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ARMY RESERVE MOBILIZATION: 
THE PERSONNEL 
LESSONS NOT LEARNED 
FROM DESERT SHIELD/STORM 

BY

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In 1990, in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Army mobilized nearly 150,000 Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers. The overall success of the mobilization, especially the success of the Combat Service and Combat Service Support units, and the overwhelming victory in DESERT SHIELD/STORM has resulted in a failure to fully appreciate why and how the mobilization worked. As a result, future military strategy of the US is being at least partially based on principles that require a quick response projected from the Continental US by rapidly deploying significant forces (to include significant Reserve forces) on short notice. Unfortunately, changes that have taken place since the conclusion of DESERT STORM raise doubts about the assumption that the Army can mobilize the force as it did during DESERT SHIELD. Such changes include the virtual elimination of the Continental Army Area Personnel and Logistics staffs, the activation of the US Army Reserve Command, the closure of numerous bases and installations, and substantial structure cuts. This study examines the reasons that mobilization during DESERT SHIELD/STORM was successful and why such a mobilization in the future may be impossible to replicate. It focuses on the Army Reserve and does not include the Army National Guard, although many of the lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD/STORM may apply to both the Reserve and Guard. The study concludes by making recommendations that, if enacted, will improve the Army's ability to rapidly and effectively mobilize Reserve forces in the future.
ARMY RESERVE MOBILIZATION.
THE PERSONNEL LESSONS NOT LEARNED FROM DESERT SHIELD/STORM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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In 1990, in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Army mobilized nearly 150,000 Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers. The overall success of the mobilization, especially the success of the Combat Service and Combat Service Support units, and the overwhelming victory in DESERT SHIELD/STORM has resulted in a failure to fully appreciate why and how the mobilization worked. As a result, future military strategy of the US is being at least partially based on principles that require a quick response projected from the Continental US by rapidly deploying significant forces (to include significant Reserve forces) on short notice. Unfortunately, changes that have taken place since the conclusion of DESERT STORM raise doubts about the assumption that the Army can mobilize the force as it did during DESERT SHIELD. Such changes include the virtual elimination of the Continental Army Area Personnel and Logistics staffs, the activation of the US Army Reserve Command, the closure of numerous bases and installations, and substantial structure cuts. This study examines the reasons that mobilization during DESERT SHIELD/STORM was successful and why such a mobilization in the future may be impossible to replicate. It focuses on the Army Reserve and does not include the Army National Guard, although many of the lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD/STORM may apply to both the Reserve and Guard. The study concludes by making recommendations that, if enacted, will improve the Army's ability to rapidly and effectively mobilize Reserve forces in the future.
Introduction

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 seriously tested the Total Army policy. DESERT SHIELD/STORM produced many spectacular success stories. Certainly one of them was the ability of the Army Reserve (USAR) to perform well in support of the Active Component (AC). Forces Command mobilized 1038 Reserve Component (RC - Reserve and Guard) units and 123,400 soldiers in support of operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM (ODS/S). Additionally, 22,000 Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) were called to active duty. The various Army Area Commands (CONUSAs) were able to deploy units on time with necessary personnel, training and equipment to perform their wartime missions. The recently released Rand report concluded that "the Reserves were available and reported promptly when called... Further, the Reserve combat support and combat service support units required relatively little post-mobilization training to be ready for deployment." 1 Although that statement pertains to both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Army Reserve (USAR) combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, for the purposes of this paper, all references to the Reserve pertain only to the USAR unless otherwise specified.

The euphoria of great success in war creates a particularly dangerous situation if it results in lack of understanding of underlying weaknesses or a failure to appreciate deficiencies. In the success of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, what has been lost is how the force was actually mobilized and why the mobilization was successful. This in turn has resulted in a blind spot that is being overlooked by the Army as it grapples with more pressing political, budgetary and structural issues. Unfortunately, failure to recognize how the force was mobilized and the changes that have occurred since DESERT STORM
may have resulted in a false assumption that is now forming the basis of US military strategy. Based on the DESERT SHIELD/STORM experience, the assumption is being made that the US can rapidly deploy substantial CONUS based forces in response to single or multiple threats.

In a recent statement regarding roles and missions of the military, Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, drew the following conclusion: "During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, 14,000 Army Guardmembers and Army Reservists were activated during the first 30 days after the President initially exercised his Reserve call-up authority. The experience of all of the military services during the Persian Gulf War indicate that National Guardmembers and Reservists can be activated and deployed on short notice in much larger numbers than called for in current Army plans." This assertion may be correct, but it is based on results produced in very specific circumstances. It seems to ignore shortcomings that were evident during the mobilization and it disregards the changes that have taken place since DESERT STORM.

The assumption by civilian authorities that the Army Reserve can be deployed on short notice and in larger numbers is highly suspect when considering projected structure cuts. Yet this assumption is now becoming the cornerstone of our post Cold War strategy. It is being used by Congress as well as the Army to support the concept that this nation can reduce forward AC presence and can project adequate power from CONUS by quickly and massively mobilizing USAR and ARNG forces. The Department of Defense operational definition of Total Force Policy as cited by the Senate Armed Services Committee is as follows:
"It is the policy to place maximum reliance on Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployment or sea duty, training requirements, and to support the rotation base. Above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a cost-effective basis." 3

Lost in this concept is the fact that mobilizing the USAR requires resources and a support system that do not exist and will be impossible to create on very short notice. As the drawdown continues, the Army will be less capable of mobilizing the force than it was in 1990. But given US national military strategy, the requirement to quickly mobilize will increase. To understand why the Army is becoming increasingly incapable of mobilizing the USAR, it is necessary to review the personnel lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD/STORM (ODS/S) in greater detail.

