EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL E. BLUTEAU
United States Army

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANDALL D. BOOKOUT
United States Army

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN C. MAIN
United States Army

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL A. PEARSON
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93-11160
Experiences in Division Command

This document contains selected thoughts from the debriefings of fourteen Division Commanders who completed their tenure of command during the past two years. Some of these commanders led their divisions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and were able to provide additional warfighting insights. In all, this document represents a collection of their thoughts, compiled to stimulate thinking about what it takes to be an effective division commander. In addition, it provides insight to commanders below division level about what division commanders think and how they think. It is not a "cookbook" but the fruit of years of very successful service to our nation and to our Army.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

EXPERIENCES IN DIVISION COMMAND

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Bluteau
United States Army

Lieutenant Colonel Randall D. Bookout
United States Army

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Main
United States Army

and

Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Pearson
United States Army

Dr James Williams
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHORS: Paul E. Bluteau, LTC(P), USA, Randall D. Bookout, LTC, USA, Stephen C. Main, LTC, USA, Michael A. Pearson, LTC, USA

TITLE: Experiences in Division Command

FORMAT: Group Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 73 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This document contains selected thoughts from the debriefings of fourteen Division Commanders who completed their tenure of command during the past two years. Some of these commanders led their divisions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and were able to provide additional warfighting insights. In all, this document represents a collection of their thoughts, compiled to stimulate thinking about what it takes to be an effective division commander. In addition, it provides insight to commanders below division level about what division commanders think and how they think. It is not a "cookbook" but the fruit of years of very successful service to our nation and to our Army.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATION FOR COMMAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFLECTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECOMMAND PROGRAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCTRINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSESSMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNIQUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCTRINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFRESHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVALRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVIATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE DETACHMENT (LRSD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOUTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PEOPLE ....................................... 22
ARTILLERY .................................... 24

EQUIPMENT .................................... 25
FIELDING NEW EQUIPMENT ................. 25
MODERNIZATION .............................. 25
MAINTENANCE ................................. 27
NIGHT VISION DEVICES..................... 28
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) ...... 29
ARMORED GUN SYSTEM (AGS) ............. 29
TRUCKS/HEMTTS/HETS ..................... 30
OH-58 ........................................ 32

READINESS .................................... 33
UNIT STATUS REPORT (2715) .............. 33
PERSONNEL ................................... 35
INSPECTIONS ................................. 36

FIELD OPERATIONS .......................... 39
STANDARDIZED COMMAND POSTS .......... 40

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT ............. 43

FAMILY ACTION .............................. 45
CHALLENGES .................................. 45
REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER .......... 46
SPOUSES ........................................... 47
FAMILY ACTION PLANS .......................... 47
OUTREACH ...................................... 48
SUPPORT ....................................... 49

LEADERSHIP .................................. 53
TECHNIQUES .................................. 53
COMBAT SUCCESS OF A SUBORDINATE LEADER .... 56
PERSONAL LESSONS ............................ 57
TIME MANAGEMENT ............................. 58
CLIMATE ..................................... 59

ETHICS ....................................... 61
CLIMATE ..................................... 61

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ....................... 65
NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS ....................... 69
CHILD CARE FACILITIES ....................... 70

METHODOLOGY ................................ 71
PREPARATION FOR COMMAND

REFLECTIONS

If there is anything that I might have done differently, that would probably have been to become more familiar with the organization of the division so that I could have leveraged many of the systems that were different from the place that I came from.

Develop terms of reference between you and the deputy commanders and the DCSM.

Develop a more comprehensive philosophy with regard to the Senior Rater Profile.

I would have studied the TO&E of the organization a little closer.

I don't think there's any substitute for experience in command at every level. I have not found anyone who has not needed experience at every level of command in order to do a good job at least at the next higher level. Command takes depth of experience.

I have found that assignments in the service schools have been particularly helpful.

I do believe in a command track. It is a pretty important
feature and one we ought to consider even harder in the future.

I was hampered as a division commander by never having served in the Pentagon. It was a clear void in my professional development.

I was very comfortable with training. I was very comfortable with maneuver and I was very comfortable with gunnery.

PRECOMMAND PROGRAMS (PCC)

I think the Precommand Course we do at Leavenworth for division commanders is very well done.

I think the precommand courses at all levels are good.

There ought to be a module that we send division commanders and ADCs to at the intelligence school where we make them more familiar with the systems and the organizations.

I think the most critical school to prepare for division command is the school of hard knock; that is troop leadership experience. I don’t think you can replace that in a classroom. I don’t think you can replace it in a book.

All the programs that have been put into place to help you in the precommand sense are good.
I think a focused program for division commanders at the operational level of war would be very valuable.

TRAINING

The things that put you in the best stead are truly understanding the Army’s training methodology, training philosophy and doctrine, understanding the equipment that you have, and having a focus that you are going to execute your own command philosophy.

I might have leveraged more time to spend at the National Training Center prior to coming into division command.

Being very familiar with BCTP and the CTCs generally helped me.

Everything I have done was building blocks to this job.

You have to enter your position having already accumulated intellectual capital along the way.

There are certain voids that you have in your experience and in your training that become apparent to you when you are responsible for a division or a corps. I did not know enough about the synchronization of fire support and intelligence.

I spent a lot of time dialoguing with the aviators about the importance of the attack helicopter battalions.
I should have learned more about logistics.

There is a lot we division commanders do not know about the logistics system and so I spent a lot of time learning about that.

I felt like an absolute novice in the intelligence area. I was very ill prepared and insecure in my knowledge, and I really put a lot of attention into it.

As we look to the future and see a smaller Army, more and more we are going to have to be able to operate, integrate, and work with a whole range of mixed forces...so it is not good enough these days for a division commander to just have qualifications in one specific area.

I am not sure I learned a lot of new things, but it certainly reinforced me on some things I needed to focus on.

**DOCTRINE**

The Army doctrinal manuals are very important to review.

If I had a little more time, I would have reviewed doctrine.

I read every word of FM 25-100 about five times.
I would have looked at the nonappropriated fund business a little more seriously.

I wish I had known more about financial management before becoming a division commander, including how it interfaces with DA.

I was not completely floundering, but I would have liked to have had a short course on financial management and how you go about securing money and the dangers of running short early on in the year and the dangers of not spending all your money.

I guess if I had to pick one thing out, it would be that I would fight like heck to get down to Fort Lee before taking over a division and learn a little bit more about installation management.
TRAINING
STANDARDS

If you use nondoctrinal terms in trying to describe what you are doing, others will not understand you.

The fact is that most of our people want to be measured against the best standard we can put together.

We should be able to write about direct fire command and control better and have better standards within our doctrine.

I have always believed we should focus on fundamentals. We had to develop training where it was very precise. The best way to do this is through lane training which allows you to get the most out of resources and get the most effective training. Lane training is not event-driven, but standard-driven.

FM 25-100/101 standardized training and it has made a difference.

We lose the fight in the last 500 meters to the objective.

We had not trained to the fundamentals so we started at the platoon level. We trained up to platoon before we ever started thinking about doing anything in a collective fashion. It has paid great dividends for us. The killing and the fighting is done at the platoon level.
I think you have to train to the standard. Do not establish your own standard, but use the Army standard which is the same for everyone. Use the FM 25-100/101 methodology and ensure that your execution is quality.

FM 25-101 is the basis for training.

I put the monkey dead square on the NCOs back for training up through Table VII. I have forbidden officers, except when they are qualifying their own tank, to be on the tank tables through Table VIII. NCOs are responsible for individual, small unit, and crew training.

The "heavy" training inspector is the division command sergeant major. The "heavy" training inspector for the brigade is the brigade command sergeant major.

You need to focus on the weak links in the chain that contribute to the collective task achieving a mark of failing or less than fully trained.

I can't think of anything that has come down the road that has affected the Army more and has made such an impact than FMs 25-100 and 25-101. You have to make these manuals your bible.
You have to understand your organization; you have to understand the doctrine.

