Readiness of the Army National Guard:
A Case Study of the 26th Infantry Division

Christopher Wakim

A Thesis in the Field of Government
for the Degree of Master of
Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University
June 1991
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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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<td>Christopher Wakim</td>
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<td>Approved for public release - Distribution unlimited</td>
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<td>1. Readiness of Army National Guard</td>
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<td>2. ARNG- Combat Readiness</td>
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Abstract

The hypothesis tested in this study is that the 26th Infantry Division cannot reach an acceptable level of training readiness in accordance with the Army's standards to mobilize, deploy, and conduct combat operations. The 26th Infantry Division is an Army National Guard combat unit with elements based primarily in Massachusetts, but with smaller units throughout the New England states. With the active Army force being reduced due to budget constraints and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, it is likely that Army National Guard units will assume more responsibility for the national defense interests of the United States and its allies. The research method used in this study is based upon an approach to the hypothesis from two directions. First, the 26th Infantry Division's actual performance of critical tasks essential to reach combat readiness was measured against the Army's published expectations in its training manuals. Secondly, personal experience and the expertise of other active duty Army trainers who have observed the unit in training were called upon to test the hypothesis. Both approaches verified that the 26th Infantry Division cannot obtain wartime readiness due to resource constraints, poor leadership, and organizational weaknesses. I conclude that the combat units in the Army National Guard have lost their focus as to why they exist and that they should be disbanded.
Author's Biographical Sketch

Christopher Wakim was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the branch of Infantry from the United States Military Academy in May 1980. He was assigned as a platoon leader in the Federal Republic of Germany with a light infantry unit, and then became the company executive officer before returning to the United States for advanced military schooling. He was assigned to the Fourth Infantry Division in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where he served as battalion adjutant, company commander, and principle instructor for a pre-command course designed to prepare company commanders for command. In 1988, he was assigned to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Readiness Group Devens to work with and train reserve component units. As a trainer in unit planning and mobilization, Captain Wakim traveled throughout New England assisting Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve units. He participated in the mobilization of reserve component troops to the Middle East in support of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.
Dedication

To my daughter...

I hope I have shown you the way.
Acknowledgements

I want to acknowledge the academicians who have profoundly influenced me in my years of study. In my youth, Barbara Fassig, Max Laborde, and Margaret Ragni taught me both the basics and formed my character. The Harvard professors, particularly George W. Goethals, Margaret Weir, and of course Mary C. Waters, led me to syntopical learning with a genuine thrill in the process.

I also wish to acknowledge Terry L. Wolf for his timely and valuable technical assistance.

I thank my mother who encouraged me throughout both Harvard and especially West Point during the "bleak years."

Finally, I especially thank my wife, Jeannette, who stood with me through the past tumultuous year. Without you, none of my accomplishments would ever have been.
# Table of Contents

Author’s Biographical Sketch..............................iv
Dedication......................................................v
Acknowledgments................................................vi

I. Introduction.................................................1

II. The Army National Guard - Structure and Missions.....7

III. Training the Force..........................................10

   Occupy an Assembly Area - The Battalion..............15
   Occupy an Assembly Area - The Company..............19
   Occupy an Assembly Area - The Platoon/Squad......23
   The Final Step - Common Tasks.........................27
   Conclusion..................................................31

IV. Planning Within Constraints............................34

V. Mobilization - Come as You Are........................46

VI. Summary....................................................53

VII. Conclusion................................................58

Appendix.......................................................62

Endnotes........................................................64

Bibliography..................................................68
Chapter I

Introduction

The United States Army is in a state of significant change. Despite Operation Desert Storm, the active component of the Army will be reduced. Due in part to a decreased threat from the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as well as large budget deficits in the United States, the reserve components (United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard) will assume a greater role in the Army force structure.

The decreased threat against the United States and its allies can be seen in three key agreements between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union. First, the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement signed in December 1987 eliminated an entire class of theater nuclear weapons with ranges between 300 and 3,400 kilometers.\(^1\) Secondly, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed on November 19, 1990, slashes forces in Europe by 40 percent with the Soviet Union bearing the bulk of the cuts. Described by President Bush as "the farthest-reaching arms agreement in history," the Treaty requires the scrapping or removal of roughly 100,000 of the 250,000 tanks, cannons, armored combat vehicles, and aircraft from the European continent.\(^2\) Further, this treaty substantiates Mikhail Gorbachev's new military strategy of "Reasonable Sufficiency," which in essence removes the offensive component of Soviet defense policy prevalent since the mid-60s.\(^3\) This Treaty has removed most, if not all, of the threat of an attack by the Soviet Union and its allies against Western Europe. The
third significant agreement between the two nations and their allies is the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty expected to be signed later in 1991. This treaty is intended to decrease the likelihood of strategic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union by greatly reducing the number of missile delivery systems and warheads allowed by both nations. All three of these agreements reduce both the actual and psychological threat of war between the two sides of the all-but-defunct Cold War.

Another major reason for the decreased threat toward the United States and its allies is Gorbachev’s current focus on rebuilding the economic, political, and social base within the Soviet Union. To do so, he must concentrate his resources and efforts within the Soviet Union itself without concern for costly foreign adventures. Despite his efforts, there appears to be a good possibility that the Soviet Union itself may collapse with, at best, only a loose federation of independent countries remaining. These internal problems once again contribute to the decreased threat against the United States and its allies. With the threat from the Soviet Union decreased substantially, the question remains, what will be the size and structure of the United States Army? While it is difficult if not impossible to predict the future with a great deal of accuracy, it is unlikely that a massive engagement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on the plains of Germany will occur, particularly when one considers the treaties discussed above and the unification of the two Germanys in 1990. Further, it is unlikely that Mikhail Gorbachev (or his successor) could sustain an army of sufficient strength to threaten Western interests in Europe.

It appears more likely that the United States Army will be
structured to respond quickly to a distant location in defense of its economic interests or citizens, such as the case of the current operation against Iraq, or as in Panama in 1989, or Grenada in 1982. No one can predict with perfect accuracy where the United States Army will be called upon to deploy, but the underlying need for a rapid deployment of highly trained soldiers who are able to effectively use sophisticated equipment and weaponry is apparent. Currently, the United States maintains 28 divisions in the Total Force (active Army, Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve). Ten of these divisions consist entirely of Army National Guard units, while eight of the remaining eighteen divisions are called "roundout" units, in which at least one brigade-size combat element from the Army National Guard will become part of an active-duty Army division in the event of a war.\textsuperscript{6} Thus, the Army National Guard forms about 45 percent of combat strength of the Total Force.\textsuperscript{7}

The Total Force structure of 28 divisions was designed originally on the assumption of a war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. The Army envisioned progressively worsening relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with sufficient time to mobilize and train the reserve forces to deploy to Western Europe in the event of a general attack. Indeed, despite the profound changes in Europe along with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, many Army National Guard units in the New England area still conduct wargames based upon a European scenario.

With the apparent end of the Cold War, the looming budget deficit, and the subsequent need to cut defense costs in an effort to reduce the deficit, the Department of Defense (DoD) has issued a directive to reduce the active component of the force structure. The Army's
adaptation of DoD's directive is called the "Building Down" (sic) Program. While Operation Desert Storm has delayed implementation of this program, the number of active duty divisions is likely to decrease by between two and six of the current number of sixteen. In keeping with the strong support Congress historically accords to the reserve components, this decrease of the active (and more costly) force will be absorbed by an increase of funds to the reserve components. But along with this increase of funding to the reserve forces will come an increased role of defense preparedness previously expected from the active force.

The Army Chief of Staff defined in his January 1990 White Paper a need for readiness as the "build down" occurs. He envisions a quality force of the right size and composition to meet a wide array of potential threats to the U.S. interests throughout the world. "This Total Army will be lean, competent, confident and well trained. We cannot settle for anything less," General Voum announced.

But the question is, can the reserve components, particularly the Army National Guard, take on the increased role of defense preparedness as the active Army pursues its "Building Down" program? This thesis is written to examine this question. Specifically, it will pursue the answer to the question by examining the 26th Infantry Division, an Army National Guard unit with elements located primarily in Massachusetts, but with units also in Connecticut, Vermont, and Rhode Island. The 26th Infantry Division can deploy anywhere in the world if called upon by the President in the event of a selective, partial, full, or total mobilization, and/or by Congressional approval or declaration of war.

My hypothesis is that the 26th Infantry Division cannot reach an acceptable level of training readiness to mobilize, deploy, and conduct
combat operations. Two different research methods will be used to prove this hypothesis. First, I will use the Army’s own manuals and training guides to assess whether resources are available to meet the minimal standards of readiness for deployment as detailed in these publications. These resources include training areas to maneuver and time available during regular National Guard training events to develop both individual and collective proficiency in wartime tasks.

Secondly, I will draw upon my experience as a trainer with over ten years in the active Army in various command and staff positions. I will apply this experience as an observer-participant of various units in the 26th Division to address the research question. Data were drawn from over two years of personal observation assigned as an adviser to the reserve component units in the New England area and as a participant in the mobilization of several reserve units to the Middle East in the latter months of 1990 and in early 1991 in support of Operation Desert Storm. Also, I used the experience of other active duty trainers assigned to work with the 26th Infantry Division to improve its training posture. The information drawn from these trainers is from a total of about 100 years of training expertise from various units throughout the Army.

I hope to conclude that the 26th Infantry Division cannot reach a level of combat readiness for deployment. I will argue that the ARNG lacks the resources and the expertise to train to the Army’s established standards. Further, training for deployment is only part of what ARNG units are expected to do. Thus, there is a confusion of purpose for why they exist.

This confusion of purpose appears to be at the root of the ARNG. The Guard is an organization with normative as well as technical and
structural sources in that it was created to contribute to the national
defense as well as to serve the governors of the respective states. A
clearly defined structure was created within the Guard for this end.
These rationalized sources appear to be the primary causal forces
supporting the organization of the Army National Guard. But these
forces are referred to by Meyer and Rowan as "rationalized myths" in
that the Guard's statements of intents and goals of "readiness" cannot
be empirically verified internal to the Guard and, secondly, that these
goals are widely believed. 10

This cross-cutting of goals has caused organized anarchy. As
W. Richard Scott has written about organizations, "What solutions get
attached to problems are largely determined by chance". 11 To cope with
this organized anarchy, the 26th Infantry Division has used the occasion
of Operation Desert Shield in the Middle East to issue a plan, which is
largely symbolic and ineffective (Chapter 4). It is my belief that the
cross-cutting of goals has resulted in ineffective planning preventing
the 26th Infantry Division to reach a level of combat readiness for
deployment.

