ROLES AND MISSIONS:
IS IT TIME FOR ANOTHER
KEY WEST AGREEMENT?

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The end of the Cold War has created a situation for the United States and its military forces that is analogous to the period following the end of World War II (WWII). The defeat of an enemy and absence of a major threat to American interest, have once again resulted in a mandate to reassess the purpose and justify the cost of our nation’s military. The turbulent years following WWII were marred by a lack of unity within the newly formed Department of Defense (DOD) and compounded the problems encountered by Congress as it sought to reorganize and downsize the armed services. The majority of disagreements were caused by a basic lack of understanding the historical roles and missions of the armed services and misguided efforts by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to retain the prestige and power acquired during WWII. If we are to avoid making the same mistakes during our own downsizing period, we must study the past and formulate a vision for the military of the future, that is supported by the entire DOD and capable of withstanding the scrutiny of a doubtful Congress.
19. ABSTRACT--CONTINUED.

This study examines the uncertain and oft time ambiguous process by which our armed service's roles and missions have developed during our nation's 217 year history. It also analyzes the adequacy of the February 1983 recommended changes to military roles and missions, proposed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and whether they are bold enough to buttress the DOD against mandated changes from the Congress. Furthermore, it makes recommendations concerning the need for a "Key West" type conference and what it should produce for the military of the future.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

ROLES AND MISSIONS: IS IT TIME FOR ANOTHER KEY WEST AGREEMENT?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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UNCLASSIFIED
The end of the Cold War has created a situation for the United States and its military forces that is analogous to the period following the end World War II (WWII). The defeat of an enemy and absence of a major threat to American interest, have once again resulted in a mandate to reassess the purpose and justify the cost of our nation's military. The turbulent years following WWII were marred by a lack of unity within the newly formed Department of Defense (DOD) and compounded the problems encountered by Congress, as it sought to reorganize and downsize the armed services. The majority of disagreements were caused by a basic lack of understanding the historical roles and missions of the armed services and misguided efforts by the Army, Navy and Air Force to retain the prestige and power acquired during WWII. If we are to avoid making the same mistakes during our own downsizing period, we must study the past and formulate a vision for the military of the future, that is supported by the entire DOD and capable of withstanding the scrutiny of a doubtful Congress.

This study examines the uncertain and oft time ambiguous process by which our armed service's roles and missions have developed during our nation's 217 year history. It also analyzes the adequacy of the February, 1993, recommended changes to military roles and missions, purposed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and whether they are bold enough to buttress the DOD against mandated changes from the Congress. Furthermore, it makes recommendations concerning the need for a "Key West" type conference and what it should produce for the military of the future.
The unanticipated end of the Cold War has created a situation for the United States of America and the Department of Defense (DOD) that is analogous to the years following the end of World War II (WW II). The defeat of an enemy and subsequent absence of a major threat to the "American Way of Life" and its interest abroad, has once again resulted in a mandate to reassess the scope and purpose of our nation's military forces.

As occurred following WW II, disagreements between the Congress and the DOD, as well as between the services, are centered on varying interpretations of the services "roles and missions" and the percentage of the defense budget dollars that accompany the agreed upon division of responsibilities. In order to minimize and possibly avoid the mistakes that accompanied the process following WW II, it is imperative that a fundamental understanding of the historical events which resulted in today's roles and missions, be shared by all who will participate in the realignment process.

The purpose of this paper is to: establish a precise definition of what military roles and missions are; provide a historical review of the fundamental events and military reforms that determined our current military roles and missions; analyze the recommended changes to roles and missions proposed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February, 1993, and determine whether his recommendations are bold enough to buttress the military against expected
changes to roles and missions from the Congress.

The search for a precise definition of "roles and missions", when used as a collective term, is difficult and full of ambiguities. The multiple documents used by the Congress and the DOD to assign responsibilities to the armed forces, all use the term synonymously with the term "functions", and to further confuse the definition, the term "mission" is used in assigning responsibilities to Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. For example, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "report on recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces." However, it refers to the assigned tasks of the services exclusively as "functions" and not "roles or missions." Furthermore, The Posture Statement of the United States Army for FY 93, states "the Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land". DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, refers to these same items as "functions." The U.S. Air Force's White Paper entitled "Global Reach-Global Power", June 1990 and the U.S. Navy's recently published "From the Sea", both address "capabilities" and not roles and missions. It is apparent that the
Congress, DOD, and the armed services are all addressing common requirements and unfortunately, each is using different terminology. The ambiguous use and imprecise definitions of these terms has been the source of considerable confusion and misunderstandings as the scope and purpose of the military is being reassessed.

