regimes that would inevitably target Western industrial democracies as "the enemy."

NATO's Self-Dissolution:
The Greatest Threat to the West

The greatest threat, as opposed to risk, that NATO countries could face would be created by NATO's self-dissolution. A gradual or, worse still, an abrupt breakdown of the Atlantic Alliance, aggravated by a growing economic malaise in the trade
relationships between the two sides of the Atlantic, could lead to the most undesirable contingency of the emerging post-Cold War international system.

The cultivation of economic, political, security and defense interdependence will continue to serve as the best antidote against the spreading virus of narrow nationalist, protectionist and confrontationalist policies. Siamese twins cannot stab each other easily, for they would both bleed to death. Yet, we must not dismiss the danger of the tempting siren songs of anachronistic particularism in all of our countries. There are, indeed, great temptations for each of us to return to old, anarchic modes of behavior stressing geopolitics over geo-economics.

Some of these temptations could influence a variety of countries. The United States, the world's one remaining superpower, could be tempted to "go it alone"—whether in isolationist or hegemonic mode—as opposed to continuing on a steady course involving partnership, consultation and collective leadership in a widely accepted (in fact encouraged) role of "first among equals." Great Britain could be tempted to opt out of its EC commitment and seek to assume once again the role of the only major European state that enjoys a "special relationship" with the United States, while reserving for itself the role of an extra-continental European "balancer." Germany, today united and seeking to adjust to the serious problems that rapid unification has entailed, could be tempted to adopt what Hans Dietrich Genscher had wisely warned against, the dangerous objective of a "German Europe" as opposed to the highly desirable goal of a "European Germany." France could be tempted to revert to an omni-azimuth mentality matching the suspicions of Anglo-American intentions with fears of a revamped and revanchistic Germany. Italy could be tempted to return to a mare nostrum orientation and to an attempt to cultivate "exclusive spheres of influence" in the Balkans, North Africa and elsewhere. Greece could be tempted to become embroiled in irredentist and counter-irredentist imbroglios in Southern Albania and/or the FYROM, which would surely
escalate into Balkan-wide warfare involving all the major states in the area and beyond. Further, the current or future leadership in Turkey could be tempted by Ottoman nostalgia to assume the role of protector (with a right of intervention) of Moslem and Turkic populations stretching in a long chain from the Adriatic coast and the Balkans all the way through the Caucasus and Central Asia to the western territories of China. Once again, the result of such hypothetical interventions would be the outbreak of regional conflicts with great potential for dangerous escalation. Finally, Russia, in its current or future avatar, could be tempted to revert to policies of Pan-slavism and/or Pan-orthodoxy, with equally destabilizing consequences.

Needless to say, the Cassandra scenarios of gloom and doom suggested above would be further aggravated by the rapid and undiscriminating enlargement of the EC, allowing it to swallow much more—in terms of new member states—than it can credibly and functionally digest. Finally, moving to the global level, even a semblance of North-South stability and regulation would be lost should the currently emerging "tri-pentapolar" concert system be disturbed. In case after case since the middle of 1990, an informal but real consensus has emerged among major centers of power. This consensus has led to the resuscitation of the UN Security Council, giving it a historic opportunity to grow strong and lasting institutional roots for the purpose of peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy.
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Notes


2. The words of Greece's immortal poet, Constantinos Kavafis, penned well over 60 years ago are quite relevant to our times: "... And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution."

3. Needless to say, the same structural logic could be similarly applied to other European-NATO countries that are concurrently members or associate members of the EC and the WEU.

4. It is hoped the World Trade Center's recent tragedy in New York City will not prove to be a dangerous benchmark of terrorist activity proliferation on U.S. territory.

5. Tripolar economically (North America, EC, and Japan) and pentapolar militarily (United States, EC, Russia, Japan, and China).
Italy Astride the North-South, East-West Axes

Giuseppe L. Cucchi

It may seem rather surprising that at this historic juncture, Italy is concerned about European security. Indeed, the internal political changes on the Italian peninsula are so turbulent and rapid as to seem more a revolution than an evolution. Consequently, Italy's energies are assumed by most observers to be focused entirely on its internal problems. However, a closer look reveals that the events now taking place in Rome—the evolution of national institutions, the change in political perspective from ideological to administrative issues, the return of political parties to purposes as they were established by the Constitution and, lastly, the replacement of a class of politicians who have been in power since 1948—are all intrinsically related to European security.

On the one hand, Italy's destabilization may give rise to problems within the European Community (EC) that the Community has hitherto managed to avoid, save for the minor instance of the extremely civil "divorce" between the three communities which make up Belgium. A similar development in Italy, though possible, seems highly unlikely. Up until now, the internal debate has been about greater or lesser decentralization, and hence about the powers of regional administrations and the need to extend them further. The so-called "Republic of the North" is little more than a slogan whose function is to alarm the central authorities so they will speed up the pace of reform—it is not a real objective to be pursued by violent means. On the other hand, the events that now trouble Italy are local echoes of the greater regional
upheaval that occurred a few years ago and that seems likely to proceed unceasingly until the entire world is restructured.

Within this context, the downfall of classical ideologies in Europe and the disappearance of the two blocks have led to the ultimate consolidation of liberalism and free-market economies, making economic security the first priority. This change has suddenly called into question the Western solidarity which has linked the two sides of the Atlantic for nearly 50 years. Europe has "discovered" that, from an economic point of view, it may be as strong as, or even stronger than, the United States. A serious problem in the "dialectics" between the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance has arisen for the first time.

The problem of Alliance solidarity has nothing to do with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate on "burden sharing" that has dragged on somewhat idly for so many years, and which really amounts to the U.S. requesting that its allies make a greater contribution to the joint security budget. The "burden"—which is now to be more equally shared—has two very clear features: obligations and costs on the one hand, and the advantages and power Europe now demands on the other.

The uncertainty and tensions among the NATO leadership are reproduced almost identically on a smaller scale within Europe. There Germany, divided and occ: ied until just recently, is gradually becoming aware of its real strength and is beginning to flex its muscles, rusted by dozens of years of inaction. In the r.:...ante, Italy's old hopes and fears are coming back to life, and a redefinition of geo-economic and geopolitical alliances is afoot—Italy may try to counterbalance Germany's predominance and thereby hamper the birth of a new Franco-German core at the heart of the continent.

The issue of regional power highlights the contrast between Italy's two different but coexisting "souls"—the European soul and the Mediterranean soul. Northern Italy, connected to the rest of the continent by the Alps (which no longer form an economic or political barrier between Italy and Central
IThaly) has a European soul because of its culture, race, technical and industrial development, trade relations and strong economic ties. Southern Italy, on the other hand, has a Mediterranean soul due primarily to its own economic backwardness. The South's economic weakness is so severe that the gap between it and the rest of Italy has been unbridgeable despite 40 years of development policy. Additionally, Southern Italy's natural openings are on the Mediterranean Sea, with the Balkan peninsula to the east and the Arabic world (particularly the Mahgreb) to the south. The internal dialectics of Europe are therefore reflected in the internal character of Italy, making any isolated analysis of either internal or external affairs impossible.

Revamping European security is a slow, collective process which works against time in a growing area of instability. Presently, the arc of crisis surrounding Italy has three main cores: the East, extending to Vladivostok; the Balkans, in the throes of civil war; and finally the Arabic world, prey to the rising tide of radical religious fundamentalism. Beyond the horizon, Italy also finds a "fourth world," which is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore during a time of global phenomena involving poverty, hunger and burgeoning populations.

Does Italy have a European security policy? Does it have an established aim and strategy? What is Italy's role within it?

Italy and Europe's Internal Security Debate

During the "good old days of the Berlin wall," Italy felt protected, defended as part of a collective security structure capable of tackling any foreseeable threat or risk. One possible front, the northeastern boundary of the country with Central Europe and the Balkans, was watched over by NATO in a line of deployment in which Italy played a minor strategic role. After the breach between Tito and the Kremlin and the
declaration of Austria’s neutrality, two buffer states existed between Italy’s forces and those of its potential enemies (Hungary and the southern Soviet front). Italy counted on the fact that enemies would be detained and worn out before they could strike a decisive counterattack.

From the south, potential risks were extremely limited and insignificant from a military point of view. The countries on the opposite side of the Mediterranean were politically unstable and industrially and technologically backward, although demographically explosive. These factors had a bearing on Italian security, but were best controlled with political, diplomatic and economic means rather than with military instruments. For years NATO considered Northern Africa and the Middle East "out of area;" only the U.S. Sixth Fleet was prepared to "show its banner" in case of real danger.

Italy sought security by belonging to the Atlantic Alliance rather than in an adequate military apparatus of its own. Its sense of security was therefore achieved indirectly and rested on greater Allies, particularly the United States. Italy struck a balance of give and take with NATO by providing political support to the United States, such as support for the deployment of "Euromissiles." Italy was a country that always thought more in terms of security than in terms of defense.

The turmoil which shook the world at the end of the 1980's and is still fomenting casts a shadow over the security Italy enjoyed in the past. Rather absurdly, the uncertainty of the current situation is the only sure element in a succession of events which has shown how incapable Italy is of foreseeing future problems. All that had been taken for granted has since been called into question, especially the "internal" aspect of security in a Europe which hesitates to tackle the toughest problems.

The power vacuum left behind by the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the shrinking of the United States' ambitions has led to a great hustle and bustle among international organizations in Europe. NATO, the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), the Western European Union (WEU)—all have rushed in at the same time to extend their areas of influence, giving rise to a situation made confusing by an excess, rather than a lack, of points of reference. In optimistic statements made by various governments, this network of security organizations is defined as "the complex of interlocking institutions." However, these "interlocking institutions" are often so busily engaged in coordinating their respective activities that they lack the time to carry out, properly and efficiently, the obligations mandated by their statutes.

On the other hand, a true effort toward elimination of the overlap of power has indeed been made. NATO has vehemently stressed the fact that its political nature continues to prevail over its task as a military organization, thereby asserting itself as the key point of reference in the sector. NATO’s success can be attributed to both the birth of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which provided rich access to the former territories of the Warsaw Pact, and to the decision to join with the CSCE, thus perhaps becoming its military wing. Additionally, the Yugoslav crisis is the first instance in which the United Nations (UN), in accordance with its charter, delegated its tasks to a regional organization.

At a lower level, Italy faces the growing weight of the WEU, which wants to change Europe’s present image as an "economic giant, political dwarf and military larva." Above all, it is extremely significant that the WEU and NATO have managed to reach a compromise based on carefully established mutual respect. A further leap forward will be made as soon as the WEU manages to absorb the entire range of European multinational organizations involved in defense issues—an objective that has only been partially achieved by the transfer of some of the Independent European Program Group’s (IEPG) prerogatives to the WEU. This is a first step in a process
which should lead to the absorption of FINABEL* and EUROCUP,** whose existence as separate components of a common structure is no longer justifiable.

These are indeed remarkable steps forward which would have been sufficient under normal circumstances. Yet, given the great dynamism of the processes under way, these steps seem particularly slow and inadequate compared to real needs. Security and stability would benefit greatly from decisive acceleration; the architecture of Italy's future security system must, however, be corrected first.

A political Europe has yet to appear on the world scene. Its birth depends on the Treaty of Maastricht, already ratified by most EC states. Many, however, contend it must be greatly improved before it can actually become a conclusive and efficient diplomatic instrument.

The reality of a European Political Union is also hampered by unsolved problems relating to the leadership of both NATO and the EC. Europe's dependence on the United States is being called into question as never before. On the basis of its own economic potential, at least part of the old continent now wants to engage in new relations with its great partner on an equal basis in every field. The upshot is confrontation and tension, drawing issues into the debate formerly unrelated to a joint security policy. Attention is focused once again on the economy, which both President Clinton and the United States Ambassador to the European Economic Community recently described as an intrinsic part of U.S. national security. As a result, negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and

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* France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg; founded in 1953 to encourage cooperation among the member countries.

** Eurogroup of NATO established 1968; informal grouping of defense ministers from European member countries of NATO except France and Iceland.
Trade (GATT), the Group of Seven* (G-7) summits and collective defense commitments are all grouped into the same "melting pot."

Another growing issue is the question of the influence of a unified German state within Europe. Undoubtedly, Germany is the country with the greatest potential, and consequently it seems destined for European leadership. Several contraindications hamper other European states' acceptance of possible German leadership—the specter of the two world wars and the fear of being drawn into a political structure that Germany would inevitably direct towards its predominant interests in Eastern Europe. These factors have prevented Italy from joining the Franco-German alliance for the construction of a "European defense pillar." Italy remains quite unwilling to relegate its Mediterranean role to a secondary level because it has proven to be of significant regional and national importance. Italy is not inclined to submit to a much stronger partner, particularly one that is so close geographically. It is more likely to pursue strong ties with the United States, a country with the double advantage of being far away and of having given proof over 40 years of its tolerant attitude toward smaller partners.

Each country can only have policies which are consistent with its historical traditions. It would be fruitless at this point for Italy to take a precise and final stance on European internal security structures. Italy’s stance during the initial stages of the Eurocorps controversy is clear evidence of its cautious approach. At the time, Italy supported the United Kingdom in an attempt at compromise. Without rejecting France and Germany’s suggestions outright, Italy simply aimed at the indispensable inclusion of the United Kingdom in mediation. Today, Italy re-asserts that there exists only one choice in the sphere of security—the Atlantic Alliance—and advocates its

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* France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Italy
continuation in order to give Europe and the WEU the time they need to develop.

During this time of Europe's internal difficulties, the acceptance of, or final withdrawal from, a European continent which hinges on Germany entails for Italy the risk of having to choose between the northern and southern parts of its own country. It will continue to tackle this aspect of its security policy, at least in the near future, on the basis of the customary compromise of compelling two different trends to coexist within the government. The first trend, which is markedly pro-Atlantic (and, on a secondary level, pro-European), is entrusted to the Defense Ministry and is aimed at keeping Italian relations with the U.S. unchanged. The second trend, which is pro-Mediterranean, is handled by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and is aimed at an open dialogue with all countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Within this context, the Prime Minister plays a pivotal role, tilting the scales in favor of one policy or the other according to the circumstances of the moment.

External European Security Relationships

The second aspect of European security, the "external" one, appears to be just as uncertain as Italy's internal situation. Apart from the inability to foresee future developments, other factors have played an equally significant role in moving toward a more stable Europe.

All industrialized nations, particularly the countries which form the traditional Western world, are going through a dire economic recession. Predictably, national public attention is almost universally focused on internal affairs—particularly financial/social affairs, employment and issues related to the economy—rather than on international affairs. This focus makes it extremely difficult to justify the allocation of funds for security purposes. Such a trend results in deep cuts in
external investments which are not perceived as having immediate, tangible returns, especially defense investments. No Western countries have avoided this trend, except perhaps Greece which, enmeshed as it is in the thicket of the Balkan crisis, considers its security a priority over and above other policy issues. Furthermore, this generally counterproductive process is taking place without coordination, with each partner trying to economize as much as possible and trying to reduce to the minimum its individual commitment, without paying much heed to what the others are doing.

Day after day, the entire Alliance is losing strength and credibility. Yet, security may suddenly depend on a coordinated and efficient use of all available resources, never before needed as they could be now. The Western Allies have unprecedented wealth, but may soon see the time when they are required to expend far greater effort than their capabilities allow.

One oft forgotten but crucial factor in Europe’s future security is the need to contribute effectively to the economic development of those countries which still have not attained an adequate level of prosperity. Geo-economic development has thus become the foremost instrument of Western, European and Italian security.

Yet, demand is presently far greater than supply. Germany is still draining funds from the rest of Europe in order to meet the costs of unification and support the indispensable economic development of the five Eastern Länder. Central Europe, the four countries grouped by the Visegrad Pact, is calling for Europe’s contribution to its integration into the free-market area. The states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) are shaky and under the constant risk of a political swing back to an authoritarian regime—this can be treated effectively only with economic measures. The Balkans too have become dangerously backward, and the world should expect that eventually greater economic assistance will be needed there as well. Ultimately, the world must address the
task of reconstructing a civil society and an industrial infrastructure in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. They cannot be abandoned, no matter what the outcome of the conflict.

Farther to the south, the Arabic world is one of the sources of migration into Europe. Migration from Egypt and the three Mahgreb countries, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, is triggered by the impossibility of striking a balance between economic resources and progressively higher population growth. Additionally, there is the so-called "Fourth World," characterized by even worse living conditions and by uncertain survival, which will require an even greater and more prolonged financial effort from the industrialized nations.

These situations cannot all be addressed at the same time and enjoy the same priority status. In addition, they are joined by other needs in which the economy plays a no less significant role—the most immediate example being that of nuclear disarmament. The agreements already reached could be made worthless or ineffective by the inability to meet the high cost of the "clean" destruction of huge stocks of weapons that have accumulated during the years of confrontation. In order to avoid losing the benefits achieved by years of arduous and uncertain negotiations, the West must provide economic aid to Russia so it can tackle this problem effectively. Clearly this constitutes yet another problem on a list that already exceeds our capabilities.

Not all Western countries have agreed on priorities for aid. Absolute priority was given to the salvage of East Germany, but this was not a combined decision—Germany practically imposed it on its European partners without their concurrence. The second priority concerns Russia, which is still capable of casting a menacing shadow over all of Europe. It is only logical that the threat that has continental ramifications should be the one against which security instruments are used first. Central Europe and the Arabic world, on the other hand, are highly controversial cases because they are two extremely different recipients of development aid. The former attracts aid
from Scandinavian countries as well as those of the Germanic area, while the latter attracts aid mostly from northern Mediterranean states.

At a European level, Italy and France's views diverge. Owing to its geopolitical position, Italy tends to consider the Mediterranean and its bordering countries as an indivisible whole. This concept is clearly reflected in its diplomatic initiatives, such as the proposal to set up a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, similar to the CSCE in its structure and distribution of development aid. France, on the other hand, has focused on the western Mediterranean, having foregone the possibility of playing a political role in Lebanon. Within the framework of strengthening links with the opposite shores of the Mediterranean, France has succeeded in setting up the "five plus five group." Five European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and, at a later stage, Malta) face five countries of the extended Mahgreb (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) in what is a ten-party dialogue. This dialogue could easily shift over to relations between the EC—ultimately the European Political Union—and the Mahgreb Union. Despite its objections to this grouping, Italy eventually gave its consent because it believes that any opening towards the Arabic world, no matter how limited, is better than what has been Europe's lack of initiative toward this important part of the Islamic world.

Indeed, Italy has continuously pointed out that one of the great shortcomings of the Western security system is that Europe and the Arabic world have not joined any large international organization together. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to do more than engage in bilateral dialogues due to the lack of an established time and meeting place. The Middle East Conference does not satisfy this need because it has restricted, carefully established and unexpandable aims.

Without such an overarching system, the primary security issues of concern to all these countries (arms proliferation,
channels for development aid, pollution, emigration, demographic development, drug trade, organized crime and technology transfer) must be addressed in the United Nations in order to find a potential place of debate. The result is that the issues become dispersed and diluted and seem to be less pressing and relevant compared to other problems.

Italy cannot abandon the Arabic world by placing Central Europe first, not just in the wider field of security but also in the more specific one of defense. As the Italian Defense Chief of Staff General Corcione pointed out in an article published in the January 1993 issue of "NATO's Sixteen Nations," from 1989 to the present day, NATO has had to mobilize three times, each time on the southern flank. Italy’s inclination toward the Arab World will, however, in part be checked by the need to earmark development aid to the rest of Africa. This aid is endorsed by Italy’s international policy and by the Catholic Church, which sees the African continent as one of the pillars of its possible future development. This new element not only has an influence on Italian security policy, but also on its defense policy.

Yugoslavia

Thanks to the efforts of the international community, the Yugoslav crisis has up to now been confined within precise geographical boundaries; but it calls into question values that are both old and new, compelling the entire world to make specific choices which will influence it in the short and medium run. In a way, the conflict can be seen as the forerunner or first example of the forces, and particularly ideologies, which will come into conflict in the future. Nationalistic aspirations, religious contrasts and the lack of humanitarian scruples are thus united into one confused jumble, leading to a series of questions which are still waiting for a precise reply:
What will be the role of the great international organizations in cases such as these? Will they succeed in asserting themselves as a decisive stabilizing factor or will they be paralyzed by their own internal limitations? Will the respect of nationalities in defining boundaries be endorsed? What about the religious nature of this war which has, up to now, been confined within precise limits? What about the conflict between "the rights of peoples" and "the rights of states?"

All these problems concern Italy directly, given the geographic proximity of the conflict and the way in which Italy's history and interests have been and continue to be interwoven with "Yugoslav" ones. Despite being unable to make a more direct and visible contribution to present peace efforts because of the unwritten rule that prohibits countries from participating in peacekeeping forces in bordering countries, Italy is closely watching the trend of events in the former Yugoslav Federation.

There are additional internal implications, apart from the more obvious external ones, that concern Italy. The protection of Italian minority groups living in Croatia and Slovenia, the redefinition of these republics by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo, and the memories of atrocities committed during World War II and the immediate post-war period, may all become political issues in the debate. The great impact of these issues on the general public could exacerbate long dormant nationalistic fears.

A solution to the crisis in the shortest possible time is therefore indispensable for Italian interests, whereas the aim of the rest of Europe seems to be to just keep the conflict within specific geographical boundaries. This considerable difference accounts for why Italian political forces and the general public have accepted the country's efforts to play a leading role in formulating a Western response.
Italy's policy has resulted in considerable human costs: eight Italians have died, four of whom were engaged in EC observation missions, shot down as they escorted humanitarian aid into the besieged Sarajevo. This may seem like a rather small figure, but it is quite high for a country which, except for the operation in Iraq, has not been involved in a real armed conflict for 48 years—two generations.

The same policy has driven Italy to become directly committed far beyond its customary level. In the wake of the preventive "Pentagonale" initiative, which tried to provide greater stability to the border areas between the Latin, Germanic and Slav worlds, Italy has contributed decisively to the embargo/blockade of the Adriatic Sea with its men and means effectively monitoring the Danube, and by placing all of the national territory at the disposal of NATO for the operation "Deny Flight."

Italy has no way of knowing when a solution to the crisis will be found and enforced in the future. Serbia is taking advantage of the Western "vacuum of will" (rather than a vacuum of power) in order to achieve old dreams at an unbearable cost. Whatever internal and international difficulties may now exist, it is very likely that Italy will continue to regard the Yugoslav crisis as its first priority and will go on assuming a leading role at a European level; though this may contrast with its traditional attitude, it is necessary due to circumstances.

Security Framework for an Uncertain Future

After having walked side by side for decades, the partners who contributed to European security during the Cold War are now beginning to go their separate ways. Old ties are becoming looser due to the disappearance of the great threat and due to the gradual diversification of national interests. Problems which would have formerly been addressed with consensus are
now viewed differently by various Western countries. Consensus, if any, is reached merely on minor parts of the issues and, when put to the test, proves to be inadequate.

In the meantime, changes are occurring in the nature, intensity and frequency of the risks and challenges. In a context of uncertainty, the scope of security covers practically all internal and foreign policy issues. Likewise, the tasks entrusted to defense and other specific structures increase. Hence, the Army is used to advance humanitarian aims, to combat organized crime and the drug trade, to assist refugees and to deal with pollution; the Air Force is used to transport refugees, food, medicine and the wounded. The commitment to the double field of security and defense is being increased to an extreme degree, while being made with diminished resources.

The "interlocking institutions" have finally begun to coordinate their respective roles, and the West has begun to react to the major tragedy of the Yugoslav crisis. The situation is therefore far from being hopeless, provided the West undertakes immediate and decisive action and attempts to conceive solutions that are in line with the scope and complexity of the problems. First and foremost, a security policy must be defined and, successively, lines of action established that are truly common to all parties.

To formulate a security policy does not mean that the West must find another enemy and turn him into the ultimate evil. Real enemies already exist. These enemies are problems, not individuals or states. With this perspective and within the framework of wise policymaking, Italy does not seek to deprive other countries of nuclear weapons or punish them for possessing them—it must solve the problem at its root and prevent proliferation with adequate means. The international community should not seek to defeat emigration, but prevent the worsening of the economic or social conditions that trigger it. Nationalism and fundamentalism are not values to be suppressed; but their most degenerate aspects and
interpretations, frequently caused by severe underdevelopment, must be restrained.

Italy is willing to contribute to international policies such as this, bearing its responsibilities in accordance with its economic potential and its international standing. It could even play a particularly positive role as a mediator between its European allies. If reaching a consensus on aims and priorities is truly desired in a debate between peers, rather than the imposition of the wishes of stronger, greater and richer partners, Italy will certainly take part.

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Turkey, Europe, and the Yugoslav Crisis

Omur Orhun

Over the past few years, we have been witnessing, if not the greatest, definitely one of the great turning points of history. The Cold War has come to an end. The international landscape which was characterized by ideological confrontation and a nuclear balance of terror has been swept away. The bitter rivalries between East and West are behind us. At first, we thought these historic developments made it possible to settle many conflicts which were a direct result of the Cold War. Peoples and countries would be able to lay aside ideological disputes and get on with the business of reconciliation, peacemaking and development. The United Nations (UN) demonstrated its new effectiveness by playing a leading role in ending the Gulf War. We looked forward to a world liberated from the awful threats of the Cold War, where nations would enjoy the fruits of commerce, industry and technology in peace, security, freedom, democracy and social justice.

However, it now appears that we carried our hopes a bit too far. We were overly optimistic. From the Balkans to the Trans-Caucasus to Afghanistan, we are witnessing the emergence of new conflicts pitting nations and ethnic communities against each other. Peace, stability and security are now threatened by destruction and economic ruin, compounded by the horrors of ethnic cleansing.

One of the most severe challenges has been the series of crises engulfing former Yugoslavia. Yesteryear, the international reaction to the sinister designs of the former Yugoslav army in Croatia was not forceful enough to deter
aggression. Today, the bitter consequences of the international community’s inadequate response are being harvested throughout the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity is being blatantly violated in defiance of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. As the international community condemns Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing and demands an immediate end to violations of international law, the suffering and destruction in Bosnia continues. People are still being killed. The resolutions of the UN Security Council have yet to be implemented. Hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees face an uncertain future away from their homes. Those surviving in the ruins of once flourishing cities are threatened by starvation, disease and extermination.

Before elaborating further on Turkey’s perspectives in relation to the Yugoslav conflict, challenges to European security in a general context and the emergence of aggressive nationalism in Europe need to be examined. Both topics have a direct bearing on the Yugoslav conflict, its root cause and possible remedies.

Challenges to European Security

As the Cold War drew to a close, Europe and the world gradually moved from the concept of simple security as perceived in the old bipolar world to extended or multidirectional security. The new concept of extended security attempts to manage the non-military aspects of security as well, and it acknowledges that lasting security necessarily must embrace more complex notions of what actually constitutes security and threats. This change can be attributed to a variety of different factors. First of all, because of the nuclear terror balance, the East-West conflict could not be settled by military means and had to be fought in areas not covered by the traditional concept of security. During the long
decades of the Cold War, Western Europe became accustomed to a higher standard of social welfare that ever before, and the importance of military power diminished in comparison to technological capability and financial influence. The 1973 oil crisis clearly demonstrated that it was impossible to solve every significant security problem by military means. The conventional meaning of security had to be broadened towards "extended security" via the inclusion of several new dimensions. Economic challenges affecting security started to attract increasing attention. In Europe, the economic and political threats that states could use against each other became more evident while purely military challenges receded. Demands that they adopt new human and religious rights and new environmental standards began to exert nearly the same pressures on totalitarian regimes in decline as a military challenge would.

Eventually, the Communist regimes in the East collapsed, and Western Europe now confronts a new set of challenges where military strength is only one element of security. The lesson to be derived from what happened in Eastern Europe is that security, in the narrow military sense, is not an adequate state of affairs, and that, unless we seek our future peace and safety in terms of "extended security," we too cannot ensure a stable and prosperous evolution.

The foremost challenge for Europe today is associated with the internal developments in the Russian Federation and their impact on Russian foreign policy. After many years of glasnost and perestroika, it now appears that the future of Russia is less, rather than more, predictable. The public debate over whether reform policies are too ambitious or not ambitious enough continues, while the economic situation steadily deteriorates, and the threat of political disintegration becomes increasingly apparent. The Federation may suddenly dissolve like the Union. Whatever happens, it will be a constant source of tension for its neighbors for a long time to come.
In Central and Eastern Europe, the rule of law and human rights have been rejuvenated, and although the countries are now democratic, old points of contention have resurfaced—not the least of which are ethnic tensions and inter-state problems arising from national minorities. In this new atmosphere, rediscovered national identity and national consciousness are quickly deteriorating into chauvinism and aggressive irredentism.

A third challenge is the economic differences between the western and eastern and northern and southern parts of the continent. Whether the quality of life in Eastern Europe has in fact worsened since the autumn revolution of 1989 is a matter of conjecture. However, it is now clear that the Central and East European countries, especially Russia, will have greater difficulty than originally anticipated in transforming into market economies unless they receive substantial aid from the West. Economic disillusionment in Central and Eastern Europe would inevitably destabilize the fledgling democracies in this region. Therefore, ways and means should be found to ensure that the aid given to Central and Eastern Europe is maintained at an adequate level and does not decrease as a result of the financial aftereffects of the recent monetary upheavals. On the other hand, the resources needed for reconstruction and the alleviation of suffering in Bosnia-Hercegovina once the senseless fighting stops—hopefully soon—can be seen in the same context.

Against the background of these challenges, it follows that a European system of crisis prevention and management would include agreed-on procedures for handling crises, and the realization of such a system must be regarded as a first priority imperative. However, in the search for what will work, it should be stressed that the European response to the Yugoslav conflict is not a useful model for the future. At the same time, the fact that the Central and Eastern European countries persistently seek closer relations with NATO shows that they do see some security in that current system. Whether they will
so feel in the long run will be determined by the degree of success attained by NATO and others in the management of the change now underway in Europe.

Even a cursory evaluation of the multidirectional challenges to European security and the multidirectional global challenges that would affect Europe indicates a strong justification for retaining a full trans-Atlantic dialogue. Hence, the search for effective policies to respond to Europe's future challenges necessitates the full participation of the U.S.

Aggressive Nationalism

Since 1989, we have witnessed the demise of one totalitarian regime after another. It is a dream come true for the millions of men and women on both sides of the East-West divide who have cherished and struggled for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Yet, rising nationalism and xenophobia on the same continent have become a nightmare for those same men and women. Although Europe is unified, aggressive and violent nationalism, so divisive in nature, is on the rise as a destructive force.

What we are witnessing today is the uneasy confluence of two counter-tendencies: integration, in some cases reaching supra-national dimensions on the one hand, and disintegration, leading towards micro-nationalism on the other. It is a curious fact that all this is taking place in an age of globalization. Globalization of the world economy with explosive advances in information and communication technologies, the ever-expanding activities of multinational companies, and growing international investment and technology flow all have the potential of turning our world into a global society. In this context, the integration process must be cherished as a progressive development in the history of humankind as it promotes peace and increases the prosperity of the people through cooperation.
Micro-nationalism, on the other hand, with its divisive, exclusive, often violent nature, is at best an anachronistic phenomena. Today, it seems that some segments of the "nation," the basis of the nation-state, are in search of not only their ethnic identity but also are in search of the means to establish their mono-ethnic states. While enjoying and preserving one's ethnic identity is a legitimate right of every citizen, the search for ethnic sovereignty is a threat to the constitutional citizenship. The violent attempts at establishing national states (as opposed to nation-states), if unchecked, may result in exclusive, ethnic-racial states. The same is true for the existing "state" structures which suppress or exclude so-called foreign and ethnic identities in the name of promoting the supremacy of an ethnic majority.

Defining minority and majority in terms of ethnic origin not only makes it harder to escape the trap of micro-nationalism, but in such a situation democracy itself gets grossly overridden because there is no way of having "equality among citizens" within the limits of this logic unless every citizen belongs to one and the same ethnic group. Fundamental and indispensable elements of democracy, however, include: a tolerance for differences and freedom of thought; political participation, which bolsters the awareness of common responsibility; group solidarity, which is the complementary element of civic identity; and finally transparency, which enables togetherness in solving problems without ignoring differences of opinion. There is no limit to division: one must learn to enjoy one's differences while respecting those of others, and differences should not lead to discrimination. We must be able to look for a higher common denominator than ethnicity, such as citizenship. Nationalism, once a positive concept that bound people to one another through citizenship in nation-states following the collapse of empires, may in its current aggressive form harm not only the unity of the nations which are, almost without exception, constituted of multi-ethnic populations, but also the very lives
and fundamental freedoms of the citizens of those states. As such, aggressive nationalism is nothing but a destructive force. In light of the foregoing assessment, the Serbian designs of expansion, ethnic cleansing and violation of human rights can be better judged and remedies found.

**Turkey's International Role**

Turkey's international role in the current stage of world developments may be defined as the sum of the parts it plays in the multiple arenas of the evolving power equation in Europe, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Trans-Caucasus regions, and the Trans-Caspian area. These evolving power equations, at this juncture of history perhaps more than ever before, represent an unstable equilibrium peculiar to times of change and transition:

- The Cold War has come to an end.
- An empire extending from the Baltics to the Pacific has disintegrated; almost the entire Eurasian land mass is in turmoil.
- Central and Eastern European states have regained their sovereignties; but the great divide bisecting Europe into different levels of prosperity is yet to be overcome.
- Western Europe is proceeding towards integration; but there are important "unknowns" in regard to its level of success in this endeavor, its future structures after the admission of new entrants and its future trans-Atlantic ties.
- In Eastern Europe, the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union where classical 19th century-type nationalism has not had the chance to undergo a maturing transformation toward a peaceful and co-existent patriotism, violent and aggressive right-wing nationalist tendencies have surfaced; ethnic conflict threatens traditional state structures; and self-determination—as a principle—has become very difficult,
if not peacefully impossible, to implement in ethnically mixed areas where the "self" is anything but homogeneous.

- The Middle East and the Arab world are trying to recuperate from the material and moral scars left by the Gulf Crisis and the subsequent war. The peace process cannot be taken for granted. Strong undercurrents of dissatisfaction prevail in many parts of the Arab world. The appeal of fundamentalist reaction appears to be widening among frustrated masses.

In such an environment, all nations and their leaders are trying to come to terms with this manifold era of change and renewal. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the parameters of the transition period were established with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Paris Charter of November 1990. Along with nuclear and conventional arms control and reduction treaties and the latest generation of Confidence and Security-Building Mechanisms (CSBM) of the Vienna Document of the same year, a new European security architecture was being prepared to be built. It is evident that Europe's security architecture will emerge on the pillars of a transformed Atlantic Alliance, the new consultative partnership forum of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It will be a deepening and enlarging European integration process, with the Council of Europe and the CSCE forming an overarching roof with their new institutions and cooperative mechanisms. A redefined Europe and Euro-Atlantic community with interlocking systems and agencies is gradually taking shape.

In broad outline, this is the general picture of the stage set for Turkey's international role throughout the last decade of the 20th century—a very different role from the one it had during the Cold War period. However, there are two basic constants in the analysis of Turkey's presence on the international scene:

- The first constant is the choice regarding her "way of life"—a free, contemporary society with pluralistic and
participatory democratic structures committed to a steady quest for more prosperity.

- The second constant is the need for a stable environment of peace surrounding its borders that would encourage the uninterrupted process of economic and social development.

A closer look at the "variable" elements relevant to Turkey's international role shows that the first variable is the trans-Atlantic dimension. The future of Europe cannot be visualized in artificial compartments within the Continent, nor for that matter by attempting to abstract Europe from its adjacent regions, whose stability and orderly progress is of relevance to Europe's security and well-being. Hence, the realization of a set of goals, often interrelated, has to be achieved: the success of Russia's economic reforms, along with Ukraine and Belarus; the taking root of democratic institutions and processes in these countries; and the narrowing of the gap between the quality of life in Eastern and Western Europe; and the maintenance of security on a continental scale. These are colossal requirements Western Europe cannot address alone. Turkey, for its part, needs to have a serene European continent at peace with itself. Therefore, the trans-Atlantic variable of the future of European-American relations cannot be overvalued.

The second variable is the future of the European integration process. A genuine whole is composed of all its parts. However, the possibility of such a Europe coming into existence in the foreseeable future is not certain. A Federal Europe may not emerge. A concentric Europe of several tiers might evolve. There are many alternative Europes which might eventually emerge. How Turkey would relate to any of them is a matter of conjecture at this phase. Europe as envisaged by the founding fathers of the Rome Treaty and as reflected in long-term perspective of the Ankara Agreement of 1963 is the basis of Turkey's association with the EC.
The third variable is the future evolution in the Balkans, the Black Sea area and the Trans-Caucasus region. The Balkans constitute a sub-strategic entity linking Turkey to Western Europe. The Balkan nations must realize their common stake in transforming this region into a cooperative partnership which initially will require that they outgrow petty, short-sighted rivalries. Turkey has a comprehensive, long-term vision for Balkan harmony and solidarity, whose origins lie in the experiment of the 1930's. Turning the Balkans into another European region in the image of the Nordic area would be in the best interest of all Balkan peoples.

The Black Sea basin now has seven coastal states. Russia, despite the latter-day "time of trouble" it is going through, will always remain a major power with a long-term potential of regaining its former "super" status. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone is a very important venture that could strengthen not only Black Sea development and trade, but also provide a link with Balkan Cooperation and, eventually, the European Economic Area.

Stability in the Trans-Caucasus is no less important for Turkey than it is in the Balkan area. A peaceful settlement of the Azeri-Armenian dispute and re-establishment of domestic concord in Georgia have to be realized if the desired stability is to be attained. The progress of Azerbaijan in becoming another democratic, secular, Westernized state in the Islamic world should be ensured and made irreversible. Consequently, Turkish interests in the area require the cooling down of passions and the building up of an atmosphere of moderation which would gradually lay the groundwork for an inter-Caucasus cooperation framework, one that could hook up with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) project and an enlarged Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

The fourth variable—a "grand" one—may be identified as the Asiatic dimension of Turkey's international role and comprises the future of its ties with the Trans-Caspian Turkic
Republics (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), our ECO partners (Iran and Pakistan), the Mesopotamian and Gulf powers (Iraq and the member states of the GCC), as well as the entire "Fertile Crescent"—Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Turkish interests within the "Asiatic" dimension of her international role have to be pursued and promoted via two main perspectives: on the one hand, the Turkish model has to be projected, providing guidance and offering economic and technical help to its cultural/linguistic sister republics in Central Asia, thus facilitating their evolution toward fully-fledged pluralistic democracies with adequately-functioning market economies; on the other hand, Turkey needs to actively wield its moderating influence in the Middle East by encouraging multilateral economic cooperation and contributing to confidence-building.

In light of the "constants" and "variables" which condition Turkish policies in respect to the changing geopolitical landscape of the world, Turkey's international role is two-fold: 1) it represents continuity in terms of its basic national choices, vocation and orientation; and 2) it is also an agent of peaceful and orderly change in the direction of democratization, liberalization and cooperative partnership in the regions and sub-regions at whose point of confluence she occupies a unique strategic position.

The Tragedy of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Possible Spillover

It is evident that the Balkans are going through the most troublesome and dramatic phase of their history. Within less than two years of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, two newly formed Balkan states have been victimized by aggression. Two members of the UN and participants of the CSCE process had their territories invaded by the same neighbor, directly or by proxy. Masses of people have been
forcibly evicted from their homes. Indescribable atrocities have followed one after another, each shamefully overshadowing the previous infamy. Diplomacy without sufficient sanctioning clout has failed to reverse this tide. Now the conflict threatens to spill into neighboring areas.

The irresolute international response to the tragedy, with no collective political will to repulse the aggressor, to curb grave human rights violations, and to create conditions for meaningful negotiations, has encouraged further military gains and crimes against humanity.

Despite the efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina is at the brink of division. Two-thirds of the country has been forcefully occupied by the Serbs and they are still carrying on with their aggression. Serbian aggression stems basically from the current regime’s non-acceptance of the fact that Serbs can and should live in peace in territories other than Serbia, as citizens of those countries with equal rights. Although it appears to have some characteristics of a civil war (one involving three sides), the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina is of neither a religious nor an ethnic nature. Rather, it is a well-calculated act of aggression, incited and supported by the Serbs, with the Serbian army itself involved in the fighting.

Since the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Turkey’s priorities have not changed: the bloodshed must be stopped, the suffering of the people must be healed by international assistance, and a just and durable solution must be reached through negotiations. In the face of continuing aggression, Turkey advocates a collective response from the international community. This includes a limited military option in order to induce meaningful negotiations. Likewise, ethnic cleansing policies already underway against non-Serbs in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak constitute a potential threat for yet another armed conflict and refugee outflow in the region. Macedonia, held together only by a fragile ethnic
reconciliation, faces the danger of dismemberment at the first spark of fire.

