United Nations' Peacekeeping: The United States Should Proceed Slowly in Supporting UN Efforts to Expand Its Role

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Albert H. Huntington

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ABSTRACT

During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, effectively kept the United Nations from carrying out its intended role as the centerpiece of the international collective security system. However, since the end of the cold war, the number of U.N. peacekeeping missions has more than doubled--13 were initiated between 1948 and 1987, but 14 more since 1988. In 1992, the U.N. Secretary General recommended ways of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Although, the U.S. National Security Strategy highlights the United Nations as a vehicle to help facilitate and maintain peace in increasingly difficult conflicts, the United States did not embrace the Secretary General's proposals. The United Nations has demonstrated its effectiveness in helping to control and defuse small-scale, limited conflicts. To expect more in the diverse world that has emerged since the end of the cold war could endanger the ability of the United Nations to continue in this relatively modest role.

A number of problem areas must be addressed before the United States provides more support. Fundamental financial and management reforms must be undertaken, U.S. law may constrain U.S. involvement and, most importantly, a U.N. peacekeeping organization as envisioned by the Secretary General could drag the United States into conflicts that have no connection to U.S. interests.
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UNITED NATIONS' PEACEKEEPING:  
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROCEED SLOWLY IN 
SUPPORTING U.N. EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS ROLE

INTRODUCTION

The 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States highlights the United Nations as a vehicle to help facilitate and maintain peace in increasingly difficult conflicts. Collective security as practiced by the United Nations has been touted as the way of the future.

With the paralyzing divisions of the Cold War now over, the United Nations has been given a new lease on life, emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace. But the requirement for U.N. action has increased dramatically and now includes everything from election monitoring, preventive diplomacy and traditional peacekeeping to humanitarian relief, facilitating the stable transition of previously belligerent states back into the community of Nations, and monitoring compliance with Security Council resolutions.

In concert with others, the United States must renew its efforts to improve the recent effectiveness of the United Nations. As was demonstrated in the Gulf War and in subsequent crises, we now have the opportunity to make the United Nations a key instrument of collective security. The United States should do its part to strengthen U.N. conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities.¹

Since the end of the cold war, the number of U.N. peacekeeping operations has more than doubled--13 were initiated between 1948 and 1987, but 14 more since 1988. The United Nations has undertaken a broad range of new operations--from Angola, El Salvador, and the Western Sahara, to Mozambique and Afghanistan. However, only a handful are considered unqualified successes and some operations have become essentially permanent efforts--U.N. forces have been in the Golan Heights since 1984, in Kashmir
since 1949, and on Cyprus since 1964. In the past year, U.N. peacekeeping forces have become mired down in very complex and widely disparate conflicts in Bosnia, Cambodia, and Somalia.

Is U.N. peacekeeping and its related operations in the interests of the United States? Is the rush to bolster the United Nations and use its offices to maintain global order the clear cut choice that some supporters paint it to be? The answers are neither simple nor without ramifications for the U.N.'s ability to carry out future peacekeeping operations.

This paper will shed some light on these questions. The first section begins by defining peacekeeping. Throughout the paper, peacekeeping is used to refer to all U.N. operations involving military personnel, although the United Nations uses several terms depending on the circumstances of the operation. Subsequent sections will address the relevant U.N. charter provisions and the evolution of peacekeeping in the United Nations; the U.N. Secretary General's proposals for upgrading and expanding the U.N. peacekeeping role and the U.S. response; and some unique contributions that the United States is in a position to make to U.N. peacekeeping. The final section discusses several problem areas that must be addressed before the United States increases its support for and involvement in U.N. collective security efforts.
PEACEKEEPING IS NOT FORMALLY DEFINED

Peacekeeping originated as a concept with the League of Nations, which was effectively undermined when the United States refused to join. Nevertheless, at least 85 separate peacekeeping operations have been undertaken since World War I and the ill-fated League of Nations--27 directly under U.N. management and control. Although, the United Nations engaged in peacekeeping with several operations in its early years, the term "peacekeeping" was not formalized until 1965 when the United Nations established a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Nevertheless, a formal definition of the term has remained elusive and the term is not specifically mentioned in the U.N. charter.