Lessons Learned

Although the force was successfully mobilized for ODS/S, it was not without extraordinary effort and the creativity of soldiers who developed ad hoc solutions to serious system deficiencies. It should also be remembered that there were two very important factors that contributed to a successful mobilization. The first of these was that the mobilization progressed at a sustainable rate. Initial reluctance by the President to call the Reserves coupled with the lack of strategic lift meant that unit arrivals at the mobilization stations and subsequent unit deployments could be paced. Enclosure 1 depicts in graph form the progression of the call-up. In the future, given anticipated increased reliance on the USAR and ARNG, the slope of the curve is likely to be much steeper. As lift capability is increased, the pace of the mobilization can be accelerated. However, at some point, given the time
requirements for mobilization and deployment, it will likely be more cost effective to increase funding for USAR readiness rather than lift capacity.

The second factor influencing ODS/S mobilization was the availability of substantial forces prior to the "build-down." The CONUSA staffs were in place, for example, and there had been relatively few cuts in installation support or TDA structure. At the beginning of the Gulf War, a large AC force of 16 divisions with supporting elements existed due to projected global requirements and forward deployed forces. Although the Army had begun to make limited cuts and "quick fix" assets had been eliminated, the legacy of the 80's provided ample response capacity. However, we will not likely be able to duplicate that situation or manage a call-up in the same way given the current political, military and budget realities.

In a Department of Army after action report consolidating mobilization lessons learned from ODS/S, it was concluded that although the "azimuth is correct, there continue to be problems that must be resolved to enable the downsized Army to meet future threats to national security." Three general problems identified were the inability to access the IRR (part of USAR) early, the degradation of late mobilizing units due to cross-leveling and the lack of a common data base. These three problems are highly interrelated. The hesitancy to declare a Partial Mobilization contributed to the need to use volunteers early in the process and to fill early deploying units with soldiers from later mobilizing and deploying units. Significant cross-leveling contributed to accountability problems that were made more difficult by having at least three different automated personnel systems.

The primary lesson "learned," but not fully appreciated or understood in ODS/S, is that for the USAR and the mobilization stations it was a "personnel" war. It was a personnel war in which the primary and almost exclu-
sive focus of the Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs), troop units, Readiness Groups (RG), CONUSA staffs and installations was on getting individual soldiers ready to deploy in the right slots by MOS and grade (MOS qualified). As a "war stopper," the personnel qualification issue was the most significant aspect of "validation" (especially for medical units) and continued from the time a unit was identified as a possible mobilization asset to the time it actually deployed.

The situation during DESERT SHIELD was further complicated by the fact that FORMDEPS (FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-1) did not anticipate a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up or a Partial Mobilization as defined in enclosure 2. It dealt only with Full or Total Mobilization. Consequently, the responsibilities for mobilizing units were not clearly delineated. The result was that Active and Reserve staffs quickly developed a modus operandi that asked a series of questions when confronting an issue: Is it in the spirit or intent of Army regulations, will it work or produce desired results and does it make sense? In effect, the entire Army structure mobilized the force using an ad hoc system built around available assets and existing capabilities. The initial absolute priority for combat units also contributed to the development of the ad hoc system since much of the support structure was not initially called-up. The development of an ad hoc system that partially abandoned Army doctrine as delineated in FORMDEPS contributed to an incomplete view of how the force was actually mobilized. It failed to fully appreciate the critical mobilization role played by CONUSA and ARCOM staffs.

Nevertheless, significant observations documented in after action reports from Department of the Army, Major US Army Commands (MUSARCs) and various mobilization stations documented fundamental
deficiencies experienced, if not fully appreciated, during the ODS/S mobilization. The most consistent and important of these deficiencies are discussed below.


Cross-leveling is the moving of a soldier from one unit to another to improve readiness of the receiving unit. Data from the US Army Reserve Command indicates that 28 to 33 percent of the force needed to be cross-leveled. Nearly all of it was done at the ARCOM level under the direction of the CONUSAs. The CONUSAs provided a global picture and had the authority to cross-level between ARCOMs. The Rand study noted that one of the keys to reported CS/CSS readiness was the extensive cross-leveling that occurred at home station and even before units were called-up. It was further noted that although lack of individual personal preparation (Soldier Readiness Programs [SRP], not training) did not detract from overall readiness, it was due in large part to the "tremendous effort" made to insure individuals were deployable prior to movement to the mobilization station and the time typically available at the installations to correct problems. The fact that the overall non-deployment rate was about 7 percent for both the AC and USAR attests to the fact that significant cross-leveling was required by MUSARCs to validate units.

Cross-leveling prior to arrival at the mobilization station became a significant issue for four fundamental reasons. First, due to the very nature of the mobilization, units arrived at the mobilization station in a phased schedule over a several month period. The limited call-up resulted in mobilization stations receiving different types of units (medical, transportation, graves registration, maintenance etc.) in sequence rather than con-
Currently, this did not provide a broad enough base for effective cross-leveling at the mobilization stations. Consequently, the likelihood of having excess soldiers with MOSs that could be used by another unit was only coincidental. This meant that in reality the MUSARCs were the only place that effective cross-leveling could be accomplished given their pool of potentially available soldiers in non-mobilized units.

Secondly, the availability of deployable soldiers with hard skill critical MOSs quickly became a serious issue. This was demonstrated by the fact that in most Army areas virtually every 91C (practical nurse) was called to active duty. Complicating this situation was the initial use of volunteers which caused vacancies in units that subsequently deployed. Also, the CONUSAs provided most ARCOMs with substantial lists of units that “might” be mobilized. Since Forces Command (FORSCOM) had no real time information on the readiness of units once the mobilization started, it was logical to identify possible units and ask for status reports. However, this immediately created a dilemma for ARCOM commanders who wanted mobilized units to validate at the mobilization stations but didn’t want to break follow-on units in the process. The logical response at that level of command was to pre-validate soldiers and units prior to movement. Unfortunately, the negative consequence of pre-validation was substantial duplication of effort in verifying the personal readiness of soldiers.

