WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN: THE GROWTH OF A STRATEGIST

BY

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DTIC ELECTE MAY 20 1993

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93-11193
This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist. It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who could plan and execute the Northern strategy in the last year of the war. It also focuses on specific instances of success and failure that led him to the position from which he could influence, if not actually author, the strategy followed by the Union in the last year of the war. It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affected the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies.
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WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN: THE GROWTH OF A STRATEGIST

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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April 5, 1993

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James M. Diamond, LTC, USA
TITLE: William Tecumseh Sherman: Growth of a Strategist
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 5 Apr 93 PAGES: 39 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist. It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who could plan and execute the North's strategy in the last year of the war. It also focuses on specific instances of success and failure that led him to the position from which he could influence, if not actually author, the strategy followed by the Union in the last year of the war.

It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affected the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies.
In the opening days of the American Civil War strategic thought, in the minds of many who would lead the North's forces, could be summed up in the three stirring words "On to Richmond!"

One who saw beyond that enticing but ultimately false course was William Tecumseh Sherman. How was it that Sherman, who had left the Army in 1853 and was serving as the President of the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy as the war approached, was able to see what the senior military and political leaders of the North could not?

The way Sherman perceived the coming struggle, what he thought about the ends, means, and ways with which he would labor for those four bloody, terrible years was in part based on his unique personality and in part developed over years of study, travel, and experience. Those thoughts and experiences, distilled by Sherman's quick, trenchant intellect ultimately produced a strategic vision of ways and means to achieve the military and political ends of the Union in the Civil War.

Sherman's successful collaboration with his contemporary and commander, U. S. Grant, brought the Union victories in the field and eventually victory in the war. Sherman's contributions to their efforts took many forms. He was a superb subordinate to Grant, aggressive in the field, quick in carrying out his orders and in accomplishing his missions.
He was also able, perhaps to a greater degree than Grant, to see and understand things about this war that often escaped others.

Despite his ultimate success Sherman did not appear on the field with all of the answers and all of the authority he needed to defeat the South. Indeed, he spent the first two years of the war growing, sometimes through very painful lessons, to reach his potential as a commander and strategist. But these first two years of the war were only a continuation of a lifetime of trials, growth, observation, study, and occasional failure that finally produced the Army Commander who would contribute so much to the Union victory in the Civil War.

Sherman's growth from the "tall, slim, loose jointed lad, with red hair, fair burned skin, and piercing black eyes" who left his home in Lancaster, Ohio to report to West Point in 1836 to the "master grand strategist of our Civil War" had many roots. These were divergent, wide ranging, and eclectic, but they all found a common home in the far reaching, ever hungry intellect, and exceptional energy of William Tecumseh Sherman.

This paper examines Sherman's growth as a strategic thinker and successful strategist. It explores how his life shaped him to fill the role that he did in the Civil War and what things contributed to his development into the soldier who could plan and execute the North's strategy in the last
year of the war. It focuses on specific instances of success and failure that led him to the position from which he could influence, if not actually author, the strategy followed by the Union in the last year of the war.

It also examines what Sherman brought to his relationship with Ulysses S. Grant and how that relationship affected the evolving strategy that guided the Union Army after Grant ascended to the leadership of all Union Armies.

Sherman brought many things to the Union's efforts in the Civil War. His contributions had their beginnings in his natural talent and intelligence and were shaped by training, observation, and experience. One way to view his evolution into what B. H. Liddell Hart called "a grand strategist" is that Sherman's intellect and personality were the seed from which he was to grow. The seed and all its potential was watered in his upbringing and training. It grew through his initial service in the Army and his various undertakings as a civilian. Sherman's service in the Civil War seasoned and matured him and produced the man who would have such an effect on that war and on the Army after the war.

Sherman's early life was relatively unremarkable for a boy growing up in the freedom of Ohio in the early nineteenth century. The major event of his young life was the death of his father when Sherman was nine years old. Nonetheless, his biographers write of a boy who passed his free time as any other youngster in Lancaster, Ohio might. When he was
fourteen however, his foster father Senator Thomas Ewing advised him "to prepare for West Point." Two years later Sherman arrived at West Point with little knowledge of what awaited him there. Despite his proclivity for independent, occasionally unorthodox, thought and his tendency to accumulate demerits, Sherman adapted. He applied himself to the demands of the school, and after four years was graduated sixth in his class.5

His class rank was not high enough to win entry into the coveted Corps of Engineers so he selected the Artillery as his branch of service. He joined his unit, the Third Artillery, in Florida in late 1841. He was happy with his first assignment as it gave him an opportunity for what he called "active service," in this case against the Seminole Indians who were being forcibly transplanted from Florida. The service was not as active as he would have liked, but it did offer him the opportunity to serve far away from what he described as the problems of living in "civilization."

Sherman always enjoyed duty in the more remote districts of the land. Being away from the trials of the civilized world enabled him to be outdoors, to challenge himself physically, and to expand his never satisfied hunger for knowledge, especially for geography and topography. In a letter to a friend he wrote:

Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, such as your father has at home; and as the knowledge of geography, in its minutest detail, is essential to a true military education, the idle
time necessarily spent here might be properly devoted to it. I wish therefore, you would procure for me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant.  

During his first Army career, from 1841 until his resignation in 1853, Sherman took every opportunity to explore the land where he happened to be. He described what he saw and what he learned in letters home, which disclose his exceptional appreciation of the land. He seemed to have a natural talent for seeing in terrain what others could not—a talent that was to serve him and his nation well in the future.

