Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination. War termination, however, deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like other dimensions of that process, are best considered in the earliest stages of that process. Joint and separate service doctrines should address three major issues regarding war termination: first, conflict termination doctrine must assist planners in defining military conditions and relating those conditions to strategic aims; second, it must contribute to the tacit bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and finally, it must offer guidance on how to transition from active hostilities back toward a state of peace. This paper suggests certain principles which, if incorporated into our doctrines, would satisfy these doctrinal requirements.
SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL:
War Termination and Campaign Planning

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Among those who occupy themselves with matters of military strategy and operational art, war termination has been a neglected topic both for academic study and, more particularly, for doctrinal development.¹ The American strategic culture, with its tendency to view war and peace as wholly distinct states, has left little room for consideration of war termination as a bridge between the two. Moreover, our strategic thinking has for good reason given preference to deterrence, while our operational thinking has focused more on concepts of warfighting that would allow us to “win” without resort to nuclear escalation. Recent events, however, suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters.²

This is not an essay about the recent Gulf War against Iraq, but growing dissatisfaction with the apparent outcome of that war suggests a need for more refined thinking about how we end our involvement in wars.³ Nor do we need to refer to the Gulf War to find instances where Americans were dissatisfied with the end state resulting from a particular war; in fact, discussions about how we should (have) end(ed) a given conflict historically have been a more prominent feature of post-war, vice pre-war, debates among Americans. As our national military strategy evolves away from a fixation on global war with the Soviets toward a focus

¹. Neglected, but not ignored. War termination studies were briefly fashionable in the formative years of nuclear war theorizing, the premier examples being Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) and Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley, 1963). Interest in the topic, at least at the strategic level, was resurrected following the American retreat from Vietnam, and Fred Ikle’s *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) represents one of the most thoughtful contributions to the subject during this period.

². Studies of war termination have also tended to become polarized according to political preferences with more conservative viewpoints espousing MacArthur’s abhorrence of compromise: “In war, there is no substitute for victory.” Those of a more liberal persuasion have likewise found war termination studies, especially those relating to strategic nuclear warfare, equally unpalatable since they feared that “thinking about the unthinkable” might in fact make the unthinkable more likely.

on ethnic and other forms of regional conflict, war termination will likely become an increasingly salient issue.

As the link between a war's end state and the post-hostilities phase, conflict termination poses one set of difficult issues for the grand strategist and different, but equally challenging questions for the operational commander. In the broadest sense, the question for the theater commander is how to connect military means to the larger political objectives of a conflict. As it relates to campaign planning, the issue is this: how does the operational commander, generally a theater commander-in-chief, translate the political or military objectives of a conflict into military conditions to be achieved as the product of a campaign?

Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination. The argument offered here is simple and straightforward: war termination deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like other dimensions of that process, are best considered in the earliest stages of that process. Existing strategic theory, leavened by the empiricism of historical example, provides clues to those guidelines on conflict termination that should become part of our operational art and doctrine.4

4. In referring to operational art ("the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals"), we intend to invoke the level at which campaign planning generally occurs. See Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1986), p. 10.

While recognizing that principles of war termination may vary as one moves along the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity, we focus here principally at the mid-intensity level. Moreover, at the mid-intensity level, one can distinguish between terminal campaigns, which seek war termination as an end state, and enabling campaigns, which serve some intermediate strategic objective short of termination. In World War II, Operation OVERLORD, the allied cross-channel attack and drive toward central Germany, provides an example of a terminal campaign aimed at ending the war in Europe. OVERLORD's predecessor, Operation TORCH in 1942, aimed at expelling the Axis powers from French North Africa and offered no pretense that its success would end the war. Rather, as an enabling campaign, it served the strategic aim of engaging the Axis forces early on while allowing time to marshal the manpower and matériel required to mount OVERLORD. Our discussion here centers on the terminal campaign.
A Military Role?

It is not self-evident that the business (or, more exactly, the politics) of ending a war is one which properly admits the military commander. Paralleling a Western tendency to see a clear division between war and peace, many observers tend also to see an equally sharp demarcation between political and "purely military" activities. Under this view, the process of war termination displays greater political than military content and, thus, is more properly the province of civilian policy-makers vice military leaders. During the Franco-Prussian War, for example, Moltke urged upon the German Crown Prince his view that, even following the fall of Paris, Prussian military forces should continue to "fight this nation of liars to the very end . . . [so that] . . . we can dictate whatever peace we like." When asked by the Crown Prince for the longer-term political implications of such an approach, Moltke replied merely, "I am concerned only with military matters."