Due to their complex and intertwined ethnic structures, the Balkan countries in general and the Yugoslav nations and nationalities in particular are so interrelated that they affect one another in a chain reaction. Within this framework, the resurrection of irredentist aspirations in the region are dangerous, as territorial claims in the Balkans aligned with ethnic nationalistic goals are irreconcilable by peaceful means. Therefore, giving a green light to ethnic unification in the region must be regarded as an open invitation to further attempts to change borders by force. Ethnic reunification will set an anachronistic trend toward racism in the middle of Europe, contrary the establishment of a new world order. Turkey has constantly offered its assistance to the international community since the beginning of the conflict with the goals of: repulsing and punishing the aggressor; curbing and reversing ethnic cleansing and deterring similar developments in the region; and creating conditions for equitable negotiations among the parties on an equal basis.

The Turkish public is particularly sensitive and concerned regarding developments in Bosnia. The ongoing ethnic cleansing, aggression and expansionism are to the detriment of the Muslims. The inaction of the international community has created deep disappointment and dissatisfaction in the public conscience, putting strong pressure on the government and challenging its moderate and conciliatory policy. Kosovo, Macedonia, Sandzak and Vojvodina are potential hotbeds where similar conflicts and atrocities may occur, with a possibility of developing quickly into a Balkan war. As there are sizable Turkish minorities in the area, the pressure on the government to pursue a more active policy will inevitably increase.

The passivity of the international community and the efforts of the aggressor, as well as some other similarly inclined proponents, have worked to the advantage of those
inclined to characterize the aggression as an ethnic and religious war. Unfortunately, this has strengthened radical factors in the Moslem world, sharpening the Moslem-Christian polarization. This dimension is bound to be more apparent if the conflict spreads to Kosovo, Sandzak and Macedonia. Such a development is naturally unwelcome to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious concept of national co-existence.

It is never too late to venture for a good cause. However, no outsider’s prescription for a cure can alone save the patient unless the patient also displays the determination to recover. All sorts of such prescriptions are now part of the treatment: UN Security Council Resolutions, International Commission on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) commitments and plans, CSCE advice, International Olympic Committee (IOC) resolutions, etc. However, the entire set of these parallel processes, notwithstanding the best of intentions which motivate them, may yield the desired results only if they are adequately underpinned by a Balkan-scale effort to halt and turn back the adverse fortunes of this peninsula. Thus, in modest terms, such an exercise could be summarized as follows:

- Renewal of the commitments by both regional and global powers to the principles and goals of the UN actions regarding the former Yugoslavia.
- Dedication to the realization of the aims solemnly put on paper in London and in the latest peace plan.
- Establishment of a complementary mechanism to the UN actions and to the ICFY process, with a view to synergizing the efforts of Balkan and regional powers to search for ways and means to put an end to bloodshed in the Balkans, to prevent a spill-over of the crisis, and to render impossible a wider Balkan conflagration.

The international community must not let the Balkans become the burial ground of ideals and norms cherished in the post-Cold War world. We must put a stop to the growing perception in world public opinion that the collective security
system as envisaged in the UN Charter has failed to address this crisis.

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Part II

The Shadow Cast by Events in Russia
Russia’s Security Concerns
and Proposals for Regional
Cooperation

Vladimir V. Shustov

The disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into a number of sovereign states has opened dramatic new vistas in the field of European and international security for many decades to come. The breakup of the old bloc-based model of security, the emergence of new political "actors" in the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) all provide a fresh background against which the post-confrontational system of security in Eurasia and in the world as a whole is taking shape.

The impact of these developments on global security is dialectic in substance. On the one hand, there are very positive and lasting effects: the perils of a large-scale military conflict in Europe have all but vanished; the logistics of the confrontations of the past are gradually eroding; and the groundwork has been laid for further interstate cooperation in meeting new common challenges in the military and political spheres. However, on the flip side of the coin: the overall potential for conflict on the continent is on the increase; new knots of ethnic and political differences are being tied; and some long-standing territorial, religious, social and economic problems are being stirred up.

The strategic development of the space of the former USSR is proving to be a laborious process. During the transition period, the new states must both overcome internal problems and seek a new model of interstate relations based on
principles of mutual interest and equitable partnership. These "problems of growth" often cause tensions, crises and even conflicts to erupt.

It is obvious that these trends will influence the prospects for security in the vast Euro-Atlantic region. Thus, the strategic objective of Russia's foreign policy is to make sure that reforms are positive and that the ongoing transformation leads to enhanced European and international security. With this important benchmark in mind, the Russian Federation has been shaping its military policy—including its military and political relations with the former Soviet republics.

Russia's Military and Strategic Legacy

As a successor state to the former Soviet Union and simultaneously the most militarily and economically powerful republic among the former constituent republics, Russia inherited a substantial part (estimates totalling up to 70%) of the Soviet armed forces and defense establishment. The issue of the redistribution of the Soviet military and strategic legacy became the subject of intense consultations and negotiations between the former republics immediately following the formal disbandment of the Soviet Union. The issue was discussed at a series of summits within the CIS (with the consultative participation of those republics remaining outside the CIS) and at meetings of experts. The discussions resulted in a generally acceptable formula governing the redistribution of Soviet military property by establishing proportional quotas. The formula was a compromise and reflected an optimized balance of the interests of the newly independent states while accounting for their geopolitical position, specific features and the traditions of their national military and economic structures.

The key parameters of the mechanism for implementing the agreements were also defined. They were based on
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civilized negotiating procedures governing the transfer to individual republics of materiel, property and the infrastructure of the Soviet armed forces. However, principles codified in the appropriate agreements were often disregarded. In some former republics (e.g., Azerbaijan, Georgia and, to some extent, Armenia), the authorities unilaterally attempted to seize combat equipment or to bring formations and units of the former Soviet Army under their own jurisdiction.

Against this backdrop, Russia has pursued a consistent policy within the CIS to ensure adequate control over the redistribution of Soviet military property. In so doing, Russia is seeking to take into account the military and political interests of all sovereign states in the territory of the former USSR and to prevent the breach of appropriate international accords in the field of arms control, especially the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. A related priority to that of redistribution is to conduct military negotiations between the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, as well as with "the near abroad" countries.

Russia has agreed in its discussions that it is imperative to ensure credible control over, and predictability of, any actions aimed at the nationalization of military property and resources of the former USSR. The same factors are applicable to the building of national armed forces in the "near abroad" countries.

A good example of cooperation is the negotiated intermediate option to solve the Russia-Ukraine problem of the Black Sea fleet. Despite the occasional eruption of emotions, the two parties are trying to abide by the Dagomys and Yalta arrangements. As a matter of fact, the arrangements "freeze" for three years the actual division of the fleet, and thus provide time for all legal and technical aspects of the problem to be explored.

Another set of issues between Russia and the former Soviet republics is the legal status and condition of Russian troops and border guards remaining in the former republics. In
addition to the Tashkent Agreement on Collective Security which sets forth major legal elements, Russia is conducting bilateral negotiations with most of the "near abroad" foreign countries. Agreements have already been signed with Belarus, Lithuania, Armenia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and similar agreements with other states are in process. The purpose of these agreements, apart from compliance with international legal norms, is to lay the groundwork for future military and political cooperation between the Russian Federation and its nearest partners. Such cooperation takes into account Russia's common strategic interests and international obligations in the military sphere, whether individual or collective. Establishing the status of its border guards, for example, is designed to ensure stable external borders of the Commonwealth (especially on its southern flank) which meet the vital interests of all parties.

The intransigent position of the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia is causing major problems. They are seeking to speed up the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territories while ignoring the realities of the situation. Russia is conducting tough negotiations with both countries; however, agreement on the status of remaining Russian armed contingents and arrangements for their withdrawal are not within reach yet. In turn, this is impeding the commencement of withdrawal procedures that are in the best interest of both sides.

The position of the Russian leadership on this issue is unequivocal. They do not link the withdrawal problem to any other aspect of the bilateral relations between Russia and the Baltic states, including that of the human rights of the Russian population living in the Baltic states. Russia is fully prepared to fulfill its international obligations by withdrawing its troops from the Baltics. However, the legal and socioeconomic questions related to the withdrawal must be settled simultaneously—and the solution must be based on a two-way street. In a sense, the solution to this particular problem could shape the character of future relations between the Russian
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Federation and "near abroad" foreign countries. Indeed, tens of thousands of armed and unsettled people are a powerful potential source of internal tensions in Russia proper. In the event of adverse developments, the foreign and military policy of Russia could undergo substantial changes affecting the "near abroad" countries. It is clear that such developments would be at variance with the vital interests of all its neighbors, including the Baltic states.

Russia is not keeping any secrets with respect to the withdrawal of its troops. In fact, under paragraph 15 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki 1992 Document, it regularly informs the CSCE participating states about the progress of troop withdrawal, especially in the Baltic states. The withdrawal of troops from Germany is a positive example. Though not all materiel and financial problems have been resolved, Germany continues to take into account the military, political and economic situation in Russia and has assumed significant obligations for settling the departing troops and their dependents inside Russia.

Though the military and strategic legacy of the former USSR saddles Russia with important political, legal and material obligations, it opens vast prospects for ensuring Russia's interests under new geopolitical realities. In the field of security, mutually advantageous relations with the "near abroad" countries can be promoted. The majority of these countries are interested in friendly relations with Russia. Russia will always seek to have good relations and to cooperate with these countries. However, countries outside the region of the former Soviet Union which attempt to use current disagreements between Russia and the former constituent republics to further their selfish interests are likely to lose.
Russia's Concept of the "Near Abroad"

The "near abroad" refers to specific areas of military and political relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. These areas are determined by a general strategic concept of implementation of Russia's interests in the "near abroad" countries. A multi-tier and multi-variant model for building interstate relations in the post-Soviet space is a key element to the concept. This model allows for various forms of integration and association between sovereign states as a function of their specific interests and willingness to cooperate in a particular field.

In terms of security, Russia is concerned with two major tiers of interaction. The first tier is the close integration within the CIS based on the Treaty on Collective Security of May 1992 signed by six states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). The treaty provides for the close coordination of efforts in the military field; however, it is not in force because not all of the parties have ratified it. The six states form the integral core of the future system of collective security for the territory of the former USSR. The system serves the interests of their defense and will not be directed against any other state. In addition, the Charter of the CIS was signed in January 1993 by eight countries (Belarus and Turkmenistan joined in). The document contains important obligations of mutual assistance and cooperation in the field of defense and security. A number of limited-scope arrangements were concluded in individual areas (e.g., in the field of peacekeeping) and have already entered into force.

Another tier of military and political interaction concerns the development of contacts with the CIS non-participating states who consider cooperative effort to be a crucial factor to their military security. Relations with these states can be developed in a regional context along more limited lines than relations within the CIS.
As far as the Baltic states are concerned, Russia could initiate activities in the future to enhance confidence- and security-building measures, convert defense industries (taking into account the potential in the Baltic states), and coordinate national environmental programs relating to military activities. There are good prospects for cooperation with various regional forces such as the Baltic Council.

Russia is not against the emerging military cooperation between the new states and Western countries or various Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms. However, it is essential that these contacts be in tune with generally recognized international legal norms, be sufficiently transparent and not be detrimental to the legitimate interests of Russia and its allies within the CIS. These developments will be followed closely.

The general long-term politico-military interests of Russia in the "near abroad" countries can be incorporated within two broad objectives. The prime objective is to create a belt of "good neighborhoods" and stability along the perimeter of Russian borders. This will require the maintenance of multifarious ties with all former Soviet republics in the defense arena as well as the development of effective procedures for solving interstate differences without confrontation, including mechanisms for preventive diplomacy and crisis management. The intention is to establish a system of collective security with an agreed-upon integration of levels of foreign and military policy and with adequate organizational structure.

Simultaneously, another of Russia's objectives is to gear its relations with the "near abroad" to a long-term all-European perspective. In fact, Russia's defense community concept can join with other mechanisms such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Western European Union (WEU) to become the institutional elements of a CSCE-based, all-European security architecture.

In implementing these objectives, Russia attaches great importance to interacting with all partners from the "near
abroad" countries. However, for a number of reasons, cooperation with the former European republics of the former USSR is of special significance. This is not surprising since the maintenance of stability in the European continent, including the European part of the post-Soviet space, represents a major prerequisite for ensuring security in Eurasia and all over the world. A primary factor in maintaining stability will be Russia's relations with Ukraine and Belarus. Among the "near abroad" countries, Ukraine and Belarus are second only to Russia militarily and economically, and their defense establishments have traditionally been closely associated. The common defense posture of the former USSR was geared to repel a massive assault from the West, and much of the sophisticated military infrastructure and massive scientific and technological potential were developed in their territory. One cannot ignore the fact that the two countries enjoy considerable influence in the CIS and in the "near abroad" alike.

All these factors contribute to the development of cooperation in the military field between the Russian Federation and Kiev and Minsk. In its content, this cooperation has already covered the entire gamut of military and political issues, ranging from control over nuclear weapons to crisis management.

There is also a potential for developing Russia-Moldova relations because the geographic location of Moldova is important to Russia in terms of maintaining stability along its western frontiers. Further endeavors aimed at settling the conflict in the Trans-Dniestr region will help to lay a foundation. Under the bilateral agreement of 21 July 1992, Russian and Moldovan units closely cooperated with a joint peacekeeping force. In accordance with their mandate, a concerted effort has been made to monitor the ceasefire and stabilize the area of conflict. Thus, real prospects exist for the speedy conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the status of remaining troops and a time-frame for their withdrawal from
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Moldova. In turn, this will make it possible to establish an adequate legal basis for more frequent bilateral contacts in the military field. Such contacts will complement the development of equitable cooperation in the field of security, which is provided for by a recently-signed interstate Russia-Moldova treaty.

Russia’s New Defense Doctrine and Cooperation with the "Near Abroad"

Russia’s military doctrine is currently being finalized. Even given the persisting pluralism of views with regard to the specific content of the doctrine, its key provisions enjoy ample support from diverse political quarters. The underlying characteristic of the Russian defense strategy is its aim to modernize the entire defense establishment and to position its armed forces on the cutting edge of technology. The basic features are: a relatively small personnel strength (planned levels of up to 1.5 million officers and men), adequate firepower and mobility, and a streamlined composition and structure. Given the substantial change in the dangers that confront the security of the Russian Federation, Russia’s armed forces will primarily be geared towards neutralizing regional and local crises, i.e., the so-called low intensity conflicts. In other words, a primary mission of the armed forces will be to project adequate military strength to meet the needs of crisis management.

In pursuing Russia’s military and political interests, interaction with the "near abroad" countries emerges as a priority task. The draft military doctrine refers in particular to the advisability of further enhancing and institutionalizing the Collective Security System of the CIS. Its speedy institutionalization is viewed by the Russian leadership as the main safeguard for precluding the emergence and spread of interstate conflicts in the "near abroad." A basis for such
crises exists despite the erstwhile historic, political and economic closeness of the former constituent republics of the USSR. Natural differences and fine shades of variation in national interests are exacerbated by the difficulties of the current transitional period, both in the emerging CIS and the newly sovereign nations. Ethnic, religious and, to a certain degree, inter-clan strife present a serious challenge. Even today, this is what underlies armed conflicts in Tajikistan, Transcaucasia and Moldova. Other regions are also prone to such conflicts.

In this environment, Russia's policies in the "near abroad" take into account the legitimate interests of its counterparts. These policies are aimed at consolidating the political and military machinery capable of dampening and removing said differences, while building on a basis of common values and interests. The adoption of a new Russian military doctrine will, no doubt, provide additional impetus to the military and political cooperation of Russia with the "near abroad," including the European republics. Specifically, the areas of strategic arms control/disarmament and crisis management will benefit immensely from such cooperation. Both these concepts call for examination in more detail.

Strategic Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Central to strategic (nuclear) arms control are problems relating to non-proliferation. Russia's policies here are conducted, as it were, within several concentric circles. First, Russia's national system of control over the export of armaments and sensitive materials, hardware and technology must be streamlined. Second, non-proliferation controls within the CIS must be strengthened. Third, the coordinated involvement of CIS countries in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
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the latest military technologies must be ensured as much as possible.

As far as intra-Russia practices are concerned, adequate legal structures and practical coordination among government agencies are currently being developed and tested. For example, the Russian president has issued decrees that, along with the Law on Conversion of Defense Industries, provide the legal basis for controls over the export of armaments and military technologies. The Commission on Exports Control and the Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation were established to implement these policies. These agencies are entrusted with regulating exports from Russia of WMD-related materials, technologies and delivery systems, as well as conventional arms and materiel.

Similar activities, albeit not as sweeping, are currently up and running in the other "nuclear" republics, including Ukraine and Kazakhstan. As in Russia, they too are paying special attention to streamlining export licensing procedures in the field of military items and "dual purpose" goods. This is a topic of in-depth expert level consultations involving Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Concerted effort in this field could become a central area of cooperation between the republics in the domains of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

At an interstate level, however, complex problems still remain. Settling the political and legal aspects of the ownership of nuclear weapons of the former USSR is the main problem. It is common knowledge that the Alma-Ata Resolution signed by the CIS countries identifies Russia as the sole nuclear state successor to the former USSR, and it obligates Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear countries. It was in this same spirit that the aforementioned three republics and Russia drafted and signed the protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I). Belarus and Kazakhstan have
already complied with those requirements by simultaneously ratifying START-I.

Ukraine's current position causes the gravest concern for Russia and other members of the international community. It is a shame that the Ukrainian Rada is delaying the ratification process. The Ukrainian authorities, while preaching their adherence to Ukraine's obligations as an allegedly non-nuclear and neutral state, are also taking steps regarded at the international level as a potential threat to the non-proliferation regime. In particular, Kiev has undertaken a number of measures to place nuclear arms deployed on Ukrainian soil under its administrative jurisdiction. Obstacles are being erected in the way of Russian experts seeking to conduct operational and technical maintenance of strategic systems; this reduces their reliability and increases the potential for adverse effects. The nuclear topic is a key subject of current Russia-Ukraine military talks. A solution to the problem could largely determine future development of military and political relations between the two states and thereby effect the stability of the CIS and the "near abroad" as a whole.

Russia must become the sole nuclear nation in the territory of the former USSR and accordingly enjoy title to its nuclear weapons. Russia's president and the top echelons of Russia's military command have stated time and again that they are open to mutually acceptable solutions to such questions as remuneration for nuclear arms withdrawn from Ukrainian soil. Jointly with other nuclear nations, Russia is prepared to consider providing adequate guarantees for Ukraine's security. Nonetheless, Russia does not wish to always remain a nuclear nation. We favor the elimination of all nuclear stockpiles of all nuclear states.

Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference scheduled for 1995 underscores the importance of speedily finding an acceptable solution to the problem of the nuclear status of former states of the USSR. Resolving the nuclear legacy of the former USSR would be a
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major contribution to the international non-proliferation regime which Russia and its "near abroad" counterparts unambiguously support.

Coordinating the imposition of controls over the sale and transfer of conventional weapons is another promising area of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova and, for that matter, all other former constituent republics of the USSR. The principal task lies in making national export practices compatible with international principles and standards while accounting for the economic and commercial interests of the newly sovereign nations. Another task is establishing a regional conventional weapons export control system whose institutions could eventually be brought under broader European and international mechanisms.

Crisis Management and Peacekeeping

Crisis management and peacekeeping emerge as the most important aspects of military and political cooperation between Russia and the "near abroad." A detailed exploration of conceptual and practical issues is currently under way at different levels: within states themselves, on a bilateral basis and within the CIS. In this connection, a rather broad consensus was reached to the effect that joint preparation for peacekeeping activities should focus on both the tasks of neutralizing conflicts and on participation in international peacekeeping endeavors under the United Nations (UN) and CSCE. Expert level consultations are regularly held involving CIS members that focus on the future and dwell upon problems such as the effective interaction with various Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms (NATO/NACC, the European Community (EC) and WEU) in the field of implementing UN and CSCE peacemaking mandates. Within the CIS, work is
continuously under way to establish a legal basis and refine procedures for coordinating efforts in peacemaking.

With the exception of Turkmenistan, all of the Commonwealth States have signed a dedicated agreement on use of joint forces to preserve peace in the CIS (Ukraine, in affixing its signature, has stipulated that any decision on its participation in peacemaking forces will be made by its parliament). In addition, several protocols have been signed defining the status of such forces, their structure and manning principles, as well as standards of materiel, technical and financial support. Today the main goal is to implement those agreements.

In terms of the conduct of joint peacekeeping operations in the "near abroad," the initial experience has been positive. For example, Russia, in cooperation with a number of CIS central Asian republics, currently conducts a peacekeeping mission in Tajikistan.

One of the most important issues is ensuring the active involvement of Ukraine and Belarus in anti-crisis activities in the "near-abroad." Those republics have sound material and military capabilities in the area of peacekeeping that unfortunately have not yet been fully tapped. In Kiev and Minsk alike, work is under way to identify principal guidelines for the two nations’ possible involvement in the emerging CIS collective security system. The degree of involvement that they decide upon will in the long run establish the parameters of their future involvement in conflict prevention in the CIS and the "near abroad." Fortunately, there are positive indications from both republics signaling that their leadership and influential political quarters tend to increasingly favor more active involvement of those states in crisis management within the post-Soviet space. Russia, which has been carrying the weight of peacekeeping in the region virtually alone, would welcome such developments.

This general overview of principal areas of further cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European
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republics of the former USSR in the field of security cannot take into account all the complexities of today's dire transitional period in the CIS and the "near abroad." What is most important, though, is that multi-faceted military and political ties with those countries are increasing and are based on the most solid of foundations—that of common strategic interests in ensuring security and stability throughout the vast expanses of the former Soviet Union and Eurasia at large.

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IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT FOUR CRUCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN RELATIONS between the nations of greater Europe and the Atlantic region have occurred in recent years:

- Cessation of the ideological divide between East and West.
- Disintegration of the Soviet Union.
- Appearance of a new momentum for the further unification of Europe.
- Creation of new security challenges to the political systems of Europe, caused by the outcome of the first two transformations above.

These fundamental shifts in the balance of power have provoked a thorough re-evaluation of the concept of international security. Some champions of this new security concept speak about a broad "new security area" that covers both the North Atlantic and the formerly Soviet-dominated Eurasian region. Should this "new security area" become a reality, it faces complicated problems in ensuring its stability and security. One principal problem is that although Western-type democracy is the main goal in rebuilding statehood in almost all Eastern countries (almost half of the so-called new security area), there is no mechanism to provide fundamental and essential security assurances. The issue is exacerbated by the diverse stability levels in this part of the Northern Hemisphere, which is referred to—perhaps too loosely—as a "community of common values."
These events continue to shape Ukraine's international environment and influence its approach toward creating favorable national security conditions.

The Ukrainian View of Security Challenges

Ukraine currently faces new security challenges created, in part, by the mere fact of its emergence as an independent state. The main problem was, and still is, that Ukraine appeared as a state without having developed the major institutions and elements of an independent state. This was the case in terms of political, military, and economic structures as well.

Probably the most vivid example of this is the structure of its armed forces. Ukraine did not have its own armed forces like most other states of the world. What it did have were the huge remnants of the Soviet army on Ukrainian territory and the third largest nuclear potential in the world. It also had a tremendous fortune invested in the military industrial complex infrastructure of the former Soviet Union, an infrastructure capable of producing the most sophisticated weapons of our time. All these capabilities, nonetheless, presented Ukraine with significant challenges in terms of ensuring its national security. National security, after all, is a multidimensional concept covering military, political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian dimensions. Together, these dimensions of national security are designed to provide relevant guarantees for the security of the individual, the people as a whole, and the nation. This broad, comprehensive perspective serves as the basis for a long-term approach to creating an appropriate national security environment for Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces

An armed force is one of the pillars on which any nation must build its national security. The problem for Ukraine is that its armed forces were inherited from the former Soviet Union. So from the very beginning, it was essential for Ukraine to put this very powerful and potentially dangerous force into a legal framework. One of the very first decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament was to create a legal framework for the existence of an armed forces and put the whole of the inherited Soviet army under Ukrainian control. In two months, Parliament prepared a package of laws and legislative acts concerning the functioning of the Ukrainian Army so that by the end of October 1991, Ukraine, alone among the countries of the future Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), had a legislative basis for its own armed forces.

Compared to the situation in Ukraine, the rest of the Soviet army was in a very unstable situation at the end of 1991. The dying Soviet Union was terminally shaken by the August coup, which included several military accomplices. The Soviet army was effectively without leadership and under no political control whatsoever. Russian leaders claimed that the Soviet army, both on the territory of the Russian Federation and on the territory of other CIS states, was under strict control of the CIS, but this was untrue. Some army leaders even said that they had no master and that the situation was very dangerous.

Some experts believe that Russia committed a serious mistake by not putting the armed forces under strict civilian control immediately. Moscow may have been calculating that the whole of the former Soviet army would ultimately come under its control; but that was not to be the case. As a result, it was not until the beginning of May 1992 that Moscow actually placed the army in Russia under political control. So, except for Ukraine, between August 1991 and May 1992, the armed forces of the former Soviet Union were relatively
independent and represented a strong source of political tension.

One of the first agreements among the CIS leaders was that Ukraine should have its own armed forces. Thus, one of the greatest potential challenges to Ukraine's national security was removed, not only enhancing internal political stability, but also strengthening stability across the European region of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

One issue which still hinders the achievement of a final and lasting disposition of the Soviet armed forces problem is the Black Sea Fleet. Attempts to resolve the fleet's ownership status have thus far been unsuccessful. Here we face, if not a serious threat to Ukraine's national security, then at least the creation of political tension between the two biggest ex-USSR states—an issue that needs resolution.

Today, Ukraine's armed forces are undergoing fundamental structural and ideological reformation. They are being reorganized and re-oriented away from politicization and toward the ethos of a professional military capable of defending the nation. At the same time, the Ukrainian army is addressing the social problems stemming from the necessity of making large reductions in its officer and soldier populations. In a turbulent economy, such large-scale force reductions are expected to pose serious social challenges.

Related to restructuring is the adoption of a new national military doctrine. The process is under way; however, it is not without controversy. There have been two attempts since late 1992 to get a new doctrine approved by Parliament, but neither has succeeded—the major point of contention being the controversy over the retention of nuclear weapons. There are some political forces within Parliament who do not want a doctrine without a nuclear component. Others in Parliament want a doctrine that clearly identifies Ukraine's potential threats. The debate continues as proponents of different positions work toward a compromise.
Cooperative Bilateral Relations

The second pillar of Ukraine’s national security is cooperative bilateral relations with its neighbors in both military and military-political fields. Ukraine intends to establish active, widespread military and political ties with neighboring countries as well as other countries of the world. The reasons for such an approach are obvious: good relations with Ukraine’s neighbors mean a healthy security environment for its state. Therefore, it has concluded bilateral treaties in military and military-political fields with all of its neighbors except Russia. Yet, some initiatives have been included in the proposal for a new Ukraine-Russia bilateral treaty, on which work has just begun. This new treaty between Ukraine and Russia will be a significant improvement over the one concluded at the end of 1991.

Regional and Sub-regional Security Systems

The third pillar of Ukraine’s national security strategy is its participation in regional and sub-regional systems of security. It is impossible to assure Ukraine’s national security without cooperation from the rest of Europe. Due to parliamentary limits on participation in military blocs, Ukraine will cooperate with security institutions without formal membership. Its approach to collective security will rest on its evolving national interests and the practical limitations of a country in the throes of economic and political transition.

The new challenges facing Europe highlight the fact that the creation of a reliable all-European security system is one of the most topical issues of international life. Ukraine is paying special attention to these political discussions because the present situation on the continent clearly requires a thorough review of outdated approaches and a search for new, non-typical solutions.
The disappearance of such geopolitical entities as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR have created a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. In some areas, political instability has resulted in inter-ethnic conflicts, presenting serious threats to peace and stability for all of Europe. With profound concern, Ukraine is observing events in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, paying special attention to the serious situation in Moldova because of its proximity to Ukraine's southwestern border.

In spite of these harsh realities, Ukraine is heartened by some of the positive results which have already been achieved. One of the brightest examples is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Ukraine welcomed the creation of this new international structure and is actively participating in all its various forums. NACC signified an important step in the process of both redefining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the future and for coming closer to the creation of mechanisms for a new security system. Ukraine believes NACC fills an urgent need in Europe in the areas of security and stability. Its experience with NACC during the short period of its existence, especially in implementing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and in addressing the issue of peacekeeping, has clearly shown NACC's great potential. Ukraine supports the concept of using selected NATO assets in peacekeeping activities under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the United Nations (UN) to further the cause of peace in Europe.

A particular advantage of NACC's involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution is that it can become a practical link to military and political cooperation within the NATO framework. In addition, the experience NATO itself is gaining in peacekeeping cannot be overlooked when considering candidates for future peacekeeping operations. Perhaps the NATO foreign ministers' decision of 17 December 1992 concerning the Alliance's ability to support peacekeeping
operations and corresponding NACC peacekeeping activities will become the rudiments of a future all-European security system.

On the other hand, NACC represents only a partial answer to the crucial problems of European security. Although NACC plays a vital role, it remains only a forum in overall security relations in Europe—a process of consultation and cooperation. It is time to ask some direct questions about its future. Of special note, the NACC region includes some potential trouble spots that pose serious challenges for the future of NACC. If the North Atlantic Cooperation Council can be effectively used to avoid crises in these areas, it will show real strength in a new cooperative approach to security.

From a broader perspective, NACC must also contribute to stability without prejudice to the competence or mechanisms of CSCE. An important aspect of the evolution of both organizations is to work toward institutional complementarity and avoid duplication in activities. Greater interaction between NACC and CSCE could lead to situations wherein NACC becomes the means for implementation of CSCE mandates. This would strengthen CSCE's role and exploit NACC's greater flexibility and access to NATO expertise. Eventually, as stability improves, NACC may lose its raison d'être and dissolve into other European security structures. But for now, it helps fill the security vacuum in Eastern Europe as well as support specific needs of both Alliance members and their "cooperation partners."

In recent times, CSCE has moved encouragingly in the direction of addressing regional conflicts in Europe. Still, its limited effectiveness and slow progress impedes it from achieving serious results in this sphere today. Invigorating CSCE could become one of the principal objectives of a CSCE/NACC joint endeavor.

Another joint undertaking might be to define mutually-agreed identities for NACC and the CSCE in the new political circumstances, though they may remain vague for some time.
Taking into account their nearly common goals but widely varying potentials, it is possible to enhance stability and security across the continent. Perhaps yet another collaborative NACC/CSCE initiative should be the development of a common Euro-Atlantic approach to challenges in the outside world, many of which will soon directly impact their collective memberships. Based on its thorough assessment of the future NACC/CSCE relationship, Ukraine supports the continued reorganization of the CSCE into a more formal and more effective international organization. Together with a more fully developed NACC, the CSCE can provide a very solid framework for a future all-European security system.

Ukraine believes the future of security on the continent lies in the transformation of both traditional and new institutions—CSCE, NATO, NACC, the Western European Union (WEU)—into an overall, comprehensive security system for greater Europe, including all the countries in the space between Vancouver and Vladivostok. Certainly, an essential element of such a system is the active participation of both the United States and Russia. It is of great political importance to emphasize the role of the United States in any all-European security system. The U.S. is inherently part of European history, European affairs and European security. U.S. involvement in European affairs during two world wars, and especially during the Cold War, leave no doubt that the linkage is permanent. The real question today is whether the U.S. is ready to accept the new European realities and to think of its role in somewhat less global terms. To put it more directly, the future challenges to regional security are ones that every country in the Atlantic region, embracing both North America and greater Europe, must consider as vital to its national interests. Therefore we must seek a new role for the U.S. in Europe.

The same approach should be extended to the role of the Russian Federation. Today, events in Russia are observed with special attention, and for Ukraine, Russian perspectives are of
greatest importance. It is hoped that Russia will proceed vigorously with democratic reforms, adhere strictly to democratic principles in international conduct, and eliminate any tendencies to dominate the newly independent countries.

As for a future European security architecture, the situation is very complex, and, realistically, Europe is still very far away from a truly effective security structure. But what can be done right now in order to meet the challenges of the times in terms of regional and national security? Beginning with the assumption that the security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe contributes to latent military and political instability, one should note that the Western system of collective security proved stable for over 40 years. Since, even theoretically, there can be no coexistence of stability and instability, one of the biggest challenges for Europe as a whole is instability in Eastern Europe. As Dr. Frank Elbe of the German Foreign Office used to say, "In the long run Western Europe will not continue to be well off if Eastern Europe continues to be badly off."

New approaches should be considered which complement efforts already underway. Ukraine favors providing a level of security reassurance for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The obvious reality is, however, that all-European security can be reached only by establishing regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe and by creating an organic linkage with Western European security structures. Both internal and cross-regional strategies should embrace the full spectrum of political, economic and military factors and afford opportunities for timely political dialogue and early conflict prevention.

Finally, regional security initiatives should further general transformations in Europe, avoid a new division of the continent and create opportunities for integrating a united Europe into global affairs. Any efforts of the Central and Eastern European countries should be paralleled by efforts of the integrated part of Europe to extend the zone of stability
across the Continent. The West, for example, could assist by: reducing the disparity between economically backward and economically developed regions, forming a common value system, assisting in the formation of new democracies, accelerating West European integration, and expanding interaction in the field of security.

For their part, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe should unite in their efforts to respond to vital economic, political and security challenges. One possibility is to structure cooperation on security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe encompassing all countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea zone. Such a zone of stability and security would be a reliable link between Western Europe and Russia in developing a broader trans-Atlantic security system. Implementing the principle of achieving "one's own security through security for all" and putting it into a broader European context could become a major theme for establishing such a zone of stability and security. Ukraine favors proposals to create a mechanism for constant consultations among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Frequent, even routine, interaction can provide the basis for satisfying each country's own needs in terms of its national security.

Some countries have asked for membership in the NATO Alliance. However, the Alliance has not indicated a willingness to enlarge its "zone of responsibility" or consider the question of expanding NATO membership, leaving Ukraine and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe—all of which inherited the same problems—feeling less than comfortable in terms of security. Following the disbanding of the former Warsaw Pact and a short period of euphoria, the West is reluctant to embrace Central and Eastern Europe even in the economic field. So, still dependent on one another, they need to work together. Unless all the countries of this part of Europe consult together on issues of state borders, territorial integrity and the realization of the rights of national minorities,
there will be no peace in Europe as a whole. The case of Yugoslavia is a terrible reminder of the cost of failure.

It as absolutely necessary for the countries of this region to set up a mechanism of constant consultations, even without any costly, elaborate organizational mechanism. Russia may be concerned if it perceives its neighbors creating such a mechanism. Therefore, such consultations must not isolate any country, and they should be clearly transparent. Properly conducted, such consultations can facilitate the process of building a New Europe, one which is more stable and more secure. This must be a common goal. Moreover, once a Baltic-Black Sea zone is appropriately organized, it can become one of the building blocks of the future system of European security and a reliable bridge between Russia and Western Europe.

International Nuclear Security Guarantees

The fourth and final pillar of Ukraine’s national security strategy is the system of national security guarantees provided by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the nuclear powers. The process of developing those guarantees was started over a year ago, in April, 1992; however, the initial responses were, unfortunately, not very positive. From the beginning, the idea of UN nuclear guarantees for Ukraine was rejected, and only after considerable discussion did the United States and Great Britain, and later Russia and France, begin to talk about national security guarantees. Those four states have made draft declarations, and China has expressed assurances of a general nature—but there is still a long way to go.

It is important to point out that Ukraine’s policy on nuclear matters is clear and consistent—it stands for general nuclear disarmament and totally rules out the threat or use of nuclear forces located on its territory as tools of Ukrainian foreign policy. Ukraine’s objective is to have relevant security
KHARCHENKO

guarantees. Therefore, it has decided to eventually give up its nuclear weapons but also to keep the right to block the possibility that these weapons could be deployed from its territory. As the process of dismantlement and destruction of nuclear weapons is both an expensive and lengthy process, Ukraine supports international assistance for this undertaking, including economic compensation. Ukraine has never officially renounced the possibility of becoming a nuclear-free country.

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The Baltic Security Dilemma: How to Secure Independence

Atis Lejins

The Baltic states gained their independence after the collapse of the Imperial German and Russian Czarist empires at the close of World War I. They lost their independence at the outbreak of World War II as a direct result of an understanding between Stalin and Hitler in a deal called the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (August 23, 1939). Though never recognized by the Western democracies as legally part of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were written off as lost forever in an empire that it was assumed would last forever. The Balts were acknowledged again by the West as independent states only after Russia granted recognition on August 24, 1991 in the confusion and chaos immediately following the failed coup. But by then the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was almost a fact. Thus history shows that empires will not tolerate Baltic independence, and it is only when a power vacuum arises as a result of the collapse of great powers that the Balts have the opportunity to determine their own affairs.

Today, however, history does not have to repeat itself. All three Baltic capitals have made the strategic choice of becoming members of the European Community (EC), a membership which affords reasonable opportunities for small states. Symbolically, the admission of Lithuania and Estonia as full members of the Council of Europe (CE) at its 44th Parliamentary Assembly's session in May 1993 is an important milestone on the road to membership in the EC or, eventually, the European Union. Latvia is scheduled to be admitted at the Fall 1993 session of the CE after it holds the first free post-
Soviet elections in June (Estonia and Lithuania had their first free elections in September and October 1992.) Entry into the EC will be a long process that, even if successful, might not provide the Baltics with the "hard" security guarantees they seek to ensure the "irreversibility of restored independence."

Baltic security concerns need to be addressed immediately. It must be clearly stated that the Baltics see the greatest threat to their security emanating from Moscow. Analysis of present Baltic-Russian relations shows that this mistrust is not just historically conditioned, but it is grounded in the present foreign policy of the Russian Federation. A brief overview of Russia’s policy toward the Baltic states is necessary in order to understand the Baltic search—some would call it a desperate search—for security guarantees from the Western democracies.

**Latvian-Russian Relations**

Although the focus of this paper is Latvia, general Baltic-Russian relations will be marked by tension for a long time. It appears that political forces calling for the welfare of people to be Russia’s top priority are not determining Russian foreign policy, at least not toward the so-called "near abroad" (a term which in itself has imperialistic overtones). Tension persists because those currently molding Russian foreign policy cannot quite reconcile themselves with the new reality—the Baltics as truly independent states.

Russia published its official foreign policy in *Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik* in February 1993. It stated that Russia seeks good relations with the Baltic states. This was followed, however, by the assertion that Russia needs to retain strategic sites in the region and has to defend the rights of Russians in the Baltics.

During talks on Russian troop withdrawal from Latvia in May 1993, Russia proposed that the Skrunda early warning site be left until year 2003, the Liepaja naval base until 1999, and
the electronics listening station in Ventspils until 1997. It is quite clear that there is no justification for these "strategic" sites in post-Cold War Europe unless it is to maintain them on a permanent basis. Such military pressure against a small state has no place in the new European security architecture and should be viewed as a litmus test for Russia's intentions toward Europe in general.

Baltic analysts consider that the Russian policy toward the Baltic states is based on the old Roman dictum of "divide and rule"—where the Lithuanians are the "good guys," and the Estonians and Latvians the "bad guys." Of the latter, the "more bad" of the two is the Latvians. It is not clear whether the Baltics will succumb to this strategy—compounded in difficulty by the obvious "indigenous" problems of three different states trying to coordinate defense and foreign policies. It is clear, however, that the Lithuanian agreement with Russia on a troop withdrawal deadline has broken Baltic solidarity on this paramount question from a position of "three on one," to that of three separate "one on one" talks.

A serious challenge to Latvia's security was posed by the human rights campaign initiated by Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry against the Baltic states in the UN and the Council of Europe. In October 1992, Yeltsin called upon the UN to investigate alleged human rights violations in Latvia after the Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, issued an invitation to investigate the General Assembly on September 25. The UN team found no fault with Latvia or Estonia. The UN missions to both Baltic states were able to check Russian attempts to condemn them at the 49th UN Human Rights Commission session in February 1993. The two countries proposed a resolution pointing to "problems caused by colonization in Estonia and Latvia" (after 50 years of occupation, Latvians are down to 52 percent of the total population, Estonians 63 percent). A compromise was reached with a resolution containing the following wording: "problems caused by massive population shifts" (in Estonia and
Latvia). Nevertheless, a Human Rights Committee under the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow claims it has gathered 100,000 signatures protesting human rights violations in Latvia, and that they will be presented to the UN and to European forums such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

Russia's unsuccessful attempt to block the admission of Estonia to the Council of Europe (CE) was preceded by another tug of war between the Baltic states and Russia over the issue of human rights. At the CE Parliamentary Assembly's (CEPA) session in September 1992, the Russian delegation accused the Baltic states of human rights violations on ten different occasions. At the next session of the CEPA (February 1993), the Balts and their allies managed to pass 29 favorable amendments to the "Report on Population Movements Between the Republics of the Former USSR."