Subsequent assignments in Florida, Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia allowed Sherman to use what leisure time he had to explore the surrounding area and educate himself on its geography and topography. Riding, fishing and hunting were favorite outdoor pastimes, and no matter where he found himself he managed to absorb everything he could about the land over which he traveled. He also gained an understanding of the economy of the region and the ways of the people who lived there. In Charleston, South Carolina during his three years assignment at Fort Moultrie, he mingled with the city's society and learned to know and appreciate the people and society of that important Southern city.

Sherman's unquenchable thirst for knowledge continued throughout his military and civilian careers. His apparently
innate ability to think on a strategic level could very well have its basis in the stores of knowledge he accumulated from his earliest years.

This quest for knowledge appears to be based on a belief that success was at its basis a practical matter; that ends were achieved by means through ways. Sherman demonstrated throughout his life his belief that he was responsible to stockpile the means and survey the ways to achieve the ends he either was assigned or assumed.

Despite his strong desire for action in the war with Mexico he endured a stint of recruiting duty in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in the early days of the war until his transfer to California came through in 1846. Although he was hopeful of finally seeing action in California, it was not to be. After spending three years on the west coast his time there came to an end in December 1849 when he received orders to take dispatches to New York. While his time in California was fruitful to his personal development it did not give him what he wanted most, an active role in the war.

Just as Dwight D. Eisenhower would after the first great American war in the twentieth century, Sherman felt that his chances for future success in the Army had been damaged by his absence from the theater of action during the war. He conceded and later recorded:

I felt deeply that our country had passed through a foreign war, that my comrades had fought great battles, and yet I had not heard a hostile shot. Of course I
thought it the last and only chance in my day, and that my career as a soldier was at an end."

Notwithstanding his concerns for his career prospects the Army assigned him in September 1850 to Company C of the Third Artillery, commanded by Captain Braxton Bragg, at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis. Although Sherman's name had been missing from the promotion list to captain while he was in California, on September 27, 1851 he was commissioned a Captain in the Commissary Corps. He left Jefferson Barracks for St. Louis to assume his duties there.

Sherman's uncertainty about his future in the Army was compounded by the pressure he began to receive more regularly and more enthusiastically from both his wife and father-in-law to leave the Army for civilian life. His father-in-law had always seen Sherman's education at West Point as the gateway to a civilian career in engineering. As early as 1842 Sherman responded to Ellen Ewing, whom he would marry in 1850, concerning his future:

But why don't I leave the Army? you ask. Why should I? It is the profession for which my education alone fits me. ... Moreover I am content and happy, and it would be foolish to spring into the world bare handed and unprepared to meet its coldness and trials.⁶

Despite Sherman's satisfaction with being a soldier, the intimation that he would do well to choose civilian life was a recurring theme voiced by his family throughout his first military career.
He obtained a very temporary reprieve from these pressures when he was ordered from St. Louis to New Orleans to take over the Commissary there and eradicate the recently uncovered corruption in its operations. But the suggestions to pursue a civilian career and the opportunity to act on them were not far behind him.

Shortly after his family joined him in New Orleans Sherman was offered a position as a bank manager in San Francisco. After a six month leave of absence, during which he traveled to San Francisco to assess the prospects of the bank's success, he resigned from the Army on September 6, 1853 and became the manager of the San Francisco office of Lucas, Turner and Company.

Thus Sherman began what he ultimately considered a series of failures. Although he was personally successful, the institutions for which he worked fell victim to the vagaries of the banking business in the 1850s and to the panic of 1857. In a letter home in August 1857 he wrote "I seem to fall on bad times in business for I am not fairly installed before failure have begun." In 1858 and 59 he was a partner in a law firm, Sherman, Ewing, and McCook, in Leavenworth, Kansas. Although he had been admitted to the bar "on the grounds of general intelligence" he spent most of his time as a lawyer running the office and managing the firm's finances. Sherman had foreseen his life in law earlier when he wrote "If I turn lawyer, it will be bungle,
bungle from Monday to Sunday, but if it must be, so be it."... His one case career as a trial lawyer—a civil case that he lost—confirmed his expectations.

Even as late as September 1858 as he managed his father-in-law's ranch near Leavenworth, Kansas he was still struggling with his strong inclination for the Army. From Leavenworth he wrote his wife:

On the way up I met four companies under Colonel Sumner ... I spent four hours in their camp talking of old times. It makes me regret being out of the service ... but I must banish soldiering from my mind and look to the bridges and gullies and round holes of the road."

But he had never really banished soldiering from his mind. He was trained as a soldier and even though his efforts were temporarily directed toward civilian pursuits everything he experienced was filtered through his outlook as a soldier. So all of his experiences from his first military career and his various endeavors as a civilian continued to form and shape the military thoughts of William T. Sherman.

By early 1859, when he was thirty-nine years old, he made the decision to try to salvage what was left of his life and return to the Army. He applied to Major Don Carlos Buell, Adjutant General of the Army, for a position as an Army paymaster. Buell's response was that there were no openings, "that in these times everything turns on political or other influences." But Buell continued "I enclose ... a paper which presents an opening that I have been disposed to think well of." Thus, former Lieutenant of Artillery,
former Captain in the Commissary Corps, former banker, former lawyer, former ranch manager William T. Sherman learned of the new Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy which was seeking a superintendent.

