Integration, Interoperability and Coalition Warfare in the New World Order

A Monograph
by
Major John P. Medve
Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Second Term AY 92–93

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
Best Available Copy
**Title:** Integration, Interoperability and Coalition Warfare in the New World Order

**Author:** MASON - JOHN P. Medve, USA

**Performing Organization:**
- **Name:** School of Advanced Military Studies
- **Address:**
  - ATTN: AHTE-SOC
  - FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO 65607-6900
  - COM (913) 684-2334

**Supplementary Notes:**
- **Distribution/Availability Statement:**
  - Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

**Abstract:**
SEE ATTACHED

**Subject Terms:**
- Coalition warfare
- Tennessee
- Civil War

**Security Classification:**
- **Report:** Unclassified
- **Of this Page:** Unclassified
- **Of Abstract:** Unclassified
I. INTRODUCTION

This monograph analyzes the relationship between integration and interoperability within the United States Armed Forces in coalition warfare. Specifically, this study will focus on command and control and logistical structures of United States coalition efforts. The aim of this analysis is to examine the utility and efficacy of doctrine in this area.

United States doctrine in the area of coalition warfare is still evolving. Currently, coalition warfare is addressed by Joint doctrine and Army doctrine at the corps and echelon above corps level. The nature of the New World Order requires leaders of organizations below these levels to have expertise in coalition warfare. In Korea the Second Infantry Division will, in all likelihood, fight as part of a South Korean corps. Currently, FM 71-100, Division Operations does not address coalition warfare. As a result the doctrine of organizations below Corps may need to include a primer on coalition operations.

This monograph examines the problem, the organizational options, and the trends of United States efforts in coalition command and control and logistic structures. Historical case studies provide examples of these structures and the utility of doctrine in coalition warfare.
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major John P. Medve

Title of Monograph: Integration, Interoperability and Coalition Warfare in the New World Order

Approved by:

James Schneider, Ph.D.  Monograph Director

COL James R. McDonough, MS  Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.  Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 14th day of May 1993
This monograph examines coalition warfare in the context of the New World Order. FM 100-5 notes that one of the characteristics of the Army is its ability to train to fight as a member of a coalition. The United States throughout its history has been involved in many coalition efforts. Since World War II the United States has supplied an overwhelming amount of forces and supplies to these coalition efforts. This allowed the United States to influence the structure of the coalition command. However, the realities of the New World Order are such that policymakers assume that military forces can be integrated to take advantage of their respective capabilities. This monograph analyzes that assumption.

The monograph analyzes three historical case studies using four planning considerations for coalitions and alliances to analyze the integration and interoperability of command and control and logistical structures in coalition warfare. The case studies are: Tennessee and the Confederate States of America, the United States and Great Britain at Anzio, and the United States and UN forces in the Korean War. The planning considerations are: goals and objectives, cultural differences, equipment, and military doctrine and training. The monograph analyzes the common trends in these case studies and balances the findings against current coalition warfare doctrine.

Finally, the study concludes by examining the current doctrine in the context of the New World Order. The monograph concludes that the Army has institutionalized coalition warfare doctrine at too high a level. The study recommends that corps and division operations doctrine include sections on coalition warfare and that the educational system reexamine the program of instruction for coalition warfare to insure its relevancy for today's world.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Historical Case Studies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

This monograph analyzes the relationship between integration and interoperability within the United States Armed Forces in coalition warfare. Specifically, this study will focus on command and control and logistical structures of United States coalition efforts. The aim of this analysis is to examine the utility and efficacy of doctrine in this area.

United States doctrine in the area of coalition warfare is still evolving. Currently, coalition warfare is addressed by Joint doctrine and Army doctrine at the corps and echelon above corps level. The nature of the New World Order requires leaders of organizations below these levels to have expertise in coalition warfare. In Korea the Second Infantry Division will, in all likelihood, fight as part of a South Korean corps. Currently, FM 71-100, Division Operations does not address coalition warfare. As a result the doctrine of organizations below Corps may need to include a primer on coalition operations.

This monograph examines the problem, the organizational options, and the trends of United States efforts in coalition command and control and logistic structures. Historical case studies provide examples of these structures and the utility of doctrine in coalition warfare.
INTEROPERABILITY AND INTEGRATION

The nature of collective efforts in the New World Order will be either as part of an alliance (a formal agreement between nations) or a coalition (a temporary arrangement between nations to obtain a specific political objective). Success in these endeavors will depend on the ability of alliance or coalition forces to establish interoperability procedures. Interoperability is defined as "the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide service and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the service so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together." The degree to which nations direct their military forces to develop such systems will dictate the degree to which these forces can be packaged in smaller units. Integration of units within a combined structure is a function of interoperability.

COALITIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The United States has a rich history of using coalitions as a means to obtain foreign policy objectives. The January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States outlines the foundation of United States political, economic, and military as one based on collective engagement. The New World Order focuses on an increase in the number of
collective endeavors in which the United States will participate.

The structure of United States coalition and alliance efforts since World War II were influenced by the United States' preponderance of forces and supplies to collective efforts. This allowed the United States to influence the command and logistical structures.

