BASQUE AND CATALAN NATIONALISM: A COMPARISON

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Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Liz, through whom I came to discover the bewitching land of "La piel de toro".
I would like to thank some very special people who helped me on this thesis.

First of all, I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee for their guidance and assistance. Professors Diamant and Furniss tolerated my speculations while at the same time giving me the focus and direction I needed. Professor Quilter proved to be especially helpful not only on this thesis, but also in the course of my studies on Spain. His thirst for knowledge of Spain and things Spanish is contagious and I enjoyed our many informal discussions. He proved to be a sage mentor. I wish to also thank Professor Suzanne Staggenborg for her assistance with the chapter on social movements and for placing the idea in my mind in the first place.

The West European Studies Department provides an invaluable service to its students and is especially sensitive to the needs of the Army officers who study here. My thanks to Professor and Chairman, Peter Bondanella, and to Mary K. Welsh, and Mary Lake for their assistance and for their friendship.

Formal studies are only a small part of the quest for knowledge. Friends and associates can be equally important in the learning process. I was especially lucky to fit into a small circle of friends upon whom I could rely on for support and interesting insights into complex ideas. Gene Catena, Paul Calbos, and Andrea Ciccarelli and their wives Kristin, Kathy, and Amanda along with my wife Liz, formed a sort of informal Mediterranean seminar where we could discuss common problems and issues which affected the Mediterranean world and where we could attempt to see past the stereotypes. There never was a shortage of topics and the discussion was lively. I will miss that learning arena dearly.
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Nationalism as a form of societal integration has been problematic in Spain for at least 100 years and arguably longer. The problem is a lack of or the weakness of a collective Spanish identity at the state level and the intensity of distinct, territorial collective identities at the sub-state level. The concept of nationality as a form of collective identity is of fairly recent origin, generally accepted as dating from the French Revolution when sovereignty was "transferred" from a monarch to the people. Many have argued that nationalism is born of the intersection between traditionalism and modernization and thus merely a transitory phenomena which will fade as a country modernizes.

Given the slow political and economic modernization of Spain during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, this explanation seems plausible to explain the intensity of Catalan and Basque nationalism up to the time of Franco's death. Franco's regime stifled political development and was having only moderate success in modernizing the Spanish economy. Spain, however, has now had a legitimate democracy since at least 1982 and although lagging behind that of its B.C. partners, the Spanish economy can
no longer be labeled as backward. Moreover, the regions of Catalonia and Euskadi (formerly called the Basque provinces) are two of the most economically advanced in Spain. The intensity of Catalan and Basque nationalism however, does not seem to be fading accordingly. The 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, a potential opportunity for nation-building collective pride for Spain as it opened itself to global scrutiny for the first time since Franco’s death, became instead a visible embarrassment for Spain as the Catalans capitalized on the media attention to further their cause for separation. Catalan flags and symbols were ubiquitous, obscuring the fact that Catalonia was merely a region of Spain. Likewise, although there were no attacks during the Olympics, ETA terrorism was at an all time high in 1992 and the nationalist political party which serves as ETA’s front (HB) continued to command 18% of the Basque electorate. What then are the reasons for the permanence of these two sub-state national movements?

The study of the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements is relevant not only to understanding the history of Spain, but also to understanding the current dilemmas of the Spanish government. Only through a thorough understanding of these two social movements can one begin to understand the reasons behind the brutal civil war of the 1930’s, the repression of Franco’s government and the risks facing the young democracy in 1975. An understanding of the frustration felt by the Basques can also shed light on the terrorism of the ETA. Barely a week goes by in
which nationalism and the nature of Spanish collective identity is not discussed in the national media in Spain.

Nationalism, or more accurately sub-state nationalism has recently reappeared as a matter of scholarly analysis. The primary models of nationalism developed in the post World War II period which postulated the demise of problematic nationalism have not proved to be accurate as most European states now experience some form of sub-state nationalist movements. Although one can expect generic political theories to somewhat oversimplify specific country problems, I believe that these theories completely miss the mark in Spain. Certainly, this is a function of the inability to conduct empirical research in Spain until after the democracy was established in late 1978 yet many political scientists still hold these theories as true turning a blind eye to the facts. Up until recently, social mobilization theory reinforced the classical explanations of nationalism. New theories of social movements, however, take a different approach as to why and how movements develop. The current focus on the rational actor and framing alignments offer new insights on nationalist movements. I propose to use this approach to evaluate and compare the Catalan and Basque movements.
The six million dollar ad which was published in all the major daily papers of Europe and the U.S. by the Generalitat of Catalonia the week of 17 July 1992 (the opening of the Summer Olympics). On the next page, two responses from Cambio 16, a weekly magazine published in Madrid.
WHICH COUNTRY WOULD YOU PLACE CATALONIA?

IN SPAIN, OF COURSE

This is where Catalonia is. It is Spain, one of the largest countries in Europe, with an area of 350,000 square miles and a population of 44 million. A country which has experienced a rapid and fascinating cultural renaissance. A country with its own language, customs and traditions.

A country which has some of the most beautiful cities in the world, from Barcelona to Madrid. A country which has some of the best food in the world, from paella to tapas.

IN CATALONIA, OF COURSE.
CHAPTER ONE

Nationalism

Our nationality is like our relations to our women: too implicated in our moral nature to be changed honorably, and too accidental to be worth changing.

G. Santayana

We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it.

W. Bagehot

Having stated in my introduction that a national identity is problematic in Spain and that there exists at least three competing collective identities which are labeled as nationalist, it is now necessary to define this seemingly contradictory assertion. For if there is one Spanish Nation should there not be only one nationalism which unites its inhabitants in a sense of solidarity? Is it not as Mazzini stated "Every nation a state and only one state for the entire nation"? Can more than one nation exist under the aegis of one state?

As a concept, nationalism seems to defy definition. Even an
extensive review of the vast literature on the subject points to no conclusive, definition of the word. Therefore the word can mean progress as it did in the early nineteenth century or have reactionary connotations as it does today. The word can be used synonymously with democracy and modernization by some and with fascism and authoritarianism by others. Some necessarily associate the word with territorial demands, others with supra state communities such as that of the Gypsies. Even nationalist movements fail to conform to any particular model and vary significantly in the criteria used to claim nationhood.

The problem lies in the fact that the word has gathered conceptual baggage throughout the years making it an umbrella term for many other complex concepts while becoming hollow itself. From its Latin root-*natio*- meaning a non-Roman, thus a foreigner, to its medieval use as a community of political and cultural (ecclesiastical) elite, the term now includes concepts of popular sovereignty, democracy, folklore, ethnic values, and industrial capitalism (Greenfeld, 1992; Hobsbawm, 1991) as well as territorial organizational ones such as irredentism, separatism, and secessionism (Hall, 1979). Lately theorists have tried to clarify the term by the use of adjectives and prefixes. Thus we would assume that ethnic nationalism is distinct from linguistic or religious nationalism as pan-nationalism is distinct from state nationalism and sub-state nationalism. Attempts are also underway to dismantle what was once an ethnocentric (Eurocentric) diffusionist approach to allow for
differences by continent and historical periods.

What seems certain is that any attempt to make a universal definition or model of nationalism devoid of historical empiricism is doomed to fail. Revisionist and reductionist arguments are the easiest traps for those attempting to explain complex socio-political movements. Using sociologist Neil Smelser's advice that in the face of a large number of variables it is better to "reduce the number of conditions, to isolate one condition from the other, and thereby make precise the role of each condition" (Hall, 1979), the editor of a recent book devises eight variables of ethnic autonomy (culture, economy, ethnicity, geography, history, language, patterns of domination, and religion) and then spends less than one sentence explaining each variable. The sentence he uses to explain the variable ethnicity-characteristics of internally and externally defined groups who behave and are regarded as a distinctive social entity- is typical of the question begging used to define nationalism.

Part of the problem of defining and conceptualizing nationalism is that it has multi-disciplinary research attention. That is, not only historians and political scientists study the phenomena but also sociologists, anthropologists, linguists and literary critics. The distinct methodology of each of these academic traditions results in a form of particularism in explaining the idea. Tilly (1981) criticizes his own field (sociology) for its disregard of history and historiography. Both he and Stinchcombe whose works he cites argue that in explaining
epochal theories of social change, sociologists have commonly blundered by forcing large models onto history instead of vice-versa. "One does not apply theory to history; rather one uses history to develop theory" (Stinchombe, cited in Tilly, 1981, pg 7). History is not failed sociology and Tilly goes on to propose a synthesizing of the historical and sociological methodologies.

What is significant is that Tilly was making this criticism as late as 1981! Social science history is an emerging subdiscipline which combines both historical and sociological methodology. Needless to say, the most recent scholarly approaches to the national question are in this tradition.

Another typical trap is to explain nationalism purely from a macro-structural or, on the other hand, an ideological perspective. Structural explanations usually revolve around the concept of modernization, both politically and economically. Functionalists, developmentalists, and marxists all point to nationalism as a transitional phase (the intersection between tradition and modernization) and when not transitional, then problematic in nature. The problem with the structural approach (as well as the ideological perspective) is that factors are reified and seen as "objective social forces which act through and move individuals, who are in turn regarded as their vehicles and representatives" (Greenfeld, 1992). Structures beget structures and human volition is reduced to a robotic, albeit rational response to structural conditions. Likewise, focusing exclusively on ideology can lead us down a mistaken path because
in the words of Gellner, "Nationalist ideology suffers from pervasive false consciousness. Its myths invert reality" (Gellner, pg 124).

Because it is easier to review that which is accepted as convention about nations and nationalism, that is where I propose to start. First, discussing nationalism and nations is useless unless the state is part of the equation. Non-state nationalism, divorced of the state, is not only rare but does not fit into the historical notion of the idea. Second, nations and nationalism do not occupy the same space. One comes before and begets the other although which comes first is not agreed upon. Third, nationalism is accepted as a relatively modern intellectual movement dating back to the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century. It enters the political spectrum later in the eighteenth century coinciding with the advent of mass politics in a country. Fourth, nationalism is inescapably intertwined with other seventeenth century movements which destroyed the ancien régime and dramatically restructured European life. These movements; capitalism, secularization, and industrialization are normally considered the modernizing motors behind the restructuring of modern states, economics and religion. Fifth, nationalism in Europe is basically a diffused theory imitated from one or perhaps two countries and spreading (as well as mutating) from one state to the other. Finally, in modern "established" states, sub-state nationalism as distinct from state nationalism or patriotism, is considered particularist and thus problematic.
Nationalism seemingly is best understood using a combination of structural and ideological approaches rooted in history. I will review some of the literature using these approaches relying mainly on the works of E.J. Hobsbawm, E. Gellner, L. Greenfeld and A. Smith.¹

The authors which I have selected all focus on a distinct component of nations and nationalism. Roughly speaking, Greenfeld links the origins of nations and nationalism with the origins of the ideas of popular sovereignty and democracy. She begins thus in sixteenth century England and the appeal of Catherine of Aragon to Rome. Hobsbawm traces the idea through the growth of the nineteenth century rational state and the subsequent competition for legitimacy required by mass politics. Gellner looks at the restructuring of society caused by the industrial revolution and what happens when all are not equally paid what he calls social Danegeld. Smith instead connects the ethnic myths of a frustrated population with their demand for equality in the power structure of a state. In the form of an outline then, my review of nationalism will trace the idea from the concept of popular sovereignty through the modernization of the state in the nineteenth century to the particularism of modern nationalist movements.

The location of sovereignty within the people and the

¹ Given that I am studying two nationalist phenomena in Europe, I will skip over the vast body of non-European nationalist research while acknowledging that some of their characteristics may have infiltrated into Spain.
recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata are the basic tenets of democracy and for Greenfeld the essence of the modern national idea. "Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon" (Greenfeld, 1992, pg 10). It was only when nationalism was imported from England by other countries that it received the notion of uniqueness. To substantiate this claim, Greenfeld points to two factors in sixteenth century England in which the ideas became inherently linked: the transformation of the social hierarchy brought on by the Tudors and the break with Rome which helped to usher in the Protestant Reformation.

The end of the War of Roses at Bosworth field signaled the end of feudal order in England. Henry VII had won his crown on the battlefield and ruled with the willingness of the people to have him as their ruler. The old nobility of the Middle Ages, being on the losing side, was quickly displaced by a new Tudorian aristocracy based on merit and not on birth. This new official elite was comprised of university educated lay-men of modest origins but remarkable abilities and education. For Greenfeld this is the juncture at which both democracy and nationalism were born. The idea of the people as an elite, a natural aristocracy which achieved nobility through service to the nation, is to raise the common man from the "rabble" and to place him at the center of the polity. Being "English" now made everyman a potential nobleman since blueblood was no longer a prerequisite.
for achieving a high position in society. This concept of the nation as a community of free and equal individuals has as its core the Humanist notion of man as a rational being. Reason was the defining characteristic of man and the possession of it made all equal in principle and thus all had equal right to participate in collective decisions. The highest fulfillment of human nature was political participation or civic responsibility derived from citizenship. The people were sovereign because they, or a portion of them, exercised sovereignty. The concept of the nation then, presupposed a sense of respect toward the individual. Love of nation -nationalism- meant first and foremost a principled individualism, a respect for one’s own and other people’s rights. "And so the exaltation of one’s nation...became the exaltation of oneself as a human being- a free and rational individual- and therefore, the exaltation of human dignity, humanity in general" (Greenfeld, pg 31). Unfortunately, the faculty of reason, a necessary component of humanity was not considered to develop evenly and thus since not all had this prerequisite characteristic, not all deserved the right to enjoy these rights.

The second factor which helped form nationalist sentiment was the break with Rome and the Catholic Church by Henry VIII in 1532. Henry VIII’s motive may have been personal (he could not divorce Catherine of Aragon, his first wife). More importantly however, and probably at the center of the Act of Succession was the question of state sovereignty free from the authority of
foreign potentates. The break with Rome introduced the concept of complete sovereignty of the king where he had been considered sovereign only in temporal matters before. By extension, only when the king was completely sovereign could the nation and the people become sovereign.