Sherman's appointment as the Superintendent of the Louisiana Seminary marks an important point in his development, not only as a strategist but also as an individual. Ever since the death of his father Sherman had been influenced by, and indebted to, his foster father, and by this time his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing. Indeed, Sherman's apparent inability to settle upon a career could well have its roots in the struggle between Sherman's desire to devote himself to soldiering and the strong desire of his family, especially his father-in-law and his wife, for him to be successful in some civilian career.

His position as Superintendent brought a degree of satisfaction to both Sherman and his family. Being the Superintendent of an institution of higher learning carried with it a certain amount of prestige in the eyes of civilians. Being the Superintendent of the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy satisfied to a degree Sherman's desire for things military. So the position offered not only some satisfaction to both parties in the Sherman-Ewing family, but the challenge of building from scratch an institution of higher learning as well.
It also provided Sherman a steady income and relieved him of the day to day concerns of providing for his family of Ellen, who was at the time pregnant, and their five children. He looked forward to the tangible rewards as well as the intangible benefits of his new position. In a letter to Ellen he wrote about the place that might be their first real permanent home:

Since I left New Orleans I have felt myself oppressed by circumstances I could not control, but I begin to feel footing and will get saucy ... Therefore if Louisiana will endow this college properly, and is fool enough to give me $5,000 a year, we will drive our tent pins and pick out a magnolia under which to sleep the long sleep.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite his enthusiasm for his new position, he struggled through two more tempting offers for civilian employment\textsuperscript{16}--at more than twice the salary he drew as Superintendent of the Academy. Ultimately he chose to remain at the Academy.

Perhaps the most important part his seventeen month stay at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy played in Sherman's development as a strategist was that it enabled him to think and reflect about himself, his country, where both seemed to be headed, and what role he would play as the events he both feared and expected began to occur.

He watched with growing pessimism as the Southern states acted on the question of secession and the Federal government did not. Eventually he came to believe that war was inevitable. It was a belief he did not welcome. For from
his unique position in Louisiana he could see what many others could not. If the Federal Government could not believe that the southern states would secede, then neither could the Southerners believe that the Federal Government would stand in their way once they announced their intentions to depart from the Union. Sherman knew differently.

Sherman, almost alone, saw that the coming war would be "no pantomime of wooden swords, but a long and bitter struggle."17 His time at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy enabled him to view the calamitous events of 1859, 60, and 61 from a perspective that few, if any, others shared. Sherman was in the midst of the secession. He listened to the arguments of leading and influential citizens of the South and presented his own positions to them. He also added to his already considerable knowledge of the South, its people, and their ways.

Sherman had a practical knowledge based on first hand experience of those who would lead and those who would be led in the South as it moved inexorably toward secession and Civil War. He also had what many who welcomed the slide to war did not--a military education and years of experience built upon it. His education and experience enabled him to see clearly into the fog of the future. In December 1860 Sherman told David Boyd, a professor of languages at the Academy:

You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you
are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, and shut out from the markets of Europe by blockade as you will be, your cause will begin to wane ... if your people would but stop and think, they must see that in the end you will surely fail.\textsuperscript{16}

While Sherman could see the problem and that the South's solution to it would end in failure, he was still convinced that it would come to war. He believed strongly in the rule of law and in the Constitution of the United States. He explained in a letter to his wife why obedience to the law was critical and why he saw the actions of the South leading to civil war:

\begin{quote}
Our country has become so democratic that the mere popular opinion of any town or village rises above the law. Men have ceased to look to the constitutions and law books for their guides, but have studied popular opinions in bar rooms and village newspapers, and that was and is the law. The old women and grannies of New England, reasoning from abstract principles, must defy the constitution of the country. The people of the South, not relying on the Federal Government, must allow people to favor filibustering expeditions against the solemn treaties of the land, and everywhere from California to Maine any man could do murder, robbery, or arson if the people's prejudices lay in that direction.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Although Sherman recognized the questions plaguing the nation at the close of the 1850s were serious, he also believed that they would settle themselves if given sufficient time. His correspondence in the late 1850s and early 1860 with his brother John, then a Representative from Ohio in the U. S. Congress, show how strongly Sherman wished that the nation would allow itself the time for its problems to resolve themselves.
But the nation would not. The South possessed the same characteristics that Sherman attributed to the North shortly after the first Battle of Bull Run when he said "In the American character Hope crowds Patience to the wall."\textsuperscript{25}

If North and South had more hope than patience that the issue of secession would be settled quickly, Sherman had patience enough to wait out the opening act of the unfolding war. He made it clear to his supervisors in Louisiana that should Louisiana secede he would have to leave his post and return to the North. He expressed the same sentiment in a letter to his brother John on January 16, 1861 "You may assert that in no intent will I forego my allegiance to the United States as long as a single state is true to the old Constitution."\textsuperscript{21}

True to his word to those who employed him as Superintendent, Sherman remained until it was clear that Louisiana would join the ranks of the seceding states. When he left Louisiana he returned via Washington, D.C. to St. Louis where he took employment on April 1, 1861 as President of the 5th Avenue Railroad, a street car company.