If the terms "roles, missions and functions" are to be used effectively, a common definition and proper use of the term must be incorporated into the military and political lexicon for use in future laws, DOD directives, and service regulations. The recently published, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, submitted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993, offers the following definitions to clarify the meanings of roles, missions, and functions for use in future publications: "ROLES are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by Congress in law." "MISSIONS are the task assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs)." "FUNCTIONS are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Service Chiefs to fulfill their legally established roles." "Simply stated, the primary function of the Service Chiefs is to provide forces organized, trained and equipped to perform a role -- to be employed by a CINC in the accomplishment of a mission."
In order to frame a complete understanding of the evolution of the roles and missions of our military and the ambiguous nature of their formulation, it is necessary to review the key historical events and documents that shaped their development. The central issue that brought about the creation of our nation was the dissatisfaction of our nation's Founding Fathers with strong British rule and use of the military to enforce the will of the King of England. As a result of this experience, the creation of another strong central government, with a standing military, was deemed as unnecessary and contrary to the emerging principals of democracy. Therefore, issues relating to the roles and missions of the military in a free democracy, were addressed reluctantly and only as required by necessity.

The first attempt by our Nation's Founding Fathers, to set down in writing the roles and missions of our nation's military, was contained in The Articles of Confederation. The Articles, written in 1778, during our Nation's War of Independence, were reflective of the prevailing attitudes of resentment for central government and distrust of standing military forces. Article II of this document set forth the parameters for individual State's Rights by stating that, "Each state retains its Sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."

The roles and missions of the forces to be raised by the States were
contained in Articles III and VI. Article III established the "missions" of the
militias" by stating that "the states enter into a firm league of friendship with
each other, for their common defense, the security of their Liberties, and their
mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all
force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of
religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever." The "roles"
contained in Article VI established that "every state shall always keep up a well
regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall
provide and constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of
field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition and camp
equipage."

The strength of the roles and missions statements contained in the Articles
were considerably weakened by each individual States having the authority to
determine the size and readiness of their militias and as a body, being restricted
from maintaining active "vessels of war" and "any body of forces" unless approved
by two thirds of the other members of the Confederation. Without the presence
of a central authority to regulate the readiness of the militias, the military
aspects of the Articles of Confederation proved to be less than what was required
to secure a new nation on the frontier of the civilized world.

Several modifications to the Articles of Confederation roles and missions
were made after 1778. However, the basic theme of a "ready and well disciplined State Militia and weak central government remained constant until the signing of the Constitution in 1788.4

The inherent weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation, emanating from its lack of a strong central government, led to the convening of the Constitutional Convention in May 1787.5 An issue that was debated a great deal during this convention was the need for and the proper role of a standing army. The basic distrust of a standing military force, that influenced the authors of the Articles of Confederation, strongly influenced the Constitutional Convention as well. Key figures such as Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe and Patrick Henry referred to a standing army as an engine of arbitrary power and the bane of republican governments.6 The basic concern of these patriots centered on the role that a standing military force would play in a nation at peace. "Would its role be to subvert freedom or defend it? Would it give too much power to a central government at the expense of the states?"7

President Washington didn't agree with Jefferson and his supporters, and advocated the need for a well trained and prepared military force. His views were later expressed in a message to Congress on 3 December 1793, "I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a position of
complete defense, and of exacting from them the fulfillment of the duties toward us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion, that contrary to the order of human efforts, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms, with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness - if we desire to avoid insult we must be ready to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful institutions of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

Following considerable debate, the authors of the Constitution were able to complete and sign the document on 21 June 1788. The considerable influence of President Washington was instrumental in ensuring that the Constitution addressed the need for a military force and the checks and balances needed to govern its use. The division of responsibilities established between the Executive and Legislative branches of government have remained essentially unchanged since the signing of the original document.

The basic "mission" statement for the military contained in the Constitution may be drawn from the preamble. It states that "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense...." Although this statement does not directly address the military, the insurance of domestic tranquility and providing for the common defense have always been interpreted as military missions and have been used to guide its establishment and employment.

