A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL
OF RUSSIA

BY

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Russian Armed Forces

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USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93-11803
Predicting the future is a thankless task. But, in Russia everyone who reads the newspapers and spends their evenings by intently watching television news has become an amateur futurologist. The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc are indubitably positive phenomena. Perestroika and its predecessor, acceleration, never had these as a strategic goal and now everything else is still unclear. Revolutions are made quickly, but the process of creation is long and tedious; it takes many years of hard work. This study provides an appraisal of what is at stake, what the problems are, how Russia is doing and provides some policy recommendations.
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A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL OF RUSSIA

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Vladislav V. Tabakin, COL, Russia

TITLE: A Strategic Appraisal of Russia

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: April 6, 1993

PAGES: 63

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Predicting the future is a thankless task. But, in Russia everyone who reads the newspapers and spends their evenings by intently watching television news has become an amateur futurologist. The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc are indubitably positive phenomena. Perestroika and its predecessor, acceleration, never had these as a strategic goal and now everything else is still unclear. Revolutions are made quickly, but the process of creation is long and tedious; it takes many years of hard work. This study provides an appraisal of what is at stake, what the problems are, how Russia is doing and provides some policy recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION

Historic changes have occurred in the world during the last several years. Events of the second half of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 have led to profound shifts in the distribution of the world's military-political forces, having a decisive effect on the entire system of international relations and the position and role of many states. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of the Baltic states from it and the creation at the end of 1991 of a fundamentally new international formation instead of the USSR, that is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf and its consequences, and internal conflict in the former Yugoslavia have resulted in changes on a global scale.

It must be assumed that this process will continue. There is still no guarantee that the CIS (at least in its current form) will be maintained, in as much as the new geopolitical situation in the Commonwealth is extremely unstable. Disintegration processes in Russia and several European and Asiatic countries may become active. On the other hand, a rapprochement between some states and their consolidation into separate alliances cannot be excluded.

All this requires a more flexible, far-sighted, and circumspect policy and immediate creation of reliable mechanisms and structures for deterrence, war prevention, and ensuring of
international security. Non-traditional political decisions and
the decisive rejection of outmoded views and concepts are needed
for this.

This study provides a strategic appraisal of Russia. It is
the first one of its kind developed specifically for Russia and
is based on the procedure that the U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
recommends its students follow during Course 5 (Regional
Strategic Appraisal). This Strategic Appraisal defines Russian
national interests (based on national values), indicates how
these interests are affected (positively or negatively) by
current and projected trends, articulates objectives, and then
recommends courses of action to achieve those objectives.
Finally, this study examines the future of real possible mutual
friendship and cooperation between Russia and the United States
of America; this study is a try to prove that these things are
real and no fancies.

This paper, including policy recommendation, was developed
to meet USAWC academic requirements.
I. RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND IN THE WORLD

A. Introduction to Russia

Russia is the largest country in the world and the Russian people are the large-hearted people in the former Soviet Union.

Russia is situated in Europe and Asia. She has a territory of 17,075,200 square kilometers (map at Appendix II, p. 58). She shares a 20,139 kilometer border with Azerbaijan (284 km), Belarus (959 km), China (3,645 km), Estonia (290 km), Finland (1,313 km), Georgia (723 km), Kazakhstan (6,846 km), North Korea (19 km), Latvia (217 km), Lithuania (227 km), Mongolia (3,441 km), Norway (167 km), Poland (432 km), Ukraine (1,576 km). Russia's terrain is very diversified: broad plains with low hills west of Urals; vast coniferous forests and tundra in Siberia; uplands and mountains along southern border regions. Her climate: ranges from steppes in the south through humid continental in much of European Russia; subarctic in Siberia to tundra climate in the polar north; winters vary from cool along the Black Sea coast to frigid in Siberia; summers vary from warm in the steppes to cool along the Arctic coast.

Russia has a population of 149,5 million. Most of the Russian people are Russian Orthodox. Russia has a labor force of 78,7 million (1989).

The first independent Slavonic state, the Kievan Rus, was
founded in 862 in present Ukraine but by the 12th century the center of gravity had shifted to the city of Novgorod, on the route to the Baltic Sea. Simultaneously other Russian principalities came into existence and gradually expanded, among them Muscovy, today's Moscow.

Russia's historical development pursued a twin track: on the one hand Russia gradually asserted itself as a European power, while on the other it pursued its imperial ambitions to the south and east - the Caucasus, central Asia, Siberia and eventually the Far East. Russia's history is also marked by repeated attempts to catch up with Western Europe economically, politically, and culturally. Over the centuries these historical factors have produced a specific Russian consciousness - a nation which can be both "European" and "Asian".¹

A formal name for Russia is the Russian Federation. Its independence was declared by the Supreme Council 24 August 1991. A new constitution is in the process of being drafted. Her legal system is based on a civil law system, while she does not accept compulsory ICJ (International Court of Justice) jurisdiction.

Over a year ago, the Soviet Union fragmented and the Communist Party was quite suddenly disbanded. Since that time, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has steered the former Soviet Union on a path of economic and political reforms - reforms that have led both Russians and foreigners to optimistically predict the establishment of a democratic and free Russian society.

The end of communist rule, in the country of its origin, was
widely celebrated as a victory for democracy. On December 8, 1991, in a small village outside of Brest in Belarus, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and the host country agreed to form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the process, they declared that the USSR had ceased to exist "as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality." The parliaments of the three Slavic states ratified the CIS agreements and specifically annulled the 1922 treaty that created the USSR. But, the CIS was the product of a political compromise forced upon Russia and Belarus by Ukraine's rejection of Gorbachev's plans for a "renewed" Soviet Union.

In 1992 a "new" independent state - Russia - appeared on the political map of the world. It will still take quite a while before firm new characteristics can be distinguished among the many changes. The country is undergoing a painful transition and already finds itself in deep economic crisis. State-owned industry and agricultural enterprises have almost been completely destroyed, and no one can predict what kind of economy will emerge from the ruins.

The international posture of the "new" Russia will depend to great extent on the world's geopolitical shape in the years and decades to come. Russia owes its emergence as a sovereign state to the dissolution of the Soviet Union - a phenomenon of great historical importance, and beyond the geographical focus of Eurasia. To fully evaluate the global significance of Russia - a nation of colossal material and spiritual potential - in the
international system, we must consider the changing global geopolitical context.²

Functionally, Russia is no longer an immediate great power. Being sort of pushed back to her territorial and global position of the late 18th century and her position of the early 20th century when relating to population, Russia still remains the largest country territorially and the world's sixth country as to population (after China, India, USA, Indonesia, and Brazil). Her economic potential is comparable to Germany's although it's far behind that of the USA and Japan. Her grandeur, in the historical and cultural sense, remains unquestionable and irrefutable.

And, if Russia appears to act like a great power in her policies, this is not because she wants to decide the destinies of the world, but because the events which take place on her territory exert a considerable influence on situations throughout the whole world. From a geopolitical extravert, shaping and reshaping the world around her, Russia has turned into a geopolitical introvert. The nature and the scale of internal problems she is facing leaves no doubt that the changes taking place will be long-term ones.

Russia's three external geopolitical shells have disappeared.

The first is purely external and extremely heterogenous. It includes both developing countries in the Soviet sphere of influence and the most remote countries from the USSR (geographically and politically). They include communist
countries (China, Cuba, Yugoslavia), as well as Finland, the most "eastern" of western countries which has closely cooperated with the USSR.

The second shell made up neighboring satellites, ex-communist countries. The former Warsaw Pact.

The innermost shell consisted of the Unions republics whose territories were, as a rule, part of the tsarist empire.

What changes has Russia's geographic position undergone as compared to that of the former Soviet Union? We should try to divide them into positive, or "advantageous", and negative, "disadvantageous" ones to Russia, being aware of all the contingencies of such assessments.