The result of these events in sixteenth century England is the birth of the idea of the sovereignty of the people as manifested in their ascendancy as an elite in their state and in the sovereignty of their state in relation to a universal world. The egalitarian effect of equal access to the state bureaucracy for both the upper and middle class is essentially the core idea of democracy. Furthermore, nationalism in terms described above is not yet a particularist notion. That is, there is no sense of uniqueness of a people, rather the focus is on the individual not the collective. Lastly, Greenfeld offers the interesting idea that nationalism is the constitutive element of modernity and not vice versa since she locates the origins of nationalism prior to the origins of industrial capitalism.

Hobsbawm connects the emerging idea of nationalism with the growth of the modern state in the early nineteenth century or Liberal era. The French Revolution and its exporter, Napoleon, had developed the idea of nation to be the body of citizens whose collective sovereign identity (note the particularism when compared to the English definition) constituted them a state which was also their political expression. John Stuart Mill added the notion of a common government comprised of the citizens or a
representative portion of them. Furthermore in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the French had added the idea of territory since that is all that a state could mean. The equation now was People-Nation-State but these terms were not further defined. Hobsbawm makes an excellent point in that as opposed to modern nationalism, ethnic or linguistic markers were not an issue. Within the territories of France and the area conquered by Napoleon, modern French was not the means of communication. The French also had no problem appointing Thomas Paine, an Anglo-American to their National Convention (Hobsbawm, pg 21).

What constituted a nation-state however is not clear from nineteenth century documents and Hobsbawm attributes this to the fact that this was assumed to be obvious by the intellectuals of the day. That is, the definition of the state was tied to the liberal bourgeois theory of the era 1830-1880. Contrary to classical liberal economic theory, the state apparatus and involvement in the lives of its citizens grew in the early part of the eighteenth century. The state became the legitimate locus of force for the maintenance of order internally to the country and had the responsibility to protect the citizens from foreign conquest. Thus the establishment of national police forces and conscription to man the large armies required in modern warfare. Territorial administration was centralized along functional lines and although there is significant variation among the governments of the states of England, Spain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, none of them were constituted or operated dualistically,
allowing distinctive, independent powers of rule (R. Grew, in Bright, 1984). The growth of the state bureaucracy along the Prussian model, the issue and guarantee of the state currency, the insistence on an official state language, the unity of territory and a legal redress system, the granting of state subsides and the improvement of the infrastructure to support industrialization, a national postal system- all point to the growing influence of the state in the lives of its citizens. The principle of nationality, then, was that nations had to pass a threshold size to be considered viable. It follows that state-building was seen as a process of expansion (since bigger was better). The key point here is that expansion and unification rationally united heterogeneous elements under one state.

The question remains however, which people of the equation people=nation=state would become states and which would not. Hobsbawm has discerned three criteria (given that the threshold size is met): association with a strong historic or current state, the existence of a cultural elite with a literary and administrative language and the capacity for military conquest. These criteria presupposed several things: first, not all nations or people would become states. Second, states would in most cases be a heterogenous mix of languages and ethnic groups, some of which would fall on the scrapheap of history in the name of progress. Third, as novel as the state was, it was only a stage in the evolution of mankind on the way toward international unification. This then is the nationalism of the early nineteenth
century.

The advent of universal (male) suffrage and the democratization of politics in the latter part of the nineteenth century changed the relationship of the citizen with the central government. "It became obvious ... that whenever the common man was given the most nominal participation in politics as a citizen... he could no longer be relied on to give automatic loyalty and support to his betters or the state" (Hobsbawm, pg 83). Other collective identities (class) competed for his support. The very notion of the nation as the repository of the national will came into question. Patriotism (as a civic religion) served to legitimize a growing impersonal state in the eyes of its citizens by engendering a sense of personal stake in the success of the state against the competing ideologies of the late nineteenth century: marxism, anarchism, socialism and independent state nationalisms.

Acknowledging that this civic religion was basically a form of social engineering, the state had the option to construct a sense of patriotism out of society's existing symbols and cultural markers or align itself with a sub-state nationalism and capitalize on their existing ideology and adherents (a process of frame alignment which I will discuss in the next chapter). The latter had the most appeal but also contained the greatest risk. For in selecting the nationalist construct of the Ille or Castile, the state also (usually) selected a language which it would raise to a national standard via the state educational
system thereby sentencing the languages of the other nationalist movements to a secondary status. I will discuss the emotional strength of languages later. Counter-nationalist movements quickly sprang up from the excluded nations such as the Catalans in the case of Spain. In this fashion, the nationalist programs of the late 1800's became de facto political movements competing for legitimacy in the arena of electoral politics. The age of nationalism, according to Hobsbawm was the period roughly 1870-1918. Two factors distinguish it from the early idea of nationalism: the threshold principle is abandoned and second, the ensuing multiplication of "unhistorical" possible states makes ethnicity and language the two key criteria of potential nationhood.

But what of class distinctions which grew antagonistic during the early part of industrialization and urbanization? For in this period the presence of class based political parties and social movements also competed for the same constituency. Following Lenin's reasoning of the national question, we would assume that the worker parties were non nationalist and conspicuously internationalist. Are nationalism and socialism not mutually exclusive since class identity will replace all other forms of identity in an industrial society? According to Hobsbawm, the combination of class and ethnic nationalism proved to be a more effective mobilizer than just one or the other. He demonstrates the point with the case of Poland which became a nation under the leadership of the Polish Socialist Party leader,
Colonel Pilsudski. Hobsbawm’s point is that having one collective identity does not exclude others even if those identities have mutually exclusive ideologies.

Gellner begins his argument from the notion that nationalism requires that the national and the political unit be congruent. Nationalism, then is a theory of political legitimacy. Gellner explanation of nationalism focuses on the reorganizing role of industrialization on the modern state. Industrial society is the first in the history of mankind to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth. Continuous improvement and the rational maximization of profit equals progress. Social control is via a social Danegeld in which social aggression is bought off with material enhancement. The greatest weakness of industrial society is its inability to survive any temporary reduction of this social bribery. The complex division of labor required by industrial society engendered previously unheard of mobility within generations and even within a man’s lifetime. "Modern society was not mobile because it was egalitarian, rather it was egalitarian because it was mobile" (Gellner, pg 25). Why? A society built on the division of labor cannot erect barriers of rank or caste and maintain its required mobility.

Industrial society also requires a "high culture" to maintain mobility. This "high culture" is essentially a common cultural (read: common language) and educational base the limits of which define the limits of a worker’s mobility. Thus, Gellner argues, the only organization which can insure and maintain the
infrastructure of a common education is the state.

Turning to the definition of a nationalism, Gellner discounts the myth of nations along ethnic or linguistic lines. There are many more languages than nations or nationalities aspiring to become nations. Some languages are destined for oblivion in the face of industrialization. Does that mean that nationalism is an ideological artefact? To accept this is to accept the claim that "nations" are mostly dormant just awaiting the reveille which will awaken them from their slumber to accept their place in the political arena. Nationalism is not the awakening of slumbering giants.

"Nations as a God given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them and often obliterates them: that is reality. (Gellner, pg 49)

Nationalism is instead a new form of social organization based on the deeply internalized, education dependent high cultures required by the new division of labor. It means the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind instead of the complex web of particular and folk cultures which existed in pre-industrial society. This is the meaning of culture which is used in the definition given by Gellner at the outset. Culture is the homogeneity which comes from standardized literacy and educational based systems of communication. It follows then that nationalism engenders nations
and not the other way around.

This definition of nationalism fits in well with what Hobsbawm described as state nationalism of the early liberal era. What then, according to Gellner causes problematic ethnic mobilization or non-state nationalism? For Gellner it is a combination of two factors: the failure of industrialization to endow all elements of society with Danegeld or material progress and the coincidence of this inconsistency with ethnic or racial boundaries. In a nutshell, industrialization engenders a mobile and culturally homogenous society which consequently has egalitarian expectations and aspirations such as had been lacking in the previous stratified and absolutist agrarian age. At the same time, the early stages of industrialization or development do not spread evenly over the surface of the land. The uneven spread creates a social differential attached to geographical areas. When pre-industrial cultures and developmental differences coincide the two will reinforce each other especially in the competition for scarce resources, roles and rewards. The disadvantaged culture has two options: cultural assimilation into the predominate one or reactive ethnic mobilization. Since the assumption is that the cultural distinctions will not be pronounced (i.e. accent versus skin color), the disadvantaged culture will choose assimilation and the eventual material progress it will bring over isolated ethnic mobilization. For
Gellner then, cultural particularism is a transitory phenomena.²

A. Smith offers a ideological perspective on the concept of ethnic markers as a basis for national sentiment. First of all, the idea that the political and the cultural unit should be congruent is common to all forms of nationalism. The point of departure is the definition of culture and the use of cultural markers for exclusionary instead of inclusionary purposes. Culture, for the authors above is a created symbolic order and thus changing over time to meet the requirements of a changing society.³

Ethnic nationalists, on the other hand, claim a collective identity based on a fixed order, that being either a biological pedigree or a culturally distinct history. Primordial or biological identities are constructed on racial characteristics (blood type, skin color, body sizes) which are maintained by genetic selection and cultural rules governing intermarriage and ethnic endogamy. This racial and ethnic identity spans social class and other associational identities and is thus superior to all "modern" types of identity. Closely related to this racial

² Hechter, on the other hand, de-emphasizes the temporal nature of reactive mobilization because he insists that the uneven spread of industrialization creates a cultural division of labor which is not easily overcome. Even subtle cultural markers such as accent will be reason for economic exclusion thus providing a persistent, latent basis for ethnic nationalism. (Hechter, 1975)

³ Thus industrial culture is different from an agrarian culture or what is now called post-industrial culture. As culture changes, cultural assimilation is an assumed objective and thus not exclusionary.
idea is that of a cultural-ideological historical identity based on a common language, customs, or territorial affiliation. This ethnic order or culture then, does not lend itself to assimilation and is exclusionary.

The common criticism of the use of ethnic markers to create a distinct culture and identity is that these markers do not in fact have any a priori distinguishing power. That is, the possession of some sort of ethnic endowment is close to universal and not unique. Thus an ethnic identity is a fabrication because only some ethnic characteristics are selected and embellished. Furthermore, no clear line separates selection from artificial construction. An ancestral land may actually be territory acquired by conquest, a common history fabricated, a natural language simply the predominate literary one. Ethnic identity is essentially a myth or an ideological construction then. The questions for Smith are: Why are these myths so powerful in an age of rationalism? Why root society and politics in culture and biology? Who do we find at the front of these nationalist demands? The answer to the first two questions is basically the same Durkheimian answer used in all ideological constructions. That is a population displaced by rapid changes in society and finding that its power base has eroded will cling to whatever framework will allow it to regain legitimacy. An ethnic identity provides an easy and malleable form of social cohesion and a resolution to the identity crisis. "The meanings and visions encapsulated in distinctive ethnic myths bring together in a
single, potent vision elements of historical fact and legendary elaboration to create an overriding commitment and bond for the community" (Smith, 1984, pg95). Historically and sociologically, we can expect these myths to emerge during periods of profound cultural clash and accelerated social and economic change (in the case of Spain, late nineteenth century).

At the front of the nationalist movements are the intellectuals marginalized by industrialization. For if ethnic myths are built on a skewed reading of the past, historicism is the special preserve of intellectuals. Nationalism offers intellectuals a piratical way of translating into institutional reality their imaginary world of freedom and fraternity couched in the language of a past era free from market forces, urbanization, and petty officialdom. I will explore this ideological packaging in the next chapter.

My criticism of the authors I have reviewed above and of most of the literature on nationalism is that it is taken for granted that there is a direct link between processes of economic or political disintegration and that of social mobilization. Nationalism in the modern sense, is not merely the by product of failed modernization, uneven development, or frustrated ethnic aspirations. In fact I believe that a nationalist movement can have any number of social origins. In Spain, the Catalans and the Basques have mobilized for different reasons which I will explore later but why haven’t other ethnic units mobilized such as the Galicians or the Castilians for that matter. I don’t believe the
answer is in the explanations given above. Rather the answer is via another nineteenth century invention: the national social movement.

To be sure, social movements have existed throughout history. But the rationale of the national social movement is essentially the same as that of sub-state nationalism: a power struggle between state authorities and extra-political challengers to those authorities. National social movements emerged with the extension of the franchise and the subsequent proliferation of created associations as vehicles of collective action. Social movement theory allows us to evaluate nationalist movements outside the strict boundaries of politics and economics because social movements are essentially political parties which span social class boundaries and which are not limited to electoral politics as the only means of legitimate collective action. Resource mobilization, one branch of social movement research, provides us with both structural and ideological criteria for evaluating and comparing social movements. The questions revolve around changes in group organization and resources, political opportunity structures, cycles of protest and framing efforts of movement entrepreneurs to create ideological packages with which they can mobilize potential followers. As I hope to demonstrate, this approach will not only help to explain the birth of these nationalist movements in Spain but also provide clues to the distinguishing characteristics and permanence of these movements.
CHAPTER TWO

National Social Movements

The study of collective action and social movements dates back to the eighteenth century although interest in the field has not been constant. In fact until the 1970’s, the most important conceptual works on the subject were produced by Marx, Weber, Mills and Durkheim. Durkheim especially had a lasting effect on American sociology and his arguments in Division of Labor and Suicide were the basis for the traditional formulations explaining social movements - mass society theory, relative deprivation, and collective behavior. These hypotheses all shared the Durkheimian notion of social strain as the impetus for collective action. Society exerts its control over individuals via their participation in a shared (or common) consciousness. As Durkheim puts it, “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience”. When a rapidly changing society (as a result of industrialization) erodes this shared consciousness faster than a new consciousness can develop the result is anomie; individual disorientation and alienation, a destructive social life and extensive conflict. Society is consequently strained by
a continuous struggle between forces of integration (shared beliefs) and disintegration (rapid differentiation). The social strain brought on by a rapid increase in individual grievances results in anomic collective action, or as some have later explained it "people going crazy together". Accordingly, we can expect to find at the center of this nonroutine collective action those very populations which have been newly created or displaced by differentiation. By definition then, movement participation was relatively rare, discontents were transitory, and movement actors were arational if not downright irrational (Jenkins, 1983).