Andrejs Pantetejevs, Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council's Human Rights and Minorities Committee, speaking on Latvian television about Estonia's and Lithuania's admission to the CE, commented that this might help the democrats win in Russia. He emphasized that it should be a message to Yeltsin to stop flirting with the Right: a clear line was drawn on just how far Russia could go in its human rights campaign against the Baltic states.

The question now is what will Russia do when Latvia's turn comes up in the CE's September session. Will Russia finally except the "loss" of the Baltic states (for the first time all three Baltic states will be part of an international organization where Russia is not a member) or will it try to destabilize the situation in Latvia during the summer in order to compromise Latvia's admittance? The latter is a possibility since the human rights card has been used often, and Yeltsin might continue to curry the Right by bashing the Balts. The tragedy, of course, in the Baltic-Yeltsin relationship is that he is using (or allowing) Russia to carry out the same type of smear campaign against the Balts—for the most part Estonians
and Latvians—that Gorbachev and the USSR carried out against him in order to tarnish his image in the West and hurt his position in Russia. Yeltsin and Russia, after all, were allies of the Balts in their common struggle against the Empire.

What strategy has Russia followed in its policy toward the Baltic states? Is there a blueprint that explains its actions? An answer may be found in the speech given by Dr. Karaganov, deputy director of the European Institute, at a seminar held by the Russian Foreign Ministry in October 1992 that was devoted to examining Russia’s strategy toward the "near abroad." The title of Dr. Karaganov’s paper was "How Can Russia Defend the Interests of That Section of the Population in the 'Near Abroad' that is Oriented Toward Russia?" The title itself reveals his Russian foreign policy strategy—Russia must protect not only Russians, Jews, Ukrainians, etc., but also the indigenous populations of the independent states such as Balts who look to the East and not to the West. And certainly, there are such Balts.

Of three possible strategies—full restoration of the Empire, unequivocal support of the former parts of the Empire that now are independent states, and partial restoration of the Empire—Dr. Karaganov advocates the latter. He identifies the first two options as either undesirable or not viable and recommends the following:

- Russians should not be allowed to return to Russia from the other parts of the Empire. They must stay in the independent states because Russia can fulfill its foreign policy objectives through them.
- An expansive investment program in the former Soviet republics should be implemented in order to create Russian economic and political enclaves in the new states.
- The Russian language should be promoted in schools and on TV. The elite of the new states must continue to receive higher education in Russian, and the new officer class must be trained in Russian.
Mr. Karaganov has some specific ideas about the Baltic states. He advocates that the "zero" option be forced upon Estonia and Latvia. This means all non-citizens should be granted immediate citizenship without any conditions because this would enhance Russia's influence in these two countries. He says that Russia ("we") should not shout loudly about throwing bombs, but at the same time should not doubt that it can use military force—if sanctioned internationally. In order to gain this support, two things must be done:

- European opinion must be appropriately influenced so that it acknowledges Russia's right to use force in the former USSR territory.

- The idea that Europe has two zones must be propagated—one where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can use force (including East Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia) with Russians as observers; the other, former parts of the USSR, where Russia has sole prerogative to use force but where the West may send observers.

Professor V. Sirotkin of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy expressed a similar bipolar view of Europe at the same seminar by advocating that Russia follow Great Britain's and De Gaulle's policies toward their former colonies: "De Gaulle gave freedom to the colonies, but after 30 years they are still on their knees in front of France." Mr. Sirotkin would like Russia to achieve similar results with states belonging to her "near abroad." Both academicians, whose careers have focused on the foreign policy of Czarist Russia, stress the need to not limit the propaganda war to only the Russian minority, but rather to include other minorities and concentrate on human rights. The proceedings of that seminar should be reread carefully because the ideas put forth there correspond to actions taken by the Russian government. With regard to Russia's possible use of force, Boris Yeltsin gave a speech on February 28, 1993 before the right-of-center Citizens Union (Grazdanskij Sojuz) where he stated that Russia would seek international support for its claim to be arbiter of peace.
and stability in the former territory of the USSR. Ukraine was the first country to protest, followed by Latvia.

In concluding this section, it is fitting to quote from a speech by the Polish Prime Minister, Madam Hanna Suchocka, delivered at the Lublin Catholic University in the fall of 1992.

The disclosure, by the Russian President, of the truth about the Soviet crimes perpetrated on the Polish people gives back to the Poles and the Russians a foundation of historical truth and allows the building of a new truth. I remember the toast raised in Warsaw by the Russian Prime Minister two weeks ago in which he praised the merits of Polish democratic opposition not for Poland, but for Russia. These are symbols which once and for all put an end to 300 years of the grim history of our states.6

Baltic leaders are eager to hear the same words from Boris Yeltsin and the Russian prime minister. Such words determine foreign policy and explain why relations between Poland and Russia are good.

NATO, WEU, CSCE and the Balts

The most important security organization presently for Latvia, indeed the Baltic states, is the CSCE for the sole reason that the Baltics enjoy membership status in the CSCE, but not in NATO or the Western European Union (WEU).

Latvia, together with Estonia and Lithuania, obtained CSCE support for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states as stated in the CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992. The CSCE is also the forum where Latvia can intervene with its grievances—as it did on March 3rd of this year, when the head of the Latvian delegation to the CSCE Forum in Vienna, Mr. A. Kesteris, expressed Latvia's fears that the "Russian military forces
located in the Baltic states could be provoked to commence uncontrollable activities."

Currently Latvia is promoting a Baltic regional table in the CSCE, whereby military activities around the Baltic Sea would be placed under CSCE control. The problem is: who will assume responsibility if a state decides to deviate from the consensus? Sweden, for example, has become hesitant after showing initial support. Unfortunately, the CSCE looks more and more like the League of Nations before the war. This is the crux of the security problem in the Baltics—who will give security guarantees to Baltic independence?

NATO and the WEU are apparently ready to support the Baltics politically. After his meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher on April 8, 1993, Latvia's Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs left with the understanding that the Clinton administration had departed from the previous administration's pro-Soviet stance with regard to Baltic independence and its pro-Russian stance on the Estonian and Latvian citizenship issue. The end document of the WEU meeting of foreign and defense ministers in Rome (May 1993), stated that Russian troop withdrawal must be unconditional. But it is very hard for analysts in Riga and the other Baltic capitals to know whether or not these political statements are being translated into action—is the West actually linking Yeltsin's economic aid to troop withdrawal from the Baltic states?

In addition, the roles of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the WEU Consultative Forum remain unclear. Are they way-stations for the Balts on the road to membership in NATO and the WEU, or are they educational institutions for former adversaries? Clearly for NATO, which was the first to establish an affiliate institution, NACC affords an opportunity to gain insight into what the former "enemy" is doing in the security area. On the other hand, NACC and perhaps the WEU Consultative Forum could be parts of a transition process in which Europe turns from a system of
alliances to a new common security order. In any event, the Balts are feeling frustrated. Probably because of this, the Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, Mr. A. Gorbunovs, proposed an interesting idea at the meeting of Central and East European Defense Ministers and their representatives in Riga on May 2-3, 1993. He proposed that the "have-nots" form a consultative group in NACC to influence the "haves" in NATO.

It must be stated clearly that NATO and the WEU have, to date, done nothing in concrete terms to rebuild the armed forces of the three small democratic states struggling from the aftershock of 50 years of occupation in the Baltics. These states had no ministries of defense during the occupation, no borders, no customs service. All this had to be built from scratch—even native military terminology had to be relearned since the language of the Empire's armed forces was Russian. Nobody rushed to help the Balts in this regard. Military aid from various Western countries is so modest that it can hardly be defined as such. Russia has refused to make compensation for arms and equipment taken from the Baltic national armies in 1940 while at the same time, the Baltics have had to face a virtual arms embargo on the part of the West. The Baltics obtained arms at great expense from Central European countries and it is these arms that have played a crucial role in keeping the peace in the Baltic region.

The Baltic states have a year-old military cooperation agreement, yet all three defense ministries are finding it very hard to implement because of a lack of modern equipment and financial resources. Joint military exercises, albeit on a very modest scale, were nevertheless held in Riga in May 1993, demonstrating that the will is there. (Earlier in the winter, the home guards of Latvia and Lithuania also held joint exercises on the borders of both countries.) In April 1993, the Northwestern Group of Russia's Armed Forces held staff exercises involving taking strategic sites in the Baltic states and securing them until the arrival of outside help. One
interesting result of these exercises was that the Russian military discovered it would take at least two days to take these sites—even on paper. Latvian armed forces have reached a sufficiently sophisticated level to offer some stiff resistance. Moreover, the ice has been broken. Israel has defied the arms embargo and is supplying Estonia with modern arms. The deal is worth $50 million and will be financed by Israel credits to Estonia. Latvia has also sent military teams to Israel and is weighing its options. The problem is one of cost—Israeli arms are about 25% more expensive than those from other countries. On the other hand, A. Butkevicius, the Lithuanian Defense Minister, announced that Lithuania will buy Russian arms.

In conclusion, Russia will not be likely to use force to convince the Baltics that they are in Russia’s "sphere of influence." Instead, they will use political and economic means, overtures of military guarantees, and various types of undercover "active measures," as the established pattern already shows.

Security guarantees from Russia are unacceptable—Western security guarantees have not appeared even on the horizon. The Baltic security dilemma is a riddle that must be solved: how can independence be secured without security guarantees?

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Notes

1. Finland and Denmark renewed recognition of Latvian independence on the same day; France, Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden on the 27th, and the United States on 2 September, just four days ahead of the USSR.

2. Opinion expressed also by the Estonian defense minister Hain Rebas at the meeting of Central and East European defense ministers in Riga, 3 May 1993.


6. "We Count on Understanding not Only Unity of Aims but also Unity of Interests." Address by Madam Hanna Suchocka, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland at the inauguration of the academic year at the Lublin Catholic University, 18 October 1992. "Materials and Documents," Bulletin, 1/91, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


8. Personal communication to author by a Latvian intelligence officer.

9. Ibid.
Part III

Dramatic Transitions in Central Europe
European Security Challenges and Systems: A View from East-Central Europe

Zoltan Szabo

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the bipolar world, a security structure that dated back nearly half a century has been dismantled. The danger of global war has decreased considerably and has almost disappeared. However, security in Eastern and Central Europe has not improved since these radical changes. Despite the fact that there is no longer a confrontation between the former East and West which carries the threat of global annihilation, new or revived dangers have emerged in the area. The sad reality is that the probability of spill-over from local conflicts into a war between states has grown in the last one or two years. The course of events has become more complex, more volatile and more unpredictable. The importance of each state's immediate geographic environment and the role of regional or local factors in security policy has increased.

Indeed, the notion of security itself has become more differentiated, comprising more and more non-military aspects. Today, conflicts arising from economic and social instability, from difficulties in transitioning to democracy and from the re-emergence of centuries-old national and ethnic disputes constitute the major threats to peace and security. These dangers are the reason that, despite the multitude of opportunities for dialogue and partnership between the countries of the former political "East" and "West," we still are far from a "Europe, whole and free." Europe is still not free from a number of dangers and threats, and its countries and regions are far from
becoming a single unit from the perspective of international security.

Security Challenges

The present European security picture can be described as concentric circles progressing from the stable nucleus of the countries of the European and Euro-Atlantic community to the most unstable periphery, the countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Many new security challenges have been thrust upon Europe by the disintegration of the two multinational states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. During this century, we have witnessed the breakup of several empires. However, not since medieval times have we experienced such large-scale territorial fragmentation anywhere in Europe.

In Eastern and Central Europe, the movement toward national self-determination has entered a new stage, one which promises to be extremely complex and sensitive from the standpoint of international security. The process highlights the frequent non-coincidence of borders of nations and of states, and the difference between these two concepts for the region. These movements have lead to the emergence of new states and, to a certain extent, to the drawing of a new political map of Eastern and Central Europe. The emergence of new states or the redefinition of states emphasizes even more the impact of ethnic minority problems in the region.

We can see instances where the right of self-determination promotes the return of political legitimacy, sovereignty and the abolition of artificial entities in international politics. But in some places, it also leads to destructive conflicts among nations and nationalities, especially where the principle is not implemented via true democracy or where ethnically mixed areas make simple, clear-cut territorial separation impossible.

Border changes may, in turn, create new minority groups. Therefore, it is important to ensure that self-determination is
implemented in ways which are always accompanied by guarantees of the rights of minorities. Any forceful change of the ethnic composition of a population, discrimination against them or forcible assimilation of ethnic groups is harmful to the respective local community and may cause eventual conflicts within or between states. The crises in the two disintegrating multiethnic states of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union demonstrate that the international community should be playing a greater role in dealing with local ethnic conflicts and the rights of minorities. Clashes between "majorities" and "minorities" demonstrate that respect for human and minority rights is not merely a legal or humanitarian question, but is also an integral part of collective international security.

In recognition of this fact, rights issues should be increasingly dealt with in the first basket—security questions—of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as in the third one, the problems of human rights. Greater Europe cannot remain passive when there are acute nationality problems in Central and Eastern Europe. The Balkans especially have to be "Europeanized," or Europe will be threatened with "Balkanization."

Prevention of conflict between national groups requires the creation of a statute for minorities, a European Charter of Ethnic Rights, to form the basis of coherent international protection. In such a protection mechanism, the High Commissioner for Minorities established in the framework of the CSCE at the Helsinki summit meeting last year could act to redress grievances and oppression at a pre-conflict level.

The Former Yugoslavia

Hungary has tried to not overestimate the Yugoslav problem—however, it is obvious that the war in the former Yugoslavia constitutes a continuing threat to Hungarian security, especially as fighting between Serbs and Croats gets closer to
Hungary’s borders. The conflict among southern Slav nations is not a new phenomenon, yet the past several months have seen the most bloody fighting on the entire continent since 1945. Despite the efforts of the European Community (EC), the CSCE and the United Nations (UN), the drama is continuing and progressing geographically from the western regions to the eastern and southeastern regions of the former Yugoslavia. The war has affected the neighboring countries most directly, including Hungary. Since its beginning in 1991, the war has meant frequent violations of Hungarian airspace and borders, and it has resulted in some 60,000 refugees—mostly ethnic Croats, but increasingly Muslims—in Hungary. The economic embargo imposed upon Yugoslavia by the United Nations has also resulted in serious economic losses—some half billion USD—for Hungary. Despite this fact, Hungary continues to support the sanctions approved by the UN Security Council.

Just a few years ago, Hungary and other one-time Communist countries across Central and Eastern Europe were source countries of immigration, i.e., "producing" refugees. Today Hungary has become a target country, facing immigrants from its eastern and southern neighbors and also, in increasing numbers, from Third World countries. The refugees and those seeking immigrant status are fleeing economic hardship, civil war and ethnic discrimination. But, at the same time, their flow constitutes an unprecedented challenge to the untested immigration policy and the fragile social balance of Central European countries and increases their economic burdens to a great extent.

Contrary to initial expectations, the majority of refugees have stayed longer in Hungary due to the continuing war and the threat of "ethnic cleansing." New waves of immigrants can be expected if conflicts break out anew in the zones of instability in the former Yugoslavia or in a host of trouble spots in the former Soviet Union. Additionally, there are places in Yugoslavia such as Kosovo and Vojvodina, two previously autonomous provinces of Serbia, where innocent and defenseless civilians belonging to
various minorities may become targets of new aggressions at any time.

The international community must commit itself to doing everything possible to maintain peace and to discourage both regular and irregular military units from starting violence in these ethnically mixed regions. It is becoming increasingly obvious that if the war escalated to Kosovo, the nature of the conflict would change fundamentally. It would involve outside powers for the first time and would perhaps even put NATO countries on opposing sides. Despite the encouraging news coming from the peace conference in Athens, it is important to stress that all measures should be used to keep the conflict within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Any eventual spill-over threatens Hungary as well as the larger international community. Besides the national security concerns of regional powers, the credibility of international organizations such as the UN, CSCE, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) is at stake, too.

Hungary is acutely interested in isolating and resolving armed conflicts and other sources of danger that have emerged close to its borders. Consequently, it warmly welcomes the fact that NATO has declared its readiness to widen its security scope (in compliance with UN sanctions and the peace efforts underway) by putting its capabilities, if requested, at the disposal of the international community. Fully supportive of this development, Hungary has approved the use of NATO’s AWACS aircraft in its airspace on behalf of the United Nations. We have also been rendering help to the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) to enable them to carry out their mission in Bosnia. Hungary has recently agreed to allow WEU customs boats to patrol the Danube if they are to be used as a supplement or reinforcement of the overland embargo already in force. Hungary’s cooperative attitude in fully complying with UN resolutions and its open support of the Vance-Owen peace efforts have provoked hostile reactions and open threats from some Serbian forces. These threats cannot be responsibly dismissed as empty propaganda.
slogans. It is hoped that the West and its other European partners understand and share Hungary's concerns.

Another security problem for Central European countries is the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the European region, the disintegration process has been relatively peaceful thus far, but disputes between some successor states about borders and over the division of common military inheritance carry the seeds of serious future conflicts. The danger of nuclear proliferation, the dissemination of nuclear know-how, as well as the fate of the sizeable conventional military force are matters of deep concern not only for its neighbors but also for the entire world. These trepidations are especially justified when considering the fragile foundations of democratic governments in most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and the open constitutional crisis and power struggles continuing in Russia.

The emergence of new states and new actors in international relations also presents new problems relative to national and ethnic issues. The effects of the creation and redefinition of states are most profound in countries like Hungary, which has "acquired" five new states as its neighbors in the past one and a half years: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Slovakia. Ethnic self-determination is a dominant and decisive political trend in Eastern Europe today. The prevailing atmosphere of nationalism in some areas is reducing the possibility of political dialogue and compromise and might further increase the danger of adventurism in future relations between nations and states.

Dealing with Challenges Collectively

However, there may be some hope for an opposite trend in the not too distant future. Hungary's experience with Slovenia and Ukraine confirms the tendency toward cooperation. Increased integration will originate from the confrontation of deep economic problems by individual nations, from the increasing awareness of the century-old interdependence among states and
peoples of the region, and also from the awareness of a shrinking world in the fields of communication and transportation. Perhaps in the future, organizations guided in their work by regional, continental or larger international cooperation will establish a greater commitment on behalf of the emerging new states.

Ethnic self-determination is a disintegrative force in the modern state, but the evolution into smaller political units may be complemented by a functional integration into larger economic units. Europe’s 20th century history proves that centripetal and centrifugal trends are not always exclusive and contradictory; they may complement or even reinforce each other. Redefined economic associations in the mid-term might accommodate political separation and self-rule along cultural or linguistic lines.

Common economic hardship among Central and East European states increases the need for new regional arrangements and new institutional frameworks in cooperation with existing Western organizations. It is in the interest of the West not only to foresee this possible trend, but also to encourage it as a stabilizing pattern for the whole continent. To ignore the reality of self-determination would be naïve; to neglect the exploration of new opportunities, foolish.

It is useful to review the various organizational initiatives of the Central European nations. The first of these is the Visegrad Group, established by Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic and Poland in February 1991. In an area which is generally characterized by a tendency to disintegrate, any effort to develop relations based on democratic values has a stabilizing effect. The countries of the Visegrad group have both historical and present-day similarities: 1) similar geo-strategic positions on the borderline of the stable and unstable halves of Europe; 2) similar achievements regarding the transformation of the previous political and economic system; and 3) similar problems when facing new security risks and when transforming their armies into a reasonable defense capability. All of these features might serve as a basis for useful cooperation in many fields, including a security policy. Hungary maintains this view despite the fact that
some partners have expressed skepticism concerning the group's future. Competition and rivalry are the appropriate strategies for getting closer to Western European or Euro-Atlantic organizations. National individualism will be counterproductive in the long run.

Among regional initiatives, the most recent example is the "Carpathian Euro-region." It is a cross-border cooperative framework comprised of countries and regions along the common frontiers of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. Romania's border regions were also invited to join, but Bucharest, regrettably, declined participation. While a good start, the Car-Euro region, and interregional cooperation in general, has a long way to go in East-Central Europe.

The Central European countries do not plan to form a closed bloc. Seeking a separate security identity in Central Europe could entail the risk of separating Hungary once again from the mainstream of European integration and trans-Atlantic cooperation, and it may result in a fragmentation into rivaling coalitions in the eastern part of the continent.

Hungary and the other Central European countries see the lasting solution to their security problems in their gradual integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic community. Full membership in the available security structures such as NATO and the WEU remains the long-term objective of Hungary. Before reaching that stage, however, Hungary aims to take full advantage of present opportunities emerging from regular contacts with NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE. This will help promote future convergence with European and North American nations in every field.

At the end of this century, following decades of artificial division, we face the challenge of creating a new unity on our continent. This unity is just as much in the interest of the "West" as of the "East" of Europe. What is at issue now is determining the conditions under which we are going to be able to find our common path in order to meet the requirements of the 21st century. Mutual accommodation presupposes receptivity on the
one side and the creation of appropriate, compatible internal conditions on the other. Due to the different levels of development within individual countries, significant national differences in interests and motivations can be perceived in this process. Both promoting and obstructing factors are present in significant numbers.

In assessing the future possibility of larger and deeper European cooperation, examining integral factors is very helpful. It is interesting to note that even Western Europe has gone through a turning point of this kind relatively recently. One of the pre-conditions of the common development of Western Europe was the fact that territorial debates were ended permanently following World War II. The hard core of this process was the settlement of the French-German dispute, which was heavily influenced in a positive way by American political pressure and economic assistance, and in a negative way by fear of the Soviets. Having said this, we can see that it was only in the 1950's that Western Europe could have created the foundations of its present level of horizontal integration by including West Germany into the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Only after this step could we rightfully claim that "Democracies do not fight each other."

Something similar should be carried out in Central and Eastern Europe as well. We have to be aware, however, that establishing a network of horizontal integration is not going to be easy in this region, since before building new structures, we will first have to demolish the old ones which proved to be wrong or artificial. It is also necessary to remember again that after World War II, not even Western European countries could solve their ethnic and national tensions and economic problems on their own. This implies that East-Central Europe rightfully expect support today from the West in this area as well.

Another significant factor promoting integration is the state of the internal development of a given society. Only societies based on similar/compatible values are able to live peacefully with their neighbors. This requirement was reached in several
phases by Western European societies, and the process was completed only in the mid-seventies, with the defeat of the dictatorships on the Iberian peninsula and the abolishment of the extreme right in Greece. The other Western European countries promoted this process by effective political and economic means.

As change takes place in their political systems, Central and Eastern European nations can promote democratic reformation in other regional states, too. The countries of Central Europe are confident that it is in the interest of the Western nations to assist these new democracies in their consolidation process and in the projection of stability into the region. We cannot overcome new risks and challenges with yesterday's formulas and recipes. Firm and joint actions are needed in crisis prevention and resolution: in issues of arms control and non-proliferation; in peacekeeping; and, if necessary, in peace enforcement. In this respect, the existing institutions and mechanisms of the CSCE, the broadest security framework on the European continent, should be exploited to a fuller extent.

No organization and no major power can meet the challenges our continent is facing by itself. A new security fabric is desperately needed which is based on a division of labor and on a geographic or functional sharing of tasks between available structures such as NATO, the EC/WEU and the CSCE. Without a greater commitment by the major democratic nations to this process, there is no hope for efficient crisis management in the Balkans or elsewhere. And without that, the peoples living in that area will not believe in Western political will or its capability to create a new political order and a shared stability on the European continent. It is no surprise that when many people under such conditions hear phrases like "the new architecture of European security," they do not listen with interest any more—but with an increasingly bitter smile.
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A View of Central and East European Security from Warsaw

Henryk Szlajfer

Need for Strategy or the End of the Honeymoon?

When policymakers find no time to think in strategic perspectives, substitutes for such thinking appear. Often, what we regard as consensus behind a country’s security policy or foreign policy is in reality political domination by one or another party, or simply the inertia of bureaucratic systems. It is only in particularly favorable circumstances where such passivity does not immediately bring about negative effects. Such were the circumstances in Poland during the first four years of her democratic revolution. During that period, a very narrow group of leaders coped with problems more or less intuitively, determining main avenues of action without building wider political support for their decisions.

That honeymoon—which was procedurally easy, but which nevertheless constituted an extraordinary challenge requiring great political intuition—is over. It is now important to think in terms of strategic alternatives and different time-horizons and to provide a procedural framework for the participation of the public and the leading actors of the internal political scene. The first steps in this direction have already been taken.
National Defense: Suicide by Neglect?

In relation to Poland's security, an indifference has arisen regarding the financial requirements for military security, i.e., for the armed forces and the defense industry. Figures show a trend of continually decreasing military expenditures. In 1986, military spending made up 3.2 percent of the GDP, but in 1992 it was only 1.8 percent. In real terms, during the years 1986-92, the value of military expenditures declined by 54.3 percent. From 1989-91, armaments production declined by more than 70 percent, and its share of the total industrial output fell from 3 to 1.1 percent. According to some estimates, in 1989 as many as 0.5 million people were employed directly in armaments production. Today, a mere 0.2 million are. The relative weakness and inactivity of the parliamentary commissions responsible for military affairs demonstrate the poor bargaining power of the "complex" (and, in point of fact, the weak appeal of security problems in general). By way of further explanation, the spontaneous cut in security and defense spending was a reaction to the communists' inflated security and defense expenditures and a reaction to the even more inflated growth of the defense industry. However, the fundamental change in Poland's security environment is the key. Had the security environment really threatened Poland's interests directly in the past four years, then, post-communist or not, the army would have obtained whatever it wanted.

Poland's Security Environment: Happy Land?

From the point of view of Gorbachev and many leading Western politicians, the lifting of the Soviet veto of democratic transformations in Central Europe in no way meant that Soviet control would be replaced by a vacuum. Quite the contrary: control was to be replaced by influence, and Central Europe
would continue to be recognized as the sphere of legitimate Soviet security interests."

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought about by internal forces, was the factor which not only saved the young, emerging democracies in Central Europe from strong Soviet pressure, but which also fundamentally reversed the basic security equation in Europe. The democratic revolutions in Central Europe, including the pioneer revolution in Poland, were only "the beginning of the beginning." The actual history of the collapse of the bipolar Yalta system began the moment the Soviet Union disintegrated. In this sense, Jacob W. Kipp is right when he ranks the year 1991 among such dates as 1789, 1815, 1919 and 1945.

Poland appreciated the cardinal significance to the new European order of national revolutions in the western parts of the U.S.S.R. not in 1991, but as early as 1989. In Poland's diplomatic and political activities, this was expressed in the so-called double-track approach to the U.S.S.R. and to the semi-sovereign republics which has been intensely pursued since 1990. Both the experiences of the past as well as political analysis indicated that democracy in Russia was possible only on the condition that the Soviet Union's imperial dimension be questioned. It was imperialism that for centuries had determined the political and military behavior of the Russian elites and corrupted the consciousness of the Russian majority. It was in the choking atmosphere of the "imperial glory" that the Pamyat' members as well as the majority of reformers, Russian democrats, grew and developed.

The security environment in which Poland is presently living provides a chance for us and for Europe as a whole. The risk taken in the years 1989-91 has paid off. Poland's eastern border is not a "border in fire." Despite grudges, historical wrongs, a difficult history and still persisting bias, no chain of hatred has been built along this border. This holds particularly true with regard to Polish relations with Ukraine.
From the perspective of Warsaw, it is clear that the new European order will last only if the ominous alternative of "either Moscow or Kiev" is discarded. This means that both East and West should re-adopt linkage politics and not discriminate against non-Russians in order to achieve short-term gains. Here is the place to pursue the policy of principles, to pursue a constructive establishment of the right to self-determination and state sovereignty. If there is any priority east of the Bug river, it is certainly not to give field to a neo-imperial Russian maneuver on the territory that Russian reformers(?!?) call "near abroad." Once they gain such a field for maneuver, this will mean the relapse into a new cold war—without the ideological justification of the previous cold wars, but it will be no less vicious even so.

Because the West won the ideological war of the 20th century at a relatively low cost, it is easy to forget the basics. It is particularly easy to forget what processes, what moves and what "actors" ensured this victory and continue to guarantee its lasting character. Therefore, one must never stop reminding the world that it was not the West, and not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), who peacefully drove the Russian war machine hundreds of kilometers away from Central Europe. This "miracle" was done by the people living "near abroad." Making this "miracle" last now depends on the preservation of the sovereignty of the newly-independent states.

A Russia that is distanced from Poland, no direct danger on the eastern border and peace on the southern and western borders—these are only some of the elements of Poland's present security environment. Poland has indeed become a happy land; or has she?

Central European Space in One Eurasian Context

One of the most deeply rooted myths produced by the bipolar world of Yalta is the concept of one Eurasian space from
Vladivostok to Vancouver. From the geopolitical point of view, the distinguishing feature of this space is the fact that it was created as a result of a simplistic merging of the Euro-Atlantic community with the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, cemented by the confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Since 1991, however, the political-territorial dimension of the Eurasian space has been a fiction. Desperate moves such as a generous extension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the recently born North Atlantic cooperation Council (NACC) to Dushanbe and Alma-Ata change nothing.

It is important to touch upon this problem for one reason only. Without emphasizing the outdated character of the concept of the Eurasian space as the reference point in discussions on the new security environment and security structures, it is impossible to give any meaning to the concept of Central European space. The Eurasian space was maintained as a coherent political and military whole not just by the U.S.-Soviet confrontation alone. Its reality was also a result of the political and military weakness of the leading Asian states (China and Japan) and of Western Europe.

All these conditions have undergone, or are undergoing change. All the same, it would be excessively optimistic to say that the crumbling "old" Eurasian space has been cemented according to new rules as effectively and swiftly as was the space now receding into the past. There have appeared certain discontinuities, "empty spaces," new poles of political and economic attractiveness. In North America, Western and Central Europe and in a part of the former U.S.S.R.'s European territory, "democracy and human rights" have become a battle cry; while in the remaining large part of the Eurasian space, these notions have become somewhat differently defined in the context of a wider socioeconomic and political matrix. In a nutshell, it is not clear whether in that area either a "soft path to democracy" or a "path to soft democracy"13 is a viable solution.

Russia will find itself at the intersection of these two decisively different parts of the Eurasian space. One does not
have to cite the famous poem by Aleksandr Blok, "Scythians," to perceive that the struggle for the Russian political, psychological and cultural identity will go on for decades, if not longer. Also, it would be naive to think that the new Russia, whose birth has been so painful, will ever turn its back on Asia. Russia will remain a transcontinental power. What are the consequences of this fact? Edward Mortimer wrote, "'Europe embodied in the European Community (EC) involves a degree of integration incompatible with having a transcontinental superpower as one of its members. A hypothetical democratic Russia as part of a pan-European security organization, including the U.S., is one thing: including Russia in the EC is quite another. No matter how democratic or market-oriented Russia eventually becomes, Russia is simply too big to be integrated fully with Western Europe without completely swamping it."^{14}

The old Soviet-dominated part of the Eurasian space has been broken up. The Central European space, as a purely political concept, appears as a peculiar residue, remaining after cracks and discontinuities in the process of reconstruction of the Euro-Atlantic space and the politically non-Russian area. Both in the eastern and western parts of this residue, political disputes and struggles about the definition of this new arrangement of forces are ongoing.

In the political and quasi-institutional sense, part of this residue appears in two forms: the Visegrad Group and the Central European Initiative (CEI), the former Hexagonale. Neither Russia nor non-Russian European republics (Moldava, Belarus, and the Ukraine) are a party to either of these international bodies. At the same time, the former communist countries who have become members of these bodies have been negotiating agreements and, at least economically, perfecting the disintegration of the Soviet-dominated part of the Eurasian space.

Yet, from the point of view of security, these institutions provide weak arrangements (for all intents and purposes, the CEI is inactive in the security area). This weakness is a result of the difficulty in defining the eastern pole of the Central European
residue: the Euro-Atlantic countries' and organizations' unwillingness to define that pole and the impossibility of the Central European countries to fulfill this task on their own.

Extending the area of CSCE influence and copying the scope of CSCE's activities in the NACC does not solve the dilemma. The CSCE is not the institution to define the new arrangement for security in Europe and to defend it effectively; at any rate, not today. The Euro-Atlantic countries cherish no such illusions; hence, they consistently aspire to maintain NATO and build the Western European Union (WEU).

In considering Poland's long-term security, it is crucial that the eastern borders of the Central European space ultimately be defined. A strategic determination of this space means both a guarantee of full sovereignty of the European republics of the former U.S.S.R. as well as the refusal to treat them as buffer or "seasonal" states. It is not a sensible policy to repeat the mistake that was made at Locarno in 1925 with Poland or Czechoslovakia. From this point of view, however, Mortimer's remark seems quite puzzling—that in case Russia became an expansionist dictatorship again, "there should be no question of going back to a front line along the Elbe, or even along the Oder-Neisse." The liberation of East-Central Europe, like the unification of Germany, is a gain which the West should do everything in its power to make irreversible."

To meet these two demands does not constitute a threat to a non-imperial Russia, nor does it separate Russia from Europe, politically or economically. It does provide, however, a barrier to a Russia that would continue to indulge in an imperial dream and not reconcile itself with the loss of its external and internal territories and subjugated nations. According to an optimistic scenario, a Central Europe which reaches the borders of a Russian state that is reconciled with itself will lose its sharp political and strategic dimension. Only then will one be able to accept the thesis that "East Europe' stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea was a geopolitical fabrication, not a geopolitical agglomeration of strategic and economic interests."
other hand, a Central Europe that has entrenched itself along the Bug river will always be perceived by Russian neo-imperial staff officers as potential strategic loot—in part or as a whole.

Institutional Dimensions of Poland's Security

The prime motive of Poland's security policy is to avoid the situation where the broadly defined Central European space is dominated—east or west—by one regional power. This is not a "revolutionary" approach or a new one to Western debaters. The relevant report prepared by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute last year justifies the rationale for the U.S. military presence in Europe in the following way: "... an American guarantee embodied in the presence of U.S. forces in Western Europe as part of NATO reassures all Europeans[?] against domination of the continent by any single power." However, what institutional or quasi-institutional pattern might produce a parallel (or approximate) solution for the East?

A short-term perspective based on a non-catastrophic variant of the course of events in Russia and Ukraine might suggest that there is already a kind of solution. A post-imperial Russia preoccupied with its own problems does not constitute any direct threat to the Central European region. Democratic Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have already lived four years without facing any genuine Russian threat, without receiving any Western security guarantees and without participating in NATO and/or the WEU.

In the long-term, however, to prolong such a situation is potentially dangerous; it is simply a "challenge" to the Eastern power. Hence, having not so much the present as the future threat in mind, the Visegrad Group countries have been incessantly demanding the extension of the Western security umbrella and institutional solutions to their region as well.

Poland's and other countries' concerns about the future result from a realistic assessment of their own strength and means. In
the situation where Western policymakers treat the territory between Poland and Russia as a buffer zone, an area waiting to be "defined," it is impossible to create a precisely Central European system that would guarantee defense against a possible escalation of the Eastern threat. Certainly, the Visegrad Group cannot now, and presumably never will, organize such a system. To put it in somewhat oversimplified terms, the Group's activities are a kind of "apprenticeship" to prepare itself for entering larger organizations. Therefore, it is no surprise that some of the Group members get impatient and yearn for making this "apprenticeship" shorter; they believe, probably wrongly, that their continued presence in the Group is a burden rather than an advantage.

Russia shows little interest in the Visegrad Group as a quasi-security institution. Russia does, however, show an immediate interest in the Group's (or the CEI's) symbolic political significance and in its acceptance and support by Western Europe and the U.S.A., including its potential future membership in the E.E.C. One observes an almost automatic intensification of Russian leadership activity as soon as even a slight chance arises that Ukraine might be included in Group or CEI activities.\(^8\)

Bearing these reactions in mind, one cannot help but feel surprised by the composure Russia shows in seeing Ukraine and the others participating in the NACC, CSCE and other European institutions. Perhaps Russia's composure should be attributed to its low opinion of these institutions' effectiveness, as well as to Russia's own presence in them.

In the context of these considerations, the institutional aspect of the security of Poland and the other Visegrad Group countries includes their possible membership in NATO and the WEU. Membership means the process leading to the institutionalization of their relations with NATO and the WEU, with a precise time-table and/or terms of institutionalization.

From the experience of the territories of the former Yugoslavia, it is clear that effective measures to ensure and to
enlarge stability zones in Central Europe are the best and least costly form of preventive diplomacy. A collective security system and its institutions have practical sense if they rest on strong foundations, although they themselves do not provide such a foundation. Stability and preventive diplomacy require that the relevant institutional arrangements be able to deter effectively and that he who violates the rules of the game pays dearly.

An appropriate institutional framework would signal to the former Soviet European republics an advantageous nexus between the development of democracy and adherence to international agreements and security regimes (the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), etc.) on the one hand, and the improvement of security on the other. No less important are related signals sent to Russia demonstrating the possible increase of institutional pressure on republican elites with regard to areas of Russia's justified interest (e.g., the plight of Russian minorities abroad).

All the same, it is difficult to press this argument if one party thinks and acts first and foremost in terms of a "realistic" zero-sum game, while the other acts first and foremost in terms of a non-zero-sum game, complex interdependence and institutionalization. This is precisely the situation we deal with as the excessively protracted debate on the Visegrad Group's membership in NATO and the WEU continues, with the "Russian factor" receiving great emphasis.

Contributing further to the problem, many Western politicians and analysts no longer defend the non-zero-sum game. Instead, they continually caution against provoking Russian nationalists and make Boris Yeltsin's life difficult by giving institutional guarantees to the Visegrad Group countries. Capitalizing on this, both Russian reformers and nationalists advise the Group "not to hasten" to NATO. During this peculiar psychological war, apples are being compared with oranges, and, as a result, the difference between legitimate security concerns, aggressive posture, strategic balance, etc. is clouded. In addition, from a strategic, long-term perspective, the territory east of the Oder
river, to which no explicit or implicit security guarantees apply, only leaves more room for maneuvering to Russia. The further one moves to the east of the Oder, the more uncertain the security, the more nervous the reactions and the less likely the chance of effective intervention become.  

Further Remarks on the Visegrad Group

The Visegrad Group cannot be recognized as even a temporary substitute for NATO and/or the WEU. Despite frequent debates about the Group and the purpose of its existence, cooperation among the Visegrad Group countries, their bilateral relations with NATO and their network of contacts are quite strong. These activities create opportunities for cooperating and coordinating projects. In the long run, the more involvement with NATO and WEU military and civilians in these projects, the swifter will be the transition to institutional ties.

It is worth mentioning here two security aspects where closer cooperation among the Visegrad Group countries is possible (and necessary), and where the group can offer prospects for a close, working interaction with such countries as Ukraine.

First, it is desirable for defense industries of all the Group countries to cooperate with one another in modernizing and reducing this sector which has been overgrown in each of them. Production of tanks, modern armored personnel carriers (APC) and aircraft (helicopters and training airplanes in particular) are areas where, given sufficient political will, cooperation can be quite fruitful.

It goes without saying that it’s easier said than done. The relevant Western European examples are not all positive. On the other hand, however, the need for specialization and economies of scale is pressing. The idea of plowing up the Visegrad Group’s defense industries is not a solution, at least not a politically viable one. But long-term modernization, reduction and functional specialization are necessary. We should learn by
the experience of our neighbors, especially the European Fighter Aircraft and the PAH2 helicopter or the German aircraft and the space behemoth Deutsche Aerospace AG (DASA). I see no reason why cooperation in selected fields should be not established with Ukraine.

Secondly, it is imperative for the security of all the Group countries to cooperate in coping with migration. Here, there is not one "wise" and permanent solution. The extent of both legal and illegal migration is difficult to estimate. In the case of Poland, figures produced by the Frontier Guards Headquarters show that in the years 1989-92, border traffic increased from 54.1 million to 154.1 million people. On the eastern border, the increase was twofold (to 18.4 million people) and on the western border, fourfold (to 84 million people). This unprecedented increase was accompanied by a sudden growth in the number of illegal aliens. In 1989, on all of Poland's borders, only 2,407 illegal immigrants were stopped. However, in 1992 as many as 32,292 were stopped, including nearly 28,000 arrested on the western border. Often illegal immigration, both that involving smugglers as well as economic immigrants, is of an organized, international character. At the same time, the resources Poland allocates to guarding her borders are, considering the country's means, enormous—in 1992, Polish Frontier Guards numbered 13,500 men.