Regarded as negative factors are usually the remoteness from Europe and the loss of important sea ports, granaries, and health resorts. Russia becomes a more northern and continental country, pushed further into Eurasia's remote corner.

The country's traditional specialization in the capital-consuming mining and defence industries become further enhanced, while there remains a shortage of consumer goods. The well-established defence system using part of the country's border is lost, and new borders, more often than not, lack the protective natural barriers.

An exclave has appeared, the Kaliningrad Region (formerly, East Prussia), is separated from Russia by Belarus and Lithuania. The system of "protective belts" on Russia's borders has been replaced by belts of tension and uncertainty. Ethnic-territorial
conflicts in these hot-spots tend to spread onto Russian territory through the open borders. Russia faces new dilemmas concerning her minorities in newly-born neighboring states, refugees, and the troops returning home.

The Cold War resolution, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the loss of status as a super power painfully wounded national pride and fostered a revanchist tendency, not to mention the economic damage due to a rupture of traditional economic ties.

The chance to Russia in the aftermath of the Cold War gives her an unique chance to revise her relations with the world. In particular, the threat of a military confrontation with the West has never been so insignificant.

Another positive fact is that Russia has retained her access to all the seas the former Soviet Union had exits to, as well as new contacts with the Union's neighbors and their relations among advanced countries (the USA, Japan, Finland, Norway), which means she has retained the role of the Eurasian transit bridge. There is no great loss in the nature of her European status. The number of her neighbors has remained the same, and the share of her European neighbors has even increased, but at the expense of ex-Soviet republics. One fourth of Russian territory is in Europe, where 70% of her population lives, as compared to 65% in the case of the former USSR, where the contribution of the Central Asian republics to the all-round balance was rather large.
Generally speaking, discussions concerning "losses" are incorrect, because the Union belonged not to Russia alone and collapsed with her full participation. The loosers may be the other republics. Russia really gains, for example, independence. She was less independent in the former USSR than the other republics. Haven't the patriots grieved precisely over this circumstance only recently? And, isn't it clear that the "loss" of the USSR's less developed parts relieves Russia of a lot of costly duties?

Russia has inherited the greater part of her economic potential, currency reserves, strategic resources, high technology, and intellectual potential.

The opening of land borders cannot be unambiguously assessed. While it weakens her defence system, in the missile era their importance is not so great. On the other hand, the absence of natural barriers facilitates transport relations with old partners which all of them still need for economic reasons.

The main danger stems not from real or assumed losses, but rather from Russia herself, from our inability and unwillingness to capitalize on newly arisen advantages. This is a danger not only to Russia's neighbors, but first of all to Russia herself. The whole course of events largely depends on her domestic and foreign policy, her understanding of her own national interests, and on the ability to defend them. In particular, the role and behavior of the Russian diaspora in the near and remote foreign countries are directly influenced by the progress or curtailment
of reforms in Russia and by the successes or failures of the negotiating process.

Russia has taken several steps toward a more pluralistic, democratic system. However, it will take at least a decade to create a functioning democracy, and even a generation or two to create a culture that is both democratic and stable. The most significant steps toward a democratic system include the adoption of elections as a principal legitimizing function and the granting of the number of recognized rights of the people. Whether it is freedom of speech, freedom of association, or freedom from fear, these conditions must be stated in the Russian Constitution, in the Federal Treaty, in the drafts and revisions of the Constitution, and must come into regular practice. In stable democratic systems there are several necessary elements, not only elections as a legitimizing function, but also respect for basic rights.

B. List of the Russian National Interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERESTS</th>
<th>INTENSITY</th>
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<td>1. DEFENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>- National Independence</td>
<td>survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Territorial Integrity</td>
<td>survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional Stability</td>
<td>vital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Global Stability</td>
<td>vital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Arms Control and Disarmament</td>
<td>major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Non-proliferation of NBC Weapons</td>
<td>vital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. ECONOMIC

- Avoidance of Economic Collapse vital
- Handling Foreign Debt vital
- Economic Transition vital
- Access to Markets and Capital vital
- Stable Convertible Currency vital

3. WORLD ORDER

- Preservation of Peace vital
- Regional Cooperation major
- Prosperous Neighbors major
- Membership in World Institutions major

4. IDEOLOGICAL

- Self-Determination major
- Political, Religious, Economical Freedom major
- Respect for Human Rights major
- Growth of Free Democratic Institutions major
- Social Progress major
- Rule of Law major

II. Challenges to Russian Interests

A. Political Trends/Challenges/Risks

Karl von Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of policy by other means. By extension the Cold War can be defined
as warfare by other (non-lethal) means. Nonetheless, warfare it
was and the stakes were monumental. Geopolitically the struggle,
in the first instance, was for control over the Eurasian landmass
and, eventually, even for global preponderance. Each side
understood that either the successful ejection of the other from
the western and eastern fringes of Eurasia or the effective
containment of the other would ultimately determine the
geostrategic outcome of the contest.

Fueling the conflict were sharply conflicting, ideologically
motivated conceptions of social organization and even of the
human being itself. Not only geopolitics but philosophy - in the
deepest sense of the self-definition of mankind - were very much
at issue. 3

What the 20th century is witnessing is more than a happy end
to the communist utopia. The tectonic structures of the world
order have come into motion and threaten to displace the
continents.

As the Soviet Union approached collapse, each republic had
its own reasons for doing away with the union. Ukraine and
Belarus wanted to renew national cultures and languages that had
decreased as a result of Lenin's, Stalin's, and Brezhnev's policy
of "russifying" other national regions. Central Asian republics
were interested in returning to Islam and to the traditional way
of life connected with their religion. Armenia was willing to
rely on Russia's muscle in the Nagorno-Karabakh military conflict
with Azerbaijan, but after the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russia

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tried to take a neutral position. Moldova hoped that, without Russian interference in the Trans-Dniester conflict, it would be able to appease local separatists. Everyone wanted to put an end to Moscow's leadership. It would give the leaders of the republics the opportunity to stop being Kremlin vassals and become the rulers of their own national ancestral lands.

The past year has demonstrated that the commonwealth solution is probably bankrupt. The new entity was created too hastily, without the benefit of plebiscites in the countries that entered it. Lacking a legitimate constitutional basis, the Commonwealth has been unable to implement the dozens of agreements, contracts, declarations, and transactions that its leaders have signed during the past year.

Why couldn't the CIS have turned into a country similar to the United States? The first reason is the fear that a new central power would arise and begin interfering in the affairs of the newly sovereign states created after the Soviet Union collapsed. The second reason is that the republics do not trust Russia.

The possibility of preserving the CIS is not great. At best, it could fulfill the function of a liquidation committee to oversee a civilized "divorce" of the former Soviet structure.

After August 1991, Russia's political situation became unique. After the coup, the Russian government could operate freely, the road to democracy and a new economy seemed open - a real victory. Unfortunately, this victory did not benefit the
democrats. After replacing the flags on top of the White House, the Supreme Soviet stopped its democratic activities and turned back to the old regime. Former party bureaucrats changed their colors, chameleon-like, but maintained their same philosophies. One can hardly find a new chief without a communist background. The democratic breakthrough did not happen, it was delayed, postponed, neutralized. The same is true at the local level - the local leaders are the same party people with "different skins."

So what happened? Why did not the collapse of communism in Russia cause the collapse of the whole system? Probably the answer is simple - when it shed its party skin, the nomenklatura were not naked, they still wore their very comfortable "professional managers" garb, standard dress of the army of state-employed bureaucrats.

Now they are even more powerful. Gorbachev's former staff, assistants to A. Lukyanov (the imprisoned former chairman of the Supreme Soviet), and the apparatchiks from the Central Committee of the Communist Party have insinuated themselves into Parliament Speaker R. Khasbulatov's office. In January 1992, democrats managed to keep their positions and even form a "government of reforms," but by the end of the year they were completely suppressed by Russia's Supreme Soviet.