FM 25-100 and 25-101 must be absolutely internalized by you and by everyone else.

I want everybody to understand that these battalion commanders are better trained and prepared than I was.

The Combat Training Centers are the most powerful drivers of enhanced performance in our Army that I have seen in my time.

PROGRAMS

We ought to do more heavy/light operations at the National Training Center.

We have to do better in integrating our air forces.

I think the Army has to think through how it is going to train its generals about fighting.

Leader training is the most important piece of training in the division. I do not want leaders -- whether they are sergeants or generals -- to do anything with their subordinates until they have been certified competent in the task.

Prior to going to the NTC, a brigade and battalion task force
needs an NTC-like experience so they don’t get caught off guard. The greatest success is achieved at the NTC by units that have conditioned themselves to go through that experience.

BCTP was the single most important driver of training that we have done.

**FOCUS**

We can do more things within the time frame we need, and without burning gas and without wearing out machines.

You have to influence your task force commanders. That is the level you have to go as a division commander.

Our philosophy is twofold. First, you have to build strong squads and platoons. We put a lot of emphasis here on battle drills. Second, at company and battalion level, the emphasis is on coordinating and integrating the combined arms team.

Be ruthless in making sure that people understand that training is your priority.

If you really want people to take you seriously, you need to be out there checking training. Our responsibility is to train two levels down. I take my responsibility to train battalion commanders very seriously.
Adhere to publishing training guidance requirements at all the required levels.

Put your money where your mouth is.

We established a division CP at the major training areas with at least one general officer present at all times. Usually more than one.

Read 25-100, 25-101, and 100-5 as many times as you can.

Talk to the three senior generals of the BCTP program -- Cavazos, Sennewald, and Grange.

Get the MSCs to look out far enough in providing the guidance and in making the taskings such that company commanders can plan and get their planning window for Weeks T through T-6 locked in.

Implement the FM 25-100/101 red/green/amber cycle.

You need to decide what things are important to you, as far as training is concerned, and publish command training guidance within the first 40 days.

I used published training doctrine.
I would underline the importance of a master training calendar. It is essential to plan major training events 24 months out. It is a commitment that battalions plan and execute.

Training focus should be at the crew, squad, and platoon level.

Twelve months out, confirm the start and the end dates of the brigade combat team exercises. Program all supporting units and supporting installation agencies simultaneously.

Training must be driven from the top down.

You have to focus on everything every 90 days or you begin to lose your edge.

I found that every couple of months or so, you have to look at your METL and reconfirm that METL or change it if required.

Commanders have to be present at training or it just will not get executed to the standard.

ASSESSMENT

We conducted AARs the second day after the war.

Underscore your priority with your presence at training and at the AARs. I probably sat through half of the AARs of all the different types of battalions that were done at the CTC.
Good battalion commanders are somewhat centralized. They decentralize in their execution, but they are centralized in commanding where their outfits are going because they are teaching young people.

At battalion level you have to have very set policies, with certain standards that you are going to uphold and expect to be achieved.

My most comprehensive assessments come from company training meetings. That is where it all comes together in the level of detail that lays out what resources are required to cause good training.

Train in a multi-echelon format. AAR the training. Sustain yourself along a median line in the band of excellence.

I believe that -- if I have leaders who understand their organization, understand how to train, and are given the opportunity and the environment that allows them to do what is required to train--they can create a well-trained set of units.

People get hung up on giving people grades and so on. That is not the idea. The real purpose of the evaluation is to enhance performance.
The idea is for everybody to meet the standard.

TECHNIQUES

I personally run the battalion EXEVAL program. I walk every night attack, every defense. I coach and teach as I go along.

Exercise the backbriefs stated in FMs 25-100/101 regarding the preparation for an intensified training period.

We put each battalion commander through the EXEVAL within six months of his assuming command--as early as possible. It lets him know the things he should be focusing on.

During his watch each battalion commander and brigade commander is going to get a JRTC or an NTC rotation or both. If for some reason someone cannot, we take them out there to walk it.

I spend about 70 percent of the time training leaders and about 30 percent training units.

The division headquarters must go to the field at least four times a year.
DOCTRINE
REFRESHER

You have to study it and you have to study it the whole time.

You have to dialogue with those people who are recent graduates of the schools and who are familiar with the most current doctrine. I think the best people you have available to you to help you work that process are the two year SAMS (School for Advanced Military Studies) graduates.

Do not assume that all your subordinates understand the doctrine of whatever it is that you are getting ready to approach or whatever the training program is.

Do not assume your leaders know doctrine. I found I had forgotten a lot of doctrine.... I found that company, battalion, and brigade commanders had the same lapse of memory I had.

We think we all understand the doctrine, but we all do not even speak the same language. We often times do not know what our own terminology and our own doctrine means. You need to ensure that you and your subordinate commanders are speaking off the same sheet of music.

People do not get into the books and read and teach.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Doctrine is in good shape.

I think our doctrinal literature is solid; but, like everybody else, we struggle making it happen.

Our mobilization doctrine is lousy. We are working hard right now to fix it, but it was the single biggest problem I faced initially.

Field Manual 100-5 is clear.

The training doctrine that we have is right on the mark.

Joint doctrine across the spectrum as part of combined operations piece training is just a natural thing for us as we support the JCS and the Expanded Relations Program.

Command and control of direct fires in the offense: You do not see much about it in the doctrine because we don’t know a lot about it but it is absolutely critical to the future.

CHANGES

Do not become an inventor of doctrine. Follow the Army doctrine. It works. It is proven. You then have a common understanding among your subordinates of what they are supposed to do which is important in execution.
Doctrinally a "corps plug" is inherent to the concept for tailoring light divisions for a mid intensity environment. Yet there is a tendency to think that it is capable of fighting in such environments without augmentation.

Nothing ever got more responsive by moving it to higher headquarters. Centralizing is not the way to go.

AirLand Battle doctrine works.

There are some things in the light divisions that are troublesome. The ability to be able to see deep and to strike deep in the light division. You have to very innovative to be able to accomplish that aspect of ALB doctrine. You have to do a lot of work with the aviation and the artillery to get the intelligence you need to strike deep.
ORGANIZATION

STRUCTURE

We've got to streamline command and control. There are too many people involved in it, particularly in the intelligence analysis arena.

We absolutely must keep dedicated OH-58D aircraft to support the artillery force. We must have dedicated command and control aircraft for the division commander, assistant division commanders, brigade commanders, the DISCOM commander, and the signal battalion commander. We have to practice division/corps operations better and more effectively so we can employ multiple brigades of artillery.

Our USAR and National Guard structure must be better rostured to support the active Army at division and corps levels.

I am very concerned about not being able to sustain combat operations. We have good people working very hard but in an inadequate organization for sustained operations. We don't have enough transportation and we don't have enough evacuation capability for the wounded. Clearly we do not have enough water hauling capability.

I built the long-range fire targeting cell in the D-MAIN. When we do cross-border operations with our Apaches, the cell sits
right there where all the intelligence comes in and where the targeting is done. That way the SEAD operation, the clearance of air lanes, and the transit routes are all coordinated in one place.

I believe someone needs to look at the MP force structure. I don’t believe there are enough military police in the division. I don’t believe there are enough in the Army, in fact.

In my division, the air defense battalion is not configured to protect the rear area.

External to the division we need to do something about our ability to evacuate wounded. I am convinced that if we had large numbers of casualties on the battlefields in Southwest Asia, the evacuation system would have been severely inadequate. We would have had a horrible loss of lives due to our inability to get the wounded from their units back to the MASH and the evacuation hospitals. There was clearly a great medical capability available and great professional people to do whatever it took to keep people alive. But the evacuation system was frighteningly inadequate and something we need to fix.

We are working with the intelligence school on the correct mix of linguists in the CEWI Battalion. That organizational structure has to be changed.
CAVALRY

Our Cavalry TO&E needs to be looked at. We must have an armored cavalry squadron in the division consisting of three ground cavalry troops with tanks and an air cavalry troop.

