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CHALLENGES FOR A NEW DEMOCRACY

BY

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Analyzing the Soviet period of Ukraine's history through different "case studies," the author emphasizes the negative and sometimes criminal role the Soviet political culture and leadership style played in the development of Ukrainian society. Some of the author's examples can be used as instructive case studies for any college's course on "strategic leadership."
CHALLENGES FOR A NEW DEMOCRACY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACTS

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This paper is an analysis of the crucial role a new generation of strategic leaders might play in the successful transformation of the Ukrainian society to a stable democracy. The author discusses some specific issues associated with the new Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy, an educational institution for senior military and civilian leaders which is the equivalent of the U.S. National War College.

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INTRODUCTION

Starting in 1991, the newly independent Ukraine entered a crucial period of her history. Ukraine declared her intent to build a peaceful, free democratic society governed by the rule of law and to revive the strength and intellectual potential of her people. The old Soviet paradigm of a closed, ideologically-oriented society was peacefully replaced with a new paradigm, very distinctive from the old one. Human nature rarely accepts any major paradigm shift without resistance. Therefore, it is easy to understand why it is so difficult for many people to accept the new reality -- even for Americans, especially for Americans.

The Americans, who never made any distinction between the Soviet Union and Russia, find it difficult to suppress their prejudice against this "emerged from nowhere" country which "came out from Russia's shadow" and immediately began to develop its independent foreign and domestic policies, taking the lead in the creation of a new democratic society. Probably, the most surprising thing for them was that this emergence took place in the geographic center of the "old Europe."²

In turn, the representatives of the former Soviet "center" who used to consider Ukraine to be "theirs" and were convinced that it was forever, now hate but are compelled to call her a "nearby foreign part" (blizhnyeye zarubezh'ye). Recently this thought was accurately expressed by *Time* magazine editor Strobe Talbott:³
The brutal fact is that many Russians -- notably including Russians that we would consider to be good guys, liberals, reformers -- in their gut, do not accept the independence of Ukraine. And believe me, Ukrainians know that.

Undoubtedly, as an expert who has written six books on the relationship between the former Soviet Union and the U.S., Strobe Talbott knows exactly what he is talking about.

Will Ukraine succeed in building a truly democratic society? It depends upon different factors, both domestic and international. Among domestic factors one which may turn out to be crucial is that of developing a new generation of honest, democratically-oriented leaders for all political, economic, and military areas. This factor is purely domestic only in a relative sense, because currently Ukraine is learning from the experience of and is open to cooperation with other countries.

Without a claim on detailed description of the U.S. model of the senior defense educational system, but proceeding from the author’s sincere desire to apply the best features of the model in Ukraine, this paper is an attempt to emphasize one more time and prove one very simple thought: if your long-term goal is to strengthen a democracy you should care about developing the future leaders who will be able to fulfill this mission.

This paper proceeds on the "worst case" scenario, that is, a reader would want to find the primary source of some piece of information; this "worst case" would be the best one for the author. The endnotes include not only references to the sources available to the author, but some commentaries as well.
The author is convinced that the information presented in the first two chapters is essential for the understanding of any current topic regarding Ukraine, taking into account the lack of knowledge about the country among both the American people in general and even some of the U.S. officials dealing with the newly independent states, in particular.

The first two chapters are in the "transmission" mode; their goal is to meet the following U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program requirement: to provide the U.S. side with some information useful for the development of future U.S. strategic leaders. The third chapter reflects the Ukraine's particular interest regarding this program: to use an access to Western sources of information in order to apply Western experience for building a new democratic society. The paper as a whole is an attempt to find a balance between the above parties' interests.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

They counted us among the dead, 
but look, we are alive. 

Bible

The law of More will be seen to decline:
After another much more seductive:
Dnieper first will come to give way:
Through gifts and tongue another more attractive.

Nostradamus, Prophecies, 1555.⁵

It is a difficult thing to understand Ukraine and some aspects of current Ukrainian policies without some knowledge of the Ukraine's history.

Ukraine means "borderland" or "frontier." She is the second largest country in Europe. This country, which occupies a strategic position at the crossroads between Western Europe and Asia, historically has been a borderland separating religions, peoples, traditions, and cultures. As a historian has written, "Ukraine" is an appropriate name for a land that lies on the southeastern edge of Europe, on the threshold of Asia, along the fringes of the Mediterranean world, and astride the once important border between sheltering forests and the open steppe. In her rolling plains and steppes there are vast regions of Ukraine's famous and remarkably fertile black soil (chernozem) which are among the most extensive and fertile in the world.⁶ That is why Ukraine was considered to be the "breadbasket of Europe" since time immemorial, and why the traditional colors of Ukraine's historic national flag are azure and golden yellow -- representing grainfields under a blue sky (The official explanation for the fact that this flag was strictly prohibited

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by the Soviet power was referred to as "Ukrainian nationalism").