The New World Order is emerging during an era of declining defense budgets. In today's world policymakers see collective efforts as a way to compensate for smaller armed forces. Collective efforts will be put together quickly with little time for prior organization. The NATO experience shows the amount of effort required to achieve minimal levels of integration and interoperability. A misunderstanding of the complexity of integration, interoperability, and coalition warfare will likely lead to disaster. Policymakers in the New World Order cannot assume away the problems of coalition warfare.

**METHODOLOGY**

This monograph uses four planning considerations for coalitions and alliances to analyze the integration and interoperability of command and control and logistical structures in coalition warfare. These considerations are: goals and objectives, cultural differences, equipment, and military doctrine and training. These planning considerations will provide
insight into the ability of the United States to foster integration and interoperability in future coalition efforts. The first two planning considerations foster integration while the latter two foster interoperability.

Three historical case studies will serve as the basis for analysis of integration and interoperability. These case studies are: Tennessee and the Confederate States of America, the United States and Great Britain at Anzio, and the US and UN forces in the Korean War. These case studies were selected to assess the similarities and differences of the partners, the impact on the four planning considerations, and the resultant command and control and logistical structure.

The analysis of these case studies will serve as a point of departure to analyze current doctrine and the likelihood of success or failure of future operations. The monograph concludes with an outline of the implications for further interoperability and integration of United States Armed Forces in coalition operations.

II. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES
Tennessee and the Confederate States of America

In early 1861 key Tennessee leaders decided to push the people of the state toward joining the Confederate coalition. The efforts of these leaders
during 1861 provide an insight into the problems of joining a coalition and organizing military forces. The Confederacy was established on the principle that each state retained sovereignty over the central government. This principle proved to be a fatal weakness in the confederation's ability to wage coalition warfare against the United States.

Goals and Objectives

The efforts of Tennessee to join the Confederate States reflect how domestic politics shape the formulation of coalition goals and objectives. Governor Isham Harris led a movement for an independent Tennessee. In February, 1861 Harris proposed a convention to consider succession. Voters rejected this option. Harris then opted for a strategy that called for an independent Tennessee without actually seceding from the Union. Harris believed that the Federal government would respond by invading the state. He felt that the citizens of Tennessee would respond to the threat of invasion by agreeing to join the Confederacy. The state legislature passed a declaration of independence on May 6, 1861. Ratification by the voters of Tennessee of this declaration occurred on June 8, 1861. However, the goal and objective of this declaration was confused. Harris and his supporters maintained the position that independence and the Confederacy were two separate
ideas. Politically the effect was to broaden the base of support of separation from the Federal government. The result was that many supporters focused on the idea of a fully independent Tennessee as the endstate. This affected the willingness of volunteers in the Army of Tennessee to serve outside of Tennessee and the designation of military objectives by commanders in the field. Defense of the Mississippi River was seen by Tennessee secessionists as the key to preventing Federal invasion. This focus hampered the ability of commanders to reallocate forces during the war.

In the interim Harris worked with Confederate officials to build the foundations of a military relationship. On May 7, 1861, Harris concluded an agreement that established a military league between the Confederacy and Tennessee. The league placed part of Tennessee under Confederate protection. Most of the state was still the responsibility of the state government. Nothing more could be done until the June 8 vote on independence. Harris wanted to set the conditions for a quick and smooth transition of Tennessee forces into Confederate service. However, the transition was not destined to be quick or smooth.

The nature of Tennessee's attempt to join the Confederacy reflect the political nature of coalition warfare. The domestic politics of Tennessee forced Governor Harris to structure Tennessee's departure from
the Federal Government in such a way as to restrict future military operations. Many volunteers joined the Army of Tennessee to defend their homeland which the governor and his supporters said was threatened. Thus many Tennessee regiments were not inclined to participate in what they considered out of area operations. Second, the Harris strategy of focusing on the threat of invasion down the Mississippi River restricted the options of military commanders. General A.S. Johnston was forced to devote precious resources to the defense of the Mississippi at the expense of other areas because of the pressure from Tennessee groups responding to Harris's view.

The objective of Confederate and Tennessee leaders were separation from the Federal union. The goals of each of these leaders differed in scope with Confederate leaders focusing on the formation of their government, while Tennessee's focus was split between those who saw security in the Confederacy and those who saw security in an independent Tennessee. Additionally, east Tennessee did not favor separation from the Union. Harris had treated the people of east Tennessee leniently. After his reelection on August 8, 1861 he reversed his policy and used force to quell any expression of unionist sympathies. The reversal caused a backlash and General A.S. Johnston had to pull units from his eastern defensive line to put down the
rebellion. Finally, Harris's view of the military situation assumed Kentucky's neutrality would be respected. His assumption meant Harris did not provide for any defenses along the Tennessee-Kentucky border. This assumption was invalidated when Polk entered Kentucky in September 1861. The violation of Kentucky neutrality showed the lack of communication and synchronization of objectives between Tennessee and the Confederate government.

Another area that reflected the lack of communication between the two governments was the transfer of units from Tennessee to Confederate authority. First, the area of operations agreed to by Harris under the military league for Confederate control did not include the east and middle Tennessee. After the Confederate command was established General Polk's command did not include these areas. This resulted in a confusing situation in which the state was still responsible for the paying and arming the militia units in these areas. However, Tennessee stopped paying and arming these units effective July 31, 1861, the date of official transfer to Confederate control. The situation was not cleared up until October 16, 1861 when the Confederate War Department decided to pay the Tennessee soldiers.