According to the Congressional Research Service, U.N. peacekeeping is the placement of military personnel or forces into a country or countries to perform basically non-military functions in an impartial manner. These functions include supervising a cease-fire agreement or truce, providing forces for observation or presence, acting as a buffer force between opposing forces, maintaining and patrolling a border, or removing arms from an area.

The U.N. Security Council normally establishes peacekeeping operations in keeping with certain basic principals, which include the following:
agreement and continuing support by the Security Council;

agreement by the parties to the conflict and consent of the host government(s);

unrestricted access and freedom of movement within the countries of operation and within the parameters of its mandate;

provision of personnel on a voluntary basis by U.N. members;

noninterference by the operation and its participants in the internal affairs of the host government; and

avoidance of the use of armed forces to carry out the mandate.

Addressed in this paper are only those peacekeeping operations that were or are being directly managed by the United Nations. As previously noted, many peacekeeping operations have been conducted by other organizations or countries, including the United States.

In addition, other U.N. sanctioned operations, such as the Korean War and Desert Shield/Storm, were not peacekeeping operations in the current sense of the term since the enforcement action was not carried out directly by the United Nations, was not based on the consent of the parties, and involved the use of force. In addition,

[t]he major conflicts fought under the JN flag were UN conflicts in name only. The American commitment to intervene, even without allied support, was the most important factor in both Korea and the Persian Gulf. UN authority was a convenient and politically popular patina, but it was not necessary to prosecute the war.
Importantly, the military operations and the international forces involved in both operations were under a U.S. commander reporting directly to the U.S. military command structure. This may not be the way of the future. Peacekeeping forces--including U.S.--in Bosnia and Somalia are under the direct control and authority of a U.N. commander reporting to the U.N. Security Council.

THE U.N. CHARTER PROVIDES A BROAD RANGE OF AUTHORITIES FOR PEACEKEEPING

Trying to avoid the mistakes of the League of Nations, the framers of the U.N. charter were determined that the new organization would have the ability to maintain world peace. Foremost among the U.N. charter's purposes and principles is a provision that the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. (article 1, chapter I)

"Thus the underlying assumption of the drafters of the charter was that, when action to restore peace was needed, it would take the form of 'effective collective measures.'" A number of provisions in the U.N. charter provide the Security Council power and authority to carry out this mandate to maintain international peace and security. According to the charter, the Security Council may
-- call on the disputing parties to settle the dispute by peaceful means (article 33, chapter VI);

-- investigate any situation which might give rise to international friction (article 34, chapter VI);

-- recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment (article 36, chapter VI);

-- recommend terms of settlement (article 37, chapter VI);

-- call on the parties to comply with provisional measures laid down by the Security Council (article 40, chapter VII);

-- decide on measures not involving the use of armed force (e.g., complete or partial interruption of economic relations and communications) and call on members to apply such measures (article 41, chapter VII); or

-- take action by air, sea, or land forces, including demonstrations, blockade, and other operations (article 42, chapter VII).

Actions taken under chapter VI are characterized as peacemaking and those taken under chapter VII constitute peace enforcement.

Several other articles are important to highlight because they provide important tools for the United Nations to carry out its peacemaking and peace enforcement roles, but they have never been fully implemented.

-- Under article 43, member states agree to make armed forces, assistance, and facilities available on call and in accordance with agreements concluded between the Security Council and each member state, subject to the ratification of those states.

-- Article 44 allows non-Security Council members to participate in Security Council decisions if their troops or facilities are involved under article 43.

-- Article 45 allows the Security Council to take urgent action by using air force contingents from member states under article 43 agreements.
Under article 48, the Security Council may utilize the resources of member states for preventive or enforcement action.

Article 47 established the Military Staff Committee to manage peacemaking and enforcement operations.

Agreements under article 43 have not been put into place because of the impotence of the Security Council during the cold war and the desire of the permanent members to preserve their unilateral freedom of action. Similarly, the Military Staff Committee has essentially not functioned as intended, having been bypassed during the cold war as well.