It was Kievan Rus’ (not "Russia", which simply did not exist at that time, but "Rus’") with its center in Kiev, the present capital of Ukraine, that became more than millennium ago the birthplace of the Ukrainian, Russian, and Belorussian nations. It was the waters of the Ukrainian Dnieper’s tributary where in 988 their forefathers were baptized and became Christians.

If nature has been generous to Ukraine, history has not. Because of her natural riches and accessibility from the ancient past to most recent times, Ukraine, perhaps more than any other country in Europe, has experienced devastating foreign invasions and conquests. That is why foreign domination and the struggle against it have been paramount themes in her history.

The seven Soviet decades, during which Ukraine was converted into a developed industrial republic, also brought her enormous disasters. The disasters were the results of a faulty and often criminal nature of Soviet leadership. Stalin’s man-made famine of 1932-33 caused the deaths of several million Ukrainians. The famine was to be for the Ukrainians what the Holocaust was to the Jews and the Massacres of 1915 for the Armenians. A tragedy of unfathomable proportions, it traumatized the nation leaving it with deep social, psychological, political, and demographic scars that it carries to this day. The cruelty and inhumanity of the Stalin’s regime were illustrated by the cynical words of a Stalin’s associate: "It took a famine to show them who is master
here. It has cost millions of lives, but .... we have won the war!" It goes without saying that all information regarding this tragedy was carefully concealed from the people, and Soviet officials never confirmed the fact that the famine ever took place. But now, when we got to know the truth, the question "who is master here?" clarifies the essence of the long-term Ukrainian-Soviet conflict -- the conflict which existed all the time, even when it was nothing but a hint in the souls of misinformed people.

The recent disaster, which traumatized Ukrainian nation no less than the famine, occurred on 26 April 1986, when reactor Number 4 of the huge Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, 72 miles (about 130 km) north of the Ukraine’s capital of Kiev, exploded. The catastrophe, which resulted from the faulty design of the reactor and human errors, caused the discharge of more radioactive material into the atmosphere than had been released in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In their traditional manner, Soviet authorities and Gorbachev personally, tried to cover up the disaster. As a Ukrainian journalist has written, "a zone of particularly heavy radiation ... is being turned into a zone of particularly deep silence." This case revealed one more time the inhuman nature of the Soviet system -- the system on which its last defender tried to pull on "a human face." For several highly dangerous days immediately following the accident the population was neither protected nor even informed: children played in their sandboxes, people came out in
the streets to celebrate May 1st Holiday, and nobody knew that invisible radioactive particles were settling on their heads.

The truth began to be revealed only three years later. The number of fatalities, officially put at 31, almost certainly reached 4,000 deaths by mid-1991 and may go ten times as high before 2036. More than 200,000 residents, at first inside a twenty-mile radius from the reactor, and then from farther away, were forced to move. The ecological damage to the environment was extreme and long term.

From the 1970s, when the construction of the plant began, there had been strong opposition in Ukraine to Moscow’s decision to build the huge nuclear plant in the energy-rich republic in the vicinity of Kiev and so close to the Dnieper River, the main water source for 38 million people in the southern Ukraine. However, the Soviet power always gave unequivocal answer to the question: "Who is master here?" The high-handed and irresponsible manner in which Moscow forced the plant on Ukraine caused widespread resentment in the republic. This brief Chernobyl "case study" helps to respond to the questions: (1) Why did Ukraine decide to be an independent country; and (2) Why Ukraine wants to be non-nuclear?

When analyzing the last period of the Soviet history any unprejudiced observer would inevitably come to the conclusion: it was Ukraine that caused the end of the Soviet empire. Ukraine moved toward the declaration of her independence using extraordinarily legal ways. It was not easy because Moscow
viewed the adherence of Ukraine as vital to the survival of the Soviet Union and did everything "possible and impossible" to keep her "in check." Major roles in achieving Ukraine's independence were played by the Ukrainian popular movement Rukh and the Ukrainian Parliament -- Supreme Council (in Ukrainian -- Verkhovna Rada). On July 16, 1990, more than one year prior to the coup d'etat attempt in the USSR of August 1991, the Parliament of Ukraine proclaimed the state sovereignty of Ukraine and declared the right to her own armed forces and the intention of becoming "a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear-free principles: not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons." At that time Ukraine's attitude toward Gorbachev's new union treaty might be expressed by the proverb: "When in the house of someone who has been hanged do not mention the word 'rope'."