Transfer problems were the most acute in the surgeon-general, quartermaster, and ordnance
departments. In relatively short time the state had put together excellent organizations in these areas. Yet no provisions were made to transfer these departments under Confederate control. The use of these departments by the Army of Tennessee resulted from an informal agreement with the state.  

**Military Doctrine and Training**

In 1857 Tennessee abolished its state militia. In January 1861 Governor Harris reported that the state did not have a militia. Harris through Herculean efforts managed by December 1861 to establish "seventy-one infantry regiments, twenty-one cavalry regiments, and twenty-two artillery batteries." This force looked larger on paper than in reality. Harris conducted a levy en masse. The accounting of these soldiers did not distinguish between the militia, independent companies, state regiments, or reserve corps. Many soldiers were double and triple counted which inflated the real size of the Tennessee force.

Tennessee did not establish a standard for unit size. Tennessee regiments interchanged the term division and brigade. General Leonidas Polk reported to General Johnston that "his Tennessee troops consisted of four brigades, but later he reported they were comprised of three divisions." He later reported to General Johnston that he did not know how
many men he had from Tennessee. The result was a
constant inflation of the number of soldiers in the
Army of Tennessee. Further, the number of men per
regiment were not consistent. The size could range
from 541 to 952 soldiers. This inconsistency
affected the training of regiments and the application
of military tactical doctrine. However, experience
developed regiments with exceptional fighting
capabilities.

The fighting force Harris eventually turned over
to the Confederacy had a cohesion developed from the
bottom up rather than the top down. The focus of
elan was at the regimental and brigade level. The Army
of Tennessee’s core revolved around the Tennessee state
militia. This resulted in a more geographically
oriented army and initially restricted its use.

Equipment

The efforts by Governor Harris to move Tennessee
into the Confederate coalition put a strain on the
ability of Tennessee to supply the newly created state
army. This strain was most apparent in rifles.
Confederate authority in Tennessee was established in
July 1861. From May to July 1861 the state had to
supply itself. The Tennessee arsenal consisted of
"8,000 flintlock muskets of which more than half were
damaged, 185 percussion muskets, 350 badly damaged
Hall's Carbines, and assorted other weapons. When the military league was ratified the Confederate government promised to send arms, but only to regiments designated for Confederate service. The proponents of an independent Tennessee found that many of the volunteers would not consent to Confederate service. The arms furnished to Tennessee by the Confederate government lay idle while Harris scrambled to organize regiments for Confederate service.

Uniformity of weapons was a persistent logistical problem. Tennessee units were ultimately furnished Springfield and Enfield rifles. This caused logistical problems for the various commands which did not get resolved until the Atlanta Campaign.

Cultural Differences

The union of soldiers in the Army of Tennessee from various states resulted in friction between units. The research does not support any indication that this friction affected battlefield performance, but is a reminder that cultural differences do play a part in coalition efforts. The bulk of the Army of Tennessee was from Tennessee. This caused an officer from Louisiana to remark that the men were "unprincipled and very degraded men and officers." A soldier from Alabama admitted, "I hate Tennessee, the institutions and the people and really feel as if I am fighting for
the Yankee side when I raise my arm in defense of Tennessee soil...There is an alienation between the troops of the Gulf states and the Border states that may grow into something serious." The cultural differences engendered a competitive spirit between regiments of different states. This resulted in increased cohesion. The advantage of this cohesion was recognized by the Confederate Congress which forbade the breaking up of state regiments.

This case study reveals the impact of the initial structure of the coalition on the ability of military forces to be successful on the battlefield. The goals and objectives of Tennessee initially were confused. The Tennessee leadership maintained a separate logic between an independent Tennessee and Tennessee as a member of the Confederacy. The result was that many regiments would not fight outside of the state. The doctrine and training of the force had to be built from the ground up given the fact that Tennessee had abolished its militia in 1857. The military leadership in Tennessee drew upon the morale of the individual soldier to train hard and endure the trial and error of fighting to develop the doctrine necessary to fight on the battlefield. The lack of doctrine hampered these efforts and led to confusion when the Tennessee regiments were integrated into Confederate service. The lack of logistical uniformity
placed increased burdens on the supply system given the variety of rifles and ammunition required. Lastly, the soldiers of the various regions that fought together recognized their separateness. This caused friction within divisions but insured cohesion at the very lowest levels.

THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN AT ANZIO

The Tennessee case study revealed the influence of joining a coalition on the constituent military forces. The case study of OPERATION SHINGLE examines the impact of integration at lower levels on coalition warfare.

On January 2, 1944, General Alexander directed the US Fifth Army to conduct an amphibious operation to break the stalemate on the Italian Front. The force designated to conduct this operation was a corps composed of US and British forces. Until this time integration between the coalition partners occurred above corps level. "Satisfactory integration of Allied units at corps level and below was difficult to attain and questionable to attempt." The target date for OPERATION SHINGLE was between 20-31 January 1944. Within 18 days from Alexander's directive an integrated corps would be put together as the assault force on Anzio. The friction of war magnified by coalition
warfare would contribute to the failure of the landings to accomplish their intended objectives.