Thirdly, for the most part, installations were not disciplined enough to cross-level even those AC or Reserve assets available to them. FORSCOM did a good job of cross-leveling between installations where possible, but cross-leveling between AC units tended to become a political issue requiring command group intervention at some major mobilization stations. Added to this was a hesitancy to fully integrate AC and Reserve assets by assigning AC...
soldiers to USAR units. If the ARCOMs had not pre-validated units, the system would have quickly broken down given the large volume of required cross-leveling and the lack of an adequate installation support base. This was especially true for medical units with critical doctor and nurse shortages.

Lastly, ODS/S marked the first use of presidential authority under Title 10 USC 673b. This authority did not provide early access to the IRR (enclosure 2). The late use of the IRR meant that the Troop Program Units (TPUs) were the only available pool from which to fill mobilizing units. Although initially an exception to policy, filling shortages from other "later deploying" or non-mobilizing units eventually became an Army de facto policy. Ultimately, many ARCOMs continued to provide "fillers" for units already at the mobilization stations as well as for units mobilizing in other ARCOM areas.

On the other hand, it should not be assumed that if the IRR had been used earlier that such problems would necessarily be eliminated. Soldiers needed in the TPUs with critical MOS skills are not necessarily found in the IRR in significant numbers. Many IRR soldiers have come from the AC. The AC is predominantly combat arms while the USAR is predominantly CS and CSS units. Tankers and infantrymen will not provide much immediate help in filling medical, personnel, maintenance, engineering and transporation shortages. This MOS mismatch will increase as the reduction in AC structure results in the Army keeping combat forces at the expense of CS, CSS and TDA structure. As a result, if changes are not instituted, the TPUs will be the primary reinforcement and reconstitution pool of the future for CS and CSS support.
Cross-leveling is likely to be a significant future requirement for three reasons. First, given the current threat assessment, it is likely that future mobilizations will be in response to regional conflicts or emergencies and will be "tailored" 200K call-ups or Partial Mobilizations. Second, given base closures, the USAR will likely mobilize units at installations with no access to Army systems. This happened in numerous instances during ODS/S and will likely be a larger potential requirement after the various Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) packages are implemented. Third, the USAR is likely to continue to experience personnel readiness problems due to personnel turnover, recruiting programs (such as the split option) that make a soldiers non-deployable assets and the lack of school seats for hard skill MOSs. The USAR Independent Commission underscored the potential problem. It verified that personnel readiness (65 percent MOS qualified) was the greatest single factor contributing to low overall readiness in the USAR thereby contributing to the cross-leveling problem.  

2. Automation:

Another serious problem encountered by the MUSARC and CONUSA staffs was that SIDPERS did not adequately support mobilization requirements. The biggest problem was that SIDPERS is not a "real time" system. It didn't allow for timely or customized reporting to meet mobilization and management requirements. Given two week up-date cycles, once the MUSARCs began to cross-level and "scrub" units, SIDPERS became highly inaccurate, not only for the identified unit but other units as well. In some ARCOMs, nearly 2000 soldiers had to be cross-leveled prior to units moving to the mobilization stations. Consequently, the ARCOMs or the CONUSAs (depending on the system developed) became the only headquarters with an
accurate picture of unit readiness. Once cross-leveling started at unit home stations, only the local systems developed by the ARCOMs and CONUSAs had accurate data. Department of Army and FORSCOM could no longer use Army automated systems to provide accurate information on unit readiness.

The necessity for an accurate mobilization data base was solved by the creation of "work around" or ad hoc systems at CONUSA, installation or ARCOM level. First Army, for example, downloaded the SIDPERS data base into local personal computers (PCs). This system was then used to track non-deployables and excess soldiers. As cross-leveling occurred, orders were used to up-date the local system. The main SIDPERS data base was up-dated at the same time. The Mobilization Cross Leveling (MCL) system, used by Department of Army to cross-level between mobilization stations, was used as units arrived as an initial verification of current unit status.

In the Sixth Army area, this problem was solved at the ARCOM level (124th and 63rd) by developing a "Mobilization System" also using personal computers. The system consisted of a PERSONNEL data base (mirroring SIDPERS but real time), an MTOE/TDA data base, and a PAYROLL data base. These data bases were continually up-dated and were used to perform MOS searches and cross-leveling of personnel. They include publishing the assignment orders, unit order annexes, manifests and mailing labels.

At the installation level, the MCL was often used as a starting point but local systems had to be relied upon to maintain accountability. Ft Hood used its Installation Processing System (IPS). This system reflected SIDPERS data but was a real-time system. Using orders provided by Troop Program Units' advance parties, data was loaded prior to unit arrival at the mobilization station. This system was compared to the Reserve Personnel File at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). Changes were worked by
exception. The success of this system depended upon the extent of the changes made at home station.

On the other hand, the SIDPERS system worked fairly well in some instances due to a specific set of circumstances. The 90th ARCOM is an example of a MUSARC that mobilized approximately 3000 soldiers and 28 units. It did not experience serious accuracy problems by virtue of being co-located with Fifth Army HQ and the SIDPERS Interface Branch which allowed for continual up-dating of the system. Orders could be processed in a matter of hours. But despite the success of such local solutions in mobilizing the force, in the final analysis these were ad hoc systems and today CONUSA access to SIDPERS no longer exists as it did during ODS/S.

Since the end of ODS/S, the personnel and logistics functions have been transferred to the new US Army Reserve Command (USARC). Although the USARC currently has the software capability to download SIDPERS data into PCs, it doesn’t have adequate hardware to support a significant mobilization such as a 200K call-up. Nevertheless, the USARC system can identify personnel by MOS and geographic area who are excess and are non-deployable. These individuals can then be "withdrawn" from their respective unit. Orders can be cut automatically and SIDPERS updated. This system has supported limited mobilization requirements for Somalia. With adequate Manning and equipment, it could support at least a 200K or Partial Mobilization. But, again, this is a "work around" system.