The Durkheimian argument was used subsequently to explain many of the twentieth century's ills: deviance, social disorganization, suicide. It was also used as we have seen in the last chapter to explain problematic sub-state or ethnic nationalism.

The political and social turbulence of the 1960's in both the U.S. and Europe brought on a reorientation of the study of social movements. Most scholars attribute the shift to the rational choice theory of economist Mancur Olson. Olson challenged the assumption that groups of individuals would act on behalf of their common interests as individuals would. Instead, the rational actor would not be moved to collective action if he could receive collective (non-excludable) benefits whether he participated or not especially since participation entailed some cost on the participants. The rational actor then is a "free rider". Accordingly, the only way to mobilize potential constituents was to offer selective (excludable) incentives.
The implications of the rational choice theory became the cornerstone of resource mobilization (RM) theory. Mobilization became a function of a cost and benefits analysis and not a function of a sudden increase in grievances or relative deprivation. Grievances were perceived as being relatively constant deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions. "Ideas and beliefs that have a revolutionary potential are usually present and are available for use by protest leadership. Sentiments of opposition, of being wronged, are also frequently present and can be easily linked with more elaborate ideologies and world views." (Obershall, 1973) Similarly, McCarthy and Zald argued that a focus on discontent is misplaced since there is always enough "to supply the grass roots support for a movement" or that movement entrepreneurs would manufacture grievances to meet the funds and support personnel available (McCarthy & Zald, 1973). In fact, it was argued, there was proof that the mere presence of grievances or relative deprivation did not always result in a population being mobilized for collective action. Meaning construction or social psychology which focused on the reasons individuals were moved to collective action took a back seat to microeconomic and organizational theories.

These new horizons of social movement theory emphasized the continuities between movement and institutional actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements and the role of movements as agents of social change.
The formation and mobilization of movements depended on changes in resources, the strength of group organization and the opportunities for collective action. The focus was almost exclusively on institutional changes (legal reforms, changes in political power) and not on personal change (e.g. religious cults, vegetarianism). Thus theorists researched how movements attempted to change "elements of social structure and/or the reward distribution of society (McCarthy & Zald 1977), organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson,1975), or represent the interests of groups excluded from the polity (Jenkins &Perrow, 1977, Tilly, 1978).

The core argument is that movement formation is a result of favorable changes in organization, resources and political opportunities thus lowering the threshold cost of collective action. For example, in an oversimplification Jenkins explains the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1950's as a result of increased urbanization of southern blacks, increased numbers of middle and working class blacks, growing black college enrollments, and the organizational expansion of the black churches. These changes restructured the black community allowing for better organization, disposable income for a protest movement, and placing the community in a strategic position in electoral politics (Jenkins, 1983). Thus the formation of the movement was not due to a sudden increase in grievances on the treatment of blacks, rather an improvement in the status of the aggrieved group reducing the cost of mobilization and improving
Tilly’s book "From Mobilization to Revolution" (1978) provides an almost mechanical equation for explaining and predicting collective action. A somewhat simplistic synopsis of the model is:

Collective action = f Interests [the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to the population in question as a consequence of various interactions with other populations] + Organization [the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals in the population (catness)] + Mobilization level [the extent of resources under the collective control of the contender (market value of resources x probability of delivery when called)] / Opportunity [group political power, tolerance or repression by the authorities].

Tilly’s model distinguishes between traditional communal type solidary movements and the large scale special purpose movements associated with the advent of mass politics in a state. Communal actors were reactive, "instinctive radicals" operating within fixed repertoires of collective action and mostly defensive in nature, i.e. food riots. Modern social movements were offensive in nature in that they pursued new advantages and rights for their members and were willing to experiment with different forms of action to prove legitimacy to the state. Some of the Tilly’s
assumptions for the model are then that the modern state has forced contenders to compete in the larger national political arena in which large numbers (potential voters) and bureaucratic structures are critical to success. These challenging national social movements however still operated outside of the narrow scope of electoral politics. The model attempts to answer two sets of questions: first, how the shared interests, general organization, and current mobilization of a population affected its members' capacity for collective action; second, how its current relationship to the government and powerful contenders affected the costs and returns of acting together. By self admission, Tilly's model is difficult to measure empirically but his arguments on organization, opportunity, and repertoires of collective action are interesting and useful for the purposes of this thesis.

The Resource Mobilization paradigm for all its persuasiveness, was criticized nearly from the beginning for ignoring or failing at least to give a plausible account for the role of values, ideology, grievances, and collective identity in social movements. Olson's rational choice theory was criticized as being overly simplistic. Sociologists were warned to be wary of "economists bearing gifts" (Fireman and Gamson, 1979) and that Olson's rational actor was akin to a radical individualist devoid of either a personal history or of any of the characteristics which define us in society (gender, race, class, religion, nationality). New research on meaning construction and social
psychology centered on the recasting of the actor as being socially embedded with loyalties, obligations and identities which reframe the issues of potential supporters for collective action. Furthermore these embedded characteristics intersect and overlap in providing the actor with meanings for his grievances, values, and collective identity. If there is a calculation of costs and benefits of action then, it is constructed within a collective context. That is not to say that the new focus denied the importance of organization, resources, and the calculation of costs and benefits by movement actors; only that an exclusive focus on such components leaves some of the most critical questions unanswered.

The central idea to meaning construction and grievance interpretation was postulated by Goffman (1974) in which he states that both the individual and the corporate actor often misunderstand or experience considerable doubt and confusion about what is really going on and why. Frames are an interpretive schemata which condense and simplify "the world out there" by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment. "By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. So conceptualized, it follows that frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, whatever its nature or intensity and that it is typically an interactional and ongoing accomplishment" (Snow et
Frame alignment is the linkage between the individual’s interests, values and beliefs and the social movement’s goals, ideology and activities or in Gamson’s words, "the mesh between cognition and culture" (Gamson, 1992). SMO’s build collective action frames during mobilization to signify meanings to potential followers. Snow and his colleagues identify four types of alignment which vary along a rough scale in the degree to which they rest on existing values and beliefs. They are, in order of decreasing reliance:

**Frame bridging:** The linking of ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames within a similar movement. Most often this is used to link a social movement organization (SMO) with untapped and unorganized sentiment pools. For example, the Christian Right in the early 1980’s used the media, personal networking and direct mail to appeal to religious conservatives across the country. Frame bridging is an integral part of the RM tradition because of the orienting assumption that grievances are sufficiently generalized and salient to provide potential supporters for SMO’s. Mobilization was a mechanical function of effectively bridging the target population.

**Frame amplification:** Refers to "the identification, idealization and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective adherents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons" (Snow et al., 1986). For example, in the study of one neighborhood SMO, the values of property and neighborhood integrity were idealized and
embellished to mobilize a protest movement against the proposed relocation of a homeless shelter into that neighborhood. The values of neighborhood integrity and property had to be amplified and elevated above the values of helping homeless transients.

Frame extension: In some cases, the potential pool of adherents may not be sufficiently large to support a sustained SMO. Frame extension allows an SMO to extend its boundaries by assimilating interests and values that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable importance to potential adherents. For example the peace movement may incorporate the environmental movements goals in order to extend its boundaries. The obvious hazards of frame extension are the requirements to devote resources to deliver on the incidental or auxiliary goals and the potential clouding of the original frame by the encompassing of auxiliary frames. In 1983, simultaneous demonstrations were organized in Western Europe and the United States to protest the pending deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles. However, by way of frame extension (or overextension) the "Euromissile" issue came to encompass gay rights, feminist concerns, antiinterventionism in Central America and other causes associated with the Left. Many missile freeze supporters consequently rejected supporting the protest because of the goals of the auxiliary frames (Snow and Benford, 1988).

Frame transformation: Frame transformation relies the least on existing values and beliefs and requires a systematic alteration of existing frames and beliefs. Movements which seek to
dramatically change the status, treatment and activity of a category of people must transform the way those people view their life situation and themselves. The first step is to reframe their status or life experiences as unjust, immoral, unexcusable and warranting change. The example used by Snow is that of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). What was once a tragic loss of a loved one to a drunk driving accident became redefined as an intolerable injustice demanding action. The injustice frame is not enough to spark movement participation, however. If the affected population is not convinced that they can and must change their status, a sense of fatalism and withdrawal will result. Thus frame transformation requires a solution for change and amelioration as part of its formula. In the case of MADD, the movement demanded tougher drunk driving penalties, better enforcement, and more education of the effects of drunk driving.

These four processes are not mutually exclusive and are usually all present at one point of a movement’s history. Collective action frames then, are an end product of frame alignment, are action oriented and function as modes of punctuation, attribution and articulation for a SMO.

The punctuation role is accomplished by highlighting a value or belief which was not previously salient on the hierarchy of values or by creating an injustice frame for a social condition

^[4 Framing, as a form of meaning interpretation, is just one type of ideology construction. What distinguishes collective action frames from other types of ideology is the focus on action by the individual.]
which is intolerable and warranting change. The attribution role has two parts: diagnosing who or what is to blame for the condition and establishing a course of action to ameliorate the condition with the SMO being given the responsibility to execute the plan. Finally the articulation role is the packaging of symbols, and experiences in a meaningful fashion so that future events need not be interpreted anew.

Having said all that, the mere presence of collective action frames is not an accurate gauge of the potential success or failure of a movement's mobilization efforts. The mobilizing potency of a collective action frame is affected by two factors: how elaborative its articulation function is and its "resonance" with the lifeworld of its adherents.

In its articulation function, a collective action frame can use either a restricted or rigid ideational system or a more open and elaborative one. The difference is that a rigid system organizes a narrow band of ideas in a tightly interconnected fashion allowing for little interpretive discretion or extension. An elaborated frame, on the other hand, organizes in terms of a wide range of ideas. The flexibility allows for easy frame extension and amplification and makes it easier for different aggrieved groups to tap into it. For example, the civil rights frame as articulated by Martin Luther King Jr. and associates accented the principle of equal rights and opportunities regardless of ascribed characteristics. This frame became a master frame for subsequent movements such as women's rights and
the Gay movement. The nuclear freeze movement, conversely, initially articulated their issues in such a narrow and compartmentalized fashion that public debate was rendered superfluous and the prospect of rank and file participation undermined. The issue was framed in such technical terms and acronyms (MIRV’s, ICBM’s, throw weights, MAD, etc.) so as to reduce potential participants to spectators in a debate amongst experts. The restrictive articulation of the frame limited its appeal and mobilizing potency because it didn’t "ring true". That brings us to the second factor of mobilization potency: frame resonance.

At the risk of being tautological, a movement’s mobilizing potency varies to the extent that it is relevant to the world of the adherents as well as bystanders. Accordingly, resonance is measured by three factors: empirical credibility, experiential commensurability and ideational centrality (Snow and Benford, 1988). Restated, a movement’s mobilization potency is strong if the following three questions are answered in the affirmative. Is it believable? Has it happened to me? Does it sound familiar?

The final issue that I want to review before comparing the two social movements that I have selected is the relationship between SMO’s and a society’s political culture. Goffman’s explanation of frames as interpretive schemata to decode "the world out there" implies that frames existed even before collective action frames. Snow and his colleagues state that frame alignment is "necessary for movement participation,
whatever its nature or intensity" (Snow et al.,1986, 464). Two points are therefore implied: first, that except in the case of the most extreme transformational framing efforts, movement organizers build their collective action frames on the existing values and symbols of the target population. Secondly, collective action frames are portrayed as being emergent in nature and it follows that they must displace existing frames erected by the legitimate authorities or leaders of the culture (national governments, religion, tribal customs, etc.) which kept the citizenry quiescent to this point. Therefore they must create meanings from existing ideational elements which shake people from their habitual passivity yet still maintain resonance with their existing political culture (Tarrow,1992).

Let us examine this argument more closely. A legitimate political regime does not maintain itself merely through coercion and repression but through its ability to shape our worldview by its own framing efforts. Events, then, are preorganized and do not come to us as raw data. As active processors, we can decode the information in a variety of ways. Challenging SMO’s would have us decode the information in a purposefully distinct manner from that of the current political frame. In Gamson’s words, "one can view social movement actors as engaged in a symbolic contest over which meaning will prevail" (Gamson, 1992). There is a battle then over the existing ideational elements in a society and the manipulation of those symbols into ideological packages or collective action frames. Collective action frames (read
emergent and action oriented) must enter a space already occupied by a competing legitimating frame which is established and quiescent. Therefore a collective action frame must first be opposed to some elements of the existing frame in order to justify competing collective action and secondly, must use actionable symbols and ideational elements and not those of compliance and quiescence and finally the framing must strike a resonant chord in the lifespace of the target population.

This is a formidable and delicate task for any social movement but especially so in societies not accustomed to social movements as a means of cultural change. "It is a formidable task to cut the umbilical chord of magic and myth which binds the oppressed to the world of oppression (citation). Tilly 's concept of repertoires of collective action (Tilly, 1986) and Tarrow's work on cycles of protest (Tarrow,1983) point to the fact that SMO's are both constrained by and create new means of collective action. The civil rights movement of the 1960's created a repertoire of non violent collective action (or a master frame in Snow's words) which was a script for subsequent movements which followed in that cycle of protest. The charivari, food riots, lynching, self immolation and street satire theater on the other hand, are types of collective action no longer available by today's standards in the Western world. By the same token, the labor strike did not enter the repertoire of collective action until late 1880 France. Thus repertoires of collective action must be linked historically to the culture in
question. For the purpose of my thesis, we must look at the repertoires of collective action available to SMO entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth century in Spain.