**Goals and Objectives**

The goal of OPERATION SHINGLE was to break the stalemate on the Italian Front with the objective of capturing Rome. The simplicity betrayed the complexity of coalition warfare. The driving force behind OPERATION SHINGLE was Winston Churchill. He believed the Mediterranean Theater held the key to victory against the Axis Powers. Success at Anzio depended on the ability of Fifth Army to break through and link up with the assault forces. This assumption did not include the tenaciousness of the German defense, which would prevent any ground relief for the assault forces.

Churchill's influence rose at a critical time in the Mediterranean War. General Eisenhower, the theater commander, was in the process of focusing on OVERLORD. Other key members of the Mediterranean staff, including Cunningham and Tedder, were also leaving for England to plan the cross channel attack. In the wake of this turbulence the plan for an amphibious landing south of Rome continued. The plan was eventually approved when Churchill garnered the agreement of Roosevelt and Marshall for the necessary landing craft for a two division assault.
The success of SHINGLE depends upon the strength of the initial landing. If this is two full divisions plus paratroops, it should be decisive, as it cuts the communications of the whole of the enemy's forces facing the Fifth Army. The enemy must therefore annihilate the SHINGLE force by withdrawals from the Fifth Army front or immediately retreat.28

In his optimism Churchill never considered the options available to the Germans. The focus of Marshall during this period was to insure the Anzio landings did not detract from the ability to launch OVERLORD.

The decision to integrate the assault force was also a function of the goals and objectives of the operation and shows how political considerations can overrule military considerations in coalition warfare. The military aspect of the operation dictated that the assault force should consist of forces from one country. However, Churchill was concerned that this risky operation, commanded by the British should not consist of solely US forces.29 Additionally, failure of British forces to participate in the capture of Rome would create negative sentiment in Great Britain.30 The assault force mission was assigned to General Lucas's IV Corps, whose SHINGLE force consisted of Major General Penney's 1st British Division, Major General Truscott's 3rd US Division, the US 509th
Parachute Infantry Battalion, Darby's Rangers, and the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Thus, the basic plan for the operation and the characteristics of the assault force were driven not by the commanders but by one of the major coalition political leaders.

Lastly, the mission of the assault force at Anzio became a confused issue. Alexander saw the mission of IV Corps as securing the Alban Hills. However, Clark in his orders to Lucas deleted securing the Alban Hills from Lucas's mission. The relationship between Alexander and Clark was cool. Further, Clark was not above dismissing Alexander as a military lightweight in front of the Fifth Army staff. The change in Lucas's mission without approval from Alexander insured confusion on the purpose and endstate of IV Corps mission.

Military Doctrine and Training

The final planning sessions prior to the operation reflected the differences between the British and US doctrine. The British arrived expecting the issuance of orders and were dismayed to find the corps staff unprepared and willing to engage in give and take.

The limited amount of time precluded sufficient training. Both division commanders felt their forces needed more rehearsal time. The Allied Naval commander was upset with the number of accidents and believed
that it "appeared impractical on the face of it to make an assault without further training." However, Clark was unwilling to revisit the timing of the operation based on the availability of LSTs. The lack of training time precluded any development of common practices between units in the IV Corps.

The administrative personnel procedures of the allied contingents varied during the operation. The US units under IV Corps adhered to Fifth Army procedures, while the British Division utilized the British Fifteenth Army Group procedures. The IV Corps solution to different administrative personnel reporting times was to require the British units to submit an additional report that coincided with the Fifth Army procedures. Further, the replacement systems were based on different practices and expectations of replacements. The British had a fixed replacement figure, while the US expected replacements based on loss estimates. The impact of this was that the British were more constrained on their personnel replacement and therefore had a lower casualty threshold to continue operations. It is unclear whether Lucas understood this reality.

Further, the IV Corps had to establish parallel systems for medical care. While the two systems had similarities, there were enough differences to warrant duplicate systems. This requirement increased the
amount of vehicles and personnel required on the beach and the number of installations in the beachhead area. This strained an already austere logistics system.  

A bright spot in the combined effort was the communications effort. The British did not possess the same communication equipment as the IV Corps. The Corps provided the British division with a signal support element that encoded and decoded messages from the different headquarters. The communication procedures used by the corps were those standardized procedures developed since the North African landings. The whole system was backed up by liaison officers at each level.

**Equipment**

The differences in equipment between British and US units further strained the logistical system. IV Corps endeavored to find commonality whenever possible to relieve the supply system. The type of POL used by the British was not in the US supply inventory. The British vehicles required conversion to detergent-type oils since the British forces drew their POL from US supply points.

The differences in weapons systems translated into a serious problem for the ordnance officers. "The antitank and light antiaircraft guns were the only weapons with compatible ammunition." The US and British supply points were based on an even-odd number
system to avoid confusion. The differences in equipment necessitated the devotion of limited supply assets to move the additional supplies needed to sustain the force.