We traditionally put a tank company with the cavalry squadron because the current cavalry squadron is inadequate to do many of the missions that it must in combat. The Army needs to go ahead and put the tanks back into the cavalry squadron at the division. I think virtually every armor leader in the Army agrees with that.

I converted the cavalry squadron to three ground troops and two air troops.

The cavalry squadron needs the firepower to have the ability to fight for information, to do what is termed as the counter-reconnaissance battle, and to do security and economy of force missions.

AVIATION

We are also building an aviation support battalion on the cheap -- for the most part, out of hide. The Army needs to get on about deciding to go with the aviation support battalion for the aviation brigade, to resource it, and to get it into the structure.
I think the Apache organizations within the heavy divisions in Europe are right. You need two battalions per division. I would say every heavy division in the Army should have two Apache battalions in the aviation brigade. Also, aviation support is woefully inadequate. You don’t have enough mechanics. Clearly there is a need for an aviation support battalion and one significantly more robust than we are envisioning right now.

We need an FSB for the combat aviation brigade to support the attack aviation battalion. We need it to support with Hellfires and fuel.

LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE DETACHMENT (LPSD)

We need to retain heavy division LRSD.

We made the decision to keep the LRSD in the cavalry. They were tasked by the G2 and trained by the MI battalion commander, but we physically stationed them with the cav because those were the guys who had to put them in and take them out. The ADC(O) also provided supervision. It was working, so why change it?

I don’t think LRSD belong in the division. I am not sure we can effectively use them. I don’t know how you get them out to do their mission. I am not even sure how the corps is going to get their long-range folks out. I could never really employ my LRSD the way I wanted to. Normally I had to get corps permission to do it anyway, and normally I didn’t get permission. So it was
not effective.

SCOUTS

There are a number of ad hoc arrangements that need to be fixed. For example, I don't think we have formalized the sniper squads that you need in the scout platoon at each infantry battalion. These snipers have the capability to perform a vital function. Do we take these personnel out of hide?

I would like to have brigade scouts.

I had the opportunity to develop a brigade scout platoon. This unit was deployed to Southwest Asia and turned out to be an essential element of the brigade. It was in HMMWVs.

We are in two configurations of scout platoons. One is HMMWV; the other is Bradley. That needs to be straightened out. The scouts are critical on the battlefield. We need to go with a heavied-up HMMWV that affords some protection against small arms. Second, we have to provide optics. Third, we have to provide a self-defense system. I think that is doable.

PEOPLE

The AOE does not resource the MTOE for the division headquarters to handle all of the OPLANs for which we are troop listed. There is planning going on all the time with the CINCS and other divisions. I am not resourced in the division headquarters to do that. So, we have to take some of that out of hide.
We had to do away with our Echo companies in our infantry battalions, not because we didn’t feel a need for the Echo companies, but because we found that we never had enough infantrymen to provide sufficient dismount capabilities. I guess it is being done all across USAREUR.

The thing that surprised me more than anything was the great, great responsibilities we give to very junior people on the support side of the house. One thing that became clear to me was that we had built the FSB very austerely. If you go to a tank battalion, for example, you have at least an E-5 sergeant, tank commander, or in most cases a staff sergeant. But if you go to a Class I ration point in an FSB you may find a Spec 4 in charge. This is an organizational change we need to make: More NCO leadership and a little more robustness in our forward support battalions.

We are so close to the margin in people in a tank battalion that if you are not at about 100 percent, you have a real fall-off. I think we have long ago cut the fat out, and we just need to be careful about redundancy and the robustness of organization that we felt we had with the Division ’86 structure. You can say, "The tooth-to-tail ratio is too high." In the Armor force itself, you still have about three percent of the soldiers providing 33-37 percent of the fire power on the battlefield. Is it wrong to support that adequately?
If you can build a howitzer that only takes two people to man -- wonderful. Who is going to secure them though? If you have an artillery battalion in the desert operating on long lines and deployed with several batteries and platoons scattered all over, and they barely have enough people to man the guns -- then what happens if somebody hits them with a ground attack? Those are the kinds of things that we have to think through.

**ARTILLERY**

The Army doesn’t have enough artillery. We probably don’t have half enough artillery. I have looked at working it across the Army and working with the National Guard and so forth. Two points jump out at you. One, the reserve component maneuver forces don’t do very well because they don’t have enough training time. Two, the artillery units of the Reserve Components are very good for the most part. If I were a senior leader of our Army, I would take a hard look at converting some of that maneuver in the National Guard into artillery. I would like to see us build about twice the number of artillery brigades that we have today, and that would be a place where I would look to get structure to do it with.

If I had the authority to do so, I would up-gun my DIVARTY from a MLRS battery to a MLRS battalion. I would also have habitual artillery brigade support behind every division -- one artillery brigade supporting every division as a minimum.
Absolutely insist on full package fielding. Don’t let somebody talk you into taking a shortfall of your PLL or your special tools and equipment. I allowed myself to be talked into that a couple of times. It was a mistake every time.

MODERNIZATION

We need to continue to enhance our antiarmor capabilities. That is, replace the Dragon with AAWS-M. We need a manned portable antitank capability. We ought to be able to put in the hands of our soldiers something they can kill tanks with.

We always load ships according to efficiency instead of according to what the unit’s needs are when they have to get off on the other end and fight. We have to change that. I want all the equipment from one battalion going on one ship instead of ships that have 16 different units on them.

We need palletized load systems. That’s a change of equipment within the organization and that would require a little more structure. But we need these systems so that we don’t have to do the manhandling to down-load and up-load, where you can merely drop a pallet on the ground and pick up an empty pallet with the truck and move away.

It was very difficult to communicate with the corps commanders as
frequently as we should have. We were moving and FM communications did not give us the ranges we needed. We had TACSAT communications as long as I was in a helicopter; but, when I was on the ground, we had to stop and set up a single channel TACSAT. We really need to go to more satellite communications that are more mobile than the ones we have now. To give you communications over the wide span of terrain, great depths that you are going to operate across, I say that you are clearly going to need the TACSAT type of communications.

We need MK-19 automatic grenade launchers in all CS and CSS battalions and on the M-113 series of armored vehicles.

We need more single channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios.

We have the superior capability to fight at night in our Army and we have to maintain that edge no matter what we do. Tremendous capabilities were realized in terms of Army aviation in both the Apache attack helicopter and the OH-58D scout aircraft. The AH-64 Hellfire is a tremendous weapons system with its 8 kilometer standoff capability. We must make sure that we maximize the capability that’s there.

MSE is a great boon. You must have six nodes in a division, not four. We took six with us and thank heavens we did. We stretched that thing 160 kilometers at one time. The equipment
was fine but it was good soldiers that made that happen.

MAINTENANCE

A solid CG-supported command inspection program is one way to tackle the maintenance problem. Aviation maintenance is always a special problem, and aviation is the life blood of the light division.

The PLL clerks spend your division dollars, so they need supervision. I found that we were probably receiving about 90 percent of what we were paying for and buying 20-25 percent more than what we needed because of the inefficiency in the requisitioning process. You have to be adamant about checking the work of the PLL clerks every day to ensure what we are buying is what we need; and that we are buying just the quantities we need. We also declared war on excess in the division; in fact, last year I got back about $6 million in training dollars because we got involved turning in excess. To make that program work we gave incentives for battalion commanders to turn in excess. If the unit is aggressive in turning in excess, they get the refund. In a tight fiscal environment the commanders are very interested in recouping all the dollars they can.

Until we get reliable engineer equipment fielded to our engineer battalions, we are going to continue to have parts problems. If we were a construction firm, we would go broke.
The biggest maintenance concern I had was with the aging equipment in the engineer battalion. What I found was a good battalion with good people but struggling with their equipment -- everything from bulldozers to river bridges. Now a lot of that was taken care of as we traded out old equipment and got the Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE).