Both theory and practice, however, suggest the interrelationship between warfighting and the post-hostilities result and, thus, the consequent importance of the military contribution to the war termination process. The aftermath of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama makes the point: a decapitated government initially incapable of managing basic governmental functions; a sizeable refugee problem; and a widespread lapse in civil law and order all threatened to mock the attainment of the operation's stated objectives.

The process of war termination should be viewed, then, as the bridge over which armed conflict transitions into more peaceful forms of interaction. War termination may, in some circumstances, lead initially to a cease fire followed by negotiations during which the original political objectives are pursued at lower cost. The process of war termination displays a strong military as well as political component. To deny the political component is to risk making war something other than the servant of policy; equally, to deny the military dimension is to risk failure to attain the policy aims for which the war was fought. "If the

goal of the political decision-maker," William Staudenmaier correctly observed. "is to resolve the political issues for which the war was begun, then the emphasis of military strategy should shift from its narrow preoccupation on destroying enemy forces to a consideration of how military means may be used to resolve political issues."6

Military strategy properly concerns itself with applying military means to attain political ends; as these ends go beyond the mere destruction of enemy forces, it is equally appropriate that our operational doctrine address matters of war termination.

The State of the Art

In the past, consideration of war termination has centered almost exclusively at the strategic level. Such studies have typically identified various patterns by which wars end, which may include: attrition or exhaustion of one side; capitulation by one party; imposition of a settlement by a third party; or the internal dissolution of one of the belligerents.7 Clausewitz reminds us, however, that political interactions do not cease with the onset of war, and either implicit or explicit bargaining and negotiation -- Schelling's "diplomacy of violence" -- occur as an inherent aspect of war through, and even beyond, the cessation of hostilities. Empirical data bear out this observation; historically, fully two-thirds of inter-state conflicts have ended as a result of negotiations either before or after an armistice.8

Classical strategists have thus typically viewed conflict termination as a process of bargaining or negotiation. From this perspective, such theorists have generally agreed upon


several broad principles designed to steer the process of war termination toward successful outcomes, including:

- pre-conflict planning for war termination;
- sustaining communications with the adversary even while fighting;
- utilizing pauses, thresholds, or "breakpoints" in fighting as opportunities for intensified bargaining;
- holding forces in reserve as a further deterrent or as added bargaining leverage; and
- demonstrating good faith, even through unilateral gestures, as part of the implicit or explicit bargaining that leads to conflict termination.9

From this broader strategic perspective, military forces contribute to conflict termination not only by direct measures designed to achieve particular policy objectives. Equally important, military forces can support the tacit endgame bargaining process by inflicting losses on the adversary that affect his cost-versus-benefit calculus and create an incentive to cease hostilities.

Transitioning from the strategic to the operational level, one might expect to find somewhat less ethereal guidance on the incorporation of war termination considerations into campaign planning. However, to the extent current policy or doctrinal publications address conflict termination at all, they offer little to the operational planner that is of any greater use than the classical strategic precepts. The National Military Strategy addresses the issue only in the broadest strokes by stating that, should deterrence fail, we seek to "end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies."10

9. Gregory F. Treverton, "Ending Major Coalition Wars," in Cimbala and Dunn, Conflict Termination and Military Strategy, p. 93. From this perspective, war termination has, generally of necessity, been viewed as a rational process admitting little room for non-rational factors such as anger, a desire for revenge, concerns with prestige, etc. For discussion of non-rational factors in war termination, see Michael I. Handel, War Termination -- A Critical Survey (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978) and Iklé, Every War Must End.

10. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO January 1992), p. 5. Note also that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act now requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the military services "written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans." Published annually, the Contingency Planning Guidance provides the SecDef, among other things, an
Nor does the armed forces' principal doctrinal publication on joint warfare offer guidance on how to translate this national objective into operational terms.\textsuperscript{11} In fact, Joint Pub 1's conceptual division of the joint campaign planning process into four distinct parts (the operational concept, the logistic concept, the deployment concept, and the organizational concept) is perhaps most striking for what it omits -- that is, any explicit reference to war termination -- than for what it includes.