While I am examining only the 26th Infantry Division for purposes
of focus and time and resource limitations, it is my considered belief
that this conclusion is applicable to Army National Guard divisions and
separate brigades throughout the United States, and that the 26th
Infantry Division is not unique in this regard. Thus, this thesis
should be viewed as an in-depth case study of what may be true in Army
National Guard units across the board.
Chapter II

The Army National Guard

Structure and Missions

The Army National Guard (ARNG) is the largest of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard components of the United States Reserve system with an assigned strength of 456,960 men and women located in every state, including Guam, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Its mission is to train individuals and units in support of the Total Force policy in the event of war. The Army National Guard traces its heritage back to 1636 when units were formed for protection of the colonialists around the area of Boston, Massachusetts. Today, the National Guard performs both federal and state assignments or "missions." Training time for these missions averages thirty-nine days per year. The National Guard is thus a low-cost augmentation force for the active Army if so called upon, as well as for their states and local communities when natural disasters or civil disorders occur. For the active force, the Guard contributes about 46 percent of the Army's combat capability at about 5 percent of the national defense budget.

The Guard differs from the United States Army Reserve (USAR) in primarily two ways. First, the USAR is mostly non-combat oriented in that USAR members provide support to combat units. This support includes medical, legal, transportation, maintenance, and supply specialties. Secondly, the USAR is not resourced or controlled by individual states, as is the ARNG. It is structured much like the active Army with a headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.
The ARNG and USAR are similar in that both recruit candidates to fill the ranks. These candidates are recruited during high school or through advertising in the media. Some are recruited through referrals made by acquaintances or friends. The terms of enlistment are the same—eight years. These eight years are broken out into three or six years of actual weekend duty with the remaining time spent as an Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), in which the soldier can be called anytime to active duty within the remaining eight-year enlistment.

With Army National Guard under control of the governors during peacetime, Guard training is usually administered by the states' Adjutant Generals (AG), who are to work closely with their active Army partners to develop particular training programs to perform effectively with the active units in the event of mobilization. This arrangement is called the Army CAPSTONE program. The Adjutant General (AG) is an appointee of the governor (except in Vermont, where he/she is elected by the legislature, and in South Carolina, where selection is made by popular election) and thus serves as chief of staff to the governor and administers the state military establishment. Historically, the Guard has been a source of patronage for the governors, and many Guard officers have engaged in partisan activity by pursuing a career in politics and the Guard at the same time.¹⁴

Because the National Guard makes up about 46 percent of the combat capabilities of the Total Force, there is an effort to equip the Guard with up-to-date equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, howitzers, and communications equipment. Further, the Army National Guard maintains over 3,000 armories and nearly 1,000 maintenance shops, usually staffed by full-time support personnel, including full-time members of the National Guard, who help to keep the equipment and
facilities in working order. Most of the training conducted by the Guard is held at the armories, but Annual Training (AT), a two-week period designed to allow the unit to maneuver and be evaluated, is held at either active duty posts, such as Fort Devens, MA, or Fort Drum, NY, or at National Guard Training facilities, such as Camp Edwards, MA, or Camp Ethan Allen, VT.

During the 1980s, the National Guard expanded the scope of their responsibilities to the active force and the Adjutant Generals by taking an active role in the nation's war on drugs. The National Guard conducted over 3,100 missions between 1983 and 1988 to eradicate domestically grown marijuana and interdict illegal drug entry into the United States. Also, the Guard has worked with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to develop illegal drug intelligence through the use of high technology observation equipment.

In sum, Army National Guard units are located throughout the United States and its territories. It is charged to develop wartime proficiency in the event of mobilization to augment the active Army and it performs state missions such as disaster relief and riot control under the supervision of the Adjutant Generals during peacetime. In the 1980s, the Guard has been asked to support the war on drugs through the use of its manpower and advanced equipment. The Army National Guard trains for and conducts these sundry missions approximately thirty-nine days a year.
Chapter III
Training the Force

Every Army National Guard (ARNG) has an assigned wartime mission. Although not all ARNG units deploy to the combat area of operations (some ARNG units remain in the U.S. to instruct new soldiers throughout basic training and advanced individual training), combat units deploy to Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Europe. The 26th Infantry Division (ID) deploys to Europe in support of NATO operations. As of this writing, the 26th ID is still designated to deploy to Europe if called upon.

Upon mobilization, ARNG units fall under the command and control of active duty units. Since ARNG units are intended to conduct military operations with these active duty units, the Army designed the CAPSTONE program. Under this program, ARNG commanders are given guidance for deployment and missions the units are expected to perform in the area of operations from active duty units. These missions are the basis for the Mission Essential Task List (METF), which is a compilation of collective tasks the unit must perform if it is to successfully accomplish its wartime missions. For the 26th ID and most other combat units, one task likely to be identified in the METL is to conduct offensive operations.

The reason for this is twofold. First, active duty commanders realize that it will require weeks or possibly months before the ARNG units will be able to arrive in the area of operations. ARNG units are required to assemble at their armories, move to their mobilization stations, conduct training, and deploy. Once deployed, the units draw
their equipment from storage sites located in Europe. From there, the ARNG units need time to account for and become familiar with the new equipment before moving into assembly areas.

Secondly, since the active duty commanders do not have a clear and concise idea of how long this process will take, they are still expected to array their forces in such a manner to repel an attack or present a formidable defensive posture to buy time to discourage a would-be attacker. So it is likely that active duty units will be either in a defensive posture or trading space (ground) for time in a deliberate, controlled withdrawal until additional units from the United States are in position to influence the battle. With this scenario in mind, conducting offensive operations is a likely METL task for any ARNG unit deployed from the United States.

To identify and expand upon this one mission and to describe how a unit in the ARNG will likely prepare for this mission, the remainder of this chapter will explain the tasks an infantry battalion, of which the 26th ID has seven, must accomplish. What exactly an infantry battalion is supposed to do and how it is to do it come from two sources. One is the unit's CAPSTONE headquarters, which tells the unit what missions it is expected to perform in the area of operations. How the unit is to perform these missions is described in detail in Army training publications. I will use these publications as the basis for how a particular mission is to be accomplished.

Next, each level of command described in this chapter will be followed by an assessment of how much they are able to do, given the expectations described in Army training publications. I will base this assessment upon several different sources. First, I will base it partially upon my own observation of these units trying to accomplish
this one particular task (occupy an assembly area) over a two-year period. Secondly, I will take part of the assessment from other active duty officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have also observed this task. These observers have years of experience in this field and are considered experts by the Army. Further, they bring a wide range of experience from different types of units that perform this task during training exercises. This allows them to view the task from a broad perspective without bias from any particular point of view.

Finally, I will base the assessment partially on the historic training records of the units expected to perform the task. These records reveal how often the task is trained and what supporting tasks are addressed to allow the unit to train the task to standard.

I will conclude the chapter by addressing what the implications are for the ARNG units. It is important to keep in mind that this is just one of several missions ARNG assigned by their CAPSTONE headquarters and that wartime tasks identified on the METL are only a portion of tasks the unit is expected to prepare for during peacetime.

The training manual the Army uses to describe what is expected from its units to perform particular tasks are described in the Army’s Mission Training Plan (ARTEP 71-2MTP dated October 1988). It applies to active and reserve component (USAR and ARNG) division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staffs and provides a descriptive, mission-oriented training program to allow a battalion to perform its wartime mission. The battalion is expected to perform all supporting collective tasks to the standards defined in the MTP, regardless of the unit’s component (active or reserve). Further, the MTP prohibits changes detailed within the manual.

To conduct offensive operations, the infantry battalion is expected
to perform approximately fifty collective tasks, according to the manual, or MTP. This number of collective tasks to conduct offensive operations will vary depending on terrain, the enemy force and what it does, the amount of casualties a unit suffers, and the logistics to support the operation. But since no one can predict with any confidence how a battle is likely to unfold, the unit is expected to prepare each task to standard. The major tasks to be performed at battalion level and the supporting tasks are as follows:

1. Move Tactically
   a. Occupy an assembly area
   b. Perform a tactical road march
   c. Perform a passage of lines
   d. Perform hasty river/gap crossing

2. Fight a Meeting Engagement
   a. Defend
   b. Bypass an enemy force
   c. Attack/counterattack by fire

3. Assault
   a. Breach a defended obstacle
   b. Reorganize
   c. Consolidate

For purpose of clarification and to develop an appreciation for what is involved in performing these collective tasks, one task (occupy an assembly area) will be selected and explained. Included in that explanation will be a description of what each level of command must do to accomplish that mission, from battalion, to company, to platoon and
squad, and finally individual tasks.

I intend this detailed explanation to serve two purposes. First, it will demonstrate the detailed planning and proficiency the Army expects from its units and, secondly, it will demonstrate the amount of resources an Army National Guard unit requires to reach proficiency in the missions it would be expected to perform in war. It is important to remember that both active and reserve units alike are expected to perform this task correctly, and that it is only one of several critical tasks.

Before I offer a description of tasks to be accomplished at each level, the three levels of command and the structure of each should be described. The Army views the battalion as the lowest level of independent maneuver in wartime. The reason is because it is structured to address the basic elements of maneuver (command and control, intelligence, operations and logistics sections) and it controls the assets it needs to conduct operations. These assets are artillery and close air support, engineer assets, air defense protection, and maintenance.

The battalion is made of usually five line companies and a headquarters company. These six companies are like the fingers of a hand with the five line companies acting in concert to allow the hand to function effectively. As each finger is a part of the hand, so is each company part of the battalion to perform a mission or task.

Each line company consists of three platoons and a headquarters platoon. The platoons have a similar relationship to the company as a company does to the battalion, but platoons have few assets outside of combat or direct fighting abilities. Platoons are made of three squads each and each squad is authorized nine men in an infantry battalion.
The expectations of each level are derived from applicable Army training manuals and the assessments are derived from the use of each level's assets to accomplish the standards derived from the manuals or MTPs.