One problem I found in the maintenance area was that certain battalions were spending far more in terms of dollars for repair parts than other battalions with equipment essentially the same age and with the same amount of use on it. I knew immediately what the problem was. I just had to verify that. I had battalion commanders or their XOs not spending enough time in the motor pool working with PLL clerks to ensure the requisition process was supporting the needs of the organization and was not wasteful. If you don't have the XO of a battalion spending the preponderance of his time working logistics operations within your battalion or brigade -- specifically your Class IX requisitioning and maintenance you will be in trouble.

NIGHT VISION DEVICES

Light divisions must be able to fight at night. It is probably their greatest asset yet we have not resourced them properly. Basically, light divisions fight at night the same way they did in World War II. We don't have thermal sights, state of the art optics and GPS. We can see a little bit at night because we have night vision goggles, but we can't shoot at night. We still look
over the sights and shoot for center of mass the same way we did in WWII. We have a long way to go to be masters of the night. The technology is there.

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)
One piece of equipment unknown heretofore, that emerged as an almost indispensable piece of equipment was the Global Positioning System (GPS). The old "slugger" or hand-held GPS was indispensable to knowing where you were in the desert. It needs to be in the hands of all leaders down to the platoon level. You have to find a way to make that technology available to our troops.

We need GPS in every aircraft, tank, Bradley, scout, and command and control vehicle.

ARMORED GUN SYSTEM (AGS)
I would gladly trade off armor protection for the mobility and fire power that comes with a weapons system like the Sheridan or an armored gun system. We don't need a tank. We need mobile firepower on the ground.

For new equipment needs, the follow-on armored gun system (AGS) is our number one need. I think there is a need for an assault gun in direct support of infantry in just about any level of environment -- built-up areas, close terrain, or open terrain. It has to be air-droppable and mobile with some limited protected firepower hopefully a 105 gun. But if it is not air droppable,
we don't need it.

TRUCKS/HEMTTS/HETS

In deploying we found ourselves lacking in terms of haul capability -- specifically, for barrier materials, mines, and those things that would be needed in the defense. We used host nation support which was great but we have to be careful that we don’t forget that early deploying units require sustainment as well. You also have to think in terms of distribution. The desert is a large place and troops were widely dispersed. Many units didn’t bring their MKTs which meant that they weren’t able to properly prepare the meats. You need everything on your TO&E to sustain your troops and then some.

We need more material handling equipment. There is a dilemma between the 2-1/2 ton and the 5-ton truck. Whereas the 2-1/2 ton is easily transportable by Air Force aircraft, the 5-ton is not; but it could be. Simply stated, we need the 5-ton. We need it for the transportation to haul fuel, water, ammunition, and more.

I became aware that the 5,000 gallon tankers that we had in the main support battalion were not up to the rigors of demand of the battlefield that we found ourselves on in Southwest Asia and probably not up to the battlefield requirements in Central Europe. We need to get rid of those 5,000 gallon tankers and replace them with HEMTTs.
We’ve bought some good trucks, but we need more. We need at least two more HEMTT fuelers for an M1A1 battalion.

We’re only authorized 68 5,000 gallon tankers and we’ve got to have 160. We crossed the LD with 160 and we never came close to running short on fuel. However, if I had my choice I wouldn’t have a 5,000 gallon tanker in the division. They would all be HEMTTs that have cross-country capability. That would take another different type vehicle out of your inventory and you wouldn’t have to worry about having parts for it. You can follow a tank battalion or a mech battalion around the world with HEMTT fuelers, but you can’t with 5,000 gallon tankers.

I would put at least one battalion of HETs (heavy equipment transports) in each division. A company in every division and two more in the Guard or Reserves. We don’t have the ability to move about the battlefield. The Iraqis had over 2,500 HETs that we knew of.

Within the heavy divisions we certainly need heavy equipment transporters. I think the Army has already decided to go to the HET (Heavy Equipment Transporter) companies within divisions. That is a problem we had. We found that the British could move their divisions with ease in the desert because they had their own heavy equipment transporters. We had great difficulties because we had to rely on outside support.
I will tell you the one thing I would get rid of right now if I was the Chief. I'd wash the Cobras out of the system as quickly as possible and replace them with armed OH-58D's in the cav squadrons. Cobras were worthless. They are only a daytime system and all they fire are TOWs. I would get rid of the Cobra and replace them with unarmed OH-58Ds, quite frankly, because of their night capability.
READINESS

I certainly never envisioned that when I took command that the division was going to go to war. Our focus was clearly to train for war; but never did I envision that we would deploy the entire division far around the world, fight a high intensity war, return home, and start the reconstitution building back in the division. I don’t think I ever envisioned that it would be in the Mideast. Our division had a multifocus view with war plans that ranged from South America to the Mideast to late deployment to Europe and elsewhere. We trained the previous year across that spectrum; but in the back of our minds all of the leadership of the division felt that, if we would ever be committed, it would probably be in a low intensity or a medium intensity environment. So, I guess the surprises were that, first, we went to war and, second, we went to that environment that we perhaps least expected to go.

What you see is what you get. It can’t be any other way when you are talking about something as important as killing and dying. If something doesn’t work, you say it doesn’t work. That’s been the standard in this division.

UNIT STATUS REPORT (2715)

There is more to readiness than just Unit Status Reporting. When I got here I looked at the 2715 and said, "Yes, we are C2 in this and C1 in that. Our operational readiness rate which drives us to C2 here is okay." That was not the issue. What were our
shortages and what were the things that made a difference and what didn’t? What equipment do I have at the NTC? What equipment is back here? We had just turned in our Cobra helicopters. Where are they? Could we redraw some of those helicopters? What is your level of fill on trucks? Do you have 2-1/2-tons? Do you have 5-tons, old series, new series, or HEMTTS? What about 5,000 gallon tankers? Whoops, we’re short a bunch of water trailers. Well, water trailers don’t pop up on your 2715 report any place. But all of a sudden we are going to Southwest Asia and I am short 50 water trailers. What kind of condition are the M16s in? They are old. Are we going to take M1s or are we going to draw M1A1s? I don’t know. What we get down to is "to be ready to deploy." That is the question, not what your readiness is. The OR rate, whether it is 89 or 94 percent, means absolutely nothing. How long have your commanders been in command? How long since you had a certain training activity? Those are different kinds of questions than are asked in the 2715 report. It is far different from the routine measurement of readiness. What I learned is that there is no routine measurement of readiness.

AR 220-1 and its readiness factors are problematic when conventionally applied to a light division. For example, giving a promotion advantage to the airborne fixes the airborne in terms of AR 220-1 reporting. However, if your unit is not very high on the DAMPI (Department of the Army Master Priority List) or not
very high on the PPG (Personnel Priority Guidance), but you are also light -- then what looks like a comparably small percentage below authorizations, say 85 to 95 percent fill in noncommissioned officer skills, more quickly breaks the light division. That's because its baseline structure is austere to begin with. That's not recognized in the readiness reporting system. It does not necessarily mean that we ought to generate a fix in the readiness reporting system. However, if you are going to command a light division, the objective computations conventionally associated with readiness reporting have different implications for you than they do for a heavy, a mech, or some other unit.

PERSONNEL

There was a challenge in the development of our middle grade non-commissioned officers. Not only was there a challenge in terms of the skills of those we were receiving, but in terms of the number that we had.

I believe the Army of Excellence cuts back down at the root level of where warfighting takes place. The machine gun crew is gone. We went from three to two men and I don't see how you do it effectively. The TOW crew has gone from five men to three men. That means you have a driver, gunner, and a section leader. That's it. You don't have anybody pulling security. You can't exercise command and control. You can't maintain a vehicle. You can't do all the things that need to be done. There are no door
gunners to man the Blackhawks, and you cannot fly at night if you have one crew chief. I took sniper squads out of hide and provided the assault helicopter battalion with door gunners. They are totally reassigned to the aviation brigade generally never to return.