THE UNITED NATIONS FOUND A ROLE AS A PEACEKEEPER

Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has conducted more than two dozen peacekeeping operations (see app. I). Since the end of World War II and until recently, the world had been deeply divided by the cold war. The United States and the Soviet Union, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, could effectively keep the United Nations from carrying out its "intended role as the centerpiece of the international collective security system."\textsuperscript{10} "In short, throughout the period of the Cold War, the UN could neither deter nor fight major wars, nor enforce the principle of collective security on issues of central concern to either East or West."\textsuperscript{11}
Nevertheless, the United Nations carved out a role for itself in the late 1940s and 1950s as an independent force for observer and supervision missions. These roles involved little danger and the U.N. presence was agreed to by both sides. The United Nations was successful in helping to shorten or ameliorate several conflicts. Though several of these operations are still ongoing, the conflicts have not erupted into war. On the other hand, U.N. peacekeeping critics argue that these conflicts haven't been resolved either, contending that the parties have not been required to resolve their differences simply because the United Nations makes it convenient not to do so.

A watershed year for U.N. peacemaking was 1960. Under the leadership of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations took a number of steps towards developing a collective security capability and authorized a peacemaking force to the newly independent Congo. After the outbreak of civil war, the U.N. force attempted to keep law and order, maintain peace between warring ethnic groups, and control the divided Congolese security forces. Though a number of mistakes were made and support by the Soviet Union eventually waned, some observers have concluded that the operation was a partial success. More importantly, this was the first time U.N. forces had been introduced into combat--basically going from passive observers to participants in creating a peaceful settlement.
The U.N. experience in the Congo chilled the concept of using U.N. forces for combat situations, but led to greater confidence by the Security Council and acceptance by the world of the role and legitimacy of U.N. forces as viable entities to help defuse, if not, separate, smoldering or potentially explosive conflicts. "In the eyes of many, UN peacekeeping armies compensated in part for the absence of the fighting armies which the UN was supposed to have had. Hammarskjold dubbed the blue helmets Chapter Six and a Half forces--that is, forces halfway between Chapter VI of the Charter . . . and Chapter VII."  

However, the United Nations did not enter into situations pitting the vital interests of the superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union--against each other. The United Nations was basically limited to introducing its operations into relatively neutral situations--the Middle East and others in New Guinea, Namibia, and the Dominican Republic and between India and Pakistan. As recognition of the overall success of these missions, U.N. peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of peacekeeping missions has doubled, and the types of missions and tasks have become increasing complex, resource intensive, and expensive. None is more complex and resource intensive than the operation in Cambodia, though the relief efforts in Bosnia and
Somalia have stressed the U.N.'s ability to provide safety and security to its forces, much less the civilians it is supposed to be trying to assist. Simply, the growth of peacekeeping has occurred because there are far fewer situations where the vital or strategic interests of Russia conflict with those of the United States.

**THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS PROPOSED GREATLY STRENGTHENING THE U.N. ROLE**

In an effort to organize for and achieve its full potential as a peacekeeping institution, the U.N. Security Council directed the Secretary General to recommend a course of action. The Secretary General was asked to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping." In June 1992, the Secretary General released his report outlining an Agenda for Peace.

The Secretary General noted that since the creation of the United Nations, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left 20 million dead. The United Nations was powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes--279 of them--cast in the Security Council. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Council was calling for U.N. intervention in many more places and under many different circumstances. New types of conflicts arising from many deep seated animosities, including
new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty and ethnic, religious, social, cultural, or linguistic strife, are threatening world peace and security.\textsuperscript{15}

In his report, the Secretary General defined four areas of action that the United Nations could initiate to help resolve conflict. As already described, the authorities for implementing them are within the U.N. charter but have not been fully implemented in the past because of the lack of consensus among the Security Council and its permanent members.

-- \textbf{Preventive diplomacy} is action to prevent disputes before they escalate into conflict and to limit them when they do occur.

-- \textbf{Peacemaking} is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through the actions foreseen in chapter VI of the charter.

-- \textbf{Peacekeeping} involves deploying forces, with the consent of the parties involved, to help prevent conflict and make peace.

-- \textbf{Peace building} is action to help strengthen and solidify peace in order to keep the parties from relapsing into conflict.

Overall, "preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."\textsuperscript{16} These four areas for action "taken together, and carried out with the backing of all members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter."\textsuperscript{17}
Peace enforcement is not mentioned in the Secretary General's document. But the term has generally been used to refer to actions taken by the armed forces of member states under chapter VII to restore peace.