The December 1992 Congress of Peoples' Deputies showed how weak the government was. Yeltsin tried to persuade the Congress to confirm Yegor Gaidar as prime minister by promising the deputies some changes in the constitution that would tremendously
enhance their power. He agreed to grant the parliament the right to approve four key positions: the ministers of defense, security, foreign affairs, and internal affairs. The Congress readily voted in favor of the constitutional changes but turned down Gaidar.

Khasbulatov's personal power has grown tremendously and the whole parliament is the real threat to reforms. These people represent the same old society with a communist face.

What does Khasbulatov hope to achieve? A goal to be the supreme power does not seem convincing. Khasbulatov probably realizes that he is unlikely to become the leader of Russia. Khasbulatov is Chechen - a major obstacle. Most Russian citizens do not want a native of an unruly province in the Caucasus to rule the country.

Khasbulatov's fate would seem logically to be second-in-command - to serve as speaker to a strong president, or to be the vice president.

From the time Khasbulatov began to openly oppose Yeltsin, he has built a surprisingly wide political base. It consists of representatives from the same kind of mid-level nomenklatura he came from, and it constitutes the majority not only in the Russian parliament, but also in most if not all local Soviets. This particular group, which has leftist leanings, is his major source of support. He has even managed to secure some support from the extreme pro-communist left and the extreme nationalistic right-wing opposition groups. He has managed to become a serious
political leader who can confidently enter into a struggle with
the president.

This is the political landscape of Russia today.

Russia has now ended up in an unusual situation: its former
enemies are now more or less friendly, but its former "allies"
have become belligerent.¹

Yeltsin reported to the Supreme Soviet of Russia the
conversations he has had with leading politicians during his trip
to the US, Canada, Great Britain, France, and the UN in the
beginning of 1992. He mentioned two fundamental principles of the
Russian government's foreign policy: to pave the way for Russia's
membership in the community of civilized states and to secure
maximum outside support for its internal transformation. Russia
will be able to become a modern civilized state only if it
overcomes the isolation the country and its society find
themselves in and by developing adequate contacts with the
international community. Conditions for successfully carrying out
such a policy are favorable, he maintained. Russia and other
states having given up their "totalitarian illusions," and the
basis has been created for building confidence between the people
and setting up relations of partnership.²

Russia has treaties with key European countries such as
Germany, UK, France and Italy. The Camp David declaration last
summer establishes a friendly relationship with the United
States, and as Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev states, makes
the U.S.-Russian relationship "potentially that of allies, and we
are not talking about creating new military blocs, but about a union and an adherence to general principles of democracy, human rights, and international stability."

At the same time Russia is surrounded by "hostile states." Of all its frontier neighbors, Russia has normal peaceful relations only with Finland, Turkey, and China. While states that were formed from pieces of the former Soviet Union and the countries of the former socialist camp suspect and openly accuse Russia of imperial attitudes and view it as a potential aggressor. Even Bulgaria, which has had a centuries-long connection with Russia, is now suspicious of its former ally and is not likely to regard it as a friendly state under any conditions.

Consequently, Russia is now separated from Europe by a wall of former satellites and new states with their own national ambitions. Moscow must constantly overcome a multitude of difficulties in its relations with Kiev, Minsk, and Kishiniev (the capital of Moldova). It is vitally important that Russia maintain normal relationships with these countries because oil and gas routes and train and plane routes to Europe cross their territories.

Serious tensions are developing between Russia and the Ukraine. Reasons for the dispute include conflicting claims to the Black Sea Fleet and claims to the Crimean peninsula (made by segment of the Russian population).

As the German senior research fellow Heinz Timmermann wrote,
the Moscow-Kiev conflict is particularly acute with regard to the Crimea, where history (Khrushchev transferred the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 as a "gift"), ethnic composition (70 per cent are Russians), and strategic considerations (it is home of the Black Sea fleet with Sebastopol as the main port) are bundled together in a tangle of problems.

But the primary conflict lies in the longstanding competing claims of the two nations as heir to the same Slavic identity.

Ukrainians are affronted, even insulted, by their century-long subjugation by Moscow. After Ukraine declared its independence in August 1991, confrontation with Russia on almost all issues became the primary focus of the young country's foreign policy.

The Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, F. Shelov-Kovediaev, has explained, "Considering its history, it was not sufficient for this country (Ukraine) to acquire independence, it was important for it to prove to itself that it was indeed independent - the same phenomenon we observe in the Baltics. Moreover, the temptation to find an external enemy, when faced with growing economic difficulties, was too great, especially when there was available a neighbor as big as Russia."

Russia, itself, has not completely acknowledged that the former Ukraine Republic is no longer a vassal territory. Some politicians of Russia are burdened with an imperial heritage, which will not disappear with the wave of a hand. Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and other states on the former Soviet
territory view Russian diplomatic activity as an attempt to reestablish imperial control. For example, the Russian foreign ministry has developed a draft treaty, "Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine." But Ukrainian politicians see it as an attempt by Moscow to retain its hold over their country.

The presence of former Soviet, now Russian, troops in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states is another problem that significantly limits Russian diplomatic possibilities. The Baltic countries view Russian troops as armies of occupation and demand their immediate withdrawal from their territories. Russia promises to do so, but not until 1994, explaining that the delay is necessary because it is currently unable to move and accommodate large numbers of troops and military equipment. But the Baltic states are unsympathetic to the Russian situation and continue to insist on immediate withdrawal.

Furthermore, Latvia and Estonia have made territorial claims to Russian lands. From time to time, Estonian nationalist extremists move frontier posts deep into Russian territory. The presence of Russian troops and continuing territorial disputes have stalled talks between Russia, Latvia, and Estonia.

West European countries are inclined to support the Baltic states rather than Russia in this struggle. They believe that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia can be integrated into the European economy much more quickly than can Russia. Thus, the presence of the "unpredictable Russian bear" in the small
European houses frightens the Europeans. So it is better to keep Russia at a distance, to be protected from it by small militant states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc.

Russia has not defined a diplomatic strategy toward the new states in the Caucasus and the Central Asia region is steadily moving toward the Muslim world. Russia, probably, has lost all influence in this strategically important area. Only the leader of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbaev, and the leader of Kyrgyzstan, A. Akaev, proclaim steadfast adherence to the Russian union. All the other states are looking for new friends.

As odd as it may seem, Russia's best possibility for diplomatic growth is in the Far East and in the Pacific region. However, there is still an impasse between Russia and Japan, based on their dispute over the South Kurile islands. This dispute will slow down the establishment of normal relations between the two countries. But it is now possible to at least discuss the problem.

Even though Russia is not yet saying "yes" to Japan's demands for ownership of the four islands, the discussion marks great progress in Japanese-Russian relations. The negotiating process is extremely difficult, and it will be a long time before this territorial question is finally resolved. Despite this, Russia has good diplomatic possibilities in all of the Par East.

Russia and China have minor territorial disputes over the official border between the two countries but, China is very
interested in Russia as a market for its products. It is also interested in Russia's raw materials, primarily its mineral resources and timber. Such potentially close economic ties can encourage successful diplomatic relations.

Relations with South Korea are developing successfully and will continue to do so. There is an economic affinity between the two countries and no political disagreements or territorial disputes. South Korean firms have successfully established themselves on Russian soil and there are a number of Russian-South Korean joint ventures in electronics, television, and a variety of other technologies. Democratic Russia does not feel burdened by any obligation toward North Korea, its former ally, and it openly expresses antipathy toward the regime of Kim Il Sung.

Russian Foreign policy is now influenced by its domestic situation and the current state of the country's economy is catastrophic. Russia is no longer a free agent in the international arena. When a country has to ask for help from outsiders, it gets less consideration. A. Kozyrev says, "No foreign policy can be successful without the establishment of order, new order, of course, not the old one, democratic and market order in our own house."