The architecture for the command and control of the military is
contained in Articles I and II of the Constitution. The applicable sections of these two articles, created the separation of power between the President and the Congress over the military and the influence that each would have in determining the establishment of roles and missions.

In Section 8, of Article I, the Congress was empowered with the authority to control the size and use of the military. It established the Congress would "...... Provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States..." and furthermore, it provided the Congress with the responsibility:

To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to the Use shall be for longer that two Years.

To provide and maintain a Navy.

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repeal Invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

The powers of the President over the military were established in Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution. It states that: "The President shall be the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.” However, the inability of the President to “call forth the Militia”, was realized to be a shortcoming and legislation passed in 1792, authorized him to, “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion ...."10

The established powers of the Congress to “raise and support Armies”, and “provide and maintain a Navy” vested them with the upper hand in determining the roles and missions of the military. The President was the Commander in Chief, but the Congress retained the authority to appropriate the funds required to “support” and “maintain” the military through the budgeting process. The basic division of power and responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches of the government, has endured to the present day and prevented the misuse of the military by either branch of government.

In the years that followed the signing of the Constitution, the roles and missions of the military remained fairly constant but were modified as necessary to deal with National emergencies. The period following the Civil War and the
President's use of the military to police the Reconstruction of the South resulted in considerable controversy. The military was used extensively in the South to enforce federal and occasionally even local law during Reconstruction, 1866-1875. The routine use of the military in this role and the subsequent missions eventually resulted in a backlash, which found expression in a law passed by Congress in 1878. The "Army as Posse Comitatus," specifically limited the military's use in law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. The intent of placing restrictions on the employment of the military in a Posse Comitatus role was not to prohibit its use, but to engender a cautious attitude concerning the use of federal troops for law enforcement purposes. The basic tenets of this law have survived into the present and are contained in Section 1385, Chapter LXVII, Title 18, of the U.S. Code.

The years following the Reconstruction of the South were characteristic of what was becoming an all too familiar pattern of Congressional neglect, during times of peace, towards the military. However, as World War I began in Europe during 1914, it became apparent that the military of our nation was not prepared to participate and that major organizational reforms were required to improve combat readiness. Congress, stimulated by the possibility of American involvement in the war, sought to make improvements by enacting the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA of 1916). This Act established the details for what
would be termed today, as the "functions" to be performed by the Army and Navy and the relationship each would have with the National Guard and Reserves. The formal recognition of the Army's Air Service was made by this Act and although it didn't have a major impact at the time, this decision would play a significant part in the disagreements that would occur following WW II, over the control of air power. The basic roles and missions of the two Services were unchanged with the Army responsible for military operations on the land and the Navy responsible for operations at sea.\textsuperscript{13}

The inaction of Congress and the President on military issues, prior to the NDA of 1916, galvanized the Army and Navy and as early as 1903, they began conducting conferences to engender a spirit of cooperation and overcome problems associated with Joint Campaigns. The Secretary of War (Army), Elihu Root felt that a forum of this sort was required to discuss the roles, missions and functions of the two services and in cooperation with the Secretary of the Navy, established the Joint Army and Navy Board.\textsuperscript{14} The exchange of ideas and professional thought that came about as a result of these board meetings resulted in the military publishing its own interpretations of roles, missions and functions in 1927 and 1935. These documents were a revolutionary step forward for the military. Prior to this time, military roles, missions, and functions were only addressed in legislation originating from the Congress.\textsuperscript{15}
These two documents addressed the tremendous advances in technology that had occurred during the first third of the twentieth century and the resultant changes that had taken place in each of the services. The most dynamic and controversial issue was the use of aviation and how it had and would continue to change the roles, missions, and functions of the two services.

The significance of these documents cannot be overstated. In the foreword to the 1927 document, the Secretaries of War (Army) and Navy established the purpose of the report.

1. It is vital to success in war that the Army and the Navy so coordinate their actions as to produce the most effective mutual support. To accomplish this it is essential that both services have a common, definite understanding of their respective functions in national defense and the approved methods for attaining coordination in operation.

2. The aim of this publication is to assemble in one volume all joint policies, agreements, or instructions which have been approved by the War and Navy Departments, with a view to securing effective coordination.