THE U.S. REACTION WAS DECIDEDLY COOL

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 directed that the President submit a report to the Congress on the U.N. Secretary General’s report. On President Bush’s last full day in office, January 19, 1993, the administration completed the report.

Overall, the U.S. reaction to the Secretary General’s proposals was less than enthusiastic. While the report characterized the Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace as a "major contribution to dialogue on ways to enhance the United Nations’ role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping," it called for a number of reforms. Specific objections were raised concerning

-- the call for entering into article 43 agreements for the assignment of troops to the United Nations as a standby force on call of the Secretary General;\\(^19\)

-- the management and structure of the Military Staff Committee;\\(^20\) and

-- a number of financial concerns, including the U.S. share of the U.N. peacekeeping assessment.\\(^21\)
The President called for a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council to discuss the Secretary General's proposals in five key areas:

-- Development and training of military units for peacekeeping;

-- Multinational training, coordinated command and control, and interoperability of equipment and communications;

-- Sufficient logistical support for U.N. operations;

-- Development of planning, crisis management, and intelligence capabilities; and

-- Equitable, adequate financing of U.N. operations.

The report goes on to announce U.S. willingness to undertake a number of concrete, unilateral steps to enhance U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capabilities. These included:

-- Assisting the United Nations to improve its ability to coordinate peacekeeping efforts and quickly mobilize peacekeeping assets;

-- Working with the United Nations to employ most effectively U.S. lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities;

-- Training combat, engineering, and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities;

-- Establishing a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools and offering U.S. bases and facilities for multinational curriculum in peacekeeping; and

-- Reviewing how the United States funds peacekeeping and exploring new ways to ensure adequate financial support of the United Nations in performing critical peacekeeping functions.

The executive branch tasked an interagency exercise to implement the President's policy and action recommendations, but it is not clear what the results of that exercise have been.
Clinton administration has not commented formally on the Secretary General's proposals. Media accounts indicate that President Clinton is departing from the Bush administration and is more enthusiastically backing the proposals of the Secretary General. At her confirmation hearings, Madeleine Albright, the new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, pledged to look seriously at the idea of a U.N. "rapid deployment force." In addition, Secretary of State Christopher was slated to meet with the Secretary General and reportedly planned to tell him of the U.S. change in position. None of this, however, has been publicly confirmed.

THE UNITED STATES IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO SUPPORT U.N. OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping has evolved to include many more tasks than ever before. Below is a table listing many of the tasks proposed for U.N. forces with the various assets required to carry them out arrayed across the top. Many of the more complex tasks can only be implemented with U.S. cooperation and involvement.
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Source: John Mackinlay, Director of the "Second Generation Multinational Operations" project, Brown University.

The tasks are listed in order of increasing risk. On the operational level, tasks of similar complexity are grouped together. For example, observers and peacekeeping are largely symbolic, have low risk, but require the consent and overall cooperation of the parties involved. At the other extreme, sanctions and high-intensity operations require a very different
approach, more effective troops, and may have to be done without the cooperation or consent of the parties involved.

Operational level group two includes five increasingly complex tasks. U.N. forces have only begun to be involved in some of them, but more can be expected as various proposals for involvement in Bosnia and Somalia are considered. Although these tasks cover a wide range of actions, they are relatively equivalent in terms of risk and are all short of hostile intervention. Internal conflict resolution, for example, covers U.N. efforts in Cambodia. Humanitarian relief protection involves efforts like the current one in Somalia; importantly, the assets required substantially increase over the less intensive tasks, but would not necessarily be used. In Somalia, for example, the presence and threat of substantial U.S. force has been enough to keep the rebels and tribal groups in line and allow humanitarian agencies to go about their missions. Similarly, the guarantee and denial of movement is equivalent to operating the no-fly zones in Iraq or the efforts to ensure that oil tankers can pass through the Straits of Hormuz. The common thread is that, unless provoked, the whole range of assets considered necessary will not be used, but are available to enforce the intent and purposes of the action. This is a key principle of peacekeeping—"to show maximum force in order not to have to use it."
The United States has indicated to the United Nations that it can provide any or all of these assets. Any request for them will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Some of these assets can be provided only by the United States. It is clear that many U.N. operations require U.S. cooperation and assistance.