The problem at this point is that the MCL system has been eliminated by Department of Army with nothing to take its place. The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) is currently being fielded to provide support for the USAR and to ultimately replace SIDPERS USAR. Unfortunately, RCAS does not provide a solution because this type of function
(mobilization) is not part of the functional description. RCAS may actually make the situation worse. Compared to SIDPERS, RCAS is an upside down system when using it to mobilize the force. As currently designed, the higher the level in the chain of command, the less access will be available. Maximum ability to access and change data will be at the unit level.

Although suitable for personnel administration and management at the unit level, the system is currently not well suited for managing mobilization. Also, it does not provide particularly good quality control capabilities.

Despite current system limitations, RCAS is projected to be able to feed up-dated personnel and assignment information to SIDPERS. However, access to unit data by the USARC and the MUSARCs (either roll-up or visibility), is an important issue and has been identified as a failing of the RCAS as presented by the vendor. Consequently, system development and fielding has been delayed by at least four months. Furthermore, given current budget constraints, the fielding of the total system will not be complete for another four years. Since the cross-leveling aspect of the system is currently in the design state, it's not possible to assess how RCAS will support that effort and at what command level it can be accomplished. Also, since SIDPERS remains operational and the current USARC mobilization system will not interface with RCAS, the MUSARCs will have to find a way to work through the USARC system. However, even if successful, this will provide no visibility or accountability for IRR personnel which was a serious deficiency during ODS/S. As a result, despite the fielding of RCAS, the Total Army has no automated mobilization system at the current time.
3. Installation Augmentation:

Augmentation of the mobilization installations by Guard and Reserve units varied considerably between installations and Army Areas. There are multiple issues to be considered in a future mobilization. For example, many Class I installations are being closed as a consequence of BRAC, especially in the northeast part of the US. Consequently, posts and installations will have to be used that are not staffed to accommodate mobilization requirements and provide no access to Army automated systems. Examples of posts with potential problems are Forts Chaffee, Picket, McCoy, Hunter-Liggett and Camp Parks. Mobilizing units at these installations will require support to be provided by the RC and possibly readiness Groups (validation). There is also a serious question of how to build base support infrastructure when funds to do so are not likely to be available.

Experience during ODS/S demonstrated that some installations such as Ft. Bragg and Ft. Hood were essentially self-sufficient, while others required augmentation by Reserve units, especially in such areas as personnel, finance, medical, dental, and transportation. At a number of installations, Guard Personnel Service Companies (PSCs) provided direct support for processing USAR and ARNG personnel through Soldier Readiness Programs (SRP) during mobilization and demobilization and in maintaining Reserve records. Even at those installations that did not require significant augmentation, organic assets had to be diverted to support mobilization efforts. At Ft. Hood, for example, "Stop Movement" and "Stop Loss" policies allowed the installation to strip the Levy and Movement section from the Active PSC. This consisted initially of 50 military and 20 civilians who were used to support SRP processing.
There was little augmentation of installations in some Army areas, due in large part to Reserve manpower ceiling limits that precluded calling-up support units until after the January 19th Partial Mobilization. The result was that units such as the Garrison units and the Personnel Replacement Battalion headquarters were not activated despite a need for them. Installations (Active Component) tended to use non-deployable soldiers to staff various functions. However, there was a significant requirement for certain types of specialized augmentation at some installations regardless of Garrison unit activation or the number of non-deployable soldiers available.

An example of a significant mobilization augmentation requirement at the installations was the increased capacity needed to conduct dental exams and provide appropriate restorative work. Not only are dental assets and facilities limited, but ODS/S indicated that USAR and ARNG soldiers have a significantly higher percentage of Class III (non-deployable) dental problems than does the AC. In fact, 29,000 of the soldiers mobilized for ODS/S were found to have Class III problems requiring substantial treatment to correct a condition likely to cause a dental emergency within 12 months.14 At some installations, the problem was worse than others. At Ft. Jackson, 47 percent of the soldiers had Class III dental problems.15 The Ft. Sam Houston Dental Clinic had to work three eight hour shifts per day in order to meet minimal requirements necessary to make soldiers deployable. This was accomplished only with the help of Reserve dental units that augmented the AC staff. Even at that, facilities (office space and chairs) were insufficient to meet the demand.

The dental problem with the Reserve is aggravated by two factors. One is that the Reserve soldier receives a physical every four years as opposed to the AC soldier who receives a dental check every year. Second,
the AC soldier has access to dental care whereas the Reserve soldier in many cases has no access because he or she can't afford dental health insurance. This situation is not likely to change until the US develops universal health care. In the meantime, the problem remains. In fact, the problem will be increased since the AC Dental Corps is being reduced by 27 percent. If the USAR experiences dental cuts as well, the Army will find itself faced with a serious dilemma during the next mobilization. Furthermore, with the reduction in the number of AC installations, the USAR will likely have to mobilize at installations with no organic dental capability. This is only one issue among many that must be solved at the installation level.

4. Records:

Maintenance of personnel (201 files), medical and dental records was a problem throughout the Army. Although units were directed to take records to the installation and store them, in many cases there were no provisions made or resources available to maintain the records of Reserve service members whose units had deployed. Some installations decided early in the mobilization process to keep them at the installation. Ft. Lewis, for example, established a separate Reserve records storage area. Unfortunately, the installation did not have personnel available to maintain the records of USAR units deploying through Ft. Lewis. As a result, the parent MUSARCs were asked to provide personnel and financial support for that purpose.

First Army, on the other hand, ultimately sent a team to all mobilization stations to retrieve the records and return them to home station or parent MUSARC. In other Army areas the records remained at the installation through which the unit deployed. In many cases, mobilized National
Guard PSCs did an excellent job of maintaining such records. Unfortunately, the failure to mobilize the Army Reserve Garrisons precluded the USAR from performing in a similar manner.