Occupying an Assembly Area - the Battalion

For this task, the battalion is ordered to move to an assembly area and prepare for future operations. An assembly area is normally located in a secure area away from direct or indirect enemy fire, but the possibility of either a ground or an air attack forces the unit to plan accordingly.

The battalion commander and his staff are expected to perform several subtasks to accomplish this task. First, they select an assembly area site that provides concealment from enemy detection and sufficient space to disperse the battalion to minimize the possibility of an attack. This site should contain adequate entry and exit routes and be defendable against a possible enemy attack. While a site may be selected from an analysis of a relief map (which depicts land features, roads, manmade objects, and wooded areas), the commander is expected to physically inspect the area for suitability if at all possible. For a light infantry unit (limited number of vehicles, none of which are armored), this site selection could take anywhere from hours to days.

Next, the battalion commander issues an operations order (OPORD) to his subordinate companies and staff. The OPORD explains how he wants the occupation of the assembly area to occur and what he expects once his unit is in position. ARNG commanders and staffs traditionally have not spent many hours writing and issuing OPORDs. Because of the need to be precise and clear in their intent, OPORDs are taught to ARNG officers
and senior sergeants for presentation in both a formal school setting and in the units. The more often they are practiced, the more effective they are to subordinate units. The effectiveness of any OFRD cannot be fully ascertained without executing the order in the area for which it is written. This implies that ARNG units must allocate time and arrange for a training area to determine the OFORD's effectiveness. For an ARNG unit, this involves at least one day's worth of training time to write and issue the OFORD and then execute the occupation of the area itself. To save time, the ARNG units will use only each unit's leaders to actually execute the OFORD, but again, without the entire unit, the full assessment of the order's effectiveness cannot be determined. Junior officers and sergeants in particular often fail to fully appreciate the detail necessary to plan and execute tasks without seeing the spatial relationship of soldiers to actual ground.

Third, the battalion quartering party, usually under the supervision of a subordinate company commander or the executive officer (EO), the second in command of the battalion, moves to the actual area of the assembly area and prepares for the arrival of the battalion. This team's activities in the assembly area are rather sophisticated and require a great deal of expertise and practice as well as a decent level of physical fitness. These activities include establishing initial security for the team with a small guard force, sweeping for hidden enemy positions or mines, and checking for a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) contamination present from previous engagements or enemy use. Once again, the key to a successful quartering party is speed and thoroughness. These skills come with repeated practice and drill as a team along with individual skill proficiency. No two assembly areas are ever the same and each presents its own dangers.
The fourth step is the battalion occupies the assembly area. As simple as it may sound, just moving to a particular spot is complex, particularly during hours of darkness when moving is most effective to prevent observation by enemy forces. How a unit moves into an assembly area has always been viewed by Army evaluators as a good indication of the unit’s discipline and level of training. The standard is to move into the assembly area quietly with no lights (or minimal red-filtered light) without losing or injuring anyone. Once in position, soldiers are to prepare fighting positions in the event of an enemy attack, clean equipment, initiate a rest plan, and establish a guard rotation.

The remaining critical subtasks include improving the defense of the assembly area against ground or air attack, conducting rehearsals or drills for future operations, checking and cleaning equipment, etc. For the battalion commander and his staff, future operations are planned and OPORDs are drawn and issued to subordinate unit commanders.

By detailing the subtasks a battalion commander and his staff are expected to perform to properly occupy an assembly area, this task should be viewed as command and control intensive (the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned forces to accomplish the mission). 18

But ARNG units at battalion level are weak in command and control in the 26th Infantry Division. The basis for this observation is threefold: the lack of practice on the ground due to time constraints, poor unit discipline, and the intentional or unintentional ignoring of critical subtasks.

First, quartering party operations are rarely done properly and more often than not, they are not done at all. This indicates an unwillingness on the part of ARNG units to allow scarce training time to
accomplish this small but critical subtask, or it indicates a tacit recognition that ARNG units do not possess the expertise to perform the subtask to standard.

In a combat situation, improper or incomplete quartering party operations could lead to disaster. An enemy force could booby trap the area before the battalion moved in or it could attack the force during its most vulnerable time—when its moving into the assembly area. An observant enemy can deduce when a unit is about to move into an assembly area by its actions, and an effective quartering party will telegraph a battalion's disposition and weaknesses before it moves in.

Secondly, the poor state of unit discipline in the 26th Infantry Division also shows the lack of command and control at battalion level. It is interesting to note that every member of a battalion has a role in assembly area operations, yet it is not uncommon to observe soldiers in ARNG units leaving the assembly areas for the camp during annual training periods to purchase personal comfort items, food, make telephone calls, or take showers. Further, logistics operations, traditionally one of the more difficult tasks of any army, are rarely practiced during assembly area operations. Maintenance, supply, and communications are performed without consideration of working in a tactical environment due to the proximity of the assembly area to the camp. Without constant and realistic practice during field training exercises, logistics will severely hamper or even render combat operations non-effective.\(^1\)

Further, battalion quartering parties do not don their protective NBC clothing while performing this portion of the task. The clothing is bulky and uncomfortable, yet necessary. By ignoring this subtask, the unit is once again not performing the task properly.
Finally, the ARNG units in the 26th ID have never even attempted to occupy an assembly area at night at the battalion level for at least the last two years, either during annual training or on a drill weekend. Once again, this indicates an unwillingness on the part of the ARNG units to allocate scarce training time to practice this difficult yet critical subtask, or it indicates a tacit recognition that this subtask simply cannot be performed to standard and it will therefore be ignored.

Weak command and control at battalion level affects lower levels also. The company, it will be demonstrated, faces similar command and control problems as the battalion, but the company commander's problems are compounded since he has no formal staff. Further, poor training of the critical individual tasks necessary to support collective tasks becomes even more apparent at the lower levels as the subordinate units attempt to occupy the assembly area.

**Occupy an Assembly Area - The Company**

The conditions for a company to occupy an assembly area remain the same as the battalion, as do the standards. The company is assigned a part of the battalion assembly area based upon the company's size and weapons systems. Like the battalion level quartering party leader, the company commander (or his designated leader) also establishes initial security, assigns sectors, checks for enemy positions or mines, and surveys his area for NBC contamination.

But the leader of the company quartering party has additional critical subtasks. He must also select a location for the company mortars and the anti-armor firing positions to support the commander's plan to defend against enemy attack. This task can only be done effectively if the commander, who almost always writes the defense plan
of the assembly area, actually walks the ground his unit will occupy before the unit arrives. The commander searches for likely enemy approaches into his sector, both by armored vehicle and by foot, and checks the positioning of his key weapons systems as well as the defensive scheme of the companies on his left and right. These requirements indicate that the commander or a designated subordinate with a keen eye for such details must do these tasks.

Next, the company moves into the assembly area to designated positions marked by the quartering party without halting. The standard to do so without halting is to prevent the unit from bunching up and consequently losing control. If the standard is not met, an observant enemy may take advantage of the confusion and initiate fire upon the unit. Once control is lost, history indicates that the unit will suffer a great deal of casualties.

Next, once the unit is in position, junior leaders encourage the soldiers to perform individual tasks to develop the commander's defensive plan. These tasks will be addressed in the next section, but at this point, it is important and required that junior leaders ensure their portions of the defense are sound. This requires a leader to walk their positions telling soldiers what to expect, what is on the flanks of each position, and where to orient their weapons. A sketch of the positions and sectors of fire are forwarded to the company commander, who develops a company sketch complete with registration points for indirect fire to support his defensive scheme.

The assessment to perform this task reflects the poor discipline of the ARNG soldiers as well as the poor command and control starting at the battalion level moving down to the companies. But at the company level, the poor leadership skills of junior leaders can begin to be
observed clearly.

As an example, instead of assuming a temporary position to provide cover and concealment from an enemy while the unit waits to move into positions, it is common for soldiers to sit on the ground with their weapons at their sides or placed up against a tree and initiate talking and smoking. This is an indicator of poor leadership skills among junior leaders when the leaders themselves fail to orient these soldiers to do what they are both trained to do and expected to do as members of the unit. Violations of this type are more prevalent as the unit becomes fatigued. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, this is an indicator of the unacceptable level of physical fitness of the members of the unit. This point will be expanded upon later, but a unit that is not fit cannot effectively train and thus cannot be expected to effectively fight if called upon.20

Also, serious noise violations are common, and junior leaders do not effectively coordinate in their defensive schemes with adjacent units. It is rare to observe a leader walk with a subordinate to the area in front of his defensive position to discuss "dead space" (area not able to be covered by direct fire weapons) or primary areas of engagement. This requirement is easily checked by asking the soldier for his range card—a sketch of his position that includes his primary and alternate sectors of fire, dead space, range fan, positions on his flanks and azimuth, and distance to an easily identifiable terrain feature.

In over two years of training exercises, these range cards have never been observed by myself or any active duty trainers to be completed to the standard the Army has set. This inadequacy shows a lack of discipline within the unit and/or ignorance of the tasks
expected. Personal experience indicates that, while junior leaders cannot explain all of the requirements to complete a range card properly, they know one needs to be completed, yet rarely are range cards ever initiated without prompting. I believe this is partially due to a lack of discipline among ARNG junior leaders.

As a final observation, the senior leader of the company has never been observed to walk the ground his company will occupy before it moves into position in the two years data for this study have been collected. It is my estimation that the commander is too busy to do this level of pre-planning because he becomes distracted by duties others should care for. This distraction indicates a general lack of organization at the company level during training exercises, but this comes as no surprise to me considering the poor command and control abilities at battalion level and the poor leadership skills of the company's junior leaders.

It is difficult to quantify exactly how many hours are necessary just to reach this point because of uncontrolled variables such as weather, terrain, and visibility, but ARNG units require at least four hours just to move from a battalion formation into company and finally individually assigned fighting positions. But this is only about 10 to 20 percent of the complete task to occupy an assembly area. As previously pointed out, ARNG units only train two weeks during the annual training period and one weekend per month. Further, the training manual acknowledges that all tasks require repeated training before the standard can be met. Next to each task listed in the MTP is a block entitled "Iteration" followed by a numerical sequence of 1 through 5.