The United Nations has enjoyed a number of successes over the past four years. It helped defuse violent conflicts in Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, and Nicaragua. And the 28-nation coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression in 1990-91 was organized under U.N. auspices. Nevertheless, the U.N. had less to do with those successes than many people think. Far more important were aggressive American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War. The undeserved praise for the U.N. has led some to overestimate the world body's effectiveness, and to prescribe for the U.N. an imprudently large role in maintaining world peace.28

In a recent study done for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the authors concluded that if the United Nations "needs to conduct a major enforcement action such as an air and naval campaign or a limited or major regional conflict, then the United States or a U.S.-led coalition or regional alliance will need to act as the U.N.'s executive agent."29 In addition, the United States could offer the United Nations certain specific capabilities—intelligence, deep attack, sea control, airlift, and logistics support—for less complex missions. The United States also has a significant qualitative and quantitative advantage in the areas of communications support and training and simulation support.30
PROBLEMS WITH EXPANDING U.S. PARTICIPATION

Peacekeeping has evolved into a much more complex and involved operation than just a few independent observers sent to monitor a truce. The U.N. charter provides much more authority and power than the United Nations has heretofore been able to exercise. In recent years, the United States has been one of the United Nation's strongest supporters, yet it has not embraced the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace. A number of problem areas need to be addressed before the United States provides more support than proposed by President Bush. Several of these problems were also noted in the President's response to the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace.

Peacekeeping Financing Is Not Equitable

Most observers agree that U.N. peacekeeping operations are underfunded. But as the United Nations takes on more and more operations, the expenses will multiply many times. "Once a small fraction of UN spending, with the launching of the Cambodia operation the costs of peacekeeping operations alone may soon exceed the whole regular budget of the United Nations." The more these services are demanded, the higher the costs. Though not a U.N. financed operation, Desert Storm, for example, cost 10 times the annual outlays of the entire U.N. system.

The U.S. share of peacekeeping expenses has grown accordingly. In fiscal year 1990, the United States was assessed and paid
$81 million for six U.N. peacekeeping accounts. In fiscal year 1992, the United States paid more than $464 million for nine peacekeeping assessed accounts; but still owed over $81 million for 1992 (as of Dec. 31, 1992). Overall, U.N. costs for ongoing operations are estimated to be $6.9 billion; the U.S. share is $2.1 billion (see app. I, table I.2).

U.N. peacekeeping operations are currently financed in three ways. First, two long-standing operations--the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Israel and the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan--are financed through the regular U.N. budget. The U.S. assessment for these operations is 25 percent. Second, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus is financed by voluntary contributions. U.S. contributions for this force have averaged about 30 percent of total costs. Third, all other ongoing peacekeeping operations (currently 10) are funded through special assessments. This is by far the largest source of funding and accounts for nearly 84 percent (about $5.8 billion) of the costs for ongoing operations. The United States is assessed 30.4 percent of these peacekeeping costs.

The United States has taken the position that the system for peacekeeping assessments has to be reformed and is arguing that its share should be no greater than the 25 percent it pays for the U.N. regular budget. The percentage share for the regular budget was originally made proportional to a country's share of
the world's gross domestic product for the 50 wealthiest states; but these ratios were established in 1973. As illustrated in appendix II, at least 15 countries are paying considerably less than their estimated share of the world's gross national product. Further, several of these countries are direct beneficiaries of U.N. peacekeeping operations.35

The Military Staff Committee Is Ineffectual

Over the years, management at the United Nations has been characterized as abysmal. While some reforms have been made, the issue of U.N. management problems has not been resolved. In February 1993, the outgoing U.N. Undersecretary General of the U.N. Department of Administration and Management, Richard Thronburgh, issued a blistering report criticizing the United Nations as "a world body hobbled by antiquated management, 'deadwood' functionaries protected by patronage and 'almost surreal' budget practices."36

With the cold war over, the United Nations probably needs to be reinvented, or at least overhauled--a task that is already being contemplated by the Clinton administration. The first requirement is a clear idea of what the United Nations can do--and what it should not even attempt to.37

The Security Council's Military Staff Committee is no exception. The Military Staff Committee is understaffed and virtually unused. The committee is to be made up of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members or their representatives. It is supposed to provide advice and assistance to the Security Council and help
the Security Council deal with questions relating to the maintenance of international peace, the employment and command of forces, the regulation of armaments, and disarmament.