But establishing order in one's own house is the most difficult thing to do. The post-communist period is one of acute struggle between political camps. There are heated discussions about what Russia is today and where it ought to go in the
future. The country is undergoing a severe identity crisis. Nobody has had convincing solutions or total support for resolving this crisis, not B. Yeltsin, not Y. Gaidar and V. Chernomyrdin, nor R. Khasbulatov.

In the midst of this highly confusing and muddled political situation, Russia is trying to define itself from geographic, ethnic, and regional points of view. On the domestic political scene we witness a power struggle between the "national-democrats" supporting president Yeltsin and the "national-patriots" supporting R. Khasbulatov. The first group wants Russia to be integrated into the Western-dominated community of civilized states while the "national-patriots" hold to the idea of Russia playing the prominent role within the CIS and insist on a specific Russian identity or even mission vis-a-vis the West.

In the highest echelons of power, there is a continuing struggle between those who would like to break with Russia's imperial past and build a post-colonial Russia open to the outside world, and those who insist that Russia has to demonstrate its power. This latter group argues that Russia's most fitting role is that of a gendarme who brings order to the former Soviet Union and the former socialist camp. They accuse Yeltsin and Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev of betraying Russia's interests, and demand that Russian foreign policy be aggressive and prepared to take the offensive.

Some of these people are close to President Yeltsin,
democrats who have crossed over to the "hawks".

It is also remarkable to note that so many of the same Russians who only a few years ago were loudly proclaiming the virtues of communism and central planning are now among the most vociferous advocates of capitalism and the free market. Not only were many current political leaders once outspoken supporters and prominent beneficiaries of the old system, but many of the people who now most strongly support a rapid move to capitalism and are doing very well in the new market environment are from the upper echelons of the old party apparatus or the upper levels of the old state institutions, the so-called "nomenklatura".

The people who made it to positions of privilege and power in the Soviet Union in recent decades were, for the most part, people who knew or learned how to win within a morally bankrupt and thoroughly corrupt institutional environment.

Kozyrev is one of Yeltsin's most faithful adherents and speaks for maximum openness to the world. He believes that the primary tasks of foreign policy are twofold: "Get established as a state and enter the family of civilized nations. Second, create a belt of good-neighbor relations around Russia, from the United States, which is only three miles away from us, to the former Union republics."

As of mid-1992, the Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev was definitely playing an important role in designing a new foreign policy for Russia. After having effectively restructured his ministry, the Foreign Minister had very qualified personnel. At
the same time, and most of all, in the defence policy field, there are other organizations and institutions influencing foreign and defence policy decisions. Examples are the Defence Ministry, an apparatus of the President, the Presidential Security Council, and last but not least the Foreign Intelligence Service.

Clearly, the main aim of Yeltsin and of his government is to link Russia with the West by way of the "four Ds: democratization, de-globalization, de-ideologization and de-militarization".7

B. Economic Trends/Challenges/Risks

In June 1991, before the August coup, an important but little-noticed scientific conference took place in Lukkuma, Germany. One of the speakers discussing the Soviet Union's future was Selwyn Bialer, an American professor, who formulated as concisely as possible what he expected to happen in the Soviet Union. He pronounced his philosophy in only one word, and even he may not have known just how right he was. The word was "disintegration."8 Today, we may argue about whether the Russian economy is still governed by communists, or by a small group of liberal economists who have government positions but lack the social support needed to achieve tangible results. And, we may argue about whether the West really intends to support Russian reforms or whether Western support will be limited to advice and humanitarian aid. But, if we want to describe the state of
Russia's current economy, we have only to repeat Bialer's description of the former Soviet Union - disintegration.

By the end of summer 1992, when everyone's attention was captured by the terrifying fall in the value of the ruble and people were busy criticizing Russia's leading government economist, Yegor Gaidar, for the growth in inflation and the fall in production (down 27% by August 1992), other important processes were receiving less public attention.

About 20 regions and republics within Russia have stopped paying federal taxes. Eleven of the largest and richest territories, including the Kemerovski region, Altai, Sakhalin, and others have, in effect, claimed economic independence. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin promised to give these territories economic independence, and now the leaders of these regions are pressing him on those careless promises.

The state power crisis in Russia means that local administrators can block the local implementation of presidential decrees with impunity. For instance, in the Altai region, the local Soviet simply declared Moscow's decrees on land reform invalid. These confrontations between local powers and the federal government sometimes take the form of open political defiance and farce. One particular case is already famous. Although Russia and Japan have still not agreed on a treaty to settle their dispute over the Kuriles, the local administration of Sakhalin leased out a part of the disputed islands for a period of 50 years. This defiant gesture occurred not only on the
eve of a Yeltsin trip to Tokyo, which, ended up not taking place, but the lease agreement was signed with "Karlson and Kaplan," a dummy company in Hong Kong, whose capitalization was worth pennies, even by Russian standards.

By their action, the Sakhalin authorities demonstrated to the whole world that the real decision-makers were not in Moscow but in Sakhalin, and that any territorial questions should be brought to them.\footnote{9}

The Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs is the first scientific center to make a serious effort to analyze the problems caused by the "regionalization" of the Russian economy. The authors of this report, which was presented in mid-October to President Yeltsin, concluded that Moscow does not control developments on the local level. Most reforms take place independently from the actions of federal authorities, and progress has varied from region to region.

According to the Expert Institute's conclusions, industrial regions such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, and Ural are more responsive to liberal reforms than agrarian regions, where the "socialist" orientation remains strong.

But, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, itself, is one of the most influential groups opposing the Yeltsin government, in spite of recent changes to the head of this organization (A. Volsky is the head of this Union).

The political influence of this lobby and of the
industrialists themselves, who primarily represent large-scale and mid-sized government properties, is already a major force in Russia's politics and economy. After the coup and the beginning of reform, the industrialists were the first professional group to form an effective lobby to pressure authorities. In reality, the pace and nature of Russian reforms depend on their approval.

Jeffrey Sachs, professor of Harvard University and head of a group of Western advisers to the Russian President, explains why, after the latest trip to Moscow in the end of 1992. He assesses Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin does not want to bear the responsibility for the depreciation of the rouble any longer. "As the old sectors of the economy decline panic ensues for a couple of reasons. First, there are privileged people in the old sectors, not the workers but the managers, who see their privileges and power threatened, and, second, people think that the decline in one sector means overall decline. They do not understand that it is the beginning of a transformation in which other sectors will develop. The old guard is still very powerful in Russia. That is why, as soon as the threat to their existence arose, the members of the old guard, together with their representatives in the parliament and state-owned enterprises, began attacking the government for economic mismanagement. As a result, since this summer [1992] enormous subsidies have been given to the old industrial structure to keep it going, even though it does not have customers. The credit given to industry is generating a hyperinflation now, and as the hyperinflation
grows nobody wins. There is a loss of purpose and direction of the reforms.\textsuperscript{10}

Hyperinflation has done all sorts of things in history. It was a forerunner of the rise of fascism early this century. In the 1970s it was a forerunner of civil war in Argentina. Each country must find its own way out of chaos.

Gaidar and his team became the government, at a rather youthful age, and had only one year in office. They represented a challenge to our political tradition from the start. For the first time in years we had a government with a human face.

Of course he made mistakes, inevitably so. After all, nobody here has ever tried to reform a communist totalitarian economy. He never lied, never made illusory promises, never engaged in a doublecross. His sole concern was the reform, nothing else. He wanted to be nothing but an economist, which was where he erred. No doubt he has already realized that as Prime Minister, one cannot simply be economist and nothing else, one has to be a politician too, otherwise they will fail. Gaidar was the first to try to bring macroeconomic methods to our administrative command system.

Nowadays everybody in Russia and abroad wonders whether Russia's economic course will change or not.