The next section will enumerate the subtasks to be done at the lowest unit level to accomplish the task to occupy an assembly area. These subtasks require the greatest amount of time to complete the tasks
to standard. I will offer comments based upon personal observation and the observations of other trainers to assist ARNG units in these subtasks.

Occupy an Assembly Area - The Platoon/Squad

The conditions to move the platoon into the assembly area remain the same as the higher two echelons. The platoon has a quartering party that performs similar tasks of the battalion and company quartering parties, but with the additional responsibility to determine initial positions for all elements of the platoon. As it will be seen, the lower the level of the unit, the more detailed actually occupying the assembly area becomes. The platoon clears a release point while individual soldiers are guided to their assigned positions without stopping. This drill only takes a few minutes to actually complete by a well-trained platoon, but preparation must be considered to perform this drill to standard.

First, the platoon leader or his designated representative must accompany the company quartering party to view his assigned sector. He must analyze the ground to determine enemy mounted and dismounted routes into the platoon sector and mark individual fighting position accordingly. A platoon front for a light infantry platoon is normally about 200-500 meters in length, depending upon the terrain and observation of the surrounding area. To walk this much ground thoroughly and mark positions as well as clear the area for mines or traps could take hours. But more importantly, an experienced and well-trained leader must perform this task.

Next, the platoon establishes local security. The platoon and squad leaders examine and adjust the initial positions to ensure mutual
support and to cover all gaps by observation or fire. An observation post (OP) is set up by the platoon leader and communications with the platoon command post (CP) are established. Depending once again on the terrain and the visibility as well as the experience of the platoon and squad leaders, this can take from one to three hours.

Once this structural framework of the platoon and squad assembly area positions is in place, a work priority is set and intensive physical labor begins. Combat vehicles (if any) are positioned, weapons are aligned, and chemical agent alarms are emplaced. It is at this point that individual and crew-served fighting positions ("fox holes") are constructed. The effort to construct these is laborious. Usually, one soldier digs while the other keeps watch for enemy activity for each fighting position (soldiers are never placed in a fighting position alone). Light infantry units have very limited digging equipment. Portable pick/shovels are used. These "E-tools" are sturdy but difficult for most soldiers to use due to a lack of experience (the tool itself resembles nothing on the commercial market). Rocky or heavily rooted ground greatly slows the digging process, but a good estimated time to plan for the construction of fighting positions is eight to twelve hours. This time period could be much greater if unit morale is low, unit organization and leadership are weak, or the level of physical fitness of the soldiers cannot support the effort required to dig in properly.

Several other subtasks are required while the unit is preparing fighting positions. One is to clear fields of fire, which involves removing brush and branches that may obstruct the gunner's view of his targets. Depending on the terrain, this subtask can take two to ten hours or more. Equipment is checked, cleaned, and tested. The remaining
subtasks to be performed in an assembly area include improving upon individual fighting positions, instituting a rest plan, and preparing for subsequent missions.

My assessment of how ARNG units in the 26th Infantry Division at the platoon/squad level is based upon personal observation and observations of other active duty trainers. Overall, research has revealed that no ARNG unit in the 26th I.D. has ever completed this particular task to standard at the platoon/squad level for at least four years.21

I attribute three reasons to why this is so. One, there is a lack of competent leaders at this level and the few competent leaders in these units are overly taxed. Secondly, leaders do not know their soldier's capabilities, which ultimately undermines morale. Third, the soldiers are not physically fit to perform these rigorous tasks.

The lack of competent leaders is a weakness common in ARNG units. The poor state of training follows a soldier as he progresses in rank in a unit. With so few competent leaders at platoon/squad level, the unit relies too heavily on the few competent leaders available to complete the myriad subtasks in any operation. Thus, competent leaders become tired and stressed with a corresponding decrease in performance. So what often occurs in stressful situations is leaders do not ensure tasks are performed to standard.

If the platoon attempts to do these tasks at night, the guides oftentimes cannot find the platoon's individual positions. This causes frustration by already fatigued soldiers, which further compounds the
loss of confidence in the platoon's leadership. This leads to a breach 
of discipline characterized by loud talking, smoking, and light 
violations.

Further, it is interesting to note that weapons malfunction 
primarily due to poor maintenance, cleaning, and/or improper assembly. 
As can be expected, malfunctioning weapons are common in ARNG units. 
This indicates not only poor discipline and training, but also deficient 
supervisory skills (junior leaders). Weapons malfunctioning has been 
observed as a systemic problem during field exercises, live-fire 
exercises, and spot inspections of units throughout the 26th I.D.

Also, leaders do not know the capabilities of their units and 
soldiers are often driven to the point of ineffectiveness. Soldiers 
resent this type of treatment and morale invariably suffers. Further, 
if a unit is too fatigued to properly perform the subtasks required, 
then the task cannot be done to standard and the unit is therefore 
untrained in this critical task. Also, the leadership's ability to plan 
training is called into question. If too many tasks are scheduled to be 
performed without sufficient resources, the leaders are themselves not 
properly trained. Regardless of the reason why, this subtask has not 
been observed to be completed to standard in any ARNG units in the 26th 
I.D.

Lastly, the unit is not physically fit to perform rigorous tasks. 
The physical fitness level of the soldiers in these units cannot sustain 
the activities required in normal, infantry training. Muscular strength 
and endurance are insufficient to allow soldiers to function effectively 
and still have energy to handle emergencies, such as a sudden and 
vicious enemy attack. With the Army's approved physical fitness 
training plan designed for soldiers over a six-month period, it is
highly doubtful that an ARNG unit will be capable of reaching a sufficient level of fitness to develop muscular strength and endurance to deploy to a combat environment.

Given the detail necessary to perform the task, occupy an assembly area to standard, and the problems discussed above, it is reasonable to conclude that at the current level of training, ARNG units do not possess the resources to perform this collective task to standard. The unit would require extensive training in the subtasks to perform the task. Further, the units would need to practice the subtasks and tasks repeatedly until the unit could do it to the Army standard, keeping in mind the state of physical fitness of the unit.

Finally, even if a unit could perform this task to standard, to occupy an assembly area is but one of many critical tasks a unit must perform in a combat environment. Conspicuously absent from this task are actions a unit takes under enemy fire or attack. As can well be expected, the variable of enemy contact along with all the additional requirements associated with that (casualties, resupply, and reporting) greatly complicates any training plan.

The Final Step - Common Tasks

As previously discussed, a unit commander identifies the most important tasks to accomplish his wartime mission and list them on the Mission Essential Task List (METL). A commander along with the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the unit then identify collective and individual tasks required to support the unit’s METL. The final step in identifying individual tasks not specifically stated in the MTPs is through the use of the Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-1-SMCT. This is the Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT).
This manual contains the common tasks that are deemed essential by the Army to "win on the modern battlefield." The manual requires each soldier to perform the individual tasks the chain-of-command has identified based on the unit's METL. The manual contains exactly 100 individual tasks to properly perform the METL task and to occupy an assembly area. All soldiers must be proficient in at least 50 of the 100 tasks listed. This is a very conservative estimate, but it is based upon the analysis of only one METL task, and ARNG units in the 26th I.D. list several METL tasks required for their wartime missions.

For the sake of demonstrating exactly what is required to train one task to proficiency, a step-by-step analysis will be offered along with the resources involved to train this task to standard. With "Operation Desert Storm," the threat of a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack against U.S. forces was likely, so the task, "Put On, Wear, Remove and Store Your M17-Series Protective Mask with Hood" is an appropriate task to analyze and it is a task common to support any unit's METL. If we assume a first-line supervisor is charged by the platoon leader to train his five or so soldiers, the first requirement would then be to organize the team and draw the masks from the unit NBC room. Next, the supervisor should check each mask before the training begins to ensure the masks are complete and serviceable in accordance with the applicable technical manual. A site conducive to training (classroom or location out of doors) must be pre-arranged and the team should be transported there. At this time, the trainer briefs the team.

The briefer orients the team by telling them what they are about to learn given the equipment they have. He then cautions the team concerning possible hazards to the training, such as hyperventilation or suffering a heat-related injury. At this point he asks the team if
anyone feels he can perform the task to standard. This "pretest" is
designed to prevent soldiers from training a task they can already
perform. If a soldier performs the task to standard, he becomes an
assistant instructor and assists the other soldiers in the team to
perform the task to standard. Next, an orientation statement is given to
emphasize why the task is important and how it fits into the larger
scheme of supporting the unit METL. The task is then demonstrated to
standard for the team so that they can visually absorb how it is done
properly. The trainer then describes each step of the task at a pace
sufficient for understanding. The soldiers are then allowed to practice
the steps in the task and, when they feel they are prepared, they are
evaluated by the trainer to substantiate proficiency. If a soldier
fails to perform the task to standard, he receives the instruction again
and is evaluated until he can demonstrate proficiency. Once proficient,
the trainer annotates in the soldier's Job Book (a pocket-size list of
individual skills required in his specialty and his current rank).

Once again, it is difficult to determine exactly how long it would
take to train this team in this task, but considering all of the steps
listed above and that this particular task has sixteen performance
measures, it is reasonable to assume a minimum of three hours is
required for an ARNG unit. Also, this is but one task of at least fifty
individual tasks to support the collective task to occupy an assembly
area. Further, ARNG units meet for training one weekend per month and
two weeks for annual training. While many tasks would not require three
hours to train to proficiency, many others would take even longer.24

For ARNG units in the 26th I.D., personal observation and testimony
of active duty trainers call into question not only whether the soldiers
in these units can perform the tasks, but also whether the trainers can
properly administer and test the task itself. Throughout the Division, training of common tasks was unsatisfactory. One person in a position to assess the training stated that a junior leader in the 26th I.D. was training soldiers in the employment of an Army anti-personnel mine without a mock-up training device of the mine itself!

Not only is this clearly a case of an unprepared instructor, but his superiors either failed to check to ensure he was prepared to give instruction or simply did not know how to properly administer common task training themselves. The lack of instructor preparedness is common throughout common task training. Evaluators often observed trainers simply reading passively from the manual and soldiers tested and evaluated as proficient, even though they did not meet the standards described in the manual.

These observations lead to three conclusions. First, instructors are not proficient themselves in the tasks they are supposed to train subordinates. It is difficult at best to try to bluff one's way through the training. Further, soldiers recognize when a trainer is not prepared. This causes feelings of apathy and resentment. Soldiers reason that if a junior leader does not feel the task is important enough for him to learn, why should they? Leaders also lose credibility and respect from their subordinates, which hurts retention in ARNG units.