A review of service doctrines reveals little more in the way of operational insight into the problem of war termination. In suggesting fundamental questions which define the nature of operational art, the Army's keystone doctrinal manual hints at least indirectly at the war termination issue: "What military conditions must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?"\textsuperscript{12} That fundamental question cannot be fully answered without addressing equally crucial considerations related to war termination. Having posed the central question, however, the Army's doctrine stops short in at least two respects: it fails to offer guidance on how to relate military conditions to strategic aims; and, equally important, it falls silent on the question of how those military conditions serve the transition from war to peace, a fundamental aspect of conflict termination.

Marine Corps doctrine similarly recognizes the importance of war termination considerations in the campaign planning process:

\begin{quote}
[The] focus on the military strategic aim is the single overriding element of campaign design . . . Given the strategic aim as our destination, our next step is to determine the desired end state, . . . the military conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination, those necessary conditions which we expect by their existence will provide us our established aim . . . From
\end{quote}

opportunity to go beyond the general language of the national military strategy and prescribe more specifically requirements for war termination; these, in turn, are transcribed into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the document which transmits operational planning guidance to the theater Commanders-in-Chief.


the envisioned end state we can develop the operational objectives which, taken in combination, will achieve those conditions.\textsuperscript{13}

As with the Army's operational doctrine, Marine Corps doctrine does little more than cite the necessity to determine a "desired end state" that is somehow related to larger strategic purposes. In contrast to their treatment of, for example, logistical, deployment, or organizational concepts, neither joint nor service doctrines currently suggest principles according to which war termination concepts should be integrated into the campaign planning process. To ensure that our operational planning effectively serves the requirements of our national military strategy, this doctrinal gap is one we can ill-afford not to fill in.

**Expanding the Doctrinal Frontier**

A concern for war termination suggests three fundamental requirements that our joint and separate service operational doctrines must address. First, conflict termination doctrine must assist planners in defining military conditions and relating those conditions to strategic aims; second, it must contribute to the tacit bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and finally, it must offer guidance on how best to transition from active hostilities back toward a state of peace.

Since it is highly dependent upon the nature of the conflict scenario, defining terminal military conditions that relate to overall strategic aims is perhaps the most challenging of these tasks. The difficulty of the task, however, also underscores its importance. Morton Halperin has suggested that, at the strategic level, "unspecified, non-rigid objectives increase the chances of arriving at an acceptable compromise and eliminate the domestic costs which would stem from a failure to gain a stated objective."\textsuperscript{14} The American experience in Lebanon in 1983, however, suggests that flaccid strategic objectives are perhaps more likely to produce


\textsuperscript{14} Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 130.
confusion and failure at the operational level. Clarity of strategic objectives is the essential precondition to the adequate definition of operational military objectives; there is, after all, little to be gained by confusing or deceiving ourselves. And it must be recognized that conditions defined early in a war -- ideally, even prior to the outbreak of hostilities -- may change as events unfold. Nonetheless, the process of explicitly and clearly defining terminal conditions is an important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian (strategic) and military (operational) leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurance that the defined end state is both politically acceptable and militarily attainable.¹⁵

Our second requirement for doctrine recognizes that war termination is, as noted earlier, a game within a game involving aspects of bargaining and negotiation. Warfighting doctrine must be cognizant of this less visible aspect of war termination which aims at the opponent's decision process. Simply stated, by manipulating the cost-versus-gain equation, a commander's operational decisions can influence an opponent's strategic decision-making. In the recent Gulf War, for instance, the U.S. Central Command's sweeping envelopment maneuver was brilliantly effective not only because it neutralized the Republican Guard forces, the Iraqi Army's center of gravity. It also placed a significant allied force in position to threaten Baghdad, thus creating added incentive for Iraq to agree to an early cease-fire. An operational decision had affected an opponent's strategic calculus by creating additional allied leverage.

At the operational level, then, the military contribution should serve to increase (or at least not decrease) the leverage available to national decision-makers during the terminal phases of a war. This task becomes more difficult when a war goes badly and the initial objectives are not attained. Even a "totally defeated" power such as Japan in August 1945,

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however, retains some leverage: the possibility that Japan might not submit cooperatively to Allied occupation provided an inducement for the Allied Powers to modify their terms of "unconditional surrender" to include retention of the Japanese Emperor.