What I have received in the middle grade noncommissioned officers for a light infantry division has not met my expectations. They come from ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) duty. They come from recruiting commands. Some of them had been there, particularly Recruiting Command, for a long time. Their branch skills had deteriorated. In many instances, our young soldiers, who have been here two or three years training in light infantry skills, are much more current than some of their noncommissioned officer leaders. I've already indicated that there was a challenge in the development of our middle grade noncommissioned officers. While the numbers or percentages may indicate a certain computed "C" level, if you factor in the state of training of those folks, then you become a little bit less confident that the readiness is as high as the numbers and computations suggest.

INSPECTIONS

We have unannounced IG inspections. We do a very rigorous maintenance inspection. Those inspections have traditionally demonstrated that the reported and the actual readiness of our equipment are very close.
It is important that division commanders get down to the motor pools, talk to motor sergeants, and talk to prescribed load list (PLL) clerks. It is very important that you talk to your division support command (DISCOM) commander and get his perception of readiness in your division.
FIELD OPERATIONS

My personal ability to provide clear, accurate, precise, planning guidance and to articulate the commander's intent for division operations was the single most limiting factor in exercising effective command and control in the field. That is a skill that takes hours and hours of work. There is a tape made by a retired lieutenant colonel named Robinson. It sits on my desk and has been there for months. I review it every time I get ready to go into some kind of an exercise. That has helped me tremendously in stating guidance and developing my intent. If you can't do that, your planners, your headquarters and your subordinate commanders are going to go through hours of grief trying to understand what you want them to do.

You have to know your organization -- both the capabilities and the weaknesses -- to synchronize it. It is absolutely critical to know those things if you are to operate successfully in the field.

If you can't talk, you can't command. I am very disappointed in the maneuver control system and will be until it becomes more user friendly.

Doctrine says that the ADC-S will man a rear battle cell in the division rear and fight the rear battle. The only problem is that doctrine doesn't give him any of the people to do it with,
and the current force structure does not identify who is going to make up the cell. So we have to pull them out of the division staff and other places -- fire support, intelligence, engineers, and Army aviation. You have to have the whole thing back there to fight the rear battle.

**STANDARDIZED COMMAND POSTS**

Most commanders when they first come in, focus on command post configuration and not what is in the command Post. They focus on things not people. Everybody wants to change the configuration of the command post. I rebuilt the whole damn command post. But I didn’t do it for showmanship or one-upmanship. I did it because I knew this was a functional process. I knew the command post needed to be something that you could work in. It was comfortable. As long as the command post can move quickly, it doesn’t matter how big it is. If you can move it fast and with great frequency, and still have something that is functional and comfortable to work with -- then do it. I am absolutely opposed to trying totally to standardize command posts.

The single most limiting factor in exercising command and control in the field is getting yourself organized. First of all what is your role going to be as a division commander? You can’t be everywhere, so how are you going to organize the command and control within the division within the field? What is the role of the ADC? What is the role of the chief of staff? Where is he going to be to effectively command a division? Is he going to
use the three CP concept by having a tactical, a main and a rear? If so, what is the relationship going to be between those three command posts and where is he going to be? You need to let the ADC fight the close battle. You need to resource him so he can do it. You need to let the ADC-S fight the rear battle and you need to resource and rely on him. You need to be the guy who is fighting the future battle, fighting the deep battle, and keeping the division properly resourced.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

I had a certification program for new people. There were 30, 60, and 90 day certification programs to ensure that NCOs, officers and enlisted personnel were brought up to speed. We sent a lot of soldiers to school to be better mechanics and prescribed load list clerks. We made sure they were school trained and certified. We had college classes at night and encouraged people to go. BSEP classes were given to help people increase their GT scores. These were the kind of things that were continually going on so soldiers could improve themselves from the lowest private all the way up to the officer corps.

We spent a lot of time on professional development. We had a very good series of speakers. These were very knowledgeable people in their field. We also spent a lot of time on certifying both our officers and our noncommissioned officers.

We had a number of senior leader seminars where we really focused on synchronizing combat power at the brigade and division commander level.

As an institution the Army has great professional development programs: the officer education system and the noncommissioned officer education system. The first thing a commander must do is to ensure that his or her soldiers leverage the institutions for PLDC (Professional Leadership Development Course), BNCOC (Basic
Noncommissioned Officer Course), ANCOC (Advance Noncommissioned Officer Course), CAS3 (Combined Arms Service and Staff School), motor officer courses, and those courses that in some cases are a prerequisite and in other cases are beneficial. First, you leverage the schoolhouse. Secondly, we have noncommissioned officer development programs, which are generally conducted at the battalion level, and officer professional development programs conducted at the battalion and brigade level where the focus, directed by the division, is a focus on warfighting.

I found that I had forgotten a lot of doctrine, so it is very important to review it frequently. Do not assume your leaders know doctrine. I found that company and brigade commanders had the same lapse of memory that I had. To compensate for that, we had to develop a warfighter series. Twice a month, we sat down as professionals. At my level, it was me, the ADCs, the staff, and brigade and battalion level commanders. We picked up a piece of doctrine and had the experts teach a class on it. Then, we always had a healthy question and answer period.
FAMILY ACTION

CHALLENGES

First of all you have to recognize that family issues are important. You do that by including it in your command philosophy model and telling them up front. Then you have to live by your word. If you think high school graduation isn’t important to a father whose kid is graduating from high school, then you are wrong. If you don’t think it is more important to him than tank gunnery, then you are wrong. So you have to make arrangements for him to go back.

You have to be ruthless in enforcing soldier and family prime time or whatever you want to call it. And you have to take care of your own family. If you ignore your own family for the betterment of the division, you will ignore it to the detriment of the division. You will be leading by example and everybody will see that. If you take the time to go to church with your family, PTA, scout things, the high school wrestling match when your son is participating, then others will feel comfortable in doing it too. The other thing is your family deserves your leave -- your undivided and devoted leave.

One of the great problems in the years to come is child care. I’m afraid if we don’t find a better way to handle child care, the costs are going to become astronomical.
One of the most important things we need to stress in our business is a simple thing that we call "predictability." I like to know what I am going to be doing 2 weeks from now. I think every soldier likes to know what he or she is going to be doing 2 weeks from now. We owe them that! We have to make it as easy as we possibly can for families to know what is happening in the near future.

REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDER

At my Post we had a lieutenant colonel either going into or out of command in that position. They screamed going in but came out saying they learned how to take care of families.

I left a very strong rear detachment at all levels. It was led by a lieutenant colonel with field grade involvement at brigade level, with company grade involvement down to battalion level and with a very strong chain of concern.

When we deployed I decided not to leave one soldier in a rear detachment at company, battalion, or brigade level. I placed an officer in command of this post. He had an excellent post staff. We had a tremendous family support agency. There was a chain of concern among the family support group leaders, they took care of each other, loved each other, and were supportive. I told battalion commanders two or three times in the desert that they were not responsible for one thing going on at the Post nor for the families. Their sole purpose was to pay attention to their
soldiers and get them ready to fight.

We decided to put very, very good people in our rear detachment at every level -- company, battalion, and brigade. We limited the number to 6-8 at the battalion level. I kept them small but I kept them quality. I took an incoming battalion commander who was not scheduled to command for another year and made him the division rear detachment commander -- a quality guy who was just a great asset to us. I did a very formal job of changing OER systems and those kind of things so it was clear who was in charge in the rear.

SPOUSES

Command group spouses met twice a week in my office back in the States. They went through the issues that would come up through the chain of concern. Then they would hand those off to our division rear detachment commander and our deputy post commander who stayed behind.