Second, commanders are failing to ensure the trainers are prepared. The "train the trainers" concept is an Army approach to place responsibility for individual and collective training squarely on the shoulders of the commanders. This is not being done across ARNG units in the 26th I.D. Finally, the common tasks that are identified for
training by the units are not focused to support the METL tasks of the unit. Common tasks are identified for training above unit level and mandated for training for subordinates units. METL tasks, however, are to be derived from unit war plans and external directives, which are not necessarily all the same.27

In sum, common task training of ARNG units in the 26th I. D. is not performed to standard. Unprepared instructors not only call into question the proficiency of junior leaders, they also adversely affect the morale of individuals within the unit. Commanders are not checking to ensure the training is done to standard and that the trainers are trained. Training resources of time, transportation, equipment, and facilities are precious commodities in ARNG units. These resources are insufficient to train more than a few common tasks to standard, even if the instructors were assumed to be proficient in the tasks they were training.

The intent of this detailed chapter was to describe the requirements to plan and conduct good training and to identify many of the problems encountered with this training in Army National Guard units. The next chapter assesses some of the techniques ARNG units employ to overcome many of the constraints of scarce resources.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to define the tasks a battalion, company, platoon/squad, and individual soldiers must do to occupy an assembly area. This task was chosen because it is a task all units deployed to a hostile environment must do and it is included on all
METLs within the 26th Infantry Division. This METL task, however, is only one of several METL tasks a unit is expected to do.

Personal observation and the observation of other professional Army trainers have led me to several conclusions at each level of command. First, at battalion level, command and control is weak. Battalion commanders and their staff lack the resources to practice critical tasks on the ground, or they are too distracted with other duties to effectively conduct training. This has resulted in poor unit discipline and disregard for performing critical subtasks to standard.

At the company level, the weaknesses of the battalions affect the companies' abilities to perform this task. Also adding to these problems are the poor leadership skills evident at the company level and the lack of organization by the commanders themselves. I believe that the company commanders lack organization skills because the battalions lack effective control of valuable resources, and control is lost due to distractions. Further, company commanders feel the ramifications of poor junior leadership skills because they rely more so on subordinate leaders to accomplish critical tasks to a greater degree than at the battalion level.

Junior leadership problems are particularly evident at the platoon and squad level. Supervisors oftentimes do not know what they are to do and soldiers perceive this as a lack of concern on the part of the unit's leaders. This adversely affects morale. Also, junior leaders at this level and at the company level as well do not know the capabilities of the soldiers or their level of training proficiency. As a result, soldiers often receive training that is beyond their abilities or lacking in purpose. Finally, many soldiers lack the physical fitness to perform these tasks to the standard.
For the lowest level of training, individual Common Task Training (CTT), soldiers are once again not performing critical tasks to standard. There are three reasons I believe for this. First, as was evident at the squad and platoon level, instructors (junior leaders) are not proficient in the tasks they are teaching to soldiers. This causes not only ineffective training but also inaccurate assessments of soldier skill proficiency. These junior leaders cannot accurately determine if a soldier is proficient if he does not know what his performance is measured against.

Secondly, unit commanders and senior NCOs are not checking to ensure junior leaders are prepared to conduct the instruction. I believe this is due to two reasons. One, unit commanders are too busy with other tasks they must perform because others within the unit are not doing what is expected, as described above at the other levels. Secondly, senior unit leadership themselves cannot perform the tasks and therefore do not check subordinates for fear of embarrassment or because they do not take the time to train themselves before they check.

Finally, the CTT tasks are selected with no general scheme or training goal in mind. This seems to confuse not only the soldiers but the junior leaders as well. The CTT training should support the unit's METL and the members of the unit should be made aware of this so that the training has purpose, but I have never seen this to be the case in over two years of observation. CTT tasks are invariably chosen by brigade level or above with no consideration to a unit's METL.
Chapter IV
Planning Within Constraints

The previous chapter described in detail what is required to perform one METL task and the individual and collective tasks necessary to do so. Also, problems observed in ARNG units were offered for analysis with the conclusion that leadership in the Guard units is weak and resources, particularly time, are insufficient to train the units to Army standards. Occupying an assembly area is but one of the several METL tasks the infantry and armor battalions in the 26th I.D. are required to perform. These units are directed to plan and conduct training on the following additional METL tasks:

- Conduct Rear Operations
- Conduct Deliberate Defense
- Establish Blocking Positions
- Perform Relief Operations
- Perform Movement to Contact
- Perform Passage of Lines
- Perform Hasty Attack
- Perform Deliberate Attack (Armor units)
- Conduct Hasty Defense (Infantry units)

But with the resource limitations and a lack of trained leaders, these METL tasks along with all of the supporting subtasks cannot be performed over the course of a year or reasonably to standard for several years. Recognizing the constraints on resources, the 26th Infantry Division has developed a long-range plan to address the unit's
training needs. This plan is called the 26th Infantry Division's Yearly Training Plan and it includes 1990 through 1996.

The long-range plan's first year is focused on squad and section training, which consists of up to nine or ten soldiers usually led by a sergeant. The intent is to focus training needs downward, presumably to allow units to train on individual skills (common tasks) and develop battle drills (actions to be conducted given certain conditions on the battlefield, such as maneuvering on an enemy fighting position). This was Training Year 1990 (October 1989 through September 1990).

Training Year 1991 (October 1990 through September 1991) is to focus on platoon and company level training. Intended to build upon the training conducted in the previous year, the platoon and company are to further develop battle drills and work on collective tasks to support the unit METLs.

Training Years '92-'96 are focused on evaluation, development of command and control and sustainment training to reinforce the lessons learned from the previous training years. The 26th Infantry Division's intention is to develop the Division's units over several years into a viable force for deployment. But I believe there are several basic and profound problems with this approach to training.

First the impetus for training is placed at the lowest levels (squad/section through company). While there is no question that training at these levels is necessary, there is no scheduled training at the battalion level. As Chapter 3 established, battalion level command and control desperately needs to be practiced and exercised on the ground because many of the units' problems begin at the battalion level. The Division recognizes the need to exercise battalion and brigade staffs, but only does so in simulations. The effectiveness of these
simulations will be expanded upon at the end of this chapter, but for
the sake of continuity, suffice it to say that the focus for training is
ineffective in order for the Division to perform its METL tasks to
standard.

Secondly, Army training manuals mandate the practice of these
complex tasks and subtasks annually to ensure unit proficiency. ARNG
units in the Division have no hope of ever reaching proficiency in one
year, let alone several years. Even if all the tasks were scheduled and
performed in one year, unit personnel turnover alone would force
subordinate units to retrain and retest each soldier as well as leaders
annually to ensure proficiency. With as many problems suffered by
ARNG units in the 26th I.D., even if testing and training began
immediately, units could not meet Army standards within this annual time
requirement.

Third, resources in New England are simply not available to train
units to standard. For example, an armor battalion has an annual
requirement to participate in an exercise called Tank Table Eight. This
simulated exercise involves units working together to engage moving
targets over a distance of several thousand meters on actual ground. It
tests the proficiency of not only individual crews, but also a unit's
ability to effectively maneuver without excessive exposure to enemy
fire, as well as junior leaders' control over their units. Currently,
there are no functional Tank Table Eight training sites in New England.
Fort Drum, NY, is constructing one, but its completion date is yet to be
established.

Additionally, with Fort Drum's site to be the first available for
New England, how effective are the Division's armor units now? And even
with the completion of the site, a great deal of practice, working
together as a crew as well as a unit, and the development of battle drills must be completed before a unit can effectively participate in the training on the site. Further, the training would need to be scheduled during annual training (AT) because the distance to travel and the expense to transport both soldiers and equipment to Fort Drum prohibits training more than once a year.

Also along the lines of limited resources in New England is the amount of space available for infantry battalions. Camp Edwards is the only suitable training area to allow a battalion-size unit to effectively conduct exercises, and even Camp Edwards is limited to about two light infantry battalions at a time for training without authorization for expansion. But authorization for expansion may be politically sensitive, and the current size of the maneuver areas at Camp Edwards does not allow for any other units to effectively train if two light infantry battalions are occupying the ground. Of course, training areas are not the only resource limitations the units in the 26th I.D. face. Training ammunition, fuel, and spare parts are expensive and current cutbacks are severely affecting the units' ability to plan and conduct what limited training they do.

In summary, the 26th Infantry Division's Yearly Training Plan is unrealistic and ineffective. Ambiguous goals (purpose of the ARNG) were replaced by this plan in an attempt to provide a basis for making decisions and achieving order. But the effectiveness of this exercise is questionable. The Plan is simply unrealistic because there are insufficient resources to effectively address all of the requirements placed upon the Guard given its lack of resources (time, expertise, and money to do so).

Specifically, there are at least three problems identified here
with the plan. First, the focus of training is at the lowest level, which is certainly critical, but it does not address the command and control problems in the combat battalions in the Division. Secondly, the Army recognizes the need for almost constant practice to obtain and sustain proficiency in a unit's collective and supporting individual tasks. ARNG units in the 26th I.D. have not demonstrated, let alone sustained, proficiency in their METL tasks and it is highly unlikely they will, particularly considering annual unit turnover. Finally, the lack of facilities in New England precludes battalion level units from maneuvering to develop proficiency in METL tasks, and dollar limitations hamper effective training with the high costs fuel, spare parts, and ammunition.

The 26th Infantry Division does not seem to recognize how to effectively train the units. For example, it calls for an Officer Professional Development Program (OPDP) to be "on going," because the current scheduled sessions offered once per quarter are insufficient. But to date, the Division offers no concrete plan and instead encourages the incorporation of a professional reading program. This involves reading books on lessons learned from previous battles, as well as reading Army manuals of various types, but this approach is not new. Personal observation and experience of this type of approach to officer development is that it is of limited use because most junior leaders cannot understand how to apply the lessons to their current units. Even if they could apply these lessons to their units and change the training scheme, the lack of resources (time, maneuver space, money) will prevent effective training.