At present the United Nations has neither detailed insight into the capabilities of U.S. forces nor the military structure to employ them to advantage. Only a handful of U.S. military personnel and a few from other countries are serving in the Secretariat or elsewhere in U.N. headquarters. The United Nations has no capability for properly planning or overseeing an operation.\textsuperscript{38}

However, the United States has not been particularly interested in making the committee effective or in turning over authority to direct U.N. peacekeeping operations. As a result, the Military Staff Committee is far from being able to direct a military operation, has been ineffectual since its inception, and is not likely to improve.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{U.S. Law May Constrain U.S. Involvement}

Peacekeeping forces are formed by the United Nations on an ad hoc basis, with troops provided on a volunteer basis. The U.N. charter envisioned that the Security Council would be able to call upon members' forces through a series of agreements under article 43. This has not been possible in the past and has not been supported by previous administrations. Although the Clinton
administration appears more favorably disposed, various U.S. laws may constrain the ability of the United States to provide combat forces to the United Nations for its use. At least four legal matters need to be addressed before U.S. troops can be provided to the United Nations under article 43.

First, entering into an article 43 agreement will require Senate approval. In 1945, John Foster Dulles, a member of the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco conference at which the charter was signed, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that an agreement with the United Nations to provide troops under article 43 "should be regarded as a treaty requiring approval of two-thirds majority of the Senate."40

Second, the same committee also discussed whether the President would need to obtain the consent of the Congress to provide troops when called-upon by the United Nations under an article 43 agreement. Although no consensus emerged on the question, one Senator suggested that the size of the force requested could be decisive. "Two or three thousand troops for 'police action' would not need congressional approval, whereas a battle force would."41 This remains to be resolved.

Third, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 may restrict the United States from assigning forces to the United Nations for combat. The act limits the President to detailing to the United
Nations a total of 1,000 personnel at one time "to serve as observers, guards, or in any noncombatant capacity." In his analysis of the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace, President Bush noted that this "limited number must be assigned to activities directed to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They cannot be used in connection with Chapter VII peace enforcement activities."42

In recent weeks, however, the Clinton administration has proposed providing several thousand troops to the United Nations for logistical purposes in Somalia. An administration spokesman explained that the U.N. Participation Act does not restrict the number of troops that can be detailed under chapter VII. Although the Somalia operation was originally a chapter VI peacekeeping operation, it was re-authorized under chapter VII by the United Nations.43 Whether this circumvents the intent of the United Nations Participation Act needs to be examined.

Fourth, the War Powers Act of 1973 further complicates whether the United States can provide troops to the United Nations for other than noncombatant purposes. In that act, the Congress limited the President's power to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities without authorization by the Congress. After 60 days, the President must have congressional approval or withdraw the forces.
How this requirement would be interpreted if U.S. forces under U.N. direction were introduced into hostilities is not clear. At least one legal scholar and authority on the United Nations, has recommended that the Congress clear this up if the United States enters into an article 43 agreement with the United Nations. Such a commitment would be subject to considerable debate and it is far from certain whether such a provision would be approved.

Finally, besides possible legal constraints, providing troops to the United Nations would likely be resisted from both inside and outside the military. It will be difficult to convince military personnel that actions they normally take must be administered within a more complex and less organized U.N. environment. In addition, other government agencies, such as the Department of State, may resent or try to control military involvement in U.N. affairs.

U.N. Peacekeeping Missions May Not Be In U.S. Interests

With no Soviet threat to contain, most local and regional quarrels are no longer of vital concern and could be handled locally and regionally, rather than globally. For example, a study published by the Heritage Foundation concluded that

[...]he United States has little or no economic and strategic interests in Cambodia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. American soldiers should not be put at risk if U.S. national interests are not endangered. Neither the United States nor any other country is likely to sustain casualties indefinitely to perform what essentially is a charitable service of little consequence to their national security.
Before U.S. armed forces are committed to any specific U.N. military activity, U.S. national security interests must be weighed against the local and regional conditions and the suitability of military involvement. The United States must be careful not to confuse a humanitarian gesture with its vital interests to "ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people." A recent Army War College study concluded that

Unable to ignore reality, we will be tempted to do something by the horror of what we see: starving babies in Somalia, detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This raises the possibility . . . that global coverage of atrocious violence can create the public perception of a vital interest (one worth fighting over) on humanitarian grounds in situations where a more dispassionate, abstract analysis would not suggest that intensity of interest. Given the pressures that seem to emerge, one can call this temptation the 'do something syndrome.'