In the form of a summary then, Tilly’s model allows us to look at the ecological factors affecting a group’s mobilization: resources, group organization, political opportunity, and repertoires of collective action. Collective action frames instead focus on the creation of actionable ideological packages and the maintenance/change of meanings throughout the life of the movement.

It is against this backdrop that I will compare the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements from their inception at the end of the nineteenth century through the transition to democracy (I have divided this span into two periods: 1890-1936, 1939-1978). Specifically, I want to look at how each movement emerged and how the framing efforts changed to meet the changing political environment. I will use elements of Tilly’s model to evaluate the organization of the movements and the opportunity side of the equation since both movements had to deal with both a large influx of non indigenous immigrant workers and the central government at Madrid. Most of my focus however will be on the framing efforts of the movement leaders and what ideational elements were used to create and maintain meaning for the constituents.
CHAPTER THREE

Catalan Nationalism

Before turning to an evaluation of the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements in this and the following chapter, it is important to understand the political and economic situation in nineteenth century Spain. A complex century, punctuated by civil wars and military coups d’etat, I do not seek to review it here except to make a few broad generalizations which will help to explain the emergence of the Basque and Catalan nationalist social movements.

I propose that the disunity of the nineteenth century and the failure of the bourgeois revolution can be traced to the Reconquista ending in the fifteenth century. The Moorish invasion of the peninsula in 711 A.D. destroyed the unity of the Visigoths and effectively isolated Spain from the rest of Europe. The Reconquista began almost immediately and took almost 800 years to the complete. The legacy of this crusade, the impact of which would not be apparent until the crisis of the Ancien Régime in the nineteenth century, was a confederal state tradition, the preeminence of the Church in state affairs and the absence of a national bourgeoisie. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spain was clearly a State but arguably not a nation.

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The quest to recapture the Iberian peninsula from the Saracens began in the mountains of northern Spain. Instead of a centralized effort directed by a commonly accepted king which might have lead to a feudal system, the campaigns were essentially conducted on a regional level by local notables and warrior families. Feudal ties never took hold and by the end of the Middle Ages the peninsula was divided among four powerful yet relatively young kingdoms: Portugal, Castile-Leon, Aragon-Catalonia, and the collapsing Moorish kingdom of Al-Andalus in the south. Castile was the strongest of these kingdoms militarily and when the last of the Muslim invaders were conquered in 1492, Castile controlled the largest portion of the peninsula (65% of the land mass and 70% of the population).

Castile was joined politically with Aragon-Catalonia in 1469 with the marriage of Isabel and Ferdinand although each ruled independently in their own reign (Portugal was added to the union in 1580 only to break away in 1640). Each kingdom also developed distinct socio-economic structures. The Castilians were essentially a frontier society maintaining a medieval work ethic of gold extraction abroad and a pastoral economy at home on the semi-arid high plain. As the Reconquista moved south, local towns and warrior families were rewarded for their military efforts by the granting of large seigniorals and regional rights (fueros). The Church also received large tracts of land which would become mortmain estates. A parliamentary system never developed. The Aragonese-Catalan federation, on the other hand, and particularly
Catalonia, was not a by-product of the Reconquista. The northern most part of the Iberian peninsula had been organized as the *Marca Hispanica*, a feudal creation of the Carolingian Empire as a defense against the further expansion of the Saracens into Europe. Barcelona, a powerful medieval city state, had a tradition of a parliamentary monarchy dating back to the eleventh century.

Although the most powerful of the peninsula’s kingdoms, for complex reasons Castile did not seek to centralize and build a state along English or French lines. The only sense of uniformity was that of religious homogeneity and that goal was executed by the only state organ common to all kingdoms of the peninsula: the Inquisition. All other political and cultural differences received exceptional tolerance from the Castilian monarchy. Even conscription for the large military, necessary to maintain the growing empire, was limited to the Castilian provinces. Likewise, trade and exploration of the new world was limited to the Castilians and the Portuguese. This confederal arrangement would remain in place, modified only slightly, until the nineteenth century.

The Reconquista was by all accounts nothing less than a "holy crusade" to eject the infidels from the continent of Europe. The fact that the Saracens were non-Christians and that under their rule countless Jews immigrated to Spain to enjoy the enlightened despotism of the Cordovan Caliph gave the Reconquista its religious tone and put the Christian Church at the forefront.
If the warrior nobles were profoundly religious, the 'religious' were also warriors. The military fortresses were monasteries, the monasteries fortresses. In such an atmosphere the Spanish clergy were not only soldiers, they were also a political clergy (Oliveira, 1946).

The Spanish clergy consolidated its position in state affairs through the Inquisition which was established initially to monitor converted Jews and Muslims but which soon grew in jurisdiction in response to the perceived threat of the Protestant Reformation.

The Church also became a major economic force in Spain. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the clergy was 150,000 strong and the revenues of the Church from land rents, tithes, and first fruits was more than those of the King. The economic, political and emotive power of the Church made it a significant political player when the absolute monarchy suffered its crisis of legitimacy in the early 1800's.

The final lasting legacy of the Reconquista was the elimination of the commercial class when the Jews and then the Moriscos (Muslim converts) were expelled in the sixteenth century. This left the country with two social classes: the aristocracy and the people. The aristocracy lived off of land.

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5 The highest per capita in Europe. (Oliveira, 1946)
6 The Papal Edict of 1291 prohibited trade with armed Muslims on pain of excommunication.
rents and the wool of the great transhumant herds of the Mesta while the common peasant was in most cases a landless laborer. The gentry numbered half a million at the beginning of the century (plus 150,000 clergy) out of a population of 11.4 million and unlike the service aristocracy of England, tended to congregate at the king's court. To be sure a commercial class existed on the Levant and in Cadiz but on a national scale it was marginalized by the lack of an infrastructure and an oppressive tax structure. Agriculture was incompletely developed (due largely to the land requirements of the stock herders) and Spain imported most of its grain from France. The discovery of the new world represented not so much new markets for Spanish goods but a source of silver. The absence of a national middle class had political as well as economic implications. Primarily, it meant a resistance to the ideas of capitalism and also the isolation and eventual intellectual bankruptcy of the aristocracy. But the most damning effect of the Reconquista was the political vacuum created by the absence of a middle class when the legitimacy of the absolute king dissolved in the wake of the Napoleonic invasion and the Liberal Constitution of the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812. With no political bourgeoisie to absorb the ideas of the Liberals, the bourgeois revolution became a conflict between the Church and the secularizing Liberal intellectuals. The

7 The Mesta was a powerful corporation of sheep owners who, because of the loans that they could provide the king, were granted extensive grazing rights and rights of way to move their huge herds from summer to winter pasture. (see map at page 46)
MIGRATORY SHEEP ROUTES IN 16TH CENTURY SPAIN.—Key: 1, cañadas; 2, royal passes; 3, headquarters of cuadrillas of the Mesta. GRAZING GROUNDS OF THE MILITARY ORDERS: 4, Order of Alcántara; 5, Calatrava; 6, Santiago.
secularizing of the state to include the elimination of the Holy Office and the sale of Church mortmain was only one aspect of the liberal constitution of 1812 but for the intransigent high clergy, it became the key issue. Those regions (Basque provinces and Navarre) which still enjoyed regional fueros protested instead the centralizing program of the liberals. Thus the strange alliance between the Church and the regionalists which became known as Carlism after the pretender to the throne in 1833. The nineteenth century became one long pseudo-religious civil war between these two factions with the Army (the de facto middle class) acting as a political ballast to swing the pendulum in favor of one or the other program.¹ Oliviera suggests that this civil war did not end in effect until Franco’s victory in 1939.

In 1874, Spain’s 11 month federal experiment - the First Republic - collapsed and by way of another pronunciamento the monarchy was restored. This Restoration government, masterminded by the conservative Cánovas, lasted until the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923. By way of a legal fiction (or corruption depending on one’s point of view), Cánovas limited the risk of political instability and Army involvement by devising a turno pacifico in which any crisis of the current government would

¹ Between 1823 and 1939, there were no less than 44 pronunciamientos (the Spanish version of a coup d'état in which a general "pronounces" in favor of a political program. Usually these coups were bloodless affairs.) As Borkenau points out, the Army had become the repository of the general will or collective sovereignty of Spain - a role normally reserved for the electorate in the post absolutist era.

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usher in the other party (there were only two: the Conservatives and the Liberals) and the subsequent elections would merely confirm this. Although this was perhaps a pragmatic solution for an alienated electorate, it excluded from the political arena those regions which had a political middle class such as in Catalonia and in a more limited form the Basque provinces. As I have explained earlier, this exclusion from the polity is one of the Tilly’s pre-conditions for the mobilization of a social movement.

Economically, the Restoration coincided with a period of prosperity. The arrival of the Bessemer process in the Basque provinces and phylloxera in France created an unprecedented demand for iron ore and wine. The cotton famine of 1866 was over and raw cotton imports tripled between 1875-89 resulting in a tenfold increase in cotton good exports the following decade. Spain also became the third largest wool industry in Europe. As I will show this economic recovery was primarily limited to the Basque and Catalan regions.

**Origins of the Catalan Nation**

As I have already stated above, modern Catalonia traces its claim to national status back to the eighth century when it became part of the Carolingian empire to protect Charlemagne’s southern flank against the Moors. By the eleventh century, Catalonia had secured its independence under Guifre the Hairy. In 1137, the Crown of Aragon was formed when the Principality of Catalonia was joined by dynastic marriage to the Kingdom of
Aragon as a means to stop Castile’s hegemonic expansion. Once the Moors were expelled from the strategic Balearic Islands in the early fourteenth century, the Crown became a major Mediterranean power trading olive oil and wool for North African spices. Its influence extended through southern France, Italy, and Greece (see map at page 50). Catalan, a romance language of Castilian and Provençal influence was already a popular vernacular in the twelfth century. The most distinguishing aspect of the Crown of Aragon is the form of monarchial government. Instead of a patrimonial monarchy with a weak parliamentary institution as in Castile, Catalonia had a tradition of an "estate state" or Ständestaat (Linz, 1976). The King, upon accession would swear to uphold the rights of the local communities which expressed themselves either through the legislative body ⁹ or the Diputación (a six man standing committee). Fiscally, the Diputación controlled all secular taxation and the Crown received only a small portion. The Crown of Aragon then, or at least the Catalan part, had an early tradition of a parliamentary monarchy and was clearly a distinct state within the Iberian peninsula.

The Crown began to decline in importance in the sixteenth century when the Mediterranean’s economic importance lessened in light of the discoveries of the New World. Prevented from trade with the Americas by Isabel I on her deathbed, the Crown maintained its confederal relationship with Castile until the end

⁹ The Generalitat, a term which was resurrected during the Second Republic and which is used today for Catalonia’s regional government.
The Crown of Aragon and the full extent of Catalan conquests in the Mediterranean.

**Catalonian Trade in the Mediterranean**—Key: 1, consulates of Barcelona; 2, banking centers; 3, routes of Eastern trade; 4, Hanseatic trade.
of the War of Spanish Succession 1714. The Crown had sided with the Austrian pretender, Archduke Charles, in the dynastic war and in defeat had lost all of its privileges of self-government. The Nueva Planta transferred all state functions to Madrid and proscribed Castilian as the official language of commerce and education. With the modernization/centralization reforms of the state under the Bourbon King Philip V, Catalonia lost its ideological and legal claim to a distinct nation-state. Although by this time Spain had lost its preeminence as a world power, the state building efforts of Philip V were buttressed with a period of economic expansion for Catalonia as it now received access to American markets. Trade in wine and cheap brandy, natural products of the region quickly linked Barcelona with American markets from which it imported cheap cotton. The textile industry became almost exclusively centered around Barcelona due to a tax exemption on cotton imports and the presence of business organizations such as the Board of Commerce of Catalonia. Catalonia soon surpassed the interior of Spain in population, resources and standard of living (Vives, 1966). By 1792, some 80,000 were employed in the textile industry in Barcelona alone. The mid century arrival of steam engines and the mechanical spinning jenny precipitated the arrival of the industrial revolution in Spain by coincidence limited almost exclusively to Barcelona and expanding later to the iron mines of the Basque

10 Charles II had died without an heir but had selected Philip of Anjou, a Bourbon, to follow him. Charles was his Habsburg cousin.
provinces.

In 1833, Carlos Arribau a poet and aspiring economist wrote a emotional poem in Catalan for his sponsor’s birthday."11 Symbolically, this was the beginning of the Catalan Renaixença which became institutionalized with the revival of the medieval poetry contests -Jocs Florals - in the 1850’s. What is important is not the literary focus on peasant traditions and folklore, rather that through the Jocs Florals the Catalan language, which was still spoken in the home and in the rural country side, gained the attention of the intellectuals and thus became a valuable resource for later mobilization. By the 1880’s, Verdaguer, "the Dante of Catalonia" had erased the division between the archaic Catalan of the revivalists and the popular Catalan of the streets.

