REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

BRUCE D. SLAWTER

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release, Distribution Unlimited
In light of the growing spirit of partnership between the U.S. and Russian defense establishments—Russian military thought deserves a fresh look. U.S. decisionmakers have a range of policy options before them. One strategy for increasing ties might be to address, by U.S. actions, the major issues which continue to affect the development of Russian military thought. Clearly, the U.S. has a long-term interest in seeing Russia succeed in its epic struggle to transform itself into a modern democracy. U.S. defense policy—if boldly but delicately formulated—can contribute to that success.
REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

BRUCE D. SLAWTER
Lt Colonel, USAF

I submit this paper to the Director of the Advanced Research Program in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

Signature: [Signature]

Full Name of Faculty Advisor: G. Paul Holman, PHD
Academic Title: Professor of National Security Affairs

Per Naval War College Research Guide, I certify that this paper is substantively acceptable, that this manuscript is free of typographical, spelling, and other grammatical errors and is ready for evaluation.

Date: 26 May 1993

Advisor's Signature: [Signature]
REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

by

BRUCE D. SLAWTER
Lt Colonel, USAF

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

June 1993

Paper directed by

G. PAUL HOLMAN, PHD
Professor of National Security Affairs
Department of National Security Decision Making


APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In light of the growing spirit of partnership between the U.S. and Russian defense establishments—Russian military thought deserves a fresh look. U.S. policymakers seeking to forge a new cooperative relationship with former Cold War adversaries could indeed benefit by sharpening their focus on the rich and sometimes troubled intellectual heritage of the Russian professional military officer, as they attempt to manage the new, bilateral defense relationship now developing.

A survey of the historical development of Russian military thought reveals three major themes of conflict and change that continue to influence military policy in Russia today. The first theme, The Magician and German, reflects the internal search for identity. At the highest, political level, this search has been characterized by a constant struggle to define the role of the Russian nation-state in world affairs. At the subordinate, military level, the quest has historically centered on the conflict between theorists attempting to preserve a Russian way of war (Magicians) and those seeking concepts and methods (Germans) that transcend nationality. The second theme, The Search for the Perfect Paradigm, concerns the desire by the Russian officer to develop and sustain a unified system of thought that provides him with a "scientific" approach to military affairs. The final theme of conflict and change, Coping with "Revolutions in Military Affairs," focuses on how Russian theorists have
tended to incorporate military-technological revolutions into their paradigm for war.

Today, the U.S. perspective reveals that U.S. decisionmakers have a range of policy options from which to choose: important choices which, while advancing U.S. interests, will help define the U.S.-Russian defense relationship in the coming years. At the present, there appears to be an increase in good will between the U.S. and Russian military services—brought about in part by successfully implemented arms control accords, IMET, and military contact activities. Channels of communication have been established, and relationships are being built upon professional respect and mutual trust. Doubts still linger, though, about Russia's future. Nevertheless, according to nearly two dozen policy specialists interviewed, Clinton Administration officials are intent on taking the U.S.-Russian defense relationship to a new level.

One strategy for increasing U.S.-Russian defense ties might be to examine in more detail the field of Russian military thought, and then attempt to address, by U.S. actions, the major themes or historic issues which continue to affect its development.

The first theme, *The Magician and the German*, could be addressed by U.S. initiatives that facilitate the Russian officer’s evolving understanding about the role of military force in the new world order. At the same time, U.S. programs
could attempt to influence indirectly the ongoing doctrinal debates in favor of defense reformers. DoD needs to design specific programs that deal with these important tasks on a frequent and routine basis. The Air Force's Sister Base Program and IMET-sponsored attendance by mid-level officers at the nation's war colleges are excellent starters; but these are long-term investments. DoD should implement, within the next six months, a national security affairs course (two weeks in duration), which focuses on influencing Russian officers of flag rank, similar to the orientation course offered by Harvard. U.S. policymakers could also influence the Russian view toward the use of force by intensifying discussions on peacekeeping operations. The U.S. Army will begin some exploratory talks with the Russian ground forces in the next several months. This effort needs to be fully supported, and the U.S. Government should consider training Russian units in peacekeeping operations in the U.S. in exchange for access to military ranges in the Russian Federation for low-level flight training or weapons testing.

The U.S. Army, perhaps, is in the best position to deal with the second theme, *The Search for the Perfect Paradigm*. Compared to the other Services, the Army has made a major effort over the last several decades to develop a corps of career officers knowledgeable in the Russian language and culture, and this gives them an immediate capability to access and influence both the substance and structure of the
Russian system of military thought. DoD should improve the overall Russian language skills of its personnel by actions such as creating Language Training and Maintenance Centers at the Pentagon, the war colleges, and command headquarters. The investment DoD makes today will reap dividends in the years ahead. Eventually all of the Services should have the capability of sending qualified U.S. officers to attend Russian war colleges in residence.

The third thematic issue, *Coping with "Revolutions in Military Affairs,*" can be addressed by U.S. actions only if Americans are willing to actively engage the Russians as full partners. One important step for building a cooperative technical partnership would be for the U.S. to develop a coherent policy that allows DoD laboratories and acquisition organizations to engage in substantive discussions on joint research & development projects. Potentially fruitful areas include ballistic missile defense, jointly manned warning centers, and airspace management.

Clearly, the U.S. has a long-term interest in seeing the Russian nation succeed in its epic struggle to transform itself into a modern democracy. U.S. defense policy over the next several years—if boldly but delicately formulated—can contribute to that success.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES ...........................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A NOTE ON USING THE TERMS &quot;RUSSIAN&quot; AND &quot;SOVIET&quot; ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABOUT THE AUTHOR ...........................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2: REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT ........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Themes of Conflict and Change ..................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} The Magician and the German ....................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} The Search for the Perfect Paradigm ............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Coping with &quot;Revolutions in Military Affairs&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Three Themes Recapitulated in the Yeltsin Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3: FRIEND OR FOE: SHAPING THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Driving Forces ..................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Predetermined Elements .........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Critical Uncertainties (Internal) ...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Critical Uncertainties (External) ...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Emerging Scenarios ................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Scenario One: Reactionary Coup d'Etat ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Scenario Two: Military Coup à la Peronista ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Scenario Three: Civilian Oligarchy .............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Scenario Four: Yeltsin Prevails .................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} U.S. Interests and Constraints ...................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Policy Tracks ....................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Track A: Cold War Revisited .....................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Track B: One Step Back! ..........................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Track C: Toward a Growing Relationship ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Track D: Solidifying a Partnership ...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\hspace{2em} Selecting a Track ................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

(CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4:</th>
<th>WHAT DOD HAS ALREADY DONE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origins of Defense Contacts</td>
<td>........................................</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Policy and the Evolving Bureaucracy</td>
<td>.....................................</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD's Agenda</td>
<td>.....................................</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Joint Staff</td>
<td>.......................................</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy Activities</td>
<td>....................................</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force Activities</td>
<td>....................................</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Activities</td>
<td>....................................</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps Activities</td>
<td>..................................</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET Program</td>
<td>......................................</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety, Security, and Dismantlement</td>
<td>............................</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summation</td>
<td>.......................................</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5:</th>
<th>THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION LOOKS AHEAD</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emerging Goals</td>
<td>......................................</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Military Contacts Program</td>
<td>....................................</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Magician and the German</td>
<td>....................................</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Search for the Perfect Paradigm</td>
<td>..................................</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping with &quot;Revolutions in Military Affairs&quot;</td>
<td>................</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Approach in Retrospect</td>
<td>..................................</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 6:</th>
<th>CONCLUSION</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>................</td>
<td>................</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BIBLIOGRAPHY | ................................ | 114  |

vii
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chapters and Titles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Themes of Conflict and Change</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dialectics</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Elements of Analysis</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Military Doctrine</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Doctrine, Science, and Art</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Level of War, Command Authority, and Geographical Focus</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Vistula-Oder Operation</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Manchurian Operation</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dialectics: Nuclear Revolution</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Theaters of War</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Dialectics: Conventional-Technological Revolution</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Postwar &quot;Revolutions&quot;</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Dialectics: &quot;Reasonable Sufficiency&quot;</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Themes of Conflict and Change</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Policy Track A</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Policy Track B</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Policy Track C</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Policy Track D</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. OSD &amp; DOD-Wide Defense Contact Events</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Joint Staff and CINC Military Contact Events</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Multi-Service Military Contact Events</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES
(CONTINUED)

FIGURE PAGE

23. U.S. Navy Military Contact Events.......................86
24. U.S. Air Force Military Contact Events....................88
25. U.S. Army Military Contact Events.........................89
26. U.S. Marine Corps Military Contact Events.................90
27. Future OSD/DOD-Wide Contact Events.......................99
28. Future Joint Staff/CINC Contact Events....................99
29. Future Multi-Service Contact Events.......................100
30. Future U.S. Navy Contact Events........................100
31. Future U.S. Marine Corps Contact Events...............101
32. Future U.S. Air Force Contact Events...................101
33. Future U.S. Army Contact Events........................102
A NOTE ON USING THE ADJECTIVES "RUSSIAN" AND "SOVIET"

The author's intent is to use the adjective, Russian, quite liberally when it forms with a noun a concept that transcends all three historical periods--Czarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet (e.g., Russian military thought). The adjective, Russian, will also be used to modify nouns that properly belong--by virtue of the historic context--to either the Czarist or post-Soviet periods (e.g., Russian Minister of War, or Russian President Yeltsin).

By contrast, the adjective, Soviet, will be used only to modify nouns belonging to the period from 1917 to 1991 (e.g., Soviet tactics in World War II).

Regrettably, there may be occasional exceptions to this methodology.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lt Colonel Bruce Slawter, a former Assistant Air Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, has travelled extensively throughout the Russian Federation. From 1987 to 1989, he was the director of Soviet Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and served as one of the original team chiefs for the newly formed On-Site Inspection Agency. From 1989 to 1992, he served as Chief, Russia & Central Eurasia Policy Branch, Headquarters, USAF, in Washington, D.C. Lt Colonel Slawter is also a Command Pilot with over 3,000 hours of flying time. The opinions expressed in this study are the author’s and do not reflect the official views or policies of the U.S. Air Force or the Department of Defense.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Revolutionary changes are taking place. . . . A new military doctrine and guidelines for defense sufficiency have been worked out. . . . That means that ground forces will be completely different in force structure and manpower, capable of repulsing an aggression, but incapable of conducting large-scale offensive operations. It will be a drastic restructuring of the ground forces in the Soviet Union and its allied countries. The United States and its allies are interested in that development.

- Statement of Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev
Before the House Armed Services Committee
July 29, 1990

During his historic testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in July 1990, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey F. Akhromeyev attempted to explain how military doctrine in the USSR had taken on a benign, defensive character. Accord to Akhromeyev, the Soviet leadership was convinced that "political means" to protect national security interests in the 1990s would predominate, while "military means" would decrease. To be sure, there would be some tension and turmoil resulting from this change; however, the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet system would survive.

In the past, Western analysts had observed how Soviet High Commands, in one succession after another, had come to rely on the concept of offensive operations in depth as the fundamental basis for Soviet national security. Since the time of Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky in the 1920s, Soviet
military professionals had struggled to perfect the force structure and military art required to support this concept. Now, in the summer of 1990, the chief military advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to convince the U.S. Congress that a new "revolution" in military thought had occurred, and to take heed.

Indeed, in the year-and-a-half preceding Akhromeyev's testimony on the Hill, Western analysts had begun to observe a number of significant changes in Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe and Mongolia--developments linked to Gorbachev's unilateral force initiative first announced in December 1988. These changes were still in progress when the rapid East European revolutions of 1989 sent further shock waves throughout the Soviet empire--and increased the tempo of the Warsaw Pact's agonizing dance of death. Finally, after the failed hard-line Communist putsch in August 1991, barely one year after his historic testimony before the HASC, Sergey Akhromeyev--distraught over all that had been lost in the revolutionary turmoil he had not foreseen--was found dead in his apartment, hanging by the work of his own hands.

Akhromeyev's successors in the new Russian armed forces will, no doubt, retain a significant nuclear and conventional capability well into the twenty-first century. But how successfully will they cope with the changing strategic landscape? Are they any better prepared--in the cognitive sense--to deal with the new world order than was Akhromeyev?
Fortunately, Western observers know a great deal about the quantity and quality of the hardware used by the military professional in Russia today--principally due to the tremendous amount of effort expended by Western intelligence services during the Cold War. Most analysts, however, never quite shared a similar zeal for learning about the theoretical foundation of military thought in Russia which influences how such hardware might ultimately be employed.

The chief premise of this study, therefore, is that--in light of the growing spirit of partnership between the U.S. and Russian defense establishments--Russian military thought deserves a fresh look. U.S. policymakers seeking to forge a new cooperative relationship with former Cold War adversaries could indeed benefit by sharpening their focus on the rich and sometimes troubled intellectual heritage of the Russian professional military officer, as they attempt to manage the new, bilateral defense relationship now developing.

The purpose of the author's research effort was twofold: first, to survey past and present themes in Russian military thought and, thereby, determine what, if any, insights might be derived to aid U.S. policymakers in the years ahead; second, to evaluate the potential for expanding the U.S.-Russian defense cooperative program beyond its current level.

During the research phase, the author's inquiry remained focused on the following questions:
• What are the elements of continuity and change in the historical evolution of Russian military thought?

• What are the implications of doctrinal debates on how Russians view the use of force?

• How do U.S. policymakers view future U.S.-Russian relations?

• What are the potential areas for defense cooperation, and what has the U.S. Department of Defense already done?

• What should U.S. objectives be, and what are the constraints on policy development and implementation?

The study’s conclusions regarding the first two questions are based considerably on secondary sources. The author has also relied on his own notes and recollections of discussions over the past several years with military counterparts from the former Soviet Union. Data for the last three questions, by contrast, were derived principally from nearly two-dozen interviews with U.S. government officials, academics, and contractors currently working U.S. policy issues.

This paper, itself, is organized into six chapters (see Figure 1). After this introduction, Chapter Two provides an interpretive analysis—of continuities and changes in military thought, and highlights three broad issues or themes which policymakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Revolutions in Russian Military Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Friend or Foe: Shaping the Defense Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>What DoD Has Already Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Clinton Administration Looks Ahead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1
should consider when evaluating future U.S.-Russian defense initiatives. Next, Chapter Three examines several of the concerns about the future of Russia from the U.S. perspective and offers up four broad "policy tracks" or options to follow. Chapter Four then looks at cooperative efforts already initiated by the Department of Defense. Following this, the themes first developed in Chapter Two are revisited in Chapter Five as the study considers programs that may be implemented by the Clinton Administration. Concluding remarks are contained in Chapter Six.

The scope of this study is limited in several important respects: First, it is confined to the U.S.-Russian defense relationship—which has matured considerably—and provides minimum commentary on the much smaller programs with the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union. Second, the study contains no substantive discussion of force structure issues. This may disappoint some readers. Lastly, the study has little to add to the already extensive literature on U.S. arms control policy. To be sure, negotiations will continue in a number of important areas, such as nuclear non-proliferation. It is the author's general belief, however, that treaty-mandated arms reductions—as conceived of in the past—have reached a temporary plateau, and that the importance of arms control to the changing U.S.-Russian relationship will diminish in proportion as the tenor of the relationship itself becomes less adversarial.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


2. Ibid., p. 5.

3. Examples of such discussions include those which took place at INF Treaty elimination facilities in the former Soviet Union (1988), the Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar (1990), the Sochi Emerging Leaders Summit (1990), and during a number of military exchange visits (1989-1992).
CHAPTER TWO

REVOLUTIONS IN RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT

A critic should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only—as the soldier does—as aids to judgment. . . . In our reflections on the theory of the conduct of war, we said that it ought to train a commander’s mind, or rather, to guide his education; theory is not meant to provide him with positive doctrines. . .

— Carl von Clausewitz, On War

Despite its recent ties to the Marxist-Leninist dialectic, Russian military thought continues to play an influential role in defense policymaking. At times visionary, this highly structured conceptual framework continues to serve the Russian high command as a basis from which to attack problems of national security importance.

Two questions must follow: First, if the traditional system of military thought is still influential in the current Russian defense establishment, can policymakers in the United States derive significant benefit from studying it? Second, are there any specific principles in Russian military thought that can be readily applied to current policy problems?