It was in this capacity that Sherman along with the rest of the country received the news of Fort Sumter. And it was here that Sherman first showed his grasp of the enormous events that were beginning to unfold. Sherman expressed his thoughts on his role in the war in a letter to his wife's family:
I have seen enough of war not to be caught by its first glittering bait, and when I engage in this it must be with a full consciousness of its real character. I did approve of the President's call and only said that it should have been 300,000 instead of 75,000 ...22

Sherman also wrote to his brother John, who had urged him to take an active role early, about how he saw the war. "The time will come" he wrote, "when professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time."23

Despite Sherman's reluctance to take an active part in the war, he already knew how the war would have to be fought. Even from the beginning he was able to view the war strategically. He saw with a clarity that would not arrive in the rest of the North for some years what it would take to subdue the rebellion, what the end result would have to be, and how, at least in part, that result would be attained.

In several letters to his brother John he explained his thoughts. "The North must conquer the South as to impress upon the real men of the South a respect for their conquerors." Only a Regular Army, not the ninety day force that President Lincoln was then assembling, would be fit for the task. He wrote that he preferred a Regular Army command to a Militia one:

...for I have no political ambition, and have naturally more confidence in Regulars than Militia. Not that they are better, braver, or more patriotic, but because I know the people will submit with better grace to them than to Militia of any particular locality.24
Sherman's brother John recalled a visit early in the war when he was with General Patterson as a volunteer aide. There, John related, Sherman:

... met for the first time in many years, his old classmate ... George H. Thomas, who then commanded a regular regiment of the United States Army in the force under the command of General Patterson. The conversation of these two officers ... was very interesting. They got out a big map of the United States, spread it on the floor, and on their hands and knees discussed the probable salient strategic places of the war. They singled out Richmond, Vicksburg, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga. To me it had always appeared strange that they were able confidently and correctly to designate the lines of operations and strategic points of a war not yet commenced.25

For his part, Sherman later told his brother that "You of the North never fully appreciated the energy of the South. Whoever controls the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri rivers will control the continent."26

So Sherman saw clearly what would have to occur to preserve the Union. He perceived, although perhaps not in a final version, the ways in which the war would have to be fought to achieve the end. And he recognized, again probably not in a final version, what the necessary means would be to achieve the end. After the war John Sherman, by then a Senator from Ohio, said of his brother "It was his knowledge, obtained through his singular position in the South, that enabled him to judge more accurately than others the immense proportions of the coming war."27

Sherman bided his time and after turning down an offer of the chief clerkship of the War Department and an
appointment as a Brigadier General of Militia wrote to the Secretary of War:

I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightly or wrongly, I feel unwilling to take a mere private’s place, and having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place. Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most service.28

On the fourteenth of May, 1861 Sherman was appointed Colonel of a regular regiment, the 13th Infantry. Thus, twenty-one years after his graduation from West Point and eight years after his resignation from the Army as a Captain of the Commissary Corps, William Tecumseh Sherman, bearing all of the learning and experience that was uniquely his, stood poised to enter the "active service" he so long desired.

Sherman’s knowledge and experience gave him much of what he needed to form a successful strategy for a Union victory. The only thing he lacked was the self-confidence to turn his strategic thinking into action. Indeed, a report written by Sherman about Colonel Buckland, one of his brigade commanders at Shiloh, would have been an apt description of Sherman at this point of his service, for Sherman described him as "a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander."29

Sherman, almost alone among leaders of the Civil War, understated his own abilities. When he was offered positions
in the War Department he demurred because he wanted to be posted where he 'thought he could do the most good, that is, with soldiers. Ultimately it was his successes and his failures in the opening months and year of the war that finally enabled him to see what he and he alone could offer the Union in planning and fighting this war.

The beginning of the war took him to places he did not want to be and offered him both troubles and trials that would result in his growth as a soldier and a strategist, although the growth would be painful at times. His journey East, away from his 13th Infantry and into Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1861, led him to Bull Run. Bull Run enabled him to prove himself to himself as a soldier. It began the process by which his confidence in himself and his understanding of the war would eventually be solidified.

His performance at Bull Run marked him as a soldier and leader and was the first step in his growth towards his destiny. Although others had dismissed his perceptions about what the war would be like, Sherman saw his early ideas about the war realized at Bull Run. What he had thought, he now knew to be true:

... that the North and South would be reunited only after the South had laid down its arms. And the only way to achieve that end was to carry the war to the homeland -- to the lives and property of Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina.30

Sherman's success in the East brought about his promotion to Brigadier General of volunteers. It also saw
him transferred to Kentucky at the request of Brigadier General Anderson, who was being sent there to command the Department of the Cumberland. Although Sherman welcomed this change, he extracted a promise from President Lincoln not to place him in charge. Lincoln welcomed Sherman's request for employment in a subordinate capacity noting that "his chief trouble was to find places for the too many generals who wanted to be at the head of affairs, to command armies..." Nonetheless, Anderson's resignation in October 1861 due to health made Sherman Commander of the Department of the Cumberland, a position he did not want and one which caused him much trouble and grief.

Sherman's estimate that it would take sixty thousand soldiers to clear Kentucky of Confederates and two hundred thousand to win in the West resulted in allegations that he was "insane ... stark mad." It began a series of events that saw him removed from command in Kentucky, transferred to a subordinate post in the Department of the Missouri, and finally sent away on a twenty day leave to regain his "mental and physical" health.