As a result of the various procedures adopted by MUSARCs and installations, records were misplaced, shipped to the wrong locations or simply left in boxes. Some were maintained by the AC which resulted in Reserve documents being erroneously destroyed. The proper maintenance and accountability of records is a very serious issue given casualty reporting requirements and the current USAR enlisted promotion system that requires record reviews. It was a potential disaster during DESERT STORM since the Army lost track of soldiers in some cases once units and soldiers arrived in theater and cross-leveling occurred. This was a particular problem for soldiers mobilized from the IRR. Fortunately, the system was not seriously tested. The joke in Desert Storm was that the last thing you tell your buddy in the foxhole before you die is what mobilization station you deployed through. In a scene reminiscent of the Civil War, just prior to battle, ODS/S soldiers should have written the name of their mobilization station above their names on their BDUs thereby insuring proper casualty notification.

Department of Army staff is currently proposing that the records remain at home station. Instead of sending the record to the installation, a temporary data record (TDA) would be created in SIDPERS. This solution seems to make sense, but it will require resourcing either the installations or the ARCOMs to provide records teams staffed by personnel knowledgeable of USAR policy and procedures (such as a PSC). It also assumes that USAR records have been accurately transferred to the AC SIDPERS data base and
that SIDPERS will remain a viable system by fielding new SIDPERS software packages.

5. Organization Structure:

Experiences of the ARCOMs in mobilizing soldiers and units during DESERT SHIELD indicate that the current TDA structure of the typical ARCOM, especially the DCSPER organization, is inadequate. The structure is based on antiquated historical staffing and funding levels that do not reflect the new missions and functions recently assigned to the DCSPER such as family support, drug testing and increasing requirements for promotion, selection and retention boards. It certainly shows no semblance to reality with Partial Mobilization added as an unexpected requirement to ongoing responsibilities. In the 124th ARCOM (Seattle), for example, in order to meet mobilization demands, the ODCSPER put up to 35 Reserve soldiers on Annual Training (AT). These soldiers were further augmented by the existing AGR and civilians as well as approximately a dozen soldiers put on short tours or Temporary Tours of Active Duty. These assets were used to support the mobilization of approximately 2000 soldiers to:

a) Meet requirements directly related to cross-leveling, discharges/delays, order processing, family care plans, etc.

b) Provide contact teams in units to validate initial status of personnel and Unit Manning Rosters upon alert and home station phases.

c) Continue minimal personnel support for non-mobilized units and soldiers (approximately 9000).

In addition, utilizing AG, JAG and Chaplain assets throughout the command was critical to the success of the effort. This included Inactive
Duty (IDT) soldiers assigned to the headquarters and major subordinate command staffs as well as soldiers from a deactivated Army Garrison unit. Other units, such as the 380th Personnel Replacement Battalion (non-mobilized CONUS Replacement Center [CRC]), were used in an Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) or Annual Training status to provide direct personnel readiness support. Such support also included other MUSARCs. For example, the 6219th Reception Battalion from the 91st Training Division provided invaluable assistance in mobilizing a Reserve hospital in California.

The requirements for additional personnel as well as additional TDA and unit structure at the ARCOM level was validated by the experiences of other ARCOMs in First, Fourth and Fifth Army areas. Using contact teams to “scrub” units at home station or prior to call-up seemed to be a universal approach. Cross-leveling and Unit Manning Roster (UMR) validation required intense utilization of resources, often on a 24 hour basis. The need to quickly develop family care plans and to brief dependents placed extraordinary demands on the system that continued beyond deployment. Further complicating the problem, was that mobilized units in remote areas often were the only occupant of a Reserve Center. Once the unit departed home station, the Center had to be closed, thereby eliminating a source of communication and support for dependents. Since many Reserve Centers are long distances from AC installations, the only source of support was from the family support group or the parent ARCOM.

The current situation is equally challenging for the USARC. During ODS/S, the CONUSA structure was still in place and provided substantial assistance, especially in the automation and cross-leveling areas. But in the future, the USARC will have to perform the command and control function. In order to function effectively on a 24 hour basis given a mobilization
surge requirement, the existing USARC DCSPER MOB section needs to be augmented with at least two four person teams to run two 12 hour shifts per day (one team per every 75,000 soldiers mobilized/assigned). Individuals should be personnel oriented, understand the mobilization process (need training) and know MOS structure and regulations. Although the USARC is not currently authorized IMAs, using IMAs to staff such teams would be a logical solution.

Computer hardware is also needed to run the mobilization program that has been developed by the USARC ODCSPER staff. As an example of this need, during ODS/S First Army used 4 powerful PCs to cross-level units and provide soldier accountability. There are other equipment requirements. FAX machines would be needed -- incoming, outgoing and classified -- as well as cellular phones and paging devices. When considering the number of possible mobilization locations across the country, the different time zones and that there are 46 MUSARCs that report directly to the USARC, it is apparent that this equipment with resulting capability is not just nice to have, but is critical to the success of mobilization. It will be especially critical as the current realities continue to impact the Army and place a greater burden for national security on the Army Reserve.

Current Situation

The US National Military Strategy, as stated in the 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment lists a number of strategic principles on which to build the national defense security foundations. These principles reflect the current realities of the potential threat, the US economic situation and lessons learned from ODS/S. Four of these principles are particularly relevant to Reserve structure and capabilities:
• Readiness: The US military must be ready for immediate deployment. Effective deterrence requires that US forces have the ability to respond quickly, prepared to fight upon arrival.

• Strategic agility: Forces stationed in the US must be able to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice.

• Power projection: Power projection contributes directly to deterrence and stability and goes well beyond simply deploying the contingency Force. US installations must be capable of rapidly deploying significant forces.

• Decisive force: An essential element of our overall strategy is the ability to rapidly deploy overwhelming force.