If one accepts the advice Clausewitz offers about studying military theory, then the answers to these questions are "Yes" and "No," respectively.

After surveying the historical development of Russian military thought from 1867 to the present, this author concludes that there is indeed little in the way of specific
prescription that the Russian theoretical approach offers the U.S. policymaker at this current juncture. Clearly, no defense official in the United States should ever be advised to make policy decisions based solely upon the doctrinal conclusions of Russian strategic thinkers—be they Suvorov or Grachev. It would be equally negligent, however, to ignore the study of Russian military thought altogether.

Clearly, the U.S. policymaker can only enhance his own intuition by endeavoring to understand methods used by the military professional in Russia to solve problems of Russian national security. The insights gained through such a process—if evaluated in the daylight of U.S. risks and interests—can indeed serve as valuable "aids to judgment" as current and future programs are evaluated. Ultimately, it is guidance—not "positive doctrine"—that the modern day problem-solver needs the most.

**Themes of Conflict and Change**

In analyzing the development of Russian military thought since the nineteenth century, there are perhaps three major themes—really issues of conflict and change—that continue to influence the Russian military officer today (see Figure 2).

Lists of major themes in the historic development of Russian military thought vary from one commentator to the next; examining the three themes selected here is perhaps only one method of approaching the subject. The issues of conflict
and change considered in this study, however, have clearly played an important role in Russian military affairs over the past 125 years and are yet to be resolved. Clearly, the themes themselves—and the manner in which the military officer has approached conflict and change within his profession—have important implications for current U.S.-Russian military relations.

The Magician and German

Perhaps the most longstanding internal conflict in the development of Russian military thought has been the search for identity. At the highest, political level, this search has been characterized by a constant struggle to define the role of the Russian nation-state in world affairs. At the subordinate, military level, the quest has historically centered on the conflict between theorists attempting to preserve a Russian way of war (Magicians) and those seeking concepts and methods (Germans) that transcend nationality.²

Although the dilemma over whether or how to Westernize Russia’s military institutions preceded the reign of Peter the Great, the intellectual discourse on the issue—in terms of serious military literature, lectures, and programs—really

THEMES OF CONFLICT AND CHANGE

- The Magician and the German
- The Search for the Perfect Paradigm
- Coping with "Revolutions in Military Affairs"
began in the years following Russia's dramatic defeat during the Crimean War by a British-led Western coalition. Russia's military system was essentially the same as that developed by Suvorov and Kutuzov. It seemed to serve the nation well in the years following the Napoleonic Wars. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, it was in drastic need of modernization, and the man tasked with making the reforms was Dmitry Miliutin, Alexander II's Minister of War.

Miliutin was a practical reformer. By the 1870s, with the support of the Czar, he had managed to transform Russia's archaic Napoleonic army into a contemporary one which, for a period of time, approached Western standards. Serfdom had been abolished, based in part of the belief that emancipated subjects make better soldiers. Improvements to the officer education system were initiated. Finally, Miliutin built two programs which are, by and large, still in place today: 1) an administrative system of military districts; and 2) a manpower system based upon short-term conscription and a large ready reserve. It was during this period that Clausewitz' *On War* was first translated into Russian (1869) and introduced into the curriculum of the General Staff Academy.¹

Alexander II's Minister of War, however, was no radical Westernizer.⁴ Miliutin shared the prevalent Russian belief that the spiritual side of war played an important role in determining an army's effectiveness on the battlefield. Still, a number of military theorists in the latter half of
the nineteenth century (the Magicians) thought that Miliutin had gone too far, and that the reforms he had pushed though were destroying the moral basis for Russian military prowess.

The stage was set for the great rift during the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century between theorists such as M.I. Dragomirov, the Chief of the General Staff Academy, who represented the Nationalists, and his successor as head of the Academy, G.A. Leer, who advocated the views of the Academics.

Like their West European counterparts, Leer and the Academics accepted the premise that the laws of modern warfare were universal, and they sought insights into modern military concepts from all sources, foreign and domestic. Dragomirov and the Nationalists, by contrast, believed principally in the mystical Russian combination of cold steel and moral force.

The debate was a serious one, and the Nationalists were legitimately concerned about the fate of Russian strategic culture. Unfortunately, the principal consequence of the schism was the gradual erosion of the Miliutin reforms and the continued disagreement among Russian military leaders on methods of modernization, prewar planning, and military art.

Russia's disastrous defeat by Japan in 1905 did result in some cooperation and theoretical advances prior to the First World War--the invention and development of the operational level of warfare, for instance. The core issue--whether or not there is a uniquely Russian way of war based upon the
special spiritual qualities of the Russian people--however, remained unresolved.

For a brief period following the turbulent years of the Russian Civil War, Soviet military thought was characterized by a considerable amount of pragmatism and spirited debate. Leon Trotsky initially played the role of the *Magician* as he vigorously argued for the preservation of the people’s militia system created by him during the Civil War. According to Trotsky, the system was empowered by the moral forces unleashed by the ideological struggle of the Russian masses against capitalist oppression. His opponent in the dispute was Mikhail Frunze who eventually replaced Trotsky as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in 1925. Frunze believed that, for reasons of national survival, the new Red Army had to transform itself into a professional cadre with Western techniques and technology--and could do so in a manner that would optimize the use of the moral forces liberated by the Revolution.

In the end, Trotsky lost the debate; but even before then, he had gradually come around to the view that the Red Army might indeed benefit from limited Westernization. As a consequence, in 1922, under the cover of secrecy, Trotsky initiated one of the most interesting epochs in the development of Russian military affairs, the period of Soviet-German collaboration from 1922 to 1933. Arguably, the cooperative programs that were implemented in the 1920s bear
resemblance to some of the programs (outlined later in Chapter Five) being considered by U.S. policymakers today.

During this fascinating interval, the Soviets encouraged their German counterparts to conduct combat maneuvers on Soviet soil— in violation of the Treaty of Versailles— in exchange for German technical assistance and approximately $100 million marks to develop aircraft and armament industries.9 The Germans built factories, experimental centers, and training establishments inside the Soviet Union. In addition, a minimum of 120 Soviet officers in senior positions passed through professional military education courses inside Germany or were attached to German military units for training.10

German programs inside the Soviet Union were initiated following a senior military contact visit by General Werner Von Blomberg in 1923. The Germans rapidly established training establishments throughout the Soviet Union, such as an armored vehicle school at Kazan, a flight training center at Lipetsk, and a chemical warfare research institute at Saratov.11 The Germans also built the Junkers works at Fili.12

In 1924, the Germans began transforming Soviet aviation into a modern air force by helping the Soviets establish a large aviation complex in the Lipetsk-Voronezh-Borisoglebsk triangle. Lipetsk, itself, was transformed into a modern, state-of-the-art air training center with a cadre of 60 German instructors and 100 technicians.13 The Fokker DX-111 was
initially used as the basic aircraft trainer. Officers and technicians officially took leaves of absence from the German armed forces.\textsuperscript{14} The Air Force Main Staff was established at Borisoglebsk with the assistance of a Captain Schondorf, and experimental joint training was conducted for a brief period between German pilots and Soviet ground forces.

In 1927, the Germans began assisting the Soviet navy. Both the U.S.S.R. and Germany viewed Poland as a common threat; consequently, for a period of time, the Germans offered to supply the Soviet Navy with experienced U-Boat captains should war break out with the Poles.\textsuperscript{15}

Stalin began terminating Russo-German cooperative programs as his paranoia increased about the effect Western influences might have on the loyalty of his subordinates. Clearly, ideological contamination through contact with the Wehrmacht became one of the chief excuses he used to devastate the officer corps during the subsequent purges. For a brief period in the development of Russian military affairs—until Stalin stepped in—the classic conflict between the \textit{Magician} and the \textit{German} seemed to be tilting in favor of the \textit{German}.

No doubt, a good deal of cross-fertilization took place between Wehrmacht and Red Army officers as they trained and consulted with one another from 1922-1933. Certainly, the Red Army had more to gain than the Wehrmacht with respect to technological development and advancement in air operations. It is more difficult, however, to assess who benefitted the
most in terms of general military theory and strategy.

**The Search for the Perfect Paradigm**

For the past 125 years, the professional military officer in Russia has valued the process of thinking about war. Studying past campaigns to derive guiding principles and creating new theoretical concepts has at times been pursued with religious zeal. Although there's no quantifiable data, one might even venture to postulate that the Russian military officer, by comparison with his counterpart in the West, has spent too much time living in a world of military theory and ideas, and not enough time perfecting his own operational proficiency. Clearly, the quest by the Russian officer to develop a *unified system of military thought* has offered both promise and disappointment to his profession.

Lenin's paradigm on war and social change provided a major impetus for theoretical development during the 1920s and 1930s. Although it takes into account the various forms of modern armed combat, Lenin's theory maintains that wars are really only violent political acts between opposing social systems. As social phenomena, their outcomes are based upon

---

*The unified system of Russian military thought is defined here as the comprehensive theoretical framework used by the military professional in Russia for studying the problems of modern warfare. The chief components of the system—which were developed to their fullest extent during the Soviet period—are doctrine, science, military art, the principles of war, and the laws of armed conflict.*
the correlation between the moral parameters [objectives] and physical parameters [means] of the opposing sides.

Lenin also introduced the dialectical method of analysis into Russian military theory. The reader may recall that the concept of dialectics is the old Hegelian analytical approach favored by Marxists to describe the process of change (see Figure 3). According to Hegel, a thesis (such as an initial concept, policy, or social class) comes into confrontation with a conflicting antithesis to produce a new end state, called synthesis. As the reader will see, dialectics (according to Russian theorists) has been an effective tool for analyzing changes in military affairs.

By comparison with the Stalinist era, the early 1920s were a relatively permissive period of theoretical discourse, and there were, no doubt, other strains of West European political theory that were absorbed by military theorists. Although it is difficult to make the case by direct reference to Soviet military writings, one such body of thought may have been the geopolitical paradigm first outlined by British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder in 1907 and later injected
into German strategic theory by Karl Haushofer in the 1920s. The classic hegemonic conflict over control of the World-Island described by early twentieth century geopolitical theorists is consistent with the dialectical method adopted by Marx and Lenin as the foundation for their theories on socialism. But whereas Marx used the dialectic to describe class conflict, Lenin expanded Marx to include some enduring notions about systemic wars between capitalist and socialist states, and pragmatically adapted these notions to the geopolitically-constrained Eurasian land mass. In doing so, Lenin provided military theorists with both an ideological identity and an important geostrategic frame of reference for nearly 70 years.

The first Soviet professional military officer to take Lenin’s theory and attempt to apply it practically to long-term national security policy was Frunze. An advocate for developing a unified national military doctrine which would fuse Lenin’s theories with less lofty military concepts, Frunze attempted to establish a new approach to war in which the entire nation would be systematically mobilized to support the political leadership’s wartime objectives. Frunze was unable to fully implement his program by the time of his untimely death in 1925.

In 1927, V. K. Triandafillov, the Chief of Operations of the Red Army Staff, introduced the Theory of Deep Battle (later Deep Operations) in his book, Basic Character of
Operations of Modern Armies. Envisioning breakthrough offensive operations with highly mobile mechanized forces, Triandafillov's concept was buttressed by Stalin's first five-year plan in 1928 which, in addition to calling for a massive forced industrialization of the nation, featured the development of tank, artillery, and air forces required to support the new concept. Deep Operations was further developed and refined by Tukhachevsky (who served as Chief of Staff of the Red Army from 1925 to 1928) and initially codified in the army's Field Regulations in 1929.

In the same year that Triandafillov published his definitive book on operational art, Boris Shaposhnikov (who would succeed Tukhachevsky as Chief of Staff the following year) attempted to define the responsibilities of the General Staff (and its relationship to the ruler and political directorate of the state) in his three-volume work, Mozg Armii (Brain of the Army). Shaposhnikov's model was the general staff system of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and much of the data for his work was derived from the memoirs of Conrad von Hoetzendorff. Clearly, in the inter-war years, the Soviets borrowed from the German general staff as well, even though they usually criticized it as being too independent of political authority.

Clearly, no other single event in Russian history has had as great an impact on the nation's military development as World War II. As many Western commentators have noted, the
Great Patriotic War is considered by the military profession to be the high-water mark in national military achievement. As such, it has provided historians and theorists with numerous case studies, often serving as a baseline from which to analyze technological and political change.

The first major effort by the Soviets to systematically study World War II was commissioned by Stalin when he established the General Staff's Military History Department headed by Marshal Pavel Rotmistrov.

According to noted Sovietologist John Erickson, the Soviets developed a clear methodology in their analysis by studying three basic areas: doctrine, armaments, and style (see Figure 4).

It's important to note here several important differences between Russian and Western military concepts. For instance, the Russians do not apply the term, "doctrine," as Western military establishments do. Military doctrine in Russia is senior-level guidance which affects the entire process of national security decisionmaking, but with a focus at the national level. To be sure, the traditional approach has been to regiment--and often codify--methods and procedures at the lower, tactical levels. However, the fact that the
Russians reserve the term, military doctrine, for the highest levels of national policy, indicates the importance devoted to the linking of military affairs to the national objectives established by the political leadership.

There are two aspects of military doctrine, the political and the military-technical. Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defense from 1967-1976, claimed that one could define what military doctrine says by answering five basic questions (see Figure 5). Answers to the first two questions dealing with the political aspect help define the threats, the political objectives, and the most likely medium of conflict; responses to the last three questions comprise a description of the manner in which the government plans to prepare the state for war. These questions, if answered fully, provide macro-level guidance to the Ministry of Defense and to the defense industries on how to develop military strategies and build force structure. During the transition to war, military doctrine affects what

---

**MILITARY DOCTRINE**

**POLITICAL ASPECT:**

- What kind of an enemy will the country have to deal with?
- What is the character of the war, and what will be the aims and tasks of the armed forces?

**MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECT:**

- What forces will be necessary to fulfill the tasks, and what direction will military development follow?
- How should preparation for war be carried out?
- What will the means of warfare be?

 - MARSHAL A.A. GRECHKO

Figure 5
we in the West would consider grand strategy, the coordination and use of all the instruments of national power (military, political, economic, etc.) to achieve wartime political objectives.

The next concept requiring explanation is military science—the field of the military professional. It is often confused with the military-technical aspect of military doctrine, which it is not (see Figure 6). Military science is broken down into several components, the most important of which is military art—the development of methods for the employment of military force at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of armed conflict (referred to as strategy, operational art, and tactics, respectively).

Returning to the Military History Department’s study of World War II and its implications for the future, Rotmistrov’s
analysts came to several doctrinal conclusions. First, they believed that, despite the use of the atomic bomb by the U.S. against Japan in 1945, the next major war the Soviet Union would engage in would most likely be conventional in nature and feature large-scale combined arms offensives—not necessarily nuclear weapons. Second, they postulated—not surprisingly given growing Cold War tensions—that the principle threat would come from Western Europe.

Concerning the second category for analysis—armaments—the Soviets concluded, of course, that both quantity and quality of weapons were important for national survival, and that the key to this process was the Communist Party’s continued centralized control over the economy. The Soviets also appreciated the fact that technology could rapidly change the face of war. Therefore, while they continued to hold that conventional, mechanized forces would dominate the battlefield, they nevertheless endeavored to hedge their bets by expanding research facilities, using German scientists captured at the close of the war, and stepping up espionage efforts to support important R&D efforts in areas such as rocketry and atomic weapons.2

Analysis of the third category—style—led to an interesting conclusion that flexibility and initiative should be encouraged at the strategic and operational levels, but discouraged at the tactical level. The Soviets believed for many years that the character of their large, minimally
trained conscript force required detailed planning at very senior levels and rigidity at the tactical level. (Military professionals in the West believe in effective planning, as well, but are generally more confident in ability of field officers and NCOs to improvise when "fog" and "friction" take effect.) For many years, the Soviets recognized that they indeed had an initiative problem in the lower pay grades; but they never did much to alter their overall approach.