The recently signed Polish-German treaty on the re-admission of illegal refugees, the DM 120 million aid to increase border control, the difficult Czech-German (and the related Czech-Slovak) negotiations and the Polish-Ukrainian agreement are all necessary attempts at institutionalization, but they are negative and restrictive in their character. Such moves shift some of the Western European problems to the Visegrad Group's eastern borders, but they do not solve them. The apprehension that all the bilateral and international measures adopted so far reflect a beggar-my-neighbor philosophy only aggravates the suspicions of the populations of countries affected by these treaties.
It is in the interest of the Visegrad Group countries to coordinate policies aimed at more effective border control as well as to increase pressure on Western countries to increase economic aid to migrant-producing nations. In turn, political and economic leaders in these countries should shoulder the responsibility for checking emigration and reducing it to manageable proportions. A long-term policy of economic growth with increased stability is the only way to find a positive solution.

If a positive approach is not adopted, Poland and other Group countries will have no choice but to follow in the West's footsteps and raise an increasing number of limits and barriers. It is hard to predict the tensions such restrictive policies will create. One thing is certain: the elites of the Visegrad Group countries are and will remain concerned primarily about the security of their own people.

And Finally: Family Quarrels and European Security

Although it may sound paradoxical, the intensifying quarrels within the Euro-Atlantic community are one of the chief sources of the security deficit and of tensions in Europe, including Central Europe. The dimensions and sources of these quarrels are different and are of different weight. What is more, their priority has not yet been established. Meanwhile, it is increasingly feared in Poland and in other Central European countries that the dynamics of these quarrels must be controlled sooner rather than later. One of the relevant proposals leads to France's re-integration into NATO and to the definition of the WEU as an organization being both "the European pillar of NATO" as well as one operating "outside of the NATO geographic area." Another proposal provides for abandoning "theological disputes" about NATO's and WEU's guiding "principles," and for solving problems instead. The latter
proposal clearly rests on the assumption that "the whole debate, on both sides of the Atlantic, is at least as much about power and influence as about what's best for European security." 32

Warsaw is not and cannot be indifferent toward these quarrels or toward Western Europe's quest for its own "identity" (and its own strategy with respect to foreign policy and security). First and foremost, Poles are increasingly concerned that if the process of looking for a new balance in the Euro-Atlantic relations takes too much time, it could cause a dangerous discontinuity. The weakening of NATO in its present condition would not be accompanied by a parallel and concurrent build-up of the effective strength and cohesion of the WEU. Realistically, the WEU will need a lot of time to progress from establishing a political identity (which has been an unfinished business until now) to developing military muscle.

As a result of such discontinuities, a natural tendency to fall back on the lowest common denominator can prevail. In a crisis situation, this can mean passivity or simply token activity. Warsaw has been watching in horror the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia. The mess created by U.S. indecisiveness, the CSCE's military impotence and the European Communities' display of divergent and mutually contradictory national interests has not given birth to the peace that would save people and Bosnia's integrity but instead to a new arbiter. Yugoslavia does not mean a tragedy alone. Yugoslavia means also that, when put to the test, the quest for new power-sharing within the Euro-Atlantic community has failed.

The present experience gives rise to a question that, in the context of a Europe that is not supposed to be limited to the Oder-Neisse or the Bug river, is of fundamental importance—what does NATO, and for that matter the WEU as well, want to be? A guard of the Western European fortress threatened by eastern and southern "barbarians," a policeman to prevail over an unruly crowd or an institutional security framework to placate unpredictable reactions and sources of potential conflicts?
The adaptation strategies of the Central European countries depend on the answer to this fundamental question. In the situation where an institutionally-structured enlargement of the security area is treated as an imprecise and remote goal, Poland and other Central European countries are compelled to adopt a "catastrophic" stand. When it comes to the worst-case scenario, this will presumably prompt these insecure countries to immediately try to internationalize the conflict.

Regarding a solution, only one thing can be said: in thinking about security, like economics, it is worthwhile to use the notion of opportunity costs. Opportunity cost analysis shows that the best strategy is to wage wars that actually do not have to be waged at all. If this kind of thinking prevails over the present family quarrels within the Euro-Atlantic community, if prevention becomes the conclusion drawn from the discussions on power-sharing and on the "widening" of security, then Central Europe will have little reason for concern.

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Notes

2. For example, at the beginning of 1993, a parliamentary sub-
commission for foreign policy coordination was established; then, in
April, the foreign affairs minister held wide consultations with the
chairmen of all parliamentary caucuses. [This paper was presented
before President Walesa's decision to dissolve the parliament.]

3. M. Perczynski and P. Wieczorek, "The Disarmament Dividends in the
Process of Systemic Transformation," The Polish Quarterly of
International Affairs, Winter 1993.

4. The figures reported by Col. Kade from the Ministry of Industry.

5. The fact that at present, it is the opposition who chairs the Sejm
National Defense Commission does not altogether explain this lack of
bargaining power.


7. See, for example, V. Giscard d'Estaing, Y. Nakasone and H.A.


9. See "Poland and the East—Statement by the Polish Foreign Minister
Krzysztof Skubiszewski in the Senate, Warsaw, September 7, 1990,"

10. According to the public opinion poll carried out last January, 68
percent of the Poles would not like to have a Ukrainian for a nei,
bor, 53 percent, a Russian; 51 percent, a German; 48 percent, a
Byelorussian; 41 percent, a Lithuanian; 32 percent, a Czech; and 21
percent, a Slovak. Among the younger generation, the respective
indicators are much lower. Demoskop, Przeglad, February-March 1993.

11. In the text published by the Polish press on the day of President
Lech Walesa's visit to Ukraine, the editors of the Ukrainskyi Ohladach
ruled that "for the first time in her history, Ukraine is truly pro-Polish,"

12. The superb Polish poet Antoni Slonimski used to say, "If you don’t
know how to behave, behave properly."

13. I borrow this distinction from Dr. Kazuo Takahashi of the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

14. E. Mortimer, "Western Europe Looks East: What Role in Central
and Eastern Europe?," in Revolution and Change in Europe.
Implications for the Atlantic Area Nations. The Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, 1993, pp. 30-31. Recently, this view was explicitly
endorsed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl; he rules out Russia’ participation

15. Ibid., p.30.

16. B. Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges. The United States and Eastern

17. "The United States and the European Community," *Policy
Consensus Report*, April 1992, p.3.

18. See A.Z. Kaminski and L. Koscluk, "The Disintegration of the
USSR and Central European Security," *The Polish Quarterly of


20. It is obvious that the Ukrainian leadership do not see any such
connection in the line adopted by Western powers toward their country.
Wrongly or not, they state a serious asymmetry in the behavior of the
West, which unsettle their sense of security. This in this context, I
believe, that one should analyze President Leonid Kravchuk’s concept
to delineate a "zone of regional security and stability in East Central
Europe" (extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea), he put forward


22. Various statements by Sergei Stankevich during his visit to Poland early this year.

23. One should place in this context the problem of nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian soil (on purpose I avoid using the phrase "Ukrainian nuclear weapons"). Under the still prevailing logic of the zero-sum game, "people are much nicer to nuclear superpowers than to pacifist abstainers." W.R. Mead, "An American Grand Strategy. The Quest for Order in a Disordered World," *World Policy Journal*, Spring 1993, p. 20.


26. All the figures quoted in the paragraph are after M. Lisiccki, "Obrona i ochrona granicy panstwowej Polski jako element bezpieczeństwa państwa," *PISM Studia i Materiały*, No. 60, March 1993, pp. 9-14.

27. The public debate that accompanied the Polish-German negotiations sharpened the Poles' perception of the immigration problem. According to the January public opinion poll results, 70% of the public believe that Poland should not receive asylum seekers, 50% demand the introduction of a visa requirement with regard to the former Soviet citizens. What is striking is the fact that even educated people, from higher income
brackets, increasingly often demand that the visa requirement should be laid down. Demoskop, Przeglad. February-March 1993.

28. It should be remembered here that the wave of immigrants to Germany consists of two basic groups: ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) and asylum seekers (Asylanten). In 1991, the first group numbered over and above 210,000 people, the other—more than 256,000. In the former, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Romania prevailed; in the latter—immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. See F.S. Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and East-West Migration," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 22-24,26.

29. Despite the amendment to Article 16 of the German Constitution, which makes the policy toward Asylanten more restrictive, in the longer term it will probably become necessary for Germany, France, etc. to change their basic immigration policy, and make it more after the U.S. pattern. According to Larrabee, "Sooner or later it seems likely that Germany must admit that it is becoming an immigration country and must establish quotas for immigrants." Op.cit., p. 30.

30. A quite opaque interpretation of these tendencies can be found in the following thesis: "... Eastern European conflicts come at a time of delicate transition in the foreign policy relations among Western nations. Cleavages in the East have already provoked diverging attitudes in the West, and may result in a weakening of Western cohesion." M. Carnovale, ECI/WEU, NATO, CSCE and Security in Eastern Europe, Paper for the Suedosteuropa Gesellschaft conference on "Redefining Regional Security and the New Foreign Policies in Eastern Europe," Potsdam-Cecilienhof, 23-26 June 1992, p. 2.


Security Perspectives of Central Europe: A View from Slovakia

Ladislav Kadlec

Five years following the end of World War I, the founder of the Pan-European movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, commenting on the European discord, uttered prophetic words, that the discord would last "until a Russian Napoleon comes, forming his Federation of the Rhine from small East European countries to strike with its help a death blow to Europe." History proved him right. "The Federation of the Rhine" entered history under the name of the Warsaw Treaty, and the member states of this pact were bound by the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty.

Some 60 years after Coudenhove-Kalergi uttered his prophecy, the Czech dissident Jiří Dienstbier stated in his "Dreams about Europe" that "to a considerable amount, in the age of superpower bipolarity—the European nations ceased to be the subject of European politics." Europe has not only been excluded from the center of the world events, it was divided and separated to the point where for one hundred years there were no boundaries. The Communist ideology deleted the awareness of being Europeans from the consciousness of the Central European citizens and replaced it by the consciousness of their being a part of the "socialist countries’ camp." In the minds of Western Europeans, Europe boiled down to West Europe only. From the consciousness of the ruling elites, the combining together of both parts of Europe evaporated.
In Europe, a region exists that is generally considered to be situated directly in the center of the continent. During the second decade of this century, political theoreticians and military strategists began to call this region "Central Europe." It represented a part of Europe that—compared with Western and Eastern Europe—did not form an overt political and geographic unity. Central Europe had to derive its name through complicated attempts at cooperation and integration. Its frontiers have never been defined exactly, and in both West European and East European diplomacy, statesmen experienced serious problems as to its localization. The area's conspicuous ethnic fragmentation markedly differentiated it from both Western and Eastern Europe—a fragmentation which took on great significance with the emergence of nationalism during the course of the 19th century.

There has been a recognizable trend to classify as Central European those countries having formed a part of the former Hapsburg monarchy. In European politics, however, we have witnessed efforts accepted by a big part of the European political public to put Central Europe within a substantially broader framework. Often the Black Sea states have been regarded as Central European ones, other times the whole range of small nations spreading between Russia or Ukraine and Germany. Germany presents a specific problem because it has been always considered the very incorporation of a Central European power. In the west, one part of Germany borders a classic West European civilization (France), and in the East the world of the Western Slavs (the Czech and Polish states). German self-definition as "Mitteleuropa" is reflected in the broad acceptance of the term and in its dual reference as marking off Central Europe. "Mitteleuropa" is seen as an area of preferential German interest and influence, as sort of a German empire that, after the implementation of German hegemony, might spread from the
North Sea or the Baltics via Central Europe to as far as the Bosphorus.

Hence arises the difficulty in giving the term Central Europe concrete outlines and contours, and in defining it exactly against such parts of Europe as the Balkans or Scandinavia, which were also comprised in the idea of Central Europe in the past. The complications go even further due to the artificial partition of the European continent into two regions. If only two parts of Europe find acceptance, i.e., East Europe and West Europe, it is very difficult to define in toto the territory not belonging to either part. In the center of Europe there is an inherent dualism. After excluding its Western, homogeneously German part, we can identify Central Europe only as the region to the east of reunified Germany. It was this logic that created the term East Central Europe some decades ago. Automatically there ensues a geographic and geopolitical division of Europe not into two or three, but into four regions: western, central western, central eastern and eastern. Even in this case it is impossible to identify exact frontiers, because a considerable part of Eastern Europe, Ukraine, has been historically identified with East Central Europe, ignoring geographic realities.

If the geographic lines between East and West were always historically vague, the issue was settled for over forty years by the result of World War II. After World War II, Europe was divided into two political, ideological and military camps, whereby Central, i.e., East Central Europe, became a part of "East Europe." Quite contrary to their cultural traditions, all Slavic and almost all Balkan peoples as well as one whole third of post-war Germany fell under the sphere of Soviet superpower influence.

Today, following the collapse of "East Europe" and the Soviet Union, the problem of Central Europe presents itself once again—specifically that part of Europe which was built on the Latin civilization, that was formed culturally with Western civilization, and that has been connected with the West by many historical and political ties. Western Europe thus faces an
unattached political zone that, unlike the Balkans, is indisputably historio-politically and culturally linked to the West. Because its integration into the Eastern bloc was unnatural, most of its affiliations with the East dissolved very quickly. Nevertheless, its relationship with the West was seriously impaired by more than 40 years’ interruption of mutual links. The top concern of the nations in this area is to find a secure place on the map of Europe, i.e. in its western part. It is natural that they seek security indivisibly because they are tied together by a common post-war lot. This is the concept behind the Visegrad group and why they are striving to integrate into the West European security system.

Shortly after the countries of Central Europe were free of the Russian Soviet empire, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks initiated the process of Visegrad within whose framework they coordinated their secession from the instruments of Soviet hegemony—the Warsaw Treaty and Comecon. At the same time, they initiated political, economic and security relations with the West which led to the signing of association treaties with the European Community (EC). Yet even as relations grow with the EC, all these nations are interested in continuing mutually expedient cooperation with the East. However, they wish to become part of the West and its integrated groupings from a political, cultural and security standpoint.

Slovakia

Slovakia, too, belongs to the West. However, due to its geopolitical position, and the power ambitions of its eastern neighbors, it is being pulled to the East. Although it has compatible cultural and civilization qualifications for an affiliation with the West, a precondition for such an affiliation is intensive and purposeful cultural and civilization activity. In the long run, this corresponds fully with Slovak history—the tendency of Slovak culture toward the West, hearkening back to
the Great Moravia period and the Byzantine Empire. Since that time, Slovakia has been situated in Western culture, and both its spiritual and civil development have been compatible with the West. Slovakia also has traditions of Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, Romanticism and Modernism rooted in both the historical and cultural strata of those epochs.

The emergence of a sovereign Slovak Republic presents the Slovak population with new challenges and requirements with which it has little or no experience. One is the need to project the republic into the fields of international politics, security and military affairs. Slovakia has always been a part of larger state units and has never designed concepts concerning its own foreign policy, military, security and strategy. In these fields it has no tradition and does not represent a settled, normal nation-state entity. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate some basic approaches for Slovakian security and foreign policy.

External Relations

Slovakia is pre-positioned politically and geographically for good relations with all neighboring countries and does not present a security threat to any of them. The Slovak Republic has only 5 million inhabitants. As for its neighbors, Ukraine has 50 million, Poland almost 40 million, Czechland and Hungary roughly 10 million and Austria about 7 million. The Slovaks have never sought hegemony and make no territorial claim to any country. Neither does Slovakia have a type of identity that would relate to foreign territories historically. Slovakia’s national mentality is deeply defensive. Slovakia’s goal is to have its security guaranteed within a broader international framework. Ultimately, together with the other members of the Visegrad group, Slovakia envisions joining the Euro-Atlantic security system.
Slovakia and the Czech Republic

Slovakia has no serious feuds with its neighbors, and relations with the Czech Republic are particularly positive. Since beginning the process of separation, Slovakia has signed a number of treaties with the Czech Republic resulting in the peaceful breakup of the two republics. Today Slovakia has worked out most of its mutual concerns and what remains is, as might be expected in the division of any international unit, economic and property-related issues. As these final details of the "Velvet Divorce" are worked out, both Czechs and Slovaks hold steadfast in their commitment to reach agreement in the context of long-term coexistence as partners and neighbors. In 1993, additional treaties should be signed concerning, among other things: the establishment of custom houses along common state boundaries, a coordinated policy for disposition of property of the former Czechoslovakia, a treaty on division of the transit gas pipeline, paying off the debts of the former Czechoslovakia related to peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (UN), and many other items. It is in the interest of the Slovak Republic to maintain good economic and political relations with the Czech Republic and, in turn, the Czech Republic is interested in seeing its eastern neighbor as an economically strong and politically stable state.

All of this is not to say there are no significant issues to resolve. Discussions about stricter control of common frontiers is a particularly important component of the Slovak-Czech negotiations. Some problems have been generated by the apprehensions of Czechland's western neighbor, Germany. Germany fears an unstoppable influx of immigrants from eastern and southeastern Europe, and Slovakia is seen as the obvious transit country for many immigrants. Attempts to halt the flow could negatively impact Slovakia, considering that the more the frontiers between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic are closed, the more Slovakia moves away from its goal of incorporation into the West.
Slovakia and Hungary

Relationships with Hungary have been marked by differences of opinion concerning waterworks on the Danube, and the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. As with Czechland, in each of these cases there exist bilateral efforts to bring the problem to a positive solution. In the instance of the Gabčíkovo waterworks, both sides have chosen recourse to the International Court of Justice in the Hague as the way to solve the problem. Slovakia is attempting to minimize political tensions over the waterworks of Gabčíkovo and to allay fears of an ecological disaster in the region. During negotiations, Slovakia will suggest a temporary regime for using the Danube waters and encourage establishment of a joint monitoring commission to observe the state of ecology in the area.

The problems of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and of the Slovak minority in Hungary, are not of the scale which precipitates conflict, such as we have seen in some regions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or in the Balkans. The Slovak-Hungarian nationalities’ relations haven’t reached the level of controversy seen between some European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. As everywhere in Central Europe, the problem between the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovak minority in Hungary entails obscure, deep and historical roots. In the Hungarian part of the extinct Hapsburg monarchy, the Hungarian *ethnicum* was hegemonic and involved serious feuds with many nationalities that lived in the Hungarian sphere of influence, including the German element. To this day some after-effects of this feuding relationship are evident. For example, some extreme political forces in Hungary find the residue of a Greater Hungarian identity and the international order introduced after World War I—in particular, the consequences of the Trianon Treaty—unacceptable.

While it would be futile to minimize Slovakia’s problems, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship has other, more important and positive aspects than the complex of the Gabčíkovo and the
Hungarian minority problems. Both states are striving to achieve political, economic and security integration with the West. Membership in NATO is of primary significance for the security of both countries, and for NATO as well the security of Central Europe is not negligible. NATO is not interested in tensions between two potential member states in the fashion of the long-running Greek-Turkish conflict, and Slovakia is eager to harmonize its international relations to a maximal extent. Nonetheless, the Hungarian side seems unable to shake off the "Trianon trauma" that has implanted itself so deeply in its national identity. Hungary may not realize the counter-productive effect an anti-Slovak campaign will have on the strategic interests of both Slovakia and Hungary. Still, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship is often perceived as a potential source of conflict in Central Europe, even though this interpretation is not in accord with the real state of affairs. This is one more reason for Slovakia to be active in launching a European process that protects the position of all minorities. Slovakia is aware of the advantages accruing to both states from the North Atlantic Alliance—NATO membership is a guarantee that the relationship of Hungary and Slovakia will be under the control of NATO and that the qualitatively new relations between these countries, which eliminate many points of friction, will become permanent.

Slovakia and Poland, Austria and Ukraine

If Slovakia’s relationships with the Czech Republic and Hungary are not conflict-ridden but only marked by unresolved problems, then relationships with its other three neighbors can be described as especially unperturbed. With Poland, intense efforts at increased cooperation are underway. Relations with Austria have developed positively in every respect; in particular, economic cooperation has grown remarkably. Austria is now the largest capital investor in Slovakia and is doing its best to meet all Slovak initiatives for moving toward even more extensive
cooperation. Ukraine is another important economic partner of the Slovak Republic. The most significant factor in Slovakia's relationship is that Ukraine is a nuclear power. This is viewed as a positive force for mediating between Slovakia and Russia. Slovakia is interested in a codification of mutual relations with Ukraine, as an outgrowth of the more positive, beneficial aspects of previous relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. As with Czechland, a big issue with Ukraine will be frontier-crossings that must be subjected to rigid control due to illegal immigration.

Slovakia and Germany

In Central Europe, it has historically been Germany that exerted the greatest influence. And, in the wake of the Cold War, Central Europe revisits the old question of whether it will become uniquely Central Europe or whether it will be transformed into "Mitteleuropa," i.e., into an area of overwhelming German influence. Since the early Middle Ages, Germanic influence has played a large role in the region's progress, beginning with the spread of Christianity, and followed by the cultivation of its economic culture. The down side of this influence was political and military domination and the assimilation of non-German peoples. These negative reminiscences are clear in the historic consciousness of Czechs and Poles to this day.

However, the significant cultural contribution of Germany cannot be denied. German culture has enriched the cultures of Central Europe, and the German language, paradoxically, has been a common instrument for understanding among Slavic peoples. Fluency in German is common for the older generation of Czechs and Poles, and creates a positive environment for integration. On the other hand, German influence is hampered by traditional apprehensions about the combination of German
economic and cultural contributions with German interests in political expansionism.

The effort to create a modern, integrated Central Europe stresses the need for Germany to participate and appreciate that it is necessary for modernizing the region. Otherwise, the region's identity will be lost, and attempts will be made to see Central Europe once again as part of "the East."

After reunification, German foreign policy had several options from which to choose. The most natural seems to be a Central European orientation, which would be an extension of the late 1960's initiative called "Ostpolitik," a policy which reflected the traditional German identification with Central Europe. Because of the strong economic and geographical position of Germany, the Central European option is a logical one. It is an orientation towards considerably weaker, but receptive, neighbors. However, German foreign policy will have to come to terms with the fact that Germany will never have the monopoly of power it enjoyed during the "German age" preceding World War I. Politically, Germany will be stigmatized for many generations to come, thanks to the historical experience of two world wars. Poland and Czechland will take pains, from the instinct of self-preservation, to balance a dominant German influence by an explicit orientation to the Euro-Atlantic region.

However, there can be no doubt that German hegemony is a policy of the past. Communications, the shift in modern economic centers to other parts of the world and the spread of Anglo-Saxon culture and language, all auger against Germany as a hegemon in Central Europe. Instead, the integration of Central Europe and Germany bears an overtly economic and security-related character. In this regard, all Central European states, and certainly Slovakia, prefer the idea expressed by Germany's recent foreign minister, Hans Dietrik Genscher, about creating a "European Germany" rather than a "German Europe."
Because of geographic position, historical intercourse, and political realities, Central Europe's relationships with both Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States are ambiguous. No state can help but support the reform activities of President Yeltsin and encourage the democratization efforts of the Russian executive. Nonetheless, historical experience, especially during the last 40 years, makes Slovakia move cautiously and observe diligently each political, economic and ideological development in Russia. The crystallization of affairs in what was once the Soviet Union is rather inscrutable, and Central Europe does not cease to feel endangered by the possible victory of neo-Bolshevik or imperial nationalist forces in Russia.

Slovakia experienced four decades during which it was—as a part of the former Czechoslovakia—a satellite of the former Soviet Union; absolutely subordinate to Soviet will, Soviet interests and Soviet orientation. This orientation included membership in the military integration of the Eastern bloc—the Warsaw Treaty. Without doubt it was a pact with a view toward confrontation, always focused on the scheme to secure the never-hidden Sovietization of Europe. For the Soviets, the Warsaw Pact fulfilled the so called "inner function," directed against the population of those member states that would try to extricate themselves from the Soviet sphere of influence. Slovakia was made to feel the severity of this "inner function" in August 1968, when the Soviet Army and, in a symbolic way, the armies of five other pact members, liquidated the Czechoslovak attempt to reform its own Communist system, the failed experiment of Dubček to devise "socialism with a human face."

Slovakia saw the military intervention in 1968 as a successful step of the USSR (i.e., of Russia) to continue safeguarding its security buffer area in Central Europe. Drawing a lesson from that experience, Slovakia keeps a close watch for signs of relapse into imperial and nationalist thought in Russia today. One can see in Russia that imperialism is gaining ground in proportion to
the increase in economic difficulties, and Slovakia sees a clear potential for Russia to try to reestablish the ex-Soviet empire. Slovakia always has to take into consideration the fact that of all members of the Visegrad group, it is the weakest and most physically isolated from Western security.

The other members of the Visegrad group have a distinct advantage in this respect, but even this does not shield them against the revival of Soviet, or Russian, imperialism. Particularly disturbing is the fact that anti-democratic elements in Russian society are absorbing indiscriminately old Bolsheviks, neo-Bolsheviks and conservatives from all social strata. Slovakia regards itself as a Central European, in fact a pro-Western country, and the advance of Russian imperial and national forces is alarming in its eyes. Imperialism rooted in deep tradition cannot be changed in a single act or by influencing only the leading instruments of the state. A long, lasting and patient process is needed. The current state of Russian society suggests that the psychological threshold between two types of Russian historical thought is very low and very unstable. These are all reasons which force Slovakia to seek its guarantee of international security in the environment of its traditional civilization in the West.

The rising nationalist tendencies in Russia pass freely into more complex anti-Western trends in connection with the traditional expansion of Russia into Asian regions. This corresponds fully with the ideas and convictions of an influential intellectual and ideological group in today’s Russia. The Russian federation has avoided any identification with Europe because in all respects it is a "Eurasian" civilization. Persistent exhortations to incorporate former republics, in particular the Slavonic and Baltic republics, into a reunified empire under Russian supremacy provides a serious warning. All indications suggest the conclusion that the seemingly fundamental turn in the orientation of Russia at the very beginning of the 90’s might not be of long duration. It is in this context that Western security is threatened
because the West has always been the priority objective of Russian imperial nationalists.

The Future East-West Seam

With regard to the classic historical conflict between East and West, i.e., between two value orientations in the history of culture and civilization, it stands to reason that during one historical period Russia fulfilled nothing more than the role of the most exposed and most powerful element of the Eastern civilization sphere. As it turns out, the East-West conflict might pass into the future millennium in substantially transformed colors; the Islamic countries and Islamic fundamentalism seem to be becoming the primary opponents of the West. Even an alliance between a half-atheistic, nationalist and anti-Western Russia and the Islamic East is quite conceivable. For the Euro-Atlantic region, a very complicated security situation could arise. It would be a great advantage for NATO to see Europe stabilized as a whole, and to build Central Europe as a reliable part of the European continent.

Like Poland and Hungary, Slovakia is situated at the frontiers between the Latin and Byzantine cultures and civilizations. In the interest of both West and Central Europe, it is best to rely on these frontiers as homogenous ones, without any satellite affiliations. One has to depart from the thesis that the neighbor of Slovakia, Ukraine, will be the first country to be hit by any change in Russia. The influence Russia is exerting on developments in Ukraine is being determined not only by the existence of a considerable Russian minority in this economically and strategically important republic, but by many other factors as well.

The integration of Central Europe into NATO, especially of the Visegrad group countries, would increase stability in the region with clearly positive consequences for West Europe. The admission of the Visegrad group as a whole into NATO would
be fairly acceptable for the Commonwealth of Independent States, because historically the former USSR saw these countries in a substantially different dimension than the former republics of the extinct USSR. Another reason not to accept the Visegrad Four countries into NATO individually, but to envision a joint admission, is to maintain the continuity of their pre-existing military and security integration.

There are also military reasons for admission of the Visegrad Four into NATO. The armies of all member states cooperated very closely in the past and it is advisable to preserve this positive tradition. The former Czechoslovakian army was reckoned among the best armed and from the perspective of human factors among the first-quality armies within the Eastern bloc. Today it is still possible to preserve and even to improve this quality. Should Slovakia and Czechland become members of NATO in the not too distant future, it will be possible to conserve most of the original military integration of the former Czechoslovakia, which could be of good use in pursuing common purposes in NATO. A comparatively early joint passage of the Visegrad group countries from one military and security system into another would bring less complications than a country-by-country admission, or admission of all states together following a long time interval.

Summary

Slovakia is a Central European state situated between the traditional spheres of German and of Russian influence. Therefore, it is natural that it will try to avoid hegemonization in the region by either one of these states through an orientation toward the trans-Atlantic security system. Slovakia views the North Atlantic Alliance in global terms, not just as an organization of countries using the same weapons, but also as an alliance of states defending the same cultural and political values. The Atlantic philosophy of NATO involves defending the
classical values of Western civilization—democracy, political pluralism, free market, human rights—in its trans-Atlantic dimension. At the same time, Slovakia is aware of the fact that, in view of its interest in becoming a member state of West European integration structures—both political and economic—it is, paradoxically, impossible to solve its security problems outside of the Western integration security system in which NATO plays a key role. Slovakia is convinced that the political, economic and security aspects form one coherent whole and believes that the West is of the same opinion.

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Part IV

Failure in the Balkans
Although any new European security system will have to focus on the requirements of the major states, it must also devote attention to issues along the perimeters of Europe, in particular the Balkans. Just as the Helsinki process facilitated a more stable environment across most of Europe, it would be fitting to now extend a similar calm on the Balkan peninsula. It seems impossible for Europe’s brighter future to become a reality if it excludes the Balkans, an integral part—albeit too often the powder keg—of Europe. If regional stability is a prerequisite for the movement towards a common European house, then it will certainly necessitate Balkan cooperation.

There can be no doubt that we have entered a period of great instability and uncertainty in the Balkans. How long such a period will endure can not be determined today with any certitude. The tragedy of Yugoslavia in terms of loss of life and the potentially irreversible displacement of some three million people (by 1993), will be remembered with sorrow for a long time in the future. The worrying events are still occurring in the heart of the Balkans. The barbarous and unreasonable war in Bosnia is a provocation to the conscience of Europe and the civilized world.

The crisis in former Yugoslavia has implications beyond regional proportions. The Yugoslav conflict exposes a delicate dilemma for many European countries, between support of the right of nations to self-determination and efforts to preserve territorial integrity in Europe. This is a debate about the rights and protection of minorities: ethnic purity is a phenomenon of
tribes and clans. It is totally inconsistent with the concept of nation states and the modern state system.

Determinant Factors of the Yugoslav Tragedy

Instead of open borders, free flow of goods, and broad economic and political cooperation, the Balkans seem to have moved back a century to the times of the Balkan Wars. Economic links between most of the countries in the region were broken even before the United Nations (UN) embargo was imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, and all initiatives for Balkan cooperation and integration failed from the outset.

The Yugoslav federal army (JNA) stockpiles had been built up over decades since late 1940’s to suffice for a full-fledged six-year war. At its height before the present conflict, the JNA inventory included around 520 combat aircraft, 2900 tanks, 2800 armored personnel carriers, 25,000 mortars, 11,000 artillery tubes, 1250 short-range land-to-land missiles, and 1.2 million rifles.¹

In pursuing their respective strategies in the conflict, almost all Balkan countries are spending large sums to modernize their armed forces, thus making the Balkans the most militarized region in Europe. The armed forces of these states comprise an average of 1 to 2 percent of the population, as compared to 0.8 to 1.0 percent in all European countries, and 0.6 to 0.8 percent in the West European ones.² Balkan military expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product averages 3.8 to 6.4, as compared to 3.0 to 5.0 in East European countries and 2.2 to 3.8 in West European ones.³ Military expenditures are highly concentrated, with the major proportion expended (not surprisingly) by those countries involved directly in armed conflict. Serbia is expending today around 25 percent of its gross domestic product for war purposes.⁴

This amount of military expenditure is a huge burden on the feeble economies of the Balkan countries. The extent of war destruction, albeit as yet difficult to calculate, is incredibly high.
And war losses would be higher if the difficulties caused by the UN embargo were quantified, both for Serbia-Montenegro and neighboring countries.

Regardless of the new geopolitical organization resulting from the disappearance of the former Yugoslavia, the Balkan area is basically a backward economic part of Europe. Approximately 56 out of 70 million people live with an average per capita GNP roughly US $1,000. Only 12 million, namely Greece and Slovenia have a per capita GNP of US $3,500 to $4,000. If we compare those figures with the GNP per capita in the European Community (EC) countries (US $18,000), we see that most of the Balkans population have incomes nearly 20 times inferior to those of the EC. These great differences in income are even more contrasting amidst the former Yugoslav republics and autonomous regions. Slovenia and Croatia, located near the arteries of transportation and East-West trade, enjoy greater industrial development and the benefits of substantial European tourist income.

Peace and security in the Balkans cannot be assured without democracy and economic development. Never in human history have dictators, who felt themselves winners, forsaken the use of violence. On the contrary, one can hardly find a sole example, to testify that a truly democratic state has committed an aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a community of states based on common interests and a commitment to democratic values has not fired a bullet in aggression during all of its half-century life.

In this respect, the most workable way to end the conflict in the Balkans, once and for all, may be to help Serbian democratic forces throw off communism.

The deepening of democratic institutions and the adoption of pluralism are preconditions for regional cooperation and peaceful resolution of differences. States with greater experience in democracy must help new democratic states establish an état de droit based on principles of freedom, equality, justice and the acceptance of differences.
Economic vitality is one of the best instruments for fostering and maintaining stability and democracy. Economic cooperation is critical for all Balkan countries. The European model of open markets and free trade is the most suitable tool for helping economies in transition recover soon. Thus far, mostly because of the Yugoslav crises, the EC has not formed a coherent Balkan policy. So it might be wise to work out and propose a special western economic policy for the whole region. Finally, a significant factor in the Balkans' prospects for economic recovery is the potential for attracting foreign investments.

**Kosovo: The Birthplace of the Yugoslav Conflict**

The abolition of Kosovo's political autonomy in 1989, under the threat of the federal army's tanks, constituted the first gross violation of the Yugoslav constitutional order since Tito's death. Once unleashed by Serbia, the upheaval led to the final destruction of constitutional order by 1991. The striving for Albanian national emancipation and the strong yearning for decolonization in one of the last colonies on the European continent-Kosovo, served thus as a catalyst in the process which led to Yugoslavia's breakup.

The situation for the two million Albanians (90 percent of the population) living in Kosovo is unique in at least three main aspects: national subjugation, centuries-old rivalries and socioeconomic repression.

Historical tensions were fuel for sparks of socioeconomic repression in communist Yugoslavia, setting off a conflagration of Kosovo in 1981. That was the point where the post-Tito Yugoslav crisis got its start. There was no political freedom and an absence of public debate. At the same time, Kosovo's economy worsened, in spite of massive investment. Protests including demands that Kosovo be upgraded to a republic, were quashed by the army. Serbian authorities closed Albanian
language radio and television services and the only Albanian daily newspaper. They pursued a policy of job eviction. Thousands of Albanians were sacked. Among them, nearly all Albanian postal workers and school teachers were dismissed for having opposed Serbian policy on education programs. Today all Albanian schools in Kosovo have been closed. Serbs and Montenegrins, with only 10 percent of the population in Kosovo, had 33 percent of the jobs in 1989 and 70 percent today. This disproportion is greater with regard to positions of responsibility. Serbia is expected to allow the right for education in Albanian language only up to the secondary school level. All other schools are to be closed, including the University of Prishtina. Only colonialists of the old type have limited the education of 2 to 3 million people in their own tongue. It is a shame that late at the twentieth century, there are still people limiting other people’s level of schooling in their homeland. Ironically, as the world witnesses the defeat of apartheid in South Africa after decades of political and economic isolation, we are seeing the cruel imposition of apartheid in Europe.

The situation in Kosovo today is more dangerous and hectic than in Bosnia. Kosovo has been described at the United Nations as a bomb waiting to explode. Terror and violence by Serb paramilitary forces is continuing, intent on creating and sustaining fear among the Albanians. There are arrests and killings every day. Through these acts they want to urge Albanians to leave the country. As a result, a silent ethnic cleansing is well under way in Kosovo. Due to violence, political persecutions, rigid discrimination, banning from government jobs and fierce police rule, more than 300,000 Albanians left Kosovo over the last year, going to Western Europe.

But the Serb regular armed forces are really the chief element of threat and violence in Kosovo. They have the task of gaining full military control of the region. In order to carry out these tasks, the Serb leadership has grouped its armed forces facing Albania into two army-size units, in Kosovo and Montenegro respectively. Inside Kosovo, the Serb military command is
intensifying troops training and exercises, especially of special forces. The amount of armaments distributed to the Serbian population is so great it is a cause of permanent concern for the Albanians.

The Serbian regime may continue to exercise relative restraint in Kosovo as long as there is conflict elsewhere. But negotiated settlement of the war in Bosnia could create problems for Milosevic, whose power relies, in part, on his skillful exploitation of crises. A cessation of hostilities would therefore heighten the prospect for ethnic rifts in Kosovo, unless nothing is done to thoroughly resolve the conflict.

Yet the question arises, how would the independence of Kosovo be possible without armed conflict, which would be tragic for the whole region? Actually the Albanians of Kosovo are working to make it possible through peaceful resistance and, for the same reason, they are asking for international observers as a first stage, before independence is achieved. Kosovo, in fact, should be made a protectorate of the United Nations (UN). These options would go side by side with the endeavor of the international community to help Kosovo gain its full autonomy, prevent warfare and assure the protection of human rights. Now the international community has a chance to avoid spill-over of the war through preventive actions.

To begin with, the immediate placement of Kosovo under UN/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) control should be a preferred alternative to the outbreak of the conflict there. There is a difficulty, because Kosovo is actually known to be legally part of Serbia and a formal request should be necessary from that state. But one ought to bring to mind that not too long ago, according to the last Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, Kosovo was an integral part of the Yugoslav federation. Besides, before this autonomous status was abolished in 1989, the Yugoslav federation rotating presidency was chaired twice by Kosovo's representatives. To make a comparison, Krajina and Slavonia used to be under Croatian sovereignty, without any administrative link to the federation at all, as Kosovo was. If the UN finds it
right to put these regions under its control, why shouldn’t it do the same in Kosovo?

The Roles of Other Balkan Countries

As a very complex question, Macedonia is also included in the scenario of the Balkan crisis. A Serbian invasion of neighboring Macedonia seems to be more likely than a direct attack on Albania. From an Albanian perspective, the stability and independence of Macedonia are a prerequisite to prevent conflict from starting in the southern Balkan. Albania has declared that no danger will ever come to that state from her territory, and welcomes a joint agreement between them to recognize the rights of the Albanians of Macedonia as equal citizens.

An important way to ease tensions in Macedonia is to make the principal segments of the population equal before the constitution. States like Belgium, Canada, and the former Republic of Checks and Slovaks, which have guaranteed the same rights to their component nationalities, are democratic states without nationalistic rifts. On the contrary, the states that ignore such rights, always have had ethnic war. Macedonia is at the crossroads. If it continues to play the nationalistic card, an ethnic conflict may erupt. Macedonia cannot create a stable state without observing the rights of the Albanians there.

The efforts of the Geneva and New York Conferences continue to be critical, and so is the leadership of the U.S. in crisis response. But regional engagement is needed as well. States like Turkey and Italy can contribute greatly to a diplomatic solution. Italy is particularly well positioned as a member of both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) and as a power in the region. Italy could also take on more of a role under the UN mandate. Her old ties with Yugoslavia and economic ties to most of the Balkan states give Italy a strong advantage as a diplomatic go-between in the crisis.
Greece could play a constructive role as well, if it recognized that its real self-interest lies in regional security and prosperity, instead of short-term maneuvers, such as its complaint that accepting refugees in southern Albania would dilute the Greek minority there. Greece could well become a leading local influence, too.

Bulgaria supports unconditional recognition of the right for self-determination of every nation in former Yugoslavia. To this end, Bulgaria recognized four former Yugoslav republics, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. However, if outside military operations, including peacekeeping under the mandate of the UN are carried out, Bulgaria will not take part.

Montenegro, the junior partner of Serbia in what remains of the Yugoslav federation, has strongly supported Milosevic. Yet, surprisingly, Montenegro recently called for reintegration of all the territories of former Yugoslavia under a new mandate, and has expressed the opinion that an integral solution of Yugoslav problems and not piecemeal accords could end the crisis.

Albania is strongly opposed to war either in Kosovo or Macedonia. Albania has made it clear that she supports the peaceful struggle of the people of Kosovo, for political and human rights in keeping with the principles established by both the Helsinki Accord and the United Nations. This non-violent approach, a novel idea in the Balkans, has not received as much attention as it should.