Explicit in these principles forming the basis of US military strategy is the ability to quickly deploy ready forces in response to an immediate threat. FM 100-17 underscores the importance of power projection: 'Credible power projection rests, among other things, on our ability to deploy rapidly forces to perform missions spanning the continuum of military operations. Force projection, therefore, is the capability to ... mobilize, deploy, and sustain the employed force.' Furthermore, the Joint Military Net Assessment concludes that Reserve Component forces are required to respond to any major regional contingency. Although a Presidential Selective Call-up could meet the needs of a single theater response, "extraordinary measures" to conduct a Partial Mobilization would be required to respond to a concurrent second crisis. Consequently, by definition, force projection strategy is contingent upon the Army's ability to mobilize Reserve forces quickly to support and augment AC combat elements. As noted by a GAO report on the Reserve force, "The Reserves have clearly become essential to meeting future operational requirements
despite an historical reluctance on the part of the United States to mobilize reserve units for military operations. 22

On the other hand, the current national budget situation is likely to reduce the ability of the Army Reserve to mobilize and deploy quickly for a number of reasons. First, a number of installations available during ODS/S are scheduled to close. The implications of this in the western US is that Ft. Lewis will be the only major mobilization station. The only location in northern California will be a Reserve facility (Camp Parks). Ft. Carson will probably be the only other major installation in the 6th Army Area. The situation is worse in the eastern US given the number of base closings potentially involved.

Second, the AC is faced with substantial personnel cuts. Recent projections made by the now Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, indicate that the best case for the Army may be a nine division structure with approximately 350,000 active duty soldiers. William Kaufmann, a respected military analyst at the Brookings Institution, believes the military budget could result in an Army structure with as few as seven Active divisions by 1997. 23 Although the situation remains uncertain, one thing seems clear. The ultimate cuts will certainly impact structure. As the AC downsizes an increasing premium will be placed on a trained, ready, lethal combat force. The likely result will be fewer assets available for installation support or TDA structure. That support which remains may be quickly consumed supporting deploying Active units or may actually be deployed to augment high priority units. This was a problem during ODS/S since the Army was in the midst of substantially decreasing the number of non-deploying units providing installation support. In future scenarios, when entire corps and/or divisions deploy with all their CS and CSS support units in response
to a crisis, most AC installations will have very few remaining resources to assist the last brigades shipping out. As Reserve units arrive at the mobilization stations, they will have the same problems as late deploying AC units. In fact, the Reserve and Guard may have to help deploy the later deploying AC units. The AC "host" units that were used very successfully to help (bedding, billeting, supply, messing etc) Reserve units arriving at the installations during DESERT SHIELD will probably not be available in the future.

Third, the Army Reserve itself faces a reduction in strength. Although somewhat delayed, there seems little doubt that the USAR will also have to accommodate structural changes and adopt new roles and missions. Initial structure cuts (actual and projected) seem to indicate substantial cuts in precisely those types of units that were vital to mobilization during ODS/S: Personnel Service Companies (slated to disappear in FY 1993 but put on hold), Army Garrisons, JAG units, Replacement Companies, Training Divisions (Reception Battalions), dental units, finance assets and brigade level headquarters. Many of these units are vital to USAR command structure. Initial force structure reductions, for example, eliminated a number of the US Army Garrisons that were organized and missioned to provide installation support. This trend is being aggravated with current and projected deactivations. The USAR already appears to be a random collection of companies and small units with very little battalion or brigade structure except for Training Divisions or COSCOMs. Although ARCOM headquarters are supposed to provide installation support during a full mobilization, it would be an almost impossible task given their structure and their mission to concurrently mobilize assigned units (for movement to multiple mobilization stations).
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the most significant change since DESERT STORM is the implementation of the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) in Atlanta. As a consequence, the CONUSAs have essentially disappeared (reduced by 45 percent) due to the elimination of the personnel and logistics staffs. Ironically these were the critical functions during ODS/S. The disappearance of these staffs during and after demobilization probably explains in large part why the Army has failed to recognize the lessons surrounding personnel readiness. While giving command of Reserve forces to the USARC, the Army has worked at cross purposes by saddling the Army Reserve Command with the pre-ODS/S concept that Training, Operations, Mobilization and Deployment (TOM-D) would be the responsibility of the CONUSAs and FORSCOM. Accordingly, the CONUSA is to serve as the executive agent for mobilization and is to command Reserve units from the time the unit is called-up at home station (mobilization phase III) until arrival at the mobilization station. This relationship is specified in FORSCOM Regulation 500-3 (FORMDEPS).

Unfortunately, TOM-D is a concept that is fatally flawed as demonstrated by ODS/S experience and as documented by the Reserve Independent Study Commission. It’s flawed because it’s based on the false assumption that mobilization stations actually have the ability to cross-level soldiers and conduct Soldier Readiness Programs (SRP - Previously known as Preparation for Overseas Movement or "POM") without massive USAR and ARNG assistance. It simply doesn’t recognize the role that was played by the CONUSAs and the limitations inherent in that role, especially in the current situation. During ODS/S, the CONUSA personnel staffs played an important coordination role given their ability to monitor multiple MUSARCs and their knowledge of individual units. CONUSA staff served as consultants.
interpreted policy, represented Reserve positions with FORSCOM and provided coordination between Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR); ARPERCEN; MUSARC headquarters and FORSCOM.

Sixth Army, for example, coordinated policy for the MUSARCs in a ten state region, assisted with cross-leveling between ARCOMs, assisted mobilization stations with filling critical personnel shortages, and provided guidance for family support problems. First Army performed similar functions and developed a real time computer system that enabled ARCOMs, under the direction of the CONUSA, to cross-level soldiers between units as well as MUSARCs. The same appears to have been true for other Army areas as well.25 With the CONUSA capabilities having been eliminated, FORSCOM's ability to directly mobilize and deploy the force is severely limited.

Although the USARC, as a FORSCOM subordinate command, can certainly be delegated the responsibility for mobilizing Army Reserve units and soldiers, the potential for confusion is dramatic as ARCOMs work directly with the USARC and installation staff to cross-level and SRP alerted units. Other than the Readiness Groups that are staffed primarily with combat arms officers and have questionable access to personnel databases (CONUSA will have no RCAS terminal), the CONUSAs have no staff capability in Reserve personnel issues. All USAR personnel expertise is concentrated in the USARC, ARPERCEN or the MUSARCs/ARCOMs.