The events of the August coup attempt overfilled the Ukraine's "bowl of patience" completely. During those two-and-a-half days of August, 1991, the President of the USSR was removed from power and was held incommunicado as a prisoner of the junta in his Crimean villa in Ukraine. At that situation neither the Ukrainian Government nor Ukrainian Parliament could impede it because they "were not masters here." This was when it became perfectly clear to Ukrainians that their "sovereign" state did not possess any real power. The real masters in Ukraine were "those eight people in Moscow:" they controlled all lines of
This dangerous situation for Ukraine's sovereignty had to be immediately changed. The only choice for Ukraine was to secede from the Soviet Union. On August 24, 1991, "continuing a thousand-year old tradition of state creation in Ukraine" the Ukrainian Parliament declared "Independence of Ukraine and a creation of an independent Ukrainian state -- Ukraine."19 Four days later delegates from the Russian and Soviet parliaments traveled to Ukraine in an effort to persuade Ukrainians to stay in the union, but their attempt failed.20 Gorbachev announced that he could not imagine the existence of the union without Ukraine, but Ukraine already made her choice. On December 1, 1991, during the all-Ukrainian referendum the citizens overwhelmingly supported the Parliament's decision with 90.3% voting in favor of independence. President Bush's wish, expressed precisely four months earlier, came true. It was: "May God bless the people of Ukraine."21 For the Ukrainian people 1991 became what the historian John Lukacs called 1945 for Europeans: "Year Zero."22

The result of the Ukrainian referendum determined the fate of the Soviet empire. The U.S. officials were compelled to admit that "Ukraine's decision to opt for independence played a catalytic role" in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.23

On December 8, 1991, leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine met in Brest, Belarus. During their summit, taking into consideration Ukraine's position regarding Gorbachev's union,
heads of the three states came to the conclusion that "talks on the preparation of a new union treaty have reached a dead end" and stated that the USSR, "as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence." They agreed to found a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to preserve the existing close economic ties and prevent the uncontrolled disintegration of the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, on December 21, in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, the CIS was "refounded," this time including eleven newly independent states.

By January 1992, Ukraine essentially had a complete legal basis for the creation of her own armed forces. In total, between August 24, 1991 and April 1992 there were adopted 26 legislative acts and 12 implementing decisions in the sphere of national defense. According to one U.S. military expert’s estimate, in terms of both number and substance, that speaks well for the Ukrainian political leadership.2

On December 30, 1991, leaders of CIS reached the agreement that members may form separate armies, and Ukraine immediately (3 January 1992) began to do so in accordance with provisions of new national legislation. The basis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine constituted conventional forces of the former Soviet troops deployed on the Ukrainian territory. According to Ukrainian laws all the military personnel stationed in Ukraine were considered to have citizenship of Ukraine, with a full right to serve in her Armed Forces, regardless of their ethnic origin. Such an approach demonstrates and confirms that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are really "structured ... based on democracy and humanism."3 To become a member of the Ukrainian military a serviceman was required to take an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.4

Both Russian and U.S. military experts state that Ukraine has inherited from the USSR a powerful military machine. The machine is composed of the second strategic echelon regiments and divisions, the most combat capable units that are equipped with modern weaponry. The approximate strength of the division-sized
and smaller units that have gone to Ukraine is 470,000 men (taking into account personnel of all military structures -- up to 700,000). Ukraine possesses a formidable military establishment in terms of trained manpower, technology, modern hardware, military bases, and a military-industrial complex.\(^3\) However, proceeding from the draft of the new Ukrainian defense military doctrine, which is in the process of being adopted by the Parliament, Ukraine does not aspire to achieve military superiority over other states.\(^3\)

The Armed Forces of Ukraine are tasked with the armed defense of the independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the country.\(^7\) At the present time their size is essentially greater than that required for defense sufficiency of Ukraine, and it is planned to be reduced.\(^3\) This reduction is also required by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, and by the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of CFE (CFE-1A agreement) signed in Helsinki on June 9, 1992 which established for each of 29 member countries both weaponry and manpower limits, respectively.\(^3\) To apportion a 27 percent cutback from the size of the former Soviet Union's arsenal in the CFE zone talks between eight CIS countries started in December, 1991 and finished in May, 1992. As a result, on May 15 in Tashkent, a special agreement on the principles and procedure for the CIS countries to carry out CFE was signed. According to the
agreement, the Ukraine's average quota for the combat equipment and weapons which can be left in combat units and separately in storage was 27.9 percent. Information about current Ukrainian arsenals and troops, and post-CFE national ceilings which Ukraine should maintain 40 months after the Treaty has come into force, are shown in the Appendix.

No aspect of Ukraine's policy has attracted greater attention than her position on nuclear weapons. In accordance with the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine adopted on October 24, 1991, Ukraine shall have a non-nuclear status, will abide by the three non-nuclear principles in the future, and emphasizes her right to control over the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed on her territory. Ukraine confirmed her status as a non-nuclear power on May 23, 1992, having signed the five-party Lisbon Protocol along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the United States. Her intention to get rid of all nuclear weapons deployed on Ukraine's territory was proved by the fact that Ukraine has removed all tactical nuclear weapons (experts name different figures within the framework of 2,600-4,000 warheads) to Russia for their destruction under the term of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and this was done ahead of schedule, by June 1992.