Major General Henry W. Halleck, who commanded the Department of the Missouri, believed in Sherman's ability and defended him against the charges of insanity. After the leave of twenty days Halleck appointed Sherman to command of Benton Barracks, a training camp outside of St. Louis at the end of December 1861.
Sherman's initial foray into the mixed world of military, political, and press was painful for him personally as well as professionally. The end result was however, as was usual with Sherman, positive. He learned the "rules of the game" and would be able to use them in the future as a way to achieve his ends.

Besides being prepared by training and inclined by nature to the tasks of soldiering, Sherman was an immensely practical man. Although noted for his sometimes outspoken manner, normally his energies were focused on obtaining results. As a young officer he used his leisure time to improve his ability to perform as a soldier. As a businessman he looked to the "bottom line" as the purpose and object of his efforts. He lost none of his practicality in the Civil War.

After he returned from his sick leave he immersed himself in his duties at Benton Barracks and provided Halleck with units that were trained and ready when called upon. On February 13, 1862 Sherman was ordered to assume command at Paducah, Kentucky and from there he supported Grant's drive on Fort Donaldson and then on Corinth, Mississippi with men and supplies.

He gave Grant moral support as well. Each shipment of men or supplies came with a note of encouragement from Sherman and an offer to come to the front if he was needed.
He remained in Paducah until he assumed command of the Fifth Division of the Army of the Tennessee on March 1, 1862.

Sherman's successes at Benton Barracks and Paducah were an important turning point. His relationship with Grant and success in supporting Grant's drive on Fort Donaldson began to free him to begin thinking more and more about strategy. "His mind was functioning clearly; intense apprehension had turned into acute penetration." Sherman was beginning a new phase in his development as a warrior and strategist. Added to all of the knowledge and learning that he brought to the war was an important lesson learned in Kentucky and Missouri about not only when, but perhaps more importantly, how to speak his mind.

Sherman's role in the events surrounding the battle of Shiloh went a long way to giving him the self-confidence and experience he needed. The battle itself tested his stability. He emerged from the test victorious. His judgment and performance were vindicated and his self-confidence affirmed. He recognized that "the very object of war is to produce results by death and slaughter." But he was also able to look within and write "I am not in search of glory or fame, for I know I can take what position I choose among my peers."

While the position he chose was still one of subordinate, his thinking was that of a leader. He was disappointed that Halleck dispersed his army of 100,000 to
various tasks instead of striking a strategic blow when, after Shiloh, the Confederate Army withdrew from Corinth. He wrote later "Had he (Halleck) held his force as a unit he could have gone to Mobile or Vicksburg, or anywhere in that region, which would by one move have solved the whole Mississippi problem."  

While he was beginning to think as a leader, he was continuing to grow as one. Sherman gained an enormous amount from his experiences at Shiloh and the move to Corinth, and he continued to contribute more and more to the Union cause. Perhaps his greatest contribution at this point was in persuading Grant not to leave the Army after he had been relegated to the sinecure of "second in command" according, as Sherman said, "to some French notion."  

Sherman understood, perhaps as no other could, the depression that surrounded Grant. It was because of the way Sherman had been handled by the press that he was able to dissuade Grant from leaving. Sherman later recalled his advice to Grant:  

Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a mere newspaper assertion of 'crazy'; but that single battle had given me new life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with him that, if he went away, events would go right along, and he would be left out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident might restore him to favor and his true place. 

Fortunately for the Union, and for Sherman, Grant took his friend's advice and remained. The relationship that would be so propitious for the fortunes of the North was
forged and would not be shaken. This relationship could almost be described as symbiotic, for each brought something unique to it that the other needed to excel. Grant brought what Sherman called "a simple faith in success" that inspired Sherman and convinced him that he was not alone in his thinking about the war and how it would be won. Sherman's contribution to this relationship was his growing sense of self-confidence that led to rapid and successful operations in the field and the honest counsel upon which Grant could always rely.

Their relationship was both professional and personal and each took pains to guard the image as well as the feelings of the other. While they might (and occasionally did) disagree in developing plans, once Grant, with his "simple faith in success" made the decision, he knew he could count on Sherman's absolute support in the execution. Sherman, for his part, expressed his feelings about Grant when he later wrote:

... when you have completed your best preparations you go to battle without hesitation ... no doubts, no reserve; and I tell you that it was this that made me act with confidence. I knew that wherever I was that you thought of me, and that if I got in a tight place you would come --if alive."

Sherman's confidence in his ability to fight battles and win was now firmly fixed. But where and against whom the battles should be fought was still evolving. Sherman's knowledge of the Southern people told him that defeating their armies would not be enough to end the war. He knew
that he could defeat the rebel armies. He was confident in the abilities of his own soldiers. Of the march from Shiloh to Corinth he wrote "I esteemed it a magnificent drill, as it served for the instruction of our men in guard and picket duty, and in habituating them to our-door life..." Although he was most comfortable leading his soldiers in the field, he had to shift his focus from marching and fighting to other concerns when he was made commander of Memphis in July 1862.