FAMILY ACTION PLANS

In dealing with family action issues we have a great system. First, we have the human resources staff people who are the staff action point of contact for family action issues. Second, I found it valuable and worthwhile to have a commander’s training conference once a year, and to bring the wives to it at a certain point. It includes battalion commanders and command sergeants major. We attack some issues associated with training that we haven’t fixed to satisfaction through quarterly training briefs.
(QTBs). For example, a CSM group was given the task of developing for presentation, discussion, and development an approach to skill development training (SDT) that we can use across the division. We invite all the installation leaders a half-day so that they can hear our command sergeants' major, commanders' and wives' concerns about installation support. One challenge we face is the self-sustaining rules for installation activities like child care. The fees are incredible.

OUTREACH

The problem I had while in command was that only 10 percent of our soldiers lived on post because we had limited family housing. We started an outreach program. You have to go out to the families, they are not going to come to you. Even though we have a very intelligent Army we still have some young soldiers who don't even tell their wives about the commissary or the availability of facilities. We had 76 married young ladies under 17 who were pregnant. We did a modest survey. Twenty-four percent of those surveyed said they had contemplated suicide, and these were women under 25 years of age. We started programs to raise their self esteem and it didn't cost much. Part of the program was under contract. We used appropriated and nonappropriated money. We bought our outreach vans with nonappropriated dollars. We got the total community involved including the hospital and service organizations. To reach people we had a well-baby clinic on wheels. They want someone to look at their child and say, "I declare this baby all right." Or
say, "This child has a problem, I want to bring him into the hospital and run some tests." We set up our program in concert with the USO. It was already set it up when I arrived and we just expanded it.

Don't be hesitant about having ambitious family care plans. We had wives that didn't know how to drive, taught by other wives who did know how to drive. We took wives who would have been without an automobile and had other wives take them to our airfield, where we figured it was the safest place to teach them to drive, and had driving classes run by wives. Be innovative and the best thing that you can do is involve the wives early in the process. When you are sitting down preparing your family action plans, it is important to have some of the spouses there to ensure that you are truly thinking about their needs in a comprehensive way.

SUPPORT

We have great young Army families compared to what you would find if you took a similar population in civil life and we have tremendous family support. Having said all that, about five percent of military families are spoiled rotten. We do more for Army families than IBM does. Some wives demonstrated against the war and claimed that their husbands were dying in the desert without food or water. The complaints would start overwhelming some family support group leaders. I called my wife every week or so to tell her what was going on in the field. I strongly
believe that family support group leaders are not responsible for every problem of every family. We really have to watch what we are doing on this. We started to get into an implication that Mrs. Battalion Commander or the rear detachment commander was supposed to solve all family problems. I don’t believe that. When we deploy to defend our country overseas, the chain of command has one purpose. That is to take care of soldiers and fight. We are not leaving our families in some Third World country. They must be responsible for their own affairs with the assistance of the Family Support Groups and the Installation Staff.

We have 60 percent of the division married. That tells you we have to take care of families. They are saying that by the year 2000 we are going to have 80 percent and maybe up to 85 percent of the force married. That tells us we must have good family programs. It also tells me that we probably aren’t thinking far enough ahead. With those numbers we will be out of the barracks business. Many barracks are probably going to be turned into apartments for young married couples. We haven’t as an Army thought through any of this change. There are studies that tell us that soldiers carry family stress into combat. If they know that their family is being well taken care of, they carry that stress a little further back. If they know that their sick mother or pregnant wife is being taken care of, they can accomplish the mission. If they don’t, they are going to be a
problem in the combat zone. Good programs take a lot of resources. When I went to Vietnam no one took care of my family, I sent them home to my hometown and knew they were taken care of. Now, with our mobile society, we can't assume people can do that so we have to take care of them.

First of all, you have to let everybody know what the standard is. I told them I will not accept family discord. It is dysfunctional in the Army. So tell them up front. "If you have family discord, you are going to have a tough time on my team. Either get rid of the discord or get rid of the family." That is harsh talk but I don't have time to screw around with a teenage hoodlum. So I send a lot of them home. But I've told them that up front. I go to the schools and town hall meetings and tell them the laws. If they willingly violate them, that is their choice, but then they have not done it in ignorance. When a kid swears at a teacher, they should already know what the outcome is going to be. Then you enforce it. I'll tell you, you will get the teachers and everybody on your side if you lay out the rules. If you don't say early on that tee shirts that have profanity and insulting sexual innuendos on them are unacceptable, then they will wear them. You have to tell them up front when that applies. You do that through the chain of command and town hall meetings. Vulgar outbursts by anyone in the public environment is unacceptable as long as you tell them that.
One key is to determine how to cope with or respond to the plethora of rumors that are generated. As a function of a deployed unit, families want to know how the unit is living, how it is eating, and how it is acting. I think that is one of the reasons that information flow is so important. The information needs to flow back.

Before we departed we took the battalion commanders through what we expected the post to look like as we were deploying and what we expected the post to look like when we left. We did that in great detail. The results of that attention to detail was that we left the post in solid condition from police to accountability of things. Then as we started the echelon forward, the ADC-M went first and I came right after him, and last was the ADC-S. As we started to phase out, we set up the necessary communication systems from the forward back to CONUS so that we could deal with problems and deal with rumors quickly.
LEADERSHIP
TECHNIQUES

What I didn't do was to change everything as soon as I walked in the door. As I saw things that weren't either productive or we weren't doing the right way, I made the changes. My methodology was to get together with all of the commanders and their Sergeants Major and correct the problem area.

Let a brigade commander command his brigade. That is the biggest thing that I think you have to make sure that you do. The Army thought enough of him to make him a brigade commander; therefore he ought to run his own brigade.

Your leadership techniques in taking care of soldiers and families and those sorts of things are the same. They don't change. The difference is that you have to remember that you are the division commander. You have a lot of great colonels who can handle the job if you give them the mission and turn them loose to do it.

Your leadership techniques are really your personality and how you go about dealing with people. You earn the respect of your soldiers: You don't automatically have that, just because you are a senior officer. If you're a soldier-oriented leader, then you will probably have a successful command because you're going to do soldier-oriented things that meet the common-sense rule.
At the division level our great responsibility is to provide conditions that allow success: a command climate that provides openness and provides the ability to make those honest mistakes that we all talked about and not to be career terminating.

As General John R. Galvin once told me, "There are not many things that you can really influence when you get into larger organizations. You need to decide what they are and then you need to set out very clearly what you want to do. Then you need to stay on it. Never waiver." That is probably true.

Repetitively state your policies. Consistently make sure that people understand what it is you are trying to do.

I had to keep from being a brigade commander. I knew what brigade commanders were supposed to do. I knew what battalion commanders were supposed to do. I thought, based on previous experience, that I knew what division commanders were supposed to do. I would find myself getting too involved in the brigade commander's business. I just had to sit back and say, "I have to stay out of there. I have to let them do their job." It took me 2 or 3 months to sort through that.

The division commander has to be more patient than a brigade commander. Things take more time as a division commander. We just can't turn things around over night. You have to let your subordinate commanders have the time to lead. You have to be
patient, and understand that you are not going to get results immediately, might not get the right ones the first time.

As you move through echelons of command you are further away from soldiers. By that I mean you are further away from reality. So you have to be very careful about what you say, what you do with the information that you get, and how you collect the data if you want to continue to make good decisions. Now you do have a larger, more responsive staff eager to provide you with information and eager to do what the boss wants. So there is more of an obligation for you to be very careful about what you ask of them and the direction you point them because they are eager to please.

I am a decentralized leader. To be effective as a division commander, I feel it is very necessary to operate this way. Basically, you must give subordinates missions and resources and get out of the way. Sure you may check on their progress once in a while, but generally it is best to stay out of the way. With my command philosophy, I was comfortable operating in a decentralized manner, because I felt that leaders at all levels understood my intent.

Be crystal clear in your intent. The key is to make sure you let them know what you want them to do. Of equal importance at the division level is to be consistent. I told my commanders when I
took command, that I hoped they would find that the things that I
was emphasizing to them in the last month of command, were the
same things that I had emphasized to them in the first month of
my command, because we need consistency. We don't need to be
jerking people around. We don't need a new set of priorities
every couple of weeks. Clear intent, clear priorities, making
what's important unambiguous, and reinforcing that continuously
with them are critical.