Ukraine also has the largest concentration of strategic nuclear weapons outside Russia. This includes 130 silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) RS-18 (NATO code SS-
19 'Stiletto') and 46 silo-based ICBMs RS-22 (SS-24 'Scalpel').

All of these missiles are under the central CIS control. Under the terms of Lisbon Protocol and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the USA and the USSR, signed on July 31, 1991, in Moscow, all strategic offensive arms on the territory of Ukraine shall be eliminated within the seven-year START reductions period. The uniqueness of the situation lies in the fact that Ukraine was the first country which voluntarily took on the burden of eliminating her strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, a choice which has huge financial implications. Having set out on the path of eliminating nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR, Ukraine counts on strict international guarantees of her national security against the possible threat or use of force by any nuclear State. According to Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk, by becoming a non-nuclear power, Ukraine will significantly weaken her military capability. That is why security guarantees are especially required when some Ukraine's neighbors have territorial claims against her.

The above background highlights some of Ukraine's current national security issues which would be appropriately dealt with at an educational institution for senior military and civilian leaders. To address this concern, a Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers decree was adopted in August 1992 providing for the opening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy (UAFA), an equivalent of the U.S. National War College.
2. SOVIET HERITAGE

GORBACHEV: "We live the way we work."
PEOPLE: "We live the way we are ruled."

(From memories of a former Soviet citizen)

The Soviet political culture and leadership style -- that was one of the reasons which caused suffering for Ukraine in her recent past. This is what any future Ukrainian leaders should avoid if they want Ukraine to be successful. This is what the builders of the new Ukrainian defense institution definitely should not use as one of its keystones.

Soviet studies became an academic field in the West as far back as after World War II. As a result, the bibliography of this problem is so vast that it seems impossible to say something new on the subject. Now, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, all the problems associated with it seem to lose their relevance. However, if you think so, you have made a mistake. A danger of the "Soviet heritage" for the development of any newly independent country currently really exists, and it has at least two dimensions, both individual and social.

First, everyone who has come out from the old Soviet system needs, according to Chekhov's vivid expression, "to press the slave out of himself drop by drop," and this is an individual problem. Maybe some people do not really need to do it.

Second, any society needs a stratum of leaders whose quality determines a degree of the society's success. Undoubtedly, the
influence of the old Soviet imperial thinking and leadership style comprises a danger for future development of any post-Soviet republic. The extent of the danger depends upon who is the "keeper" of this thinking and this style.

Fortunately, Ukraine had chosen her new leadership at the national level in the most democratic way. The innovative thinking and long-term vision of her new national authority facilitate the paradigm shift toward a democracy for Ukraine's entire society. However, to form the stratum of new leaders, Ukraine needs more than free elections: she needs a new system for leaders' development. The UAFA is designed to be a significant part of the system.

What were the general features of the Soviet political culture and leadership style? According to George Kennan, the political personalities of Soviet power were "the product of ideology and circumstances." He was probably right because usually things are more visible for analysts from the outside. By 1992, the communist ideology was totally destroyed, and well-known circumstances have led to the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Does it mean that inherent in Soviet power the old paradigm was automatically replaced by a new one? The key elements for understanding why the response to that is "No" are associated with the nature of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet elite.

The former Soviet superpower was serviced and maintained by an internal state system centered in Moscow, which had come to be
known as the "center." The "center" was aptly described by John Morrison as a black hole in the Communist universe where wealth was disappearing, not a physical space inhabited by real people. The formal autonomy was only a constitutional fiction for the outlying Soviet republics, because they had been tightly, often brutally controlled from the center. Up to 1990, when a law was passed which established a new position of President of the USSR, the Communist Party's Politburo was the focal point of decision-making authority. Ownership was concentrated in a single center, a kind of 'supermonopoly' which possessed the plenitude of economic and political power. The Party's control was ensured by a hierarchically organized ruling class that represented and defended the supermonopoly's interests in all spheres of social life. The fundamental aim was the preservation, strengthening and extension of the supermonopoly's power.

The ruling class started at lower levels and extended to the top echelons of the Soviet leadership. Western researchers sometimes informally called it the "nomenclature class" because of the system of nomenclature (nomenklatura), or lists of posts the appointment to which required the approval of a given higher or lower party body. The nomenklatura system was shrouded in deep secrecy, and no one knew the list's exact size. The nomenclature class comprised those cleared for assignment to responsible positions in the party-state. Its members and their families lived in a relatively closed world of privileges which
so sharply differentiated their life-experience from that of ordinary citizens that they could almost be living in different countries. These people had comfortable apartments, cars and country houses. They were served by a network of so-called closed distributors, inconspicuous special shops where food and other products, including foreign goods, were available at subsidized prices. They had opportunities for foreign travel, adequate health care, and could enjoy the facilities of desirable Soviet resorts at the best times of the year. Through informal channels of influence their children could make their way into the restricted number of openings for higher education and thence into careers in the official world. In short, this privileged minority did have common interests to defend, and the August coup attempt confirmed their determination to do so at any cost.