Lastly, recalling the dog in the old joke who chases the fire truck (has he considered what he will do with it should he catch it?), our doctrine on conflict termination should cause us to think through the implications of successfully attaining our objectives. It should suggest ways to transition from battlefield success to a post-hostilities environment in a manner that preserves and reinforces our political objectives. During this aspect of the war termination process, the role of various civilian national or international agencies may become increasingly prominent, and particular responsibilities may transfer from the military to the civilian domain at this stage. Various civil affairs functions, especially refugee control and humanitarian assistance, come to mind as examples in which a transition toward greater civil relief agency involvement may be prudent.

As the bridge between war and peace, war termination doctrine should address the issue of when and how to transition out of a military-dominant role in the post-hostilities phase. History is replete with examples of warfare which solved one set of problems only to give rise to other, if less acute, problems. Both the Gulf War and the U.S. invasion of Panama typify the civil-military challenges likely to be a common product of regional war: providing food, shelter and medical care to refugees; reinstating civil order; restoring civil government. Our doctrine must recognize that effective war termination must link the war-fighting phases of a conflict with the post-hostilities environment, which may well require tapping into the resources, expertise, and authorities of agencies outside the Department of Defense. Like planning in the low intensity conflict arena, then, formulation of war termination plans can truly be effective only if accomplished in an interagency context.

For those who have considered the issue of conflict termination at the strategic level, the Korean War has often provided a common basis for discussion of problems inherent in the
process. And at the operational level as well, the Korean case brings to light many of these requirements for war termination doctrine.

**War Termination in the Korean Case**

The Korean War had clearly entered its terminal phase by June 1951; by that date, an informed, objective observer could certainly have predicted the general outline of the eventual outcome. MacArthur's brilliant stroke at Inchon in September 1950 had given United Nations forces the upper hand and had prompted an upward revision in U.S. war aims from restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* along the 38th parallel toward reunification of the entire peninsula under South Korean control. Pursuit of this expanded objective triggered massive Chinese intervention in November, prompting MacArthur's laconic comment that, "We face an entirely new war."

By March 1951, however, the Chinese offensive had effectively been blunted, and an objective observer could certainly have concluded that the Chinese and North Koreans, having thrown their best punch, had been denied the opportunity to achieve their maximum political objective of unification of the peninsula under communist rule. As the United Nations pursued its Spring offensive, the Eighth Army Commander, General James Van Fleet would later comment that "... in June 1951 we had the Chinese whipped. They were definitely gone. They were in awful shape. During the last week in May we captured more than 10,000 prisoners."17

Likewise, while the United States had not necessarily been denied its maximum objective, the evident costs of pursuing reunification under a South Korean regime, together

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16. Gay Hammerman defines war termination as beginning at "the point at which an informed, objective outside observer could predict the outcome of the war." Hammerman notes the coincidence between this and Clausewitz's concept of the "point of irreversibility" -- the moment at which a commander's reserves become inferior to those of his adversary. See Gay M. Hammerman, *Conventional Attrition and Battle Termination Criteria: A Study of War Termination* (Loring, VA: Defense Nuclear Agency Rpt. No. DNA-TR-81-224, August 1982), p. 11.

with growing anxiety over Soviet intentions in Europe, caused the Truman administration to step back from that expanded war aim. Restoration of the 38th parallel accompanied by an armistice at an early date became the principal American objective. Throughout the twenty-four month stalemate that followed, continued hostilities produced only marginal adjustments in each side's position along the 38th parallel, while indirect and direct bargaining addressed issues that were largely ancillary to the original war aims of each. Mindful of MacArthur's earlier misfortune, Van Fleet elected to halt the United Nations offensive in mid-June along the 38th parallel, stating in his memoirs that, "The seizure of the land between the truce line and the Yalu would have merely meant the seizure of more real estate."

Bernard Brodie, among others, has argued that Eighth Army's operational decision to halt its Spring offensive at mid-peninsula forfeited an opportunity to terminate the war at an early date:

"The reason for continuing the extraordinarily successful enterprise that the U.N. offensive had become had nothing to do with the acquisition of more real estate. Its purpose should have been to continue maximum pressure on the disintegrating Chinese armies as a means of getting them not only to request but actually to conclude an armistice. The line they finally settled for two years later, or something like that line, might have been achieved in far less time if we had meanwhile continued the pressure that was disintegrating their armies."