Additionally,

The primary goal of collective security is to prevent invasions or occupations. . . . Secondarily, collective security hopes to preserve existing internal political arrangements. The fundamental issue of U.S. policy should be how to best advance America's security. . . . Global disorder per se does not threaten the United States. . . . In most cases instability poses little danger to America and can be contained by other states, met by more modest steps such as sanctions, or simply ignored.

If the United States is not clear on what the end result of a peacekeeping operation should be, it could get bogged down in unmanageable situations. For example, the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Somalia clearly began as a humanitarian gesture, but the United Nations recently approved continued involvement in
Somalia as a peace enforcement operation (chapter VII). The United States is planning to place as many as 4,500 at the disposal of the U.N. commander. It will be an interesting test of whether the United Nations and United States can define the operation's objectives in sufficient detail to determine when the mission is completed.

The Honorable Casper Weinberger, a former Secretary of Defense, suggested the need for vital interests to be present before any military action is contemplated and that victory and popular support be reasonably assured. In a 1992 article, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin S. Powell posed the following questions to help determine whether force should be used. They are also helpful in considering whether the United States should become involved in U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.

-- Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined, and understood?
-- Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
-- Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost?
-- Have the gains and risks been analyzed?
-- How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further, and what might be the consequences?

It is not at all clear that in most of the situations involving U.N. military operations that sufficiently vital U.S. interests will be present to justify force. The passive, non-combative
The nature of peacekeeping makes the absence of vital interests somewhat less important because forces are not being sent to war but to maintain peace. But the absence of vital interests makes a difference in more severe missions, such as peace enforcement, because forces will be sent into conflict situations to create or enforce peace. In those circumstances, the U.S. involvement and the expected outcome of the situation will have to be justified in terms of U.S. vital interests.55

CONCLUSIONS

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only economic, political, and military superpower in the world. The success of any collective security arrangement or expansion of U.N. roles and missions requires U.S. support, cooperation, and involvement. U.N. peacekeeping forces have enjoyed a string of modest successes since the end of the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States. The 1993 National Security Strategy and many pundits suggest that the United States must get more involved and help make the United Nations a truly effective peacekeeping force.

Yet, the United Nations is a handicapped organization. It does not have assets or military forces of its own and must depend on the ad hoc responses of its members to field peacekeeping teams. It is struggling to keep afloat financially and is hamstrung by ineffective and questionable management. The United Nations
should not be given more than it can do. A Heritage Foundation study states the problem this way:

In the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, and the newfound respect shown the UN, a danger arises that policy makers will let their misguided idealism get the better of them. Congress and the President should take a clearheaded, realistic look at UN peacekeeping and establish some priorities for U.S. policy. These should be (1) defend American national security, (2) protect the American taxpayer, and (3) avoid surrendering American sovereignty to the UN bureaucracy. . . . The UN is a poorly run institution that should not be entrusted with preserving global peace.36

The United States is in an awkward position vis-a-vis the United Nations. Whether the United Nations succeeds or not, the United States will play a key role. The United Nations has been a convenient vehicle for projecting force--albeit peacekeeping forces--into local conflicts that threaten to escalate into regional conflicts or drag other countries into the fray. But the United States needs to be in a position to extricate itself and act unilaterally if necessary to carry out what is in the vital interests of the United States. Operating through the permanent five members and the rest of the Security Council demands time and patience. This precludes a fast reaction and means that the United States cannot always be sure that the United Nations will act within U.S. interests.

The tranquility and good fellowship that has characterized the United Nations over the past several years will not last. Other members of the permanent five, especially China, will begin to
assert themselves and either veto U.S. initiatives or propose their own that are not in the interests of the United States. Vetoing or not participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations supported by other nations will pose a dilemma for the United States, and could lead to U.N. gridlock and effectively emasculate the U.N.'s ability to carry out even the simplest of peacekeeping operations.