Coexisting with the nomenklatura were patron-client relations. Officials who had the authority to appoint individuals to certain positions cultivated loyalties among those whom they appointed. The patron (the official making the appointment) promoted the interests of clients in return for their support. Patron-client relations had implications for policymaking in the party and government bureaucracies. Promotion of trusted subordinates into influential positions facilitated policy formation and policy execution. A network of clients helped to insure that a patron's policies could be carried out. In addition, patrons relied on their clients to provide an accurate flow of information on events throughout the
country. This information assisted policymakers in ensuring that their programs were being implemented.57

The Soviet elite was not a ruling class in the usual sense of the term -- it was a relatively closed social group that consciously defended its collective right to transfer its property and privileges from one generation to another. Western studies have shown that the degree to which an elite can act cohesively depends in part on the establishment of sufficient mutual trust, so that its members will, if necessary, forego short-run personal advantage in order to ensure stable rule. The fact that the Soviet elite was overwhelmingly drawn from a rather narrow stratum of society and enjoyed common backgrounds and experiences created a potential for developing such trust. Relatives of top leaders had at times occupied positions of influence. Some members of the elite and leadership were related to each other by marriage, but such nepotism had never been publicly condoned by the regime. Moreover, members of the elite also shared common privileges that they could jointly defend. Such privileges were guaranteed by one's position in the bureaucratic hierarchy; therefore, personnel stability was an essential precondition for the elite to enjoy these privileges uninterruptedly.55 While individual politicians came and went according to the iron laws of biology, the structures in which they operated were stable.59

The Soviet elite had always tried to hide its privileges from public view, leaving its special stores unmarked, building
its vacation homes in secluded places, and riding in its limousines with the curtains drawn. This phenomenon of "inconspicuous consumption" contrasted sharply with the openly self-confident behavior of elites elsewhere in the world. Both the extensive political controls exercised by the regime and the enormous privileges that the system granted to those who served it conscientiously were major reasons why the considerable differences of opinion that naturally arise did not overflow the bounds of conventional Soviet politics and did not cause explosions for such a long time.  

Gorbachev's new approach toward Soviet personnel policy was evolving in two distinctive phases. The first phase, when Gorbachev was still at the acme of his domestic popularity, could be represented by his program of restructuring the Party's personnel policy in January 1987. The program was a typical case of "words without deeds." The reason for its "successful" collapse was the resistance of the Soviet elite. Among Soviet top-level officials, including Gorbachev himself, probably the only person who sincerely believed in and actually tried to fulfill this program was Boris Yeltsin. Because he violated the elite's "unwritten rules of the game," he had to be punished. He was fighting in proud solitude and, at the end of 1987, he fell in an unequal battle with Moscow's powerful elite. But, as we know, he did not give up.  

During the second phase, Gorbachev was compelled to change the rules of the game by introducing the principles of free
elections, and his favorite expression to describe his new approaches was "the processes are under way." By 1990, however, he was unable to control events any more. According to the testimony of knowledgeable people, Gorbachev usually "enjoyed" only the second- or third-order effects of his domestic policies. He became more of a spectator than an actor in the battle between new democratic forces and the Soviet elite.43

Unlike Gorbachev, other elites had a clearer long-term vision. That is why they began to adjust to the newly emerging political and economic environment in advance. Moreover, they often used power and influence to change economic regulations and legislation in the most beneficial way for themselves and not the ordinary people. As a result, the August coup attempt marked, probably, the end of the elite's transition to its new position rather than its defeat.

Harvard professor Edward Keenan was probably right in considering that it was one of the system-preserving features of the Soviet political culture to deprive nonparticipants of crucial information about the rules of the system itself.44 The author's point is that Keenan's thought was absolutely correct with regard to not only foreigners, whom Keenan had in mind, but primarily for the entire Soviet population as such (naturally, excluding the elite). In terms of informational freedom, the classic Soviet state represented a society of general secrecy where rumors often were a major source of information. The isolation of Soviet policies from public review and excessive
secrecy turned out to be convenient means to cover Soviet ruler's errors and wrong decisions.\textsuperscript{65}

During seven decades the Party sought to lead the Soviet people to communism, defined by Karl Marx as a classless society that contains limitless possibilities for human achievement. The Party's goal required that it control all aspects of Soviet government and society in order to infuse political, economic, and social policies with the correct ideological content. The Soviet concept of power required that the Party leadership remained in theory the sole repository of truth. The leadership of the Communist Party was therefore always right.\textsuperscript{66} The two components of the Soviet supermonopoly -- monopoly on truth and monopoly on information -- were the pillars of vital importance for the Soviet empire.