Negotiations co-mingled with intermittent military action by both sides continued fitfully for two years. Not until Eisenhower credibly threatened in February 1953 to resume the United Nations offensive with the use of nuclear weapons did the Chinese truly begin to bargain in earnest. By July 1953 both sides had agreed to an armistice under terms not significantly different from those proposed two years earlier.

Our earlier analysis suggested that, with respect to conflict termination, operational doctrine should tell us something about how to define military conditions in a manner that

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18. Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 94. Brodie suggests that in large part the offensive was halted in June 1951 because the Chinese had hinted through intermediaries of their interest in an armistice.

19. For a perceptive analysis of the role nuclear weapons played in terminating the Korean War, see Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 47-50.
relates those conditions to strategic aims; that it should facilitate a military contribution to the bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and that it should help to guide the transition from hostilities back toward a state of peace. The terminal phase of the Korean War illustrates the potentially adverse consequences that may attend a campaign which fails to address these issues.

If by June 1951 restoration of the 38th parallel accompanied by an armistice at an early date had become the principal American strategic objective, the historical record does not indicate an effort by planners at either the operational or strategic level to define explicit, observable conditions that would achieve all three aspects of this strategic aim. Occupation of the 38th parallel speaks for itself, but what of the other two components: a cessation of hostilities (an armistice); and a time constraint (at an early date)? What specific military conditions might achieve all three dimensions of the strategic objective? As opposed to a positive statement of specific operational conditions that should be sought, planners seemed more concerned with framing operational conditions in a negative sense -- that is, statements of what should not be done (e.g. do not go back to the Yalu) given a belief that a particular result would either be ineffectual (just "the seizure of more real estate") or counterproductive (fears of Chinese or Russian escalation). Decision-makers seemed guided by a belief that holding the 38th parallel would over some ill-defined period of time result in some unspecified level of increased casualties or other costs to the Chinese that would eventually produce an acceptable truce. What level of costs and what period of time? Whence would come the leverage necessary to compel termination on terms favorable to us?

Clearly, answers to these questions cannot always, if ever, be known with certainty, but by defining military conditions with a high degree of specificity, operational planners allow civilian leaders the opportunity both to examine critically the assumptions that underpin the plan and to assess whether the military conditions will, in fact, accomplish their intended political objectives. Again, we underscore the importance of communication between military and civilian leaders in order to ensure congruence between operational outcomes and intended
political objectives. Defining both strategic and operational objectives in explicit, unambiguous terms will do much to ensure this congruence.

If one accepts, as this writer does, Brodie's view that the U.S. Eighth Army erred in failing to press its June 1951 offensive beyond the pre-hostilities demarcation line, perhaps northward to the peninsula's narrow neck, the consequences of that omission -- 12,000 additional U.S. casualties over the following two years -- provides a compelling argument for the advantages that accrue if military forces are used to gain greater leverage during the war termination process. In the regional wars likely to be the dominant pattern for the foreseeable future, adversaries are prone to seek the attainment of limited objectives, with the understanding that some trade-offs are likely to be required on both sides if the conflict is to remain limited. As in Korea, as in the more recent Persian Gulf conflict, war termination becomes a contest in which political leverage borne of battlefield success is the dominant theme. This may at times require planners to define operational objectives which exceed bottomline political objectives in order to gain leverage that will promote expeditious termination of hostilities and the effective transition to a post-hostilities phase.

Some Guidelines for Campaign Planners

Our argument throughout has been that the current gap in our operational doctrines regarding conflict termination seriously hampers our ability to plan effective military campaigns. Working from commonly accepted war termination precepts at the strategic level and armed with an appreciation of war termination issues in recent conflicts, we propose some tentative first steps toward an appropriate doctrine in this arena.

- Consider identifying a distinct war termination phase in the campaign planning process. Simply stated, war termination is too fundamental an issue to be subordinated as a lesser included component of some other aspect of the campaign planning process.