According to the resource mobilization (RM) model, grievances are ubiquitous; mobilization is a function of the lowering of the cost of mobilization and the building of collective action frames. From an ecological standpoint then, I have listed several factors which by the late nineteenth century had lowered the costs of mobilization of a population essentially excluded from the polity. First, Catalonia (already separated from Aragon) was the most prosperous region in Spain. Secondly, the manpower requirements of the textile industry and the arrival

11 Arribau was in Madrid at the time and interestingly never published in Catalan again, becoming instead an agent for Catalan business interests in Madrid. (Carr, 1966) It is rarely mentioned that Ode to the Fatherland, written in the Romantic tradition of the times was written by a member of the Catalan elite.
of the phylloxera in Spain (destroying as it did in France the wine industry and forcing a migration to Barcelona) concentrated a network of people (textile workers, merchants) into a small urban area. The Renaixença made popular the Catalan language as a cultural marker distinguishing the Catalans from the Castilians and defining them as a category of people. This "catnetness" (a function of category and networking) is an important indicator of a group's cohesiveness and the stronger the group ties, the lower the cost of group mobilization. The revival of the Catalan language also renewed an interest in the political history of Catalonia, a factor which the other "historic nations" of Spain could not claim. At this point however, it is debatable whether the Catalan worker felt any sense of unity with his industrial boss. Still, class cleavages were not significant and the class warfare promoted by the anarcho-syndical trade unions CNT and UGT would not become a factor until the next century.

From the standpoint of political opportunity, this nascent Catalan awareness did not pose a power threat to the Castilian-Andalusian oligarchy of the Restoration government. The only conflict rested in the issue of protectionism versus free market political economy. For although the textile industry exported some of its products to American markets, the prime consumer of Catalan textiles was the rest of Spain. On the continent, British textiles were cheaper and Catalan textiles could not compete. The businessmen of Barcelona thus lobbied for protection from British products in the form of high tariff barriers. This import
substitution kept foreign textiles out of Spain and insured a high price for Catalan products but it also raised the price of other products which Spain imported from the rest of Europe. The government of Madrid had experimented with free market programs since the arrival of liberal economic ideas in the beginning of the century. The fact that the Catalans were the principal advocates of protection and the effect which that policy had on the rest of Spain resulted in the first notions of Catalan particularism. Valenti Almirall, a federalist and political activist became one of the first to advocate a regional program for Spain with Catalonia as the pilot region.\footnote{Almirall's \textit{España Tal como es}, gave an accurate portrait of the inadequacies of the unitary state but did not clearly propose an alternative. Specifically, in light of the failure of the First Republic, federalism was "prostituted" in the eyes of most Spaniards and not an option (Carr, 1966).}

For the purpose of this thesis, I propose taking the 1880's when Almirall first gave voice to political Catalanism as the starting point of my evaluation and the elections of 1977, arguably the first democratic ones in Spanish history, as the end point. For the purposes of brevity I will divide this one hundred period into two periods: 1880's - 1923 (the pronunciamento of Primo de Rivera in 1923 eliminated Catalan particularism and establishing a seven year dictatorship) and 1958 -1979 (the twenty post war years were ones of mere survival). I will skip the Second Republic and the Civil War because of its complexity. The first period will give us insight into the origins of the movement and especially the difficulty of creating ideational
packages and collective action frames. The second period will bring to light frame alignment between competing groups and the creation of a unified oppositional front.

**Origins of Catalan Nationalism**

At the same time that Almirall was creating an ideology for essentially urban bourgeois Catalanism, a similar process was occurring in the conservative and ultracatholic Catalan countryside. The Bishop of Vich, Torras i Bages, advocated regionalism over the "unnaturalness" of the unitary state uniting different peoples in a secular mass. He proposed a patriarchal social organization based on a love of the fatherland which was inseparable from a love of God. "Catalunya and the Church are two things in our past which cannot be separated... if anyone wishes to reject the Church, have no doubt that at the same time he must reject the Fatherland along with it" (Hughes, 1992, pg 320). In this Torras displays his Carlist roots and his anti-Liberalism. Torras becomes a high profile statesman befriending the great Catalan and ultracatholic architect Gaudí and later serving as the symbolic president of the Jocs Floral in 1899.

These two groups, the Barcelona industrialists and the rural traditionalists, distinct at first, shared common symbols in creating meanings for their adherents. The key question became can we, Catalans, continue to participate in a system that is decaying, that is out of tune with the times and whose inefficacy
is patent? The loss of Cuba in 1898, the resulting economic crisis in Catalonia, the parliamentarianism of Madrid built on corrupt suffrage and caciquismo, the inability of the national government to deal with the problems of urbanization in Barcelona, the insensitivity of free traders to the needs of the Catalan business, the Romantic notion of the political liberty of Catalonia at its peak, the anti-clericalism of the Castilian government, all were symbols which were packaged to create an ideological frame shaking potential adherents from their passive acceptance of Madrid. This frame alignment via frame bridging between traditionalist and industrial Catalanism represents the beginning of an oppositional master frame. The goals of the one became that of the other. There were even social experiments in industrial organization along the patriarchal lines advocated by Torras in the textile companies of the Barcelona suburb, Reus. The Bases de Manresa as developed by Almirall would became the charter of conservative federalist Catalanism. The tenets of this document were that Catalonia would have its own organic laws, that only Catalans could pursue public careers in Catalonia, that Catalan would be the official language and taught in public schools, and that forces of public order would be responsible to the regional government of Catalonia.

Turning now to an evaluation of the mobilizing potential of this social movement, we find that the movement capitalized on

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13 A war which many believe could have been avoided by the granting of limited autonomy to the colonies.
the gloomy mood of Spaniards in the last decade of the century. For the reasons listed above it proved easy to articulate a frame which highlighted the decadence of the Spanish state and which had resonance with the middle class conservatives and liberals of Catalonia. For unlike the other political currents in Spain at the time, this bourgeois Catalanism did not seek to eliminate the Spanish state nor did it propose the revolution which the Anarchists and the Communists did. The articulative framing was however more restrictive than elaborative because there was no allowance for anything other than full political autonomy. Furthermore, although there would be later attempts to incorporate the other "nations" into this federal scheme, the initial framing was that of the particularism of Catalonia only. This would limit Catalanism's appeal as an oppositional movement in the country. Without spending too much time on repertoires of collective action, the movement encouraged folklorish types of events: poetry contests, dances, etc. Protests, outside of political editorials and rhetoric, was nonexistent as this conflicted with the patrimonial framing of the movement. The collective action frame thus lacked action-oriented content and did not pose a threat to the power of Madrid. A social change in the population of Barcelona after the turn of the century however, would create a cleavage in the "catnetness" of the movement. The inability to recognize or the patent disregard for this change in the group's organization would fragment the Catalan movement.
The expansion of the textile industry in Barcelona required a continued influx of cheap labor. Whereas at the end of the nineteenth century this supply had come primarily from rural Catalonia, after the turn of the century, this manpower came mainly from Murcia and parts of Andalusia. The massive influx of people into Barcelona created housing problems immediately and concentrated the immigrants in the poor decaying neighborhoods of the harbor area. These immigrants were not Catalan and had no sense of bourgeois Catalanism. Categorically, these immigrants were the lumpenproletariat of the Andalusian latifundias; that is illiterate, anti-clerical and naively millenarian (Brennan, 1948). Most had been exposed to the ideas of Bakunin and felt a kinship to their proletariat brothers of the Barcelonean mills, the only other place were Bakunin was more successful than Marx among the working class. Within the working class, then, a competing social movement took shape. The working class movement was anti-Catalanist, violent and itself divided between anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism along French lines, and marxism.

The collective action frames of these groups, contrary to that of the Catalanists, were action-oriented; "propaganda of the deed", that is violence. The collective action frames of the Almirall and Torras I Bages, with their Catholic notions of syndicalism

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14 Brennan attributes the anti-clericalism of the nineteenth century to the alignment of the Church with the aristocracy after Mendizabal disentailed and sold the Church’s property in 1825. Severely impoverished by this act, the Church was forced to seek financial help with the landed nobility thus beginning their feud with the Liberals and alienating the peasants.
held no lure for the working class. The Catholic Church had lost all legitimacy with this class and the legitimacy of the industrialists was a function of their ability to suppress worker demands, something they did with armed gangs instead of negotiation. The leftist Radical Party and its leader Lerroux, who preached the gospel of violence, became the umbrella organization of the working class in the first decades of the century.

The Catalan nationalist movement then was a three cornered conflict. The bourgeois Catalanists against the workers and Madrid, and the workers against both. In many cases Madrid encouraged this cleavage in order to weaken both sides (Carr). Only when Madrid stepped in to this conflict did the two movements join together against the common hegemon. In 1906, in the aftermath of a political cartoon lampooning the army, the government of Madrid passed the infamous Law of Jurisdictions which gave the military court-martial authority in any event which attacked the military. In response, a loose organization called the Solidaritat Catala was formed consisting of elements across the political spectrum. In the 1907 elections, this coalition won 41 out of 44 Catalan seats breaking the rule of the cacique in Catalonia. Unfortunately this was primarily an ad hoc coalition and virtually disappeared in the next election.

Class cleavages only deepened, however, and in 1909 (what would become known as the Tragic Week) they came to a revolutionary head. The spark was the supplementary draft
required because of military failures in the Moroccan war and which was limited to Catalonia. Instead of uniting the Catalans, (the unjust draft system favored the sons of the middle and upper class who could buy their way out) the draft incensed only the working class which would bear the brunt of the burden. Lerroux whipped his followers (the Young Barbarians, as they called themselves) into a frenzy resulting in a three day street conflict with the police, the burning of churches and convents, and eight-three dead. The subsequent purges in the fortress of Monjuich, the very icon of Castilian dominance in Barcelona, were purportedly at the request of the industrialists who feared class revolution.

The history of Spanish politics from 1906 through 1936 is one of the loss of the legitimacy of the government (Brennan, 1946). Part of this blame goes to the King who dismissed and appointed governments seemingly at will (there were no less than 23 governments between 1902 and 1936). Catalonia gained limited autonomy in 1914 under the Mancomunidad but lost all powers under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923. In general, Catalanism began a turn to the left in 1922 with the Accio Catala and then with the Esquerra Republicana of the Second Republic.

The reality was, however, that the Catalan national movement of this period could not or would not come to terms with class cleavages. Moderate Catalanism was not a threat to the power of Madrid. The fear of class warfare kept the bourgeois Catalanists
tied to Madrid for protection. This in turn co-opted the industrialists in the eyes of the more leftist nationalists and caused a further cleavage in the Catalan national movement. Let us turn to the second period of evaluation now.

**Catalan Nationalism 1958-1978**

In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the Generalitat of Catalunya went underground and then abroad\(^\text{15}\). The belief that the Allies would remove Franco or that his own fragile coalition would implode proved to be wrong. Franco immediately suppressed the Catalan and Basque provinces (except Navarre which had remained loyal to him) and purged the country of its republicanism. The isolation of Spain imposed by the Allies after WWII and the devasting cost of the Civil War and the immediate post war purges extended the effects of the war until the 1950’s. Franco’s regime was merely another restoration government in the country’s history of civil strife since the Napoleonic invasion. And Franco’s restoration government would face the same problem of previous restoration governments: how to create a national Spanish identity.

The course Franco initially plotted seemed to be one of widespread repression of any regional particularism. By the 1950’s however, these techniques seemed destined to fail and in light of Spain’s desire to create a favorable impression abroad, the regime relaxed its repression and granted certain concessions.

\(^{15}\) The Generalitat became in reality housed in one man: Josep Tarradellas, the last living official of the Generalitat at the time of Franco’s death.
to local sentiment.

In 1953, Spain signed an agreement with the U.S. giving the American military permission to build air bases in Spain in exchange for an aid package. This break of the imposed isolation represented the beginning of Spain’s recovery.

First, a look at the ecological factors affecting mobilization. The economic aid package of the Americans beginning in the 1950’s and the infiltration of the government of Opus Dei members with their commitment to economic recovery within the catholic framework of Franco’s coalition, gave Spain a measure of economic prosperity in the early sixties. Again Catalonia became the economic work horse of the country. Between 1950 and 1975, the population of Catalonia grew from 3.25 million to 5.67 million or at a population growth rate of 100,000 a year. Of this growth 57% was from immigration of workers from outside Catalonia (Parellada, 1990, table 6, pg 73). The population by economic sectors in comparison to the rest of Spain is at table one.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC SECTORS</th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRY</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parellada, 1990
The data in the table reflects the continuing industrial preeminence of Catalonia in comparison to the rest of Spain. This would be more apparent if the figures for the Basque province of Vizcaya were listed separately and not included in those of Spain.

In terms of political opportunity structures, the 1960’s brought a loosening of Franco’s authoritarianism (Francoism was not a totalitarian system). Beginning in 1966, student unrest increased followed by an increase in working class demands as the vertical syndicates failed. Catalan also enjoyed a resurgence in light of lessening repression. The Basques, on the other hand were under constant martial law in the late sixties and early seventies due to ETA terrorism.

At the risk of oversimplifying the situation, the ecological factors of the 1960’s are surprisingly similar to those of the late nineteenth century. Spain was a unitary state with a right wing oligarchy in Madrid. Once again the periphery (including the Basque provinces) was the locus of economic expansion as well as political discontent with the stifling centralization of the center. Unlike the Catalanism of the first period however, this period reflects successful frame alignment and action-oriented ideology in the building of a unitary master oppositional frame. Johnston, in his article on the Catalan coalition, identifies

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16 In 1933, 740 books had been published in Catalan; in 1945 only 2. In 1959, the regime allowed for the publication of new works in Catalan. Newspapers, however, were prohibited until the 1970’s.

63
four separate processes of frame alignment: a general movement to the left of Catholic organizations, a similar turn to left of Catalan nationalist parties, the transformation of the mild oppositional Catalanism into a militant one and an acceptance on the part of the growing immigrant class of the claims of the nationalist movement.

The first alignment process is perhaps the most ironic. Liberal marxism had lost out to the communists in Barcelona in the first six months of the war. Those elements which had survived the communist purges of 1937 were purged by Franco in 1939. After the war, French Catholic philosophers such Jean-Paul Satre began to influence the younger clergy in Spain. These philosophers pioneered themes of Catholic socialism and other themes heretical to the high clergy yet entering Spain no less. Pope John XXIII’s influence through the Second Vatican Council also had a profound effect on the younger clergy of Spain. These marxist influences penetrated the Catholic youth of Spain and (according to Johnston) particularly in Catalonia via Catholic youth groups and outings. These clubs became the linkage for Catholics of different social backgrounds and the point of contact between working class and nationalist youth. The Bishop of Barcelona was not a Catalan and did not support the movement.