The conventional wisdom of waging war accepted "the sanction that the noncombatant population, as well as private property generally, should be free of molestation except where military necessity prevailed." Sherman recognized in Memphis that the Southern civilian was as much a part of the war as was any soldier in the Southern ranks. Within his charter to garrison Memphis Sherman wanted to show its citizens that "war was terrible, and peace beautiful, that rebellion meant ruin, while obedience to law meant, in the end, prosperity." He also wanted "by a policy of justice and mercy ... (to) nurture in the citizens of Memphis a renewed loyalty to the Union." But Sherman was not interested simply in a kinder and gentler Memphis. He was still a soldier and still at war and his experiences there further developed what became his philosophy of war--war waged against the enemy on all fronts, military, economic, social, and psychological. He sent away families whose heads had gone south and seized their then
vacant buildings for the government. He attempted to regulate the cotton trade that was occurring in the city, as he knew it was aiding the war effort of the South. Since Memphis had been "a post of the Confederate Army, had been captured by the United States navy and army, and was now a military post ... there was to be no law except the law of war."45

Sherman's rule under the law of war was overruled by the political leadership on the question of his embargo on cotton. That Sherman would stop the trade in cotton showed that he understood the importance of economy to the war effort. That he accepted losing his argument with the government in Washington on the issue showed his increasing understanding of the political aspects of the conflict.

Although Sherman was willing to lead the citizens of Memphis back into the Union fold he was not willing to overlook their role, active or passive, in military actions occurring in or near the city. Besides sending away the families of those who had gone South, he responded to attacks on river traffic by destroying the town of Randolph thirty miles upstream of Memphis. He also announced that for every attack on river traffic he would expel ten families, chosen at random, from the city.

After only four months in Memphis he wrote to Grant:

We cannot change the hearts of these people of the South, but we can make war so terrible that they will realize the fact that, however brave and gallant and
devoted to their country, they are still mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war.\textsuperscript{46}

How he would make the people of the South realize that fact was becoming ever more clear to him.

Sherman's time at Memphis came to an end in December, 1862 when he departed to begin the campaign against Vicksburg. Although his stay in Memphis was relatively short, the things he learned there and the successes he enjoyed continued his evolution as a strategist. On the day he departed Memphis for the operation against Vicksburg he wrote to his brother "We must fight it out if it devastates the land and costs every cent in the North."\textsuperscript{47}

Sherman drew heavily upon Grant's "simple faith in success" even though he did not always agree with his plans. Sherman disagreed strongly with Grant's plan for the operation against Vicksburg. He would rather have gone overland from Memphis to attack Vicksburg from the east, while Grant, who had to balance military operations with political pressures, opted to use the Mississippi as the route to Vicksburg. Nevertheless, once Grant made his decision Sherman supported the plan as if it was his own.

Sherman begins the chapter in his \textit{Memoirs} on Vicksburg by writing "The campaign of 1863 resulting in the capture of Vicksburg was so important that its history has been well studied and well described in all the books treating of the civil war ..."\textsuperscript{48} Sherman himself was one of the first, if not
the first, to study the campaign well. From his study of the various attempts to capture Vicksburg came some of the last pieces that would form his strategy for the remainder of the war.

Among the lessons that Sherman took from the six month long effort to capture Vicksburg were those dealing with logistics, and the ability of an army to move without being tied to fixed lines of communications. This insight came from two incidents, one at the beginning of the campaign and one closer to the successful conclusion of it.

Grant's first attempt at Vicksburg failed because of a cavalry raid against Holly Springs that destroyed his supplies and communications and forced him to retire towards his starting point at Oxford, Mississippi. Sherman had recognized already the problems of securing a line of communication through a hostile territory, for as early as November 1861 he had written:

I have the Nashville railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it is far from safe; as soon as actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma ... all these detachments weaken the main force and endanger the whole.⁴⁹

In July 1862, upon being recalled from Holly Springs to protect the railroad through Corinth, Mississippi, he despaired "of ever protecting a railroad presenting a broad front of 100 miles from their (rebel cavalry) dashes."⁵⁰ Grant's problem at Holly Springs in early 1863 reinforced
Sherman's belief in the vulnerability of railroads as secure lines of communication.

Nevertheless, when Grant elected to cross the Mississippi south of Vicksburg, cut his communications, and strike out from Bruinsburg to Jackson, a distance of less than forty-five miles, Sherman was alarmed. He wrote to Grant urging him to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible, for this road will be jammed, and as sure as life, if you attempt to supply fifty thousand men by one single road."51

Grant then taught his subordinate and friend a lesson in logistics that Sherman would use to teach the people of the South about the ways of war. Grant explained:

I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the Army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance.52

The move from Bruinsburg to Jackson was successful without the wagon line of communications Sherman wanted to maintain and the lesson was not lost on him. As Grant moved his army west to attack General Pemberton and Vicksburg he left Sherman at Jackson to "destroy everything public not needed by us."53

Sherman's work at Jackson and his subsequent contribution to the success at Vicksburg reinforced his
respect for Grant and his own self-confidence. Upon his return to Jackson after Vicksburg had fallen he was a more mature, thoughtful, and thorough conqueror.

He was also encouraged to discern something different in Jackson's newly conquered population. The leading citizens of Jackson, "men whom Sherman knew as 'very intelligent and influential' came to him to discuss, with sad dignity, ways and means of bringing themselves and their State back into the Union." Sherman was surprised by the effect that the fall of Vicksburg had on the people, "They are subjugated," he wrote, "I even am amazed at the effect..."

Sherman was beginning to see that a key, if not the key, to winning the war was the erosion of the Southern people's faith in "a government which they now feel is unable to protect or support them." He intended to bring on this erosion of faith through what Liddell Hart called a "sense of helplessness caused by the unchecked progress of a hostile army through their country, and from the burden of its presence." This is how Sherman would have the people of the South experience the war to which their government had led them.