The Soviet political elites lacked the confidence, competence, and sense of purpose needed for ruling a society collectively. The events of August 1991 proved that the people at the top of the communist system were not the best and the brightest of the society they governed. That system did not encourage or reward initiative, imagination or decisiveness.\textsuperscript{67} It is unlikely that these people truly believed in the "bright communist future" and the "higher socialist morality" they officially preached. In terms of ideology the Soviet empire was built on the basis of a fraud and was ruled by a small group of "keepers of truth," predominantly cynics. Russian novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn called the Soviet Union a country where
"the lie has become not just a moral category, but a pillar of the state." The fate of the empire was predicted by Abraham Lincoln who once said: "You may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all the people all the time."

The Soviet political culture and leadership style can be illustrated by the following vivid examples, taken from the memoirs of Andrei Sakharov who is considered "one of the greatest heroes of the twentieth century." The first example gives an idea about "the way we were ruled." In 1955, Marshal Nedelin, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, gave a banquet after the successful test of a Soviet H-bomb. During the banquet when Sakharov's toast seemed to Nedelin inappropriately pacifistic, he immediately put the pacifist "on the spot" in such a brutal way that it was absolutely inappropriate for that situation. In the best case, if you dared to remind such a leader about ethics, the leader would probably ask: "What is ethics?" The reason for using this example here is that Nedelin, a representative of the Soviet military elite, was "teaching" in a very unceremonious and cynical way someone who was not an ordinary person. A representative of the Soviet scientific elite, Sakharov was "The Creator" of the H-bomb being tested. Marshal Nedelin turned out to be such a good "teacher" that after a while his "pupil," academician Andrei Sakharov, gave up his privileges and positions to become the leader of the Soviet dissident movement and a world-renowned human rights activist. The reason? Because he
was an honest person.

As an influential member of the elite he was much more informed than an average Soviet individual. He gained access to the Soviet leadership and could personally observe the behavior of those few people who ruled the country. As an intelligent person he gradually and inevitably came to the conclusion what some other members of the elite had come to before him: the system could not be trusted; it is dangerous for everybody, and first of all for its own people. Unlike others from the elite who got to know the truth, he was courageous enough to declare it publicly. Once he unriddled the "Soviet enigma" he devoted the rest of his life to the struggle against the system. In 1975, when Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, the Prize’s citation proclaimed him "the conscience of mankind."

The fate of "the teacher" himself was very symbolic as well. Let Sakharov's words speak for themselves:

Nedelin was killed in 1960, during preparations for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test. The USSR already had an ICBM, but the new version possessed many military advantages, and it had been given high priority. Nedelin, then commander of Soviet strategic forces, was in charge of the test.

The missile had been set up on a launch pad, and the splashdown zone in the Pacific Ocean announced. The navy was patrolling its perimeter, and special vessels fitted with telemetry equipment had taken their stations. During the final check of the missile’s systems, the control panel signaled a possible malfunction. The technicians in charge recommended that all work be halted until the problem was identified and solved. But Nedelin objected: "The government set the schedule and we’ve got to stick to it." He ordered them to resume preparations for a launch.

The marshal had his desk placed on the pad directly under the exhaust tubes. The technicians
returned to their posts. Suddenly the main engines began firing. Jets of red-hot gas shot out of the exhaust tubes, struck the launch pad, and rebounded upward, engulfing the scaffolding and the workers on it. Nedelin was probably killed in the first seconds. The automatic cameras had been triggered along with the engines, and they recorded the scene.... Some 190 people died that day.2

Undoubtedly, Nedelin as a bold combat commander clearly understood the role of personal example. What was the "source of his conduct" in this particular case? Did he act like a dragon devouring itself as a Western reader could conclude? By no means. Rather, it was the behavior of a hostage of the soulless system who doomed himself and his subordinates to nonsensical death.

The above examples constitute only an infinitesimal part of "unique" Soviet heritage. If carefully selected from the multitude of "do not do like this" and if deeply researched, some of the Soviet examples are worthy of scholars' attention. They can be used as instructive case studies for any college's course on "Strategic Leadership."
3. U.S. POSITION: HOSTILITY, NEUTRALITY OR PARTICIPATION?

Historical lessons teach us that every new democracy is premodially weak until it becomes a tradition. The democracy is weak not because something is wrong with its democrats, but only because it is new. People are not born as adults, and infancy is a natural period of their life. The U.S. news media currently lacks an appreciation of the truth as applied to the Ukrainian democracy.