The 1935 version of the report was the last attempt to define the roles, missions, and functions of the Army and Navy until the end of WW II. The terminology and format of the report were widely accepted and later used as a guide to redefine the roles, missions and functions of the military following WW II in the National Security Act of 1947 and Key West Agreements.16

The period of reflection, following WW II, once again reminded our nation
that a lack of military preparedness would be paid for with the lives of brave, young Americans who are asked to stand in "Harms Way" to deter aggression. Senior military officers were determined to capture the lessons learned from the war and ensure that they were incorporated into the roles, missions, and functions of the military in the post war period.

One of the most progressive thinkers produced during WW II, was General of the Army, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold. His vision for the post war era was seemingly unencumbered by the paradigm of military organization and readiness that proved to be disastrous at Pearl Harbor and the Kasserine Pass. His views were couched in his War Reports published in 1945 and not only provided a vision for the future, but the organization and principals that must govern its use.17

Vision:

In order to secure the maximum effectiveness with the greatest economy, our fighting forces must be organized so as to provide soundly integrated command of three autonomous services, each of which has an equal and direct share of the total responsibility.

Organization:

1. One integrated, balanced United States military organization that will establish, develop, maintain and direct at the minimum expense the forces, including the mobile striking forces, required for peace enforcement and for national security with the capability for the most rapid expansion in case of all-out war.

2. Retention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization with a Chief of Staff to the President.

3. The size and composition of our striking forces to be based on:
   a. Capabilities and limitations of possible enemies.
   b. Effectiveness and employment of modern weapons of war.
c. The geographical position of the United States, its outlying bases and such other bases as it might control or use.

4. Maximum economy and efficiency to be secured by:
   a. Ruthless elimination of all arms, branches, services, weapons, equipment or ideas whose retention might be indicated only by tradition, sentiment or sheer inertia.
   b. Ruthless elimination of duplication throughout the entire organization.

Principles:

1. The above organization, to attain its objectives, must adhere rigidly to the following principles:

   a. Development of the intelligence necessary for the effective application of our military force to whatever job it may be called upon to do.
   b. Continuous planning for both offensive and defensive operations against all potential enemies, taking into account their capabilities and possible intentions.
   c. Planning for, and direction of technical research to ensure the most modern weapons are being developed, tested and service tested in order to retain for the United States military equipment its present preeminent position.
   d. Development and application of the most effective tactics and techniques.
   e. Realistic recommendations for Congressional appropriations for military purposes and for the distribution of these appropriations where they will produce the maximum benefit to the national security.

World War II brought unprecedented death and destruction to war-making and peace-loving nations alike, and as may future war will be vastly more devastating, the mission of the armed forces of the United States should be not to prepare for war, but to prevent war—to insure that peace be perpetuated.

The similarities between General Arnold's vision of the future security needs of the nation, at the end of WW II, and President Clinton's, present day, "four
generic categories of military competence," (Nuclear Deterrence, Better Intelligence, Rapid deployment, and Technological edge) are striking. The clarity of General Arnold’s vision may have been a product of not being directly involved in the combat actions of war. His position as Commander of the Army Air Forces and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided him with a vantage point to judge the effectiveness of the military in a different light than that of a commander in the field. His insights into the needs of the military in a peace time environment are as true today, as they were in 1945.

The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA of 1947), was a major effort on the part of Congress and the President to codify the lessons learned from WW II into binding legislation that would be used to address national security needs and restructuring of the military.

Title I of the Act addressed national security issues and created the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. Changes to the military were contained in Title II of the Act and authorized:

1. Creation of a National Military Establishment, consisting of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
2. The appointment of the Secretary of Defense to direct the National Military Establishment.
3. Establishment of the U.S. Air Force as a separate service.
4. Formalizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
5. Creation of the Joint Staff.
The origins of the Act started with President Truman’s prompting the Congress to push for the unification of the Armed Services as early as December 1945.\textsuperscript{19} Congressional hearings conducted in the Spring of 1946, tore at the very fabric of the services by asking questions such as: “Why do we need a Navy at All?” “Why do we have separate ground forces in the Marine Corps and Army?” “Why do we have three air forces—Army, Navy and Marine Corps?”\textsuperscript{20} As would be expected, these type of questions caused the Navy and Marine Corps to be very protective and uncooperative. The testimony became so emotionally charged and heated that the President ordered the hearings closed and directed the Secretaries of Navy and War (Army) to present a compromise solution the following year.\textsuperscript{21} The two secretaries presented their plan the next year and due to their attempts to build consensus, their plan was judged by General Omar Bradley, as being “a greatly watered down compromise.”\textsuperscript{22} The Navy and Marine Corps continued to oppose all attempts to push forward a unification plan but the Congress, believing it would save money, passed the bill and it was signed into law as the National Security Act of 1947, by the President on 26 July 1947.\textsuperscript{23}

It must be noted that the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of the Army Air Forces that pushed for the reforms stated by General Arnold, all retired or changed positions by the start of the hearings. The new Chiefs of Service had a much narrower view of the military and resorted to
protectionism, when a broader perspective was required. Each Chief of Service fought to protect his service from the loss of power and prestige accumulated during WW II.