Albania on one side and Serbia, the major actor in former Yugoslavia's ethnic strife on the other, fought two wars in the early part of this century, wars that ended in territorial adjustments largely favorable to Serbia. Such is not the case today. The current power balances suggest that any Serbian aggression would very likely end in a costly stalemate.

Being against the forceful change of borders, Albania is making no military preparations to go to war. In response to propaganda reports that Albanian troops were mobilizing on Serbian borders, an international group of journalists was asked to visit the frontier areas with Kosovo and Montenegro. The trip
showed that the reports were false. Albania's policy pursued in regard to Kosovo is characterized by the determination of the Albanian government to be a source of stability in the region. She is just as determined to prevent the conflict as she is resolute to cope by all means with the forceful ethnic cleansing of Albanians away from their homes, and to respond to the massacre of them by Serbs.

The Role of International Institutions

Intractable political problems confront UN decision makers contemplating further UN military intervention in Bosnia or the wider region. This sets Yugoslavia apart from other crises. In fact, one can see clearly two different responses for the same phenomenon of barbarism, respectively in Bosnia and in Iraq and Somalia. The international community reacted forcefully to pacify the latter countries. But this is not the case in the former Yugoslavia, where different standards are being applied to solve the crisis. What was not tolerated in Iraq and Somalia is being tolerated in Bosnia. The same standards are not equally applied. In Bosnia, while the victim is deprived of the right to get arms, the aggressor is allowed to arm. Although an embargo has been declared, Serbia has access to oil and the necessary means to prosecute its war.

Tougher UN sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro are based on the assumption that the generator of the war is Belgrade. At the minimum, Belgrade has a strong voice in determining the decisions that would have to be made to halt the fighting. But it is hardly believable that sanctions could destroy the will of Serbian leaders. At a maximum the sanctions can only raise the cost of what Serbs are doing. It is necessary that the UN sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro should be given a chance to work before using a military option. As a last resort, the air strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo options should be kept under consideration.
The European Community (EC) is capable of offering the Balkan states little more than economic aid or preferential access to markets. The EC does not possess distinctive military forces, and it has yet to develop a coherent persona in foreign and military policy. It has been thought that the WEU might provide the military organizational arm of the Community, and in turn of the extension of Community influence throughout Europe. However promising this may be, it too is a capability which exists only in the distant future.

To speak of Europe means the European Community, and there is no doubt that the EC is the major agent of policy and economics on our continent. But there is also no doubt that the concept of Europe extends beyond just the twelve. Irrespective of different levels and speeds of development, all parts of Europe merit international support under such great principles as peace and security. Former Yugoslavia proves that, if this is not done, the consequences can be incalculable: Europe is experiencing the triumph of barbarism, inhumanity, mass killing, rape mutilation and "ethnic cleansing."

Optimism in the effectiveness of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), particularly in the field of human rights, appears to have been only partially justified, in the light of the human tragedy engulfing Bosnia and nearby Kosovo. The CSCE is an unwieldy consultative forum for the establishment of normative procedures and the principles of human rights, it lacks the means of direct enforcement and is dependent upon the concert of the larger powers.

It is widely thought and aired that NATO is the sole factor that may guarantee peace, stability and security in the whole of Europe. NATO has the organizational capacity to deploy forces and to police a lasting armistice in Bosnia. The contingency planning which has taken place between NATO and the UN for just such a NATO "out of area" role is so far highly conditional upon the achievement of a political settlement. Certainly, this would be the precondition for Russian agreement within the UN Security Council. It is difficult to envisage any adequate plan to
respond to the broadening of the crisis, the dimensions and forms of which, would be largely unpredictable.

Clearly, in trying to solve the problems in former Yugoslavia, the international community faces a very difficult and complicated task. Many claim that a UN task force should come in, but many examples show that these units will take a long time to become effective, whereas NATO has all the qualities for performing these tasks. The concrete engagement of the North Atlantic Alliance should not only be seriously considered, but has become all but a necessity. NATO seeks to contribute to the stability of the region, and presently its ships and those of the WEU enforce the embargo on the Adriatic (Albanian ships are modestly helping implement it, too). NATO also supervises the no-fly zone in Bosnia.

NATO, as the most credible security institution, could play a central role, a move which would coincidentally help define the mission of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-cold war era. NATO should take the lead, and in the process it will transform itself in the tasks of expansion and adaptation. The time has come for NATO to show that it is worthwhile. The Yugoslav conflict is a challenge for Alliance legitimacy, and NATO must get involved and solve the crisis if she wants to remain relevant in the future.

While moral indignation pervades American and European minds over the atrocities in Bosnia, international institutions have yet to find a common understanding of such crises, a common set of goals, organizational strategies or the collective will to respond. The Western response to the bloodshed in Bosnia has been woefully inadequate. Notably, the world has waited for U.S. leadership in dealing with the Bosnia syndrome in the Balkans, and it hopes President Clinton is preparing to offer decisive leadership.

The United States appears predisposed to increase its response should the conflict spread to Kosovo. Kosovo is given special attention in American deliberations on the crisis because of the implications of a widening conflict which could threaten U.S. "strategic interests."
While there is general belief that a lasting peace in the Balkans can only be achieved with central participation by the United States, there is still no consensus among the American administration and public for wide-scale military intervention.

Unfortunately, political conditions in the United States, and the diverse attitudes among the governments of Western Europe do not lend themselves to decisive action. British and French reluctance to commit their forces to punitive military action, in addition to their "humanitarian" UN role, is consistently affirmed. Russia has supported the UN Security Council restrictions on Serbia so far, but, for domestic political reasons, is unlikely to agree to direct military interdiction in the form of aerial attacks or the deployment of troops against Serb military ground emplacements in either Bosnia or Serbia. The other European states bordering on the Balkan peninsula have neither the will nor the economic and military capacity to sustain a regional security regime and are dependent upon the initiatives of the United States and, to some extent, the Western European political community.

To sum up, it is difficult to conceive of a security structure for the Balkans which the international institutions of Europe would be willing and able to impose or guarantee.

The Bosnian catastrophe must serve as a dire warning to the international community about impending crises elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Western policy must be both preemptive and reactive. It must contain both a long term strategic vision and a package of shorter term policy responses. In the short term, steps have to be undertaken to define the role, structure and mission of preemptive peace monitoring, reactive peacemaking, and protracted peacekeeping operations.

At the moment, the question of a military solution to the dirty war in Bosnia is high on the agenda. The military option is thought to consist of lifting the arms embargo for Bosnia and directly using military elements. Air strikes against Serb targets might need to be supplemented with forces on the ground. The U.S. administration has ruled out no options beyond the use of
American ground forces to repel Serbian aggression. Therefore, a solution may be found in having a ground component, namely the Bosnian armed forces, fighting for their own territories and their own villages, and a Western air component, which makes certain that resupply of the Serbian irregulars is much more difficult, if not rendered impossible. The air strikes must not aim at population centers, but should deprive the powerful Serbian army of its aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery and logistics, so as to create conditions under which to negotiate fairly.

Prospects for Regional Security

The Balkans have long shared the common challenges of under development, imperial domination and autonomous social groups and minorities. These continuing realities suggest that internal regeneration alone of order and security remains a pessimistic hope. Even in the event of a provisional cessation of hostilities in the Balkan region, the dire economic problems and inequalities between the states will continue to sour relations, provoke political jealousies and encourage protectionist policies, to say nothing of a refugee problem which is approaching a Palestinian scale. They are unable to establish a viable financial or commercial order and are reorienting their market's relations towards the EC, the Danube region or other outside initiatives.

A lesson from the experience of Europe as a whole may be learned by the Balkan countries. There is a strong need for institutional structures, such as a micro-CSCE, for future Balkan conflict prevention negotiations. Simple and immediate confidence-building measures such as greater military transparency, particularly in sensitive border areas, and the linking of economies through bilateral contacts would be helpful as a start. In the long run, local arms control regimes can be constructed, provided the political vision and the institutional structures are present.
The bipolar world now is history. The axis of conflict is changing fast. Preoccupation with the East-West conflict rather than the economic and cultural gulf between North and South, allowed a wide range of developing nations to emerge as regional powers. The perceptions of the Bosnian war in Arab countries have illustrated the depth of the problem facing that part of the world in its relations to the West. One cannot separate the Middle East from the Mediterranean, and the Balkans may become the true hot spot of a future North-South confrontation, just as Germany and Central Europe were during the East-West dichotomy of the past.

It is not a coincidence that the entire international community—from NATO, the EC and the UN to the CSCE—is preoccupied with the Balkans. It is full of dangerous policies advocating pure ethnic states, denial of minority rights and renewed territorial aspirations between nations. There is no other way to prevent and stop the spread of the crisis in the Balkans than to overcome the historical prejudices and stereotypes which course through the region. The answer lies first in stopping the war; then in guaranteeing the Helsinki principles. There will be no peace in the Balkans if the rights and the status of ethnic minorities are not brought to the level of UN and CSCE documents. In this respect, the application of a policy of open borders and the free flow of people, goods and ideas, is the only possible way to overcome distrust, suspicion and misunderstanding. These should be the first steps for stabilizing the present crisis in this region.

From the perspective of the past two years, the EC’s failure to solve the Yugoslav conflict was largely the consequence of treating this area as a marginal region of the continent, whose integration in the EC structures is entirely uncertain. In this respect, southeast Europe differs from Central Europe, where German interests, along with dynamic internal changes in Visegrad countries, ensure their relatively quick association with the EC. Efforts of Italy to bring in Yugoslavia through the Hexagonale collided with the incipient problems which brought
war to former Yugoslavia. Yet, exclusion of the Balkans from the European integration process will have far-reaching consequences for the security of the entire continent.

The Balkans are destined to become very important, especially as a link between Europe and Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, as well as between Central Europe and the Mediterranean as a whole.

The starting point of an active Western policy toward the Balkans, but also of the Balkan countries toward West, should certainly be initiatives toward establishment of a system of bilateral and multilateral contacts, first by initiating Balkan cooperation and then by selective institutionalization. On the other side, this process should also encompass initiatives toward bilateral and multilateral linking of countries in this region with the EC and sub-regional economic groups. Important in this respect are initiatives such as Balkan cooperation and Black Sea cooperation. Although cooperation in the region is in crisis today, revival is feasible.

Finally, the fact that most Balkan countries are economically underdeveloped or faced with structural transformations means that it would be necessary to establish a comprehensive "package" of economic aid of the U.S. and the EC. Such an approach would have direct, positive effects on countries of Near and Middle East, but also of the Black Sea and Asia, for which, the Balkans could become the nearest "gate" to Europe.

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Notes


2. Author’s calculations according to the presentations and discussions in the Second Seminar on Military Doctrines organized by the Conflict Prevention Center, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Vienna, October 8-18, 1991.


4. Some analysts assess that in addition to Turkey, the Balkan countries spend annually more than US $12 billion on military budgets, and that their standing armies total more than 1,100,000 troops, 11,000 tanks and 2,200 aircraft.


7. See "The Alliance’s Strategic Concept," November 1991, NATO Office of Information and Press, pp. 5; "Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchangeable."
Southern Europe: Concerns and Implications from a Bulgarian Perspective

Mikhail Srebrev

When the leaders of Europe, the United States and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki in 1976, the world sighed with relief. It believed the Old Continent would shake off bloc confrontation and the end of the Cold War was near. That optimism, however, proved to be premature. Both the West and the East were unprepared to implement the Helsinki Final Act. Neither bloc could shake off the vestiges of prejudice and mutual mistrust that had accumulated over the past three decades. Many of the old contradictions remained in place—they were only modified and shaded.

Years had to pass before hope for real change could be revived. As a result of the events of 1989-1990, the Balkans and Europe faced a radically changed economic, political and military-strategic landscape. Communism suffered defeat. The bipolar configuration collapsed. The East European economy broke down, and the West European one moved toward the threshold of depression.

Yet, the present situation does not qualify as being particularly unique in Europe’s history. The European continent has suffered similar shocks before, ones which have radically changed its configuration and left their mark on individual European countries. If we recall them now, it is not just because they cause anxiety for the present, but they are also warnings for the future.
The deep roots of the current crisis can neither be understood nor evaluated correctly unless we review events of the last century. The results of the wars between the European countries and Napoleonic France culminated in the Vienna Congress. Under the leadership (some call it dictatorship) of Austria, Russia, England and Prussia, the old feudal order and former dynasties were restored in the countries temporarily conquered by Napoleon. More importantly, the territorial claims of the victorious countries were satisfied at the expense of the defeated countries. A new system of international relations was established, with one of its primary aims being the struggle against the national liberation movements. It was natural that the fathers of that system hoped it would be eternal or at least long-lasting; however, their expectations proved to be wrong. A new struggle for spheres of influence and markets began and found its expression in diplomatic fights, inter-state frictions and even open war. The Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the subsequent Berlin Congress (1878) turned out to be fateful for the Balkans.

As a consequence of the Russian-Turkish War, the political map of the Balkans was radically changed. The Bulgarian state was restored to its ethnic borders after five centuries under the Ottoman yoke. The Balkan territory of Turkey was greatly reduced. Russia consolidated its position and influence in the region at the expense of the other great powers, causing strong discontent in London, Vienna, and Paris and leading to the Berlin Congress.

The provisions of the Berlin Treaty revised the San Stefano Peace Treaty, curtailing Russian war-time gains and providing important economic and political privileges to the rest of the great powers. This in turn exacerbated rivalry among the countries—England, Russia and Austria-Hungary—who were most interested in the fate of the eastern Mediterranean.

In viewing the current Balkan situation, the first major conclusion is that the Berlin Treaty did not solve any national
issues but rather created new sources of tension in international relations. Henceforth, the Balkan nations’ aspirations for emancipation and independence were constant irritants needing permanent correction by the European political situation.

After World War I, the iterative reshaping of Europe began anew, and another state formation appeared on the Balkan peninsula. The creation of the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (later called the kingdom of Yugoslavia) was proclaimed on December 1, 1918. The included nations had lived in different economic, political, cultural and social conditions until the end of the first decade of the 20th century. Macedonia, Kosovo and parts of today’s Serbia and Montenegro were within the borders of Turkey until the Balkan War of 1912; Serbia and Montenegro were still monarchies until World War I, and Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Vojvodina were part of Austria-Hungary. Territories later included in Yugoslavia belonged to two empires which differed in their economic development and way of life, pre-determining their role in the kingdom of Yugoslavia—a kingdom that clearly revealed the collision between a highly-developed north and underdeveloped south. Slovenia and Croatia inherited a much more developed infrastructure than did Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

This brought about a dichotomy in the exercise of political and economic power in Yugoslavia. By virtue of a number of circumstances (the largest territory, the greatest population, the longest established state traditions), Serbia seized political power. However, Slovenia, Croatia, and, to a certain extent, Bosnia-Hercegovina wielded economic power.

Finally, religious differences had a strong influence as well. Three major religions—Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam—as well as a number of sects and smaller religions coexisted in the territory of Yugoslavia. The contradictions among these religions added fuel to national conflicts or, in some cases, even generated them.

The unitarian character of the newly created kingdom caused strong resistance, mostly in Montenegro and Croatia, which was
drowned in blood. Violence and national oppression became lasting features of Yugoslavia until its disintegration in the face of German aggression in April 1941. Disproportionate economic and cultural development, deeply-held religious differences and national inequalities and oppression were prominent characteristics of that first Yugoslavia, major factors that cannot be ignored in any analysis of the present Yugoslav crisis.

The four-year war (1941-1945) of the Yugoslav resistance against Germany and its allies did not resolve these contradictions. Despite the fact that it was a war for national liberation, it had all the characteristics of a high-intensity civil conflict. The bloodshed and irreconcilable hatred caused and suffered by all Yugoslav nations during this war relate to the present tragedy of the former Yugoslavia.

Origins of the Current Yugoslav Conflict

Any analysis of the current Yugoslav conflict runs the risk of being incomplete or imprecise, and proposals for solving the conflict risk being inadequate if the factors that initiated it are not fully taken into account. Although these factors are numerous and diverse, they can be categorized as internal or external.

Important internal factors in the history of the conflict are both political and economic in nature. After the 1948 conflict between Stalin and Tito, the development of Yugoslavia significantly deviated from the development of the other "peoples' democracies." Until the beginning of the 1970's, the model of self-government functioned well enough—primarily due to generous Western support. Beginning in the mid 1970's, however, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) slid into a severe crisis, and towards the end of the 1980's, the policy of self-government suffered complete failure.

As the central government weakened, the economic disparities among SFRY federal units deepened. One of the most attractive aims formulated in the constitution and other
documents was the elimination of economic backwardness in the underdeveloped regions. In practice, however, those goals were Utopian—the differences not only remained, they increased. For example, the ratio between the per capita gross national product in the economically most backward region (Kosovo) and the most developed republic (Slovenia), was 1:3.2 in 1950 and 1:7 in 1980 in favor of Slovenia.

Complicated national problems were another important factor. The proclaimed "brotherhood and unity" of the Yugoslav peoples turned out to be unattainable. Nationalist conflicts were never eliminated, and they periodically boiled to the surface, shaking the federation to its very core. The Yugoslav Communist Party—the Union of Yugoslav Communists—established a system (defined by some researchers as "secondary territorial division") that created administrative boundaries with intentional disregard for existing ethnic boundaries. This system caused nationalist and inter-republican conflicts and increased the dissatisfaction of all administrative-territorial units. Discontent has always been present in Yugoslav history, but it sharpened visibly during the second half of the 1980's—since Tito's death—deepening the general crisis in Yugoslav society.

The disastrous and disparate economic situation finally brought the crisis to a head when the developed republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared their unwillingness to render any further economic assistance to the hopelessly lagging economies of Montenegro, Macedonia and especially Kosovo. The latter, for their part, argued that they could no longer accept the role of being resource appendages to the developed northwest republics.

Adding fuel to inter-republic economic tension, reaction against the political structure of the Yugoslav Federation itself gained momentum. Powerful secessionist propensities were born in Slovenia. Slogans for an independent state reappeared in Croatia. Kosovo, never reconciled with losing its autonomy, raised more frequent calls for becoming a republic. Serbia rejected constitutional restrictions limiting its jurisdiction to the territory of the Serb republic—it also wanted control over the
autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Supplemented by similar processes taking place in the other republics, these trends gave birth to a clash between federalists and confederates. In the initial stages, the principal federalists were Serbia and Montenegro, and the confederates were Slovenia and later Croatia.

In summation, near the end of the 1980's, SFRY found itself in a crisis of confidence unseen since World War II, unparalleled in its most recent history and distributed across all social strata—a crisis which brought about the dissolution of the "marriage of convenience" between the Yugoslav people.

The natural question is: why did Yugoslavia not fall apart earlier? The answer to this question lies in the second group of factors—the external ones. Again, history played a role. Seventy-five years ago, Yugoslavia was born as the result of both internal and external conventions. Internally, the long-lasting aspirations of some southern Slavs were crowned by the unification and creation of a common state. Those aspirations, however, could not have been fulfilled without the consent and approval of the great powers. Consequently, the external convention, the Versailles system, turned out to be most decisive; it sanctioned the foundation of a kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. Yugoslavia did not survive only as a result of Versailles, however. The Yalta agreements and the notorious "50-50" agreement between Churchill and Stalin contributed greatly.

Today, some analysts consider that the 1989 Malta Summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, by revising and correcting Yalta, significantly contributed to the ultimate decomposition of SFRY. What are the arguments behind such an assessment? First, it is indisputable that with the demolition of the bipolar bloc, especially the elimination of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia lost much of its political and geo-strategic importance to the great powers. Yugoslavia had been a "buffer" between the two great military-political blocs. It was also a test site for adjustments to the political and economic systems of the former
socialist countries. The Yugoslav leadership took advantage of its valued position in a most sophisticated way, receiving colossal financial infusions and essential political support from both sides, particularly the West. The conclusion that the SFRY profited for decades from the Cold War is by no means far-fetched. Whether, however, the end of the Cold War brought about the end of Yugoslavia is still an issue for debate.

The foreign policy of Yugoslavia was based on the country's involvement in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), of which Yugoslavia was one of the co-founders and Tito its leader. The Yugoslav leadership succeeded in avoiding any potentially severe consequences while at the same time adopting a fairly independent foreign policy. The nation soon achieved a prestige in international circles which went far beyond its economic clout and grew along with the growing importance of the NAM. But the changes taking place in Europe and the world during the late 1980's and early 1990's greatly curtailed the role of the nonaligned countries in world politics. With the marginalization of the NAM on the world scene, its founders and leaders were also marginalized, especially those in the SFRY.

As the 1980's drew to a close, Yugoslavia and its fermenting crises were buffeted by developments across Eastern Europe, particularly within the former Soviet Union. The sweeping aside of totalitarian regimes and attempts to implement market economies could not pass by the SFRY. In spite of all the differences cited earlier, there were still too many similarities between Yugoslavia and her imploding East European neighbors to immunize the SFRY from radical change.

However important history may determine that the internal and external factors were, neither by itself could have caused the destruction of the Yugoslav Federation. It was the unfortunate nexus of both which made life together for the Yugoslav republics and their national minorities impossible and brought the country to violent disintegration.
Basic Trends in the Yugoslav Conflict

Viewed strategically, the Yugoslav conflict has completely remade the political and military Balkan maps. The political upheaval is particularly stark. Five new states—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia (or Skopje) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)—rose from the corpse of the old Yugoslav Federation. Radical strategic change, however, has not resulted in a new order, but rather a sinking from tenuous order into complete turmoil. The complex and unsettled international legal status of the new states; the diffused, inconsistent response of the rest of the world to their birth; and the feverish nationalism of their internal development have created a dangerous and difficult-to-fathom geo-strategic chemistry across the peninsula.

Along with the political changes sweeping the rest of Europe, some parts of the political monism in the Balkan republics broke away in the form of new, more pluralistic governments. Acclaimed as progress, this process had unfortunate by-products. Most prominent was the lack of clearly formulated national interests or foreign policy vis-a-vis newly acquired neighbors. There was simply too little time to learn the process of international politics or to build consensus and perhaps consider less costly alternatives—too little time before crisis struck.

Of all the states in the region, the political process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is most supportive of its government’s approach to the conflict—at least as far as the war in Croatia and support of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina are concerned. This point is significant—at the moment, there are no important differences between the ruling administration and the opposition on national objectives or how to pursue them. That allows a high degree of certainty in forecasting that, even with shuffles among government officials, there will be no serious changes in the foreign policy of FRY, especially with respect to the situation of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Belgrade’s
strength also helps in anticipating the reactions of other countries in the region to Serbia’s policies.

The foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Slovenia have undergone perhaps the most fundamental revision since its independence. Slovenia’s new aim is to disengage from all its Balkan neighbors and affiliate itself with Central Europe. In order to disassociate Slovenia from the Balkans’ troubles, Ljubljana has tried to ignore the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia and will likely support, even passively, only those regional states whose interests coincide with its own. At the moment, one such country is Croatia. However, Croatian-Slovenian friction over some border issues and economic problems has emerged since both states gained sovereignty, and continuing tensions or cool relations between Slovenia and Croatia are anticipated.

Internal political turmoil in Croatia and the unfinished war with Serbia will be decisive factors in shaping the new Croatian foreign policy. There is general agreement among all political factions that the demands of Belgrade and the Serbs in Croatia for secession from the Croatian state are unacceptable. However, on a number of other issues—the most important being the methods for preserving unity with Serb-controlled territory—Croatian public opinion is divided, in some cases polarized, regarding both the ends and means of national policy. The solutions to the Serbian question offered by the present Croatian government do not have broad public support.

The future development of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is difficult to forecast. Bosnia exists nominally, but not in reality. Evidence of Bosnia’s limbo lies in both a lack of international recognition and in the Serbian Republic dictating, de facto, the development of events in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The future policy of the Bosnian government will continue to be reactive and look, perhaps furtively, for ways to end the conflict at some point short of capitulation. Whatever the result, the Bosnian Muslims will be the most injured party. The elements
of a new conflict have already been established, predetermining a short duration for the next peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

All indicators point to Kosovo as the next center of the Yugoslavian crisis. This is corroborated by the strong discontent of the Kosovo Albanians with their present status, by the unwillingness of Belgrade to make concessions, and by the inconsistent application of pressure from external powers. In attempting to force the Yugoslav government to compromise, the world community has encouraged the Albanian people to unrealistically expect support. On the other hand, the continuous propaganda surrounding the conflict inevitably creates dangerous attitudes and hinders future negotiations. It must be made immutably clear that the Kosovo knot will be untied only by political means. The Kosovo problem can be solved only with the maximum good will of the politicians of both Serbia and Kosovo, and with the active engagement of the international community in crisis prevention and peacekeeping.

Because of the unsettled international legal status of the republic, the FYR of Macedonia continues to maneuver and is unwilling to commit itself on some of the most important aspects of Balkan relations. With the admission of the republic to the United Nations (UN) and its full recognition by the international community, its concerns will no doubt be clarified and addressed more explicitly.

In analyzing the crisis' military aspects, several important considerations are relevant. First, the issue of security goes beyond the regional Balkan framework and becomes an all-European concern. Europe and its Balkan region are more closely related and interdependent in the sphere of military-political security than in any other sphere. Western and Eastern Europe could be divided—not just along the border of prosperity and poverty as some have observed (quite accurately), but also on the basis of security and the lack of security. The new system of collective security in Europe is only in its initial stage of formation. So far the system has functioned ineffectively and has not put out any of the military fires in Europe. There are
different views among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries about the future functions and tasks of their organization. The European Community faces new serious political and economic difficulties which will delay the integration of the Balkan countries into the community, thus making political and economic stability problematic. All this causes reasonable concern and uncertainty. The attempts of the West to fence itself off from the confusion and chaos spinning in the Balkans are understandable, but the apprehension of the Balkan countries that the new system may turn out to be not all-European but only West European is also understandable.

Second, the existing imbalance in armaments and armed forces of the Balkan states is a regional balance of power concern. The armed forces of the former Yugoslavia which are not subject to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty remain comparatively large. Before the disintegration of the federation and the loss of some forces from the territories of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, military observers ranked the Yugoslav People's Army fourth or fifth among European armies. At the moment, the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consists of 150,000 people, 80 percent of them in the land forces. After mobilization, the armed forces would grow to 600,000, which would automatically turn Yugoslavia into a regional military power with exceptional potential and rich combat experience. After mobilization, only Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina would be able to sustain military forces roughly equivalent to those of the FRY. The maintenance of combat readiness in the future, however, will be related to a number of structural changes. For now, there is a ratio of approximately 1:1 in personnel between Croatia and FRY, but the ratio in respect to armament and equipment heavily favors the FRY Army. The military capabilities of the other countries are extremely limited in comparison. The situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) is especially dramatic because its army is just being formed and
does not have, nor will it have for some time, modern armaments.

Concerns voiced over the widening and the intensification of the Bosnian conflict are founded in part on the troubling military imbalance across the Balkans. It is obvious that expanding the war will present Europe with problems of tragic consequences. Such a possibility should be eliminated—one way to do this is to reduce the imbalance in armaments of the respective countries to acceptable limits; another way is to compensate for the imbalance through effective security guarantees. A dominant military power is not in the interest of either the Balkans or Europe.

In any discussion of the economic aspects of the Yugoslav crisis, the first conclusion is that the majority of the Balkan countries (with the possible exception of Slovenia) will suffer from the consequences of the present war for a long time. A second, sobering fact is that adaptation to market principles and mechanisms will be particularly painful for all the former republics of Yugoslavia (as well as for Albania, Bulgaria and Romania). If we add to this forecast the anticipation that the remaining two countries from the region, Turkey and Greece, will not be spared the impacts of recession, we come to the conclusion that the entire peninsula is faced with a most grievous economic situation. The economic sanctions imposed under the United Nations have affected not only the FRY, but other Balkan states as well (mostly Bulgaria and the FYRM), causing unrest, resistance and calls for compensation for the huge sanction-induced losses. It appears inevitable that economic disaster will not only further destabilize the Balkans but cause repercussions across the whole continent as well. The mission of all European structures and the European Community in particular must be to minimize this economic instability.

Though at first the moral and psychological aspects of the Yugoslav crisis seem of secondary importance, they will have a lasting influence on the post-conflict situation in the region. One of the most serious continuing problems is nationalism. The people living on the Balkan peninsula cannot shake off the
suspicions that Western Europe is unable to fully appreciate this problem. The national emancipation of the continent’s western part during the last century is still at issue in the Balkans today. The national and minority problems are often territorial ones, and both political theory and practice have proved repeatedly that the minority-territorial knot is highly volatile, carrying with it a huge, negative charge.

The decomposition of the Yugoslav Federation, the formation of new Balkan states, and the wars and military conflicts have expanded and deepened existing problems and added new ones which are no less dangerous. The second largest refugee flow since World War II is being generated from Yugoslavia, and it already threatens the economies of even the most developed European countries. Several difficult national problems have emerged, the most serious being the Serbian-Albanian tensions, primarily over Kosovo. These problems are aggravated by the complexities of dividing public and state property and by the suffering of separated families. The moral traumas of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia will take years to cure. The injuries, physical as well as psychological, suffered by Bosnia-Hercegovina will influence the politics and sentiments of successive generations. The damages increase as the crisis deepens and as the conflict spreads into other territories. Unless we use the most just criteria and find the most acceptable compromises, the Balkans of the future will be a smoldering nationalist volcano which can erupt at the slightest provocation. With such a perspective, the nations from the region will find it difficult to remain calm and can only hope that their preoccupation is understood and shared by the West European countries as well.

A Solution to the Yugoslav Conflict

The continuation and deepening of the crisis in former Yugoslavia entail enormous risks for the Republic of Bulgaria.
The conflicts in the former SFRY have become one of the most serious challenges for Bulgaria's new foreign policy. There are two grave dangers imbedded in the Yugoslav conflict which have direct relevance to the security of Bulgaria—the possibility of spillover and the impact of refugees.

The first danger is the assumption that if the Yugoslav nightmare is not ended quickly and decisively, it may spread south and include Kosovo and the FYRM. A possible conflagration in Kosovo (which most specialists deem more probable) would inevitably engage some or all of its neighboring countries. Most Balkan experts share the opinion that the potential for spill-over into the FYRM, while not imminent, is very real. At the same time, they unanimously agree that any involvement of the Republic of Macedonia would have disastrous consequences. Known as "the apple of contention," Macedonia has been the cause of much friction and conflict (two Balkan wars included) between Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Turkey since the end of the last century. There is no doubt that military action by any of these countries against the FYRM would inevitably involve the rest of them, and most probably Albania also. The complex and intertwining interests of different European and non-European powers in this important geopolitical space makes active intervention by non-Balkan and even non-European actors a real possibility.

The second danger is based on the presumption that if the war continues in Bosnia-Hercegovina and potentially spreads to new territories, huge numbers of people will seek refuge in other countries. If West European countries close their borders, refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina can go only as far as neighboring countries. This will generate complex problems, including xenophobic reactions to refugees.

Aside from obvious political and security implications, the consequences to the Bulgarian economy of a drawn-out conflict and massive influx of refugees may be exceptionally grave. Bulgaria is probably the country most seriously affected by the UN economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Its shortest land
routes to Western Europe have been disrupted and navigation along the Danube is difficult. The cost of exported products has risen several times over and makes delivery impossible to West and Central European markets, as well as to markets of the two former Yugoslavian republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The UN embargo raises barriers to commercial and economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—relations that are particularly important to the Bulgarian economy because of the geography, complementary economies, the lack of linguistic barriers, and common difficulties in finding more exacting markets for products, etc.

The fact that Bulgaria is an immediate neighbor of Serbia and a country which has signed the Danube Convention raises yet another difficulty. The international community expects Bulgaria to actively exercise control over traffic along the Danube. However, Bulgarian material-technical capabilities, personnel and other resources, and the lack of experience in similar situations all make it very difficult to meet such expectations. Besides, Bulgaria must consider the danger of provocation along the Danube, so it welcomes understanding and cooperation from West European countries, the United States and multilateral European institutions. The recently signed memorandum with the Western European Union (WEU) has been an important step in this direction.

Bulgaria intends to do its best to prevent either an expanded conflict or an increase in the flow of refugees. The government and its competent authorities are making enormous efforts to reduce the negative consequences of the embargo, even though the results thus far are hardly encouraging. It is determined to observe the UN sanctions as long as they are in force, but Bulgaria will continue to seek just and sufficient compensation for its huge losses. First and foremost, however, the overall objective remains to stop hostilities and to prevent spillover to other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Recognizing Yugoslav and Balkan realities and following the principles of international law, the political leaders of Bulgaria
have supported the actions of the international community aimed at ending the Yugoslav crisis. Bulgaria is convinced that the best way to achieve peace in the Balkans is through negotiation by all interested countries, with the active mediation of all relevant international actors, particularly the UN and the European Community (EC). While Bulgaria appreciates the effort expended thus far to end the conflict, the international community has been inconsistent and indecisive in some respects. The continuing search for solutions by West European countries such as the United States and Russia is encouraging, and the main provisions of the Vance-Owen plan are a beginning, even though they do not take into account certain important realities. However, there are still many available resources that should be employed as vigorously and effectively as possible.

Nonetheless, Bulgaria is not naively optimistic, and therefore does not reject, *a priori*, the use of military means to resolve the crisis. The use of military means is, however, by definition an extreme measure. We should resort to force only when it becomes clear that all other means are fruitless. If such proves to be the case, a sober evaluation of the situation and earnest political wisdom are needed. A military solution is difficult because of the complicated, contradictory and in some cases even mutually exclusive interests of some West European countries, the United States and Russia. These divided interests may explain the indecisiveness of the West about an effective military intervention in the tragedy in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

There are two other factors we cannot ignore—the *operational environment* and the *national psychology* of the Serbs. The geographic features of Bosnia-Hercegovina are mountainous, allowing for continuous guerilla action. In addition, the people of the republic learned resistance methods quite well during World War II. The three ethnic groups have accumulated great quantities of armament and munitions, and functioning war industry plants in the region will support resistance for a long time. A considerable foreign force will be necessary to challenge this environment, with no solid guarantee
of success. Moreover, there are justified fears that any military intervention could lead to complications similar to those in Vietnam, Afghanistan or worse.

The second factor, the national psychology of the Serbs, must also be considered. The Serbs are freedom-loving people and decisively reject any action which they regard as intervention in their internal affairs. Outside pressure only consolidates them in their struggle to protect their national interests.

Bulgaria has repeatedly declared its determination not to get involved in a military solution to the Yugoslav conflict. Strict neutrality is the only correct decision, and the motives behind it are easy to explain. The Balkans are out of breath. There is not a single state in the region which is not burdened with unsolved minority and territorial problems. There is not a single state in which some group has not laid claim to its immediate neighbors. For this reason, any involvement of neighboring countries in the Yugoslav conflict will be met with suspicion—it will be assessed as an attempt to gain position or as an aspiration for revenge, or both. Therefore, the majority of the Balkan states agree they must show restraint and political foresight.

It is not possible to eliminate the real Yugoslav crisis or the potential Balkan one by forcefully imposing the will of any of Balkan or non-Balkan country, no matter what economic, political or military power it may possess. The end of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the reduction of tensions between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia and the resolution of other contentious issues will be achieved only through consensus among all the countries in the region.

The basic objectives should be the elimination of conflict and tension throughout the Balkans and the preservation of the peninsula as a unified economic and political whole within the framework of a united Europe. The region cannot develop in ways which contradict the dominant integration processes on the continent. If the present regional disintegration is not reversed, the Balkans may regain their lamentable reputation as "the powder keg of Europe"—a development which the Balkan
nations, the West and the international community clearly do not want.

Finally, the security of the individual Balkan countries and the peninsula as a whole is critical to the present and future of the region. None of the countries in the region is independently capable of guaranteeing its borders or the inviolability of its sovereignty, therefore collective guarantees are necessary for all Balkan countries. Axes or alliances directed against third countries are not the answer. Such a task cannot be successful and lasting without the active participation and support of the European security structures, namely of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and NATO. However, the involvement of these structures to date in solving the vital problems of the Balkan countries has been clearly inadequate.

Realizing that the conflagration in "the powder keg of Europe," can hardly be eliminated without the participation and the support of the entire international community, this involvement must be consistent with the interests of the Balkan countries. Any attempt to derive economic, political or military dividends at the expense of any Balkan or non-Balkan country can only cause new tensions and suffering. The powers influencing world policy must not let this happen.
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The Yugoslav Crisis has become chronic. The main reasons for the continuation of the crisis are complex and are exacerbated by the contradictory nature of the international efforts aimed at solving it. International mediation itself is hampered by a justified reluctance to becoming entangled in a conflict the outside world cannot comprehend, and by an underground clash between major power interests over the outcome in the former Yugoslavia.

The crisis is bad for both Europe and Romania. It is bad for Europe because during the Cold War, Europe became a highly integrated continent in security terms. If Sarajevo could trigger a world war in 1914, it can trigger one even more so in the 1990's provided the present conflict persists long enough for old rivalries between the great powers to reappear or new ones to form. It is bad for Romania because the crisis aggravates Romania's security problem—achieving a very complex, difficult and painful transition while positioned between two open conflicts, one in the former Yugoslavia and the other in the former Soviet Union.

The Conflict

The Yugoslav conflict looks different depending on the angle from which it is observed. The humanitarian angle is certainly the most visible, and therefore the one which is most intensely manipulated politically. Killings, rapes, prison camp detentions and ethnic cleansing, although shocking, are only the tip of the iceberg. Because such things are dutifully reported by the
international media, they are frequently used for propaganda purposes in order to mobilize public and diplomatic support and to condemn "the other side."\textsuperscript{1}

The "Balkan" angle presents the conflict as irrefutable evidence of the perpetual violence and proverbial lack of civilization which characterizes a region incapable of overcoming its traditional role as Europe's powder keg. In today's terms, this might translate to the incapacity to learn and practice democracy and free market economics. In fact, this is the same rationale Central European powers have used to disassociate themselves from the rest of Eastern Europe since the revolution of 1989.

A third approach highlights the ideological angle, emphasizing factors that contributed to the conflict in the beginning. From this view, the conflict was started by the Communist Serbs in an attempt to save themselves from the condemnation of history by creating Greater Serbia. Indeed, if one looks at both the media campaign against Milosevic in the late 1980's and the mass demonstrations of the opposition in Belgrade in late 1991, it is easy to accept that line of reasoning. Yugoslavia had to pay the price of lagging 50% behind the rest of Eastern Europe immediately after 1989, whereas they had enjoyed a 50 percent advantage up until then.\textsuperscript{2}

Still others prefer to look at the conflict from a religious angle, presenting it primarily as a clash between Christianity and Islam. They start from the premise that the present front line coincides roughly with the line dividing the two religions (and civilizations) in the Balkans before World War I.

Last, and probably most important, is the geo-strategic angle. This view looks chiefly at the significance of Yugoslavia's breakup as it affects the redistribution of the balance of power in Europe, a process that has been taking place since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. In a way, Yugoslavia is the quintessence of the entire Balkan area: it is strategically located and, therefore, important; and it is "mosaic" in ethnic, religious, cultural and traditional terms and, therefore, destined to be "divided and ruled." Indeed, over time, the Balkans have
demonstrated a remarkable consistency when the relationship between internal cooperation and external involvement are compared—the former is paralyzed or extinguished every time the latter increases in intensity. Today is no exception.

At an important international conference held in Munich in November 1992, it was noted that:

While the outside actors might not be divided by conflicts of interests, there could be some friction among them because of differing historical and cultural sympathies. Like Russia, the United Kingdom and France have often been viewed as having a traditional attachment to Serbia, while Germany, Austria, and Hungary feel closer to the Croats and Slovenes. Turkey, for its part, has special links to the Muslims and the Albanians.

Indeed, while Germany pressed its European partners hard to recognize the newly proclaimed independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the Anglo-Americans issued intermittent warnings about the dangers in Kosovo and Macedonia, and Russia remained aloof. All are evidence of a significantly increased external interest in the region.

Essentially, the military conflict started when the Serbs—whose fate and reactions were not considered beforehand—reacted violently to the proclamation of independence by first Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and later by Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992. The fact that the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina has proven to be impossible to settle is due to the unique nature of this republic—if Yugoslavia is the quintessence of the Balkans, Bosnia-Hercegovina is the quintessence of the former Yugoslavia. And if one considers the mountainous terrain, its rough climate, as well as its long warring traditions, one gets a rough image of the reasons why the conflict rages on.