Cultural Differences

Despite a common language the British and US forces under IV Corps still had to work through their cultural differences. The British were continually frustrated with the US proclivity for holding a meeting as a means to arrive at a common solution to a problem. The British viewed meetings as events to give approval for a plan or a course of action after the necessary staff work had been accomplished. This difference at problem solving resulted in friction between the British division commander and the IV Corps staff.41

The contents of rations was a basic cultural difference that added a burden to logistical system, but maintained morale. The British retained their taste for tea over coffee. The end result was a decision by IV Corps to supply each force with its indigenous rations.42

OPERATION SHINGLE was executed after much planning but little reflection on the impact of integrating divisions under a corps. As noted above, the allies had refrained from this type of integration after the early North African experiences. The nature of the operation should have warranted more
consideration of the inherent friction in an integrated
unit. The commander of IV Corps, General Lucas, was
not sensitive to the issue of coalition warfare. He
did not organize a combined staff and his own
leadership style dampened the relationship between
himself and his British subordinate. Additionally, the
outside political forces did not permit IV Corps
adequate preparation time prior to D-day. The
combination of divergent objectives and differences in
doctrine, equipment, and culture amplified the inherent
friction in war to create the disaster at Anzio.

US AND UN FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR

On 25 June 1950 the North Korean Army invaded
South Korea. President Truman authorized the use of
US ground forces four days later. The same day the
Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a message
to all member nations asking what assistance they would
give to South Korea. Only Nationalist China
initially offered ground troops. General MacArthur
decided to use these troops based on political
sensitivity. On July 8, 1950 General MacArthur was
designated the UN commander. The President of South
Korea, Syngman Rhee, placed Republic of Korea (ROK)
forces under MacArthur’s command on 14 July. Initially ROK forces were directed through their own
Army chief of staff. The exception to this was when
ROK units were attached to US units. Follow on UN forces did not arrive until August 1950. By the end of the conflict twelve countries along with the US and ROK forces would make up the UN command. The Korean War provides examples of the use of small units from coalition partners during a UN effort.

General MacArthur recommended the addition of 1,000 ground troops from UN members. He wanted primarily infantry units with supporting artillery and support units so these units could be employed as soon as possible after their arrival. MacArthur also directed that the units come with equipment that could use US ammunition and had personnel who could speak English. He was attempting to mitigate some of the friction of combined operations. The position of the US as the nation with the preponderance of forces and equipment gave him this latitude.

**Military Doctrine and Training**

The UN member nations responded to the request for forces in larger numbers than MacArthur anticipated. US policy planners indicated to MacArthur that 25,000 to 35,000 allied troops, instead of the 1,000 UN troops, had been promised by member nations. The Eighth US Army was given responsibility for implementing an integration policy for these units. Problems developed with the arrival of a unit from the Philippines that made it clear to US commanders that
some sort of reception center was necessary to insure a smooth integration of forces. On October 7, 1950 the Eighth Army established the United Nations Reception Center (UNRC) at Taegu University. This center was to standardize and train UN forces along US doctrinal lines. The center trained units from Thailand, India, the Netherlands, France, Greece, Ethiopia, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

The major lesson learned at the UNRC was how to structure the various UN units. Initially the units were organized "according to TOE 7-14 Infantry Battalion. EUSAK discovered that, in practice, this placed an undue burden on the available service elements of the parent unit to which the UN contingent was attached eventually. Hence, it began to restructure the UN units, commencing with the Columbians, while still in their UNRC training phase, using TOE 7-95 Infantry Battalion Separate which gave the battalion additional vehicles and more administrative personnel."

The desire of MacArthur to have all units use US doctrine did not mesh with reality. Most of the nations involved in the coalition had pre-war associations with either the British or the US. The result was a split in the use of doctrine. The implication on the ground was the difficulty of exchanging sectors between US and British trained
Further, UN units tended to go their own way in the use of doctrine for "air power, supporting ground weapons, armor, and the use of minefields."\(^{55}\)

The command and staff procedures of the various UN member units was simplified by the existence only two types of staffs, one based on the US model and the other the British. The experience of many British and US leaders from World War II prevented much confusion in this area. Many governments insured that their contingents had enough personnel to handle staff work and relieve the tactical commanders from administrative chores. However, in many cases this created another headquarters element between the UN unit and its controlling headquarters. For example, the Thai contingent was to be a regimental combat team. The Thai government sent a battalion plus the necessary overhead for a regimental combat team. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division balked at having a regimental headquarters, battalion headquarters, and service units for adjutant general, judge advocate, military police, quartermaster functions for one battalion. Eventually only medical and service units were retained.\(^{56}\)

**Equipment**

There were three logistic systems operating during the Korean War. The US system which supplied the bulk of supplies for US and UN units. The British
system which supported Commonwealth units. Finally, the ROK maintained its own supply system. The US system had the additional burden of maintaining an accounting of materials issued since the US was to be reimbursed for the supplies rendered during the war.57 However, the normal problem of equipment mismatch in coalition warfare was mitigated to a large extent by having the US provide the bulk of equipment for UN forces. The problems that arose were in large part due to allied unfamiliarity with US equipment and maintenance procedures.