Apparently President Yeltsin does not subscribe to the apprehensions which considerable social groups feel over Gaidar's resignation. He believes that the reforms will continue under the new Premier.
Russian economist G. Yavlinsky, Director of the Center for Economic and Political Research (EPI Center) said "... relations with the West. I would formulate my position as follows: We won't accept any money for the time being, because right now we cannot create the minimum conditions necessary to ensure that it will do any good. We won't accept any money - that's all there is to it. There's nothing so terrible about that. We're a rich country. Instead, we'll learn to make better use of our resources. Otherwise we'll grab credits now, but when we really need them no one will give us any. We must remain on very good terms with the West, but we must think only with our own brains and get out of the situation through our own efforts, because there are no analogous cases - we have an atypical situation, very unusual conditions."

Next are the businessmen in politics. It is an indisputable fact that businessmen become noticeable figures in the political scene. This is not to say that they are totally behind the formation of the Party of Economic Freedom, or the party of Mr. Borovoy, as it is called sometimes. In fact, this party was not founded with the aim of expressing the interests of businessmen as a part of society, even if it does represent that. Its leader, Mr. Borovoy, founded it for himself, to make his own political career.

The world is brought into motion by people who want to make a career for themselves in politics, science, or arts. In this respect businessmen do not differ from others. Their
participation in politics is not only economic and "natural," but also has substantial merits for society. It is difficult to bribe a businessman who holds a government post, not because he is more honest than others, but because few people would be able to offer a bribe alluring to him.

The broad participation of businessmen in politics is a long established tradition in other countries. In the United States, for instance, businessmen as well as lawyers promote the largest number of politicians out of their midst. It is only important that a businessman engaged in politics should represent himself, not his "class brothers" if he holds a non-elected post, or his constituency if he holds an elected post.

The greatest danger to Russia lies, in the search for a "third way." A certain part of our intellectual and political elite is engaged in this search. There are different motives here. Some are sincerely concerned over the country's destiny. Others simply use this slogan in the political struggle, playing on national sentiments. But regardless of these motives, the very idea of a "third way" is engendered by the inferiority complex. The countries with high living standards and advanced positions in science, the economy, and other spheres have no need to search for their own, "special" way. When the situation is bad, when a state was strong and rich only recently, has shown weaknesses the people begin to look for alternatives or what does not exist in nature. In hurts people to feel hopeless. In such cases they usually use methods of psychological defence.
It is time for our people and their elite to understand that if someone is richer than others there are three ways of altering the situation: first, to expropriate what such a man has amassed; second, convince oneself that though this man has more wealth you are better than he in other ways, spiritually for instance; or, third, to try to achieve a larger fortune. Under the circumstances, only the third way is reasonable.

C. Ethnic Trends/Challenges/Risks

As Mr. Ronald Grigor Suny said, "History confounds through surprises and seemingly unpredictable events. The unfamiliar is forced upon the uninitiated, and obscure and distant places become objects of concern. What might be called the Sarajevo syndrome, an unanticipated conflict arising from ill-understood causes yet with unexpectedly far-reaching effects, was evident in February 1988 when tens of thousands of Armenians stood in the central square of Stepanakert, the district center of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) in Azerbaijan, and demanded merger with the Armenian republic.

The Gorbachev leadership was faced a few months later with the mobilization of the Baltic peoples, and one by one the nationalities of the USSR coalesced around separate agendas favoring a greater role for non-Russians in their own self-determination. With the emergence of the mass nationalist movements and the steady gravitation toward national political autonomy, sovereignty, and independence, the Gorbachev
Revolution, largely a revolution from above, was transformed into an uncontrolled confrontation of the central state with a growing social revolution from below."

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a catastrophic impact on the geopolitical foundation of the international system. All of a sudden, from the geopolitical equation a quantity was withdrawn – a quantity which had secured the stability of the whole system. The destructive consequences of this structural disintegration manifested themselves immediately. Global relations, based on permanent adjustment of contradicting national interests, lost impetus for restraint and discipline. The process of destabilization of otherwise orderly interrelations has been gaining speed, and control over antagonisms is weakening.

New geopolitical theaters are replacing traditional balances, creating a need for new geopolitical combinations and international intrigues by larger powers. At the same time, the end of the Cold War has unleashed nationalism. Previously restrained by coalitional interests and ideological motivations, nationalism is becoming a major force behind events on the international scene.

However, the corrosive influence of nationalism started the process of disintegration of multinational states (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even Russia itself). The logic of state-building in new formations encourages them to seek ways and means to enhance their independence, to look for patrons
and allies, and to enter into conflicts and wars with each other. That in turn converts each of them into a separate element of the geopolitical environment. Lacking any experience in statesmanship, and with no instruments for projecting influence, these new members of the world community easily become pawns in the geopolitical gambits of the big powers.

And now, the Russian periphery is becoming increasingly important as the breakup of the Soviet Union gives rise to new territorial and boundary disputes, challenges Russia's leadership to maintain the newly formed Commonwealth, and exacerbates ethnic and regional factionalism within the Russian Federation. The "Russian periphery" as referred to herein is a border zone between Russia proper and the non-Russian former Soviet republics. Some sections of Russia's boundary within the periphery mark the historical limits of tsarist expansion. Other sections were established through treaty agreements, annexations, and territorial exchanges.¹³

A zone of contact and conflict between groups widely varying in language, religion, and custom, the Russian periphery represents a type of microcosm which can be used to study ethnic and territorial dynamics found throughout the former Soviet Union and many other regions of the world. What will happen if a democratic form of government takes hold in China?

Of more than 150 territorial disputes involving the former Soviet Union, one-third are along the Russian periphery. The interior of Russia proper may also become the setting for future
nationality conflicts. Several autonomous ethnic enclaves within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Chechnya, pose some of the most sensitive territorial and administrative challenges facing the Russian government today.

Meanwhile, Russia is trying to use its trump card, the presence of national minorities (primarily Russian) in its diplomatic relations with the Baltic states. These minorities are second-class citizens. This is an old problem, but for a long time defending Russians in border countries was not part of the Russian diplomatic agenda. When the Baltic states first began to move toward independence from the Soviet Union, Russia defended those actions. However, as the authorities in the Baltic states slowly developed increasingly nationalistic leanings, Russia's response was eventually summarized by Mr. A. Kozyrev, "We are raising and will keep raising questions (concerning the position of Russians in the Baltics) at the United Nations. We have a right to do this because the Baltic states acquired independence, to a considerable extent, because of the democratic victory in Russia.

During a September 1992 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Kozyrev said that the United Nations should play a major role in securing human rights and freedoms for national minorities in some of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Speaking primarily about the Baltic countries, he reported that during the recent presidential elections in Estonia, 42% of the population was denied the right to vote.
When an economy is in shambles and people do not have enough bread, nothing unites a nation more successfully than the search for an external enemy. Gorbachev's perestroika put an end to the Cold War. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the CIS states declared another cold war on each another.

Life was difficult enough in the Soviet Union. But during the last year the standard of living has declined catastrophically. The break in economic and cultural ties between the former Soviet republics has been accompanied by wars, terrorism, increased crime, hunger, unemployment, hyperinflation, primitive nationalism, chauvinism, extremism, and separatism - and this is only the beginning. In Russia, Ukraine, and some of the Central Asian states, the mortality rate now surpasses the birth rate. People have started to lose faith that anything will ever change for the better.

Seventy-five million people - a quarter of the population of the former Soviet Union - reside outside the borders of their ethnic homelands.

The only groups who did not lose are the communist elites, who have managed to retain their positions of power and their privileges. Even though the party is outlawed throughout the Commonwealth, communism, with its totalitarian methods and inhumane traditions, has managed to survive.