In sum, because the conflict cannot be viewed accurately from just one of these angles, it certainly must be viewed in some respect from all of them. Any solution addressing only one or the other of the above described viewpoints will not suffice.
An integrated approach—perhaps with the geo-strategic aspect and its implications given prominence—is required. And if one takes into account the irreparable damage done to ethnic coexistence by this protracted conflict, it might be no less true that ethnic security is the key to its resolution.5

From this point of view, the proposal currently on the table—forceful action to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept a detailed plan which does not respond to either their major interests or the reality on the ground—seems to be only a partial solution. It aims at solving only a part (although a central part) of the present Yugoslav conflict. The current plan should either be extended or supplemented with other plans in order to address the remaining active components (Krajna, for instance) or latent components (Kosovo, Macedonia, and perhaps even Vojvodina) of the conflict.

Significance and Implications for Romania

The significance of the Yugoslav conflict to Romania is manifold. First and foremost, from the political and legal point of view, the breakup of the former federal state of Yugoslavia (and of Czechoslovakia, for that matter) is a de facto blow to the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty mandated Romania's reunification with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina—all ancient Romanian provinces—and established them as part of the territorial status quo after World War I.6 This is certainly not an encouraging factor in an environment increasingly critical of the treaty, especially in Central Europe.

Therefore, the Yugoslav conflict might have a highly destabilizing effect on the foundation on which peace, security and stability in Europe currently rest, namely the Helsinki Final Act. According to that document, European borders are not to be modified through the use of force; such changes are permitted only if the parties involved agree to them. In fact, the first such modification took place when German reunification was
accomplished. A number of other territorial transformations have also taken place—for example, the breakdown of the former federal states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Czechoslovakia. It is true that they did so peacefully (at least for the time being), but their existing internal borders have become international borders and are therefore subject to the Helsinki Final Act, which must be preserved.

Yugoslavia, though, is a special case. Not only has that country broken apart violently, but internal armed conflict, particularly in Bosnia-Hercegovina, threatens to create a dangerous precedent. While the conflict rages on, an increasing number of voices are advocating internal territorial changes because other solutions do not seem to be in sight. If this were done, a powerful legal precedent contradicting the Helsinki Final Act would be created, one by which other instances (provoked or unprovoked) could be "solved" in the future. This perspective is not encouraging for a country like Romania, which experienced the violence of the 1989 Revolution. Indeed, Romania, and not Yugoslavia, might be viewed as the first victim of violent dismemberment because its revolution centered on a prolonged armed conflict between the former Securitate—protecting the dictator—and the Army—fighting against the dictator.

The Yugoslav conflict has also altered Yugoslavia's political relations with Romania. For hundreds of years, Romania's surest border was with Yugoslavia. Mutual respect and friendship were the result of long-term political cooperation stretching from the struggle against the Turks to the common opposition to the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. An example of this cooperation was the president of Romania's ability to meet with almost all the leaders in the region during his recent visit to the former Yugoslavia. Following the imposition of United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions, however, Romania honored its international obligations first. Inevitably, this policy will affect Romania's leverage in Belgrade and test the above-mentioned good relations with Yugoslavia.
Because of good political relations, economic ties between the two countries developed extensively over the years, especially since 1964. Observance of UN Security Council-imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia has cost Romania dearly, particularly at a time when the country needs capital badly. Her access to external financing—compared to other Eastern countries—has been meager, to say the least. In all, by the end of 1992, direct and indirect losses and damages to the Romanian economy were estimated at approximately US $7 billion.

The river Danube is another resource strongly affected by the present situation. Its importance has increased substantially since it was linked with the Rhine river, making it the largest waterway on the European continent. The negative impact of the Yugoslav conflict has been felt both legally and physically. In a legal sense, the exercise of national authority has already been altered to a certain extent due to the need to enforce sanctions. In turn, there are physical difficulties in enforcing the embargo and in preparing for some of the worst contingencies—oil spills, or flooding caused by the destruction of dams.

Negative impacts on Romania would increase if the conflict intensified as a result of UN-sanctioned external military intervention. The negative consequences would accrue in two respects. First, it is probable that the political climate in the region as a whole would deteriorate, thus permitting those ready to fish in muddy waters more room for maneuver. Second, if Serbia were to become a direct target, then Kosovo and, perhaps, Vojvodina would immediately become "hot" areas because they are already "fused" for conflict. Needless to say, if Kosovo is affected, the prospects for a general Balkan war increase correspondingly. The same goes for Macedonia. With regard to Vojvodina, any deterioration in the situation of the Hungarians living there might have serious repercussions on Romania's Hungarian minority. On one hand, it is highly probable that they would use increased international awareness and sympathy to further their isolationist (perhaps even unionist) aims in Transylvania. On the other hand, if things go badly, refugees
may flood the Banat, an area of Romania which has become politically sensitive since December 1989.

As one can see, the violence in the former Yugoslavia has a considerable potential for triggering a Balkan-wide conflict. The problems with such a conflict are at least two-fold. First, it would most certainly be a very bloody war and one that would be extremely difficult to extinguish. Second, it would be very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to ensure insulation vis-a-vis potential Muslim fundamentalist involvement. Meaningful involvement from the Muslim world would add a completely new dimension to the current conflict with potentially uncontrollable consequences not just for Europe, but perhaps for the world at large. Therefore, urging decisionmakers to exercise extreme caution is probably the least one can do to avoid such nightmarish consequences.

Western Support

There is no doubt that the present association of former Warsaw Pact members with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is reassuring. Even in the absence of expressed NATO security guarantees, it is encouraging that Romania, together with Russia, is part of the same consultative framework, meeting regularly and voicing Romania’s security concerns freely—concerns which will be taken into account and incorporated into NATO planning. However, there are problems with this arrangement.

The greatest concern involves the unity of the West. There are some in Romania who have reservations about Western unity continuing into the future. The disappearance of the main enemy, the Soviet Union and its military power; the rebellious economic recession (a belated price for defeating communism?); the opening of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union to Western competition; and the general remodelling of the world
balance of power—all these factors pose serious questions about the fate of the West’s unity, a unity which was essential to the defeat of communism. These fears are not calmed by: the present competitive course on which NATO and WEU have apparently engaged—knowing that the European Community (EC), in contrast to NATO, has been created to counter U.S. competition; the considerable difficulties encountered recently by the furthering of Western European integration; and the tendency for nations to act independently of their Western multilateral institutions. Quite the contrary, these elements fuel fears about the West’s unity, thus burdening those who struggle to convince their countries that only an extended cooperation with Western institutions and organizations will solve their financial, technological and security problems.

Western institutions and organizations are uncertain as to how to respond to the persistent attempts of some Warsaw Pact countries to have them take sides in local conflicts. These countries either exaggerate the dangers they face or invent new ones. The West must stick firmly to the principle of strict equality of treatment in order to guarantee a continuing collaboration with all former Warsaw Pact member countries, as well as the maintenance of peace and security in the whole of Eastern Europe.

Romania’s Position Vis-a-Vis the Yugoslav Conflict

Romania’s official position with regard to the Yugoslav conflict has three fundamental components. First, the only viable solution to the conflict is one which can be reached peacefully and by the parties directly involved. Therefore, irrespective of how impatient the outside world might become, its main mission is to bring the parties to the negotiating table and facilitate their agreement.
Second, Romania will firmly abstain from any military involvement in the conflict, not to protect its leverage in Belgrade, but in order to not complicate things further given the specific territorial interests of some neighbors former Yugoslavia. Also, Romania has no specially trained troops for this kind of mission. Needless to say, direct peacekeeping and peace enforcing by Romania are out of the question.

Third, Romania has declared its availability to help find a solution to the conflict. The advantages of Romania’s assistance are: it is neutral in regard to the outcome of the conflict itself, it has good relations with practically all former Yugoslav republics, and it has an accurate understanding of the situation because of her knowledge of the Balkan region.

Romania has tried to find diplomatic solutions ever since the summer of 1991 because it is convinced that all the postwar years of Balkan cooperation will become meaningless unless we adopt a more active attitude towards finding a solution to the current conflict. Unfortunately, thus far those efforts have proven fruitless. Recently, President Iliescu visited Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade in an effort to inform himself on the real situation and on the positions of those states, and to induce the parties to continue their attempts at finding a solution to this costly and dangerous conflict. The results of that visit are currently under evaluation. It should be noted, however, that Romania’s efforts are meant to be a supplement to, not a substitute for, the efforts of the international community. Although the Vance-Owen plan seems to be the only solution, a preliminary assessment suggests that it can also be improved upon.
Notes

1. In spite of the general recognition that all parties to the conflict are currently engaged in committing such crimes, only the Serbs get the "credit" for it on the basis that either they were the first to engage in such despicable practices, or they committed them on a larger scale. This is unacceptable as a matter of principle.

2. In October 1944, during his visit to Moscow, Churchill offered Stalin a deal over the Balkans in which Yugoslavia was "divided" fifty-fifty between Western and Russian influence. Stalin graciously obliged by accepting the offer.

3. For instance, the first multilateral structures for Balkan cooperation were erected after World War I when the traditional external competitors—Austria-Hungary backed by Germany, Russia, and Turkey—disappeared from the scene. Cooperation became paralyzed again immediately after German and Italian aggression returned to the area at the beginning of the World War II, only to be revived once more in the relatively stable environment created by the inclusion of the region in the Soviet-American world balance of power. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, that cooperation is again paralyzed following the breakdown of that balance.

5. Ethnic cleansing, however despicable, reflects a deep sense of insecurity because local ethnic groups cannot conceive of living in areas other than those inhabited exclusively by their own group.

6. Later that status quo was generally reconfirmed through both the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

7. Given these rapid legal changes, it is no wonder Romanians do not encourage "federalist" suggestions, even though they are often presented as being in consonance with the "future" of the continent.

8. "However, one cannot exclude the modification of borders from the outset, because a possible conflict can thus be solved at least partially in a given area. For example, we can envisage a border modification in the disintegrating Yugoslavia, of course if all the sides agree on this." (Interview with Foreign Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Gyorgy Csonyi of the Hungarian Forum, *FBIS-EEU-93-103*, 22 January 1993, p. 29.)

9. "Let me give you a few practical guidelines on how to manufacture and conduct an ethnic war, not just in Eastern Europe: if you gave me the control of the media, weapons, and gangs of racists, cutthroats and pillagers, I could spark an ethnic war in Washington D.C., New York City or Chicago in 30 minutes... Given the money, weaponry, and media monopoly, any cunning politician can provoke an 'ethnic' or 'racial' war in virtually any multi-ethnic or multi-religious village, city, region, or state." Janusz Bugajski, "Balkan Futures: Understanding Ethnic Conflict," paper presented at Slovenia Conference, 22 April 1993, p. 10.

10. Industrial losses were evaluated at US $3 billion as a result of disrupted production links, cancelled shipments of commodities and raw materials, and unsold goods, especially in the fields of machine-building industry, petrochemistry, chemistry and metallurgy. Transport recorded losses estimated at US $0.1 billion, agriculture and food industry—US $2.7 billion, tourism—US $0.6, and uncollected custom taxes—US $0.6 billion.
11. If one defines Eastern Europe in geo-political terms as the area between Germany and Russia and takes into account both the reunification of Germany and the physical removal of Russia from the river's shores, the recently increased strategic importance of the Danube, coupled with the tightening of the external controls on it (for the time being through the Western European Union (WEU)), is hardly reassuring for the river countries themselves. Moreover, what if sometime in the future, Russian forces sent on peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia make the river their main supply route? This would, most certainly, diminish Romania's value as a potential physical filter for Russia's traditional imperial aims in the Balkans.

12. It is rather strange to blame Romania and/or Bulgaria for not stopping those in breach of the embargo, while carefully avoiding doing anything negative with respect to the real source of those unauthorized transports. (On the other hand, it is difficult to believe those who say that this is another instance of the disadvantage of not possessing nuclear weapons.)

13. Some specialists claim that an oil spill from a normal size convoy of barges might be worse than the "Exxon Valdez" catastrophe, or that the destruction of the dams would create a tidal wave 12.9 m high which would travel 40 km in 78 minutes, flooding a vast area down the river.

14. The tragic experience of 1940 is still very vivid in Romania's mind. Then, following the Hitler-Stalin deal and the annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina by the latter two months later, Hungary blackmailed Germany into imposing on Romania an arbitrary "settlement" of her territorial claims, following which Hungary received half of Transylvania with more Romanians than Hungarians. It was able to do so by threatening to declare war on Romania unless her claims were not satisfied at once. Germany—then fully engaged in the battle of Britain—badly needed to avoid a war in Romania, which was her main source of oil supplies to support the air offensive. Consequently, it pressured Romania to accept the Hungarian claims, with the above mentioned tragic result. With that experience in mind, no wonder few Romanians would be happy with the inevitable
deterioration of the situation in the entire area following such an increase in military activity in former Yugoslavia.

15. It should be noted that the present demands of the Hungarian minority in Romania for territorial autonomy—a request which ignores the de facto self-government the Hungarians enjoy in the areas where they are in majority, following the free local elections held every four years—are already counting on the future autonomy they expect the Serbs would enjoy in the former Yugoslav republics after the conflict.

16. Especially if coupled with the present apparent reinvigoration of Islamic forces in other Balkan countries such as Bulgaria.

17. Given the fact that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was created on a basis which no longer exists and that it does not have actual "muscle," it is clear that the real source for security on the continent is provided by Western political and military institutions. However, the CSCE will continue to play an important role in this delicate field, and Romania will continue to work fully with it and honor obligations generated by decisions made within that framework.

18. In general, Romania declared its intentions to participate with troops in such missions starting in 1994, when she hopes to have a battalion-strength force fully equipped and trained for such purposes. At present, initial measures are being taken to create the necessary framework.
Part V

Vision and Commitment from the United States
Fragile Peace

Simon Serfaty

An Uncertain Future

Victory in war loses its momentum quickly. Passions fade. Expectations recede. Soon, there is puzzlement. "We" won—but what, and who are we? Domestic priorities neglected during the war are uncovered. At home, political leaders who helped ensure the nation’s sacrifices are dismissed in the name of new visions. Abroad, conflicts with allies, muted during battle, resume with calls for new architectures. Meanwhile, the former enemy states, too, require attention. "They" lost—but who are they, and so what? Neither the misery of their people nor the sovereignty of their governments can be denied for long—or else.

So soon after the unconditional surrender of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, this should still be a time for celebration in the West. Instead, it is a time for much apprehension. Every new crisis wears some historical disguise. Which part of the past will prevail next—another round of ethnic hysteria in the Balkans, another bid for hegemony in Europe, another expression of America’s isolationist fantasies or another cycle of economic depression and political radicalism?

An Historical Perspective on European Security

The Cold War’s sudden finale is unlike what had been the case one generation earlier. The United States formally accepted the responsibility of world leadership in 1947, ensuring that the war that had just been won would not resume, and that another war
about to begin would not be lost. By the standards to which we have since grown accustomed, much was special about Secretary Marshall’s unveiling of his plan for Europe, on June 5, 1947. His speech had been written quickly and without rhetorical flourishes. It was short and was read stiffly, as if Marshall was bored with his assignment. The audience, too, seemed distracted. To these young Harvard graduates, the postwar world looked promising. To Marshall, however, it seemed threatening without some urgent action by the United States. "The . . . future hangs on proper judgment," he warned. Marshall’s vision of the present conditioned his vision of the future—the "new" postwar world demanded both a cure of the insanity behind and a containment of the turmoil ahead. To repudiate their past, the countries of Europe were urged to overcome their rivalries and rally behind the monumental task of reconstruction that awaited them. America was asked to anticipate its future; to overcome its mistrust of Europe and do "what must be done." At a time when the nation was anxious to come home—to reduce taxes and cut government spending—Marshall’s prescription was bold and generous. Aid was to be provided immediately to the wartime allies and also to the defeated states. The aid was in the form of colossal grants, distributed over many years and to all nations that agreed to cooperate with one another as well as with the United States. Nor was this all. Later, a formal alliance would be signed, collective defense would be organized, and troops would be deployed.

Beyond its immediate contribution to economic reconstruction, the Marshall Plan and everything else that followed aimed at building habits of cooperation in a new Europe whose security would be guaranteed by American power for as long as it took. The Cold War is over and the West has won it, but these tasks have not been completed. The "new Europe" is not here yet. In Bosnia and too many other places, the resumption of historical blood fights confirms that, once again, the future of the world will be shaped in Europe—the continent where both world wars and the Cold War started, and now the
continent where the combined legacy of these wars is especially
dangerous. Accordingly, the Western coalition which became the
distinctive fixture of America’s ties to Europe is not done
either—the Old World continues to rely on the availability of
U.S. power for its security.

No more now than equally soon after either one of the two
world wars, this is not what had been anticipated when the Berlin
wall fell and the Soviet empire crashed about three years ago.
Today, it is the brutality of war in Bosnia that has provided for
a rude awakening; in early 1948, it was the Soviet-sponsored
coup in Czechoslovakia; and in late 1922, it was France’s
reckless invasion of the Ruhr. What followed in the 1930’s and
the 1950’s is well known—hence our apprehensions and concerns
for the 1990’s. Yet, before allowing the postwar blues to settle,
we can still hear, one more time, the melodious sounds recorded
along the way. Thus, there is much that is truly "new" in the
1992 version of Europe. Once a recurring source of war in a
fragmented continent, the Franco-German pas de deux serves as
the foundation of a union of European states which is denying its
members the sovereignty on behalf of which they used to fight
as nation-states. Launched after 1945 as a declining
"community" of the needy, this union has become an ascending
community of the willing—one in which no state is big enough
to prosper without the others, no state is strong enough to live at
the expense of the others, and no state is mad enough to
contemplate military action against any other.

Nor is the jamais vu of Europe limited to the ties that prevail
between the 12 countries that comprise the European Community
(EC) and the many other countries that want to join it. No less
significant is the marginalization of the domestic clashes that
used to threaten the internal stability of most EC countries. The
ideological divides of the past are mostly gone. The rise of the
EC co-opted the radical parties of the Left that once advocated
some sort of rupture from the existing economic or political
order. The end of the Cold War preempted the appeal of
nationalist parties of the Right that once stood as a rampart
against a Soviet subversion of the state. To be sure, there remain many issues—some old, some new—that provide for much public emotion. Yet, however intense these may be, the political battles they cause are mostly waged in centrist republics whose political leaders debate their competence rather than their convictions.

Finally, as this new community of European states has deepened its integration, the United States has become increasingly involved with every aspect of the community’s life. Initially, the American Republic owed its identity and its security to its distance from Europe. Even after World War II, going home was a real option, and exercising it would not have been "agonizing" after all. Now, however, America’s economic assets, political influence and sheer physical presence in Europe have gained a significance that go beyond the military accounting and the geopolitical debates of the past. The Cold War has achieved what two world wars could not do—Americans may feel weary and leery about Europe, but they are not prepared to leave it. Over time, "over there" has become "over here."

To the question Winston Churchill raised in 1946 with much anguish—"What is Europe now?"—at least one answer can still be offered in 1993 with some certainty. This is not the Europe of 1948, undermined by Communist ideology and threatened by an expansionist military power centered in Russia. Nor is it that of 1922, abandoned by America and endangered by the depth of Germany’s resentment against its neighbors. Nor is it that of 1914, too divided, too rigid and too militarized to avoid the escalation of local conflicts of imperial succession into a world war. As historical disguises are discarded—from Sarajevo to Sarajevo—they unveil a continent that has been altered beyond recognition. In a "new Europe" that is less divided and less confining than it used to be, fears of a Germany that might be too powerful, of a Russia that might be too big, of an America that might be too distant and of Western democracies that might be too fragile have lost the reality they used to have.
Mishandling of the Bosnian Crisis

To be sure, for the past two years, the disintegration of Yugoslavia has served as a reminder that the past still lingers. As Dean Acheson, who succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State, once asked, "How do you tell the present? How do you know something is present and not characteristic of the past?" Over Croatia first, and in Bosnia most tragically, no historical disguise can fully cover the naked reality of Western appeasement, trans-Atlantic differences and intra-European discord in the face of the brutality that has devastated the entire area. But why did Western countries show such disarray over the outburst of violence in the Balkans?

"Whoever thinks the future is going to be easier than the past is certainly mad," wrote George Kennan. Such collective madness, which was already widespread as the Cold War ended, was intensified after the overwhelming victory of American power and leadership in the Gulf War. In the unipolar moment that was then heralded, America stood guard at the gate of a new international order—this ambition had been heard before, but it could now be enforced like never before. The defeats of both the Soviet Union and Iraq served as unforgettable lessons "that what [the United States] say[s] goes," as President Bush put it. This renewed confidence in the superiority of American power helps explain the embarrassment with which the policy debate over Bosnia has unfolded. "Are people dying because the United States could do more if we wanted to?" rhetorically asked a high State Department official in May 1993. "Yes, the answer is that." The fact is that non-intervention is more difficult to justify than in the old days, when the killing of civilians—say, in the streets of Budapest—was carried out by Soviet power or relied on its protection.

We should have known better, of course—meaning we should have hoped for less. In 1991, the conditions of collective action in the Gulf were unique. They could not be repeated anywhere else—least of all in the Balkans where the conflict was
especially ill suited for another demonstration of U.S. power at a time when the public showed no taste for intervention abroad. Moreover, the very idea of war in Europe had come to seem like an aberration—perhaps causing our denial of Yugoslavia’s progressive descent into its civil war after the free elections held in mid-1990.

Admittedly, today’s crises can be lived most easily in the past tense, when the evidence of failure helps the observer single out the many errors made along the way. Still, how else can we learn from the past unless we remember these errors for the future? In the summer of 1991, Slovenia’s and Croatia’s commitment to independence was unmistakable, and Serbia’s military deployment made its response predictable. After this, it was an error to ignore a French proposal for the preventive deployment of Western military forces between the warring factions because of some trans-Atlantic quarrel over a proposed Franco-German corps and an intra-European quarrel over the role of the Western European Union. Then, the reluctance of most Western states to recognize new states in Yugoslavia was overcome by Germany, whose insistence on early recognition of Croatia proved to be disastrous in the absence of explicit guarantees for the protection of minorities. Both of these errors—the lack of preventive intervention and hasty recognition—were then compounded in Bosnia-Hercegovina the following spring.

Forcing Bosnia’s communities to live together in a unitarian state governed by Muslims was a tragic error, too—no such state had ever existed, and the other two communities would not accept submission to Muslim rule. As the ensuing civil war erupted, imposing an arms embargo on Bosnia was also a mistake since it consolidated an imbalance that virtually guaranteed Serb gains and Muslim losses. Pretending, nonetheless, as the Vance-Owen plan did in the fall and winter, that a state that did not exist when it was created could somehow be preserved after so much one-sided killing compounded the initial mistake of recognition even more. Instead of objecting to the plan in
January 1993 when the angry warnings of candidate Clinton were feared in Serbia, the new U.S. administration should have endorsed it without delay. After that, everybody's search for an all-gain, risk-free policy that would liberate the victims and punish the assassins became increasingly futile. In the United States, the President's vacillations confirmed that in foreign policy, dissent is a more effective avenue to power than a substitute for it. In Europe, the sad performance of the EC and its members confirmed that the discipline achieved by its members over economic policy cannot yet be found in foreign policy. On both sides of the Atlantic, the questions asked by each side about the other under the earlier circumstances of Cold War discord are asked again—Where do "they" stand? What are "their" objectives? How reliable are "their" commitments?

Throughout, the missing ingredient in Bosnia has been all too obvious—"When you try to conduct diplomacy without power and the other side is using force," observed George Shultz, "you wind up making a fool of yourself." With force being used in Bosnia day in and day out, the willingness to apply credible counter force has been sorely missing. But whose force, if America does not have the inclination to use the power it already has, and if Europe does not have the will to build up the power it does not have? Lifting the embargo on Bosnia's Muslims, repeatedly promised by candidate Clinton during his 1992 presidential campaign, and rearming them in the name of a belated military balance is more likely to intensify the urge for unilateral revenge than to create the conditions of some multilateral accommodation. This can hardly be America's vision of the new world order after the Cold War—distant killing fields where U.S. leadership consists of providing all sides with an equal chance to kill their rivals. But this can hardly be Europe's vision of its new order either—killing fields that are plowed by neighboring countries. Whether during the Cold War, between the two world wars, or prior to World War I, the 20th century offers many models for such conflicts—hardly reassuring and never conclusive.
There has been no scarcity of plans for the resolution of the war in Bosnia. But as plans were presented across the Atlantic, each side assumed too much too soon about the other—a supplement of will in the United States (notwithstanding its abundant military power) and a complement of power from Europe (notwithstanding the relative will of some to intervene). America's commitment to doing its share should have taken a more explicit and less conditional form earlier than has been the case: 1) assertive diplomatic pressures on Germany to discourage premature recognition and on Serbia to deter the use of force; 2) punitive action (including air strikes) and preemptive sanctions (including a tight economic blockade) against Serbia (and even Croatia); 3) active participation (including ground forces) in humanitarian efforts in Bosnia; and 4) a firm pledge to make substantial contributions to the peacekeeping forces needed after an agreement.

The Vance-Owen plan was flawed because its implicit assumption that the various communities settled in Bosnia could still live as one convinced no one and frightened everyone. This assumption was already debatable before the war started; the conduct of the war made it impossible. What should, and still can, be avoided is the ethnic disintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the direct result of force by one group against the others. Only after a cease-fire of some proper duration—say, three to five years—could the provinces defined by Vance-Owen or any similar plan choose to merge with neighboring states or operate as independent states. During this "decent interval," some sort of international trusteeship would maintain the appearance of unity, with security for all three communities guaranteed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces (including U.S. forces as well as forces from some non-NATO countries), and economic reconstruction provided under the aegis of the European Community.

But enough—there was too much euphoria after the war in the Gulf, and there need not be too much hysteria because of the war in Bosnia. However repulsive ethnic cleansing may be, its
application in Bosnia does not compare to the Holocaust, and however distasteful the specter of a Greater Serbia may be, it does not threaten Europe to the same extent as the Third Reich. The defeat of Serbia will not prevent ethnic violence elsewhere, and its victory will not precipitate similar conflicts everywhere else. Not every event is a defining moment in history, and not every event is a life-and-death issue. As Walter Lippmann put it many years ago, "The world will go on somehow, and more crises will follow. It will go on best, however, if among us there are men who...have their eyes on a longer past and a longer future." What can be remembered from the "longer past" and what can be done about the "longer future" to avoid or defuse the many more crises ahead?

After the Cold War

Cold War concepts have lost much of their relevance now that they have worked. Containment was mostly a passive concept designed to defend a status quo that was admittedly unsatisfactory. Early on, it was harshly criticized by some as immoral. As Soviet power grew, its "morality" was a function of the price that would have to be paid to force change. Outside Europe, where the superpowers sought an escape from their stalemate, attempts at liberation were usually painful, always costly and rarely successful. Deterrence, too, was a Cold War concept that worked best under conditions of strategic parity between the two superpowers. But the frequency of local wars throughout the Cold War—hardly all of them Soviet- or U.S.-inspired—demonstrates that deterrence was rarely effective when it involved only one superpower (let alone neither).

After the Cold War, containment and deterrence need some refinement. The threat has become more diffuse, the adversary less identifiable, the stakes more ambivalent. To wit, how threatening are the remains of Soviet strategic power; what might activate or contain the resurgence of such a threat in the future?
Can the disparities between the two sides of Europe be bridged, and how; do these disparities matter more than long-standing and increasing disparities between the First and the Third World? Do all states have an inviolable right to sovereignty, do all people have an inalienable right to self-determination? At whose expense and at what cost?

The collapse of the Soviet Union has left many people on the brink of ethnic (cultural, racial and religious) conflicts. Yet, pretending, as was the case in Yugoslavia, that periodic outbursts of brutality are therefore inevitable is a self-serving alibi for doing nothing before the conflict broke out. It is also an unqualified indictment of all—the victims and the killers—after the conflict did break out, since either group could have been, and might yet become, the other. However, what can be remembered and learned from the transformation of Western Europe during the Cold War is that the killing could and did stop when nations and their people became too rich or too hopeful to hate, in the midst of a larger community of states that was kept loose enough to safeguard the identity of the group and the dignity of the citizen.

America was the catalyst that helped organize this community after World War II. But memories of the U.S. role should be less focused on the resources it provided than on the people who inspired and implemented it. In 1947 President Truman was surrounded by an extraordinarily gifted group of advisers who were listened to in Western Europe by an extraordinarily gifted group of statesmen. Together, they seized the historical moment that a lesser group of men might have spurned. On one side of the Atlantic, these people made American aid available in large quantities; on the other side, they accepted it without lengthy debates over the demanding cooperative conditions attached to it. In so doing, a united West did not merely contain the threat of aggression from within, it also ended the habit of aggression from within. These conditions are lacking everywhere, East and West. Leadership in the West has been timid and insufficient.
In this context, the renewed debate over the U.S. role is a false debate. What is controversial in declaring that limited resources will compel the United States to "define the extent of its commitment and make a commitment commensurate with those realities?" Depending on the issue, this will fall short of, or go beyond, what some in the United States and around the world might hope for, or fear—has it ever been different? To suggest otherwise is to imagine an undifferentiated use of American power that never existed. Even at the peak of the Cold War, each U.S. administration stressed the limits of American power and, therefore, the need for priorities. "American assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in a situation which might otherwise be solved," noted Dean Acheson in January 1950, in justifying his policy of non-intervention during the latter phase of the civil war in China. "We are not omnipotent," wrote John Foster Dulles to explain the U.S. abstention during the 1956 Hungarian revolution. "If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity," pleaded John F. Kennedy in June 1963 in urging the re-thinking of U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union. And, concluded Richard M. Nixon in early 1970, in the midst of the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina, "Our power and policy are but a significant factor in the world . . . We will help when it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

That the Soviet leaders did not heed Nixon's call for accommodation is all too obvious—as we now know, their successors lived to regret it. Clearly, they hoped to do better than the tie in Europe, which the United States offered in the name of detente. By then, they were confident of their ability to encourage and exploit instability in the world. But they overlooked how incompetent they were at creating new stabilities once their surrogates had seized power. The collapse of Communism might have been less abrupt, and the aftermath of the Cold War more orderly, had the history of the Cold War been shorter.
A New Post-Cold War Security System

Western policy in Yugoslavia has failed. Yet, notwithstanding its tragedy, this failure will have been helpful if it refines a post-Cold War system of crisis management in and for the European continent, a system that can rely more effectively on instruments that are not only trans-Atlantic (NATO), but also communautaire (the EC and Western European Union (WEU)) and pan-European (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe). This will be best achieved if allies stop treating each other as if they are rivals.

America’s ambivalence toward the European Community, as well as Europe’s doubts about the Atlantic community, are especially misplaced. The idea of Europe became a reality after it was adopted by the United States. The Atlantic idea was implemented after it was promoted by Europe. Both ideas are complementary—a prosperous and united European community can best emerge in a strong and cohesive Atlantic community. These ideas need to be completed and ultimately merged.

Although self-help has been encouraged by every U.S. president since the end of World War II, attempts by Europe to go its own way in the defense arena are often viewed as redundant, futile, self-defeating or hostile. These concerns, repeated most recently in reference to the proposed Franco-German corps, are exaggerated. If anything, the war in Bosnia has confirmed that a weak Europe stands in the way of a strong NATO because it limits Europe’s contribution to the common defense burden at a time when the United States is entitled to expect more rather than less from its allies. But the unprecedented degree of consultation that has taken place over Bosnia also shows that apprehensions are unfounded in Europe (and in the United States) that American (or European) power might be used under conditions that would be opposed by the Europeans (or the United States). In short, political instabilities and residual military capabilities in the East confirm the need for a strong and united NATO; U.S. expectations for a more
equitable distribution of labor, and European apprehensions over a dangerous renationalization of defense policies, make the case for a stronger and more united WEU.

Thus, the two processes—Atlantic and European—continue to follow the same converging paths as they did during the Cold War. More room must be created for the European idea in NATO and for the Atlantic idea in the EC. Already, NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) has proven to be an effective device for associating the former Soviet republics and the countries of Eastern Europe with NATO. The EC’s economic relevance to this association is all too obvious. NACC could now also be used as an effective device to link NATO to the EC. Similarly, the United States is now a de facto non-member of the European Economic Community—one whose assets and influence are superior to those of most EC members. Already, steps have been taken to regularize consultation between the United States and the European Commission. In coming years, such steps might be widened to permit some participation of the United States in the discussions of the European Council on a basis comparable to the status given to the EC Commission in the Group of Seven (G-7) meetings. After the Cold War, a European economic system that does not make room for broad consultation with the United States before decisions are made is no more viable than an Atlantic security system that does not make room for further European participation before action is undertaken.

Although enlargement of NATO and the EC to the East need not be ruled out in the future, it would be premature at this time. NATO is based on treaty commitments that could not readily absorb the unresolved territorial and political issues faced by the newly--liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The EC requires a discipline which the weak economies and fragile democracies in the East would find impossible or dangerous to obey.

Membership should, and will, come later. So it was during the formative years of NATO, when former enemy or neutral
states joined after lengthy debates. And so it has been for the multi-speed growth of the EC, where, since the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957, each new application for membership has taken 12 to 15 years before being worked out in practice. Yet, the postwar political stability and economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe is an issue that requires immediate commitments by the EC and its members. The principle of a Europe that is politically whole and free could at least be acknowledged in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament more fully than it has to date. Nor do the EC’s vague promises of aid and association suffice—"little now but more later." More specifically, an unequivocal commitment must be made that countries in the East will gain full access to the EC markets by a given date. Otherwise, apprehensions that market access might be constrained indefinitely will continue to slow the flow of foreign investments, hamper the growth of export-based manufacturing industries and exacerbate tensions within each of the countries, as well as between them and their neighbors in the West.

Similar limitations apply to an enlargement of the "NATO area" outside the European continent. To rely on the Gulf War as a model of future NATO involvement in future Third World crises is to misrepresent the nature of the Gulf crisis as well as its resolution. More broadly, to suggest that an Atlantic consensus will emerge in future Third World crises more easily now than it did during the Cold War is to pretend that the Cold War—alone motivated the political, economic, strategic and cultural differences between the United States and Europe in the Third World. This is not the case. To this extent, the WEU, as opposed to being merely the European pillar of NATO, is likely to find its most distinct significance primarily where NATO’s traditional boundaries end.

This is not to imply that EC countries do not have more than nuanced differences and interests in their respective attitudes and policies toward any one specific region in the Third World. Nor does it imply that NATO should disclaim responsibility for, and be condemned to abstain from, specific regions. But, as is the
case within the EC, there can and should be within NATO some informal understanding between the United States (and Canada) and Europe about which has the greater responsibility, and about which should take the lead role in producing the "first draft" of a regional policy. Such an understanding might include U.S. leadership in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and European leadership in sub-Saharan and North Africa, for example. Toward this end, the coordination of trans-Atlantic policies might best be achieved with a loose process of Atlantic political cooperation comparable to the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that was launched after the 1969 Davignon Report.

Staying the Course

The 20th century was born in Europe, and much of its script was written and acted by Europeans. It is still ending in Europe, but the script and the actors have changed. Before World War I, Europe was described as a good place to be alive. Two world wars made it a place where it was all too easy to be dead. After the Cold War, it was hoped that the carnage would end at last. Instead, it seemed to resume, and as change is said to be out of control, there are fears that peace may be out of reach. These apprehensions are exaggerated. Only a misreading of the past would suggest that previous postwar eras evolved with more order or predictability than the brief period since the end of the Cold War. Whatever predicaments and dilemmas may have been inherited from the past, the balance sheet of the West is extraordinarily positive. In 1993, the tragic spectacle of the war in Bosnia is cause for despondency and despair. Yet, this is the time to stay the course rather than to start anew. Now as before, a strong and united Atlantic Community and a stronger and uniting European Community are not only compatible but also complementary. Together, NATO and the EC, as well as the various institutions evolving around either, guarantee the
fulfillment of the ultimate objective shared by all its members: a Europe whose stability, security and affluence extend to all states on the continent and across the Atlantic.

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Notes


8. Nonetheless, the proposition that an extra decade of Cold War confrontation might have been avoided had a Reagan-like offensive been launched earlier is not convincing. In the 1970's, the combined scars of Vietnam and Watergate needed to heal first. In the early 1980's, Ronald Reagan's evocation of an implacable "evil empire" relied, therefore, on the nation's moral renewal achieved during the much-maligned Carter years, no less than on the evidence of Soviet malevolence accumulated during the Brezhnev years. Without these contributions, Reagan's policies would have been deemed even more offensive and provocative than they were initially.
An American Perspective on New European Security Challenges

William H. Taft IV

For almost half a century, the major threat to Europe has been a general conflict between ideological adversaries, each possessing enormous conventional and nuclear forces. Avoiding such a conflict while preserving freedom was the over-riding preoccupation of those working in the security field.

The coming period will be very different in both the number and diversity of concerns. Over the next several years, a variety of challenges to European security will persist. Some are more dangerous than others and some more likely.

First, the possibility of a major confrontation between nuclear powers continues, even if it is highly remote. Therefore, a strategy and force structure needs to be developed to assure that it remains remote. Second, there is the chance that a conventional conflict will break out involving two or more states, each with significant conventional military capability. Third, there is the possibility of smaller conflicts, involving irregular forces, erupting either within a single country or across international boundaries. Finally, there is the danger that the pattern of cooperation among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies could weaken over time with the consequence that their ability to act together effectively will be lost.

New Alliance Force Structure

Each of these risks should be addressed in any security strategy for Europe and each requires certain elements of force structure.
While there is some overlap in requirements, the reality is that the world is a very different one from the bipolar world of the past. In earlier days, it was generally the case that if the Alliance possessed the forces to deter the Soviet Union, it had what it needed to deal with other contingencies. In any event, the Soviet threat was so serious that investments to meet it had priority. Today's different threats need specialized responses.

Containing the threat of conflict between states possessing nuclear weapons requires that a balance of those weapons be maintained by potential adversaries. This is the pattern that worked up until now in the nuclear age; of course, in the future much lower levels of weapons will be possible. The task of balancing Russia's nuclear arsenal has been carried primarily by the United States over the years, and this will doubtless continue. At the same time, there are considerable political advantages to sharing the task of nuclear deterrence as widely as possible within the Alliance, whether through weapon basing or in other ways. This is not to say, of course, that more nuclear states are needed in Europe in the traditional sense; they are not. But a consequence of limiting the number of nuclear states is that one of the most difficult challenges in Europe today, and for some time to come, will be to provide equal security to nuclear and non-nuclear states. The Alliance has managed over the years to provide this to its members; the broad sharing of nuclear roles contributing to the success of its efforts. Arrangements must now be developed where non-nuclear states in Central and Eastern Europe can provide for their legitimate security requirements. Specific commitments of every nuclear state to assure the security of non-nuclear states in the event of conflict with a nuclear power could be the key to this. In any event, a balance of nuclear forces at low levels will be an essential factor of stability and security in Europe in the foreseeable future.

Avoiding conflict between powers with significant conventional capability requires different sorts of forces. In view of the much reduced size of potential adversaries' active forces, a deterrent balance can be maintained now at much reduced
levels. An active force just a fraction the size of what the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement would permit, if backed up by a reserve that could be promptly mobilized, is adequate. Such a force, however, cannot of course always be in the right place when it is needed. It must, therefore, be capable of relatively rapid deployment and a significant investment in airlift and sealift is necessary to assure this.

The prospect of smaller conflicts breaking-out in Europe is, sadly, a likely one. These may involve regular or irregular forces; in any event, a variety of tactics can be expected. Peacemaking and peacekeeping forces must be created and trained to deal with these situations. These forces will need to be rapidly deployable and in a high state of readiness. They must also be easily adaptable and trained to operate with non-allied troops, inasmuch as broad coalitions are often most effective in this type of work.

The fourth challenge to European security identified here is the possibility that the western alliance's patterns of cooperation, developed over decades to deter and defeat an attack from the Warsaw Pact, will weaken in the absence of that overwhelming threat. The consequences of this weakening could effect not only the trans-Atlantic link, but the European movement towards political and economic union as well. Obviously, the risk of this happening must be avoided at all cost; nothing could be more dangerous. Nor is this possibility so remote that the Allies can afford not to exert themselves regularly to prevent it coming about. The danger here is that too many people on both sides of the Atlantic may come to think that deeper European integration can proceed while the trans-Atlantic link represented by the Alliance is loosened. This is not true, of course. It has been the engagement of the United States in European security policy over the last fifty years through the Alliance that has provided the essential context for the European integration movement. And so both the Alliance and the movement towards economic and political union must be maintained in order to have either. This means, in practical terms, that a significant American military
presence in Europe is needed to support vital political engagement; the integrated military structure of the Alliance plays a key role in hosting the U.S. presence as well as in tying the forces of the European allies together.