Military art did mature significantly during the course of the war, and the Soviets believed that they had eventually developed the proper command relationships and geographic perspectives for their combat leaders (see Figure 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF WAR</th>
<th>COMMAND AUTHORITY</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC</td>
<td>SUPREME C-IN-C</td>
<td>ALL TVd &amp; TVd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-IN-C HOF (TVD COMDR)</td>
<td>TVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL</td>
<td>FRONT COMDR</td>
<td>FRONTAL SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY COMDR</td>
<td>ARMY SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL</td>
<td>DIVISION COMDR</td>
<td>DIVISIONAL SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REGIMENT COMDR</td>
<td>REGIMENTAL SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BATTALION COMDR</td>
<td>BATTALION SECTOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7
Clearly, the Soviets believed that the key to military art was mastering the operational level of warfare.\textsuperscript{25}

The Soviets repeatedly cited the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian strategic offensive operations in January 1945 and August 1945, respectively, as textbook examples of applied military art (see Figures 8 and 9).

![Figure 8: The Vistula-Oder Operation](image-url)

![Figure 9: The Manchurian Operation](image-url)

During these offensives, massive Soviet fronts (units of multiple armies) were used to achieve strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{26}

The Soviets experimented with large corps-size formations throughout the war, and the concept of the conventional multi-front strategic operation would continue to dominate the Russian theoretical paradigm for years to come.\textsuperscript{27}
Coping with "Revolutions in Military Affairs"

The final theme of conflict and change in Russian military thought focuses on how Russian theorists have tended to incorporate military-technological revolutions into their paradigm for war. As defined by the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Russian military affairs has experienced two such revolutions in the postwar years (nuclear and conventional-technological) and by some accounts may be passing through a third (advanced conventional munitions). Clearly, the ability on the part of the armed forces to put new technologies to use has been affected by both civil-military relations and changing technology exploitation cycles. Adding to this the political challenges of the changing world order, this chapter will show that the perfect theoretical paradigm, since Stalin's death in 1953, has indeed been put to the test.

The detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviets in 1949 encouraged some theoretical modifications in military thought. Stalin, however, was still firmly in control of doctrine; and the Korean War, in which conventional forces proved very important, seemed to validate for him the continued pre-eminence of the conventional medium of war.

Real theoretical change only began after Khrushchev came to power. During the latter part of the 1950s, he took some major steps, such as reducing the large standing ground forces and pushing significantly for increased research and development of new systems to take full advantage of new
technological innovations in nuclear weapons, rockets, and command and control. Long-range bombers and fighter-bombers were specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons. Finally, to the dismay of the Ground Forces, Khrushchev founded the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959 and, before Communist plenums in 1960 and 1961, proclaimed that a "Revolution in Military Affairs" had occurred which changed forever the concept of war.  

Khrushchev’s proclamations forced Soviet military theorists, in a priori fashion, to explain what had occurred and to flesh out the full implications of Khrushchev’s sweeping doctrinal shift. Figure 10 illustrates the following dialectical forces at play: Stalin’s geopolitically constrained military doctrine, which relied heavily on conventional ground forces (thesis), came into confrontation with new technologies in nuclear weaponry, missiles, and command and control systems (antithesis). The result: a new form of armed combat optimized by Khrushchev’s single-track military doctrine (synthesis).

Clearly, Khrushchev entrusted the fleshing out of the
new military doctrine to Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, who left the post of Chief of the General Staff in 1960 to supervise a major re-write by a team of authors of the 1930s work, Military Strategy. In each of his three editions (the first published in 1961), Sokolovsky explained forcefully why nuclear weapons were now the foundation of national security strategy. In this watershed work, he downplayed the importance of conventional ground forces, and announced that the inter-continental theater of war was now decisive. The next war could be won quickly by destroying the Socialist bloc’s chief enemy--the United States--directly. Nuclear weapons, according to Sokolovsky, could also be used to encircle and destroy the enemy’s conventional forces.

It’s interesting to note here the Soviets’ early rejection of the notion of limited nuclear war. They denounced NATO’s flexible response strategy for political-propaganda reasons when the concept was announced in 1967. It’s clear, however, that by the early 1970s, a number of Soviet theorists believed that a massive intercontinental nuclear exchange would occur a short time after the first tactical nuclear weapons were detonated in Europe.

Just as Sokolovsky was finishing his last edition of Military Strategy in 1968, one can see the beginnings of the second revolution in military affairs, which was characterized by new advancements in conventional technology. The revolution came to full fruition during the tenure of Marshal
Nicholai Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff (1977-1984). Ogarkov brought an interesting background to his post. He served in World War II extensively, but as a member of the technical services. He had never had a true combat command in time of war. His extensive engineering background, however, did give him an early appreciation of the combat potential of conventional technological innovations.

Ogarkov’s belief was that the rapid increase of the number of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Atlantic--and the balance of those weapons--made the prospect of any type of nuclear warfare suicidal. At the same time, new non-nuclear technologies, such as microcircuitry, lasers, and microwaves, might restore the importance of the conventional battlefield to military affairs.

Ogarkov theorized that the combined arms strategic offensive operation, such as that which was used in the Manchurian Campaign in 1945, could indeed become decisive again if the Soviets properly incorporated new technologies as they became available and got to work early developing new operational methods and making organizational changes.

He examined the concept of sequential nuclear warfare (the Russian term for flexible response) to see if Soviet tactical nuclear weapons might be used on a limited scale before escalating into a global nuclear war--but rejected the notion. Ogarkov concluded that the conflict could not be contained. This reasoning, however, led him to the belief
that the revolution in high-technology conventional weapons and new forms of combat might permit the Soviet high command to get inside the decision cycle of the NATO political leadership and achieve operational and strategic objectives in Europe before NATO tactical nuclear weapons would be released. Ogarkov postulated that a strategy and an armed force could be developed that played on the hesitations of the West and permitted the Warsaw Treaty Organization to win the war conventionally before it became a nuclear confrontation.

It was during this period that Ogarkov in his theoretical reconstruction of the battle area developed the Theater Strategic Operation (TSO). The TSO concept involved strategic offensive operations in one or more adjacent TVDs in the Western Theater to support the main Soviet effort on NATO's central European axis (see Figure 11).
Ogarkov implemented several changes in order to restore the importance of the conventional battlefield and optimize the new technologies. He re-created the operational maneuver group (OMG), and placed this large operational formation in the first strategic echelon facing Western Europe. Ogarkov's concept was for the OMG to punch through holes made initially by lower-echelon tactical forces in order to seize operational and strategic objectives such as command & control facilities, supply depots, nuclear stockpiles and launchers, and to create general havoc in the enemy's rear. During this period the Soviets also revisited the independent air operation.

What had occurred to necessitate these changes? Figure 12 depicts the dialectical processes at work. According to the model, Khrushchev's single-track military doctrine--based on the pre-eminence of the Strategic Rocket Forces--had come into conflict with bilateral nuclear parity, which cancelled out any useful advantage Soviet nuclear forces might achieve in a conflict. Strategic nuclear weapons therefore became useful for one wartime purpose: to prevent the enemy from introducing his nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict. At the same time, the appearance of
new conventional technologies offered the potential of making the traditional Eurasian battlefield a decisive medium once again. The result of this dialectical conflict was Ogarkov’s duel-track doctrine in which the state placed increased emphasis on the development of highly mobile, state-of-the-art conventional forces for national security, while pursuing a more moderate pace of nuclear force modernization.

Ogarkov encountered several problems as he pushed the Soviet defense establishment into this new doctrinal direction. Throughout his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, he faced the daunting task of welding the services into a joint force capable of combined arms operations, and he was only partially successful in this respect. He attacked the ground forces for fielding obsolescent tank forces which he predicted would become vulnerable to NATO’s high-precision weapons. He encountered expected resistance from the premier service—the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Since the time of Khrushchev, the SRF had come to expect priority in budget matters. Finally, to achieve his intent, Ogarkov attempted to diminish the independence of the navy which, under Gorshkov, had been pursuing its own strategic agenda.

Ogarkov did make some significant progress toward improving Soviet conventional capabilities, but he stepped on a number of powerful military and political toes on the way. In the end, in 1984, due to his failure to compromise on budgets, arms control, and his own vision, he was removed as
Chief of the General Staff and replaced by Sergey Akhromeyev.

The next "revolution," defense sufficiency (or reasonable sufficiency), is the last of the major changes in military thought to occur in the Soviet era (see Figure 13).

![Graph showing POSTWAR "REVOLUTIONS"

Figure 13

While it was not a military-technical revolution, per se, defense sufficiency was indeed a "revolution" in terms of its political-military impact. Clearly, it was closely linked to the internal and external forces which eventually brought down the Soviet regime in 1991.

Marshal Akhromeyev attempted to explain the importance of this new doctrinal shift to U.S. Congressmen during his testimony before the HASC in 1990; but even he had failed to grasp the full significance of the political and economic
forces which destroyed the old perfect paradigm in the first place. Clearly, the struggle to define what exactly constitutes "defense sufficiency" continues in the new Russian defense establishment today.

One can argue that the concept of defense sufficiency had its official origins in a speech presented by Leonid Brezhnev in the city of Tula in 1977. In his watershed remarks oriented to a domestic audience, Brezhnev expressed the clear view, for the first time, that the Soviet leadership had serious reservations about the utility of nuclear weapons as means for achieving political objectives in time of war. Moreover, the Soviet leader rejected the notion that superiority in nuclear weapons alone could guarantee national security. According to Brezhnev, the defense potential of the nation and its nuclear forces needed only to be maintained at levels sufficient enough to maintain the peace. By his remarks, Brezhnev echoed a growing, paradoxical revelation among several Soviet theorists: the key to the long-term security of the Soviet people may lie in the preservation of the opponent's national security as well.

Eight years later, when Gorbachev came to power, he had to come to terms quickly with several stark truths about the Soviet defense establishment and its practical utility as an instrument of national power: First, he realized clearly that, despite the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the nuclear warfighting strategy of Sokolovsky had become
obsolete; and since nuclear war could no longer be rationally considered as a "continuation of politics by other means"--as Lenin (really Clausewitz) would put it--the continued growth of the nuclear arsenals could only raise the specter of "accidental nuclear war." Second, Gorbachev knew that the growth of the Soviets' conventional arsenals was having little effect on the advancement of Soviet objectives in Eurasia. The war in Afghanistan, in particular, was a terrible scar on the U.S.S.R., and demonstrated Moscow's inability to enhance its position in the third world though the use of force alone. Finally, Gorbachev quickly realized that the Soviet military, since Khrushchev's fall in 1964, had been generally unrestrained in demanding and getting the national resource effort they wanted, and that this overemphasis on defense was the chief non-systemic cause of the Soviet Union's downward economic performance.

To seize control of the defense agenda, Gorbachev pursued several strategies. First, he carefully purged the High Command--starting with Ogarkov in 1984 (before Gorbachev officially took over the reins of power). Next, he declared the new military doctrine (reasonable sufficiency) defensive in nature and, as
Khrushchev before him, challenged the High Command to flesh out the military-technical implications. (See Figure 14 for an illustration of the dialectics involved.) Finally, Gorbachev began aggressively pursuing arms control initiatives under the lead of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, starting with the INF Treaty negotiations.

Gorbachev had to deal with the repercussions of two watershed events in the late 1970s that, more than any other external phenomena, served to alter the Soviets' paradigm about applying military force in Eurasia. Arguably, the experiences also helped speed up the process of internal Soviet decay. One such watershed event was the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Much has been written about this historic event. The other milestone, a strategic blunder of perhaps equal proportions, was the decision by the Soviets in the 1970s to attempt to intimidate America's European allies by fielding a new intermediate-range missile called the SS-20.

The two-stage, three-warhead SS-20 was considered by the U.S. and its NATO allies to be extremely destabilizing. Then, in 1979, at the insistence of the Europeans, NATO collectively adopted a "dual-track approach" to deal with the issue. First, the United States would develop and deploy new NATO intermediate-range systems, called "Euromissiles." Second, simultaneous to the fielding of the new U.S. systems, the U.S. would enter into negotiations with the U.S.S.R. in order to eliminate the missile class altogether.
In 1981, the Reagan Administration proposed the "zero-zero option." The Soviets immediately rejected the concept. Then, as the U.S began to deploy the first batteries of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), the Soviets walked out of the negotiations.

The Soviets returned to the bargaining table when Mikhail Gorbachev came into power in 1985. Initially seeking concessions, Gorbachev wanted to include British and French nuclear systems in the negotiations. When the U.S. rebuffed this, he then offered to eliminate just those intermediate-range missiles located east of the Urals if the U.S. eliminated its dual-capable (conventional/nuclear) aircraft in Europe. Subsequent to this, he proposed eliminating both Soviet and U.S. systems—provided the British and the French agreed to freezes on their own nuclear missiles.

While the October 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik was portrayed by the U.S. press as a failure, it in fact provided a major breakthrough for the INF negotiations. Reagan was severely criticized for not agreeing in principle to Gorbachev’s proposal to completely eliminate all nuclear weapons by the end of this century; but he was able to get Gorbachev and his advisors to agree to several key concessions. First, the Soviets dropped once and for all their attempts to divide NATO by insisting that British and French missiles be included in the prospective treaty. Second, they offered to include in the negotiations their
ground-to-ground "shorter-range" systems (ranges between 500 and 1000 kilometers), such as their SS-12s and SS-23s. Finally, and perhaps of most significance, the Soviets agreed, in principle, to the concept of treaty-compliance monitoring by means of on-site inspection.35 By late 1986, Gorbachev was faced with continued economic turmoil and increasing West European resolve that the SS-20s would have to go as a precondition for any long-term assistance with his perestroika reforms.

Still seeking some concessions, though, Soviet negotiators proposed in 1987 that only U.S. bases in NATO be subject to on-site inspection. They then extended their on-site inspection proposals to include all of NATO and only non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization facilities. By the summer of 1987, however, the deployment of remaining Euromissiles was proceeding on schedule—with only relatively minor protests at U.S. GLCM bases, such as at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom. The Soviets realized they were losing a ten-year effort to dislodge the U.S from its European allies, and Gorbachev decided to make the most of a worsening diplomatic situation by agreeing to virtually all of the U.S. negotiating points, including the provision to conduct on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, when the Treaty was finally concluded in December 1987.

For the United States and its NATO allies, the INF Treaty proved to be a triumph of resolve and multilateral
cooperation. The decision to deploy the Euromissiles to Western Europe was taken with great political risk to the European governments involved. The fact that the Europeans never broke ranks should be credited to the strength of the NATO alliance. Ultimately, it was this show of solidarity which provided U.S. negotiators the leverage they needed.

Perhaps, the most important impact of the INF Treaty negotiations was that they gave the Soviet regime a startling wake-up call that, together with the quagmire in Afghanistan, demonstrated the limitations of the U.S.S.R.'s unidimensional superpower status. These two events exposed the Soviets' impotence in the new economics-driven world order and irreparably cracked the foundation of their perfect paradigm.39

Three Themes Recapitulated in the Yeltsin Period

The themes examined in this chapter were introduced chronologically; however, each has always been present in Russian military thought, often overlapping with one or more of the other themes, and always interacting with a number of other important factors, such as culture, climate, and domestic politics. Today, we see the continued evidence of the themes and their dynamic properties in
the current debates over the defense sufficiency policy of post-Soviet Russia. There are many important issues left unresolved by the collapse of the U.S.S.R., and U.S. decisionmakers ought to have a clear understanding of the policy implications of all three themes as they begin to build a new relationship with the Russian defense establishment.

The first theme concerning The Magician and the German is evident in the current disagreement between traditionalists and reformers on two central issues: a) Russia's role in the new world order; and b) the type of military force the nation requires in the future. The traditionalists are fighting to maintain Russia's former military power as a necessary prerequisite for continued superpower status. They want to continue to rely on the Strategic Rocket Forces as a broad basis for "explicit deterrence" against conventional or nuclear attacks and as an implicit protection against "political, military, or economic blackmail." They also want to be able to repulse air, sea, and land invasions with a scaled-down version of former Soviet conventional forces. The reformers, on the other hand, are more worried about internal disintegration and proliferation of weapons technology than they are about foreign invasions. They are also more willing than traditionalists to accept Western assistance in order to stem the hemorrhage of technology, and to work with the U.S. on defense programs such as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) and a Global Protection System (GPS).
Reformers also tend to want smaller conventional forces that are highly mobile and capable of all-azimuth responses.42

The May 1992 draft of the new Russian military doctrine appears to have been a compromise between the various factions, with traditionalists and reformers alternately winning and losing on a number of areas where complete consensus could not be reached. For instance, traditionalists were able to insert into the draft document a provision stating that defense sufficiency should be developed in accordance with "national and historical traditions" as well as within the norms of international law. The draft also conveys a heavy traditionalist emphasis on universal conscription and mass mobilization of reserves as the cornerstone for offensive operations, and squarely identifies the "readiness of the population" as a sustaining element in war. Reformers--not all liberals by the way--were able to include a number of noteworthy provisions in the 1992 draft, such as the gradual implementation of volunteer professional units and the creation of rapid reaction forces. They were also able to expand the list of "special missions" to include anti-smuggling, disaster relief, and peacekeeping.