The sharp decline of the situation on and near Russian borders muffles Russia's special interests in the ethnically and confessionally kindred Balkans, in Transcaucasia, and in Central
Asia. Less remote territories are taking their place - Russia now has her own Balkans in Moldova with her Trans-Dniester region and the Gagauz Republic, her own Caucasus, i.e., the North Caucasus, and her own internal Islamic fundamentalism.  

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia was burdened with the concern for about 25 million Russians and 3 million people belonging to her other ethnic groups abroad. Added to that, are about 47.5 million Russophones in other republics. 

Every person regardless of whence and whither he has to flee, is struck by the tragedy of losing his Motherland. Even in normal conditions, mass migrations cause tremendous social and economic damage to the nation.

The only way out is to deter by all means possible the already growing process of ethnic migration whose scale approaches one million in Russia alone. This is possible only by achieving the correspondent inter-republican agreements on mutual obligations regarding ethnic minorities and by toughening sanctions on human rights violations.

D. Military Trends/Challenges/Risks

For 2,500 years civilized societies were faced with the question of how to organize the existence of a specific state institution, the army, so it was safe for an unarmed civilian society. The urgency of this question in Russia today is dictated by the following. First of all, some social circles may use the armed forces for achieving their interests. Secondly, they may
use military power to establish a certain political regime in the country. History has numerous such examples, and the question "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (Who protects from the protectors?) remains significant at the present time.\(^{15}\)

In states with a formed democracy which are developing relative stably (for example, United States, Great Britain, France), there is the necessary accord between legal constraint on activity and moral self-constraint. On the one hand, governments of these countries have had time to develop a package of democratic laws; on the other, these societies had a period of sufficient training of generations of professional cadres for their armed forces who were brought up in a spirit of democratic values by formation of "moral self-constraint" in the minds of servicemen.

There is a serious imbalance between legal constraint and moral self-constraint of the military in states where the status of democracy is still not firm and is threatened. In these countries laws are approved, previously banned organizations and parties receive power, social and political rules are established, and constitutions are adopted. But here too a contradiction is preserved among convictions of the military or a considerable portion of them, in which their foundations are closer to the dictatorial concepts of a regime than democratic concepts and new legislation.

In accordance with their historical, political, social, cultural, and military traditions, each state and its army have
their own features.

In the case of the republics which were previously part of the former USSR, the following features are manifested. The Army of the former Soviet Union was the most ideologized and politicized Army in the world, and the military, who received a party education, was dependent on this party for a long time. Therefore it would be erroneous to presume that past education based on Marxism-Leninism would suddenly disappear. However, the reasons for failure of the coup of 19 August 1991 demonstrated that six years of perestroika and glasnost provided the necessary, albeit small, opportunity for democratic values to be established and spread among Soviet citizens, including the military.

It must also be noted that in the case of the former Soviet Union there are several other factors which complicate the transition to democracy. The following can be included among them. **Total absence of democratic traditions.** Their formation in the functioning of social and political structures within the state takes a long time, as proven in any paradigm change. **A change in the economic model of society.** Replacing a planned economy with a free market economy inevitably gives rise to an enormous number of problems in the area of relationships of production, exchange, and distribution. **Fragmentation of the former Soviet Union.** A reduction in the former USSR’s military might in the international balance of forces. Every empire, like every state with significant power in
the world, has difficulty agreeing to a reduction in its power. Armies are especially sensitive to this. Above all it should be understood that all the above problems and concerns will be compensated for in the historical plane, since they make up an inalienable part of the price which must be paid for achieving enormous success in succeeding decades - turning Russia into a powerful and respected democratic force of the world. It is advisable to agree with subordination of armed forces to the Constitution and to the elected democratic civilian authority. The military must continue to remain a nonparty entity independent of any political party. This is the only method for the Army and Navy to be a service to all society.

No democracy will succeed without the support of the military. Herein lies one of the reasons why Russia needs military professionals with democratic convictions and why the Armed Forces are called upon to play a deciding role in the democratic future.

When the Commonwealth of Independent States was proclaimed it was decided that it would have a united armed forces. It was a far-fetched formula at the time because the army still remained a single body. The huge military machine was held in abeyance for some time. The Commonwealth did not set up political bodies to supervise the armed forces (i.e. civilian control) while interstate coordination was ineffective. Ironically, this "deceptive" formula helped gain time for everyone. Some gave up their "Union" illusions, others could lay the foundations of
national statehood.

Today, a year later, the CIS armed forces seem to have melted away. The military wing of an interstate organization cannot be stronger and more effective than its leading political structure in a democratic society. Marshal Shaposhnikov's calls for "the priority of collective interests over national ones" could not influence the situation, of course. In my view, despite the numerous CIS documents on military issues, the common military-strategic organization could not be preserved. There was simply no political basis of support for it.

The united armed forces outlived the Union state by two months. The CIS summit held in Minsk on February 14, 1992, formalized the division of the single army into strategic forces, general-purpose forces, and armed forces of the member states. Since then Shaposhnikov's terms of references have been rapidly diminishing. The decision to form the armed forces of Russia, adopted in early March of 1992, became a turning point in this process. I suppose, that Russia had a strategic purpose to do it, because the former Union's republics began to pull to pieces the former Soviet Army. At the end of May, the CIS Chief Command moved from the premises of the former Union Defence Ministry and the General Staff on Arbat Square to the empty Headquarters of the Warsaw Pact on Leningrad Avenue. But the removal concerned only top-ranking officials (Marshal Shaposhnikov and General Samsonov) and their immediate aids. The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff remained under Russian control.
The treaty on collective security, planned since the autumn of 1991, could only be signed in a truncated form on May 15, 1992, at the CIS summit in Tashkent. In the final count, only six countries - Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia - became parties to it. In Tashkent, the CIS leaders signed a less known but practically more important agreement on the share of the united armed forces due to each CIS country. Under this agreement not only the CIS members but also Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova have already received their shares.

Thus, a difficult page has been turned. What could hardly be imagined only a year ago has happened. The division of the world's largest armed forces has been completed. Speaking today about the problems of the Army, its reform, its role in politics, and its men and officers, we have in being the Russian Army.

And now, the Russian armed forces are in transition. Today the role of the Ministry of Defense and the role of the General Staff are more or less separated. The General Staff manages the troops and maintains combat readiness at the proper level. The role of the Defense Minister and the Ministry of Defense is to fulfill military-political functions. As General of the Army P. Grachev said, "Perhaps after 1995, when the situation in the Army stabilizes, we will reach a point where the Ministry of Defense will be a civilian department. It should solve military-political problems plus prepare orders for arms, equipment, and the sale of weapons. And the role of the General Staff is to manage the
troops."

Who controls the nuclear potential of the former Soviet Union? This is the main question today from Western states. "The ensuring of reliable centralized control and supervision of the strategic forces stationed on the territory of four independent states, the upgrading of their structure, and the observance of the treaty on strategic weapons" was how the Commander-in-Chief of the united armed forces described their deployment in the former USSR. The strategic nuclear forces are now distributed as follows: Russia has 80%, Ukraine 10%, Kazakhstan 6% and Belarus 4% of the total.

The task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintaining reliable control over them, and ensuring nuclear security is the most forceful of all arguments in favor of the united armed forces. On this matter the situation remains in need of regulations. The question of who takes part in the control over strategic nuclear forces and in what capacity has yet to be specified. As we know neither Ukraine nor Kazakhstan has the nuclear button, only Russia.

The Nuclear Planning Committee, envisaged by the agreement on Command of the CIS armed forces, has not been formed. Russia officially included strategic missile troops into its armed forces, their commander-in-chief was appointed by the presidential decree of August 19, 1992, and the Russian Defence Ministry had worked out the concept of using strategic nuclear forces without considering the similar forces in three other
states of the Commonwealth.