Pulling together these considerations, then, the following conclusions can be reached about force structure. First, there should be an integrated military structure within the Alliance including a significant American contribution. The 100,000-man troop level aimed at by the Clinton administration is appropriate in this context. Second, there is a requirement for standing forces that can be rapidly deployed over considerable distances to contain either irregular or conventional conflicts. These troops should be equipped and trained to perform peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. They should be able to operate not only with each other but also in broader coalitions. Like the United States, the larger nations should contribute forces with sufficient numbers and capabilities to support their political engagement in the continent's security policymaking. On this measure, the United Kingdom (UK) and Italian troop levels seem to be at about the lowest acceptable point; and Germany's restricted role outside its borders also seems to limit unreasonably the effectiveness of its contribution. Smaller allies may be able to make valuable contributions, given the levels of active manpower they support, more effectively now through role specialization, and this tendency should certainly be encouraged where appropriate. Significant reserve forces with adequate training and equipment will also be needed to deter and defend against larger conventional threats. This is the price of reducing active forces by half a million men, or more, as a result of the end of the cold war. Finally, nuclear forces will be needed to balance this capability—a balance which has provided the most effective deterrent to major conflict in Europe for many years. The responsibility for supporting these nuclear forces ought to be shared as widely as is politically possible.

These, then, are the missions of the Alliance—deterring nuclear and conventional conflict; peacemaking and
peacekeeping; and assuring that the allies adhere to patterns of cooperation in security matters that will enable Europe to continue on its course to political and economic union. An appropriate force structure, as broadly set out here, is required to support them.

The Roles of the ESDI and CFSP

Some will say, if the Alliance is to do all of the above, what will be left for others to do? In particular, they ask what will be the role of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)? This is an important question, and agreement on the answer is essential.

To develop an answer, it is first necessary to be clear on what ESDI is, what it is not, and specifically where it is coming from. ESDI is an important symbol of both Europe's desire to function as a unit in the security field and its wish for a larger role. It gathers strength from the same sources of feeling as the move toward a common foreign and security policy within the European Community (EC), although it includes some non-EC members; it reflects the intention to re-balance the Alliance so that the Europeans can have more influence in both policy-making and execution. These two developments—closer cooperation among the Europeans and a larger role for them in managing their own continent's security—are evidently desirable, and, as their symbol, ESDI should enjoy broad support.

What ESDI is not is a system for managing Europe's security itself. It is a potential component of such systems—the Alliance, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the United Nations (UN), perhaps—but no more than a component. It is because of confusion on this point that ESDI is sometimes controversial.
What, then, is the role of ESDI? Its role is to act as a combination of nation-states within the continent's various security systems to the extent its member states wish to do so. As a larger entity than any of its member states it may, of course, have more influence and assume more responsibility within those systems than a single state, but its character is not different from a state. Perhaps a useful way to think about ESDI is to recall that today many security and defense identities operate within the Alliance. There is an American security and defense identity, for example, a German one, a French one, and so forth. The consequence of ESDI, if it is developed to its furthest potential, would be simply the submergence of a number of security and defense identities into a larger one. The fact that this may occur does not change the Alliance's role or purpose, however. ESDI should not, in short, ever be thought of as carving out any role that now is performed by the Alliance; it is a combination of nation-states and should retain the basic relationship to the Alliance that nation-states currently have.

What has been said about ESDI is also true of the move towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the European Community. The emergence of a strong CFSP is highly desirable. It will not, however, be desirable if the realization of CFSP becomes an occasion to redefine the role of the Alliance as the forum for developing and agreeing on the security policy of the allies. Nor would CFSP long survive an eclipse of the Alliance which has contributed indispensably to its own growth and potential.

Relationship of ESDI, CFSP, and the Alliance

There are two serious risks involved in the development of ESDI and, related to it, CFSP, that merit a fuller treatment here. First, there is the question of what approach ESDI and CFSP will adopt towards the Alliance. Second, there is the question whether the
Alliance should in certain circumstances defer to ESDI and CFSP in the management of particular matters.

With respect to possible approaches towards the Alliance, the European allies currently have two different views. The majority participate in the integrated military structure and take a comparatively broad view of the Alliance’s agenda in the security field. They give emphasis not only to Article V’s commitment to common defense, but also to Article IV’s provision for consultation on security issues broadly defined. The minority do not participate in the integrated military structure and take a narrower view of the Alliance’s purposes. The minority view is essentially the legacy of de Gaulle’s decisions in the 1960’s redefining France’s security policy.

In recent years, much has been said about France’s moving closer to the Alliance. This talk is most welcome. The closer CFSP and ESDI come to reality, the more important it is that the European allies agree on a common approach to the Alliance. It is essential also that this common approach reflect in general the current majority, not the minority, view. It should be completely understood why this is so: quite aside from its role in assuring an effective military capability for the allies and maintaining confidence among the European states about their intentions, without the integrated military structure and the broad definition of the Alliance’s agenda the ability to sustain more than a token American military presence in Europe and American political engagement in NATO would be seriously strained.

Obviously, some very difficult political decisions must be made in Paris and other European capitals in order to reach a common policy towards the Alliance; but that is inherent in the idea of an ESDI and a CFSP. If Europe cannot agree on a common policy towards the Alliance that provides the fundamental guarantee of its freedom and security, it is difficult to see what value any common security policy it may agree on will have. To the contrary, if the current difference of views persists on the role of NATO and the integrated military structure among the European allies, it will completely undermine the
effectiveness of any particular policies they may adopt under CFSP. The sooner this point is grasped and dealt with, the sooner real CFSP will be achieved.

Now to consider the idea of ESDI as an agent of the Alliance in dealing with certain situations and crises. This role for ESDI as an institution of first resort, with the Alliance as an essential back-up to deal with cases that are either too big to start with or get out of hand, has been advocated by a number of people in both Europe and the United States. This approach could be characterized as one in which the Alliance provides the European allies with "catastrophic security insurance" while they manage the continent's security on a day-to-day basis and handle minor crises.

Like catastrophic health insurance, this catastrophic security insurance has a lot of attractive features for both the insurer and the insured. For the insurer, a large deductible and co-insurance provision keep him clear of minor engagements while creating an incentive for the insured not to call on the policy; it is also less expensive, in the short run at least, to provide catastrophic coverage rather than comprehensive coverage. For the insured, there is flexibility to manage smaller problems without interference from the insurer, while resting easy that major illnesses will not result in bankruptcy.

There are, however, some drawbacks to this approach that should cause hesitation. The main concern is quite simply that, at least in the security field, the credibility of this type of insurance policy is low. Can Europeans safely rely on the United States agreeing to tie its security with theirs only at the moment when theirs is in greatest jeopardy? Will they not be tempted to build alternative possibilities? Would potential adversaries be deterred in either case? The opportunities for serious miscalculation are great.

A second, more practical consideration is that this approach deprives the European allies of the active support of the United States—political as well as military—in managing their smaller problems. The engagement of the United States in dealing with
Those problems surely makes success more likely than if it were absent.

Thirdly, it will be expensive for the European allies to duplicate the military assets the United States can contribute to these activities. One may wonder, in view of the fact that such assets have generally been made available to European allies for both in and out-of-area crises—Zaire, Chad, the Falkland Islands, etc.—whether parliaments would actually fund them. The result is the worst of both worlds: a less than credible defense against major threats and a less than effective capacity to manage minor ones. Add to that the natural tendency of nations in these circumstances to try to fend for themselves, and you have a very dangerous combination indeed.

Finally, there is the most practical point of all: this system has just been tried—indeed, it seems it is still being tried—in connection with the Balkan crisis over the past two years, and it doesn’t work. It doesn’t work at two levels. First, the European allies are not in a position at this point to make policy effectively among themselves. They do not have the necessary confidence in each other’s continental, as distinct from national, perspective; nor do they have in place the institutions to develop or execute security policy consistently and effectively. Thus, various policies were adopted towards the Balkans during the eighteen months or so that the EC was in charge of the matter up until this past winter, but it could not fairly be said that any of them was a European policy. Indeed, a large part of the difficulty was that most lacked the credibility of a truly European policy. There was at first, an Anglo-French policy disposed to support a loose federation-style structure with Belgrade at the center; then a German policy of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia; followed by a Greek policy of not recognizing Macedonia and, for a time, Bosnia; and, finally, all these policies and others—including, most importantly, one giving priority to humanitarian relief—submerged in a general non-policy of ad hoc reaction and deference to the peace plan of the week.
Last February, this fatally flawed approach led in due course to Washington, just as the two-tier system of security suggests it should. But there, at the second level, the defects of the process were again exposed. Engaging politically in the management of the crisis for the first time at far too late a juncture, Washington was by then in too weak a position to forge a policy commanding consensus. Too much had happened for the theretofore absent leader of the Alliance to catch up with the course of events and master them.

The Alliance itself has thus been seriously strained by the operation of this totally impractical, indeed dangerous, two-tier system. As for what has gone on in the Balkans, it is already established, whatever the outcome, as an indelible failure that surely will haunt the conscience of every European and American politician who has had a hand in it over the last two years. Whatever lessons this sad history may teach about the Balkans, the lesson for the Alliance is clear: the two-tier, catastrophic security insurance system doesn’t work.

A New Approach

So what does work? What is a winning system? The formula of the Copenhagen communique of 1991 provides the best approach. The Alliance is recognized there as the forum for consultation and agreement among the allies on European security policy; it should be used for this purpose, as it generally has not been used, by either the EC or Washington, during the course of the Balkan crisis. Moreover, it should be used in a way that reflects the larger role and greater influence that the European allies naturally expect to play, and should play, as ESDI and CFSP develop. In that way, ESDI will find its effective vocation within the Alliance, not apart from it.

For this to happen, of course, the United States must adjust the role it plays in the Alliance as well. This adjustment must be towards a less dominant position, even while it remains the
ultimate essential guarantor of the allies’ security with its nuclear arsenal and enormous conventional capability.

The United States has been adjusting its role on the military side of the Alliance significantly. Lower troop levels and replacement of a number of high-ranking Americans in military headquarters positions with Europeans indicate the diminished role the United States expects to play. Progress in this regard should continue. On the political side, however, the record is much less even. In the Balkan crisis, in particular, Washington has seemed either unwilling or incapable of taking an active role in policymaking, unless it is allowed to determine outcomes. In neither case has it suggested that NATO is its preferred forum for addressing the issue with the allies.

And yet NATO is, in fact, the exactly right forum for consultation among the allies on the Balkan crisis, and not just because the Copenhagen communiqué gave it this role. The main reason NATO is the right forum for developing a Balkan policy is that, in it, there is an opportunity for participation and influence on outcomes for both the European allies and the United States in a balanced way that reflects not only their interests in the matter but also their capacities to contribute to its solution. This is not true in the EC, where the United States, a vital contributor to solutions, is absent; nor is it true in the White House, where the issue ended up last month, because the Europeans, whose vital interests are involved, are absent. Both the EC and the White House should now have learned that the formality of consultations only after a policy is developed in their more exclusive fora is no substitute for a policy development process in which all allies are engaged from the outset.

In short, in the task of managing the crises that routinely present themselves in European security, the United States should try to act more like a normal European state than has been its custom during the Cold War. Its interest in European security remains, of course, no less than that of European countries; NATO’s premise that Europe’s and North America’s security are indivisible—demonstrated in three wars, one cold and two hot,
over the course of the century—reflects this. At the same time, however, Europe’s capacity for contributing to its own security has increased in comparison with the United States, and its responsibility for policy-making should correspondingly grow. This can happen naturally in NATO, where the allies have always accorded each other equal status, even as they respected the perhaps “greater equality” of certain states. The procedures are in place in the Alliance already, then, for the United States to take the lower profile that circumstances now suggest is appropriate, without undercutting the credibility of allied policy by visibly abstaining from a part in its development.

One question that vexed the policy debate about the Balkans from the outset was whether the U.S. would contribute forces to assist in the execution of any plan that might be agreed upon requiring troop deployments. Some Europeans suggested that a place at the policy development table should be contingent, at least in the U.S. case, on a willingness to contribute forces. With a different spin, but the same consequences, some Americans pointed early on the fact, as they considered it, that the U.S. would not in any case contribute forces to the Balkans as a justification for their political disengagement from the issue.

Admittedly, there were reasons in the spring and summer of 1991 why the United States might have wished to rule out definitely the use of its troops in the Balkans. There was a desire to avoid polarizing the conflict in an East-West context and creating a confrontation with the Soviet Union; also, the American public was very skeptical of any policy that suggested the Iraqi War was a prelude to an enlarged American role as world policeman and looked to the President for assurances this was not so. Taking a highly publicized powder when the Balkan crises emerged met this domestic political requirement. Nonetheless, it is hard not to think that putting the question of military contributions ahead of whether to become engaged in the issue politically was getting things backward. It served as an excuse for those many Americans and Europeans who did not want the U.S. to participate in policymaking on the Balkans in
any event. As a matter of logic, there is nothing to recommend it. As a matter of history, it contributed to a tragedy.

The fact is that, as a country whose own security is indivisibly linked to Europe’s, the United States should always be a participant in developing security policy for the continent, just as the European allies are. This should be a matter of course. Only after a policy is developed and agreed upon should the question of military forces be conclusively addressed.

And what then should be the attitude towards the use of U.S. troops? It will, of course, as for every country depend on the circumstances, but in general the United States should strive to consider this issue as much like a normal European state as possible. Now that the Cold War is over, it is increasingly possible to do this. The United States should be prepared to contribute its fair share to support policies adopted as a result of an Alliance consultation process in which it has participated. Its fair share will be less than in the past, just as its policy influence will be less; that is to say, the Alliance will be rebalanced. This rebalancing, however, can only effectively be done in the Alliance, not by setting up alternative procedures. Thus, the status of U.S. forces in dealing with European crises should be normalized.

The approach described is the best way to deal with the challenges to European security that were set out at the beginning. As can be seen, the most serious challenge is to resist the temptation to relax the patterns of cooperation that have developed within the Alliance over the past decades; but even this and certainly the other dangers should be manageable. Broadly speaking, the requirement is simply to make adjustments in the Alliance and use it for its expressed purposes.

Extending Cooperation Eastward through Partnership

In addition to these threats which need to be managed, Europe’s present circumstances offer opportunities which should
be seized to increase security and stability. The most important of these opportunities concerns central and eastern Europe and the status of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia. This treatise would not be complete if it failed to consider this subject.

There is a good chance, if matters are handled wisely, that the same patterns of cooperation that have characterized the conduct of the West European allies in the years since World War II can now be extended eastward. It should be a priority of Alliance security policy to bring this about. But what is the best way to do it?

The establishment of a constructive partnership with Russia is, as so often in European history, the key to strengthening security for all central and east European states in the coming years. This partnership could conceivably be achieved by Russia’s becoming a member of the Alliance, but there is reason to doubt the workability of this approach. The Allies have had many occasions to observe the difficulties the United States has had in trying to put on the character of a normal European ally; even with its geographical distance and unambiguous lack of grievance or ambition on the continent, its size and power make it an unsettling partner. How much more unsettling would Russia be?

On the whole, it seems more promising to build a partnership between the Alliance and Russia rather than trying to engage Russia as a new partner within the Alliance. This would be appropriate to Russia’s status as a major nuclear and conventional military power, second only to the United States. The partnership would build on the various treaties that already exist—Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), CFE, Helsinki and Paris. It should also be supported by a generous economic assistance program—the Marshall Plan has shown that this is the soundest basis for building a lasting partnership in similar circumstances. It could be extended through further agreements regarding the security of non-nuclear powers, as suggested early in this paper. Agreements to train and operate together in
peace-making and peace-keeping missions provide further opportunities. A schedule of policy level meetings to review the partnership’s activities would be a natural feature. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) provides a model today for this approach.

In the context of a working partnership between the Alliance and Russia, it is easier to address the security interests of the new central and east European states. The NACC is, of course, available today, and its usefulness can be expanded. It may be that, as the decade grows old, certain NACC members may develop such close ties with the European allies in other fields—political and economic—that it would make sense for them to join NATO. This should be treated as a natural evolution, not a threat to anyone but rather a reflection of how a country has developed and oriented itself. Certainly, it will be important for any new members of the European Community to join NATO, especially as CFSP and political union gain strength. NATO should be working now to prepare for this.

With respect both to Russia and the smaller states, the NACC is the key institution at the moment. It presents to both the allies and their partners a tremendous opportunity to work together in addressing Europe’s security problems. There is reason to hope that what NATO has done for Western Europe the NACC can do for Europe as a whole—establish a pattern of cooperation in policy-making as well as military training and operations that binds old adversaries together in times of crisis. That surely should be the goal—these are the principal challenges to Europe’s security in the coming years.
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Absent an engaged leader for any length of time, Europe, like the rest of the world, becomes a chaotic place. At first, the erosion of stability and security seems distant and insignificant. Eventually, however, American interests become involved, and the security of the United States itself begins to diminish. True, America could adopt an isolationist or "management by exception" approach to foreign affairs, and the world would muddle along. But, sooner or later, luck runs out as it did in Kuwait, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The fact that worse has not happened since the end of the Cold War is less the result of strategy than of chance. The reality is that sustaining peace, if that is America's interest, will require more than just the raw preeminence of being a superpower. It calls for leadership of the kind that only the United States can provide.

Will America be simply the sole remaining superpower, or will we provide the leadership the world expects and needs? American leaders have spoken often and loftily of vision and leadership for the era that lies ahead. After the Berlin Wall was opened, then-Secretary of State Baker spoke of an "architecture for a new era." Later, President Bush described a "new world order," and the concept of "collective engagement" was espoused. Today, the new Administration describes "a strategy of enlargement" as the successor to the doctrine of containment, and President Clinton, although eschewing slogans, asserts that "the United States intends to remain engaged and to lead." All are promising words that create expectations of firm leadership. However, the dearth of U.S. leadership since the Gulf War has been apparent, and the decision to place domestic needs ahead of
international initiatives has found strong support in the Congress and the public. Now, four years after the Wall came down, allies and a growing legion of would-be allies have grown impatient for indications of a new U.S. strategy and leadership. The premise of this essay is that America will lead—although differently than in the past—and that there are already indications of how that leadership will be exercised. World events have begun to return foreign affairs to center stage for the Clinton White House, as they have for past "domestic policy" presidents. An initial tendency to conduct foreign-policy-by-event is yielding slowly to a whole cloth which could eventually replace the Cold War policy of Containment. America is beginning to connect the dots.

What follows is a description of the American leadership debate as it relates to Europe, built from the initial Marshall Center discussions as well as the many public venues that have addressed these topics since. Within that debate rests the essence of a future U.S. strategy for European security.

U.S. Interests in Europe

What are America’s national security interests\(^2\) in Europe beyond the Cold War? A U.S. claim to leadership in Europe must be rooted in the soul-searched answers to this prime question. Will interests beyond U.S. borders that are seen as worth fighting for be defined narrowly, or will they reflect a broader sense of purpose? At home, America risks a loss of consensus on foreign policy whenever national interests are not adequately explained. There must be a clear link between national interests and the strategic investments of U.S. foreign policy. Abroad, many nations look to see where the most powerful nation of all is headed, and what it will defend. Some nations, such as Iraq and Bosnia-Hercegovina, drew their own conclusions about what America will or will not fight for, and paid the heavy price of miscalculations.
American security interests in Europe can be defined best in two levels of detail, one broad and the second more specific. The broad answer is that fundamental U.S. interests are unchanged in spite of monumental global events. The country must ensure its survival as a free and independent nation and protect America's core values, institutions, prosperity, and its people. These are perpetual, sovereign responsibilities not subject to alteration by external factors. In addition, the United States works throughout the world with other nations and through international institutions to protect the following vital interests: regional stability; democratic political systems; a more open trading system; and reassuring the world's faith in America. These interests, too, are born of America's national identity and remain fixed in spite of what has taken place in recent times.

If all of the above interests were brought together in one word, it would be "peace." In making the case that managing peace should be the Nation's most compelling interest, Eugene Rostow recently wrote:

The supreme security interest of the United States—the interest most worth fighting for—is an organized and effectively enforced system of general international peace: not a world order of Utopian perfection, but one in which the phenomenon of war is kept within tolerable limits.

Few would argue that such generalized security interests by themselves provide a suitable strategic azimuth for the allocation of resources, or that defining more specific interests is unimportant. Filling in the blanks is the second level of detail; the more nettlesome answer to the question that opened this section. In the search for answers, it is little comfort that America has rarely defined its vital interests in peacetime. Only during war, including the Cold War, have clear national interests held the Nation's collective commitment, resources and resolve. Happily, war is not the threat today, but the risk of losing a firm grip on peace, of slipping toward a steady stream of crisis and conflict, is. Therefore it is imperative that interests be
satisfactorily articulated to America and the world.

Recently, Secretary of State Christopher provided a more definitive picture of U.S. global interests. He offered six "foreign policy priorities," which he called enduring interests: economic security, reform in Russia, a new framework for NATO, trade relations with the Far East, Middle Eastern affairs and nuclear nonproliferation. Christopher's list reflects the Clinton administration's emphasis on economic security as the underpinning of future national security policy. It depicts an American view of the world through a new, broader prism. Russia's shaky reform is the top priority because of the risk of renewed nuclear threat or a return to confrontation. It is a telling irony that Russia, the essence of America's Soviet nemesis throughout the Cold War, remains the first concern for the era ahead. Taken together, the shaping of NATO's continuing transformation and speeding up U.S.-Pacific integration telegraph the intent to achieve a better balance of U.S. interests between Europe and the Pacific. Since World War II, U.S.-European links have been dominated by security concerns rather than an economic relationship, while U.S.-Pacific links have been mostly the opposite. There is ample rationale for continued strong ties with both regions. The remaining two priorities on Christopher's list, the Middle East and nonproliferation, represent the realities of U.S. dependence on imported oil and the worst possible instability, the spread of nuclear technology and sophisticated weaponry.

There is one other U.S. security interest, one that will leave its mark on future U.S-European affairs, and that is readily detected in President Clinton's pronouncements on foreign policy: the United States intends to shift the burden of being the world's policeman to a much broader group of actors, though it plans to remain the cop of last resort. Where vital U.S. interests are not immediately threatened, the Administration wants regional crises to be addressed early and in earnest by regional powers and institutions. Where regional efforts are insufficient to contain a crisis, or American interests are at imminent risk, only then will
the United States play a major role. Where U.S. participation is in the fore, the preferred method will be under UN-sanctioned action.

The key to understanding this re-balancing of American security interests is to recall Paul Kennedy's admonishment against "imperial overreach." Kennedy held that a nation must manage three feats: 1) provide military security for its national interests; 2) satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry; and 3) ensure sustained growth. Kennedy went on to assert that throughout history, great powers have declined because the burdens of their external commitments overwhelmed their ability to sustain economic growth.7 Heeding Kennedy's warning, America seeks to "throttle back" its direct global commitments by sharing the burden, and thereby continue to lead the world over the long term. This raises U.S. interests in overhauling organizations such as the UN and NATO, and also in the transformation of the European Union (the EU—formerly the EC), WEU, Council of Europe (COE), CSCE and other entities capable of contributing to regional and global stability.

What does all this say about U.S. security interests and leadership in Europe? First, as the security institution in Europe, the NATO Treaty obligation remains the pivotal relationship for protecting U.S. interests and the one around which all other relationships with Europe will be built. Second, the United States would consider any crisis that threatens the general destabilization of Europe as a threat to its own national security and would likely engage directly to end the conflict. Finally, it suggests that for any building crisis such as the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis, the United States will expect European powers and institutions to take the first initiatives in crisis prevention and response. Nor is this model Europe-specific—similar strategies will be pursued for other regions of the globe.

Other U.S. interests in Europe—those generally below the threshold of military intervention—include promoting democracy; the implementation of arms control agreements and treaties; the
protection of human rights; the harmonization of economic and trade policies; the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); crisis prevention; and the extension of security to the east of NATO's present boundaries. For these "other interests," the United States will insist on a seat at the table, but expect Europeans to sit at the head of the table more often.

However the Administration ultimately describes U.S. interests in Europe, both an unambiguous rationale and forthright salesmanship will be essential on Capitol Hill and with the American people. This is why a strategic policy as potent as Containment for garnering public support, one that America can in unison get behind for the longer term, is so sorely needed. Whatever else has changed, Europe and the world have come to know that a political promise of U.S. resources for security commitments abroad is only as enduring as the support for it at home.

Latent Strengths of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Keeping America's alliance with Europe at the core of U.S. foreign relations is not forewarned by historical or cultural ties; it is a matter of strategic pragmatism. Europe is America's most essential partner for maintaining a world at peace. Next to the 50 United States of America, Europe is the most integrated and developed region of the world. And, of those with the means available to manage peace, the most effective institutions lie across the European-North American axis or within Europe itself. Nowhere else in the world have the foundations of common purpose been so fully established and implemented or so effectively employed as between the United States and Western Europe. Clearly the Euro-Atlantic synergism is a resource for the future, and its strength should be channelled toward future challenges.

Today the vast geo-political region defined by NATO and its
prodigy, the two year old North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), encompasses the largest reservoir of industrial wealth, military power, political leverage and economic influence in the world. These resources, harnessed to common global interests rather than invested in arms races and internecine conflicts, represent a huge potential for addressing the looming problems of the underdeveloped and undeveloped world. In fact, taken as a whole, no collection of nations has greater potential for either moderating or increasing tensions in the world than those with membership in NATO and NACC.

Neither in our own hemisphere nor around the Pacific Rim is there even a remote possibility of finding the power and cohesion already existing and still advancing in Europe. Perhaps, in time, there will be robust political communities in these regions. However, for the next 25 years, i.e., the long term of strategic planning, only Europe can offer the U.S. a steady political and military partnership. Europe is the one region of the world that will be more of a comrade in arms than a challenge to overcome in the 21st century. Therefore, even as the quest for economic security creates a healthy re-examination of U.S. interests and priorities, it is important to remember that the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic axis now represent ties to: six of the G-7 nations; 21 members of the 24 OECD industrialized nations (the G-24); four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; four of the five nations with deliverable nuclear weapons; and the largest collection of weapons manufactures in the world.

The Euro-Atlantic axis also contains the greatest integration of democratic nations in the world. Democracy, born of the 18th century ideas of European philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Hume, had its fullest fruition in America. Today, firmly rooted across Western Europe, those principles are being advanced throughout Eastern Europe as well. Each state added to the fold of democracy makes the world less prone to conflict and less threatening to U.S. interests.

In the wake of the Cold War, a vision should emerge to lock
in peace in Europe, and then to spread similar "cultures of stability" to other regions or the world. Perhaps Europe’s stability could help to stabilize the Middle East, or to influence an emerging Far East, or simply provide a structure of order and peace for other nations or regions to adhere to and emulate. However, the first question is, will the opportunity for lasting peace in Europe elude the great powers for a third time this century? As before, a lot depends on U.S. leadership.

Europe and U.S. Policy Toward Russia

It has become commonplace to refer to Russia and America as partners. However useful this characterization is diplomatically, it should not obscure the anxious nature of U.S.-Russian collaboration. The principal issue on which the United States cooperates with Russia is the aim of making Russia’s still-questionable reforms permanent. Making Russia a future friend—a genuine partner—means democracy and open markets must prevail over political-economic authoritarianism and imperialism. In this ideological struggle the United States is the principal external partner of a reform movement that has, after 75 years, finally come to power under the tenuous leadership of Boris Yeltsin. This is something quite apart from partnership with all of Russia, whose legislature, courts, military, media and people include large segments who harbor the belief that a return to greatness will be found only by re-embracing the old systems.

In the business of facilitating reforms in Russia, Europe, America’s staunch Cold War ally, will still be its biggest partner. Like America, Europe regards the outcome in Russia as its greatest security concern and is expending considerable resources to support President Yeltsin. Both allies realize that if things go badly in Russia’s bid to reform, it is hard to predict which side of the Atlantic will fare the worst. In June 1993, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd spoke bluntly on this point when he noted: "If Russia is in chaos, it is chaos that will be exported; if
Russia continues the path of reform, we will enjoy increased cooperation.\(^8\)

Unfortunately, the turbulence and occasional bouts of chaos buffeting Russia's domestic scene show few signs of abating, and many believe the outside world wields little leverage in resolving the turmoil. Indeed, none other than the Russian people can invoke the will to shake off not just the travails of communism, but a 500-year-old habit of authoritarian rule and imperialism. The task is made more complicated by a grievously wounded Russian pride, and unfounded but real fears of encroachment by the West. Though daunting, the unprecedented opportunity to turn Russia toward democracy, and the negative ramifications of a return to confrontation, leave no alternative but to carefully nurture the threads of reform, always mindful that success is a long shot at best. Precisely because of the tenuous nature of the situation, collective strength and coordinated action are valuable techniques.

Success in Russia will require patience, good judgment and teamwork, both by Yeltsin and his supporters abroad—who will have to be tough, and at times accommodating. Not only must the external world buttress Russia's economic restructuring, but it will have to ensure that democratic political reforms, however long their evolution, do not wither and die along the way. In addition, Russia must get the blunt message to shed its imperialistic nature, lest the traditional targets of its hegemony—Central and Eastern European states—be re-acquired by force or coercion, re-opening the wounds that divided Europe before. All these reforms will need to be pushed, although at a pace short of where the Russian in the street is likely to conclude the only hope lies in reversal and rebellion. As with any habit-breaking, there will be both regression and clever attempts to avoid unpleasant medicine. The right approach will likely require as much stick as carrot.

But, how should U.S. policy toward Russia and U.S. policy toward Europe be melded? Simply, the two should become complementary parts of a whole strategy, supporting each other
and working in close tandem. The United States should take Europe as a full partner in designing a new security order, and in making sure Russia is firmly embedded in it. Europe should take on more responsibility for helping Russia’s evolution, and have an important say in how the work gets done.

At this writing the Clinton Administration’s trans-Atlantic policy is still in evolution, however it is evident Europe wants closer and more balanced cooperation on all security questions, not the least of which is support for Russia’s reforms. If anything, the U.S. should ensure it does not portray Russia as a more worthy strategic ally than Europe on pan-European security matters. For the rest of this century at least, Russia will be predominantly a partner of dangerous necessity and for limited, albeit expanding, collaboration on regional security matters. Europe, on the other hand, remains a stable and potent partner of strong camaraderie and common purpose. Wisdom dictates that we work together.

**Policy Lessons from the Yugoslav Crisis**

If there is a place to begin learning how to protect the rights of minorities it is in the morass of former-Yugoslavia. Indeed, America has a strategic interest in quelling the conflict infesting that sick region. If, as Eugene V. Rostow asserts in his recent work *A Breakfast for Bonaparte*, U.S. national security interests include a general condition of peace, a crucial subset of that interest is peace in Europe. It should be unmistakably clear that the United States can broach general war in Europe no more in the future than it could in the past 45 years. Given our experience thus far this century, and particularly with the Balkans, the United States would do well to be ever vigilant for the sparks that can suddenly ignite regional conflict. But that does not mean the United States must act to prevent or halt every conflict in Europe any more than in other parts of the world. It is worth remembering that in Europe’s last period of peace, from
1815 to 1854, as well as during the peace of the Cold War, conflicts erupted from time to time. The key was that these conflicts were not allowed to progress into war between major powers. However, the security and defense of Yugoslavia is not a vital national security interest of the United States. Therefore, for all its tragic agony, the ex-Yugoslavia crisis is not an appropriate conflict for committing American military power, at least not in terms of decisive combat force. To be certain, any such horrific attack on human life, ethnic minorities and property diminishes the safety of our democratic way of life and must be countered by intense political pressures, economic sanctions, diplomatic initiatives, legal actions and massive humanitarian aid. But, unless the risk of a broader conflagration appears on the horizon, one that constitutes a threat to U.S. interests, no nation or international body should expect direct U.S. military intervention. Perhaps if such a position had been a clear tenet of American strategic policy from the start, appropriately communicated before tensions became open warfare, the decisions of the combatants would have led to an earlier and less bloody solution.

Given how deep an abyss the ex-Yugoslav states have fallen into, United States policy objectives must at last become calculated and unemotional, clear and consistent. Resolution of the conflict must come from the parties involved—they must decide to cease the outrage without expectation of any outside intervention short, of course, of UN force protection and spillover prevention. The conflict cannot be allowed to engulf states beyond the Balkans nor NATO states in the Balkans. Diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian initiatives to reduce the suffering and end the fighting should proceed, or where appropriate, be intensified. If warranted for humanitarian reasons, air strikes against military targets should be an option. Each warring state's (or party's) war crimes against either persons or property should be tracked, prosecuted and satisfied before economic assistance or political relations are restored.

The United States and its allies have committed to
peacekeeping in Bosnia-Hercegovina after specific preconditions have been met, conditions that should be strictly interpreted and held to the letter before any deployment. If ever executed, Yugoslav peacekeeping could become the test bed for new U.S. and NATO innovations in peacekeeping focused on getting results in the near- to mid-term. For example, agreement to deploy peacekeepers might include reasonable costs, negotiation regimes, and residual sanctions -- mandatory for all parties and designed to make negotiating peace more attractive than perpetual peacekeeping (à la Cyprus). The UN, CSCE and NATO cannot afford to engage in peacekeeping indefinitely. As Canadian Secretary of State Barbara McDougall remarked, the parties in conflict cannot be made to feel too comfortable with peacekeepers, lest they prefer the status quo to the pain of compromise that brings lasting peace.9

Peacekeeping: How Much of a Strategy?

Freed from the constraints of the East-West paradigm, UN peacekeeping holds renewed promise in the search for world peace. For 45 years, peacekeeping has been characterized in the main by lengthy deployments of strictly impartial and purely defensive military forces.10 For the United States, the idea of preventive or conflict-ending peacekeeping is a fresh alternative to costly and debilitating conflicts. Furthermore, increased acceptance of internationally directed peace operations means a more active United Nations and, axiomatically, fewer calls for a global policeman. Already, since 1988, twice as many peace operations have been undertaken than in the previous 40 years.11 Significantly, more and more of these operations have straddled the long standing barrier between Chapter VI (traditional peacekeeping) and Chapter VII (peace enforcing) of the UN Charter.

However, some hard issues must be tackled as enthusiasm for peacekeeping moves up the scale. The first issue is the essential
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but often lightly-regarded task of defining terms. Especially in
the United States, this means definitions suitable for
communicating with Congress and the American people. What
exactly is peacekeeping? Not surprisingly, the meaning has
become murky among a plethora of new terminology.
Traditional peacekeeping is no longer the central theme.
Confusion grows because the term "peacekeeping" persists as a
convenient shorthand for a full suite of new and redefined terms,
expanded definitions and levels of commitment. Conflict
prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace building,
protective engagement, preventive engagement, humanitarian
intervention, and refugee assistance each have their own
implications, yet are commonly discussed under the umbrella of
peacekeeping. Encouragingly, the search for more precise
meanings is gaining momentum. Also, terms such as "peace
operations" have been put forth to replace peacekeeping as a
more accurate overall rubric. As we proceed, and occasionally
rush, in this uncharted direction looking for future security, it is
essential to have a common lexicon.

A second issue is the unequivocal requirement for any nation
engaged in peacekeeping to maintain a policy of impartiality
toward all parties in the conflict. This goes beyond obvious
requirements relative to the disposition and rules of engagement
of deployed peacekeeping forces. The perceptions of all parties
in the conflict with respect to a peacekeeping nation's
impartiality depends on that nation's political and economic
actions, and especially the military actions of its non-
peacekeeping forces. The perception, valid or invalid, of political
partiality will quickly affect the status of peacekeeping forces,
and risk reprisal by one or more of the host parties involved. For
the United States, there will be situations where simply what
America stands for or its unique position as world leader
effectively co-opt impartiality. In addition, if accepted as a
peacekeeper, the United States is prevented from being a peace
enforcer. Impartiality is non-negotiable. One analyst observed
after the loss of 241 Marines in Lebanon:
the lesson for future peacekeeping is clear: when the operation takes on the role of imposing a solution, it is no longer peacekeeping but enforcement, and the latter ... implies that the soldier ... has been restored to his traditional role of fighting man.13

Finally, U.S. combat power has many sophisticated military capabilities that would become marginal and get dulled during peacekeeping operations of only a few months. At a time of shrinking force structure, it is important to understand the high risk of expecting the same force to convert rapidly from peacekeeping to combat operations and perform at its peak. The duration of peacekeeping operations has traditionally been long, and although the aim is to cut deployments drastically from the historical norm, there is little evidence yet that this can be planned for. Clearly, with fixed force strengths, peacekeeping will reduce the forces available for traditional military options—a fact the military will need to highlight well for civilian leaders.

Even more than Somalia, the crucible for the United States on all these issues, if it comes, will be Bosnia. Analysis suggests that Bosnia will be the most formidable challenge for the UN, NATO and the United States. Bosnia will require a diverse blend of humanitarian aid, refugee assistance, diplomatic peacemaking, traditional peacekeeping and likely some "protective engagement" military measures. Once engaged, how long it will be before NATO can end such a commitment is impossible to say. Can NATO muster the forces, political attention and resources needed for success in a long-term endeavor? Could NATO, which has taken a visibly anti-Serbian stance at times, preserve the perception of impartiality that is so essential to success? What will be the effects on NATO's collective defense mission if the mission extends over many years? The Alliance hopes to make quick work of its mission and then turn the follow-up operations over to UN or CSCE forces, probably civilians. However, the Balkan's deep social and political divisions hardly seem amenable to a more speedy conclusion than the divisions in the still-intractable Cyprus
situation, for example.

Engaging the American People.

In commenting on America’s propensity for withdrawal from world affairs as soon as clear and present dangers have passed, Rostow wrote,

In their hearts, nearly all Americans believe that the natural and rightful role of the United States in world politics is one of isolation and neutrality, living in peace in a Western Hemisphere carefully insulated from the wickedness and corruption of Europe and Asia. The power of this belief is so great that the principal problem of American foreign policy... is a conflict between our collective unconscious and the realities of life in the late twentieth century.14

The immense task of the American Executive and his staff is to first of all convince the Congress and the nation of the need to lead the world, and to do so with the zeal and commitment warranted by the challenges to our interests. As a start, America must believe in the need to act abroad. By first convincing the Congress, the nation's collective leadership can then convince the people, just as surely as they have been convinced to support higher taxes, deficit reduction, the War in the Gulf, and NAFTA.

When President Truman presented the Truman Doctrine, the de facto assumption of world leadership from the British, to Congress on 12 March 1947, he too had a tough challenge. Why should the U.S., weary of war, concerned about rising unemployment and recession, and anxious to focus on internal matters, agree to send financial aid and troops to ward off communism in Greece? Facing a Republican-dominated Congress and the 1948 election campaign, Truman took the leadership of Congress into his counsel, convincing them of the risks to U.S. interests. In turn, Congress and the key members of the Administration worked in harmony to win the support of the American people for both the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan. The country saw the need and pulled together. Eight months after the first Marshall Plan ships (the first of billions of American tax dollars to be spent on foreign aid) sailed for Europe, Truman won re-election.15

Because today's risks to U.S. interests (the new "enemies") are less tangible and monolithic than the Soviet Communism Truman opposed, doesn't mean public support for effective world leadership no longer exists. It only means today's leaders will have to find the right approach, become a unifying force, and accurately define the nation's overseas interests and risks to the American people. In the end, that will probably lead to a more earnest debate and the crafting of a better policy.

We began this chapter with a discussion of U.S. interests, but our interests as a nation should never be too narrowly defined. If we adhere to the view that we are not a leader, but only the largest member of the community of nation states, we create a situation fraught with danger. It is not too late to forge a new strategic policy, but we need to get started. Momentum and consistency will be vital to success. For this we must return to the unfinished work of renewing NATO.

A New Context and New Directions for NATO

Permanent peace will depend on an array of institutions for dealing collectively with crisis-generating conditions, and then with the management and resolution of crises themselves. The objective is to forestall open conflict. In order to focus the contributions of various organizations, America needs to understand the limitations and potential of each venue, and the nature and trends of U.S. influence within them. Chief among these security-related communities are the UN and the relationships between NATO, NACC, WEU, and CSCE. The United States should have an agenda for each institution, one which integrates it into a new security context for NATO and Europe.
The United Nations. The UN has long been a major contributor to European security, and its new vigor in crisis prevention and response is as necessary and welcome in Europe as it is elsewhere in the world. In both Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia, the UN's unique peacekeeping forces and humanitarian relief networks have filled a crucial void in Europe's own ability to contain conflict. Besides its own operational roles, the UN is one of the two sources of political legitimacy (CSCE is the other) for NATO, NACC or WEU peacekeeping operations.