Clearly, Russian military thought has lost its ideological bearings for the time being and is still searching for a definition of Russia's future role in Eurasia. This is evident in the differing views on Moscow's responsibilities vis-a-vis ethnic Russian minorities in the non-Russian
republics of the former Soviet Union. Leaning toward Russian nationalism as the underlying basis of the state's national security interests, traditionalists believe that Russia's armed forces should be employed actively to protect the rights of Russian minorities wherever they live. They also think that the international community should keep its business to itself. Some of the more liberal reformers, by contrast, believe that Russian military forces have the responsibility to protect the rights of all minorities--Russian and non-Russian, and tend to be more open about the notion of allowing international organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to monitor such "police actions."

The second theme presented in this chapter, The Search for the Perfect Paradigm, is evident in both the structure and the substance of the current debates. On the one hand, the fact that the discussion of Russian military policy is focused on the traditional centerpiece concept of military doctrine--and follows nearly the same structural outline for doctrine provided by Marshal Grechko twenty years ago--attests to the staying power of the theoretical system. On the other hand, portions of the 1992 draft of the military doctrine are still linked to archaic World War II and Cold War principles; and this holdover from the past is being questioned by both moderate and liberal reformers.

For example, the May 1992 draft doctrine clearly fixates
on the preparation of the state for protracted conventional conflict in Eurasia against a high-tech enemy who initiates the war by launching a Barbarossa-style invasion. The draft does indeed state that "local wars" are the most likely form of armed conflict. The document, however, does not provide any details of what a future local war might look like; neither does it provide any guidance on how to prepare the armed forces for such a conflict. By contrast, the draft doctrine does include a surprisingly comprehensive description of future high-tech conventional warfare. It also lays out the specific tasks of the armed forces in such a war and provides corresponding guidance on force structure.

While the 1992 draft of the new military doctrine doesn't name names, it implies that the chief adversaries Russia would face are the United States and NATO. To follow the draft's reasoning, therefore, the U.S. and NATO ought to convert their alliance system into a political organization, halt further nuclear weapons tests and upgrades, and declare a no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons policy. A number of reformers, however, do not agree with this reasoning, for they recognize that the U.S. and NATO pose little threat to Russian interests. These same reformers, though, are less sanguine about the potential for conflict with China.

The third theme of conflict and change, Dealing with "Revolutions in Military Affairs," is present as well in the current doctrinal musings. Clearly, the 1992 draft of the new
military doctrine has a serious problem in terms of linking desired ends with the available means. The draft, in fact, seems fairly visionary in its description of what a future high-tech war might look like. But the new Russian Ministry of Defense must be living an "Alice in Wonderland" experience if it believes it can create—under current economic conditions and with existing manufacturing infrastructure—the robust, high-tech force that the draft document, if adopted as doctrine, calls for.

Russian theorists are evidently doing some advance work in future employment methods and forms of armed combat, and the new doctrine, if approved, will direct that a portion of the defense budget be shifted from series production into research and development of new technologies and manufacturing techniques. But Russian industry simply will not have the advanced manufacturing processes currently available in the West for many years to come—even if the shift to a market-oriented economy is accomplished fairly rapidly.

There are a number of other important technical and political issues of the "Revolutions" left unresolved by the recent rounds of the current doctrinal debates. These issues include the future of command, control, and security arrangements for nuclear weapons titularly under the authority of the Commonwealth's Unified Command; the willingness by Russian and Commonwealth national command authorities to use nuclear weapons if nuclear "assets" were attacked by
conventional weapons or terrorists; and finally, whether or not the Russian High Command can transform the militaries of the Commonwealth member states into a Warsaw-Pact-styled collective security organization under its domination.

Clearly, each of these three themes should be understood by U.S. decisionmakers as having policy implications for the growing U.S.-Russian defense relationship. The historical analysis presented in this chapter—based upon the Russian perspective—was necessary to provide the background for a subsequent discussion of U.S.-Russian defense cooperation programs. This study will specifically revisit each of the themes of conflict and change when it examines the Clinton Administration’s vision for military cooperation in Chapter Five. Before then, however, it’s important to step back for a moment and broadly look at the changing U.S.-Russian defense relationship—and the various strategic options—from the U.S. defense official’s point of view.

2. The expression, "The Magician and the German," is a metaphor for the long-term struggle in Russian military theory between Slavophiles (or Nationalists) and Westernizers. The term, "Magician," is borrowed from William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 303-307. Using the term "German" to signify the perspective of the Westernizers is this author's invention. According to one enduring, although apocryphal, piece of etymological trivia, pre-modern Russians used the same word for "German" as they used for "foreigner." Today, the Russian word for German--némets--is closely associated with the word--nemét'--which means to be incapable of speech. The inability to speak (or to speak understandably)--from the primordial Russian’s perspective--must have been a characteristic shared by quite a few foreigners.

3. Interview with Dr William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 24, 1993. While the Prussian military theorist's major work on war was indeed studied by Czarist military officers, it was the writings of Baron de Jomini--not those of Clausewitz--which exerted the greater Western influence on Russian military thought during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This author has concluded through his survey of the literature on the subject that Clausewitz' treatises on the higher strata of military theory--such as the subordination of strategy to policy--were filtered into military thought much later by way of Lenin, who, in turn, received his education in Clausewitz though the writings of Engels. By contrast, the notion that Clausewitz' teachings concerning the operational level of war may have come to the Soviets by way of the Germans during the Treaty of Rapallo period is subject to a great deal more speculation. Clearly, military thought in Russia today bears some resemblance to the principles and concepts presented in On War. Nevertheless, as this chapter demonstrates, to conclude that contemporary Russian military thought is nothing more than warmed-over Clausewitz is severely short-sighted.

4. For a further discussion of the Miliutin reforms and of the debates between the Russian "nationalist" school and the "academics" (Magicians and Germans, respectively), see Walter Pintner, "Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov," Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy.
5. There is an interesting parallel here between the issue faced by the Nationalists in nineteenth century Czarist Russia and a similar one encountered by the Spartans during the Peloponnesian Wars in the fifth century B.C. According to Thucydides, the Spartans were very concerned about the long-term societal implications of changing their traditional approach to war. They, therefore, resisted the impulse to emulate the sea-faring methods of their principal rivals, the Athenians. In the end, they developed into a maritime power, defeated the Athenians decisively at sea, and changed their society forever.

6. Later factional fights occurred between old-style Nationalists, such as Sukhomlinov, the Minister of War, and a new group of Westernizers, called the Young Turks.


10. There is some disagreement among scholars on the number of Soviet officers who actually trained in Germany. Erickson's number (120) is probably the most reliable figure. Clearly, Zhukov attended the German General Staff College; Tukhachevsky may not have. Tukhachevsky made his first recorded trip to Germany in 1932, and then only as an observer.

11. In 1928, the Germans and the Soviets built an experimental chemical gas center at Volsk. See Erickson, p. 264.


13. Erickson, p. 159. Today, Lipetsk is the premier tactical aviation base in the Russian Federation and serves as a major center for the development of air force methods and procedures.


15. Erickson, pp. 247-264.
16. See the author's defense of the notion of linking MacKinder to Russian military thought in "Geopolitics: A Framework for Analyzing Soviet Regional Behavior," *Global Affairs*, Winter 1989, pp. 63-85. Refined by theorists such as Nicholas J. Spykman and Colin S. Gray, traditional geopolitical theory remains useful as a framework for analyzing Russian strategic priorities. In the past, Americans tended to discount the conceptual linkage between geopolitical theory and Russian military thought for several reasons. First, we are an insular air/sea power; we have never suffered catastrophic destruction of population and property from invading land-powers as the Russians have. Second, a good portion of early geopolitical theory was incorporated into Nazi lebensraum doctrine in the 1930's; consequently, the theory's potential as a tool for analyzing Moscow's military policy remained largely unrecognized as academics tended to distance themselves after WWII from concepts associated with Nazism. A number of historians argue that the case for linking geopolitical theory with Russian military thought is flawed because modern technology has rendered Eurasian land power relationships anachronistic. Although this criticism has its merits—particularly from the perspective of US strategic defense—it appears to have been a moot point vis-a-vis Soviet planners who, for many years, structured armed forces and set global priorities in accordance with traditional geopolitical principles (despite their declarations to the contrary). Geopolitical factors may have influenced the post-World War II development of the concepts of *Theater of War* (TV) and *Theater of Military Operations* (TVD). The Soviets divided Eurasia into three Continental TVs (Far Eastern, Southern, and Western). The Western TV was further divided into the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern TVDs. Clearly, throughout the Soviet period, military theorists—from their Eurasian land power orientation—continued to place control of the rimlands of Europe and Asia after national survival on their lists of priorities. See also Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Force Planning for the Post-Cold War World: Can We Learn from Geopolitics?" *Fundamentals of Force Planning*, Vol I: Concepts (Newport: Naval War College, 1990), pp. 27-39.

17. Critics of this one point fail to grasp the *sine qua non* of Russia's historic geographical orientation: it is a Eurasian land power that continues to be interested, first and foremost, in exerting its influence in contiguous regions, such as Europe and Asia. Developing itself into a maritime power with overseas interests—while a desire—has generally been assigned a lower priority. See William C. Green, "The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1993, pp. 80-102, for an example of a critique of the geopolitical approach that—by fixating on a maritime perspective—comes to a wrong conclusion.

19. The reader can come to his own conclusions as to whether or not Deep Operations was a by-product of Soviet-German cooperation in the 1920s. Clearly, during this period, there is a resemblance between the concepts developed by Tukhachevsky and those espoused by Guderian in Germany.


23. The General Staff has always "assisted" the ruling authorities (such as the Central Committee of the Communist Party) in the development of military doctrine—probably even preparing initial drafts through the Minister of Defense. The General Staff has often dominated the process. Only rarely, such as during the preparation of the 1990 draft doctrine, were their concerns not fully addressed.

24. During the Second World War, the Lend Lease program was a technological windfall for the Soviets in many respects. Unspecified quantities of U.S. secret documents and advanced technology components from American industries were shipped to the U.S.S.R. through Great Falls and Alaska along with Lend Lease items. For nearly four years, U.S. customs gave the Soviets carte blanche to ship unchecked items from the United States. See Keller, p. 252.

25. The U.S. Army never fully considered the operational level of war until the early 1980s when it created *AirLand Battle Doctrine*. As noted earlier, the Russians had been writing and organizing at the operational level since before WWI.

26. The Soviets used the concept of a geographic strategic command or a strategic direction earlier in the war. It is commonly accepted, however, that the first time the Soviets used a high command of forces (HCF) to control front and armies in a theater of military operations (TVD), per se, was during the Manchurian strategic offensive operation in August 1945.

28. Two such cycles, experienced by all advanced industrial nations, are technology push and concept pull. The phenomenon of technology push takes place when the military professional is provided with fairly mature technological innovations and then changes his operational concepts and organization to optimize the new technology. During concept pull cycles, the military professional is leading the effort by developing operational concepts and making organizational changes based primarily on technology projections. For a further explanation of the two phenomena, see John E. LaSala, "Operationalizing the Military-Technical Revolution," Advanced Research Project, Naval War College, Newport, 1993. The military theorist in Russia has tended to prefer concept pull to technology push. The period of the conventional-technological revolution under Ogarkov—in which significant new operational concepts were implemented without realistic force capability—was characterized by concept pull. Given some of the rosy force capability projections of the latest draft of Russian military doctrine, the new Russian High Command may be hoping against hope that a concept-pull approach may be attained once again. The Nuclear Revolution, which was resisted by many of the rank and file, and the Gorbachev phase (1985-1991) were characterized by technology push. The importance of the defense technocrat and relative impotence of the senior military during technology push phases in the former Soviet Union were underscored to the author during two sessions with officials in Moscow. During the first, Mikoyan Chief Designer Belyakov, when asked to describe the military acquisition process, remarked, "The Air Force tells me what they want: I give them what they need." Much later, when former Air Force Commander in Chief Shaposhnikov (now Commonwealth CINC) was asked the same question, he replied, "Well, of course I try to make recommendations; but I usually take what they give me."


30. The Soviets had experimented with various types of large shock formations during World War II.

31. The development of Western operational concepts, such as follow-on forces attack (FOFA) and the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine, were influenced by the discovery, in the late 1970s, of the Soviet OMG and Ogarkov's re-emphasis on maneuver warfare.

32. Dominated by officers from the ground forces, the Soviet high command had always viewed conventional strike aviation as not much more than long-range artillery. This had been the general view even though the Soviets had enjoyed some
success with the independent air operation during the latter stages of WWII.


35. Figure 13 illustrates the notion that the third "revolution"—affecting principally the political aspect of military doctrine—has had considerable overlap with the preceding conventional-technological revolution of the Brezhnev period. Defense Sufficiency clearly came into its full development under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The point here is that one should not attempt to confine the three "revolutions" into three distinct time periods.

36. See A.A. Kotenev, "On the Defeat of the Basmach Bands in Central Asia," Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military Historic Journal), February 1987, pp. 59-64. The Russians continue to look to their past for clues on how to solve current military problems, although the limited attention given to the war in Afghanistan is reminiscent of inability on the part of U.S. historians to examine critically U.S. strategies in Vietnam until many years after the war. As the Soviets were trying to extricate themselves from Afghanistan, they examined several earlier episodes dealing with Muslim para-military insurgencies in Central Asia, such as the Basmachi rebellion in the 1920s. To successfully quell the earlier insurgency, (which took place principally in Turkmenistan), the Soviets relied on fixed garrisons, highly mobile ground units, and "flying operational groups" to locate the Basmachi bands and isolate them from their bases of supply. Such tactics were emulated by the Soviets against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan by Spetsnaz and other mobile units. The Soviet tactics in Afghanistan were initially successful until the U.S. stepped up its technical assistance to the insurgents.

37. The Soviet Union later deployed the SS-20 to the Soviet Far East as well.

38. It should be noted that Gorbachev tried several times after this to back out of his commitment to on-site inspections.

39. Some commentators believe that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program was the decisive pressure blow which cracked the Soviet system. This author does not fully agree. SDI clearly provided the Soviets with some motive and focus for arms control; however, the quagmire in Afghanistan and the SS-20 fiasco were immediate problems. Both events showed the true "fabric" of the "emperor's new clothes" and shattered for ever
the self-image of Soviet military and political power.

40. The author's intent here is not to fully analyze the May 1992 draft of Russian military doctrine but, rather, to briefly examine several of the salient issues surrounding the doctrinal debate in the light of the previous treatment of the three historic themes. There are several excellent commentaries which provide much greater detail on the 1992 draft doctrine, such as Mary C. FitzGerald, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," Naval War College Review, Spring 1993, pp. 24-44, and Charles J. Dick, "Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine," Journal of Soviet Military Studies, December 1992, pp. 552-566. For an interpretation of force structure implications, see Susan Terranova, "Evolving Russian Military Doctrine: Force Structure and Capabilities," Advanced Research Project, Naval War College, March 1993. This author does not share Terranova's enthusiasm for using the 1992 draft as a reliable basis from which to make predictions concerning future Russian force structure. The draft is significant--but principally as a snap shot of the debate about Russian military policy which, no doubt, will continue to evolve until the domestic situation stabilizes.

41. This is not to imply that there are only two polarized camps in the doctrinal debate. In the new pluralism of Russian defense policymaking, there are several gradations of views on at least one side of every issue.

CHAPTER THREE
FRIEND OR FOE: SHAPING THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

The Cold War is over! Russia is becoming a Western-styled democracy.

- But a sudden coup could reverse the entire process.

Now's the time to "put the genie back into the bottle": let's eliminate our dangerous nuclear and conventional arsenals and concentrate on the more likely threats.