To correct this deficiency, FORSCOM proposes to augment the critical functions of the CONUSAs during domestic emergencies and transition to mobilization by using TPU and IMA Reserve soldiers.26 The plan requires pre-assigning a total of 486 TPU and IMA personnel to the four CONUSA headquarters to perform "critical tasks." The new mobilization assistance TPU (consisting of a commander, senior NCO and mil tech) would be a USARC
asset, under operational control of a CONUSA and assigned to a local MUSARC. Unfortunately, it is not clear what critical tasks would be performed. In the personnel area, for example, 55 officers and 85 enlisted soldiers in four Army Area Commands would be assigned responsibility for the "increased workload in strength management, family assistance, casualty reporting and publication and distribution of orders." However, since the Department of the Army has transferred the CONUSA responsibility for such functions to USARC and no longer has the capacity to perform them given the lack of a data base, it is hard to envision what role such a staff would play.

The CONUSAs during ODS/S were effective because the DCSPER staff was highly knowledgeable of the units being mobilized, understood AC personnel policy and how it differed from USAR policy and procedure, had access to Army automation systems such as SIDPERS and the Standard Army Management Information System, and were clearly in the chain of command. None of these characteristics or capabilities would likely exist using Reserve soldiers to augment CONUSA headquarters under existing structure. Expecting the CONUSAs to serve as executive agents in this scenario without Reserve personnel expertise or visibility as to real unit readiness is a recipe for disaster. Trying to communicate through a dual chain of command, both USAR and AC, violates the principle of unity of command as well as common sense and is fundamentally at odds with the USARC Independent Commission's findings and recommendation to eliminate redundancy of headquarters. The potential for confusion over command relationships during a mobilization, especially given the premium on rapid deployment and power projection, is significant. Restaffing the CONUSAs with TPU and IMA personnel during a mobilization would only add to the confusion. The Army
would be much better served to provide such additional resources to the USARC, ARCOMs or mobilization stations.

Implications

It is evident that the Total Army will not have adequate resources to mobilize the force in the same way as in DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Even during DESERT SHIELD, with the assistance of the CONUSA staff, the mobilization effort was successful in large part due to its phased and paced nature. After action reports indicate that a larger, quicker mobilization would have out-paced ARCOM staffs and would likely have overwhelmed many mobilization stations. This would have been especially true if additional AC installation resources had deployed or there had been a second contingency. Not only would the ability to SRP soldiers and validate units have been reduced or eliminated, but "host units" would not likely have been available.

The situation would have been further complicated if additional units such as the Personnel Replacement Battalions and Reception Battalions (Training Divisions) had been mobilized. Although it would have helped the installations, it would have further reduced the personnel assets available to the MUSARCs/ARCOMs at precisely the time they were most needed to provide support at home stations and assist with cross-leveling and pre-validation. In the future, the lack of adequate installation support during a mobilization requiring extensive Reserve forces could force a choice between deploying less than mission capable units or slowing the deployment rate. The results could be serious in view of US commitments and the projected requirements for rapid response. Early deploying combat units could arrive in theater with inadequate or insufficient CS and CSS support. Given an Army structure that increasingly favors heavy combat units, any reduction
in the availability or effectiveness of CS and CSS units will make our national military strategy difficult to implement.

General Powell has stated his belief that Army Reserve and National Guard strength needs to be reduced along with AC. However, like the AC, the USAR must not simply be a smaller version of the Cold War Army. Significant structural and mission adjustments are needed. The needs of the USAR and the future missions and responsibilities must be considered separately from AC structure. That is, USAR structure should not be solely based on providing direct CS and CSS support to deployed combat units. Reserve structure must take into account mobilization requirements and enhance the ability of the USARC to mobilize and reinforce deployed units independently of the AC or the IRR. To this end, the Chief, Army Reserve has recently proposed that the USAR take over the command and control of smaller active installations such as A.P. Hill, Ft. Indiantown Gap, Ft. Chaffee and Ft. Pickett. This has already been approved for Ft. McCoy and Camp Parks. Not only does this have the potential to enhance the ability of the USAR to mobilize at such installations, it may free a substantial portion of AC strength to be used for higher priority assignments. It is a step worth taking provided adequate resources are available to staff such installations. It will also require giving the Army Reserve Command authority consistent with responsibilities already assigned if the force is to be mobilized in accordance with strategic principles.

Recommendations

- Assign responsibility for mobilization of USAR units and soldiers to the Army Reserve Command by changing FORSCOM Reg 500-3 (FORMDEPS) to give the USARC command and control of USAR units through mobilization
Phase III (Home Station). The USARC should have command and control of all mobilized Reserve forces until units (or soldiers) actually arrive at the Mobilization Station. FORSCOM should only assume command at that point.

- Recognize the limitations of RCAS and provide the USARC DCSPER with the necessary personnel and equipment to effectively manage a Presidential Selected Call-up (200K) or larger mobilization. Specifically, this should include assigning up to 12 IMA or TPU personnel to the USARC ODCSPER to staff three four person teams capable of operating on a 24 hour rotating basis to support cross-leveling activities. Support should also include 5 PCs, 3 FAX machines and the necessary phone lines to support such equipment operating concurrently with existing resources.

- Add Troop Program Units to the USAR structure with a mission to support a specific mobilization station and/or ARCOM. There is an identified need at the mobilization stations, for example, for augmented SRP ability, medical and dental capacity, JAG assets familiar with state law, and Reserve records teams to maintain records for promotions, casualty reporting and redeployment.

- Retain USAR Personnel Service Companies (PSCs) in the inventory based on mobilization and USAR support requirements rather than a CAPSTONE relationship or direct support requirement for AC structure and missions. These units could compliment the Conus Replacement Centers and would have an IDT mission of supporting Reserve units in such areas as personnel records, officer and enlisted management and personnel accountability. Consider assigning a PSC to ARCOM headquarters having command and control of a significant number high priority Contingency Force units.