The second frame alignment was between the bourgeois

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17 POU M, the marxist party of Catalonia had been purged by the communists under Stalin’s guidance in 1937. Stalin did not want to support a liberal revolution in Spain at this time preferring to make Spain a russian satellite (Orwell, 1937)
Catalanists and the Marxists. As I have demonstrated above, Catalanism of the first period was a conservative middle class phenomena. The experience of the Second Republic and the Civil War and the disunity of the Popular Front had inculcated severe distrust among these groups after the war. Once again the momentum of the Marxist frame, especially among the young who had no memory of the war, allowed for a successful bridging of the two frames. In 1968, a new party; the Socialist Party of National Liberation (PSAN), became the new front for the working class and nationalist struggle against "national oppression and class oppression" (Johnston, 1991). Other parties of the left accepted this new alignment in varying degrees of intensity and forms.

The third alignment is perhaps the most important because it is the transformation of the movement into that of the total and exclusive opposition to Franco's regime in this region. This required a reworking of the ideological packaging to capitalize on symbols requiring action instead of quiescence on the part of the movement's adherents. It was the lack of action symbols in the collective action frame of Almirall's Catalanism which weakened it as a competitor with the framing efforts of Madrid. The quiescence of the middle class after the Civil War had, by default, also legitimized Franco's regime. Catalan nationalism had to punctuate ideas and create a frame which legitimized it as an oppositional force in the eyes of the large non-Catalan working class living (imported by Franco to dilute Catalanism) in the region. Johnston believes that this process was a function of
two external forces of change which entered Catalonia in the sixties. First, a legitimization of national rights and culture emanating from the Second Vatican which essentially defended the use of Catalan at the highest levels of the church. Once again a member of the clergy, this time the Abbot of the Monastery ofMontserrat16 encouraged middle class catholics to leave the security of their homes to make a pilgrimage to Montserrat to support the Pope’s position on linguistic rights. The outlawed "Hymn to the Catalan Flag" was sung resulting in several arrests (Johnston). Secondly, the growing activism of student movements influenced the middle class youth of Catalonia. In 1960, twenty young Catalans were arrested and purportedly tortured for leading an illegal Catalan nationalist song at a public concert (one of these was Jordi Pujol). The significance of the fact was that these young Catalans were not working class marxists but young, middle class Catholic Catalanists whose acquiescence the government had taken for granted. The arrests also began to give Catalanism the militant credentials it would need to win over the immigrant working class. The torture of these youths brought region wide protests and demonstrations. Interestingly, the working class immigrants took to learning Catalan and especially encouraged their children to learn the language as a means to improve their employment possibilities. Assimilating this

16 Montserrat is one of the four mountains of Catalonia which have significant symbolism for the Catalans. Supposedly, the Holy Grail was stored in the monastery at one time. Monsignor Escarre was relieved of his position shortly after the incident.
cultural marker or at least tolerating it proved a powerful thrust to the resonance of the Catalan national frame.

The master frame of Catalanism as an oppositional movement to Franco's regime represents the successful alignment of the bourgeois industrialists, Catholic regionalists, and the working class. In the absence of legitimate elections, action-oriented collective action frames which included protests, hymn singing, flying of the banned Catalan flag, demonstrations, and sermons from the pulpit allowed the Catalan social movement to consolidate its position as a unified oppositional force.

The first free elections in Spain were the June 1977 elections. In these elections, the Catalan nationalist left and center left parties received 70% of the votes with the state center party (UCD) coming in at a mere 15%. The coalition of the Socialists of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE) was the big winner receiving 30% of the vote.

In conclusion, the success of the modern Catalan nationalist movement was a function of its resource base but more importantly its ability to bridge the class cleavages which had undermined earlier Catalan nationalism. This nationalist movement, organized along territorial lines instead of functional ones blocked the penetration of national parties. It has maintained this territorial opposition to Madrid in all elections for the last fifteen years. In that time, Madrid has made significant progress in developing a federal solution for Spain. The Catalan nationalist movement has, then, defied the common nationalist
theories which I surveyed in chapter one and can only make sense in light of social movement theory as a social movement which not only continues to have the resources but also the resonance with its members to maintain their allegiance.
CHAPTER FOUR

Basque Nationalism

"Garean gareana, legez". (Let us be what we were)

The study of Basque nationalism is somewhat more complicated than that of the Catalans because of the changing definition of the Basques. Unlike the Catalans, the Basques claim an ethnic as well as a political identity. At issue are at least four criteria by which the Basques might define themselves: race, language, religion, and geography. I will address the geography first as it is the easiest. The first three are cultural markers and I will address them as resources for mobilization.

The Basque provinces or Euskadi (in Basque) traditionally meant the four regions of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava and Navarra. In fact the definition of the Basque provinces is a result of the special foral rights (administrative autonomy) given the region since the early days of the Reconquista. The first three provinces were essentially part of the Castilian kingdom from the thirteenth century on. Navarra, however, was a

There are also three Basque regions immediately across the French border but they have not been a significant factor in Basque nationalism and I will not specifically address them here.
kingdom in its own right although it was soon eclipsed by the stronger kingdoms of Castile on the west and Aragon on the east as the Reconquista moved south. In the 1529, it became part of the Aragonese-Catalan federation under Ferdinand I (husband of Isabel I) yet it maintained its fueros. The Basques would join Navarra in the Carlist cause but would part with them ideologically after the defeat of the Carlist War in 1874. Navarra would side with Franco in the Civil War while the Basque Provinces sided with the Republicans at the last moment. In the territorial reorganization of the country after Franco’s death, Navarra chose not to be a part of Euskadi although the Basque Statute of Autonomy maintains that option open for the future. I will assume the convention of not including Navarra in my definition of the Basque provinces.

The regional autonomy protected by the fueros would become the key issue of the Liberal-traditionalist conflict in the wake of the 1812 constitution. Carlism would unite under its banner the defenders of regional fueros, the estranged church hierarchy threatened by the secularization of government and disentailment of church property, and the pretender to the throne, Charles of
Bourbon. As I stated in chapter three, the Carlist conflict was an ongoing power struggle during the nineteenth century ending (at least in its overt form) in 1874 with the defeat of the Carlists by the Army and resulting in the restoration of Alfonso XII (son of Isabel) to the throne as a constitutional monarchy. This Restoration government, under Prime Minister Cánovas, eliminated most of the fueros of the Basques and the Navarrese (the only other region with historic fueros, Catalonia, had lost them in the War of Spanish Succession a century earlier) yet still allowed a measure of fiscal autonomy called the conciertos económicos (economic agreements). These were tax privileges which allowed the two regions to pay Madrid a set tax sum each year while not dictating the means of raising the sum. Over time, the government would threaten even these privileges arguing that they gave the two regions a special and undue particularism. As had happened in the Catalonia after the elimination of its fueros in the eighteenth century, the Basque provinces and especially

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20 Ferdinand VII, having been placed on the throne by the defeat of Napoleon’s army in 1814, attempted to rule as an absolute monarch but was restrained by the alliance of the Army with the Liberals and had to accept the constitution of 1812. In 1823, with the assistance of the French army he reasserted his absolute rule. From 1823 to his death in 1833, he unsuccessfully attempted to please both the Liberals and the traditionalists and his death marked a power struggle by both sides. Having not produced any heirs as he approached death, the traditionalists allied themselves with the pretender; Ferdinand’s brother Charles. Ferdinand apparently did sire a child but died before the birth of his daughter Isabella. According to Salic Law, only a male heir could ascend to the throne but the alliance of the military with the Queen regent prevented Charles from taking the throne and sparked the Carlist War in 1833. Carlism was primarily restricted to the Basque Provinces, Navarra, and rural Catalonia.
Vizcaya enjoyed an economic upswing under the government of Madrid.

Given the nature of the Carlist cause and the fact that the Basque and Navarra regions were the locus of the cause, it is easy to understand why many explanations of Basque nationalism use the modernization theory which claim that the movement is a reactionary one against the marginalization threatened by the modernization of the Spanish state (Kimmel, 1986). If this were the case, however, one would also expect Navarra to develop a nationalist movement. In fact, Navarra did not ever develop any sense of political or social distinction from Madrid. Basque nationalism was an invention of a small elite who were able to capitalize on the economic prosperity of the Basque provinces and especially Vizcaya in the late nineteenth century. Navarra did not undergo the industrialization of Vizcaya and remained a rather poor agricultural society until recently. By tracing the history of Basque nationalism from its inception in the last decade of the nineteenth century through its gestation in the first decades of this century and its transformation under Franco’s rule, I hope to show that the movement was a function of resources and framing as I did with the Catalan movement.

Unlike Catalonia, the Basque Provinces were never a powerful nation distinct from Castile. The ancient history of the Basques is still being debated, especially the origins of their language which is not of Indo-European origin. Popular at one time was the notion that the Basques are a distinct race, perhaps
of the lost Iberian tribes which wandered the peninsula in pre-historic times. Anthropological studies "proved" the distinction first by cranial measurements and then by Rh factor blood typing (supposedly Basques are categorically A+ as opposed to the rest of the Spaniards). Anthropologists, however, have not been able to prove any racial theory as of yet thus race is a weak cultural marker. It is generally agreed that the Basque provinces did not experience Muslim rule during the occupation of the peninsula by the Saracens but this was probably a factor of geography rather than organized defense (Payne, 1975). The provinces were later controlled by both the Asturian and the Navarrese kingdoms before succumbing to Castilian hegemony in the thirteenth century.

In the confederal manner in which Castile maintained hegemony over all of the Iberian peninsula, the Basques were generally left to their own system of government. The region had been nominally Christianized by the eleventh century and the

21 A popular myth was that the Basques were the descendants of Tubal, the grandson of Noah, who was the first to visit the peninsula. Tubal taught his descendants monotheism and the language of Paradise (Atienza, 1979).

22 More recent studies have used fingerprints (digital dermatoglyphics analysis) to compare Basques to other Spaniards in the racial debate. Fingerprints are thought to more reliable in the study of the evolution of populations. At least one initial dermatoglyphics study supports the thesis that the Basques are the survivors of an ancient relic population (M.I. Arrieta et. al., 1987)

23 Pactismo, or negotiated pacts was, according to the great Spanish historian J. Vicens Vives, the root of Spain's national problem. See The Catalans and the Minotaur in J. Sobrer (ed) Catalonia: A Self Portrait
period of the thirteenth century through the fifteenth century was one of clan feuds between local notables as the region developed with the growth of towns and commercial shipping activities. In the late fifteenth century, the Castilian Crown intervened and brought law and order to the region and instituted a provincial government called Juntas Generales under the supervision of a royal administrator. This was not so much a legislative body as it was a means to ratify royal decrees and apportion local taxes whose level they managed to maintain below that of Castile. The Juntas met irregularly (Payne). Nonetheless, the significance of the fueros cannot be overstated. They protected a rural way of life, making the local notables the advantaged class while the merchants and budding industrialists were kept at a second class status. They were a charter which essentially gave the regions political and economic autonomy.

In general Basques penetrated the royal court of Castile serving in the state bureaucracy, military, merchant marine, and clergy (Monreal, 1985). Bilbao, in the Bay of Biscay, became an important commercial port exporting Castilian wool and also the hub of a growing fishing and whaling industry. With the discovery of the New World, Spanish ships ventured to the Far East acquiring spices and silks to add to their commercial and naval hegemony.

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The foral arrangements accomplished this via four main features: 1) The Provincial Assemblies (Juntas) were structured on municipal representation. Each municipality, regardless of population, enjoyed equal representation. Since most of the municipalities were rural, the Juntas disproportionately weighed toward rural interests. 2) In order to hold office, one had to own land, effectively excluding many urbanites. 3) The internal customs border with the rest of Spain limited access to Spanish markets. 4) The main resources of the region, iron ore and timber, were municipal property, restricting exportation.
of the New World, Bilbao became second only to Cadiz in importance and even obtained from the Castilian Crown a monopoly on the cocoa trade.

As I have already stated in chapter three, the Basques sided with Philip of Anjou during the War of Spanish Succession and thus maintained their fueros (albeit slightly modified under Philip's centralizing regime) while Catalonia lost theirs under the Nueva Planta.

We must conclude, then, that during the period beginning from its inclusion in the Castilian Kingdom in the thirteenth century through the Constitution of 1812, the Basques in general considered their fortunes narrowly linked to that of the Castilian monarchs. It was only in the face of the crisis of Ferdinand VII and the Liberal Constitution that any sense of Basque (and Navarrese) particularism developed. This Catholic-regional movement (Carlism) was defeated in 1876.

Before turning to the origins of Basque nationalism it is interesting to note a comment by Oliviera about the nature of the Carlist movement. Oliviera claims that if the Carlist movement was primarily a regional autonomy movement, then why did the Carlists not rally to the cause of the First Republic which was an attempt to create a federal state. In fact the dethroning of
Isabel in 1868 by the Army marked the beginning of the second Carlist War (or a continuation of the first depending on which scholar one consults). For Oliviera, the intransigence of the Carlists is due to their religious zeal. Apparently, the Savoyan prince asked to reign Spain by General Prim did not meet the strict religious requirements of the Carlists and neither did the short lived Republic, with its anti-clerical charter. Oliviera concludes that the Carlists were not really as interested in regional autonomy as they were in a theocratic government which the Carlist pretender offered (Oliviera, 1946). I believe, on the other hand, that this highlights the earlier point I made about the preeminent role of the Church in state affairs. The Church was successful in framing the Carlist movement as one of reviving the historic patrimony of imperial Spain under the Catholic Monarchs, Isabel and Ferdinand. The Carlist movement had a powerful ideology and slogan: "God, King and Fatherland". Furthermore, this ideational package or collective action frame, effectively used later by Bishop Torras i Bages, had no serious competitor as it would in Catalonia. Having neither undergone

25 Isabel had the alleged misfortune of being married to a homosexual (Carr, 1973). She is better known for her extramarital affairs with her military escorts than for her political acumen. General Prim removed her from the throne in 1868 and ruled the country as a regent until a suitable prince could be found. The Carlist pretender was out of the question because of his anti-liberal position which threatened to return Spain to the absolutism of the eighteenth century. Finally, Amadeo of Savoy was asked to assume the throne. General Prim was assassinated by an anarchist’s bullet on the day Amadeo arrived in Spain. After two futile years, Amadeo abdicated giving Spain its First Republic. The Republic lasted thirteen months.
radical industrialization nor an influx of immigrant workers, the Basque region’s acquiescence in the national government relied almost exclusively on the foral arrangements.