- No! We need to hedge our bets. We still need powerful nuclear and conventional forces--just in case Russia reverts back toward autocracy.

- Typical Conversation Overheard in the E-Ring of the Pentagon, 1992

For the immediate future, the debate among U.S. policy specialists regarding our evolving defense relationship with the Russian Federation will be framed by these two divergent viewpoints. The democratization of the Russian Federation and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union is a positive, irreversible trend, according to one perspective; as a consequence, U.S. armed forces should be completely restructured from their previous Cold War configuration. By contrast, the viewpoint on the opposite end of the spectrum holds that the principal by-products of the collapse of the Soviet regime are continued multinational disintegration and increased Eurasian instability--phenomena which will be with us well into the next century. The Russians still have the capability of destroying America. If the reform process fails, according to this pessimistic perspective, a
reactionary, hostile regime could emerge. The U.S., therefore, must retain a robust strategic and conventional capability as an insurance policy—at least for now.

Clearly, U.S. decisionmakers have a range of policy options from which to choose: important choices which, while advancing U.S. interests, will help define the U.S.-Russian defense relationship in the coming years. Policymaking should always be an iterative process, and the business of forming cordial relationships with former adversaries needs to take into account a number of dynamic factors—such as the themes of conflict and change analyzed in the previous chapter—as it charts a steady course into the unsettled waters of a new, exciting era.

Contrasting with the previous chapter, the purpose of this portion of the study is to examine U.S. concerns about defense—as they apply to the Russian Federation—and to begin to narrow down several of the fundamental choices we have before us. This chapter, however, is not only about such broad, fundamental approaches. Perhaps more importantly, it’s also about how key policy questions in the months and years ahead might be framed. The methodology suggested here is to narrow the broad range of options concerning our future defense relationship with the Russians into four sub-spectrums, called policy tracks. We’ll approach this, first, by considering scenario building blocks (driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties) for a
crystal ball analysis of where Russia may be headed, and second, by looking broadly at U.S. interests and constraints in the years ahead.

Driving Forces

Arguably, the U.S. and its allies will continue to have an interest in fostering the long-term integration of Russia into the international politico-economy. The pace of such integration, however, by and large will be linked to the success of political and economic reforms inside Russia itself. As has been the case during much of the past 45 years, the West can do relatively little besides waiting patiently and facilitating the accomplishment of the herculean tasks that the Russians, for the most part, must accomplish for themselves.

The principal driving forces which will determine the evolution of post-Soviet Russia, therefore, are internal. And chief among these internal forces is the economy which, in turn, will influence all other driving forces. Russia has a long road of economic transformation ahead, as evidenced by President Boris Yeltsin’s political battles in the spring of 1993 with the Russian parliament and his stillborn efforts to transfer the ownership of large, rust-belt industrial enterprises into private hands. Tied directly to the driving force of the economy is the nation’s poor infrastructure. No doubt, it will take billions of rubles invested over a decade
to bring Russia's overstretched rail network, third-world roads, and virtually non-existent commercial telecommunication systems up to Western standards.

Another driving force closely linked to the economy is the national bureaucracy, which generally has been resistant to change. The inertia of the bureaucrats contributed to Gorbachev's failure in 1991. Several years before, the former Soviet leader began distancing himself from some of the failed socialist principles of the past, such as single-party politics and centralized planning. He did this by disrupting the party's nomenklatura network which kept the command economy functioning and the bureaucrats who ran it in check. The result was disaster. Today, the inertia-bound bureaucrats are still in place throughout the Russian economy and government. Important organizations such as the internal security organs and the foreign intelligence services have suffered few purges below the very apex of their bureaucracies. Such organizations continue to be major driving forces resisting radical change.

Other driving forces that do not bode well for the Russian Federation include the environment, which has been choked with poisoning industries for decades and continues to be threatened by catastrophe-prone nuclear reactors; widespread corruption, which diminishes economic performance and assaults the basic fabric of Russian society; and the desire of several important autonomous sub-state entities,
such as Tatarstan, Chechenia, and portions of Siberia, to make a clean break with Moscow altogether, and stand on their own.²

Two positive driving forces, however, include the Russian culture and educational system. The Russian people are a resilient, adaptive group of survivors. The educational system has produced a highly literate population which, while held back during 75 years of Soviet rule, can easily be transformed into a Western-styled, high-technology work force.

**Predetermined Elements**

Geography, topography, and climate are perhaps Russia’s most enduring features that will continue to have both positive and negative impacts on the future of the nation—as they have throughout Russian history. While the harsh climate and expanse of territory make commerce and agriculture difficult, Russia (excluding Ukraine) is blessed with some of the world’s richest natural resources (such as oil, minerals, & timber) and agricultural land.

Demographics is an important predetermined element which also offers mixed blessings. The near-zero growth rate of ethnic Russians will moderate the strain of the housing crisis and help keep costs associated with a social welfare state at a reasonable level. Over the next several decades, Russia, however, will not be able to fuel economic growth by a natural expansion of the work force—as it has in the past.

Other predetermined elements include the growing
inflation rate for consumer goods (roughly 2,500 percent in 1992), Russia's unpaid debt to foreign creditors ($10.5 billion), and the continued drop in economic performance (about 19 percent decline in gross domestic product from its 1991 level). 3

Critical Uncertainties (Internal)

In order to properly analyze emerging scenarios in the evolution of the Russian state, we must consider both internal and external critical uncertainties. No doubt, the principal internal uncertainty is the speed with which the essential reforms will be made inside Russia, and whether or not those reforms can take root and transform the Russian economy during the current proto-democratic phase of post-Soviet politics. Yeltsin's privatization program, for instance, got off to an enthusiastic start at the beginning of 1992. By year's end, however, reforms instituted at the national level had slowed down considerably, and Yeltsin's point man on reforms, Yegor Gaidar, had been replaced as prime minister. 4 Several questions, then, follow such developments: Can Yeltsin and pluralism in Russia survive long enough to pull the nation out of its economic morass, or will some other form of government be necessary? Clearly, Russia needs a new constitution, judicial system, and body of law. How will such institutions evolve, and how will they help shape Russia's style of government, system of political parties, and national security
policy? These questions are far from being resolved.

Other internal critical uncertainties include the final form and substance of the new military doctrine discussed in Chapter Two, the outcome of civil wars in adjacent areas, such as the Caucasus and Moldova, and the consequences of the current independence movements of autonomous entities inside the Russian Federation, itself. Ideological struggles, while not over, are surpassed by ethnic and nationality conflicts.

Unknowns, such as how Russian minorities will be treated outside Russia in the future and the outcome of ongoing disagreements between Commonwealth nations over the division of foreign debt and status of former Soviet military assets will also be important determinants.

Critical Uncertainties (External)

The foreign assistance being sent from the West in the form of economic loans and grants, humanitarian goods, technology, and technical expertise supports Russia's reforms—if only on the margin. The uncertainty, here, is whether or not such assistance will be enough to make a difference, and how much longer the industrialized nations will be able to keep up the effort.

In the area of Russian national security, the list of external critical uncertainties includes unknowns such as future threats from China and radical Islamic states, regional conflicts in Eurasia, and the pace of arms control focused on
the U.S.-Russian nuclear balance, regional confidence-building measures, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Emerging Scenarios

While considering all of the building blocks discussed above, all forecasts regarding what Russia might look like in the coming years should be built around the core issue of whether or not Yeltsin and the democratic processes unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet Union can survive long enough to pull Russia out of its economic morass. In other words, are we expecting too much of a new republic as large and complex as Russia to make economic restructuring of historic proportions before political institutions take root and constitutional-legal systems formed? Or will Russia have to take several steps backward before it can leap forward? If Russia drifts toward autocracy—as the U.S.S.R. did just prior to the August 1991 putsch—and if there is an outright successful coup, what form of government might emerge? More importantly, what would be the implications of such a shift in the political course of Russia in terms of U.S.-Russian relations?

For the moment, Yeltsin seems to have won a great deal of public support in the April 1993 referendum on his performance and policies. The vote, however, will not directly result in any legal changes to the power relationship between the
president and Supreme Soviet—a condition which caused the constitutional crisis in the first place. Yeltsin is now attempting to go around the Supreme Soviet by appealing directly to the heads of the Russian Federation’s 88 regions and districts to send representatives to a constitutional assembly. Yeltsin hopes that this assembly will help create a new constitution favoring a strong, French-style Presidency.

For Yeltsin and his supporters, however, getting from where the political impasse now stands to the eventual full ratification of a new constitution is highly problematic, and the United States should anticipate all eventualities. Given our building blocks and the core issue of the survival of democracy in Russia, therefore, let’s consider four of the more likely scenarios to emerge from the situation in the Russian Federation as it stands in the late spring of 1993, starting with the worst case.

**Scenario One: Reactionary Military Coup d’Etat**

Traditionally, the Russian military prefers to sit on the sidelines during political disputes and sees itself playing the role of arbiter and executor of the policies of the dominant political power. Always "duty conscious," it might, however, be compelled to take decisive action, given sufficient cause, popular outcry, and political support.

The character and policies of any hypothetical military dictatorship coming to power in post-Soviet Russia, therefore,
would be highly dependent upon the conditions and motives of the military junta at the time it seized power. It should be noted here that none of the scenarios considered in this analysis envisions the restoration of the Communist Party, per se. The Soviet system has been severely discredited; however, this would not deter any faction which successfully pulled off a coup from using the instruments of coercion and bureaucratic methodology developed by the Communist Party—as the situation required.

The regime most likely to employ the instruments and methodology of the former Soviet police state would probably be a highly reactionary military dictatorship with extreme Russian nationalist sentiments. Clearly, this regime of nationalist extremists (controlling the Russian armed forces) would pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests—but for a number of reasons other than its resemblance to the former U.S.S.R. First, the junta might want to preserve a perception of Russia as a superpower by immediately slowing down nuclear and conventional force reductions previously agreed to. Second, it would tend to reverse the severe reductions in military manpower and series production now being implemented by the Yeltsin government. Third, in order to support this re-expansion of the military establishment, the new rulers might want to terminate current economic reforms and place the nation back on a rigid command economy footing. Fourth, perhaps most dangerous, an extreme Russian nationalist
dictatorship would be the one most likely to risk civil war and strong international condemnation by attempting to forcibly annex key territories in neighboring republics. The regime’s motives for doing so would be to protect the rights of ethnic Russian minorities and reclaim access to areas, such as parts of the Baltic states and the Crimea, which it might consider to fall within Russia’s strategic zone of influence.

**Scenario Two: Military Coup...à la Peronista**

The next scenario envisions a senior military officer (or group of officers), in true "man on a horse" fashion, assuming authority over the Russian state for relatively limited, benign objectives, such as the restoration of public order and to effect, by decree, the transformation of the economy. While strongly nationalistic and pro-defense, the military dictatorship under this variant would be more risk adverse than the regime illustrated in the previous scenario.

The Russian military has little experience in running a large economy, and it realizes this. Any military autocracy installed by force, therefore, could lead to regionally-based warlordism—depending upon the reaction of the Russian population to its initial actions. But if it survives, a military dictatorship coming to power under this scenario could conceivably evolve along the lines of a South American Peronista model. It would seek to enhance the long-term military power of Russia through advanced technologies and
mobile forces; more importantly, it would probably recognize that the surest way to build such forces would be to effect the economic reforms and build the political institutions Russia now requires by decree, just as the Pinochet regime did in Chile during the previous decade-and-a-half.

This scenario also holds that the relatively benign military dictatorship coming to power in Russia might eventually restore democracy, as was done in Argentina and Chile. On the down side, however, a military regime coming to power under this scenario, as the one in Scenario One, would be dominated by traditionalist military thinkers. As such, they would tend to delay reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal and large conscript-based forces. The regime might also be predisposed, for organizational-cognitive reasons, to use military force to solve political problems.

Scenario Three: Civilian Oligarchy

The threshold point for the military taking over in the wake of a national crisis, however, is quite high, and would have to include elements such as the complete breakdown of the energy, food, or transportation systems, pogroms against Russian minorities living in non-Russian states, or nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. A civilian-directed coup, backed up by the Russian military leadership, might have the greatest chance of being successful, however, and could be triggered at a much lower political threshold. There might
even be an attempt to disguise Yeltsin's removal during the coup as some vague, constitutional procedure.

The principal objective of a civilian oligarchy coming to power under this scenario would be to minimize social disruptions by slowing down the current pace of economic reforms. Under this scenario, stability and long-term planning would be the highest virtues.

The character and ultimate goals of the civilian oligarchy in this scenario would be similar to those of the Peronista-style military dictatorship in Scenario Two, except that, for organizational reasons, the civilian oligarchy might tend to be more conservative about the use of military force to solve political problems.

Scenario Four: Yeltsin Prevails

The final scenario considered here is clearly the most favorable in terms of U.S. interests. And as the descriptor indicates, it envisions Yeltsin plodding along against the odds toward eventual political and economic transformation. Clearly, in the wake of the April 1993 referendum, Yeltsin has been given a mandate to effect change quickly as Russia's first democratically elected chief executive. Ironically, if he succeeds, it will be a result of his increased ability to accumulate personal power, aggressively hold dissenters at bay, and swiftly effect constitutional and economic changes by going over the heads of the parliament.
U.S. Interests and Constraints

Clearly, the United States has an important interest in seeing Yeltsin succeed and in creating whatever conditions it can, externally and internally, to facilitate the process of Russian democratic institution-building. But as the pessimistic viewpoint presented at the beginning of this chapter implies, over-optimism could cause U.S. policymakers to neglect their most important responsibility, ensuring the survival of the United States...with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.10

The U.S., however, will be severely constrained in the foreseeable future by how much it can spend on defense; and given the need to maintain the vitality of the U.S. economy, it probably isn’t in long-term U.S. interests for defense officials to maintain force structure, procurement, and forward deployments at Cold War levels. As the discussion concerning scenarios for Russia’s future has demonstrated, however, the emergence of Russia as a stable, non-threatening partner of the West is not a foregone conclusion. Any radical reduction of capabilities designed to deter or fight a militarized hostile Russian state, therefore, may pose varying degrees of risk.

As a consequence, let’s assume--for now--the validity of the pessimist’s argument which holds the two following conventionally held suppositions about future U.S. policy toward Russia: a) the central goal of U.S. strategic planning
should be to hedge our bets against a resurgent Russian military threat; and b) the amount of risk to the U.S. is inversely proportional to the resources expended on U.S. force structure.

Policy Tracks

As pointed out earlier, our purpose is to suggest a methodology for framing the policy debate regarding our future defense relationship with Russia; the intent here is not to develop comprehensive policy guidance for every future risk. Nevertheless, by framing the debate about strategic choices and developing four broad policy tracks, we can begin to sketch out some general defining characteristics and categories of approaches. Given the assumptions stated above, the four categories range from a relatively low-risk, resource-unconstrained spectrum (Track A) to one that is high-risk, resource-constrained (Track D).

Track A: Cold War Revisited

Track A (see Figure 16) is the ultimate hedge against the worst case: a re-emergence of a hostile Russian military threat. As such, it would be the most costly response to Scenario One above: a sudden coup by a group of highly reactionary Russian nationalists committed to re-building the nation's superpower status and prone to use military force.

Track A, however, should be considered an option of last
resort, for it would be extremely costly. More importantly, however, if it were implemented prematurely, it could send threatening signals to the Russian military and, thereby, serve to precipitate an internal political crisis, such as a coup, which it would be designed to counter in the first place. Another problem with this alternative is that a decision to adopt it would have to be made in the relatively near term. In other words, Track A is not a realistic option—unless the Russians oblige U.S. policymakers and play out Scenario One early on.

Track B: One Step Back!

Track B (Figure 17) is essentially the status quo as it existed during the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. It is specifically tailored to deal with either Scenario Two (Military Coup à la Peronista) or Scenario Three (Civilian Oligarchy)—depending upon the tenor of the new regime’s declarations concerning U.S.-Russian relations and its intentions toward upholding agreements such as START I.
START II, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. First, all agreements would have to be revisited and re-evaluated in light of the long-term objectives of the new regime. Second, while the production of the Trident would be slowed due to budget constraints, the production line, itself, should be kept open. The initial cancellation of IMET and Military Contacts would send a clear signal to the new rulers that, while the U.S. no longer considered business to be as usual, U.S. decisionmakers understood the conditions and rationale for the coup, and wished to keep the lines of communications open and the relationship generally moving forward. The principal objection to this alternative, as with Track A, is that it could be counterproductive if implemented before Yeltsin would be removed by a hypothetical coup. Under current conditions, it would be better to freeze current programs and halt future initiatives than to precipitate a crisis by a miscalculated move designed to hedge one’s bets.