Clothing became a complex issue during the war. Many units did not understand the US sizing tables and consequently ordered uniforms too large for their soldiers. Some contingents, notably the Thai, were simply smaller than the normal US sizes.58

The combined effort also caused problems in other areas of equipment issue. Some UN contingents needed extensive training in the use of US cold weather gear, and some US equipment simply proved too complicated for them to operate and service—liquid fuel/high pressure cooking and heating apparatuses, water purification techniques, and insect repellent material, for example. UN personnel actually died from confusing fuel tablets with food or salt tablets, while immersion heaters were thought to be part of shower units, helmet liner neck bands were mistaken for ties, and words like poncho, shelter half, cargo pack, kitchen fly, and pile liner, while familiar to European allies, were quite foreign to Thai troops.59
ROK units posed a particular problem with the myriad of vehicles and lack of organizational maintenance. Many of the vehicles in the ROK Army were obsolete. The US ordnance units had to support the ROK units in addition to the US and UN forces. However, the allocation of these units was solely based on US needs. 60

The integration issues that caused the most problems in the Korean War revolved around the familiarity of UN forces with US equipment. As noted above, many of the UN units did not have the training or the exposure to mechanized equipment prior to deploying to Korea. The UNRC provided basic training on this equipment, but more needed to be conducted when these UN units were attached to US units. Further, the reservoir of knowledge available to the planner based on their World War II experiences proved invaluable in this area.

Cultural Differences

Language proved to be the perennial problem it has been in all combined operations. The variety of languages in the UN force taxed the liaison system. Yet, MacArthur's headquarters had established English as the official language of the war. The expectation was for UN forces to arrive in Korea with enough English speakers to conduct operations. As a result all orders were published in English and any
translation problems were left to the subordinate allied units. Units endeavored to ensure that radio and telephone operators spoke English and had the ability to take down orders.61

Rations were also a problem based on the various religious and dietary requirements in the force. Turks were given two pounds of bread and no pork in the M ration. Thai forces were provided more rice in their rations. 1 Corps discovered during an inspection that 40% of the biscuit ration of the 1st ROK Division was being issued as ingredients. The Corps helped the ROK Division establish a central field bakery and assigned a food advisor to the ROK division.62

The Ethiopians proved sensitive to racial and religious issues. The Ethiopian commander insisted that evacuation reports list "Ethiopian" instead of "Negro" for his soldiers. Further, religious beliefs prohibited autopsies on Ethiopian dead.63

The US learned valuable lessons in how to handle the cultural differences of the UN forces while these units were in the UNRC. The UNRC proved to be the key in preventing minor problems from becoming major friction on the battlefield. The key to integration was the ability to familiarize the UN units with US doctrine and equipment and gain an appreciation for the specific needs of the unit. In many cases cultural differences were pushed to the background when units
were attached to US organizations. These units tended to "develop esprit de corps, overcame administrative difficulties and solved problems of operational coordination."64

III. ANALYSIS

The three case studies serve as a basis to analyze the ability of nations to integrate forces in coalition warfare. The four planning considerations of goals and objectives, military doctrine and training, equipment and cultural differences are the basis for this analysis.

Goals and Objectives

The immediacy of the threat to one of the coalition partners seems to increase the tendency of integrating forces in a coalition. The political leadership in Tennessee and South Korea determined that the threat was severe enough to warrant an integration of forces. The cost-benefit analysis done by those respective political leaders indicated their survival as a sovereign nation depended on a short term integration of forces.

The US and Britain at Anzio case study also reinforced the importance of internal politics to the structure of coalition forces. The goals and objectives of Britain at Anzio were to maintain pressure on Germany through the indirect approach. The integration of a British force under US command was
dictated by the need for British heroes and casualties to buck up British morale and assuage US concerns. Therefore the British division was integrated into the IV Corps in response to internal and external political needs.

The case of Tennessee in the Civil War also reflects the primacy of the political dimension in coalition warfare. The Governor of Tennessee and later the Confederate leadership found that the political realities in Tennessee permitted the integration of forces but restricted the use of those forces. Many Tennessee volunteers joined the fight against the Federal government, not to promote the idea of the Confederacy but to champion an independent Tennessee. As a result these forces could not be transferred at will.

The lesson for military commanders in these three case studies is that the political nature of the coalition will in large measure dictate the structure of coalition forces. In the three cases integration was deemed vital to one of the members of the coalition and acceptable to another member. The degree of integration was a function of agreement between the political leadership, not necessarily the military leadership of the coalition partners.
Military Doctrine and Training

The differences in doctrine and training between coalition partners does affect the practical ability of forces to integrate. However, as noted above military commanders may be forced to integrate forces despite these differences as a result of political considerations.

In the first two case studies the similarities between the integrated forces were greater than the differences. However, this did not necessarily mean that the coalition efforts would be successful. In fact these two case studies were examples of failure in the execution of operation despite these similarities. The results of Tennessee in the Civil War and Anzio are a harbinger of the types of failures that occur when the political leadership does not understand the complexity of coalition warfare and the affects of the integration of forces.

The Korean War is a unique example of coalition warfare. The US had the preponderance of military forces and was able to structure the coalition command. The creation of the UNRC indicated that the military leadership understood the importance of organizing and training the coalition partners prior to their entrance on the battlefield. However, the US was able to dictate the organization, doctrine, and training of these coalition forces. This situation is unlikely to
reoccur in the near future. The inability of the US to establish these conditions will dictate the use of separate command and control as well as logistic systems in future coalition efforts.