20. Indeed, the conflict termination phase may itself be divided into sub-phases reflecting, for example, the transition from military to civilian preeminence as the process unfolds.
Emphasize a regressive, or backward-planning, approach to campaign development. Ever mindful of Fred Ikilé's caution that decision-makers not take the first step toward war without considering the last, every aspect of a campaign plan -- target selection, rules of engagement, psychological operations, to cite but a few examples -- should be designed and evaluated according to contributions made or effect upon the explicitly defined end state to be achieved. This can be accomplished most efficiently in a regressive planning sequence.

Define the operational conditions to be produced during the terminal phase of the campaign in explicit, unambiguous terms. The absence of definition or detail in operational objectives may produce unintended consequences in the course of a campaign. More important, the process of defining operational objectives with a high degree of clarity should prompt increased communication between the civilian and military leadership that will help to ensure congruence between operational objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign.

Consider establishing (in consultation with appropriate civilian decision-makers) operational objectives that exceed the baseline political objectives of the campaign. Remember that the war termination process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue, and that the military contribution can significantly affect the leverage available to influence that process. This may include territory or (from your opponent's perspective) other high-value objectives whose possession would enhance the government's ability to secure a favorable political outcome.

Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade your opponent's command and control may impact, positively or negatively, on your efforts to achieve particular objectives. Will your opponent be able to effect a cease fire or otherwise control the actions of his forces? Efforts to target command and control facilities should carefully consider the trade-offs involved: at what point might the military advantages to be gained from targeting command and control be outweighed by potentially adverse impacts on the goal of stopping the fighting?

Consider the manner in which the tempo of the terminal phase of an operational campaign impacts the ability to achieve established policy objectives. Once a campaign has
reached the point of "irreversibility," experience suggests that aggressive exploitation is most likely to secure the desired objectives at lower costs. A high operational tempo continues the pressure on the adversary and makes it more difficult for him to engage in destructive acts that raise the costs of your victory. Witness, for example, the wanton Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields in the Gulf War. At other times, depending upon one's knowledge of the enemy's decision process, it may be prudent to consider pauses or "break points" in the terminal phases of a campaign to allow the opponent's decision-making machinery opportunities to cease fighting. This may be especially important where degraded command and control has hampered an opponent's ability to consider and communicate a decision to quit. 21 In either circumstance, operational tempo is clearly a key consideration in war termination.

- View war termination not as the end of hostilities but as the transition to a new post-conflict phase characterized by both civil and military problems. This consideration implies an especially important role for various civil affairs functions. It also implies a requirement to plan the interagency transfer of certain responsibilities to national, international, or non-governmental agencies. Effective "battle hand-off" requires planning and coordination before the fact.

Viewed independently, none of these proposed guidelines appears startling; some will even suggest, quite correctly, that these prescriptions are, like so many other aspects of warfighting doctrine, more exemplary of common sense than of any particular revealed

21. Note, e.g., after the capture of Napoleon III at Sedan, the difficulty Bismarck encountered in locating a French "government" duly empowered to negotiate an armistice. See Howard The Franco-Prussian War, pp. 230-34.

As a counterpoint, critics have justifiably suggested that, as with the 1972 bombing halts in Vietnam, such pauses may allow an opponent the opportunity to renew his military resources, or convey a lack of resolve, or both. See, e.g., Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 156-7. Ironclad principles are not to be found here. Had seizure of Baghdad been an Allied objective during the Gulf War, for example, a strong case can be made that the Allies would have been well-advised to a) clearly communicate that intent to the Iraqis, and b) initially pause outside of Baghdad in an effort to negotiate its surrender prior to incurring the costs (on both sides) inevitably associated with either the siege or offensive campaign that would have been required.
wisdom. What is startling, however, is the obvious absence of any coherent approach for conflict termination in any of our current warfighting doctrines.

Concluding Observations

We have repeatedly made the point here that the war termination component of a campaign plan represents a transitional phase: a transition from war to peace; a transition from a military-dominant role toward a civilian-dominant role; a transition from a set of circumstances and problems generally familiar to operational planners toward others with which they may be decidedly less familiar. These points reinforce the importance of a high level of dialogue and coordination between civilian and military decision-makers regarding the conflict termination process. As Fred Iklé notes, "In preparing a major military operation, military leaders and civilian officials can effectively work together . . . to create a well-meshed, integrated plan."22 The ability of military leaders to contribute to that joint planning process will in part depend upon the extent to which they have carefully considered the challenges posed by the war termination problem in the period before deterrence fails.

22. Iklé, Every War Must End, p. 85.