POLICY TRACK B

- **START I & II, NPT Re-Assessed**
- **ICBM De-MIRVING Slowed**
- **Bombers Remain Off Alert**
- **Trident Production Slowed, But Kept Open**
- **U.S. European Withdrawals Halted Initially (110,000-130,000, 2-2.5 Divisions, 3-4 Tac Wings)**
- **IMET & Military Contacts Cancelled Initially, Then Revisited**

Figure 17

68
Track C: Toward A Growing Relationship

In Track C (Figure 18), we see the beginnings of a long-term commitment to collectively engage our Russian counterparts in a larger defense condominium.\textsuperscript{12} We are roughly following Track C at the present. START I & II have been completed but not implemented, U.S. ICBMs are being downloaded, and European reductions continue to Congressionally mandated force levels.

Clearly, Track C is the most appropriate approach if the U.S. favors a strategy designed to encourage the success of Yeltsin's economic reforms (under Scenario Four) through the development of non-threatening relations with the Russian defense establishment. It is the first of two policy tracks that challenges the two conventional assumptions introduced earlier: that our strategy should be designed to hedge our bets against an anti-Yeltsin coup, and that risk is inversely proportional to U.S. force structure.

**POLICY TRACK C**

- ICBM De-MIRVING Continued
- Trident Production Halted at 18
- Seawolf Production Halted at 2
- U.S. European Withdrawals Continue to Congressionally Mandated Levels (100,000, 1-2 Divisions, 3 Tac Wings)
- Military Contacts Expanded
- IMET Funding Increased

Figure 18
Track D: Solidifying a Partnership

The final policy track presented here, and perhaps the one with the most apparent risk, makes a bit of a leap of faith that the Russian Federation over the next few years will evolve into a stable, non-threatening state--well on the road to economic recovery--with its democratic institutions firmly rooted in the socio-political fabric of the nation. Track D holds that the vision of Russia as a stable, pluralistic ally of the United States ought to be our principal strategic objective; and that the best way to achieve this goal, paradoxically, is to continue to re-orient our strategic and conventional force structure away from Russia as a Cold War enemy, and to actively facilitate the transformation of Russia’s armed forces to a defensive posture. Under this track, the Office of the Secretary of Defense permits and encourages the Services to make direct purchases of Russian military technology, and DoD begins some limited joint R&D projects.

POLICY TRACK D

- All U.S. ICBMs De-Commissioned
- U.S. European Withdrawals Accelerated (40,000-80,000, 2-3 Brigades, 2 Tac Wings)
- Joint Military R&D Approved, Including GPALS Research
- Exchange Officers in Combat Units
- Joint Watch Officers in C1 Centers
- Multi-National Crisis Response Units Formed
- U.S. Training Facilities Established in Russia; Russian Training Facilities Established in U.S.

Figure 19
such as work on the aerospace plane, space boosters, and Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Collective engagement throughout the spectrum of military-to-military relations, such as exchange officer programs, U.S.-Russian multinational units, joint peacekeeping employment under the auspices of the U.N., U.S. training facilities in Russia, and the like, would be the hallmark of Solidifying a Partnership.

Selecting a Track

In an era of diminishing defense budgets, U.S. decisionmakers and defense planners must be willing to confront old assumptions about international risk and create bold new ranges of options to advance U.S. interests vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The choices will not be easy; but we do have other alternatives besides designing a reduced U.S. force structure around a reduced "Russian Threat."

There is no certainty as to what the Russian Federation might look like in several years' time, as this chapter has postulated by analyzing four of the more likely scenarios and the building blocks upon which they are based. If Yeltsin is forcibly removed by a strongly nationalistic faction, as many observers have predicted, then the U.S. may have few alternatives besides halting currently scheduled cuts in strategic and conventional forces, and cancelling military exchanges and discussions.

At the present, however, there appears to be an increase
in good will between the U.S. and Russian military services--brought about in part by successfully implemented arms control accords, IMET, and military contact activities. Channels of communication have been established, and relationships are being built upon professional respect and mutual trust. What long-term effect this warming trend will have on defense policymaking inside Russia, however, remains unknown.

Still, there is growing support among U.S. officials for taking the U.S.-Russian defense relationship to a new level. The new Clinton Administration, in particular, seems to support the notion of pushing defense cooperation to the maximum, perhaps, even, toward a group of options approximating Track D, Solidifying a Partnership.

This study will examine some of the initiatives the new Administration may want to pursue later on in Chapter Five. Clearly, President Clinton’s new national security "team" has a "vision" of U.S.-Russian relations that differs qualitatively from that of its predecessor. Before looking at future options, however, it’s important to examine in the following chapter some of the important work that has already been done.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. For a thorough treatment of the methodology for using driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties, see Peter Swartz, "Creating Scenario Building Blocks," The Art of the Long View (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 105-123.

2. Indeed, a number of political entities have already declared their secession from the Russian Federation. For an excellent synopsis of the political status and intentions of the successor states to the Soviet Union (and those of several of the autonomous political regions located within the Russian Federation itself), see Morton H. Halperin et al, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1982), pp. 148-157.


4. Economic Survey of Russia 1992, p. 13. Only 13 to 15 percent of the targeted small business establishments, for instance, had been "privatized" by the end of 1992. 96 percent of all agriculture products were still being produced on state-owned or collective farms. Heavy industries--except in reform-minded cities such as St. Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod--were still untouched by privatization.

5. Interview with Dr. Paul Holman, National Security Affairs Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 25, 1993.

6. For an analysis of the internal Soviet power struggle in the months leading up to the August 1992 putsch, see Bruce D. Slawter, "The Crisis in the Baltics and the Kremlin’s Drift Toward Autocracy," Strategic Review, Spring 1991, pp. 70-77.

7. Ibid., p. 73.


9. Slawter, p. 73.

11. It should be underscored here that the author does not mean to suggest that U.S. decisionmakers and force planners ought to focus solely on the U.S.-Russian military relationship. On the contrary, they need to consider all potential adversaries. The U.S. forces in Tracks A, B, C, and D are of salient importance to the U.S.-Russian relationship and balance of power. Under any single track, the specific TRIAD mixes (strategic bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs) would be determined by CINCSTRAT and the National Command Authorities after the specifics of START I and II had been fully analyzed. Also, it is not by accident that the author excludes naval forces (except the Trident and Seawolf) from this presentation. Naval forces other than SLBMs, in the context of the U.S.-Russian balance of power, are increasingly irrelevant. The Russian Navy’s "blue water" capability will diminish, and the notion of "horizontal escalation" by CVBGs against territorial Russia in the future will have little practical meaning—if, indeed, it ever had in the past.

12. For a description of some of the benefits that can be derived from such a relationship, see Fred Charles Ikle, "The Case for a Russian-American Defense Community," *The National Interest*, Winter 1991/92, pp.22-32.
CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT DOD HAS ALREADY DONE

In view of the potential for building a strategic partnership between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, the parties intend to accelerate defense cooperation between their military establishments including: intensifying contacts at all levels; expanding activities that encourage doctrinal and operational openness; establishing expanded exchange and liaison programs; and exchanging ideas on fostering proper civil-military relations in a democratic society...

- Excerpted from the Washington Charter
  Signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin
  June 17, 1992

By the time Presidents Bush and Yeltsin had signed the Washington Charter during the June 1992 Washington Summit, the Department of Defense had already gained a great deal of experience developing working-level relationships with defense counterparts in the former Soviet Union. With scarcely little notice by Western media, U.S. service men and women had been quietly and professionally laying the groundwork for the new "strategic relationship" during ground-breaking activities such as performing on-site inspections at Soviet missile facilities, flying Cold War-era strategic bombers--without bombs--into the heart of Russia, and hosting Russian Navy warships during visits to U.S. ports.

The Russian response to this American enthusiasm has been mixed. On the one hand, the average military officer in Russia appreciates the opportunities for travel that the new relationship offers him. These are frustrating times for the
military professional in Russia, and routine contacts do provide him a much needed psychological outlet. The natural generosity of the Russian culture makes it easy for the military officer to develop cordial personal relationships with American counterparts. On the other hand, the Russian military professional today remains extremely proud of his own military heritage and, therefore, tends to eschew overtures from the U.S. that contain paternalistic overtones. The Russian officer is also reminded by his heritage to be wary of forming new relationships. For him, the purges of the 1930s—as distant as they may seem today—serve as an example of what happened to military professionals who seemed to get too "chummy" with foreigners during the last great push for peacetime military cooperation with the West. Clearly, some Russian officers still view the current warming trend in U.S.-Russian relations in cyclical terms. Doubts still linger, and concerns about career prospects and personal safety—should Russia’s democratic processes be reversed—have tended to temper enthusiasm for closer ties, as well.

An incident during the Soviet port visit to San Diego in July 1990 provides one of many anecdotal examples of these often mixed sentiments. Prior to departing San Diego on the last day of the visit, a Soviet naval officer was told by his U.S. counterpart that Americans had a tradition of tossing a personal object—such as a coin—into the harbor before departing, and that this would ensure a safe return. When the
American inquired as to whether Soviet personnel performed the same ritual when they left their ports, the Soviet replied that no, they had no such custom. Later on, the American observed the Soviet officer leaning over the rail of his ship emptying all of the contents of his pockets into the water. When the American asked him why he was doing this, the Soviet replied that he had serious doubts he would ever see America again, but that he was willing to try just about anything.¹

Origins of Defense Contacts

Despite such concerns, U.S. military relations with the former Soviet Union and its successor states have improved since the Soviet Navy's port visit to San Diego in 1990, and there will be more opportunities for Russian naval officers to visit the United States. But even before the first Soviet ship visit, there were dramatic changes already in the works—modifications in Cold War attitudes that had to occur in the U.S. and Soviet military establishments at their highest levels before relations could change. Two men, more than all others, helped bring about such change: Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff.

U.S.-Soviet military relations in the post-Vietnam period had hit rock bottom in the wake of the shooting by a Soviet sentry of Major "Nick" Nicholson, a U.S. Army officer, in East Germany in 1985. Major Nicholson had been on an otherwise
routine (and legal) observation mission in East Germany for the U.S. Military Liaison Mission located in Potsdam, and there were serious indications that the senior Soviet officer on the scene had intentionally let Major Nicholson bleed to death after he had been wounded. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) "Cap" Weinberger was furious about the affair and placed a moratorium on all military contacts until the Soviets offered an official apology. Weinburg was never fully satisfied with the feeble Soviet explanations and issued a restrictive policy to the Services that required his or his deputy's advanced personal approval for all contacts, official or social, between U.S. and Soviet military personnel. This policy had the effect of reducing the "trickle" of military contacts between the two nations' militaries in the mid-1980s to barely a few "drips" a year, and remained in effect until Frank Carlucci replaced Weinburger as SECDEF.

Marshal Akhromeyev, who had an important role in finalizing the INF Treaty, called on Secretary Carlucci during the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in December 1987. One of the discussion items included future military-to-military relations. Secretary Carlucci later discussed with Defense Minister Yazov in March and May of 1988 the possibility of resuming military contacts. Their dialogue finally resulted in an invitation to Marshal Akhromeyev to visit Washington later that summer. Admiral Crowe would be his official host.

Admiral Crowe and Marshal Akhromeyev quickly developed a
close personal relationship, and together they decided to move out on normalizing relations between the two nations' militaries. Akhromeyev was given a red-carpet tour of U.S. military facilities, and issued an invitation for Admiral Crowe to visit him in the Soviet Union the following year. More importantly, the two senior officers made two significant commitments: First, they agreed to create a formal two-year calendar of military-to-military contacts. Second, they agreed to form a joint working group to look into ways of preventing inadvertent military incidents or accidents. By the time of Admiral Crowe's visit to the Soviet Union the following summer, the U.S.-Soviet joint working group had finalized the details of an Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities which Crowe initialed in Moscow in June 1989.

**U.S. Policy and the Evolving Bureaucracy**

Initial U.S. goals for the program were to minimize dangerous military incidents, gain access to the Soviet military establishment, and attempt--through role modelling and dialogue--to influence senior Soviet leaders to accept the general U.S. approach to arms control and civil-military relations. SECDEF no longer personally approved each visit or contact event; however, an interagency working group was created to set priorities and guidelines, ensure events didn't conflict with other foreign policy objectives, and approve
changes to the original calendar.

Clearly, the two-year calendar was originally intended to be the Chairman's program with extensive Service involvement. The interagency working group chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy & Resources, however, became heavily involved from the start. This has resulted from time to time in some bureaucratic tension between the Joint Staff and Services, on the one hand, who generally wanted to expand working-level contacts early on, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the State Department, on the other hand, who favored a highly centralized, gradual approach.

From 1989 onward, DoD has expanded its efforts to develop Soviet and Russian policy specialists to handle non-arms control issues for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The bureaucracy has grown somewhat—particularly since the August 1991 putsch in Moscow—but it remains dwarfed by the large arms control community DoD still has in place.

The OSD cell under Strategy and Resources charged with overseeing defense contacts—Russian, East European, and Eurasian Affairs—has tripled in size to nearly 20 policy specialists. By contrast, the Joint Staff's European Division in J-5—the pivot around which the military contact program functions—has expanded its manpower from only two to five action officers. This Joint Staff cell—called the Russia/Republics Branch—is clearly one of the most active
offices in the Pentagon today, yet it remains critically undermanned.

In 1989, the Air Staff founded its first policy branch for Soviet and East European affairs, and this two-officer effort was expanded in 1992 to the size of a six-person division to handle security assistance implementation as well. By comparison, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps staffs, which are organized along less regional lines, have yet to re-arrange their manpower authorizations. Each currently has only one officer working non-arms control actions for the former Soviet Union.

**OSD’s Agenda**

Early on, OSD officials in the Bush Administration attempted to strike a balance between the growing interest among senior U.S. military officers to develop closer ties with the Soviets and the need to keep Cold War defense acquisition projects alive as long as possible. The revolutions in Eastern Europe were going our way, the Soviet system was straining under enormous internal forces, and there was no imperative from the OSD perspective to let up the pressure on the Soviet defense establishment by prematurely decentralizing military relations. With this philosophy in mind, much of OSD’s efforts during defense discussions on non-arms control issues were directed along two avenues: The first was to convince the Soviets to de-politicize its
military. The second was to encourage the Soviets to convert their defense industries to civilian use (see Figure 20).

The first objective of de-politicization was attained in the fall of 1991 when Russian President Yeltsin disbanded the national-level organs of the Communist Party, such as the Central Committee. By contrast, the goal of transforming defense industries to civilian production—despite continued efforts by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations—continues to be elusive.

Clearly, senior Bush Administration officials during this period discouraged all U.S. efforts to keep former Soviet defense industries afloat, and this policy extended to DoD acquisition organizations who continue today to be restricted from purchasing or leasing advanced technology from the former Soviet Union. Struggling to stay ahead of events,
Bush Administration officials in 1991 became furious when they learned that scientists from the Strategic Defense Initiative Office managed to circumvent this policy by leasing the Soviets' Topaz II space nuclear reactor for Star Wars tests in New Mexico. OSD immediately clamped down on all contacts by returning for a number of months to the old Weinberger-era procedure of requiring either SECDEF or DEPSECDEF approval for each event. Since 1992, this procedure has been dropped, and procedures for approving routine events have been relaxed considerably.

In the last eighteen months, OSD's goals for U.S. defense cooperation with the new Russian armed forces have shifted to the following: the safety, security, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; non-proliferation; a Russian military responsible to elected officials; a demilitarized market economy; and a smaller military with defense oriented forces. OSD has also concentrated on efforts to obtain IMET funding for the training of Russian defense and military officials.

The Role of the Joint Staff

The Joint Staff's Russia/Republics Branch in J-5 remains the focal point for the military contacts program, and works daily with the Services, OSD, and the U.S. attaches in Moscow to negotiate activities. The Nuclear Arms Control Division (also in J-5) has a cell actively working safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) issues, while the Defense Security...
Assistance Administration (DSAA)—a separate DoD organization—implements the IMET program (SSD and IMET will be discussed subsequently in this chapter).