Between the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863 and the beginning of the Atlanta campaign in May 1864 Sherman added the final experiences and lessons to the strategy that would see him successfully through the end of the war.
In the months between Vicksburg's fall and the opening of the Atlanta campaign Sherman and his soldiers were occupied by three major events. In October he was notified of his promotion to be the Commander of the Army of the Tennessee as he led his soldiers eastward through northern Mississippi and Alabama to Chattanooga where Union forces were facing Braxton Bragg and his fifty thousand soldiers. The move to Chattanooga was a trying one for Sherman. He was inching his way along, repairing the railroad as he went and dragging along with him supply wagons to relieve the starving Union troops trapped by Bragg against the Tennessee River.

On the twenty-seventh of October Sherman received a message from Grant to "drop all work, hurry eastward with all possible dispatch to Bridgeport."\(^5\)\(^8\) There was going to be a battle at Chattanooga! Had Sherman been traveling as lightly as he wished he would have covered the one hundred and fifteen straight line miles in far less time than the thirteen days it took him. As it was, the journey merely reinforced for him the wisdom of his ideas about traveling fast and light and, instead of repairing and protecting railroads, "moving, devastating, piling on the blows thick and fast."\(^5\)\(^9\)

Sherman was not to pile on blows thick and fast to his satisfaction just yet. He and his army played a role in driving Bragg away from Chattanooga. His next mission grew out of the message Grant received after the battle.
President Lincoln wired Grant congratulations after the battle, "Well done. Many thanks. Remember Burnside." Grant responded by dispatching a corps under General Gordon Granger to rescue Burnside's soldiers at Knoxville, but almost immediately recalled them and gave the mission to the quick marching Sherman.

Despite Sherman's objections to operating in eastern Tennessee he rapidly marched his soldiers the eighty-five miles to Knoxville. When his cavalry entered the city on December 3d, they found not a starving army but a comfortable garrison basking in its recent victory over the Confederates under Longstreet. Sherman stopped his westerners, many of whom had made the march from Chattanooga to Knoxville in cowhide moccasins because they had walked through their boots, fifteen miles outside of Knoxville. Sherman's next march was back to Bridgeport, where he put his army into winter quarters and then departed to Ohio for a short leave.

Even while on leave for an infrequent visit with his family Sherman's mind was ever on the war. He wrote to his brother John "The Army of the Confederacy is the South, and they still hope to worry us out ... We must hammer away and show such resistance, such bottom that even that slender hope will fail them." Yet in the same letter he admitted "We can hardly fashion out the next campaign."

For the next campaign, wherever it would be, Grant wanted the twenty thousand veterans who were employed in
garrisons along the Mississippi to join his ranks. Sherman was uncomfortable with this because the Mississippi was once again suffering the assaults of guerrillas on its traffic. The Mississippi was key to Sherman. He expressed his thoughts about it to General Logan:

To secure the safety of the navigation of the Mississippi River I would slay millions. On that point I am not only insane, but mad ... Fortunately the great West is with me there. I think I see one or two quick blows that will astonish the natives of the South and will convince them that, though to stand behind a big cottonwood and shoot at a passing boat is good sport and safe, it may still reach and kill their friends and families hundreds of miles off. For every bullet shot at a steamboat, I would shoot a thousand 30-pounder Parrotts into even helpless towns on Red, Ouachita, Yazoo or wherever a boat can float or soldier march. Well, I think that in all January and part of February I can do something in this line.62

What he did was to cripple the guerrillas by destroying Meridian, Mississippi, a guerrilla base and supply point, along with its railroads and arsenal. Sherman's march on Meridian was not a repeat of his move to Chattanooga. His instructions for the march stated:

This expedition is one of celerity, and all things must tend to that ... not a tent, from the commander-in-chief down, will be carried. The sick will be left behind, and the surgeons can find houses and sheds for all hospital purposes.63

If Sherman was not in "high feather" he was at least inspired by the opportunity to begin to "pile on the blows quick and fast."

Although his plan for the march on Meridian wasn't completely successful in execution--his cavalry under General
Sooy Smith was defeated by Forrest and never joined him at Meridian--it was completely successful in its effects. Sherman moved his soldiers in two columns, confused the Southern General Polk as to his intended objective and caused Polk to scatter his forces between Meridian and Mobile. Sherman's soldiers then took Meridian, as Lewis wrote, "Almost without the firing of a shot."^64

Sherman's soldiers burned Meridian's cache of supplies and arms along with gristmills and two large hotels. They also destroyed the railroads for twenty five miles in all directions. But the true effects of their raid began as the destruction ended. The reaction to his raid began to spread through the South. Sherman's strategy to take the war to the very hearts of the Southern people was beginning to have an effect.

In a message he sent to his subordinates Sherman told the residents of the South what they faced if they continued the war. In a paper to be read to civilians he wrote:

> If they want eternal war, well and good, we accept the issue ... A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequence. Many, many people with less pertinacity have been wiped out of national existence." He finished his message by telling the people "to those who submit to rightful law and authority, all gentleness and forbearance; but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better."^65

Sherman's evolution from the lad who entered West Point to the grand strategist who would devastate the South was
almost complete. He shared with his wife his anticipation of the spring campaign with Grant "if we can't whip Jo [sic] Johnston, we will know the reason why." He was right. He would whip Johnston, but not with Grant.