If we turn to the origins of the U.S.-Ukraine relations, George Bush’s famous remarks to the Ukrainian Parliament on August 1, 1991, come to mind:

I remember the French expression, *vive la difference*, and I see different churnings around this Chamber, and that is exactly the way it ought to be. One guy wants this and another one that. That’s the way the process works when you’re open and free -- competing with ideas to see who is going to emerge correct and who can do the most for the people in Ukraine.\(^3\)

Now Ukrainian parliamentarians, encouraged by this address, try to follow Bush’s advice; and, particularly when addressing the nuclear issue which is considered to be of vital U.S. interest. As a result, Ukraine faces the whole gamut of negative emotions ranging from perplexity to barely hidden hostility. The way some American newspapers cover the issue represents almost "nothing which flows from objective reality." Taking into account the Fourth Estate’s capability of simultaneously informing -- or misinforming -- an audience of tens of millions,\(^4\) it is easy to understand the result. In this
particular case very few American periodicals try to reflect objectively the positions and concerns of each side, but most of these very few journals are too specialized to have much effect. The topic "Ukrainian Nukes in the Mirror of the American Media" is worthy of a separate research. In short, the problem deserves to be another good case study for any college's course on "Media and Society."

Hopefully, the American news media is not the only national institution which has an impact upon U.S. foreign policies. The American system of checks and balances is able to restore the lost balance in treating Ukraine more objectively.

A foundation for the development of U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral state-to-state relations was laid during the first official visit by the President of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, to Washington, D.C., May 5-7, 1992. During the visit both sides agreed to use bilateral military and defense contacts in the area of security to provide advice and assistance in the development of civil-military institutions. Simultaneously, the U.S. offered to enhance contacts at all levels and invited Ukraine to participate in the U.S. IMET program.  

This program provides military education and training on a grant basis to students, including senior officers, from allied and friendly nations. It is recognized as one of the most cost effective components of U.S. security assistance. The program exposes foreign students to the U.S. professional military establishment and to the American way of life, including U.S.
regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights, and belief in the rule of law. Students are also exposed to U.S. defense procedures and the manner in which the U.S. military functions under civilian rule.  

As a result of the invitation made by the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army the first two representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were selected on a competitive basis and sent to study at the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in July 1992. From the U.S. perspective, Ukraine’s participation helps to enrich the educational environments of the colleges. Ukraine’s particular interest regarding this program lies in the access to Western sources of information and Western experience in order to apply that experience in building a new democratic society. The benefits consist of establishing mutual trust, understanding and good working relationships between the U.S., Ukraine, and other foreign countries participating in the program, at the senior officers’ level.

Newly emerging military cooperation between the U.S. and Ukraine has an additional aspect. Creating a new senior defense institution, namely Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy similar to the U.S. National War College, Ukraine faces a dilemma: which model to follow? Most probably, the choice will be made between the model of the prestigious Soviet (currently Russian) General Staff Academy which was the "Alma Mater" for the majority of high-ranking Ukrainian officers and generals, and the U.S. model.
This choice will be of crucial importance, because the first option does not promise a fast change of old Soviet political culture and leadership style, while the second option does. The comparison of the above models is beyond the scope of this paper. From the purely military point of view, the jury is still out on which would be the best. However, in terms of strengthening democratic values the American model is undoubtedly beyond compare because it was designed especially for a democratic society.

Despite its long-term advantages, the U.S. option is more expensive for Ukraine to maintain. The Western approach requires a new selection system, Western sources of information, a Western-oriented book collection, intensive faculty development, high-tech facilities, and exhausting development of revolutionary, new case studies. Taking into account Ukraine's current economic difficulties and human inertia of thought, we come to the familiar situation, "I want but I cannot afford."

The new UAFA is in the process of being created based on the existing Army Air Defense Academy in Kiev, otherwise, "the process is under way." Here we have the situation where the old selection system, faculty, facilities, ideologically-oriented book collection, and the Soviet General Staff Academy curriculum are already in place. Under these circumstances an intermediate alternative "a la Gorbachev" might appear to be the most economical and, therefore, the most likely. This third option is a slow, long-term transition from the Soviet to the U.S. model.
with uncertain consequences. This outcome would be, naturally, far from the best one for both Ukraine and the U.S. because it means a slowing down of Ukraine’s “successful transformation ... to a stable democracy.”

Making a transition from the sphere of assumptions to reality, we can conclude that close military cooperation between the U.S. and Ukraine is extremely beneficial for both sides, and it needs to be expanded. With regard to military education, this can be achieved by using different ways, such as: (1) an exchange of students and faculty between the UAFA and U.S. War Colleges; (2) joint Masters and Ph.D. degree programs; (3) combined student classes through video-teleconferences between the UAFA and the U.S. War Colleges, etc. The faculty exchange would be especially useful during the part of the colleges’ curricula devoted to regional strategic appraisals. Additionally, the exchange would facilitate using the U.S. library stocks by Ukrainian instructors to develop selected case studies.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

Shortly before his death, Joseph Stalin uttered: "Education is a weapon, whose effects depend on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is aimed." The dictator was madly cruel, but you cannot say he was not smart. Keeping his words in our minds as a warning, let us work together to turn military education into a "weapon" of, not against, democracy.
APPENDIX

UKRAINE'S ARMED FORCES BEFORE AND AFTER CFE¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment/Manpower</th>
<th>Current Force Number</th>
<th>Post-CFE National Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>6,204</td>
<td>4,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A C V s²</td>
<td>6,394</td>
<td>5,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>4,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>1,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total equipment</td>
<td>17,366</td>
<td>14,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ According to U.S. and Russian sources of information. See endnote no. 41.