One of the principal roles of the Joint Staff is to balance the Chairman’s objectives with those of the various CINCs (see Figure 21). Clearly, the interagency process has favored keeping the military contact program with the Russians as principally a Washington-Moscow affair. As such, extensive involvement by geographical commands, such as EUCOM and PACOM have generally been discouraged until recently.3

One of the other functions of the Joint Staff in developing the military contacts program is to see where there may be some Service overlap and to make recommendations as to how the various Services might economize their individual
efforts by co-sponsoring activities (see Figure 22). Until recently, the Services were burdened with the financial responsibility for funding events, and the Joint Staff would often designate a single DoD organization, such as a particular Service Staff or NDU, to take the lead in planning and funding multi-Service exchange visits (e.g., professional military education seminars and discussions between medical specialists). In March 1993, Congress authorized DoD to use $15 million from the $800 million designated under Nunn-Lugar legislation for SSD purposes to help pay for expanded military contacts. Eventually, the funds will be made available by OSD to the Joint Staff and Services. Until then, the military contact program will continue to be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, using principally unit-level travel per diem funds and contingency accounts to finance most activities.

**MULTI-SERVICE MILITARY CONTACT EVENTS**

- US Medical Delegation Visits USSR (Fall 88)
- Soviet Medical Delegation Visits US (Spring 89)
- US Historians Visit USSR (Spring 89)
- Soviet Historians Visit US (Mar 90)
- Voroshilov Military Academy of General Staff (MAGS) Delegation Visits National Defense University (NDU) (May 90)
- Service Staff Reps Meet with Soviet Gen Staff Members at Sochi Emerging Leaders Summit (Jul 90)
- NDU Delegation Visits MAGS (Sep 90)
- US Specialists in Drug & Alcohol Abuse Visit USSR (Apr 91)
- MAGS Delegation Visits NDU (May 91)
- US Military Journalists Visit Russia (Oct 91)
- Soviet Rear Services Delegation Visits US (Dec 91)
- Russian Officers Meet with US Service Chaplains in US (May 92)
- Russian Specialists in Drug & Alcohol Abuse Visit US (Jul 92)
- Russian Officer Attends NDU (Fall 92)
- US Logisticians Visit Russia (Sep 92)
- CIS Gen Stolyarov Meets with US Chaplains (Oct 92)

Figure 22
U.S. Navy Activities

The U.S. Navy has had, perhaps, the longest continuous formal contact with its counterpart Service in the former Soviet Union, and this relationship began with the establishment of the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) regime in 1972. Since then, the navies from the two nations have held routine conferences in the former Soviet Union and the United States to discuss dangerous naval activities and incidents. This annual discussion format was expanded in scope in May 1992 to include broader Navy "staff talks" (see Figure 23). At the present, the U.S. Navy's goal is to be able to perform combined operations with the Russian Navy at Sea, specifically in the mission areas of show of force, blockading, and ship monitoring. At the request of President Bush, Russian President Yeltsin deployed the Vinograd, a Udaloy-class destroyer, to the Persian Gulf to work with U.S. and allied naval forces in quarantine missions.

**U.S. NAVY MILITARY CONTACT EVENTS**

- INCSEA Program Begins (1972)
- Soviet Warships Visit San Diego (Jul 90)
- US Warships Visit Vladivostok (Sep 90)
- Soviet Warships Visit Mayport (Jul 91)
- CINC Commonwealth Navy Chernavin Visits US (Nov 91)
- Kuznetsov Academy Delegation Visits US (Dec 91)
- Naval War College Delegation Visits Russia (May & Jun 92)
- INCSEA/Staff Talks Take Place in Moscow (May 92)
- Chief of Naval Operations Kelso Visits Russia (Jun 92)
- US Ships Visit Severomorsk and Conduct Passing at Sea Exercise (PASSEX) (Jul 92)
- Blue Angels Visit Russia (Sep 92)
- US Ships Visit Vladivostok for Opening of US Consulate (Sep 92)
- Russians Deploy First Destroyer to Persian Gulf to Work with US Ships (Oct 92)
- US and Russia Conduct PASSEX in Mediterranean (Oct 92)
- Russian Delegation Visits San Diego for Staff Talks (May 93)

Figure 23
against Iraq. The Vinograd was relieved in January 1993 by the Admiral Tobbitz, and a third Russian deployment is planned for late spring of 1993.

The U.S. and Russian Navies are well on their way to working out procedures for maneuvering with each others' forces at sea. The U.S. Navy currently has a policy of encouraging its captains to practice communicating with Russian warships and performing passing at sea exercises when opportunities arise.

In addition, the U.S. has invited the Russians to participate in the 1992 BALTOPS exercise in June 1993, along with several other Baltic and Nordic states. At the present, the Russians plan to send one ship.

**U.S. Air Force Activities**

The USAF program has focused on two main goals:

a) establishing personal ties between the USAF acquisition community and Russian aerospace enterprises and institutes; and b) building long-term unit-to-unit relationships at the wing/base-level.

The Air Staff began working on the first goal in 1989 as a participant in early exploratory discussions between the Mikoyan Design Bureau in Moscow and General Dynamics in Fort Worth (see Figure 24). These discussions culminated in a breakthrough visit in 1990 by a U.S. aerospace delegation led by USAF Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) Welch for
discussions at several Moscow-area design bureaus. The visit was hosted by Mikoyan and the Soviet Minister of Aviation Industry, and resulted in several spin-off exchange visits such as subsequent discussions in August 1991 at the previously closed Gromov Flight Test Center (known in the West as "Ramenskoye").

Unit-level ties began after the August 1991 putsch in Moscow with the visit of the USAF Chief of Staff in October 1991. During the visit, General McPeak and his Russian counterpart, General Deynekin, agreed in principle to conduct bomber and fighter unit visits, staff college lecture exchanges, and combined search & rescue training exercises. Following this, General McPeak proposed in January 1992 to establish long-term ties between air force units at the wing level, called the "Sister

### U.S. AIR FORCE MILITARY CONTACT EVENTS

- Ass't SECAF for Acquisition Welch Tours Mikoyan and Ministry of Aviation Facilities in Moscow (May 90)
- Soviet Dep CINC Air Force Deynekin Visits Langley AFB (Sep 90)
- Dep Ass't SECAF for Acquisition Visits Moscow Aerospace Facilities and Attends Zhukovsky Air Show (Aug 91)
- Chief of Staff McPeak Visits USSR (Oct 91)
- Gen McPeak Initiates "Sister Base Program" (Jan 92)
- CINCS Gen Stolyarov Becomes First Russian to Fly F-16 (Feb 92)
- SAC B-52s & KC-10 Fly Non-Stop From Barksdale AFB to "Sister Base" at Ryazan, Russia for 50th Anniversary of Long-Range Aviation (Mar 92)
- CINC Russian Air Force Deynekin Visits US; Flies B-1 (May 92)
- Air Command and Staff College Delegation Visits Gagarin Air Academy (May 92)
- Russian Tu-95s Fly to Barksdale AFB (Sister Base) for SAC's Last Bomb Competition Symposium (May 92)
- 11th Air Force (Alaska) Delegation Observes Russian Search & Rescue Exercise at Vladivostok; Hosts Russians at Elmendorf AFB (Jun 92)
- Russian Su-27s Visit Langley AFB (Sister Base) (Jul 92)
- Russian Air Force Colonel Enters Air War College Class (Fall 92)
- USAF Acquisition Delegation Attends Moscow Air Show (Aug 92)
- USAF F-15s From Langley AFB Visit Lipetsk (Sister Base) (Sep 92)
- Air War College Delegation Visits Russia (Sep 92)
- 11th Air Force Conducts Combined Arctic Search & Rescue Exercise Near Tiksi, Northern Siberia (Apr 93)

Figure 24

88
Base Program," and USAF military contacts since then have been built around this concept. In March 1992, the USAF sent the first combat aircraft to Russia when a contingent of approximately 60 airmen flew on board two B-52s and one KC-10 non-stop from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, to a "Sister Base" near the city of Ryazan.

U.S. Army Activities

Despite an early trip to the Soviet Union in 1990 by General Vuono (former Army Chief of Staff), initial U.S. Army attempts to establish unit-level activities were frustrated in part by the role General Varennikov, the former CINC of the Soviet Ground Forces, seemed to play in the Baltics crackdown and the August 1991 putsch. Since 1992, however, the pace of army contacts has increased considerably (see Figure 25), starting with a visit by a delegation from the Combined Arms Center to the Frunze

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. ARMY MILITARY CONTACT EVENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Soviet Cadet Delegation Visits West Point (Feb 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• West Point Cadet Delegation Visits USSR (Mar 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Army Chief of Staff Vuono Visits USSR (Nov 90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Soviets Send Team to Rifle Competition at Ft Benning (Jan 91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US Combined Arms Center Delegation Visits Russia (Apr 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US Army Band Participates in WWII Victory Day Parade in Russia (May 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian Cadet Delegation Visits West Point (Jul 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US Band Visits St Petersburg (Jul 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Russian Air Force Colonel Eners Army War College Class (Fall 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US Team Participates in Russian Kayak Competition (Aug 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• US Combined Arms Center Delegation Visits Russia (Sep 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secretary Stone Visits Russia (Oct 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cnd &amp; Gen Staff College Delegation Visits Frunze Academy (Dec 92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ground Forces CINC General Semenov Visits US (Feb 93)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 25
Staff Academy and culminating with a highly successful visit to the U.S. by General Semenov, the new Russian Ground Forces CINC, in February 1993.

During the Army Chief of Staff counterpart visit, Generals Sullivan and Semenov agreed in principle to establish a working group between the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Russian Ground Forces Main Staff. The two military leaders also agreed to pursue the concept of sending U.S. Army students to the Frunze Academy as one-year students.9

U.S. Marine Corps Activities

Marine Corps efforts have been limited to date. This is due in part to the fact that the Russians do not have a truly independent counterpart service.10 Russian naval infantry remains subordinate to the CINC of the Russian Navy, and all military contacts have to be approved through the Russian Navy Main Staff. General Mundy was able to make some headway during a trip to Russia in November 1992, and the Marine Corps expects that unit-level contacts and attendance by Russian naval infantry officers at Quantico training programs will soon be on the agenda.

90
**IMET Program**

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Russia is closely related to the Military Contact Program, however, it is executed by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and funded independently.

It's important to note that the Russians, unlike many other nations, have never asked the United States for any form of Security Assistance. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1992, Congress enacted the program and authorized $153,000 to be spent during the last several months of FY92. In June 1992, the Russians, not wanting "to look a gift horse in the mouth," signed the IMET agreement.

Russian military officers are eligible for a wide spectrum of IMET training programs. Still, it has been U.S. policy to steer them away from programs that are technically or operationally oriented and, instead, have them concentrate on professional military education. Currently, there are three Russian officers attending U.S. war colleges--one each at Carlisle Barracks, Maxwell AFB, and NDU. In addition, there are three officers attending the Defense Resource Management School at Monterey, plus several officers taking English language training courses.

Congress increased IMET appropriations for Russia to $700,000 for FY93, and DSAA expects the amount will be raised to $1,000,000 for FY94.
Safety, Security, and Dismantlement

In December 1991, Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar Amendment to the Conventional Forces in Europe Act of 1991 which authorized DoD to reprogram $400 million from its FY92 budget to assist the former Soviet states in transporting, storing, and dismantling their nuclear arsenals. The total reprogrammable amount was increased to $800 million by Senators Nunn and Lugar in the DoD Appropriations Act of 1993, passed October 6, 1992. The Clinton Administration is now recommending that Congress appropriate $400 million in new DoD monies for SSD purposes in FY94.

Since 1992, OSD and the Joint Staff have been actively involved in a series of negotiations, known as the "SSD Talks." These talks have produced several initial agreements, several of which were announced at the Clinton-Yeltsin Summit in Vancouver on April 4, 1993. Of the $800 million currently available under Nunn-Lugar legislation, the U.S. has so far pledged $130 million for dismantlement, $75 million for the construction of a facility in Russia for storing plutonium, and $10 million to help establish nuclear material control and accounting systems. Approximately $75 million in SSD funds has also been pledged for use in Belarus.

Nunn-Lugar monies have been committed for non-SSD programs as well, such as $15 million for military-to-military contacts and $10 million for a study that will assess the environmental problems caused by years of nuclear dumping by

92
the Soviets in the Barents and Kara Seas. In addition, the U.S. government has committed $6 million out of $40 million available from Nunn-Lugar defense conversion funds to build 450 housing units for Russian military officers returning from assignments outside of the Russian Federation.\(^5\)

The U.S. government has been criticized by Congress and the press--perhaps unfairly--for moving too slowly on committing Nunn-Lugar funds to the SSD process. There are a number of bureaucratic problems, no doubt, on the U.S. side. Most of the initial delays, however, were due to concerns about how to account for the proper expenditure of DoD’s funds once they were obligated to the various recipient organizations in the former Soviet Union. There are also a number of Nunn-Lugar restrictions that require U.S. labor for some of the work. Clearly, the Russian military is hesitant about intrusive U.S. involvement in nuclear dismantlement activities such as the removal of fissionable material from re-entry vehicles and munitions.\(^6\) The $400 million in new DoD funds being requested by the Administration for FY94 are not limited by a number of these conditions.\(^7\)

**Summation**

As this chapter has shown, the Department of Defense has already made some noteworthy--if at times unfocused--efforts toward establishing cooperative ties with the new Russian defense establishment. As a whole, DoD is still feeling its
way in the rapidly changing defense relationship, and is currently being pushed, sometimes relentlessly, by important outside groups, such as Congress, academia, and the U.S. business community, to redouble its efforts.

As momentum gains for increased U.S.-Russian defense cooperation, and as serious funding becomes available to pay for new programs, policymakers in the new Administration could perhaps benefit by taking a fresh look at Russian Military Thought and the major historical themes--discussed in Chapter Two--which continue to affect its development.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR


2. Information contained in Figures 20 through 26 was compiled from data supplied by a number of officials in DoD. Several officials requested anonymity. Those who did not are cited in the accompanying narratives.

3. Interview with an anonymous DoD official with access to current policy issues.

4. Interview with an anonymous DoD official with access to current policy issues.

5. EUCOM, by comparison, has taken the lead in developing relations with the military establishments of East European nations such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and has developed the Contact Team concept for providing formal consultative advice to these new democracies. The Washington bureaucracy is still hesitant about letting EUCOM get too heavily involved in activities in the former Soviet states.


12. A Russian naval officer will attend the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, beginning in August 1993.


16. Interview with an anonymous DoD official with access to current policy issues.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION LOOKS AHEAD

During the Cold War, our foreign policies largely focused on the relations among nations. Our strategies sought a balance to keep the peace. Today our policies must also focus on relations within nations, on a nation's form of governance, on its economic structure, on its ethnic tolerance. ... As long as there are reformers in the Russian Federation and the other states leading the journey toward democracy's horizon, our strategy must be to support them, and our place must be at their side. ... - President Bill Clinton
Speaking Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the U.S. Naval Academy, April 1, 1993

The pace of U.S.-Russian military relations seemed to slow during the first half of 1993, particularly from Inauguration Day in January until the end of April. This was due to two reasons. First, President Yeltsin's power struggle with the Supreme Soviet caused a number of Russian military officials to reconsider their growing cordiality with Americans—just in case Yeltsin fell. Second, the new Clinton Administration lost a lot of time getting its Russian policy "team" into place—particularly those key players at the assistant secretary level. As a consequence, some parts of the bureaucracy had to mark time as they waited (and some are still waiting) for the political decisionmakers to officially arrive on scene—before moving out on a number of issues.

Evidently, the Administration was able to recover in the days prior to the Vancouver Summit and deftly acquitted itself
in providing unequivocal political support to Yeltsin at a much needed time. The summit was a risk to both Presidents, and while the aid package the U.S. presented to the Russians was short on substance, it no doubt helped Yeltsin’s showing in the referendum several weeks later.