38
The Division also recognizes that weapons marksmanship is poor. The solution offered is more training time allocated and full unit participation. While this may be an effective solution on the surface, it fails to consider the lack of training proficiency of junior leaders in the unit, who will be tasked to actually conduct the training. Also, if more time is allocated for training, obviously something else will be postponed, once again straining the already grossly inadequate resource of time.

The Division also recognizes the lack of Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) sustainment training, which is individual training designed to keep soldiers sharp and proficient in their skills. The Division points to the poor Skill Qualification Test (SQT) scores (see Chapter 6) and unsatisfactory common task training conducted by the units (see previous chapter). But once again, junior leaders lack the skills themselves as well as the time to bring soldiers up to proficiency in their skills.

Finally, the 26th Infantry Division understands the need for physical fitness to perform combat training effectively based upon lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield (see Chapter 5). But the solution is both unrealistic and ineffective. The "fix" is to conduct physical training every day during weekend drills and during annual training (AT). With weekend drills once a month and annual training two weeks per year, the very most any physical training can be done is thirty-nine times per year—totally unacceptable to reach physical fitness sufficiency. Leaders in the Division may respond to this comment by stating that unit members will be "encouraged" to do physical training on their own during the week, but most members have not done so to date and there is no evidence that they are about to start.
Even though the 26th Infantry Division seems to recognize some of the problems in its subordinate units, the solutions are ineffective, unrealistic, or simply nonexistent. As a case in point, battalion and above staff simulations routinely conducted by ARNG units in the 26th I.D. will be analyzed to substantiate this observation.

Command Post Exercises (CPXs) are common throughout the Army to increase effectiveness by enhancing command and control and interaction between various staff elements. The 26th I.D. conducts a CPX yearly. The exercise is called "Yankee Excellence," and a great deal of effort and time is invested in this event by both the members of the Division and active duty advisers. This group of primarily senior officers work on the skills they are likely to perform in combat as a division staff. These skills include determining what a mission or task entails (mission analysis), working as a staff to closely analyze what will be necessary to accomplish the mission (staff estimate), developing possible recommendations to accomplish the mission (course of action development), and preparing the OPORD as directed by the commander.

Persons in a supervisory capacity to assess the actions of the division staff observed many shortcomings that would render the division ineffective in a combat scenario at its present level of training. For example, during the preparation for the issuance of the OPORD, key members of the staff were absent during the mission analysis portion. These members were by no means ancillary to the task at hand. Without timely and detailed analysis from each staff member, the staff is seriously flawed.

Observation of the staff estimate portion of this process highlighted the unfamiliarity of senior officers with Army doctrine. With the potential lethality of today's battlefield, commonality of
language and an in-depth knowledge of Army doctrine is essential. In a
time of war, the 26th Division would operate with active duty units,
which will use Army doctrine and doctrinal terms daily. They undoubtedly
expect the ARNG units to understand and implement this doctrine, but
this was not the case during the staff estimate and during battle
simulations, as will be expounded upon later in this chapter. Also,
once the estimate was done, key principle staff officers were absent
when the courses of action were being developed. This is a serious
flaw. These senior officers are supposedly placed in these key
positions due to their wide range of military knowledge and experience.
But what occurred is senior leaders delegated these responsibilities to
junior (and less experienced) members of their staffs without guidance
or input. I believe this occurred because senior staff officers do not
know what to do. This belief is reinforced by the observation of other
active duty trainers.

Finally, the actual preparation of the order was hampered by
inadequate guidance given by the Division Commander. Any commander
must give clear and concise guidance as to how he wishes to perform the
mission and how he envisions the mission occurring so that his staff has
enough information to plan accordingly. But once again, this critical
portion of the orders drill was inadequate.

These observations of the division staff are important and telling
of the Division's capabilities and weaknesses. With a very clear
relationship in any Army organization between the various parts, muddled
and ineffective orders produced at the top invariably affect the lower
levels of the organization, as was seen during the actual play of the
division exercise.

Personal observation and observations of other trainers confirmed
the poor command and control skills of both the division staff and subordinate brigade staffs as well.\textsuperscript{36} An "incident list" was put together using the experience of the trainers to simulate normal radio traffic and likely occurrences the Division would encounter in a combat environment. The Division had spent months in preparation of the exercise, as had subordinate brigades to a lesser degree. On the weekend of the exercise, many key players arrived late and some subordinate brigades sent representatives who had not read the operations order or the division plan. This reflects two problems recurring throughout the Division.

First, late arrivals failed to properly check to ensure their staffs were present and prepared to conduct the operation. Also, decisions need to be made prior to the play of the exercise. Without the decision-makers present, the responsibility falls to subordinates who are rarely familiarized with the plan to the extent of the key players. Secondly, by not sending players who would benefit the most from the exercise, subordinate brigades viewed it as simply another Division requirement of questionable utility. Further, the Division staff did not mandate the presence of certain brigade players, which once again detracted from the credibility of the exercise.

These observations were confirmed once the play of the exercise commenced, which leads one to conclude that the Division and the brigades have weak command and control skills as well as insufficient expertise as a staff. As the initial incidents were relayed to start exercising staff activities, responses were delayed at best and usually nonexistent. Within ninety minutes of the first portion of the exercises, which was designed to take twelve hours, the Division staff
had been rendered ineffective. It simply could not handle the amount of messages arriving, let alone respond to them. As a result, the play was halted and active duty trainers were asked to walk the staff through the procedures on how to operate as a staff in a combat environment.

Despite the artificiality of the exercise (no pressure from enemy forces, full manning, and fully operational equipment) as well as the greatly reduced number of actual messages this or any division staff is likely to receive in a combat environment, the 26th I.D. staffs were ineffective. Thus, despite the Division's recognition of its weak command and control abilities, it still could not conduct an exercise to improve upon its weaknesses. I believe root causes of these weaknesses are that the staffs do not possess technical or tactical expertise and are either unwilling or unable to learn, due in part because of resource constraints. A great deal of time needs to be dedicated to obtain the skills to be effective. According to The Professional Development of Officers Study, "the bedrock of the officer corps must be officers...expert in the tasks of those arms and services; at the very core of their expertise must be the ability of these officers to fight."  

This particular exercise was not an isolated incident in the Division. The experiences of observers from units throughout the 26th I.D. verify, to one degree or another, the same lack of expertise. But Army doctrine demands proficiency in more than the area of command and control. More broadly speaking, "Success on the battlefield will depend on the Army's ability to fight in accordance with four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth and synchronization."  

As a case in point, a similar board exercise was conducted with the division's armored brigade in January 1990. The preparatory staff
activities were held, similar to the actions described above, but with a lesser number of staffs (a brigade is about one-third the size of a division). Because of the decreased level of the play, simulated U.S. and Soviet forces game pieces were used, not unlike chess pieces. This allowed the brigade's commanders to "see" the battle as it occurred with the intent to teach as well as play the battle. An active duty officer was chosen as the commander of the attacking Soviet forces due to his familiarity with Soviet armored tactics. The brigade was arrayed in a defensive posture in the vicinity of its actual wartime area.\textsuperscript{39}

Immediately upon commencement of the play, it was apparent to most active duty players that the armored brigade was entirely too closely deployed, thus presenting itself as a lucrative target for extensive bombing or even for a nuclear attack. But for the sake of play, the opposing forces (OPFOR) commander was to proceed without the use of nuclear weapons. As he moved, it became apparent that the brigade had arrayed its forces assuming the OPFOR would simply move down a particular valley without deviating from course. Had he done so, the OPFOR would most likely have been destroyed, but the Soviets use reconnaissance forces much as the U.S. Army does to detect such traps.

When the OPFOR commander adjusted his board maneuver accordingly, the American brigade knew it was in trouble. The commanders in the brigade did not anticipate such an obvious move, and they could not react to the OPFOR commander's change in course. The OPFOR commander simply attacked the American force from the flank and, due to the lack of flexibility in the brigade's plan, it was helpless to react. The degree of this defeat could be seen when the OPFOR commander was instructed to ignore Soviet doctrine and go back to the axis of advance the armored brigade had anticipated. This was ordered to prevent
embarrassment and humiliation of the brigade's officers. This order was probably inappropriate, because the full thrust of the brigade's dire mistake eluded the commanders.

This exercise showed that the brigade violated all four basic Army tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Brigade forces were arrayed in static, inflexible stronghold positions that rendered the force incapable of any action. Secondly, the unexpected change of the anticipated axis of advance overcame the brigade's commanders. They failed to "read the battlefield" and to act quickly and without hesitation. Third, inelasticity of the brigade's defense was apparent as the brigade flanks were rolled up by the OPPOR. Finally, the brigade could not effectively coordinate artillery and air support. This prevented the brigade staff the ability to influence the battle or deploy a reserve force in time to the correct location.

What conclusions can be drawn from this exercise? The exercise reflects the current state of readiness of the brigade, which could be called upon at any time to deploy. For the unit to deploy as it is, the loss of many lives would needlessly occur. It is uncanny to review the after-action reports of previous exercises and read the same comments year after year. Yet the brigade has yet to make the appropriate adjustments to training.

Reserve commanders often respond by saying that postmobilization training time will be utilized to address these deficiencies, but mobilization for Operation Desert Storm dispelled many of these assumptions, as discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter V

Mobilisation - Come as You Are

The previous chapters were intended to demonstrate the complexities of trying to reach a state of readiness for the 26th Infantry Division combat units. The details just to train to the Army standard one METL task, occupy an assembly area, are lengthy and near impossible to reach proficiency given the ARNG's limited resources in New England.

Forces Command (FORSCOM), the headquarters for all major combat commands of the United States Army, recognizes that most units will require additional, full-time training if mobilized for war. A unit is assigned a "C-rating" based upon the number of days the unit commander feels he needs at the mobilization station (MS) for training to reach a deployable level of training proficiency. This is a subjective determination based upon the unit's records, reports of inspections, maneuver results, and the commander's own assessment. To assist the commander in determining his postmobilization needs, he has an annual requirement to fill out a Postmobilization Training and Support Requirements (PMTS) document. The PMTS is also designed to assist the unit's MS to plan for ranges, fuel, ammunition, and other facilities to support the unit's training.