The responsibilities (roles and missions) of each of the armed services contained in the NSA of 1947, were left vague at the request of the services. All of the services wanted to avoid having their responsibilities dictated in a piece of legislation that would require another Act of Congress to change. By granting this request, Congress had provided a great deal more flexibility to the process required to change the responsibilities of the services.

The principle functions of each Service established in the NSA of 1947, were primarily based on the geographical confines in which they operated. Thus, the "Army was to be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; the Navy for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, and the Air Force for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations."25

The lessons learned from WW II, revealed that as each Service conducted operations in their own domain they might also have to operate in another Services' area of primary responsibility. The NSA of 1947, further authorized the Army to include not only land combat and service forces but also "such aviation and water transport as may be organic herein." The Navy was authorized to
include "such aviation as was organic to naval combat and services forces." 26

The creation of this "area of gray" started the practice of duplicating capabilities among the Services and allowed the services to pursue their own combat development agendas. As a result, Senator Sam Nunn and others in Congress are currently questioning the requirement for military capabilities that are often duplicated and sometimes triplicated within the DOD.

The implementing directive for this Act was Executive Order (EO) 9877. 27 It was the intent of the compromise, when vaguely defining responsibilities in the original Act, for this document to fully detail the "functions" of each of the services. 28 A concise analysis of the functions outlined in the EO is contained in Kenneth W. Condit's, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume II, 1947-1949.

The mission of the Army was elaborated by the Executive Order to include the seizure or defense of land areas (including airborne and joint amphibious operations) as well as the occupation of land areas. The Navy's operations were to include control of vital sea areas, protection of sea lanes, suppression of enemy sea commerce, support of occupation forces as required, naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, and seizure of those shore positions capable of reduction by such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization. The responsibility of the Air Force was to include gaining and maintaining of general air supremacy, establishing local air superiority as required, conducting of strategic air warfare, air lift and airborne support, air support to land and naval forces, and air transport operations except as provided by the Navy. In addition, each Service was responsible for conducting joint operations. 29
However, the wording differences between the NSA of 1947 and EO 9877, were sufficient to restart the disagreements between the services over their responsibilities and functions. The fight between the Navy and Air Force over functions relating to air power, became very heated and eventually caused the Secretary of Defense to call for a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Key West Naval Base, 11 through 14 March, 1948, to resolve their differences.29

It should be noted that EO 9877, was the first document to use the terms "Common Missions of the Armed Forces of the United States" and "specific functions" of each of the services.30 The interjection of these new terms without precise definitions to describe what had previously been termed as responsibilities, gave rise to the misinterpretations that plagued this document.

The basic disagreements of the Services, as they entered the meetings at Key West, centered on the Air Force - Navy dispute over air power and the Army-Marine Corps argument concerning the size and purpose of the Corps.31 As a tactic to limit the discussion during the conference to only important issues, Secretary of Defense Forrestal informed the assembled Chiefs of Staff that, "If they failed to reach agreement, I shall have to make my own decisions."32 The seclusion of the conference site and absence of competing interest allowed the Service Chiefs to resolve their differences during the four day conference and present their recommendations to Secretary Forrestal on the 20th of March. The
The "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," replaced EO 9877 as the complimentary document to the National Security Act of 1947.33 The "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," or "Key West Agreements," became popularly known as a "roles and missions" statement. However, these two terms are not used in the text of the document. The word "functions" was used to detail what had previously been termed as "responsibilities" in other documents. The term "functions" is defined in the glossary of the document as "responsibilities, missions and tasks." 34 The definitive nature of this document is comparable to the Joint Army and Navy Board report of 1935, that carried the Services through WW II. The functions of the Department of Defense and its three subordinate departments were governed by this document until March 1954, when the Department Of Defense (DOD) published Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.35

The purpose of DOD Directive 5100.1 was to streamline the operational chain of command between the National Command Authority and the DOD.36 The directive established that the chain of command would start with the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the affected Service Secretary and end with the appointed Service Unified Commander. Commanders of Unified operations during
this period were selected on a mission by mission basis and appointment was
based on which service had the predominance of forces involved in the
operation. The functions of the Services established during the “Key West
Agreements” were essentially unchanged by the directive.