By all indications, the problem of nuclear weapons can hardly be solved satisfactorily within the CIS framework. With regards to Ukraine, Moscow must look for other, more effective ways of settling the problem such as bilateral exchanges of concern, appeals to broader international forums, and support from other nuclear powers. Russian and Ukrainian high-ranking experts are expected to meet soon for the discussion of this issue. The nuclear forces and means deployed on the territory of Belarus and Kazakhstan must also be placed under Russian control as early as possible in accordance with agreements which take into account the concern of these countries. The leaders of the above mentioned three countries can also arrive at the conclusion that keeping nuclear weapons just for an emergency is not a reliable guarantee of their security. Moreover, it may provoke a future conflict. Such sentiments are particularly widespread in Ukraine.

As the only nuclear state on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Russia could offer its future allies nuclear guarantees of their security. Thus, strategic nuclear forces would be finally excluded from the united armed forces while deterrence would become more reliable.

It has been known since the time of the "massive retaliation" doctrine that nuclear forces can prove incapable of checking aggression unleashed by conventional armed forces. Non-nuclear forces are necessary for dealing with such a threat.
What are the Commonwealth's possibilities in this respect? In the northwest, west, southwest, and also in the east, Russia will evidently have to depend for defence mainly on its own armed forces or, where it is possible, to seek the assistance of international institutions. Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus will not agree to a military alliance with Moscow. Such a position is certainly rational given the present situation in Europe. Things are different in the south. In the past, the countries bordering on the USSR in the south were inferior in military potential. The superpower does not exist any longer and the southern neighbors - Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan - look like giants in comparison with Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even Uzbekistan.

The Tashkent treaty unites Russia with Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics, and Armenia. Russia is interested in regional stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in deterring states which lay claim to regional hegemony. A power vacuum is an invitation to aggression. The interests of Russia, the Central Asian republics, and Armenia would inevitably be infringed upon if such were to occur.

The Chief Command has plans for forming a Commonwealth mobile force for such an emergency. It would include a sort of "fire company" capable of arriving in the area of a small-scale conflict within three to five days and extinguishing it; rapid deployment forces, that would be able in 10 to 15 days, to deal with medium-scale conflicts; and larger forces for engaging in a major conflict.
Immediate danger does not come from the area south of the former Soviet border, it lies in the area north of her borders. However, in the next few years and, possibly decades, the southern and south-eastern belt of Russia's neighbors will represent a zone of instability with numerous seats of "internal" conflicts. By virtue of many factors, Russia will be unable to fence itself off from armed conflicts, even if it makes serious efforts to do so.

The experience of Karabakh demonstrates that the localization of conflicts "until they burn themselves out" does not promise a quick success. What is more dangerous is that such seats of tension can generate new ones. That is why, though the internationalization of conflicts involves some risk, operations of this kind will have to be undertaken nevertheless.

But how? Russia could act alone, for instance. This method is usually vulnerable to criticism because in such a case Russia appears to be acting as a hegemonic force. This is a useful trump card for influential nationalists who exploit anti-Moscow and anti-Russian sentiments. Such sentiments are fomented and will apparently be fomented in all former Soviet republics in the near future. Needless to say, Russian unilateral armed operations would endanger the Russian minorities abroad. Therefore, Moscow can and must act on a bilateral basis. In many cases it will probably be the most acceptable way.

Lastly, collective actions can be taken. Thanks to this concept the task of preventing conflicts and restoring or
maintaining peace can be achieved without reviving the image of hegemonic Russia and making thousands of compatriots the hostages of one or another operation. Collective steps should naturally be determined by a number of conditions already tested in previous world situations.

While it may be strange to say, the first political-social issue of the Russian armed forces today, in my view, is housing. As of today there are about 150,000 families of officers and warrant officers without apartments. Because of the mass withdrawal of troops from abroad it is predicted that by 1995 about 400,000 families will be without apartments. This is a tragedy, but also is a great political danger.

As stated in the introduction of this paper events of the second half of 1991, 1992, and the beginning of 1993 have led to profound shifts in the composition and distribution of the world's military-political forces. This is having a decisive effect on the entire system of international relations and the position and role of many states. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of the Baltic states from it, the creation at the end of 1991 of a fundamentally new international formation that is the CIS, the 1991 successful war in the Persian Gulf and its consequences, and the internal conflict in former Yugoslavia have resulted in changes on a global scale.

It must be assumed that this process will continue. There is still no guarantee that the CIS (at least in its current form) will be maintained, in as much as the new geopolitical situation
in the Commonwealth is extremely unstable. Disintegration processes in Russia and several European and Asian countries may become more active. On the other hand, a rapprochement between some states and their consolidation into separate alliances cannot be excluded.

All this requires a more flexible, far-sighted, and circumspect policy and immediate creation of reliable mechanisms and structures for deterrence, war prevention, and ensuring of international security. Non-traditional political decisions and the decisive rejection of outmoded views which encompass a reassessment of military threats and a definition of new principles for ensuring security must bring military doctrines into accord with contemporary realities.

Presently the United States, European countries of NATO, and many eastern European states have refined their military-political policies. A new strategy for the North Atlantic Alliance has been developed. With respect to this, the restructuring of the defense system of NATO has commenced. A similar task stands before Russia and the CIS as well. However, unlike the Western powers, we must not simply refine individual tenets, but work out a completely new doctrine, which will differ fundamentally from previous Soviet military doctrine.

E. Specific Flash Points

What role will the countries that emerged from the Soviet ruins play in the future? There are at least three possibilities.
First, a joint fight for survival in the economic, military, and the cultural-legal sphere would mean further development of the CIS and Russia. This forecast leaves no independent geopolitical role for Eastern Europe and brakes or stops altogether the redistribution of spheres of influence.

The second variant presupposes a peaceful parallel in efforts to survive but it is less realistic. In case it does take place, we shall witness the South, a kind of a Third World, looking for a rich patron. More likely than not Eastern Europe will join the former Soviet, rather than Western European, geopolitical space.

According to the third variant, permanent conflicts will make the chances for individual survival very slim indeed. It is probable and will almost inevitably bring a division of the Soviet territory into spheres of influence. In this case Eastern Europe will be doomed to be a cordon sanitaire. The dangerous Eastern region will reduce to naught all the benefits of Western aid.

The Russian ambassador to the United States Mr. V. Lukin wrote that the new world role of Russia indeed begins at home. Only strong, stable, and democratic Russia will become a worthy partner for other civilized states in efforts to ensure stability in the key regions of Europe and Asia. And only such a Russia can serve as a locomotive of gradual democratization for its neighbors to the south and southeast.17

Conversely, a collapse of democracy in Russia would most
likely lead to its collapse in the other post-Soviet states. Once again, history is throwing an enormous challenge to Russia. But perhaps this is Russia's new mission: to become a guarantor of stability throughout the Eurasian heartland through its own democratic revival.

Economic, economic, economic, and the internal power struggle are real flash points for crises today in Russia.

Today we have to contend with the consequences arising from the abolition of the super-centralized state. The totalitarian principle has been lost and the differences between the regions and different population groups have started a snowballing effect at a high speed, given the absence of any political organization to control this process or an economic model consistent with resolving it. This being the case, differences have started turning into contradictions and are threatening to become conflicts.

There is a feeling that the failure of the stabilizational stage of the reform, the political hysterics triggered by this, and the forms in which all this has been taking place mirror the mounting conflict between the new state of the country and the state of the former supreme authority, which was inadequate. Russia is a different country, which lives in a new way, yet there is still no new script to lead this novelty. Our political establishment is like a damaged motor vehicle: the engine doesn't run, but everyone is busy finding out who is at the steering wheel, thus persuading themselves that this is the sole problem.
not the mechanical condition the motor vehicle is in.