Up until this point Basque particularism as defined by Carlism was not separatist and thus not nationalist. Economically, the Basque provinces were an agrarian zone except for the province of Vizcaya which was rich with iron ore. The arrival of the Bessemer process in 1856 made the Vizcayan deposits cheaper to mine than those in Lancashire and with the encouragement of the provincial government, British steel manufactures invested heavily in the region and especially in the city of Bilbao which straddled the navigable Nervión River which was used to transport the ore from the mines to ships in the Bay of Biscay. With the defeat of the Carlists in 1876 (they had effectively blockaded the river and Bilbao), the industrialization of Bilbao began in earnest. Between 1876 and 1880 iron ore output increased tenfold and then doubled again by 1900. Unlike the light textile industrialization of Catalonia, heavy steel and iron industrialization required large capital investments effectively limiting the market to a few powerful capitalist families (Harrison, 1983). Their reinvestment of profits into the city gave birth to a local banking sector, a stock market and a host of other industries such as cement processing and ship building. Between 1886 and 1901, almost twice as much capital was invested in new companies as was in Barcelona in the same period. Thus within the span of a quarter of a
century, Bilbao became the second most important industrial center in Spain. And as was the case in Barcelona, the industrialists found their fortune tied to the economic policies of Madrid. An industrial pressure group similar to the Catalan Liga helped pressure Madrid for the protective tariffs passed in 1891. In summary, Vizcaya enjoyed an economic boom during the Restoration and as long as the tax advantages of the conciertos económicos were respected, the notion of foral privileges became, for the industrialists, second to Madrid's economic policy.

The defeat of Carlism resulted in a myriad of political parties attempting to represent frustrated Carlist causes. Basque nationalism was the brainchild of Sabino Arana, the son of an upperclass Basque shipping magnate and devout Carlist. Arana grew up in Bilbao but his family moved to the mild climate of Barcelona in 1882 when Sabino was seventeen to preserve his frail health. Arana attended the University of Barcelona and may have been influenced by the Catalanism sweeping through the region at the time (there is no general agreement on this point). The Renaixença was beginning to reach its peak and Almirall was already well known. Against this background, Arana began to conceive his notions of Vizcayan-Basque nationalism. The Basque provinces had not undergone the Romantic revival of the Renaixença and Arana devoted himself entirely to Basque studies beginning in 1885. Since, as was the case with all upperclass Basque families, Arana spoke Castilian and not Euskera (Basque), his first years were dedicated to linguistics and he published a
grammar book in 1883\textsuperscript{26}. Arana returned to Bilbao in 1888 to develop his ideology for Vizcayan nationalism. Central to his ideology was the fact that the Basques were never conquered by the Castilians and thus the relationship with Spain was one of choice and not one of subordinate to master. Spain had usurped the government of the Basque Provinces and was now corrupting the Basques with its liberal hypocrisy. While regional autonomy based on historic fueros was suitable for the Catalans who were Spaniards, it was unacceptable for the Basques whose fueros were a means of "international" relations with Spain.\textsuperscript{27}

Arana combined the ultracatholic notions of Carlism with the myths\textsuperscript{28} of Basque particularism. The political party which he founded with the help of his brother Luis in 1895 (and which would become the Basque nationalist party, PNV), proposed a republican theocracy for the three Basque provinces and Navarra in Spain and the three Basque provinces in France. The republic would be called Euskadi (an Aranist neologism meaning "homeland") and would have as its flag a two cross banner symbolizing Christian faith and the independence won by the Vizcayans in a

\textsuperscript{26} Gramática elemental del Euskera Bizkaino. The Basque language was actually a group of provincial dialects.

\textsuperscript{27} Arana expounded most of his nationalist doctrines via a bi-weekly journal, Bizkaitarra, which he founded in 1893 (Payne, 1975).

\textsuperscript{28} These myths are that: a) the Basques are a Chosen People being the descendants of Tubal, and having learned from him the language of Paradise and the practice of monotheism and b) that the Basques were a free, egalitarian people having beaten the Leonese (and by extension the Castilians) in 888 AD.
ninth century battle with the Kingdom of Leon. The political slogan of the party was "God and the Old Laws", a derivative of the Carlist "God, Fatherland, and King". According to Payne, Arana’s ideology was "a unique blend of nineteenth century Spanish apostolicism [and] modern European ethnic nationalism which was at once neotraditionalist, politically revolutionary, and radically theocratic" (Payne, 1975, pg 73). In 1895, the party conducted their first political act by burning the Spanish flag at a musical concert in Guernica (the site of the symbolic foral tree where the Castilian monarchs affirmed the Basque fueros).

The Basque nationalist movement then, was a packaging of traditional and innovative symbols. It was politically and economically traditionalist disdaining at the same time industrial capitalism for its destructive effect on the traditional social structure and the rational centralization of the modern state. Arana’s ideology was also racially exclusive reserving the "Homeland" solely for Basques and not the "maketos" as he called the rest of Spain. In this, Basque nationalism was markedly different from Catalanism because Catalanism was irredentist in its solution for Spain.

Initially, however, the PNV may have been too radical in its demand for a separate Basque state for the party had little support from either the industrialists or the rural countryside.

29 The Battle of Arrigorriaga in 888 between the Duke of Vizcaya and the Kingdom of Leon was fought on the feast day of St Andes. (Atienza, 1979)
Arana was arrested in 1895 for subversion and after serving a three month sentence returned to his literary endeavors restricting his political activities. In 1902, he sent a telegram to President Roosevelt congratulating him on the passage of the Platt amendment and for freeing Cuba from "the Spanish yoke". The telegram was intercepted and Arana returned to jail. His health failed the next year and he died in November 1903.

The PNV and Basque nationalism struggled for adherents in the first decade of the new century for two reasons. First, the notion of a separate Basque nation, while somewhat resonant with the Basques because of the myths which Arana drew upon and embellished, was a radically novel idea. A Basque state did not exist in their collective memory and there had not been a literary movement to remind them or create one for them. Euskera was not as pervasive in the region as Catalan was in Catalonia and thus did not have the mobilizing potency to create a collective identity. Secondly, although Bilbao was the largest city in the provinces, it did not occupy a hegemonic position in the region as Barcelona did in Catalonia. Therefore, politically, the territory was split among various parties and social movements. In Bilbao, the predominate group was a political and economic monopoly by the iron and steel industrialists represented by the Spanish Conservative Party although still maintaining a modicum of Basque particularism. The large, mostly immigrant working class of Bilbao were represented by the Spanish Socialist Party and its trade union; the UGT (the anarcho-
syndical union CNT did not enjoy support in this region and may account for the relative lack of violence as compared to Barcelona). The nationalists occupied a relatively minute portion of the political spectrum attracting only the rural population of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa marginalized by the growing cities (the rural populations of Alava and Navarra having not experienced industrialization sided instead with the Conservative Party and would not be part of the Basque autonomous community during the Second Republic and the Civil War).

In the last years of his life Arana recognized the need to ally his fledgling party with a larger base if it were to survive. At the same time, the lower middle class businessmen of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa having themselves been marginalized by the monopoly of big business, turned to the nationalists. This proved troublesome (frame overextension) because the goals of the small businessmen were that of regional autonomy along Catalan nationalist lines and not the separatism of Arana. After Arana’s death the party came under the control of these businessmen who moved the party toward the political center and changed the name to CNV or Basque National Communion. This party enjoyed only moderate success suffering from ideological infighting up through the Second Republic.

An analysis of the Basque nationalist movement up to this point indicates that the movement is weak and suffers from structural as well as ideological flaws. First, the sense of being Basque is largely a mythical construction of Arana and
cannot rely on language or other cultural markers to distinguish it from the dominant Castilians or the more recent identity of Carlism. Secondly, the size and depth of the group is limited as Arana did not enjoy the support of either the intellectuals, the powerful industrialists, the working class or the entire rural population. The support of the Church came mainly from the lower Basque speaking clergy while the rest of the former Carlist parties also enjoyed the support of the Church. The region is essentially divided along functional lines and national parties have penetrated the region. If we use the repression/facilitation function of the government as a means of measuring the perceived challenge posed by the nationalists\textsuperscript{30}, we find that Madrid made neither a great effort to suppress the Aranaists nor to penetrate his party focusing instead on the industrialists of Bilbao. In sum, the nationalists had neither the resources nor a collective action frame which mobilizes potential adherents to challenge the quiescence established by the legitimate government. Let us turn now to Basque nationalism during the Franco years.

\textbf{Basque Nationalism 1950’s - 1979}

As in the case of Catalan nationalism, the immediate postwar

\textsuperscript{30} Tilly’s model posits that the government will either tolerate or repress weak movements and in the case of a strong challenge will repress the most controversial portion of the challenge while facilitating the less threatening portion (Tilly, 1978) An example of this is Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship in the 1920’s. The government could not ignore the nationalist claims of the Basques and the Catalans but instead repressed all separatist claims and organizations while encouraging folkloric revivals.
years were ones of severe repression for the provinces (Navarra had sided with Franco in the Civil War and enjoyed special privileges under his regime including the conciertos economicos). Basque provincial government was abolished and replaced with bureaucrats from Madrid, Euskera was outlawed in public and even the lower Basque clergy was punished for its role in the war 31 "At best, the local populations felt that they were paying to support an army of parasitical bureaucrats; at worst, the sense of being an occupied territory was easily engendered" (Medhurst, 1979 pg 6). Franco's regime was merely another restoration government in the country's history of civil strife since the Napoleonic invasion. And Franco's restoration government would face the same problem of previous restoration governments: how to create a national Spanish identity.

The course Franco initially plotted seemed to be one of widespread repression of any regional particularism. By the 1950's however, these techniques seemed destined to fail and in light of Spain's desire to create a favorable impression abroad, the regime relaxed its repression and granted certain concessions to local sentiment.

In examining Catalan nationalism during the Franco years, I showed how the movement became the predominant oppositional force to Franco's regime in the region and was a coalition of nationalists, middle class Catholics, immigrant workers, and the

31 The 1 July 1937 Collective Letter of the Spanish Bishops legitimized Franco's uprising in religious terms (Perez, 1986).
industrialists. I explained this as a function of frame alignment and a new ideology which embraced activism. I will use the same criteria to evaluate the Basque movement under Franco.

The second industrial wave which Spain experienced in the late fifties and early sixties was again limited mostly to Barcelona and the northern two Basque regions of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa (Madrid also enjoyed industrial expansion during this period). Once again, the demand for labor brought a massive immigration of workers from northern Spain into these industrial centers. By 1967, the three provinces were ranked the top three in Spain in terms of disposable income. The problems facing the nationalists were the same as those facing the PNV in the first decade of the century: how to reconcile class distinctions with the exclusive nature of Arana's nationalist charter, intransigence versus cooperation with Madrid, and independence versus autonomy. For reason which I will explain below, Basque nationalism split between two main factions: middle class "moderate" nationalism represented by the PNV; and radical separatist working class nationalism represented by ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) and later by the nationalist left (Herri Batasuna).

32 Between 1951 and 1970, 300,000 immigrants moved to the Basque provinces concentrating mostly in Bilbao and San Sebastian (Guipuzcoa). In 1970, 30% of the Basque population was not native (Della Porta, 1986) Although most of the immigrants to Barcelona were from southern Spain and brought with them no real sense of regional identity, the immigrants to the Basque regions were mainly from northern Spain and brought with them a strong sense of Castilian identity. This would prove important in the assimilation of immigrants which the two regions would undertake.
From its exile abroad, the PNV continued to support the notion of a fully autonomous Basque nation within the Spanish state. As it had before the war, the party continued to draw its support from farmers and white collar workers of the lower middle class, small entrepreneurs, skilled workers and a minority of Basque Catholics from the urban classes. The upper class business elite had, if anything, become more closely associated with the regime as they relied on preferential fiscal treatment from Madrid. The business interests of this elite were tied to Spain’s autarchy and a survey of Spanish businessmen in 1963 showed that the Basque elite alone disapproved integration into the European Common Market (Payne, 1975). Categorically, then, this group was non-nationalist and did not support the nationalist movement.

The mass immigration of workers to the industrial centers of Bilbao and the recently industrialized San Sebastian was both a means to fill the labor requirements and, as some have alleged, a ploy by Franco to dilute ethnic sentiment (Medhurst, 1982). The strain of rapid urbanization on these cities was in part a normal by-product of industrialization but also a function of the regime redirecting state investment to other regions in the country (Madrid being the greatest recipient of this state investment). Nonetheless, working class alliances (parties and unions were illegal) did not uniformly develop and instead a renewed sense of ethnicity did (Della Porta, 1986). This ethnic revival was a function of the resurgence of Euskera as a cultural marker, the impotence of the PNV in exile, the secret leftist leanings of the
lower clergy protected by the greater hierarchy of the Church, and the loosening of government repression followed by a more severe era of repression in the wake of ETA terrorism in the late sixties and seventies.