The complexity of the issues and chaotic nature of this period brought out
the worst and subsequently the best in the leaders charged with making the
required changes. The “worst” was demonstrated by the absence of support for the
Secretary of Defense by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Service, as each
lobbied Congress for support of their individual service’s agenda for change. The
“best” was characterized by the eventual cooperation and professionalism
exhibited during the Key West Conference. As we enter our own chaotic period of
change following the end of the Cold War, we are starting to repeat the mistakes
of the past, as each service publishes its own view of the future, in publications
such as “From the Sea”, “Global Reach-Global Power”, and “The Army in
Transformation: Army Focus 1992.” Each of these documents represents an
attempt to garner support for the publishing services’ agenda for the future. To
preclude the divisiveness that resulted between 1945 and 1947, a unified DOD
vision of the future must be produced to unify the Services, as we tackle the task
of realigning roles and missions for the 1990’s and beyond.

The only other attempt at major reform to the DOD during the period
following WW II, was the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. In response to criticism concerning the redundancy of capabilities among the services, President Eisenhower recommend to Congress that the Secretary of Defense be authorized to disregard the Key West Agreements and allowed to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate roles and missions within the DOD. However, Congress viewed this proposal as provocative and infringing upon their authority to assign the statutory functions (roles and missions) of the armed services. As a compromise, Congress granted the President power to, in times of national emergency, transfer, reassign, consolidate, but not abolish service functions.

The Act failed to address the assigned functions or roles and missions of the Armed Services and continued the tradition of redundancy and duplication of capabilities within the DOD created by the NSA of 1947. The combination of failing to address roles and missions and Congressional denial of the President's requested mechanism for effecting changes to roles and missions by the Secretary of Defense, seriously diluted the worth of the legislation. However, on a positive note, the Act did successfully restructure the operational chain of command by eliminating the Service Secretaries from the chain and subsequently strengthened the Secretary of Defense's position, by giving him direct access to the appointed unified commanders. As a further refinement to command relationships, the Act
abolished the command status afforded the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Air Force and placed them in the position of Chief of Service and not operational commanders. \(^4^3\)

Major changes to the DOD were not addressed again, until the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. As a result of the demonstrated lack of joint war fighting skills exhibited during the 1970's (Desert One) and the 1980's (Grenada), the basic foundations of the DOD were examined to determine the causes. \(^4^4\) Congress, as well as many service members, felt that most of the problems encountered on these operations emanated from a lack of joint training and education and that the services should organize, train, and equip their forces to be employed as part of joint commands. \(^4^5\) The Act took steps to remedy these shortcomings and designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. It further strengthened civilian authority over the military by centralizing the planning, programming and budgeting functions in the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries. \(^4^6\)

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to reorganize and improve the joint aspects of the DOD and therefore did not address the functions of the Services. However, it did improve the process by which the functions (roles and missions) of
the Services could be addressed and subsequently changed. In Title II, Part A, 
Chapter 5, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is tasked to submit a report 
every three years or upon the request of the President or Secretary of Defense, 
concerning recommended changes to the "Roles and Missions" of the armed forces 

The use of the term "roles and missions of the Armed forces" in 
Goldwater-Nichols, represents the first use of the phrase in a legislative 
document describing what had been referred to as "service functions", in DOD 
Directive 5100.1, since 1954. The introduction of this new term amplifies the 
current day dilemma of how to establish the precise definitions of military roles 
and missions, when ambiguous and inconsistent terminology is used by the 
agencies involved in the process.

The report on "Roles and Mission" to be submitted by the Chairman is a 
positive step towards gaining what President Eisenhower attempted to accomplish 
in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958. Contained within the report are 
"recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and 
missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve 
maximum effectiveness of the armed forces." In preparing the report the Chairman 
is directed to consider: a. Changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United 
States; b. Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces; and c. 
Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare. It is
interesting to note that the three areas requiring comments by the Chairman in the report are contained in the "vision" provided by General of the Army "Hap" Arnold in 1945. The most recent version of this report was submitted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell in February 1993.