- Use Reserve Personnel and Administration Battalions to create a modular (tailored) unit structure for providing mobilization support to Active
Component mobilization stations. Such units would provide command and control of those units needed to augment a specific installation: PSCs, record teams, Replacement Regulating Detachments, dental units, finance detachments etc. Although these units would have no further CAPSTONE mission, they could be deployed to the theater as needed. DESERT STORM demonstrated a need for provisional Personnel and Administration (P&A) Battalions in theater to support the Personnel Group in providing command and control of the extensive personnel and postal assets.

- Keep the USAR Garrison units in the structure and assign each one responsibility for a specific installation. Garrisons will be especially important for staffing those installations that are assigned to the USAR (whereas P&A Bns would support AC installations). However, the Garrison TDA should include finance personnel in addition to those MOSs normally associated with a Garrison. In addition, each Garrison should be resourced to provide command and control of other support units needed for mobilization and deployment support.

- Staff and resource the ARCOMs to accomplish the mobilization mission. This would include adding a Mobilization Division to the ARCOMs' ODCSPER TDAs along with necessary equipment such as lap top computers and cellular telephones. Family support activities also must be augmented.

- Explore the possibility of utilizing Readiness Training Units (RTUs) designed to augment ARCOM DCSPER staffs during a mobilization to meet the significantly increased family support requirements. Such units could be particularly effective in providing briefings for dependents and assisting with the validation of Family Support Plans. As a minimum, IMAs should be assigned to ARCOM headquarters to coordinate Family Support activities.
for mobilized units. These individuals would ideally be from the communities in which the unit or Reserve Center is located.

- Mobilize appropriate ARCOM headquarters during a Partial Mobilization. Operating on a 24 hour schedule with soldiers in an IDT, or AT status causes problems, especially for soldiers requiring day care (which is almost impossible to get at night). Mobilization causes Family Care Plans for headquarters staff to be activated. This is important since the USARC and the ARCOMs will essentially mobilize the force in the future given personnel and logistics requirements.

- Do not adopt the FORSCOM proposal to restaff the CONUSA Headquarters with TPU and IMA personnel. Instead, assign such assets to the ARCOMs to directly support mobilization Phases II (Alert) and III (Home Station) and records (201 files) maintenance during the subsequent phases through redeployment. Do not send personnel records to the installations.

- Place increased emphasis on assigning CSS (personnel and logistics) personnel to the Readiness Groups rather than exclusively combat arms. Since the Readiness Group personnel will be the only AC people in the field during a mobilization, they can play an important role in assessing units, validating units mobilizing at non AC installations and working potential personnel readiness problems with the Mobilization Stations. Additionally, having Active CSS personnel work with the USAR (predominantly CSS) builds professional peer relationships that are extraordinarily useful in a crisis.

- Develop one personnel system for AC and USAR personnel (as required by law). This must be a primary focus of the Army if there is ever to be one Army. In order to realize the "seamless" mobilization recommended by the Independent Commission, there must be one core data base. This becomes especially critical as AC resources at the installation level become more
limited. Reserve and Active personnel units will then be training on and using one system.

- Insure that RCAS supports mobilization requirements from a command and control perspective. Do not eliminate RC SIDPERS until cross-leveling capability is validated. In the interim period during the extended fielding of RCAS, recognize system limitations and provide support for the USARC and local MUSARC systems.
The Availability of the Reserve Components in ODS/S

Figure 3.1—Phases of Reserve Mobilization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION</th>
<th>ACTION REQUIRED</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>PERSONNEL INVOLVED</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Any requirement</td>
<td>Operation order</td>
<td>Commander-in-chief</td>
<td>Active duty force.</td>
<td>Used for any military purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Any level of emergency</td>
<td>Publish order to active duty.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves. Retired members of the Regular Army and Army Reserve with 20 years of active service. May be ordered to active service involuntarily.</td>
<td>May be used for any lawful purpose. Consent of the governor is required for ARNG members serving under 10 USC 672 (d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up)</td>
<td>Presidential Executive Order</td>
<td>10 USC 673 (b)</td>
<td>Units and individuals of Selected Reserve (NG &amp; USAR); limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days and extendable for another 90 days.</td>
<td>President must report to Congress within 24 hours of circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used in lieu of a call-up (10 USC 331 et seq. 3500, 8500) or for disaster relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contingency operation, war plan, national emergency (partial mobilization)</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and executive order</td>
<td>10 USC 637</td>
<td>Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve (NG and USAR); limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years.</td>
<td>President may extend appointments, enlistments and periods of service when Congress is not in session. 10 USC 671 (b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. War or national emergency (full or total mobilization)</td>
<td>Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency</td>
<td>10 USC 671 (a)  10 USC 672  10 USC 674  10 USC 675</td>
<td>National Guard and Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress</td>
<td>May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve forces and extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Domestic emergency. 10 (Selective mobilization)</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation to disperse under 10 USC 333 and executive order under 10 USC appropriate to purpose of the call</td>
<td>10 USC 3500  10 USC 8500  10 USC 331  10 USC 332  10 USC 333</td>
<td>National Guard and Reserves</td>
<td>May be used for Federal aid to states in case of insurrection (10 USC 331); to enforce federal authority (10 USC 332); to suppress interference with state and federal law (10 USC 333)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-1. Mobilization Authorities

Enclosure 2
Endnotes


8. Rand, 49.

9. USARC Independent Commission, Sec III.

10. Mr. Robby Robinson, Department of Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel: Mobilization (DAPE-MO), interview by author, Baltimore, Maryland, 17 January 1993.


12. Robinson.


14 *Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned*, 1-3-70.
15. Donald R. McNeal, DDS., *Dental Health Status and Treatment Needs for Reservists Activated - Operation Desert Shield*, (Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 30 October 1990), 5.


17. LTC Stone.

18. Robinson.


27. USARC Independent Study Commission, Sec 111, 5.
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Pummill, Dave, COL, former 90th ARCOM DCSPER. Phone interview by author, 25 January 1993.


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