Based on the unit's METL, the Postmobilization Training and Support document (PMTS) identifies what tasks will be trained at the mobilization station that the unit commander cannot train to standard for the current year. Further, it allows the commander the option to plan for sustainment training (training conducted to refresh soldiers in
certain skills, but skills they can already perform with little additional instruction). The manual to assist in completing, the PTBR document encourages scheduling equipment-intensive training before training for individual tasks, presumably because equipment will be shipped to the area of operations before the soldiers depart by aircraft. The PTBR document is to be reviewed by the chain of command up to the Adjutant General (AG) of each state, and finally to one of the six continental armies (CONUSAs).

Every two years, FORSCOM conducts a simulated mobilization exercise to test the units and the mobilization stations' abilities to plan for and conduct a mobilization. As an evaluator and organizer of the mobilization exercise in October of 1989, called Exercise Proud Eagle, I was able to look at unit capabilities and problems first hand.

The exercise for most of the units in the 26th I.D. was very indicative of their state of training, leadership, and concern for performing the goals of the exercise as well as possible. First, most of the units deployed their advanced parties (usually three to four members of the unit) with incomplete or missing paperwork. This prevented an accurate assessment of the units' mobilization readiness status. Secondly, some units simply sent a courier to deliver the paperwork required for the MS. When MS personnel asked the courier about specific and essential information concerning the unit, the answer was not available. Evaluators were once again forced to become trainers for the members of the advanced parties of the mobilized units, as was the case for the "Yankee Excellence" CFX described in Chapter 4. Otherwise, there would be little if any training value at all for the entire exercise. Once the units' advanced parties arrived at the MS,
the units' portion of the exercise play was complete, so no 26th I.D. units actually did mobilize.

The lessons from the exercise were numerous. First, units were not checking paperwork for accuracy or completeness. Secondly, training concerning the specifics of mobilization was abysmal. Key pieces of information were not available, such as how the units' soldiers and/or equipment were to reach the NS. Even more significant, the PTES documents were almost completely useless to a unit. They were either not available (no one in the unit did the PTES document), not filled out completely, not completed in accordance to the unit's METL, or were completely inaccurate (such as filling out the request for thousands of rounds of ammo more than the unit actually needed).

To further point out the lack of proper supervision of these units, the PTESs were usually approved up through the division for acceptance. Another lesson learned from the exercise was that in the event of a mobilization, training areas were insufficient to permit combat units in the 26th I.D. to train. They would simply not be available. Finally, time the units would require at NS for training was very difficult to estimate, but with the poor state of unit mobilization preparedness based strictly on a "best guess" because of incomplete paperwork and muddled training plans, most if not all units would require well in excess of two months, which renders them "C-4" (non-deployable). As such, FORSCOM would be forced to either send the unit as it is, provide additional resources to train them to standard, or not mobilize them at all (for Operation Desert Storm, this proved to be the chosen option, as discussed in the next chapter).

Finally, written reports and personal testimony of evaluators who participated in the previous FORSCOM mobilization exercise two years
earlier (Exercise Golden Thrust) verify that the same comments were made with little or no improvement two years later. In fact, a conference held by the 26th I.D. in the early stages of the build-up of units to the Middle East in support of Operation Desert Shield brought forth lessons learned concerning mobilization problems. Once again, the same problems that had occurred during Exercise Golden Thrust (1987) and Exercise Golden Eagle (1989) occurred for Operation Desert Shield, but this time it was no exercise.

Many more valuable lessons were learned concerning mobilization of reserve component units. Although no combat units were mobilized, there is no reason to believe that problems with the actual units mobilized would not be the same for combat units in the 26th I.D. In fact, the units that did mobilize at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in support of Operation Desert Shield were smaller in number and almost entirely less equipment-intensive as would be ARNG combat units in the 26th I.D., particularly the armored units and the mechanized infantry units. Also, the units mobilized from both the Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve (USAR) headquarters were highly specialized, non-combat units. They were primarily medical, transportation, military police, and construction engineering units as well as a few Judge Advocate General (JAG or Army attorney) units.

These non-combat units were able to deploy because what they would do in a war zone is similar to what they do in their civilian occupations. Combat units, on the other hand, do not have civilian-related occupations. However, it was significant to note that soon after the units began to arrive at Fort Devens to process before deployment, it became apparent that the units were so ill-prepared to perform common task soldier skills that active duty trainers were
required to travel to the unit home stations to help them prepare. This is a significant departure from not only the Fort Devens mobilization plan, but also mobilization plans throughout the country that received mobilized units. The problem was that the trainers were needed at the AB to perform other duties as evaluators of the mobilized units. Also, trainers were to monitor the units' progress to ensure training at the MS was METL-based and performed to standard. However, with the dispatch of these trainers to the units, many of the functions anticipated by these active duty trainers were curtailed. In fact, resources at Fort Devens were quickly strained to capacity and both the active duty trainers and the Fort Devens staff raced against deployment schedules frantically hoping to cover at least a few of the essential, individual survival skills so that the units could deploy.

But the emphasis was on individual skills. With rare exception, most units never had the time to practice their METL tasks. Recall that the METL tasks are mission essential, and that most units deferred training until mobilized, as annotated on the unit PTSSRs. The poor state of training must have been noted by FORSCOM headquarters, because a message directed that units were deployable only if they received Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) training, as well as survival skills and medical training. The requirement for METL training was dropped. To make the situation even more significant, most of these units do not require even a small fraction of the METL training a combat unit would, because many of the skills are individually oriented tasks (driving a truck, preparing a legal brief, or performing surgery). For a combat unit, being able to work as a team is essential, and the only way to do so is to practice in conditions as close to real combat as possible.42 And as previously addressed, training areas are at a
premium in New England. Even Fort Drum, the closest facility suitable for training large units, would not be available because of use by active duty units, although this observation was not tested because no attempt at all was made to obtain training facilities by mobilized units at Fort Devens due to a lack of time.

Significantly, FORSCOM mandated active duty trainers conduct individual skills classes before a unit deployed. Although these skills were neither complicated nor unique, the active duty trainers were required to both teach the skills and certify each soldier's proficiency before the soldier could deploy. Although a reason why this was so was never offered, I believe it is because no faith is placed in the reserve component units' junior leaders to train the tasks to standard. In fact, this requirement seems to confirm what was expounded upon in the previous chapter as to why training is so poor in ARNG units—junior leaders cannot train to standard even these common skills and the senior sergeants and officers of these units neglected to train the junior leaders to perform what is viewed Army-wide as their jobs. My observation and the experiences of others confirm the belief that senior leaders cannot or will not train junior leaders when the senior leaders cannot perform the basic tasks themselves or do not have the time to learn and instruct junior leaders.

Operation Desert Shield shattered most of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) held by the units, the mobilization stations, and headquarters up through the Department of the Army. Units would be deployed poorly trained, ill-prepared, and incapable of a timely departure without extensive active duty assistance. This assistance was well beyond what any headquarters in the Army anticipated. Significantly, the units mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield
in New England are exclusively non-combat units and require a great deal less training than an actual combat unit if mobilized.

There is little doubt that the entire mobilization system, the first since the Vietnam buildup, which was an entirely different environment and a greatly extended timetable, will need to be re-evaluated and re-designed to account for many of these lessons learned. But most significantly, what I believe has been the bane of training to standard in ARNG units is validated by Operation Desert Shield: units are poorly trained, junior leaders are not capable of training their soldiers, and the senior leadership is either not proficient themselves in the skills they are required to possess or simply are too busy to prepare effective training and check their subordinate leaders.
Chapter VI

Summary

The face of the United States Army is about to change significantly. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact prompted by the emerging independence of eastern European states from the Soviet Union decreases the need for a large, active Army presence in Europe. Also, the looming federal budget deficit continues to be a major concern of the U.S. taxpayers. In response, active duty manpower will be cut by at least 22 percent by fiscal year 1995.43

But with this decrease in active duty strength, many of the responsibilities will fall to the reserve components, which will assume an even greater role in America's defense posture. The question then becomes, can the reserve components, specifically, combat units in the 26th Infantry Division (Army National Guard) assume this role?

The 26th Infantry Division, like all ARNG units, has thirty-nine days per year to prepare for its wartime mission as well as state requirements that may arise as the Adjutant General (AG) sees fit. The ARNG is a state asset until federalized by order of the President of the United States or by an act of Congress. The 26th I.D. is responsible to the state to provide disaster relief and riot control, as well as to prepare for its federal or wartime mission to deploy anywhere in the world.

It was the intent of this paper to closely analyze all of the collective and individual tasks required of a combat infantry battalion in the division. By identifying the tasks at each level of supervision, several problems were identified with the system. First, command and
control of ARNG units is seriously deficient. This is due in part to a lack of expertise and a shortage of time to develop this art sufficiently. The officer education system is designed in part to develop the skills needed by officers to properly command and control their units. The three pillars of this system are formal schools, experience developed in the units, and self-development. But most ARNG officers lack the time to leave their civilian jobs to take formal Army courses, and the lack of expertise in the units limits the amount of experience these officers can develop. This leaves self-development, in which officers would study Army doctrine on their own or by taking correspondence courses. But this program is poorly managed and lacks focus in many ARNG units in the 26th I.D.

Secondly, junior leaders do not possess the expertise to properly teach subordinates in common skills, particularly if these junior leaders have little or no active duty time. This problem is compounded by the failure of the senior leadership to train junior leaders how to properly conduct training; once again due to either lack of expertise on their part or a lack of time to do so.

Third, individual proficiency of the soldiers in ARNG units in the 26th I.D. is seriously deficient. The Army's Skill Qualification Test (SQT) is a biannual examination of soldiers' skills in their particular specialty (active Army soldiers take the exam annually). This is currently the only objective means to assess soldiers' qualifications in the Army. For ARNG units, the overall average of the test results for both 1988 and 1989 were below the cutoff for passing (51.5% and 59%, with passing marked at 60%). For comparison, the active Army soldiers
average 15% and 20% higher respectively on the tests. Additionally, 74% of all active duty soldiers who were required took the SQT, while only 32% of ARNG soldiers actually did.

This not only points out serious individual training deficiencies, it also indicates a weakness in the ARNG unit leadership, who not only failed to prepare the soldiers, but also grossly failed to enforce the requirement to take the SQT. Further, the Army publishes and distributes an SQT Notice four or five months in advance of the window for administering the test, which is usually one year for ARNG soldiers. The notices tell the soldiers, "specific tasks to be tested...all tasks listed appear on the test." Thus, soldiers need only to look up the tasks in their training manuals to refresh themselves, but apparently this is not being done. Finally, while the SQT is far from inclusive of all tasks a soldier should know, it is a good tool to assess individual proficiency. These results point out the abysmal level of not only individual skills, but also the leadership and quality of training in ARNG units.