COMBAT SUCCESS OF A SUBORDINATE LEADER
I think that is something that probably you can recognize right
away: How much respect do the subordinate leadership and
noncommissioned officers within the unit have for their senior
leadership? You can tell the command climate in a unit right
away by just going around and talking to soldiers about how they
feel about their unit. If the unit doesn't exhibit pride and if
there's an absence of teamwork and loyalty, then you are going to
find a commander that's going to have some trouble taking the
unit into combat.

I think the best way to determine that is through stress. You
determine that through stressful training. I don't know if it is
always correct or not, but it is a good measure.

You know subordinates and soldiers have to have a lot of
confidence and respect in their leaders. You gain that over
time. The leader in peacetime who is rough and abrasive and who
doesn't treat his soldiers with the respect and dignity they
deserve will not be successful in combat, period. He may be
successful for a time, but sooner or later that leader will fail.

PERSONAL LESSONS

It is important for a commander to be visible and accessible. If
you are visible and accessible, you will create the kind of
climate that you want. You have to take time to talk to
soldiers. You have to go where soldiers are. It is not good
enough to bring ten soldiers up to your office. It is not good
enough to eat lunch with ten soldiers and think you are going to
find out what is going on in the division. You have to talk to
them where they work -- motor pools and ranges. You have to get
on the ground with them and look at their range cards. You have
to ask them if they know how to boresight a tank, have them show
you how to do it, maybe even take the time to participate in that
kind of practice. They need to understand that you sprang from
exactly where they are. You weren't born as a brigade commander
or a battalion commander. You understand this soldiering
business. You have to put something personal into it. You have
to ask him if he is married. Ask him about his baby and watch
his face light up when he is talking about that child. Those
things are important to him and he likes to talk about family.
Then you find out what is really going on in the division. You
just ask him, "What time did you get out of here last Thursday?"
Then you find out "Yes, we got off at 1530, but the First
Sergeant kept us in formation for an hour giving us all this
great information." You have to get down to earth without losing the dignity of the of the position you represent -- and you can do that.

Patience is number one. Number two is making sure that every subordinate understands your intent. It is awfully hard. We used to talk about commander's intent and we still do in BCTP. But it is getting everybody to understand what you really mean. It is very difficult. You have to go over it and over it, and have commanders come brief back your intent. If you have the patience you will be far more successful and create the right kind of environment.

You got to be a division commander because somebody thought you could do the job. Don't try to change your modus operandi. Do the things you have done before. At the same time, be willing to learn. I learned from my people all the time.

TIME MANAGEMENT

The most precious resource that you have is time.

The utilization of your time is a key part to how you do your command.

You learn that time is a greater problem for you. You are just spread. You learn you have to speak a lot more. Good speaking takes time to prepare, whether it be at a formal dinner or
whether it be at a downtown affair with the civilians. So time management becomes a challenge for you.

CLIMATE

That may be the most important thing you do as a division commander: You have to be visible, but yet you can’t interfere. You have to be accessible. It is hard to get people to come to see you as the division commander. There is a natural reluctance. Your commanders will go to your chief of staff. He has to know that he has to get the brigade commander into the boss’s office. It works this way for a while until they learn to trust you. After you have been in command for a while, you sense when something is bothering one of your subordinate commanders. You don’t make it a big deal. I used to go out "trolling." I would jump in the HMMWV and troll through the division area. It is amazing what you can pick up by talking to soldiers. You can figure out a lot about the division.

I think the most difficult problem I had was when we were in a "have/have not" situation, or it was perceived to be this type situation. We had several tenant units. They also felt like they were outside the division looking in. They believed they were being treated differently and it was causing me some problems. We solved it through a series of sessions. We did some very simple things that seemed to make a difference. This particular unit was wearing a different patch than we were wearing. We put them all in division patches. They became a
part. It wasn't just the patch, it was also the fact that the commander got on board. Then we integrated them into the division, not only by wearing the patch but by sharing the workload and by integrating them into taking some of our support missions at the National Training Center.

Guard your schedule jealously. You decide what goes on it and don't let anybody else screw with it. Decide what you go see as the commander and then delegate the rest to others. You don't have to go to every social event. Have your Chief go to some. It might be more important for the betterment of the division. If you put out your schedule publicly, it will cease to be your schedule. It will become others schedule and they will find a thousand and one reasons why their appointment is more important than the one that is on there. So develop a routine: Don't come too early, don't stay too late, and don't have marathon meetings.

I'll also tell you that I think the higher you go, the less opportunity you have to spot a phony. People are working away. They are doing the things you want them to do, and you may not know that they are abusing some people because that doesn't always come out. There are people that we see that are getting ahead sometimes that do not do one of the things the Chief absolutely insisted upon with his six imperatives. That was to treat everyone with dignity and respect.
ETHICS

What you say to your commanders in private is important to the ethical climate.

You and your immediate subordinates set your ethical climate.

Guys who have taught ethics classes inside of units have amazed me. You demonstrate ethics pretty much by your lifestyle and personal example. You establish the ethical climate by the way you do whatever you do daily. If I go to the club, drink, and then get in my car and drive home, then turn around and tell people not to do that by invoking some sort of punishment on them -- then I have established a certain kind of ethical climate. If I treat transgressions by senior officers a certain way and similar transgressions by junior enlisted in another way, then I have set that too.

I think you also have to emphasize very strongly from the beginning your feeling on equal opportunity. You absolutely have to hue to the Army line. You can be in an all-male unit and still harass female soldiers. We're not going to put up with that.

CLIMATE

First of all the climate of the command has to be a nonthreatening environment. You cannot have people working for you that have some sort of fear about their careers or fearful
that they cannot be honest. You have to set the tone of honesty, trust and integrity.

The first thing you have to make sure is that your guidance on ethics is understood by all of your chain of command, so they know from the beginning what is expected of them. They need to hear it from the new commander. The absence of guidance can sometimes cause you a problem. I ensured that the things I valued in the officer corps and in soldiers were included in my in-briefing with the new people.

It is important that you are up front and honest. You must call the shots the way they are. As a commander you must be prepared to hear bad news whether you like it or not. You are not always going to get a rosy picture. If you get a rosy picture all the time, you better look inward. You have some problems out there that people are fearful of coming up and telling you.

I think it has to do with not only yourself as the individual setting the example, but it is an understanding that honesty and integrity are nonnegotiable. I think through openness you have to encourage leaders at all levels to tell it like it is and do what is right whether somebody is looking at him or not. It is, "not shooting the messenger." It is leaders at all levels understanding that they don’t compromise integrity and you don’t put subordinates into ethical dilemmas where they will. You
transmit messages into senior leadership level every time you are in a meeting or every time you meet somebody. Make sure you personally, your assistant division commanders, and colonels, every time they see somebody are sending the right message and the right signal. Those are the techniques.

The only time in my entire tour that I had some ethical challenges was during combat. I had not a messy problem, but larger than I would have liked with fraternization. Young soldiers living together side by side in the field and so forth. I found at one period there, even though we had stressed it all the way through our training and so forth, I had some challenges and concerns there and I finally had to call them in and go through it from language to action to try to head that off.

The division commander has to set the ethical climate within the division. He has to ensure that what he does and says is ethical. He cannot use his position to influence situations or actions that are unethical or perceived that way. Sometimes it is very difficult because people who work around a division commander want to make things happen for him and quickly. So there are great opportunities for unintentional, unethical behavior. So you must teach what is ethical and what is not ethical. Then you have to set the climate and standard for it. I discuss this at great length with battalion and brigade commanders because soldiers expect their leadership to be
ethical.