**Emerging Goals**

Clearly, the new Administration desires to do everything it can (given fiscal limits) to assist in the control and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and to support current efforts by the Yeltsin presidency toward democratization, marketization, and a downsized military. U.S. officials, as they formulate guidance for the Department of Defense, appear to be taking the U.S. into a new defense relationship with the Russian Federation that approximates *Policy Track D: Solidifying a Partnership*, which was described earlier in Chapter Three.

One of the goals of this new activist approach to the U.S.-Russian defense relationship is to get Moscow to commit to a long-term dialogue between the two nations’ militaries. The military contacts regime, under which exchanges have been conducted since 1988, is not legally binding. Moscow has often slowed the process by not acting upon U.S. proposals or by postponing events. Now that SSD funds are becoming available to pay for military contact activities, the Clinton Administration wants Moscow’s long-term commitment.
After postponing an earlier session, the Russians agreed to meet in Washington for the first U.S.-Russian Joint Staff talks in May 1993. While the Americans were unable to get anything approaching a legally binding document, they were able to agree "in principle" with the Russians to a new series of military contact activities which will be planned for the remaining months of 1993. The Russians also agreed to consider a number of proposals for 1994.

At first glance, the contacts seem to feature more mid-level activities. Senior official visits will, no doubt, continue—as they remain an essential part of the ongoing dialogue. Oftentimes, though, high-level exchanges turn out to be burdensome representational visits and create false expectations, especially if they are short on substance.
From looking at Figures 27 through 33, one can see that the program for the remaining part of 1993, when compared to past years, has devolved to the Services. The number of OSD, Joint, and Multi-Service events totals 7. This compares with approximately 35 Service-specific events planned for the remaining months of 1993.

The U.S. Navy’s planned program introduces semi-annual P-3 visits to Nikolayevka Air Base in Russia. One Russian warship will participate in BALTOPS ’93, and a U.S. Navy ship will visit a Russian port on the Baltic Sea coast. In addition, the Russian Navy will send its first officer to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, under the IMET program.

**FUTURE MULTI-SERVICE CONTACT EVENTS**
- Russian Rear Services Delegation Visits US Logistical Facilities (May 93)

**FUTURE U.S. NAVY CONTACT EVENTS**
- P-3s Initiate Semi-Annual Visits to Nikolayevka Air Base (May-Jun 93, and Jul-Sep 93)
- Russian Navy Warship Participates in BALTOPS ’93; US Navy Warship Visits St Petersburg or Kaliningrad (Jun 93)
- Commander, COMSEVENTHFLT Makes Flag Ship Visit to Vladivostok (Jul-Sep 93)
- Russian Midshipmen Cruise on US Navy Ships (Aug 93)
- Russian Navy Captain Second Rank Enters Naval War College (Aug 93)
- Russian Navy Port Visit and PASSEX at San Francisco (Oct 93)
The U.S. Marine Corps will dovetail several of its events with navy port visits. In addition, the USMC presentation team will make a separate visit to Russia in the fall.

During the latter half of 1993, the U.S. Air Force will expand its "Sister Base" program to include training and airlift bases. Specific activities will feature visits between airlift, training, and bomber wings, and exchanges of delegations between engineering schools and staff colleges.

U.S. Army activities also feature several unit-level exchange visits. The

FUTURE U.S. MARINE CORPS CONTACT EVENTS

- Commander 3rd Marine Division Visits Vladivostok With COMSEVENTHFLT (Jul-Sep 93)
- USMC Presentation Team Visits Russia (Sep 93)
- Russian Naval Infantry Visits San Francisco (Oct 93)

Figure 31

FUTURE U.S. AIR FORCE CONTACT EVENTS

- Air Command and Staff College Delegation Visits Gagarin Air Academy (May 93)
- Russian Airlift Regiment Delegation Makes Sister Base Visit to Charleston AFB (Jun 93)
- Zhukovsky Engineering Academy Delegation Visits Air Force Institute of Technology (Jun 93)
- Commander, Air Mobility Command Visits Russia (Jul-Sep 93)
- Russian Educators Visit Air University (Aug 93)
- Commander, Pacific Air Forces Visits Russia (Aug 93)
- Gagarin Air Academy Delegation Visits Air Command and Staff College (Sep 93)
- Lipetsk Fighter Delegation Makes Sister Base Visit to Langley AFB (Sep 93)
- Commander, First Air Army Visits Hickam AFB (Sep 93)
- Langley AFB Delegation Makes Sister Base Visit to Lipetsk Air Base (Oct 93)
- Schyolkovo Research Center Makes Sister Base Visit to Edwards AFB (Nov 93)
- Russian Bomb Wing Makes Sister Base Visit to Barksdale AFB (Nov 93)
- Russian Training Unit Makes Sister Base Visit to Randolph AFB (Nov 93)
- Russian Meteorologists Visit US (Dec 93)
- Russian Delegation Attends Search and Rescue Planning Conference at Elmendorf AFB (4th Quarter 93)

Figure 32
Russians will attend a Reserve Component Seminar to be held in Australia, and the U.S. Army’s Recruiting Command will make presentations in Russia. Some of the most promising features of the Army’s program, however, may be the series of discussions on peacekeeping operations.

The positive aspect of the new military contacts program is that it appears to reflect the new Administration’s overall approach—which is to be less restrictive than the Bush Administration was of the types of activities the Services can pursue. The downside, however, is that the program still lacks overall focus. The Administration clearly has a long-term vision of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Russian military professional; however, it seems to be pursuing a number of endeavors at the same time. Clearly, DoD could do with some better direction than "more is better."

If the vision of the Clinton Administration is to persuade the Russian military toward "our way of thinking"—as it has often been said over the last several months—then one
strategy might be to examine in more detail the field of Russian military thought, and then attempt to address, by U.S. actions, the major themes or historic issues which continue to affect its development. In Chapter Two, this study suggested that three themes, in particular, merited such investigation.

The Magician and the German

The first theme of conflict and change that U.S policymakers might want to address is the Russian military's search for identity. Specifically, U.S. policy should be geared toward facilitating the Russian's changing understanding of the role of military force in the new world order. At the same time, U.S. programs should attempt to influence indirectly the ongoing doctrinal debates in the favor of reformers. Random contacts do have some effect on shaping the Russian military officer's new sense of identity. DoD, however, needs to design specific programs that deal with these important tasks on a frequent and routine basis.

The Air Force's Sister Base Program and IMET-sponsored attendance by mid-level officers at the nation's war colleges are excellent starters; but these are long-term investments. DoD should implement, within the next six months, a national security affairs course (two weeks in duration), which focuses on influencing Russian officers of flag rank, similar to the orientation course for senior Russian officers that Harvard has offered. The course could be held at any one of the war
colleges in the U.S. It should feature lectures and
discussions lead by civilians of diverse backgrounds and by
senior U.S. flag officers. The U.S. goal should be to get 100
Russian general officers and admirals though the program every
12 months. The curriculum should emphasize the U.S. defense
policymaking perspective, seek Russian independent views, and
make it clear that the U.S. military profession is also
struggling to define its future role.

Next, U.S. policymakers can influence the Russian’s view
toward both the use of force and military reform by
intensifying discussions on peacekeeping operations. The U.S.
Army will begin some exploratory discussions with the Russian
ground forces in the next several months. This effort needs
to be fully supported by the U.S. Government, quickly expanded
and, perhaps, elevated to the level of ministerial
discussions. Clearly, there is fertile ground in this area.
Russian foreign affairs experts see a future external
peacekeeping role for the Russian military; however, the
senior military leadership may be hesitant about using forces
in this manner due to a lack of experience. Russia’s armed
forces may be involved in the inter-ethnic and inter-republic
clashes in the former Soviet states for years to come.
President Yeltsin has already stated that he wants Russian
forces to be the policemen of central Eurasia—under a U.N.
flag.3 What better way could the U.S. influence the use of
force within the former Soviet states than to help the
Russians develop proficiency in peacekeeping functions?

At the very least, currently planned U.S. Army discussions should be expanded to include the Marine Corps, which has had considerable recent experience in peacekeeping operations. If the discussions go well, the U.S. Government should offer to train several Russian regiments in peacekeeping operations each year. After they are trained, the Russian units could then be sent for short tours into places like Somalia or Yugoslavia (if there is a peace accord). After their tours are completed, the Russian government might want to rotate the units into trouble spots of the former Soviet Union under the auspices of either the U.N. or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.4

As a long-range option, the U.S. might consider offering up a small U.S. Army post (one slated for closure) to the Russians as a permanent training facility for peacekeeping operations. Post operating expenses would be paid by the U.S. government, and housing could be provided for the Russian permanent cadre (and families), and for the rotating units. In exchange, the U.S. might be able to obtain access to military ranges in the Russian Federation from which to conduct activities such as low-level flight training or weapons testing.
The Search for the Perfect Paradigm

The U.S. Army, perhaps, is in the best position of all the Services to access and influence both the substance and structure of the Russian system of military thought. The Army has made a major effort over the last several decades—through the Soviet Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program—to develop a corps of career Army officers knowledgeable in the Russian language and familiar with the Russian theoretical paradigm. This investment is paying off in terms of the types of programs the U.S Army is now able to pursue—such as the TRADOC doctrinal discussions and possible U.S. student attendance at the Frunze Staff Academy.

Clearly, the other Services are lagging behind and continue to show little interest in making the necessary long-term investment to develop and maintain the required language skills or area expertise. Often, the Services have to hire interpreters through the State Department to support senior-level discussions. Why is this? The answer is, simply, that there are precious few military linguists in DoD with the verbal skills and technical proficiency to do a credible job. Aside from the Army, the only major non-intelligence organization in DoD to make a systematic effort to develop and maintain the Russian language proficiency of its personnel is the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). OSIA’s leadership recognized early on the linkage between good language skills and the ability to work effectively with the Russian military
on a day-to-day basis. As a consequence, OSIA has made the necessary investment to provide programs such as in-house tutorial services to its personnel—free of charge. DoD should consider doing the same throughout all of the Services, and begin, perhaps, by creating small Russian Language Training and Maintenance Centers at places such as the Pentagon, the war colleges, and command headquarters. In general, DoD can do a lot more to increase the Russian language proficiency of its personnel. The investment DoD makes today will reap dividends in the years ahead.5

In time, TRADOC's discussions with the Russian ground forces should be emulated by the other Services. The Joint Staff should also stay involved in the doctrinal discussions. Several near-term projects the Russian and American staffs might pursue are the joint development of a Russian-English dictionary of military terms and the publication of a manual that shows where the nations differ on methodology and theory. The Joint Staff might even consider setting up permanent exchange liaison billets at the General Staff's Directorate of Operational and Strategic Analyses and at the Joint Staff/J-8. Finally, all of the Services should eventually send officers to attend Russian war colleges in residence. Bringing Russian officers to schools in the U.S. under IMET will continue to be important. We should not forget, however, that assigning Americans to study and work in Russia can also influence evolving Russian viewpoints.
Coping with "Revolutions in Military Affairs"

In the future, we may be in a position to influence how the Russians exploit the new defense-related technologies--but only if we are willing to actively engage our counterparts as full partners. In many respects, this is one of the most potentially fruitful areas for defense cooperation, but we must first realize that the Russians are extremely proud of their scientific and technical achievements. As such, they will tend to eschew U.S. approaches that contain paternalistic overtones.

One important step for building a cooperative technical partnership would be for the U.S. to develop a coherent policy that allows DoD laboratories and acquisition organizations to engage in substantive discussions on joint research & development projects. The Russians have made a number of thoughtful overtures to the U.S. Currently, however, the U.S. military is barred even from engaging in exploratory discussions, let alone from committing to research programs or technology purchases. DoD needs to revise Cold War-era restrictions and develop a sound, new interagency regime for vetting joint R&D proposals that clearly advance overall U.S. goals.

Ballistic missile defense may be a particularly fruitful area for U.S.-Russian technical cooperation. The Russians are very concerned about future missile strikes from unstable regimes along their southern periphery. Since June 1992, both
sides have been engaged in working-group discussions on a Global Protection System (GPS). The Russians are very interested in developing ballistic missile defense on a bilateral basis. GPS-related discussions should be given a high priority in the Clinton Administration. At the very least, the U.S. should continue to pursue former Secretary of State James Baker's proposal made in February 1992 to develop jointly manned missile warning centers.

Airspace management is a third area for potential technological cooperation. Air traffic control--traditionally a function of the former Soviet defense establishment--is in a state of shambles. The U.S. goal of helping the Yeltsin government downsize the Russian military could be facilitated by encouraging the Russian Federation and the other newly independent states to adopt a Western-style air traffic control system.

If modernized correctly, a new civilian-based system could enhance worldwide travel and communications as it brings in hard currency to the Russian government in the form of increased airline revenues. Officials from DoD, the Federal Aviation Administration, and U.S. industry have been involved with the Russians in some initial discussions. The new Administration should examine this effort very closely and perhaps underwrite a package of U.S. and Western credits that encourages the Russians to adopt such a civilian-based system.
The Thematic Approach in Retrospect

To explore areas of potential defense cooperation by examining the major themes of conflict and change in Russian military thought is only one avenue of approach. There are many concepts now coming to the forefront; the examples offered under the headings of the three thematic issues presented in this chapter are meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive. The point is that future efforts need to be more closely harmonized with overall U.S. goals, and whatever approach is finally brought to bear on the policymaking process should provide DoD with a better focus.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE


2. Data for Figures 27 through 33 were extracted from a document entitled "Plan for Contacts Between the Armed Forces of the United States and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for 1993." The document was agreed to "in principle" by both sides during the May 1993 U.S.-Russian Joint Staff Talks in Washington.

3. So far, peacekeeping units and other "volunteers" from the former Soviet states have performed quite poorly in places such as the former Yugoslavia and central Asia.

4. Interview with Dr. G. Paul Holman, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 25, 1993.

5. DoD needs to be thinking about developing skills in other languages as well, such as Ukrainian, Georgian, and Uzbek. Developing and maintain skills in Russian, however, due to its common usage throughout the former Soviet states, will remain the best near-term investment.


8. A delegation led by General-Colonel Anatoliy Malyukov, Russian Air Force Chief of Staff, visited several U.S. facilities for airspace management discussions in the spring of 1993.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

As this study has demonstrated, military relations between the United States and Russia are growing rapidly, and Russian military thought, if examined critically, can indeed provide important insights on how to proceed.

Clearly, the rich and often troubled intellectual heritage of the Russian military professional deserves a fresh look. As Chapter Two’s conclusions suggested, one way of examining this heritage is to focus on major themes of conflict and change--issues that continue to affect the formulation of Russian military policy, even today.

This study’s focus then shifted to the U.S. perspective in Chapter Three as both scenarios and policy responses were broadly outlined. Next, Chapter Four demonstrated that past efforts on the part of DoD to develop military relations have already been quite extensive, if at times random.

After briefly examining the new Administration’s philosophy and several of its military contact proposals in Chapter Five, this study then returned to the three historic themes developed in Chapter Two. Chapter Five concluded by demonstrating how U.S. decisionmakers--by using a thematic analysis of Russian military thought--might bring more focus to bear on the overall policymaking process.

Some may argue that there are still too many constraints on both sides for the U.S. and Russian defense establishments
to become any closer than they already are. Many officials in the new Administration believe, however, that more can be done.

Practically all policy specialists agree that the United States has a long-term interest in seeing the Russian nation succeed in its epic struggle to transform itself into a modern democracy. U.S. defense policy over the next several years—if boldly but delicately formulated—can contribute to that success.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS


ARTICLES


FitzGerald, Mary G. "Russia’s New Military Doctrine." Naval War College Review, Spring 1993, pp. 24-44.


UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND MANUSCRIPTS


INTERVIEWS

Interview with Lt Colonel Larry Bockman, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, RI (also former Assistant Naval Attache, U.S. Embassy, Moscow): March 25, 1993.
Interview with Dr. Bobby L. Childress, Senior Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 25, 1993.

Interview with Dr. Raymond Duncan, Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 25, 1993.

Interview with Dr. William C. Fuller, Jr., Strategy and Policy Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 24, 1993.

Interview with Dr. Virginia Gamba, Program Officer, Arms Control, Disarmament and International Cooperation, MacArthur Foundation, Chicago (visiting Newport, RI): March 25, 1993.


Interview with Dr. G. Paul Holman, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval War College, Newport, RI: March 25, 1993.


Interviews in the spring of 1993 with policy specialists working current U.S.-Russian issues who requested anonymity.