Grant's summons to Washington, D.C. and command of all the Union armies arrived in early March. Grant immediately informed Sherman. Sherman responded by urging Grant vigorously to command from the West. But it was not to be. Grant knew that the Union forces in the West were up to the work that remained. He also knew that he would have to command the Union forces in the East. The strategy that would coordinate the actions of these forces--West and East--and bring the Civil War to an end was still in the minds of these two Western Generals who had campaigned and fought so well together. There was little time remaining before Grant must depart.

Before he departed for Washington Grant asked Sherman to accompany him as far as Cincinnati. They could spend the time enroute talking and planning. There is no record of the time the two spent together on the journey east. Lewis wrote that "The railroad train rattled so loudly that they fell silent." Whether or not they planned on the train, their final planning session occurred in the Burnet House in Cincinnati. Here the two, alone with their maps, thoughts, experiences, and strategic visions, charted the remainder of the war.
When the conference ended the two generals "grasping one another firmly by the hand, separated, one to the east, the other to the west, each to strike at the same instant his half of the ponderous death blow." 66

Although no notes or records exist of the time at Burnet House, we know that when it was over Sherman told his wife "with the spring campaign the real war would begin. All that had gone before had been mere skirmishing." 69 Other than that we must rely on Sherman's recollections many years after the war had ended:

Yonder began the campaign ... we finally settled on a plan. He was to go for Lee and I was to go for Joe Johnston. That was his plan. No routes prescribed ... It was the beginning of the end as Grant and I foresaw right here ... 70

What Sherman and Grant saw was a coordinated attack on what today is called the "Center of Gravity" of the South. They both recognized that the one thing that kept the hopes of the Southern people alive was the existence of their armies. Sherman's vision of war went beyond the simple defeat of Joe Johnston in the field. He did not only mean to defeat Johnston and his Army. He meant to do it in a way that would devastate the South and her people and utterly destroy their will and ability to continue the struggle.

Sherman had learned from his seasoning in his first army career, from his years as a civilian, and from everything that he experienced from the opening days of the war forward what it would take to win. It was what he learned and how it
shaped his vision that made his part of the last great campaign more than just a military movement. His campaign was a political as well as military maneuver. Its objectives were every facet of the South's war effort, military, social, economic, and psychological. He aimed to destroy not only the South's army, its railroads, and its granaries; he aimed to crush its morale, its very willingness, to continue to make war.

Sherman, in his growth to strategist, earned many titles. To his soldiers he was Uncle Billy. To the press he was crazy. To the South he was a marauder, an arsonist, a looter and worse. His biographers call him "The Fighting Prophet", "Soldier, Realist, American", "The Merchant of Terror", and "The Advocate of Peace." Coulter, a scholar often accused of pro-Southern sympathies in his works, said of him "it was the great American god of efficiency which Sherman was serving." 71

It was that god of efficiency that enabled Sherman to see the hard road that would lead to peace. It was his personality, his experience, and his willingness to abandon the orthodox in order to gain success that gave him the vision to see that the "legitimate object of war (is) a more perfect peace." 72

Finally, it was his firm belief that the best way to achieve that object was to wage war so harshly, so efficiently, that the entire enemy population--its army, its
people, its economy, its very social fiber--felt what he called the hard hand of war and would be ready, even eager, to give up war for the beauties of peace. These experiences and beliefs enabled Sherman to combine with Grant to plan and execute the campaign that would carry the war to the homeland of the South and finally, after four years of terrible struggle, defeat the armies and the people of the South.
Endnotes

2Ibid., 65.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., 2. Sherman's father died in 1829 when Sherman was nine years old. Thomas Ewing took the youngster in and in Sherman's own words "ever after treated me as his own son."
5Sherman's academic standing was fourth; he stood sixth overall because of his total demerits.
6S. M. Bowman, & R. B. Irwin, Sherman and His Campaigns (New York: Charles B. Richardson, 1865), 17.
7Reference mislaid.
9Ibid., 19.
10Ibid., 149.
12Ibid., 153.
13Ibid., 156.
15Howe, Home Letters, 177.
16Sherman, Memoirs, 1095. Sherman was offered a banking position in London twice, once in 1859 and again in 1860. He studied both offers closely but ultimately chose to remain in Louisiana.
17Bowman & Irwin, Sherman and His Campaigns, 24.
19Vetter, Sherman: Merchant of Terror. Advocate of Peace, 66.
20Bowman & Irwin, Sherman and His Campaigns, 28.
23Thorndike, The Sherman Letters, 111.
26Thorndike, The Sherman Letters, 133.
27Ibid., 88.
28Sherman, Memoirs, 189.
29Ibid., 261.
30Vetter, Sherman: Merchant of Terror. Advocate of Peace, 87.
32Ibid., 1098. The Cincinnati Commercial took advantage of many opportunities to malign Sherman throughout the early stages of the war. His attitude toward the press in general and the Commercial in particular was less than amicable.
34Ibid., 212.
39Ibid., 276.
42Vetter, *Sherman: Merchant of Terror. Advocate of Peace*, 128-129
43Ibid., 130.
44Ibid.
49Ibid., 227.
50Ibid., 228.
52Ibid.
54Ibid., 296.
59Ibid., 312.
61Ibid., 218.
64Ibid., 333.
66Ibid., 342.
67Ibid., 345.
68Bowman & Irwin, *Sherman and His Campaigns*, 158.
Vetter says that Coulter is a scholar often accused of pro-Southern sympathies in his works.
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