III. Policy Recommendations

The basic trends, key points, and priorities of Russia's foreign policy continue to be hotly disputed. First, traditional questions have to be answered that are now being discussed anew throughout the country: "Who are we actually? Where are the values to orientate ourselves by? What path should we follow?" As long as the answers to these questions remain uncertain the West is going to have problems with Russia. At the same time however, the West has the chance to assist Russia's reorientation with an open mind, with understanding, and sensitivity to its specific traditions and conditions. Forces leading society toward a liberal democracy (Kozyrev) and those wanting to anchor the country in the community of civilized states (Yeltsin) have to be encouraged. This is significant as Russia will always remain a major power in spite of its present internal turbulences. This diagnosis not only reflects an objective situation: Russia far surpasses its neighbors with regard to its territorial extent, population, economic, and military power, and will therefore be a very important partner for them. It also reflects a subjective truth. This is because the new elites, including the "national democrats", believe Russia to be the Soviet Union's legitimate heir.

We need to join the club of the world's most developed states. As Foreign Minister Kozyrev says, with its huge "natural,
human, and scientific-economic resources" Russia possesses everything necessary to join the club of the world's most developed states as a "worthy great power". And he adds: "This reflects a simple and clear appreciation of how Russia is changing its strategic interests in the modern world, and the nature of its domestic and foreign policy concept".  

It is indispensable to guarantee full and legal equal rights for the Russian part of the respective population (Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan) and effectively protect Russian minorities (in Central Asian republics and the Baltic states). Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev gives a strong warning, saying that Russia would in accordance with international law even use force if necessary.  

We must continue to strengthen ties of friendship and co-operation with: the Atlantic-European region; the G7 nations; Western-oriented countries of the region; the "four tigers" in South-east Asia; South Africa; Brazil; Argentina; Mexico; and, numerous other countries. 

In order to stabilize and rehabilitate the economy and carry out its internal reforms successfully, Russia urgently needs material help on a large scale and comprehensive know-how from the outside. This means that links with the seven leading industrial nations are indispensable, especially since they control the most important international economic and financial institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. To create close relations of
partnership and co-operation with the club of leading industrialized nations is seen as an essential precondition for Russia's step-by-step transition from the periphery to the center of global developments.

Russia may join a reorganized NATO. This organization, together with the USA and CSCE, is essential in maintaining East European and international stability.

We want the CSCE to be strengthened by expanding its institutions and intervention mechanisms. As an all-European community working for stability and common values, the CSCE is important for Russia because it is a substitute for EC membership that Russia aims at but cannot obtain in the mid term. In addition, Russia's engagement in the CSCE underlines its European character without alienating it from the Central Asian CIS states. These states were also admitted to the CSCE. Finally, Russia expects CSCE to support its efforts to secure human and citizens' rights for ethnic Russians living in the successor states of the former Soviet Union.

We need to establish friendly relations with Japan. Only by solving the "northern territories" question can a basis be found for a long overdue peace treaty. Certainly, Moscow's Japan policy is part of its endeavors to activate Russia's relations with countries of south-east Asia. To gain Japanese friendship is even more important because Japan is an integral and very influential member of the G7.

We need to maintain and develop our relations with the USA.
The United States as the sole remaining superpower is Russia's most important Western partner. We need to follow the Russian-American declaration adopted during Yeltsin's Washington visit of January 1992 which states the key points as: "Russia and the United States no longer consider each other to be potential enemies. From now on, their relationship will be one of friendship and partnership based upon mutual trust and respect as well as a common obligation to democracy and economic freedom." Without any doubt, Moscow finds it relatively easy to enter the new era of relations with the US because the United States and the West in general are interested in a strong Russia exerting international influence, provided of course that the country continues to follow the path towards democracy and solves problems with its CIS neighbors in a peaceful way.

Today, Russia's foreign policy is not determined so much by ideology or a prior doctrine/policies, but primarily by the imperatives of her geopolitical role and position. I would call it the logic of a great power. At the same time, Russia faces natural limitations, primarily from absences of economic levers it could use to achieve her foreign policy goals.

Indeed, there still are quite a few spots of tension on the globe. The world continues to be split into the rich and the poor. It's unlikely that people will put up with this forever and will not try to change the appalling conditions they now live in. Our own experience shows that it's impossible to remedy such an injustice overnight. It takes years of strenuous work, tolerance,
and thrifty use of the country's wealth before a poor country turns into a rich one. Many still are unaware of this. The poorer the country, the more desperate its conditions, the stronger revolutionary sentiments become, promising to resolve all age-old problems at one fell swoop. These factors will never stop the emergence of new "hot spots" on our planet.

"A new world order" is perhaps a far broader notion. It implies order in everything: in relations between countries, in relations between people, and in observance of those people's rights. It seems to be the specific duty of great nations to formulate the basics of that "order" and help other nations, by word and deed, while not hampering their progress.

Only the strong and effective rule of law can save Russia. However, the strength of this rule does not constitute forcing the "absolute" (i.e., the ruler's) truth on all and everybody. Nor does it consist of achieving a crushing defeat of one's political opponents. The authorities' strength and wisdom lie in their ability to come to terms, to seek and find rational compromises, to draw people together for the sake of civil peace and legal reforms. This is the only way to survive. Now, as never before, we need to come to a negotiating table and think about our most vital interest: the good of Russia, Eastern Europe, and the world.

As the crime situation worsens, the people get poorer by the day, and social discontent mounts along with the dangers of the disintegration of the Russian state, one can hardly agree with
those seeking to radically curtail the President's rights and to
turn him into an English Queen. They fail to realize what
consequences such a development could have for Russia.

Only effective executive power structures led by the
President can carry out the reform, react to changing
circumstances and keep them under control, resolve pressing
problems, overcome daily obstacles, and enforce law and order.

The key is that if the supreme bodies of authority do not
reflect in their activities whatever is happening in the country
and build a clear perspective on this basis, what will remain
will merely be a tug of war. If the authorities, for example, do
not set about drawing up a document constituting the country and
the relationships in this country, which will be valid in 1995 or
1997, the country will lose even the little it currently
possesses. This perspective must be prepared, not for the
authorities, but improve a political situation in which the
present day "personal chairs" take no part. Therein may lie the
solution to the main contradiction between the country's new
realities and the old formula of authority. If, when considering
the objectively established vagueness, a power-political
infrastructure has been prepared for those who will come after
the present day rulers, we shall be freed from many things: from
ambitions, partisan partialities, and the ugly alignment of
political forces. Already there is a persistent need to try and
discern a society and a type of statehood in which there will be
no present day, often accidental political policies and
accidents, which will deter the march which history has commenced.

If we really want to create a new Russian Armed Forces we need to develop a concept about Russian priorities and interests in the military-political area, which does not yet exist. These are the:

- guarantee of national security, security of territory, and borders;
- integration of Russia into the world's security system;
- establishing good relations and cooperation with all countries. Among them Russia must occupy the place of a great nation;
- elimination of the reasons for war, large and small;
- study of the issue of defence of our external interests by military means;
- and, demilitarization of the state, society, policy and mass conscience.

The World would do well to resist the temptation of "over-reacting" to Russia's possible actions that may not comply with an already familiar stereotypes. It will have to understand its new resolve to defend her national interests, mainly by political means and by no means regard it as an obstacle to partnership with Moscow. Change is necessary, recognized, and being implemented but, it must be remembered change takes time and patience.
STRATEGY
(FORMULATION GUIDELINE)

NATIONAL PURPOSE
(ENDURING VALUES & BELIEFS)

NATIONAL INTERESTS

STRATEGIC APPRAISAL
(DOMESTIC & GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTS)

NATIONAL STRATEGY
ENDS - National Objectives
WAYS - National Strategic Concepts
MEANS - National Resources

MILITARY STRATEGY
ENDS - Military Objectives
WAYS - Military Strategic Concepts
MEANS - Military Resources

RISK ASSESSMENT

REVISION AS NECESSARY
ENDNOTES


18. An interview of Mr. A. Kozyrev with *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 1 April, 1992.

19. An interview of Mr. A. Kozyrev with *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 1 April, 1992.

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