The enigma of the Basque language, according to one author, is not its origins but its permanence. Euskera did not enjoy the widespread popularity of Catalan in the initial nationalist period and under the regime's repression, it almost disappeared. A survey of Basque housewives in the 1960's showed that only 50% could understand Euskera, 46% could speak it, 25% could read it and only 11% could write it (Payne, 1975). Unlike Catalan which was associated with social mobility since all businessmen spoke it (in private initially), Euskera was the language of the rural farmers. The main reason for Euskera's resurgence was the protection and attention it received from the Basque lower clergy. In fact the Basque church had been the largest publisher of works in the Basque language since the seventeenth century. Beginning in the 1950's, secret Basque language schools, Ikastolas, began teaching Euskera with many of the teachers being priests. This reinforced the relationship between the clergy and the working class youths who attended the schools. Euskera is a difficult language to learn and this reinforces its use as a oppositional symbol or cultural marker. More important, however, is the improved and sustained relationship which the language

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33 I. Sarasola, quoted in Perez, 1986.
34 Ibid.
permitted between the lower clergy and the working class youth.

Although the Spanish Catholic Church had quickly endorsed Franco in the July uprising and occupied an important position in Franco’s corporate government after the war, by the sixties the church began to distance itself from Franco. Medhurst stipulates that the Church was actually divided among three groups whose loyalty to Franco went from those rending him whole hearted support such as Opus Dei, to the largest group which favored democracy and local autonomy, and finally the radical minority which was marxist and predominately located in the Basque region. This radical minority, under the umbrella of the Church’s protected position in the regime, provided the young marxists with meeting places and helped to smuggle in literature from France and smuggle out those wanted by the police. As Franco loosened the restrictions on folkloric groups and associations, these groups centered around parish priests and facilities.

Thus we have a very interesting frame alignment within this sphere. The Basque clergy, very much within the nationalist universe, became the refuge for the symbolic Euskera and illegal marxists reunions. This leftist leaning was much more than that of Catalonia which received inspiration and legitimacy from the Second Vatican. The ultraliberal militancy of the Basque lower clergy is a complex phenomena which is still being debated by scholars but all agree that from the militancy of these priests and their influence on the working class and middle class youth a new organization was born: ETA.
The origins of ETA were in a small group of radical nationalist students from the Jesuit university at Duesto (Bilbao) in the mid-fifties. These students or etarras rejected the moderate, parliamentary-oriented tactics of the PNV. The first ETA “handbook”, published underground in 1960, is full of religious undertones and symbology. Initially these etarras objected to the “castilianization” of the moderate nationalists. Castilian and not Euskera was used in their publications and meetings. For the etarras, to be a Basque nationalist meant first and foremost to converse in Euskera and not the language of the imperialists. The First Assembly of ETA held in France in 1962 envisioned a federal state composed of the seven Basque provinces and organized along a poorly defined socialist program. ETA was not committed to violence as a means of political action in the beginning nor was it necessarily a working class movement. The fact is that ETA has never had a homogenous governing body nor policy (Zirakzadeh, 1991). By the end of the 1960’s, ideological diversity had crystallized into multiple organizations: Eta-berri, ETA-V, ETA-VI, and ETA-milis. The fragmentation was over

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35 There are references to “responsibility before God and Fatherland”, apostolic passages of “a faith without works, is a dead faith”, and the notion that the Basques, as opposed to the rest of Spain, have a tradition of being anticlerical yet profoundly religious (Perez, 1986, pg 425).

36 “The Basque-speaking pseudopatriot who does not teach Basque to his children is a monster, the ultimate by-product of national degeneration...The Basque patriot who does not speak Basque is a living contradiction, is a constant traitor to his word, an atheist at daily communion” (From a 1961 ETA publication, Unzueta, 1988)
several issues including the use of violence and the integration of immigrant, non-Euskera speaking workers.

Violence entered the group’s repertoire of collective action in the late 1960’s. Influenced by the Cuban and Algerian revolutionary writings of the times and the writers of the New Left in Europe\textsuperscript{37}, the spiral theory of violence as advocated by Federico Krutwig\textsuperscript{38} was generally accepted by the group. The theory explains the use of violence as follows: during a popular protest against some injustice inflicted by the government, trained guerrillas would covertly attack government personnel which would result in a police round up, jailings, and possible torture of innocents. This would lead to more broad based protests and so on. As time passed, however, even the use of violence fragmented the group and there is evidence that many ETA cells conduct violence without following any logic or ideology (Zirakzadeh, 1991). This does not support the notion, however, that ETA violence is a product of frustrated individuals marginalized by rapid industrialization or social reorganization (essentially the modernization theory). Zirakzadeh argues that the decision to use violence was and is a rational decision made by calculating the cost and benefits of such action. Accordingly, Zirakzadeh attributes Basque violence to three factors: the

\textsuperscript{37} Michel Bosquet, Lelio Basso, Ernest Mandel wrote regularly for a Parisian journal called Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico which was sympathetic to socialism but hostile to the Soviet Union in the wake of the crushed Hungarian uprising of 1956.

\textsuperscript{38} Vasconia, 1962.
existence of local economic dislocation and disruption, a
tradition of non-violent local political struggle, and the
informing role of formal ideologies (Marxism, New Left)

From its origins of anti-immigrant and industrialization,
ETA has both embraced and rejected class ideology (the reason for
the first split between ETA factions). By way of generalizing,
however, one can assume that ETA has not conducted a frame
alignment with the goals of the working class.

Growing ETA violence and a hard recession in the late
sixties encouraged the regime to reverse its slow relaxing of
repressive measures. Beginning in 1967, the regime began
suspending civil rights and in the immediate aftermath of a
terrorist attack would declare a state of emergency in the region
imposing martial law and arresting suspects by the hundreds.
Although this infuriated the law-abiding Basques and immigrant
workers, and in the case of the Burgos trial of 1970 focused
international attention on Spain, it did not result in the
alignment of class interests as it had in Catalonia. The PNV
disapproved of ETA publicly and resisted a coalition with this
nationalist group. ETA, with its exclusive racial charter, did
not mobilize immigrant workers who opted instead for the national
parties of the left (underground until the death of Franco in
1975). The results from a survey in 1979, showed that 65% of the
immigrants (mainly working class) consider themselves either
Spanish or more Spanish than Basque. Meanwhile, 88% of native
Euskera speakers considered themselves Basque or more Basque than

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Spanish (these Euskera speakers are of the working class as the middle class and the upper class spoke predominately Castilian).

It is no surprise then that in the first national elections of 1977 and 1979 we find the Basque provinces split between the PNV and the PSOE (Spain’s national socialist party) with the UCD (the center-right state party of Suarez) coming in third. The PNV had not succeeded in creating a unified nationalist coalition as the leftist Catalan coalition had in Catalonia. Beginning in 1979 Herri Batasuna, the front party of ETA organized after the June 1977 elections, began to occupy a position on the nationalist left, stealing votes from the PNV and the PSOE. Today, it commands 18% of the electorate in the Basque provinces (EL PAIS Semanal, 13 December, 1992).

In conclusion, the Basque nationalist movement had not reconciled class with ethnicity nor the issue of autonomy versus independence during Franco’s regime and the Basque movement was less successful in portraying itself as a unified nationalist movement at the time of Franco’s death. Even today, fifteen years after the creation of a democratic state in Spain, Basque nationalism does not speak with one voice.
CHAPTER FIVE

In this final chapter, I will highlight the comparisons which I have already made about Basque and Catalan nationalism and conclude by making a brief evaluation of these two nationalist movements using the modernization and ethnic theories which I reviewed in chapter one.

First of all, the Catalans had a valuable resource in the fact that Catalonia had, at one time, been a powerful nation. This made it easy to resurrect the names and symbols of the self rule which they had enjoyed as a nation prior to union with Castile and Spain. The Basque provinces, on the other hand, had no real collective memory of nationhood and although they had enjoyed significant political freedom under the Castilians, the Basques were undeniably tied to the Castilian state. Thus, while the Catalans could distort history to claim that they were conquered by the imperial Castilians (by trickery if not by force), this was a much less convincing notion for the Basques. The fact that Catalan was spoken as a dialect in many areas outside of Catalonia which had at one time been under the influence of the Catalan mercantile empire (portions of southern France, Corsica, Sardinia, and southern Italy) reinforced this argument. Euskera was limited primarily to the seven traditional Basque provinces. Language also played another powerful role in
the nationalist claims of the two regions - a means of creating a
cultural marker distinguishing the periphery nation from the
center.

The Catalan Renaixença, beginning from a nostalgic poem in
1833, sparked a renewed interest in the language among
intellectuals. The coincidence of the Romantic movement, with its
focus on folklore and the peasant, intensified the effect of
Catalan in reminding people of their historic roots as a great,
distinct nation. The collective memories of a nation are
necessarily contained in a strong literary tradition. For it is
axiomatic that language, next to skin color, is the most powerful
of ethnic markers. Catalan also served as a means to bridge class
distinctions as native Catalans from all classes spoke it.
Finally, in the effort to assimilate non-Catalan speaking
immigrants from the rest of Spain, it proved very fortunate that
Catalan was a relatively easy language to learn since it had many
similarities with Castilian.

The Basque language did not have the mobilizing potency of
Catalan for various reasons. First, there was no literary
tradition in Euskera. Most of the famous writers from the Basque
provinces, including the two most famous ones; St Ignatius Loyola
and Miguel Unamuno, had written in Latin or Castilian.
Furthermore, the elite of the provinces spoke Castilian almost
exclusively. Euskera was limited to the rural countryside and was
kept alive by an oral tradition instead of by the public schools.
Euskera was a powerful cultural marker because of its difficulty,
but that also served to lessen its assimilative potential. Even today Euskera does not enjoy the popularity of Catalan.

Tied to the function of language is the presence of an autonomous middle-class culture. The Renaixença was more than a mere literary revival. It was the cultural revival of Catalanism sparking a renewed interest in the arts, theater, and architecture. To be sure, the prime reason for this is that the region was also enjoying a period of economic prosperity. The presence of a university, an opera house, famous artists and painters, and a renowned self-defined Catalan architect (Gaudi) served as another resource which the nationalists could draw upon to embellish their claims of self sufficiency. In comparison, the Basque regions had no public universities (only private Catholic ones) and no sense of a middle class culture distinct from the Spanish culture.

The final comparison seems, in light of the above, an obvious one. Basque nationalism initially was a reaction to the confusion imposed by powerful and rapid social change. While Catalan particularism had been developing over the course of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, Basque particularism was disguised under the veil of Carlism, which proved to be a complex phenomena not necessarily synonymous with Basque particularism. Furthermore, Carlism did not enjoy the support of the entire region yet burdened it with respect to finances and manpower since most of its battles were fought there. Arana essentially invented Basque nationalism in 1895 and
gave it its reactionary, anti-Hispanic, exclusive nature. As a social movement, Basque nationalism was restrictive and drew upon limited resources of group integrity; Catalanism, on the other hand, was deeply rooted in the industrial classes and enjoyed the increased resources of a prosperous class.

Turning now to an evaluation of the two nationalist movements in light of modernization theory and ethnic myth models, it is helpful, first, to review these two models. The theory espoused by Gellner stipulates that modernization (he uses the term industrialization) is a necessary condition for state nationalism. Industrial society is egalitarian and requires a uniform educational system which will link culture to the state in order to sustain industrialization. The early stages of industrialization, spreading unevenly across the land and endowing certain groups with privileges while limiting others causes a temporary reaction which becomes ethnic nationalism if the group by-passed coincides with an ethnic group. Given this, we could expect ethnic nationalism to eventually disappear.

Applying this theory to the Basque and Catalan case, we find that Gellner's theory suffers from serious empirical evidence. The two regions constitute both the womb and the apogee of industrial development in Spain. The Basque region, however, merits some additional attention. Basque nationalism, born in the industrial city of Vizcaya, was a reaction to the effects of industrialization and had the greatest support in the rural countryside of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. Initially then, we might
agree with Gellner's argument. The fact that Basque nationalism has persisted this long and after the entire region has enjoyed the effects of industrialization (social Danegeld) discounts the further utility of the theory\textsuperscript{9}. The theory also fails to explain why ethnic nationalism did not develop in the rural regions of Spain by-passed by industrialization until the later years of Franco's regime.

The core of Smith's ethnic nationalist argument is that the rise of the modern scientific state had created previously unexperienced opportunity in the state bureaucracy which soon became overwhelmed with applicants. As desirable posts became rarer, the dominant ethnic groups tended to co-opt them at the expense of the weaker groups. Perceiving that they had been barred from avenues of social mobility, the frustrated ethnic elite sought to create alternatives to the existing state structure. The ethnic revival, then, was a form of political radicalism caused by the alienation of an ethnic elite. The techniques of this elite in creating the base for the nationalist movement was to create ethnic myths using the resources of a glorious history, a distinct language and other cultural markers. While I will concede that the techniques used by both the Basques and the Catalans are of the type which Smith describes, the notion of the alienation of the Basque and Catalan elite is empirically unfounded. I have explained above the roles played by

\textsuperscript{9} Likewise, Hechter's internal colonization theory fails because it is those very regions which have a ethnic identity which are at the top of the economic scale and not vice versa.
these elite in the central government. I cannot find any proof of discrimination by language or ethnic group. While the political corruption of the Restorative government may have limited the representation of Catalan interests in Madrid. There is also ample evidence of interaction between these two elites. Arana’s vision of Basque nationalism was very much a construction along the ethnic myths which Smith describes yet the Basques, more so than the Catalans, were part of the Spanish elite.

My conclusion, then, is that most theories of nationalism tend to oversimplify complex socio-economic phenomena and are not historically specific. Social mobilization theory, of which I have only presented a brief sketch, concentrates on both the micro and macro aspects of nationalist movements by focusing on resources and political opportunity and the construction of collective action frames (ideology). In my opinion, only by looking at nationalism as a social movement can we hope to explain its changing and persistent nature.
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