What you will find is that there are all kinds of people out there who will tear down buildings to do what you want them to do. The higher you go the more you have to be concerned that people understand unequivocally that there are certain things that you might want as a leader but cannot be accomplished. People have to feel free to come back and say, "I can't do that because it is illegal" or "If we did it, sir, it would be unethical in this regard." I don't think the Army has any senior leaders who want anybody to do anything illegal, immoral, or unethical to accomplish their objectives. I certainly do not, and you have to continuously tell your people that. It is particularly true on the community side. Your military guys are less inclined to go off and do something dumb because they think you want it. What I have found with civilians is they will go off and do it. You will find yourself in violation of some regulation because one of those civilian employees wanted to make happen what the General wanted. I continuously emphasize to the civilian side of the house that, while I may state a desire to have something done or some project accomplished, everyone is expected to come back to me if they perceive that they are being asked to do something illegal or unethical.
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

My biggest surprise was the installation and the almost consuming quality that it has on the time and resources of the leadership. The installation and the surrounding community are totally demanding of time and resources. I had just come from a division on an installation post, so I thought I understood that the installation demanded a tremendous amount from you. This particular installation is isolated and the communities around it that are totally dependent on the post itself. I was not quite prepared for the amount of energy that it and the civilian community demanded.

It takes time to learn the senior civilian leadership, to establish a dialogue with them, and to understand that they are trustworthy, caring and interested in the professional performance of their people and in how that system works. I was much more comfortable with the divisional part of it -- far less with the installation/civilian work force. It took me a long time to learn how they functioned and how to try to lead them. I should have paid more attention to it in the beginning. There were reasons why I couldn't. But if I had it to do over again and didn't have a war, I would have spent more time consciously paying attention to the installation headquarters staff and civilian workers than I did.
We need to force guys like myself to go through a course of study someplace that teaches standard organization and resource management. We assume too readily that a general who has served on similar installations understands all of that. We do not -- unless you have been an installation commander.

We have a garrison installation management course at Fort Lee. I'd say you should absolutely attend that. It will also teach you how to manage funds. I will also tell you that there is nothing like going to visit another garrison operation. See how other commanders are working on different posts and how they do business. Get some ideas from them. I think the combination of both of those are important.

A large concern still is simply the dollars and the resourcing to upgrade aging facilities. Those run from motor pools, to barracks, to swimming pools, and theaters. There is simply a maintenance and repair requirement that is of concern. You couple that with Class IX and environmental requirements that must be paid by law. Some of these bills are enormous.

Decaying infrastructure may be the most critical issue facing our Army. The infrastructure was my greatest concern. We have allowed it to decay severely. That didn’t happen to us overnight but over the last decade. It is serious stuff. It is water mains and gas lines that cost a lot to fix. They are out of
sight and out of mind, and can cause you some severe problems. You have to get the money to fix them and that is not easy. It consumes a lot of your energy. But that becomes general's business very quickly. That infrastructure runs further than the gas mains. It goes into the buildings; it goes into the barracks. We have to bring our facilities to standard. I was disappointed in the fact that we needed to do so much infrastructure work. It is a quality of life issue.

Installation management and quality of life issues have an impact on what you do. You have to organize yourself for combat in this installation management business; if you are not careful, it will consume all of your time. You will find yourself spending 75 percent of your time with installation management because you don’t understand what you are doing. If that happens to you, then you are in trouble because you are going to be spending a lot of your time away from command anyway. Then if you start devoting too much time to the installation side of the house, your division will suffer. You have to pick and choose what you are going to go for on the installation side, then make it happen. If you are spending much more than 40 percent of your time on installation matters, you aren’t doing what you were placed there to do. That is to command the division and make sure it is combat ready.

The first thing I would have them do, if they hadn’t been there,
is to attend the Installation Management Course at Fort Lee. This will get them off on the right foot. If they haven’t had installation management experience, they should talk to either serving or previous installation commanders. If you are not careful, you can do an awful lot of damage by your own ignorance.

Installation and community management will take a lot of your time as a division commander in Europe. It is important and you cannot ignore it. A division commander must know the Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) business, the club system and the Installation, Morale, Welfare and Recreation Fund (IMWRF), and the Department of Defense School System (DoDDS). He also needs schooling in the contracting business and the process whereby estimates are made. There is so much to be done that you can’t do it all. It is important to focus on the two or three things that you feel are weak, then work to improve them. Military Construction, Army (MCA) funds have not enabled our barracks to be brought up to standard; they still need work and renovation.

I was still surprised by the amount of installation matters that I personally had to get involved with as the division commander. A lot of my time is eaten up with installation matters, but I must say these are vital because they affect readiness, in its purest form, but also in terms of family satisfaction. I also discovered that paying attention to the smooth running of an installation offers real opportunity. A well run installation is
a heck of a way to save Army dollars.

I have spent a lot of my time learning the installation management and resourcing business, learning the community operations, just learning what the various directors do. I had a superficial knowledge of what they did, but I sure didn’t have an in-depth knowledge. So becoming familiar with what they did was a great challenge for me. The biggest thing we have worked and continue to work since I have been here is that, now, even today, we have soldiers living in facilities that are not up to standards, while certainly not the abominable standards that we had 10, 12, or 15 years ago.

NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS

It is a tough business that a lot of people don’t understand. It is important to the installation and quickly becomes general’s business. We are going through a tough period where we have had appropriated dollars pulled from nonappropriated fund activities. We have to get to the point where we are somewhat profitable. It is a business and has to be done business-like. There are certain activities that we have to subsidize, but we have to prioritize.

Over the years in the Army, in the interest of training and readiness, we have taken cuts in the BASOPS dollars. So the installation has not been maintained adequately. We are hurting in our motor pools and we are hurting in our barracks. That’s a
child care facilities in our communities. We have some excellent child care facilities, but they are nowhere sufficient in capacity to meet the needs of all our people. We have tried with some success to upgrade, improve, and expand. But we are still way short of what we need in that area.
METHODOLOGY

This document is a product of the "Division Command Lessons Learned Program" sponsored by the Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. All outgoing division commanders are interviewed by U.S. Army War College students during their last year of command. This provides the basic input for this program.

The interview is coordinated and questions prepared by MHI under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Headquarters, Department of the Army.

This project followed the four major steps of the Army Lesson Learned Program. Those steps are collect, process, analyze, and disseminate. Students of the Class of 1992 conducted the interviews, the collect step of the program. The process and analyze steps were done by four students of the U.S. Army War College Class of 1993. Dissemination is conducted by DCSOPS.

The four Class of 1993 students had all been battalion commanders in divisions. One was a Desert Shield/Desert Storm veteran as a battalion commander, and both light and heavy division experience was represented. The students developed their methodology for the analysis of the interviews and the lessons to be included in the final product. All general officer transcripts were analyzed by each member of the team. After analysis, each then focused on three areas and developed the detailed remarks to be included in the final document based on
the input from each team member. The team members considered the target audience and the dissemination plan for this document as the remarks were developed. They sought comments that were not obvious to those without battalion or higher level command experience; were general officer level in their depth of impact in a division; and were significant in that they appeared with regularity or were strongly emphasized in the interviews. Each student prepared three chapters and defended them to the group before the chapters were produced in their final form.

The four students possessed the expertise, experience, level of focus, and significant observer analysis skills for a project of this nature. The observers needed familiarity with the twelve general topic areas with respect to doctrine, practice, or both. The observers needed to be able to visualize the application of the doctrine in situations described by the interviewees. The observers needed to be able to visualize the non-doctrinal practices related by the generals. For example, family support, installation management, and ethics may have little or no doctrinal base; yet are critically important to division command.

As mentioned previously a major factor in the analysis process was the dissemination plan. Since this document is targeted for incoming division commanders and assistant division commanders, as well as the attendees at the brigade and battalion precommand course, the students sought comments within the previously identified criteria that would focus on the intended audience and issues at their levels of command. As a result, not
all comments made by the general officers during the interviews are included in this document. In addition, when many comments referred to the same issue only representative remarks were included.

This document forms the basis of the "Experiences in Division Command 1993" publication. It is expected to be published by DCSOPS in the summer of 1993 and distributed beginning in the fall of 1993.