* * * * *

The United States needs to proceed cautiously. The United States must define its role in U.N. peacekeeping operations in terms of U.S. national interests. A U.N. peacekeeping organization as envisioned by the U.N. Secretary General could drag the United States into conflicts that have no connection to U.S. interests. The United States should not get involved in "no-win" situations without clear, identifiable objectives. In addition, the United States should not expand its support of U.N. peacekeeping efforts until fundamental financial and management reforms are undertaken at the United Nations.

The United Nations has demonstrated its effectiveness in helping to control and defuse small-scale, limited conflicts. To expect more in the diverse world that has emerged since the end of the cold war is asking too much and could endanger the ability of the United Nations to continue in its relatively modest role. The
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**APPENDIX I**

Table I.1: Completed U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (as of Dec. 31, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>U.N. Costs ($millions)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Emergency Force I (UNEF I)</td>
<td>1956-67</td>
<td>$214.2</td>
<td>Supervise withdrawal of forces from Egypt and serve as buffer between Israel and Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGL)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Monitor infiltration of arms and personnel across Lebanese borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC)</td>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>400.1</td>
<td>Verify withdrawal of Belgian forces and restore order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Supervise disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Republic (Egypt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission of Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Observe the situation and to report on breaches of the cease fire between the two de facto authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Supervise cease-fire along India-Pakistan border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Emergency Force II (UNEF II)</td>
<td>1973-79</td>
<td>- 446.5</td>
<td>Supervise cease-fire agreements and control buffer zones between Egypt and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)</td>
<td>1988-91</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>Supervise cease-fire following Iran-Iraq war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)</td>
<td>1988-91</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>416.2</td>
<td>Supervise transition of Namibia from South African rule to independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)</td>
<td>1989-92</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>Monitor arms and troop infiltration and demobilize Nicaraguan contras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)</td>
<td>1991-early 92</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire and prepare for deployment of UNTAC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I.2: Ongoing U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (as of Dec. 31, 1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>U.N./U.S. Costs ($millions)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$375.0/ 93.8</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire along Israeli borders and assist UNDOF and UNIFIL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>665.0/ 199.5</td>
<td>Monitor buffer zone separating Greek and Turkish Communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>490.0/ 149.0</td>
<td>Monitor separation of Syrian and Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,990.0/ 605.0</td>
<td>Establish buffer zone and facilitate peace between Israel and Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>25.0/ 7.6</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire and administer free elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>114.3/ 34.7</td>
<td>Monitor buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait following the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>180.6/ 54.9</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire and hold referendum for independence or joining Morocco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23.0/ 7.0</td>
<td>Monitor human rights and phased separation of forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,900.0/ 577.6</td>
<td>Supervise government functions and eventual elections while rebuilding country and disarming factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>634.0/ 192.7</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires between factions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>330.0/ 100.3</td>
<td>Implement peace agreement for Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.1: Selected "Wealthy" Members of the United Nations and Their U.N. Regular and Peacekeeping Assessments Compared to the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP ($US)</th>
<th>Percent Share of World GNP</th>
<th>Regular U.N. Assessment (percent)</th>
<th>Peacekeeping Assessment (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$22,470</td>
<td>22-25.4</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>30.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Ibid.
5. For example, the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and the Multinational Force in Lebanon.
8. The Foreign Policy Association, p. 15.
11. Ibid., p. 1.
12. Durch, p. 36.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 7.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
22. Ibid., p. 1.
23. Ibid., p. 2.

26. The table was presented by John Mackinlay at a conference entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping with Special Reference to Cambodia," Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 1993. The conference was co-sponsored by the Congressional Research Service, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the General Accounting Office. The discussion of the table is based on Mr. Mackinlay's presentation.


29. Bills, p. 16.

30. Ibid., p. 17.

31. Luck, p. 25.

32. Ibid., p. 25.


37. Watson, p. 35.

38. Bills, p. 20.


40. Russett, p. 78.

41. Ibid., pp. 78-79.


44. Henkin, p. 13.

45. Bills, p. 20.
46. Ibid., p. 174.
51. Ibid., p. 167.
53. Snow, p. 27.
54. As quoted in Snow, p. 27.
55. Snow, p. 28.
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