Equipment

The variety of equipment within a coalition hampers the integration of these forces. The Tennessee experience indicates that the different types of rifles strained the logistical system of Tennessee and the Confederacy. The US and Great Britain at Anzio case study reaffirmed the traditional coalition arrangement of separate logistical systems. The differences in equipment were most keenly felt in the communications arena. The IV Corps had to supply the British division with the necessary communication equipment in order to communicate with each other. Similarly, in Korea the US provided the communication link between the UN forces and their higher headquarters.

The differences in equipment between coalition partners will continue to exist. Efforts between NATO partners to find common equipment ground have had minor success. Yet, each nation's defense industry will continue to produce unique equipment. These differences will require the creation of separate logistical systems between coalition partners. These differences will continue to constrain the flexibility of military leaders.
Cultural Differences

Cultural differences are inherent in coalition warfare. In the two case studies that had the most similar cultures the soldiers recognized differences between themselves and their coalition partners. Soldiers from the Gulf states in the Civil War observed there was something different about the soldiers from Tennessee. The challenge for military leaders is to ameliorate these differences and promote cohesion. The UNRC began this process in the Korean War and US commanders observed that attached UN forces tended to identify with the parent unit.

Despite these positive indications there are several cultural differences that will persist and have the potential to inhibit the integration of forces. First, language is a fundamental problem. Except for the Tennessee case study language differences presented unique challenges to military leaders. At Anzio the US and British found that slight differences in term definitions caused some problems. In Korea MacArthur attempted to alleviate the language problem by simply declaring English the common language. He was naive to think that this would cause nations to round up all the English speakers and put them in their units. The result was a realization that liaison requirements were critical to the success of integrated operations.
Another common cultural difference was food. Each case study showed that cultural preferences were reflected in the soldier's eating habits. The US supply system was able to adjust in the Korean War to the various culinary needs of the UN forces. While this aspect of integration by itself will not undermine the coalition effort it does serve to indicate the recognition of the military leadership of the importance of the various contingents and promote cohesion.

Lastly, leaders of integrated forces need to be culturally tolerant. In the Tennessee case study no evidence was found to indicate that Tennessee or Confederate leadership were intolerant. However, in the Anzio case study the Clark's distrust and Lucas's inability to develop close cooperation with the British undermined the operation from the start. In Korea the leadership attempted to group UN forces on the basis of cultural similarities. A recognition at the highest levels of the importance of cultural aspects on integration of forces.

The above analysis of integration in coalition warfare reveals the complexity of warfare in these areas. The four planning factors need to be considered when military leaders structure coalition efforts. However, the analysis also revealed the importance of political considerations that may restrict the latitude
of the military leadership in structuring the coalition force. Further, differences in military doctrine, training, equipment, and culture can only be mitigated to some degree. Only in the instance when one coalition partner dominates can forces be integrated in a rational manner. Unfortunately, the New World Order has precluded this situation from being reestablished in the near term.

IV. CONCLUSION

Integration and Doctrine

Coalition efforts are deemed to be the predominate type of operations the US will be involved in the near future. Joint Publication 1 notes "there is a good probability that any military operations undertaken by the United States of America will have multinational aspects..." This section will examine what US doctrine states concerning the integration of coalition forces.

JCS PUB 3-0 (TEST) is the doctrine for unified and joint operations. Chapter four of this document addresses combined operations. The combined commander is charged with establishing command relationships, integrating national and international agency efforts, establishing interoperability arrangements, and defining rules of engagement. In peacetime CINCs are charged with the responsibility of establishing a
common base for military operations especially combined
document, tactics, techniques, and procedures. JCS PUB 3-0 has some significant deficiencies
despite the consideration of important aspects of
coalition warfare and the potential for integration of
forces. The document assumes the US will have the
ability to establish the conditions within the
coalition for integration. This underlying assumption
probably does not exist in the New World Order. In
fact broad base coalitions may restrict the ability to
integrate forces.

The Final Draft of FM 100-5, Operations devotes
a chapter to combined operations. The authors recognize
the difficulty in "forming a strong combined force." The
analysis of the three case studies validated the
considerations commanders need to take into account in
combined operations and underscored the importance of
the planning factors needed to execute operations with
the intent of achieving unity of effort. Implicit in
the chapter are the elements necessary to establish the
conditions for integration of forces in combined
operations.

The US Army is currently developing FM 100-8,
Combined Army Operations. This document recognizes the
importance of differences that inhibit interoperability
especially in the communications field. The document
underscores the importance of liaison in coalition
efforts. The document provides anecdotal evidence from the Gulf War of integration of British and French forces within the US structure and some of the problems encountered in this effort. However, the separation of western and Arab forces is the more significant aspect of this war. The New World Order may not allow another situation to occur when the solution of the difference problem is complete separation of command and logistic systems. The proposed doctrine does not provide any consideration of how US forces integrate into a combined structure not dominated by the US. The doctrine in this regard has not anticipated future US efforts.

FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, does not address combined operations. However, FM 100-15-1 Corps Operations Tactics and Techniques, April 1991, unedited coordinating draft does have a chapter on combined operations. The disconnect between the base manual needs to be addressed when FM 100-15 is updated. The draft of FM 100-15-1 addresses combined operations from the perspective of the US corps serving as a multinational organization. The manual focuses on functional areas and establishes checklists for staff officers in each functional area to insure unity of effort. The two elements the proposed doctrine keys on understanding national differences in doctrine and equipment capabilities. Again, this proposed doctrine
focuses on a US led corps without devoting any attention to US integration into other multinational organizations.

Finally, FM 71-100, Division Operations, does not address combined operations. This is an area that needs to be addressed quickly. Future US efforts will, in all likelihood, involve the integration of a US division under a coalition corps. The Second Infantry Division in South Korea is the prime example. However, without doctrinal guidance the division must address its relationship with a ROK corps and identify the assets necessary to accomplish its mission.68

V. IMPLICATIONS

The analysis of the three case studies and doctrine reveal several implications for the integration of coalition forces. First, the armed services have institutionalized the planning factors for combined operations. Joint and Army doctrine reflect the lessons learned about integration of forces at the army and corps level. However, great care must be taken in insuring that the DESERT STORM model is not institutionalized as the school solution in combined operations. In future efforts the political objectives and the scope of the operation may not permit the creation of parallel command and control systems. Second, the institutionalization of combined planning
in doctrine is occurring at too high a level. The realities of the New World Order indicate that corps level combined operations will put US divisions within these structures. Currently, the doctrine does not address the division in combined operations. Division planners must consider what assets will and will not be available within an allied command structure. Further, the controlling headquarters may not permit the division from conducting operations in accordance with US doctrine. Third, a critical aspect of combined operations is liaison between the various integrated components. Liaison officers in VIIth Corps as part of their NATO mission were seen as so vital that they were permanently assigned to several allied formations. In future combined operations liaison will continue to be critical to success. Yet, there is a lack of doctrine and training for liaison personnel. The lack of doctrine and training will need to be addressed soon. Fourth, combined logistics will continue to present unique problems for military leaders. The ability to integrate logistic systems is a function of the similarity of combined forces. Unfortunately, future operations will consist of dissimilar forces. Nations also may prefer to keep logistics separate as a way to invoke their sovereignty and limit the combined commander from utilizing forces without considering the views of the parent nation.
This monograph has examined the integration of forces in combined warfare. Future US military operations will predominately be multinational efforts. US military leaders understand the complexity of combined operations at the Army and Corps level. However, the conditions of combined operations in the New World Order have driven the level of combined operations beyond the current level of understanding.

Army doctrine must adjust to meet the challenges of coalition warfare at the division level. The leaders in the military education system must also reexamine the specific case studies on coalition warfare analyzed. Great care must be used to insure that the selected case studies reflect the challenges of today's environment. An analysis of the broad issues of coalition warfare will no longer serve the needs of the commanders and staff officers at the division and brigade level who will be thrust into combined command structures and be expected to deliver quick, decisive victory.
ENDNOTES


2 Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Final Draft, 19 January 1993, p. 6-2, 6-3.


4 Connelly, 26.
5 Connelly, 26.
6 Connelly, 27.
7 Connelly, 43.
8 Connelly, 41.
9 Connelly, 31.
10 Connelly, 32.
11 Connelly, 28.
12 Connelly, 33.
13 Connelly, 43.
14 Connelly, 41.
15 Connelly, 31.
16 Connelly, 32.
17 Connelly, 28.
18 Connelly, 33.
19 Connelly, 43.
20 Daniel, 47.
21 Daniel, 17.
Daniel, 18.


Hixon, 64.


D'Este, 84.

2 D'Este, 77.

2 Quoted in D'Este, 77.

D'Este, 95. Hixon, 65.

D'Este, 95. Hixon, 65.

D'Este, 95.

D'Este, 107.

D'Este, 108.

D'Este, 77.

D'Este, 77.

D'Este, 77.

D'Este, 77.

D'Este, 72.

D'Este, 73.

D'Este, 69.

Hixon, 70.


Hixon, 68.


Appleman, 48.
45 Appleman, 112.
46 Appleman, 112.
48 Nixon and Cooling, Combined Operations in Peace and War, 229.

49 Nixon and Cooling, 229.
50 Cooling, 28.
51 Nixon and Cooling, 230.
52 Nixon and Cooling, 230.
53 Cooling, 33.
54 Cooling, 37.
55 Cooling, 37.
56 Nixon and Cooling, 247.
57 Nixon and Cooling, 253.
58 Cooling, 44.
59 Nixon and Cooling, 256.
60 Nixon and Cooling, 257.
61 Cooling, 41.
62 Corps, Command Reports, May 1953, 45.
63 Cooling, 32.
64 Cooling 50.
65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11 November 1991, 41.
66 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS PUB 3-0 (TEST), Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, January 1990, IV-2.
67 Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Final Draft, January 1993, 6-3.
68 A full exploration of this relationship can be found in "A US Division in an Allied Corps," unpublished paper, LTC William Tetu, School of Advanced Military Studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCTRINAL MANUELS


ARTICLES


BOOKS


45

------ *Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out of Area Campaign: Linking NATO and the WEU.* Carlise, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991.

UNPUBLISHED WORKS