The UN is also the venue for bringing Europe's sizable resources to bear on crises and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. However, facilities for coordination and communication between the UN and Europe's regional security institutions are far from adequate and require investment. A reformed UN must be better able to buttress organizations like CSCE politically, and to tap into capabilities such as NATO, NACC or WEU in dealing with crises that are inter- as well as intra-regional.

The future role of the UN will depend in large part on U.S. skill in keeping the world community behind its agenda for a stronger UN. Maintaining consensus will be far from easy. The U.S. has already announced its proposals for UN internal and operational reforms, and these should be pursued with visible American engagement and resources.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, the synonym for Western European security and defense, has emerged from the Cold War as a survivor by steadily transforming its exclusive collective defense identity into a growing capacity to meet the political-military challenges of regional security, not only for NATO allies but for its former adversaries as well. NATO is the centerpiece of U.S.-European relations as well as the dominant operational capability for crisis response, and it will remain so even as America gradually strengthens its other trans-Atlantic ties through agreements such as the 1990 U.S.-EC Declaration and the 1992 Helsinki
Document. NATO’s political and military agendas are now aimed principally at the development of a credible crisis management capability, to include crisis prevention. To do that, NATO must achieve two of its chief objectives: the development of ESDI within the Alliance, and the extension of security and stability to the ex-Communist states. The full accomplishment of these goals will take time, commitment, resources, and U.S. leadership for years to come. In the lead-up to the NATO summit in January 1994, the U.S. pressed for further implementation of ESDI within NATO, and deepening the Alliance’s security relationships with Central and Eastern Europe.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC is now the primary medium for pan-European cooperation on security and stability. As an adjunct organization of NATO, NACC has gained a reputation for sponsoring the most meaningful consultations and practical cooperations on security with Central and Eastern Europe. NACC activities have expanded to include defense budgets, defense conversion, civil-military relations, disarmament technologies, environmental clean-up, airspace coordination and others. In addition, a special Ad Hoc Committee on Peacekeeping explores areas of potential long-term cooperation, including training and doctrine. However, NACC’s most important role is in reassuring partnership members of the Alliance commitment to their security. As an institution short of full membership in NATO, NACC does not meet the security aims of those newly independent states who assert that only full membership satisfies their security needs. Nonetheless, the NACC initiative has been a unique success in stabilizing the region as a whole during a period of tumultuous political transitions.

In December 1991, NACC’s inauguration was an historic step. Now, two years later, there are more calls to deepen NATO’s commitment to extend its security in order to keep the dream of permanent regional peace alive, and indeed, NATO has declared publicly that it is not a closed club. The path to full participation, in any case, should be more clearly defined -- a
path open to all but marked by the essential criteria that will preserve the alliance even as it expands. Diluting NATO's already tenuous capacity for consensus would help neither its present nor prospective members.

The Western European Union (WEU). WEU is steadily developing into an important security structure for Western Europe. It flexed new-found muscles to mixed reviews in the Gulf and in the Adriatic, and more recently earned respect for enforcement of the international embargo along the Danube. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU is tied permanently to the European Union as the organization that will ultimately be the expression of ESDI. As envisioned by the EU, ESDI will be visible both within and, when appropriate, separably from NATO. Given the relationship established at Maastricht, it seems logical the WEU will eventually come completely under the EU as its defense arm. WEU restructuring and its new missions are consistent with U.S. interests in reforming NATO along the lines of a more balanced U.S.-European partnership. The WEU should be encouraged to seriously pursue the development of European crisis response capabilities such as the EuroCorps, a military planning capacity, and stronger armaments cooperation.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CSCE's conspicuous silence since 1992 is due to concentration on the metamorphoses of other institutions such as NATO, WEU and EU. It is also evidence that for addressing concerns such as ameliorating Russia's internal crisis, security assurances for Central Europe or resolving the conflict in former Yugoslavia, CSCE is not yet a prime actor. Moreover, CSCE's quietude reflects the difficult challenge of internal institution-building resulting from decisions at Helsinki 92 and those still incomplete actions called for by the 1990 Charter of Paris. Nonetheless, CSCE has a major role to play in the maintenance of lasting peace in Europe. CSCE is the right venue for exposing crisis-triggering social tensions, formulating preventative measures and perhaps for the initial recognition of crises that may eventually be managed under NATO or the WEU. With
proper political initiative from leading members, its present somnolence can be cut short and CSCE could take a prominent place in Europe’s future security architecture. Over time, CSCE should become a sort of regional UN, providing both a way to protect the UN from itself having to handle Europe’s crises, and a strong caucus for action as the UN itself focuses on challenges in the rest of the world. Such a development should be viewed as a positive step for Europe and the world.

Too much integration? Commentators often disparage the endless “acronym soup” of security institutions floating around Europe. However, the overlapping memberships of a cluster of useful organizations weaves a comforting fabric of political integration and military transparency among nations that have fought numerous wars with each other across the centuries. In a significant way, this integration has contributed to making the period since 1945 a time of unprecedented peace in Europe. The conclusion with respect to future U.S. strategy for Europe seems unavoidable: international cooperations should be nurtured as a fundamental technique for sustaining peace and stability in Europe. U.S. policy should be supportive of any European security organization that can adapt to a relevant and complementary role for the future. Still, the good of integration needs to be protected from wasteful institutional competition and needless redundancies.

A New Balance Within a New NATO

It is time to cast a new U.S.-European balance in NATO. NATO’s transformation over the past three years, while monumental, has been primarily the adaptation of the old cooperation to meet the security demands of the future. The dominant U.S. role in Europe’s security affairs, never codified but universally accepted, remains largely intact at the centerpiece of Alliance affairs. Now, however, on both sides of the Atlantic there is sentiment to fundamentally change the cooperation
relationship itself—to change the way the United States and Europe relate to each other, albeit with NATO still at its core. The Declarations of the London and Rome Summits have been, in the main, implemented; and, because of significant changes in Europe's security equation since Rome, new and bolder steps will be needed to finish the transformation to a new order.

The need for more fundamental transformations. Three events since November 1991 make a new partnership an imperative to a strong Alliance. First, the demise of the Soviet Union and the markedly new military tasks of crisis response beyond NATO borders and "peace operations" call for basic changes in the integrated military structure. Second, the rapid success of NACC demonstrates that it is both possible and necessary to take larger steps toward expanded cooperation on regional security and crisis management. Finally, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and with it the serious beginnings of a genuine European security and defense identity (ESDI) embodied in the WEU, creates pressure for a more balanced relationship between America and Europe than previously possible.

The challenge in constructing a new partnership is to do it in a way that builds upon, and does not weaken, the most sound security cooperative in history. It can be done; the trick will be to renovate within an agreed framework. The North Atlantic Treaty is a good place to start: the original language is flexibility enough to encompass a new relationship among the signatories. Neither is it necessary to discard the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, although amending it to address activities beyond NATO borders and peacekeeping operations is a good idea. In addition, U.S. political engagement and military presence in Europe will still be needed for as far out as the future can be defined. In other words, the superstructure of the Alliance is an enduring bedrock on which to build.

Accommodating ESDI. The central element of any new trans-Atlantic security-defense partnership will be to offer a greater role for Europe in Alliance decisionmaking, responsibility sharing and assumption of resource burdens. The EU, although the
primary agent of unification, has given the WEU responsibility for execution of collective security decisions and relations with NATO. Therefore the focal point of a new relationship should be the relationship between the U.S. and WEU pillars of NATO, with due consideration for other members of the Alliance.

The WEU has already shown vigorous momentum at its new headquarters in Brussels by absorbing the IEPG\textsuperscript{19} armaments cooperation, and taking over many of the EUROGROUP functions within NATO. The WEU has also managed Europe's response to the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and conducts its security cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. Recently, the WEU reached agreement to plan military operations for the EuroCorps. Each of these activities has lent further definition to Europe's collective defense capability and the underscored Europe's intent to become a more independent pillar in NATO. The balance within the trans-Atlantic partnership, in a slow metamorphosis literally from the beginning, seems poised for revolutionary change.

Reassurances and expectations as ESDI grows. But can Europeans sustain their resource obligations and political commitments to NATO and indulge a growing ESDI as their defense budgets decline? Strong declarations to avoid redundancy with existing NATO assets cannot wish away the cost of building up WEU and of the EuroCorps structure. Practically speaking, the resources must be siphoned away from NATO, and this worries the United States. By the time it becomes obvious that NATO has a hollow force it will be difficult to reverse the damage. It also may be too soon to expect the European to have built up their own infrastructure. At the least, there is the danger of narrowing the options of political leaders in time of crisis.

The United States is anxious for signs of Europe's continuing commitment to NATO as ESDI takes on greater substance. Maastricht's recent ratification notwithstanding, political and military Europe still needs a strong U.S. partner. The Alliance gives the United States a means to engage in Europe's decision process early whenever there is the possibility of become
involved in security or collective defense. Reducing NATO to simply an insurance policy against great crises, the French concept, would quickly become a false security as NATO falls into disuse. Instead, the Alliance needs to be granted new missions, sustained resources and leadership talent, and strong political support in member capitals in order to remain vibrant.

Forms for launching change. Form is often as important as substance in NATO, but some past efforts at reform suggest how to proceed today. One way is to call for a sequel to the highly acclaimed 1967 Harmel Report, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance." Harmel is said to mark the beginning of the current "phase" of NATO history. With the tasks called for by Harmel completed it is time to define new tasks for the Alliance.20 Another technique is to draft a declaration on a new trans-Atlantic bargain modeled after the 1974 Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations.21 To become a truly pivotal document, however, a new declaration would have to contain notable guideposts for future structures and missions. Another technique is to use a combination of both ideas, especially if momentum is important. The Harmel study became pivotal; however, it took a year to complete.

Extending NATO Membership to the East

Among NACC partner states, the central issue for the past three and one half years has been to chart a path, however long, toward full membership in the Alliance. NATO responded, first at the London Summit in June 1990, by inviting former adversaries to become liaison partners. Later, at the Rome Summit in December 1991, NATO extended the offer of consultation and cooperation through the NACC. NATO has never said "no" to eventual membership and has at times declared that NATO is not a closed club. However inquiries about full membership have been consistently discouraged, a tactic that has occasionally generated open frustration.22 At NATO's summit in
January 1994, NACC partners were disappointed that next step, dubbed Partnership for Peace, did not identify criteria or a time frame for eventual membership. On the other hand, PFP's open-ended nature may create security relationships that the Alliance will be unable to step away from in a crisis.

There is no doubt that NACC partners are motivated by fear of what they see as an already neo-imperialist Russia. They are determined to stay out of a new Russian orbit. In side-stepping the issue, NATO allies cite concern about Russian perceptions of NATO encroachment, and the dangers of strengthening nationalists in Moscow who would roll back reforms and cooperation with NATO. Should Russia's influence hold sway? What if hardliners come to power in spite of external support for reforms—will it be easier for NATO to expand in the face of overt tensions with a bellicose Russia?

Nearly 3 years after the Warsaw Pact closed its doors, protests that NATO expansion threatens or isolates Russia, or that it creates a *cordon sanitaire* for the old West seem implausible and somewhat paranoiac. Given the openness, inclusiveness and outright assistance NATO members have continue to extend to Russia, often in lieu of help for neighbors in equally tough straights, the last adversary Russians should visualize is NATO. Then too, there are some in Russia who are likely to never accept the passing of the Cold War.

There are at least three alternatives for expanding NATO. First, NATO could invite states or groups of states (such as the four Visegrad states) to join as previous states have joined, i.e., following the procedures of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Second, NATO could accept groups of states under Article 10 after they have signed a collective defense treaty among themselves. The precedent for this alternative is the 1948 Brussels Union Treaty among five European states, agreed to as a prerequisite to negotiations with the United States on the North Atlantic Treaty. Finally, declaring a need for due caution regarding the acceptance of politically unproven states, the Alliance could devise a protocol of association that would draw
potential members distinctly closer to NATO over several years, in order to explore the desire of both parties for full membership. An associate membership would not necessarily end in membership, but would serve as a prelude to Article 10. This third alternative, associate membership, is examined in greater detail below.

A protocol of association should begin with strict but realistic prerequisites aimed at ensuring that prospective associate members have progressed to the point where prospects are good for a deeper and longer term relationship based on the Atlantic Charter. To be meaningful, association would have to offer enhanced security, although not the guarantees of full membership. It should also be accompanied by costs and responsibilities, again, appropriately less than for full members.

Naturally, some prospective applicants would have more to do in order to meet standardized application criteria, but the choice to meet them sooner rather than later would be their. Moreover, the criteria need primarily to be established and defensible on the grounds that they protect NATO, whose strength is in the interest of all. A list of association protocol prerequisite criteria might include:

1. Ratification of all applicable arms control treaties.
2. Active membership in UN, CSCE and the Council of Europe.
4. A freely elected national executive and parliamentary representatives.
5. A democratic form of government based on a public document (constitution, etc.) which protects rights for the individual.
6. Permanently renounce any claim to territory beyond current borders.
7. Settlement of any major dispute with neighboring states.
8. No citation by the UN or other international agencies for terrorism or human rights violations. A written protocol
might consist of an extract of the Washington Treaty consisting of the prologue and articles one, two, four, seven and eight. Once approved by NATO, the protocol regime should be offered to all NACC partners and former Neutral Nonaligned (NNA) states alike, without differentiation. Potential members would effectively create differentiation by either accepting or rejecting NATO's open invitation. Applicant powers would enter typical negotiations and final approval would be given by vote of the full NAC, just as provided for when applying for full membership under Article 10.

Importantly, the protocol should contain a provision that it will endure for a specified period (perhaps five years). This would be a period declared in the protocol as a time for the parties to assess the potential for closer security cooperation. At the end of that period, the protocol partner could, by mutual consent, be invited to join NATO as a full member pursuant to Article 10. This is to say, NATO would have another chance to decide to accept or reject the member, although practically speaking a rejection at that point would have to be based on a real threat to NATO consensus-building, or on an imminent military crisis that had not been responsibly addressed.

Under the scenario described above, it would take approximately six years (including crafting of protocols and negotiations) before the first applicants would be eligible for invitation to full membership (i.e., January 2000). Even then, full membership would be subject to unanimous approval by the NAC. Of course, if it desired, NATO could offer full membership guarantees at any time in order to provide immediate protection in the event of crisis.

Properly crafted, an association protocol would be sufficiently costly to applicants, and have strict enough criteria, that NATO would remain strong while expanding at a moderate pace. Ideally, some NACC states would find NACC itself to be adequate security, others would be satisfied by permanent associate membership (a type of NACC plus), and still others
would want full membership. It is less important to provide full membership right away than to commit to a reasonably specific path toward eventual expansion. The main principles the Alliance must not compromise as it expands are: 1) the preservation of its ability to achieve consensus, and 2) the acceptance of members who can contribute to collective security. The second of these principles means not approving requests for membership from states with imminent security problems.

The most difficult consensus for the Alliance to achieve will be agreement on what additional security benefits NATO can offer that will make association with NATO a meaningful enhancement of NACC cooperation. The first objective of extending security benefits short of a full guarantee should be to increase regional security and stability. The second objective is to explore the possibilities of closer cooperation on security and eventually defense in a non-binding relationship. Consistent with these goals, and the caveat that a thorough study is essential, some mechanics of enhanced security cooperation (over and above the 1994 NACC workplan) might include:

1. Nonvoting participation (not simple observation) in all possible NATO sessions, including most permanent sessions of the NAC and all practical committee meetings, with the intent of maximum reasonable participation in Alliance business.
2. The right to call for consultations under Article 4 whenever the associated state's physical or political security are threatened.
3. Provisions for a Representative to the NAC, and for liaison with the Military Committee, SHAPE, and other appropriate military agencies on an information sharing basis.
4. Maximum feasible access to selected NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) for the purpose of developing a national defensive force compatible with NATO.
5. Participation in selected NATO training, schools and exercises beyond those offered to NACC.
6. Inclusion in all
routine communications and distribution at NATO and SHAPE.

7. Opportunities to engage in appropriate armaments cooperations.

The costs of association membership should be the responsibility of the associate member. This will be a significant signal of the willingness and capability to contribute to collective security. Some costs (now born by NATO for NACC projects) include travel and other "participation" costs. Association members should pay the cost to establish permanent representatives at HQ NATO, and for liaisons to the MC, SHAPE and other agencies. In addition, associates should be assessed a reasonable portion of NATO costs related to administering associate programs such as cooperation initiatives, schooling, and construction.

In some fora the term "associate member" has acquired negative connotations as a barrier to full membership or as a permanent second-class status. These ideas should be dispelled. In reality it is a courtship for both the Alliance and the prospective full member, to get to know each other more intimately and to explore the serious but fragile business of collective defense, security, and even survival itself. Therefore, association as an antechamber is a responsible interim step. If NATO were to move too quickly and degrade its stabilizing properties, the entire region, members and nonmembers alike, would be less secure. NATO has the obligation to consider its own preservation as essential to regional security.24

Beyond the NATO Summit

That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is still struggling to define its future is abundantly clear. A telling sign is that the January 1994 summit marks the sixth summit in as many years, a number equal to all summits in the previous 39 years of Alliance history. A new declaration, centered on reaching out
more substantively to non-members through Partnership for Peace (PFP), and on meaningful steps toward a real ESDI capability through the creation of Combined-Joint Task Forces (CJTF), is to be the summit's principal product. The importance to NATO's survival of making these two initiatives work is hard to overstate. It is imperative for East European states to realize an adequate sense of security through stronger ties to NATO. No less essential is that the Alliance fully incorporates Western Europe's bona fide expression of collective security and defense. In both arenas potentially de-stabilizing alternatives exist, and may soon be pursued if the Alliance is not forthcoming.

To secure its place in Europe's future security structure, the Alliance must also find within the summit's by-products the collective will to overcome its timidity in crisis management and response. The big question is one of NATO's relevance to the kinds of crises -- such as Yugoslavia -- likely to face Europe in the future. To date the Alliance has answered equivocally and side-stepped the toughest tasks. PFP and CJTF will have to be bent to the tasks of crisis response, and not just serve as visual evidence of political accord. Those who judge critically NATO's future worth will look for an institution capable of handling threats to peace. It is axiomatic that this must become NATO's new raison d'être.

The most pressing Alliance business in 1994 will be to wring the most out of the PFP initiative. Alliance leaders are right to fear a credibility gap should PFP prove to be less than a meaningful step closer to membership. Post-summit momentum will be needed to meet plans for a PFP exercise in 1994, and to convince disappointed Central Europeans that PFP will improve their security. The main challenge, however, will be to define the Alliances' long term relations with partner states, and to decide what influence Russia will wield in setting the pace and nature of security relationships outside its borders.

It will be necessary to give some berth to Russian concerns, but NATO cannot waver from the steady strengthening of security ties with NACC partners who have the desire and
capability to do so. As to full membership, it should come as it did for Spain, after several years of mutual assessment, cooperation, and confidence building. Membership ought to be a natural evolution of political relations. Should PFP succeed, membership could be the topic of yet another summit, two or three years hence.

The summit should also presage the full acceptance of WEU as the European security and defense identity within the Alliance. Notably, the WEU will be one of the prime benefactors of the JCTFs to be embedded within SHAPE's Major Subordinate Commands as an adjunct of the PFP initiative. The availability to WEU of these ready-made command and control elements, which NATO could detach for operations under WEU in some scenarios, will be a major step in the direction of a European-led crisis response capability. The reality of a genuine ESDI will permanently re-cast the Alliance as a more equal partnership.

With the U.S. acceptance of ESDI as something not anathema to its interests in Europe, and French realization of the necessity for a future NATO, the evolutions of both the WEU and the Alliance must be harmonized. The best approach will be open and frank consultations among all the allies. It is an illusion to think that creating a capable ESDI will be cost free, or that some redundancies will not be born of competing political demands. In fact, WEU is already a competitor for resources and talent heretofore going to NATO. However, the allies must avoid the specter of ESDI as the successor to a dying NATO, or suggesting that NATO and the long somnolent WEU are destined to exchange roles. These would be ill omens for the longevity of trans-Atlantic cooperation.

If the allies are serious about the Alliance’s future role at the center of a new European security structure, few will argue that NATO is due major internal restructuring as well. Reorganization might start with a review of the relationship between the Military Committee and the major military commands, particularly SHAPE. It should also question the relative future significance of various committees on the
International Staff. Perhaps the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, heretofore the most powerful committees after the North Atlantic Council, should receive less emphasis. Other committees and functions might be accorded greater prominence, such as the committees which address political, economic, environmental and civil emergency cooperation. Organizationally, information and automation networks should be modernized, and the use of task forces and ad hoc committees should be examined in lieu of large standing committees and costly bureaucracies.

Finally, it must be unmistakable that both Europe and the United States see the Alliance is the crucial link for future trans-Atlantic cooperation. If NATO is to overcome doubts about its waning relevance, the council of first resort on common security issues will have to remain the North Atlantic Council. Equally important, NATO must face up to the toughest security issues as it always has, collectively, and with political resolve and sustained investment. America must show that Europe and NATO are still preeminent strategically, even as Pacific interests increase and internal demands require greater resources. In turn, Europe must indicate that it is committed to an active role for NATO beyond being a back-up to WEU. It will not be enough for Europe to recognize NATO’s utility as an American safety net. Europe will have to accept, and even welcome American participation in its security affairs for a long time to come.

By creating a fresh trans-Atlantic partnership and accepting new members, NATO can take on new institutional life and fix itself at the hub of a broader regional security network. It follows that the allies will have taken the necessary steps to make peace a permanent condition across Europe. That is a goal worthy of mighty collective effort. Without such effort, NATO will follow the Warsaw Pact into Cold War history, and peace in Europe will be left to chance. A lot depends on U.S. leadership: the importance accorded the Alliance in U.S. priorities, and Washington’s engagement in charting NATO’s future.
1. These five references are taken from the following sources respectively:

2. The lexicon of "interests" is varied and enjoys little consensus on terminology. For this monograph, national security interests or the shorthand term "security interests" mean those interests the state protects with its diplomacy, treasure and ultimately with its blood. The degree to which an interest is infringed often determines the state's response. For an excellent discussion on interests, see Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, "Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems" (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 27-36.


5. The most notable examples of peacetime interests being declared were the Monroe, Truman and Carter Doctrines. In each case a U.S. president acting essentially alone warned potential adversaries of U.S. interests in various regions of the world. These examples have been exceptions, not the rule.


10. The United Nations first deployed peacekeeping observers to the Middle East Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. While their mission has evolved, they are still there. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been on continuous duty since 1964.

11. In his 27 September 1993 speech to the UNGA, President Clinton noted that in 1987 the UN had just 10000 peacekeepers deployed, and that in 1993 there were 80000 peacekeepers deployed in 17 operations on four continents. For more detailed information see Lewis and Sewall, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends versus Means," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1993.

12. A good set of current definitions can be found in the "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping" presented to the NACC on 11 June 1993 in Athens, Greece. Other readings on the array of peace operations include Lewis and Sewall and "Defining a Role Beyond Peacekeeping" by John MacKinlay, a paper presented at the NDU workshop on Military Implications of UN Peacekeeping Operations, 17 November 1992.


16. See President Clinton's remarks to the UN General Assembly, 26 September 1993.


18. An excellent earlier treatise on this topic, the essence of which is remarkably germane today, is Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future—Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1985). See especially 149-154 on cooperation beyond Europe, and 182-191 on military cooperation among states that now make up the European security and defense identity.

19. The 13 member Independent European Program Group (IEPG) was formed in 1976 for the purpose of European collaboration on armaments. All functions of the Lisbon-based IEPG were absorbed by the WEU by early 1993. Within the WEU armaments cooperation is now managed by the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).

20. The Harmel Report called for openness to the East, unification of Germany and efforts to ultimately end East-West confrontation. It also called for continued Alliance military strength.


22. Frustration over this issue was the sentiment most often expressed by Central and Eastern European participants in the Marshall Center Conference in June 1993. Debate occasionally sparking heated speculation over a Russian veto or a "new Yalta agreement" between Russia and NATO.

23. In brief: the Prologue addresses the principles of democracy; Article 1 agrees to the peaceful settlement of disputes; Article 2 commits to friendly international relations and economic collaboration; Article 4 directs consultations should any state feel threatened; Article 7 acknowledges rights and obligations of members under the UN; and Article 8 declares signatories neither have or will make international agreements in conflict with the Treaty. In sum, the proposed extract
provides the basis for limited association. The selected extract excludes the defense cooperation mentioned in Articles 3, 5 and 6. Articles 9 through 14 are simply the mechanics of Treaty's implementation.

24. The protocol of association described here was first proposed by the author in August 1992 at the U.S. European Command, as a strategy for absorbing members of the former Warsaw Pact into NATO. In October 1993, at a defense ministers meeting at Travemünde, Germany, the U.S. proposed a less structured concept called Partnership for Peace (PFP) that contains similar provisions, such as a written agreement between the Alliance and each PFP partner. Notably absent from PFP are specific prerequisite criteria, a duration time, and explicit mention of future membership possibilities. PFP also is oriented on military cooperation versus open-ended collaboration. PFP has gained support both from NATO allies and Russia, but it has been criticized as too weak by Central European leaders. Should PFP be strengthened, associate membership may be an unnecessary step in moving toward full membership.
Appendix I:
The Marshall Plan Speech

delivered by Secretary of State
George C. Marshall, 5 June 1947, in Oslo, Norway

Mr. President, Dr. Conant, members of the board of overseers, ladies and gentlemen:

I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position.

But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of
national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than has been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile, people in the cities are short of food and fuel, and in some places approaching the starvation levels. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes
no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom
politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation. I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp
at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done? Thank you very much.
Appendix II:
Address by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

delivered at the dedication of the
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Garmisch, Germany, 5 June 1993

Thank you very much for the opportunity, and the honor, of letting me join in the dedication of the Marshall Center.

I want to comment today on the unique opportunity that this event represents.

Here we are assembled, both allies and former adversaries, to commemorate the opening of an institution that will draw us even closer. We dedicate this center on the 46th anniversary of George C. Marshall’s very famous speech at Harvard. Most remembrances of this historic occasion will talk about the Marshall Plan. I want to talk today about George Marshall’s vision, one that was only partially realized by the plan that bears his name.

Forty-six years ago today, on this very day, Secretary Marshall issued a challenge to the countries of Europe. If these countries could jointly develop a plan "to place Europe on its feet economically," the United States would support and finance such a plan "so far as it may be practical for us to do so."

What many have forgotten is that George Marshall made this offer to all the countries from the Atlantic to the Urals, including the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Marshall’s vision was inclusive in nature, one that envisioned economically successful democracies cooperating in international relations to their mutual security. No country was excluded.

Now at that time, events intervened. Stalin declined the offer. The Iron Curtain closed. And only half of Marshall’s vision was realized.
Now it is 46 years and one Cold War later. We have an unprecedented opportunity—not to come up with a new Marshall Plan, but to rededicate ourselves to Marshall's vision. That vision was for a Europe whole and free. The realization of that vision could be within our grasp. To seize this opportunity, we must do two things.

First, we must create a new European security system for the dangers we face today to replace the old Cold War system for a divided Europe. Second, we must work to ensure the success of democratic and economic reforms in these nations, with special attention to the courageous efforts of reformers in Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. And I believe that the Marshall Center, which we are dedicating today, will play a central role in both of these efforts. Let me discuss each in turn.

A new security system for Europe. During the Cold War, Europe was divided into two competing alliances. There was no common security, just security from each other.

Now all of the nations of Europe face new dangers that challenge us to work together. The most pressing danger is from ethnic or nationalistic conflicts that have been unleashed by the end of the Cold War. The former Yugoslavia has already been engulfed by such a conflict, and such a conflict threatens some areas on the periphery of the former Soviet Union.

Ethnic conflicts destabilize the host country and can spread into and involve neighboring states. And even those countries not directly threatened, by being in the region, by ethnic and nationalistic conflicts can be affected by the economic disruption and refugee flows.

The new Europe must therefore create an effort to cope with the historical legacy of the past, not just the Cold War but centuries of conflict that preceded it. The Cold War conflict suppressed, but did not end, many lingering animosities and anxieties that could and are reigniting in the same way that ethnic rivalry has in the Balkans. These could threaten the stability of all of Europe. The United States cannot hold itself aloof from
the instability and conflict in Europe. U.S. involvement in two world wars in this century demonstrates that beyond doubt.

How then is this new security system for this vast space to be created? Not by undermining the strength and solidarity of NATO, and the strength and solidarity of our bilateral relations with its members, including Germany on whose soil we now stand. Not by the announcement of some grand new architecture. Not by fruitless arguments about which of the current institutions shall have the right to do what. My belief is we should proceed pragmatically and patiently as we seek to weave a seamless security web across this space—thread by thread.

The U.S. effort to do this envisages three complementary initiatives. First we seek to strengthen and extend institutions that are now working: NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Group of Defense Ministers from the nations of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, the CSCE.

Second, we should thicken bilateral relations between each of the nations across this space. The United States is seeking to expand its bilateral relations, economically, politically and militarily, with each of the nations who will participate in programs of the new Marshall Center. Defense Minister Ruehe from Germany just talked about some of the things they are doing on a bilateral basis; we encourage other nations to do likewise.

Third, we favor the growth of regional understandings and associations among neighbors. For example, the nations of Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics could comprise such a group. Groupings that calm security concerns among neighbors enhance the wider security of us all.

In all of this, the Marshall Center will play a central role in the evolving security structures of the new Europe. It underscores the U.S. commitment to a new partnership between East and West. It is a part of a web of bilateral and multilateral institutions intended to bring us closer together.

The Center will provide a place to develop a comprehensive system to promote national security and reduce the risk of
nuclear war and terror. It can promote militaries that are responsible to democratically-elected governments. It can promote demilitarized market economies. It can promote small military forces that are geared toward defense rather than aggression. It will assist in the development of modern, professional and defensively minded militaries in the former members of the Warsaw Pact. It will help develop civilian defense experts, help establish democratic methods of defense planning and management and deepen regional defense cooperation. The Marshall Center is a small step, but it is an important step on the road to the new European security structure.

Our second task, the second of two, in realizing George Marshall's unfinished vision is to support democratic and economic reforms across this region with special urgency, I think, today in Russia.

If, for example, reform were to fail in Russia in favor of dictatorship or anarchy, the risks and costs to the West and to Russia's Eastern European neighbors become very, very grave indeed. It would shatter the prospect for partnership, place the evolving European security institutions under stress, dramatically increase the risks of conflict in the East, and impose new demands on our own—meaning the United States'—defense spending.

The success of Russian reformers will encourage the forces of democracy and economic reform in the non-Russian republics and strengthen the basis for economic cooperation among them. Likewise, the success of democratic and economic reform in Ukraine and the other non-Russian republics will contribute to the success of reform in Russia and to the reconstruction of regional economic ties on a democratic, non-imperial basis.

In this context, let me speak directly about the relationship between what we are trying to accomplish in our relations with Russia and the security of Europe.

There can be no doubt that Russia is the key, the key factor in shaping the future of the security environment for the United
States and for the new Europe alike. Speaking parochially as Secretary of Defense for the United States, we can only reduce defense expenditures if there is a diminished threat to our security, and the security of our Allies and the security of democracies around the world. To apply an economic term to a security issue, the success of Russian reform is the largest factor affecting “demand” for U.S. defense—and the demand for defense dollars.

I believe a democratic, nonimperial Russia is the best guarantee of security and stability in the new Europe. A democratic Russia that participates fully in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations, and adheres to its values, will increase the sense of security of its neighbors, reduce the danger of a relapse into the destructive patterns of the past, and make possible the continued transformation of European security institutions into more inclusive and cooperative instruments.

Our security cooperation with Russia should not be a cause for concern to our European friends and allies. It represents no diminution of our commitment to the security of Europe. In fact, it should be viewed as an enhancement of our common security, and we are not working just with Moscow. We seek to strengthen our security relationships with the nations of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

As the President has said, “the movement toward political and economic reform in Russia and the other new states of the former Soviet Union is the greatest security challenge of our day...” We must work together to integrate the Central and Eastern Europeans into the new Europe, and to ensure the success of reform.

How do we do that? On the economic side, the European Community has a critical role to play in shaping the outcome in the East. For democratic and economic reform to succeed, the Central and Eastern Europeans will need access to Western markets, investment and assistance in building the institutions of a free market economy. The prospect of community membership
strengthens reform. Close association helps draw Europe’s new democracies closer to the West.

On the security side, NATO will not mistake solidarity for inflexibility. In the future, we must consider how our closer association with the democratic states of the East will evolve. For the present, however, we must find innovative ways to draw our Central and Eastern European partners close to the Alliance.

In all of this, the Marshall Center can play a critical role. It will be a place for us to share ideas and technical advice. It will help to create that web of ties between and among the newly independent states.

In conclusion, let me say again that we are at a critical moment in history, one that offers the opportunity to realize all of George Marshall’s original vision in a free and prosperous Europe. The transition from Communism toward democracy and the free market is a process that is ushering in the post-Cold War world we all want—not one in which there is merely an absence of superpower confrontation, but the expansion of the democratic community of nations to include the entire continent and beyond.

We now have the opportunity to forge a new relationship in cooperation with our former adversaries that will ensure peace and security in Europe. The Marshall Center underscores the U.S. commitment to a new partnership between East and West. It will be part of the web that brings us all closer together.

In both formerly divided halves of Europe, nations have expressed a commitment to democracy, to free markets and to peace and common security. Together we can and must support, protect and nurture these commitments. George Marshall would have expected us to do no less.

Thank you.
Thank you very much, General Shalikashvili, for inviting me here to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. It is a pleasure for me to come. The formal opening of the George C. Marshall Center is an important event also for U.S.-German relations, for the Euro-Atlantic community and for cooperation with our new partners in the East.

The Marshall Center will be a forum for meeting representatives from the states of Central and Eastern Europe and exchanging views with them on issues regarding security policy. I welcome the resoluteness with which our American friends are working here to turn the idea of all-European and trans-Atlantic cooperation into a practical reality. I would like to thank the United States for this commendable initiative, which has had my support and my backing from the very start.

I also see the fact that this new center of intellectual activity has been built in Germany as a political signal: situated in the heart of Europe, Germany bears a special responsibility not only for the unity and stability of our continent, but also for relations between Europe and America.

We Germans will always remember the name of George C. Marshall. It stands for the immense help our American friends were willing to provide to rebuild Europe after the Second World War, which quite consciously included former adversaries. And my personal life I am sure would have been a completely different one if it had not been for a man like George C. Marshall. And what I really would like to see is that the young generation in Central and Eastern Europe has the same kind of
experience which my generation had after the Second World War in Germany when we found new friends and international acceptance.

It also stands for the vision of establishing firm political and economic links between America and Europe: to form a strong and successful community of Western democracies upholding common values, to assure the region peace, freedom, prosperity and stability.

These links were decisive for overcoming the division of Europe. We Germans are aware of and appreciate the effort America has made to pave the way for our country to unite. We are exceedingly grateful to our American friends for this.

Today, we face a similar challenge: how to rebuild Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. We are called upon to deal with the terrible legacy handed down by the communist dictatorships. This is a strategic task common to us all—to Europe and to America.

Europe needs America. As far as we are concerned, the strategic support provided by the U.S.A. is irreplaceable. America, however, is also dependent upon the support of its friends in Europe. We are linked by common values and like interests. This is why it goes without saying for us that America should play a key role in shaping Europe's future; Europe's identity must have a living trans-Atlantic dimension. It also means, however, that Europe as a whole must assume greater responsibility both for its future and for the common challenges which we are facing.

This is conditional to a decisive degree on the broad-scale unification of the entire continent of Europe—integration in the fields of economy and security policy. This is the reason why we must not merely deepen European unification, but at the same time open it up to the East deliberately and determinedly.

I thoroughly agree with my American colleague when he says that the turnaround towards democracy and a market economy which has taken place there must be made irreversible. This is also a chief task for our Alliance and one of strategic importance.
Economic success is vital for the advancement of democracy. Prosperity and security throughout Europe are inseparable. What we fail to do now will cost us dear later.

Germany cannot be left to do this alone. My country has so far contributed the bulk of the aid that has gone to the CIS states. What we now need is a concerted effort by all—Western Europe, the United States and Japan. We are extremely pleased to see that the U.S. administration also assigns top priority to this task.

Germany attaches great importance to close, trustful and friendly cooperation with Russia because consensus with Russia is a must if we are to meet the international challenges ahead. This is why we have always given firm political and material support to the process of reform initiated by President Yeltsin and to his bold economic and democratization program. We back the efforts being made by the Russian government to implement the rule of law, a market economy and a policy of peaceful cooperation in the international community. This policy has strengthened trust and confidence in Russia all over the world.

Russia, however, is also placing immense trust and confidence in the West and its willingness to involve Russia in the development of Europe. This is valuable capital for building a true peace order.

Germany is cultivating friendship and partnership with Russia based on contractual agreement. My Russian counterpart Minister Grachev and I have signed a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation. This fits into a tight net of cooperation my country is weaving not only with Russia, but also with Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak republics and other partners in the East.

Our aim must be to increase stability in the east of Europe. We must not allow a kind of region in between to develop in Europe. What we require is a long-term concept for the whole of the continent. It must take account of the security need felt by all the states concerned. And it must be in keeping with the possibilities open to Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance.
One thing I am convinced of: the transfer of stability eastwards will pay off for our alliance. The Marshall Center will provide a valuable impetus to the task of cooperation with our new partners. It will play an important role, an important part, in the North Atlantic Alliance's Liaison Concept. My dear American friends, I congratulate you on the excellent choice of names for the new center, for the name of George Marshall stands for continuity and new perspectives.

I trust it will provide a broad impulse for work to continue on the process of cooperation. What we need now are concrete and practical steps. The bilateral cooperation agreements reached with the forces of our new partners allow the Bundeswehr to expand cooperation and integration eastwards.

As a place where service personnel from the East and West are able to meet, this center will promote understanding for our common security. Each side will be able to learn from the other. The new Alliance task of peacekeeping is an area of cooperation that I think is worthwhile and one that demands our urgent attention.

Thank you very much.
Appendix IV:
National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) was established in July 1984 as an interdisciplinary research institute with both senior civilian and uniformed analysts from all four Services. The Director of INSS reports through the President of the National Defense University to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands. The Institute oversees the Office of Regional and Operational Security Analysis, which does analyses for the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief. INSS also includes a Publications Directorate which publishes both monographs and the quarterly periodical, *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, a Symposia Directorate; and a War Gaming and Simulation Center. Together, these elements support the analyses of joint and combined strategy and operations, regional and functional issues, command and control, and defense technologies and economics. The Institute is staffed by approximately 65 professionals, including senior analysts, editors, and administrative staff. The current Director of INSS is Dr. Stuart E. Johnson, B.A. Amherst College; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Appendix V:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Marshall Center) is an academic institution, chartered by the Secretary of Defense as an element of the United States European Command (USEUCOM). The Marshall Center was dedicated on 5 June 1993 in Garmisch, Germany. Its mission is to foster understanding on defense and security matters among the U.S., its NATO allies, and the countries of Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by offering courses, holding conferences, and sponsoring research on defense procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic states with free market economies. The Marshall Center also analyzes how regional conflicts might be avoided, contained, and resolved by peaceful means. The Director of the Marshall Center reports to the Commander in Chief of USEUCOM. The Marshall Center comprises three academic institutions. The College of Strategy and Defense Economics has the mission of educating mid- to senior-executive level Central and East European defense officials on defense planning procedures appropriate to democratic societies. The Research and Conference Center is charged with sponsoring conferences, workshops, and advanced research projects on issues. The Foreign Area Officer and Language Training Institute has the mission of training U.S. military and civilian specialists as foreign area officers, as well as providing language refresher training. When fully operational, the Marshall Center will be staffed by approximately 140 military and civilian professionals, including an international faculty, researchers, and staff. The current director of the Marshall Center is Dr. Alvin H. Bernstein, B.A., Cornell University and Oxford; M.A. Oxford; Ph.D., Cornell University.
About the Editor

Charles L. Barry is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, where he is a member of the European affairs research team. LTC Barry is a career U.S. Army Officer who served combat tours in Vietnam as an infantry commander and air cavalry pilot. His military experience includes extensive service with the XVIII Airborne Corps, including a tour as Operations Chief of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He has commanded airborne, airmobile, mechanized, aviation and training units. LTC Barry served 9 years in Germany with the VII (US) Corps and Headquarters, U.S. European Command. At the European Command he served as the Chief, Strategy Branch in the Plans and Policy Directorate, as Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and performed special projects for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

LTC Barry graduated from Loyola University of Chicago, and earned a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Security Manager's Course.