As has been demonstrated by these historical examples, the development of our armed services' roles and missions has been a process plagued by ambiguous terminology, interpretations of shades of grey, political intervention, and service parochialisms. The end result of the process is a military establishment that is viewed from outside as resistant to change and unable to define its roles, missions, and functions with any amount of certainty. The most important lesson that can be learned from this study is that in order to move forward with any degree of precision, it is necessary to agree upon and accept, as recommended by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a common set of terms and definitions that will be used in all legislative acts, directives, and service doctrinal publications that apply to the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces. In order to establish a new start, all existing documents referencing roles and missions must be rewritten to incorporate the new terminology. As was stated by British Field Marshall "Monty" Montgomery, during WW II, "it is time to tidy up the battlefield."

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993, "Report on the
"Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States", may be the most definitive document to be published on the subject, since the Key West Agreements. However, the adequacy of the recommended changes are questionable when viewed in light of the continually changing expectations of the President, Congress, and the American public concerning the part the military will play in our Nation's future and the size of the Defense Budget needed to finance its operation. Senator Sam Nunn has stated "that it is time to take a fresh look at the basic organization of our armed forces....While respecting each service's unique capabilities, we can reduce redundancies, save billions of dollars and get better team work." During the recent Presidential campaign, then Governor Clinton stated "that as President I will order the Pentagon to convene a roles and mission conclave similar to the 1948 Key West summit that set the groundwork for today's division of military labor."

Chairman Powell's report addresses 29 issues that effect the roles, missions, and functions of the Services. Four issues are significant changes to the Unified Command Plan, nineteen address issues related to roles of the Services and six are concerned with Service functions. However, the report fails to enumerate the cost savings to be realized by each recommend change and leaves the reader wanting more definitive information before passing judgement as to the adequacy of the effort.
The process through which the report was formulated dictated that several draft versions of the report be prepared for staffing and comment by the various commands and agencies of the DOD. Unfortunately several excerpts of the draft versions were leaked to the press and some of the more revolutionary proposals, found in draft, did not survive for inclusion in the final report. The impression that the Chairman's report is a consensus proposal and not a document void of Service protectionism is easily made.

The lack of cost savings information and the impression that the report may be a consensus document that avoids perceived protectionist issues between the Services, reduces its effectiveness. Therefore, the document cannot be considered as a "stand alone" reflection of the changes required to streamline the DOD for the next ten years and beyond. The requirement for bold, definitive changes, asked for by Senator Nunn, can not be satisfied by this report and it has set the agenda for Congress to dictate changes to the roles, missions, and functions.

To preclude the roles, missions, and functions of the DOD from being determined by Congress for largely political reasons and the services failure to provide something more tangible, it is imperative that a series of conferences be convened to formulate and publish a vision for our nation's military in the post Cold War era. The words "Key West Agreements" are rapidly becoming a cliche, but they are currently the "politically correct" term to be used when referring to the
future of the military. Therefore, the opportunity to capture the spirit of cooperation and professionalism that prevailed at the original Key West Conference, while satisfying the demands of the President and the Congress for a conference should not be lost. The basics of the original Key West Agreements have lasted for 45 years, if a document as sound as the original can be produced, the DOD and the Nation as a whole will be well served. An added objective of the conferences will be to update all existing documents that pertain to roles, missions, and functions using the current definitions provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The aim of the conferences must be to, as stated by General of the Armies, "Hap" Arnold in 1945, "pursue the ruthless elimination of all arms, branches, services, weapons, equipment or ideas whose retention might be indicated by tradition, sentiment or sheer inertia." Anything short of this lofty purpose will be a disservice to the Nation and the men and women that serve in its armed forces.


5. Epley, 50.

6. Ibid., 60.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


10. Epley, 81.

11. Ibid., 9.

12. Ibid., 117.

13. Ibid., 136-137.

14. Ibid., 11.

15. Ibid., 175.
16 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 466.


22 Bradley, 466.

23 Ibid.

24 Epley, 196.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 167.

30 Epley, 214.

31 Condit, 177-180.
32 ibid., 161.
33 ibid., 183.
34 Epley, 219.
35 ibid., 220.
36 ibid., 248.
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
39 ibid., 278.
40 ibid.
41 ibid., 279.
42 ibid., 278.
43 ibid., 279.
44 ibid., 300.
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
47 ibid.

49 ibid.
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