The 26th I.D. has attempted to address these serious shortcomings through its Yearly Training Guidance, but it is unlikely that this plan will be effective for several reasons. The focus for the "fix" is at the lowest level and, while training certainly is required at that level, there is no effective plan to address the serious senior leadership deficiencies. Secondly, the division cannot hope to reach proficiency in training without first developing training expertise in both the junior and senior leader levels. Finally, there are inadequate resources of time, maneuver area, and money to conduct meaningful training. The units lack the necessary expertise to do so. These serious deficiencies can be seen not only in the individual units down
to squad level, but also in CPXs held at both the brigade and division level.

Operation Desert Shield pointed out many of these deficiencies in ARNG units and several more. First, if combat units in the division were to be mobilized, there are insufficient training areas in New England to bring them up to proficiency to meet deployment windows—77% of reserve component units are due in Europe within the first sixty days of the start of mobilization. And while deployment to Europe is unlikely given the current situation, the division would face similar time requirements if mobilized anywhere in the world.

Secondly, it appears mobilized units are no where near as prepared as previously believed. The First United States Army euphemistically "questions" training records reporting, physical fitness, weapons qualification levels, and individual skill proficiency. These records are seriously skewed and do not truly reflect unit readiness status. Similar numbers are being reported in the combat units in the 26th I.D. and the same questions are being asked.

Finally, units as well as mobilization stations across the country have been taxed to capacity, even for this relatively low-level call-up. Units are deployed with only training in basic individual skills. FORSCOM has all but abandoned attempts to allow units to train in METL requirements. Additionally, FORSCOM's lack of faith in the abilities of junior leadership training capabilities is indicated by the requirement for active duty trainers to certify all deploying soldiers in the individual tasks instead of the units' junior leaders doing the training. Once again, this points out the systemic deficiencies in the ARNG.

In sum, it is unlikely that the ARNG units in the 26th I.D. can
reach a level of readiness for deployment. Thirty-nine days per year are not sufficient to prepare the unit to reach even minimal proficiency in its METL tasks according to the Army standard, and even these days are not available for pure training. Fifty percent of a guardsman's time is spent on non-essential, administration tasks. Personal experience and interviews of guardsmen also reveal that only four or five days of actual training occur during AT, which is the most critical training time of the year for any ARNG unit to conduct effective, collective training.

The requirements from state, federal, and administrative sources and their associated lack of resources along with personal issues of careers, families, and continued education have rendered ARNG units in the 26th Infantry Division incapable of reaching a level of wartime readiness.
Chapter VII
Conclusion

The combat units in the 26th Infantry Division located throughout New England cannot reach a state of readiness to reach wartime deployment. The unit is seriously deficient in trained junior and senior leaders, individual skill proficiency is well below the Army standard, training plans are unrealistic and ineffective, and resources (particularly time), are not available to bring the unit up to an improved state of readiness.

At the time I am writing this chapter, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), a Georgia Army National Guard combat unit, was mobilized in November 1990 and is going through unit training at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. NTC is used primarily by active Army mechanized forces to hone collective training skills by maneuvering against a highly skilled OPFOR (opposing forces) unit. Active Army units value the training because of the realism, particularly with the use of high-technology, laser engagement systems that provide immediate and accurate feedback from engagements. The 48th Brigade, a roundout unit for the already deployed 24th Infantry Division (active Army), is having serious training problems. In fact, the brigade has been extended for at least seven additional days due to serious training deficiencies.

The active Army observers/controllers have found poor individual soldier skills, a shortage of qualified leaders with experience and formal schooling in their fields, and a lack of "battlefield sense"
among the commanders necessary to adjust to the confusion of combat.\textsuperscript{51} Based on the analysis in this thesis, this should come as no surprise, but the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau may feel differently: "Guard members have achieved every goal, met every standard, and passed every test."\textsuperscript{52} Thus, this recent comment prompted by the requirement of the 48th Brigade's rotation to the MTC simply adds to the confusion and lack of focus in the Army National Guard system.

It is wholly unrealistic to expect an ARNG unit to be proficient in combat collective tasks. The active Army trains an average of 200 days per year, while ARNG units train only 39 per year with about 50% of that time devoted to administrative tasks.\textsuperscript{53} The complexity of modern equipment, the strain on resources, the turnover rate, and the demands placed on the Guard not related to its wartime mission all militate against readiness. This is why I believe the 26th Infantry Division cannot reach a readiness posture.

This is not to imply that all reserve units are ill prepared. On the contrary, many reservists bring extraordinary civilian skills to the Army. These non-combat related skills are essential to the Total Army concept, which cannot exist without them. But the vast majority of these civilian skills are individual specialized tasks, unlike the requirements for combat units, which demand teamwork, strong command and control, physical fitness, and esprit de corps. Thus, the support units that mobilized and deployed to the Middle East for Operation Desert Storm, at least as observed at Fort Devens, are capable and essential. For this reason, non-combat units in the reserve components should be staffed with sufficient resources to train. But by viewing the 48th Brigade's experience, combat Guard units cannot deploy in an acceptable time. There are ten Army National Guard divisions and six are roundout
brigades. If these units had to deploy, there are not sufficient training facilities in the United States to prepare even a small amount of these units in a timely manner.

The entire Army National Guard system must be reviewed. What is the mission of the Guard? Today's Guard is a descendant of the mid-seventeenth-century colonial militia. As time progressed, the Guard's mission became more complex and demanding. With state and federal requirements, it appears that the Guard has been overloaded and cannot reach a state of readiness in its combat units. The purpose of the Guard must be clearly defined. The Guard is an organization with normative and structural sources to contribute to national defense as well as serve the governors. These sources are the primary causal forces supporting the Army National Guard, but these sources are "rationalized myths" in that the goals of the Guard ("readiness") cannot be empirically verified internal to the Guard, and that these goals are widely believed both by the Guard and members of the defense establishment. Is it to assume more requirements based upon the Army's Building Down program to decrease the cost of defense? If so, can the Guard realistically be expected to be trained in state missions such as riot control, disaster relief, and the protection of key assets and infrastructure in the United States?

It is my opinion that all combat Army National Guard units should be disbanded. The Warsaw Pact is defunct and it appears that future areas of conflict will be of low-to-moderate levels, as was the case in Iraq, Panama, and Grenada. That is not to say the active Army should not be reduced, for it should be because its current structure is based upon a major war in Europe. But as this paper has shown, the combat units in the Army National Guard cannot reach an acceptable level of
readiness. Regardless of how much can be saved, it makes no sense to 
rely on a force that cannot deploy and fight effectively.

What can be learned from this study? It is interesting to view the 
Guard as an organization that has reached paralysis and ineffectiveness 
in purpose. It appears it has continually taken on additional 
requirements as the complexity of the entire system of defense grew. 
Its people have lost the training and development base to allow the 
organization to identify and address its needs. Further, the Guard can 
be viewed as an organization subject to political influence that 
detracts from its goals and degrades the quality of its people. 
Finally, it demonstrates that an organization with cross-cutting goals 
that lacks accurate and valid means of evaluation will form a 
self-perpetuating bureaucracy hopelessly deadlocked into a 
non-responsive, bloated entity that has lost its original purpose for 
its existence.
Appendix
Definition of Terms

Collective Tasks: Actions to be taken by two or more members of the same unit that have a common, measurable standard of performance. These standards of performance are usually detailed in Army training publications.

Operations: This term is applied in a military sense to mean the collective efforts of various types and sizes of units performing collective tasks to produce a common goal.

Proficiency: Obtain an acceptable standard in a single tasks as detailed in army training publications. Proficiency in training is determined through observation by an unbiased and experienced individual or team of a unit performing a task or group of tasks. The observers have the same specialty in the tasks being performed by his peers or subordinates. For individual tasks, proficiency is measured through both observation and objective testing.

Readiness: Determined by both subjective and objective measurements, readiness in the Army is measured in terms of percentages of personnel strength and skill qualifications, available equipment and the operational rate of that equipment, and its level of individual and collective training proficiency.
Resources: Defined in terms of time, equipment, land for maneuver, transportation, personnel, and expertise, this term dictates what a unit can or cannot do to train to the expected tasks it is designed to perform.
Endnotes


11 Scott 273.


16 Uniformed Services 114.


21 This research is based upon personal interviews with senior sargeants and officers in positions to observe and train these units from August 1989 to January 1991.

22 FM 21-20 8-1 thru 8-7.


24 This depends upon individual proficiency, motivation, strength of the unit's leadership, and the distance to an appropriate training site.


26 STP 21-1-GMT 3.

27 FM 25-100 2-1.

28 Headquarters, 26th Infantry Division, 26th (YANKEE) Infantry Division METL, 7 September 1989.

29 Headquarters, 26th Infantry Division, Training Years 92/93 Command Training Guidance.


31 Temple 99. The 20% turnover rate cited is country-wide. Actual turnover rates for specific units in New England are much higher, depending upon the strength of the unit's leadership and the local economy. Specific percentages are classified.

Anthony Cimino, Administration Assistant to the Commander. Interview with author, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, 23 July 1990.

26th Infantry Division armories throughout Massachusetts were closed during the winter months in 1989 thru 1991 to reduce the cost of heating. This is a severe measure that indicates the extent of budget cutbacks.

92/93 Command Training Guidance.

Exercise was conducted at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts in March 1990.


For security reasons, this location cannot be revealed, however it was played over the former Federal Republic of Germany.


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These results are obtained from a summary roll-up of SQT results for Infantry skills, 11B, 11C and 11K.

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47 Richard A. Davis, Director, Army Issues, GAO, Testimony before
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February 23, 1989. 142-43.
48 Operation Desert Shield Lessons Learned.
49 Topic of discussion during the 26th Infantry Division's Command
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50 Davis (B) 145.
51 Maze 3.
52 Herbert R. Temple, Jr. (Ret.), "Retraining is Not Needed,"
53 Davis (B) 142-3, 147.
54 Scott 141.
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