² Armored Combat Vehicles.
ENDNOTES

Debate, Agenda Item 9." United Nations. General Assembly. 47th
Session. Provisional Verbatim Record of the 16th Meeting.

2 The geographic center of Europe lies near the town of
Rakhiv, Transcarpathian Oblast of Ukraine. See Ukraine: Facts
and Figures, (Kiev: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992), 17.

3 On 26 January 1993 Time’s editor at large and foreign
affairs columnist Strobe Talbott was nominated for the new post
of ambassador at large and special adviser to the U.S. Secretary
of State on Russia and the Independent States. See Henry Muller,
"From the Managing Editor," Time. (Feb. 1, 1993), 12;

4 Strobe Talbott, "Crisis or Kiosks in the Former Soviet
Union?" Arms Control Today, (Dec. 1992), 16.

5 Edgar Leoni, Nostradamus: Life and Literature (New
York: Nosbooks, 1965), 217. The translation of this
Nostradamus’s prophecy Leoni accompanies with the following
interesting commentary (Ibid., 617-618): "For the reader in the
second half of the 20th century, this is one of the most
interesting of all the prophecies of Nostradamus--one full of
portentous meaning for this era, after having had none from the
16th to the 20th centuries. We now have the generic name
'communism' to apply to the utopian ideologies of which Sir
Thomas More’s Utopia is the common ancestor. Undoubtedly this
work, published in Latin when Nostradamus was on the midst of his
education, was read by him. The prophecy implies a widespread
success of this ideology prior to its decline, and mentions that
the decline will start where the Dnieper is located. This is the
principal river of the Ukraine....It is not unreasonable to
speculate on a possible 20th-century fulfillment of this
prophecy, involving the Soviet Ukraine and perhaps its chief city
(which is on the Dnieper), Kiev. The nature of the more
seductive law and the more attractive tongue are subjects for
further speculation."

6 David T. Twining, Ukraine’s Defense Dilemma (Carlisle
Barracks: USAWC, 1992), 1; Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History
(Toronto, Buffalo, London: Univ. of Toronto Press, Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 3.

7 Kiev (in Ukrainian -- Kyiv) was founded circa the 5th
century.
About 1,420 miles (2,285 km) long, the mighty Dnieper (in Ukrainian -- Dnipro) River is the third largest river in Europe. It bisects Ukraine geographically and unifies her central part economically. The Dnieper River has always been a trade route linking the Baltic coast countries with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

The exact figure is unknown. Soviet statistics for the period are notoriously unreliable. Displeased with the results of the census of 1937 that revealed shockingly high mortality rates, Stalin had the leading census takers shot. Some Western authors estimate the figure to be between 3 and 6 million (Ibid., 415), while more recent researches estimate the figure to be between 7 and 10 million.

Until recently, even at the acme of Gorbachev's glasnost', the famine in Ukraine of 1932-33 was a prohibited theme.


The eight-men junta was a group of high Soviet officials who were attempting to seize power. See Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, (Vol. 71, no. 1, 1992), 164-173.

KGB was the acronym for the Committee for State Security of the USSR.


22 Mandelbaum, 173.


26 These purposes for the creation of the CIS reflect the author’s viewpoint from the Ukrainian perspective.


28 "Law on Armed Forces of Ukraine," Ibid., 63-64.


33 See endnote no. 28, article 3.


35 Dokuchayev, 38-39; Olynyk, 7.

37 See endnote no. 28, article 1.


41 Ibid., 29; "Weapons in Europe Before and After CFE," Arms Control Today, (June 1992), 32; Dokuchayev, 39.


48 Zlenko, 19.

49 "Ukraine to Join START and NPT; All Tactical Nukes Removed," Arms Control Today, (May 1992), 22.

50 Dokuchayev, 40.

52 X. (George F. Kennan) "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, (Vol. 65, no. 4, 1987), 852.


54 Mandelbaum, 165.


58 Beissinger, 41-42.

59 Morrison, X.

60 Ibid., 42-43.


63 Ibid., X-XI.

64 Ibid., p. X.


66 Zickel, 281; X., 859.

67 Beissinger, 44; Mandelbaum, 166.


Ibid., 194.

Ibid., flaps.

Ibid., 195–196.

Bush, 1096.


Green, 361.


Tucker, Robert C. *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev.* New York, London:


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Armed Forces Staff College. Faculty Development/Assessment Program. AFSC Regulation 100.9. Norfolk: AFSC, 1992.


