ESSAYS ON STRATEGY 1858-1993

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FOREWORD

Essays on Strategy VIII begins with a study addressing the need for a shift in emphasis within the US intelligence community away from purely defense-related matters toward increasingly more important issues of international economics and commerce. If changes in the world continue at the current pace and extent, they could require such an unprecedented reorientation in national strategy.

The other essays in this anthology also examine aspects of the changing international environment. Three of them—each of which was recognized for excellence in the Strategy Essay Competition sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—analyze the requirements of US policy toward post-Noriega Panama, options for relocating US military facilities displaced or soon to be displaced from the Philippines, and whether, if adopted, the resurrected "Open Skies" proposal would benefit the United States. The final essay, an especially thoughtful and wide-ranging one, explores the relationship of national public policy to differing cultural concepts of the nature of man.

Written by students at the nation's Senior Service Colleges, this collection of essays exemplifies the kind of innovative, long-range thinking that will be more important than ever in the final decade of the twentieth century.

J. A. B. BALDWIN
Vice Admiral, US Navy
President, National Defense University
ESSAYS ON STRATEGY
SHOULD THE US GOVERNMENT ASSIST BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN competing for foreign markets and protect domestic markets from unfair competition? This question is a fair one to raise today as the Cold War fades and the Cold War economy of the United States faces fundamental changes. These changes can come willy-nilly, driven by the desire to cash in on the "peace dividend" that some say will burst forth from major reductions in the defense budget. Or they can be orchestrated by careful, innovative planning that recognizes the strategic importance of a powerful, secure, growing US economy.

Surely, the national interest now requires a fresh look at how much the government should involve itself in the marketplace at home and overseas. The government's role in nurturing and protecting commerce and business will be rigorously debated in the 1990s as a new economic order develops following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the stunning US-led defeat of Iraq, the continued

Jeffrey W. Wright, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, wrote this essay while assigned as a National Defense University Research Fellow and student at the National War College.
JEFFREY W. WRIGHT


An issue central to this coming debate is to what extent intelligence resources, especially those of the Department of Defense, should be used to support and protect commerce.

Intelligence in Support of Commerce
The idea of using intelligence to support commerce certainly tests moral, political, and practical waters. William Safire, writing in The New York Times, has raised the central issue:

In the bipolar thaw, allies will be spying on us: should we be spying on them? For example, is it in America's interest to know the status of Japan's investment in biotech, as Tokyo hires scores of consultants to learn ours—or is this a form of industrial policy we should declare immoral and illegal?!

If we assume that Japan, Britain, France, the USSR, and other nations will not hesitate to marshal the full assets of their governments, including intelligence assets, to support their national economic vitality, should the United States not do likewise? Espionage and intelligence collection are primary tools in the economic portfolios of many nations, both friends and foes. According to Senator David Boren, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, economic espionage is on the rise:

If you doubt that we are shifting from military competition primarily to economic competition, look at the targets for foreign intelligence operations. It's very interesting, but as the arms race is winding down, the spy race is heating up. And where is the growth area in this espionage activity? Not by foreign companies, but by foreign governments. It's against private commercial targets in the United States. More and more the increase in espionage is to steal our
commercial secrets for the sake of national economic purposes, as opposed to the theft of military secrets to build military strengths relatively in other countries.\textsuperscript{2}

Let us further assume that the promotion of commerce as well as the control of commerce is a government function. Government ought, therefore, to apply all legally available resources to the end of promoting commerce; it would be in the national interest to do so. The authors of \textit{Megatrends 2000} clearly make that assumption, writing, "In the Global Economy, economic considerations almost always transcend political considerations." And they conclude, "It is now clear that the 1980s was the decade when economics became more important than ideologies."\textsuperscript{3} Soviet President Gorbachev must be numbered among those who endorse such a "global economy."

As the world economic order changes, countries such as Japan are competing economically under different rules than the United States follows while competing on the same field. A totally level playing field or "free market" in world commerce is mythical. Each nation tries to tilt the playing field in its favor. Japan had a $49 billion dollar trade surplus with the United States in 1989—some of it the result of playing by different economic rules internationally and keeping its economy relatively closed nationally.\textsuperscript{4} Because the United States has not yet begun playing by Japanese rules, US industries are failing to keep pace with Japanese in product innovations, productivity, and quality, especially in the automobile industry. This failure contributes further to the trade imbalance.

Japan is nonetheless a friendly country and a very important ally. It has reacted to just criticism of its markets being closed to foreign products, of documented cases of product dumping, and of predatory business practices by reaching a 1990 trade agreement with the United States, which if honored will be a major step toward improving trade between the key Pacific trade partners.\textsuperscript{5} Because
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Japan and the United States are the linchpins of the world economy, a trade war could only damage the health of that economy. Japan also plays a key role in foreign aid and economic assistance to developing nations. For all these reasons, the US government should monitor and analyze the economic and commercial activities of Japan in the 1990s with the thoroughness and diligence with which it monitored the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the case of Japan, the United States certainly must question whether, as a nation, it has competed smartly. By dumping products and using other predatory practices in the United States while keeping its domestic markets closed to many segments of US commerce, Japan has not competed fairly. But how does the United States make up for this disadvantage in smartness and competitive fairness? Improved worker and manager productivity, quality control of products, and improved domestic savings and investment rates all help, but an additional way to level the playing field, or perhaps tilt it in favor of the United States, is to increase the use of intelligence assets to monitor foreign economic activities and research and development initiatives. CIA Director William Webster recognized that the United States will need to take to the playing field as both referee and competitor:

It is the job of intelligence to examine what is occurring, the forces at play, and the ways that actions taken abroad can affect our national security interests. With a clear understanding of the playing field, policymakers can better determine whether or not it is level as far as US interests are concerned. And understanding the capabilities and intentions of competitors will assist our policymakers in deciding how our nation will play. I think it is very important for us to recognize that other countries may not be playing by rules we would necessarily advance. The better we understand this, the better position we will be in. This may not affect our own rules of play, or our own standards, but it
certainly affects the stakes, the outcome, and even the decision of whether to play in that particular economic area.\textsuperscript{6}

Furthermore, the United States has been lax in efforts to control industrial espionage and market crimes by agents of foreign governments and foreign companies. One of the best recent examples of intelligence supporting the detection of a market crime came in the 1987 revelations that the Toshiba Corporation had sold to the Soviet Union equipment and technology to help make submarines run more quietly.\textsuperscript{7} Even though the intelligence did not head off the Japanese initiative, it allowed the United States to take sensible measures afterward.

A debate over the use of governmental intelligence for commerce has started. In an April 1990 speech, CIA Director Webster made one position in that debate clear: “There is now universal recognition that economic strength is key to global influence and power... Throughout the next decade, we will continue to see an increased emphasis on economic competitiveness as an intelligence issue.”\textsuperscript{8} Senator Boren agreed:

When you look at the targets for intelligence against the United States—[foreign] government intelligence services shifting to economic sources—we’re going to have to develop economic skills within the intelligence community. We’re going to have to know about intentions about oil production levels and exchange rates and trade policy. We’re going to have to protect our own commercial enterprises against the theft of commercial secrets. We’re going to have to begin to think about the role that we want our own intelligence services to play in terms of protecting America’s economic and commercial interests around the world.\textsuperscript{9}

These two statements indicate unambiguously to other industrialized nations that, though the United States may lack a national industrial policy and a governmentally
managed economy, US policymakers are prepared to protect and promote the nation's economic interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF WORLD ECONOMIC CHANGES

US policymakers today face a growing range of issues with national security implications—technology transfers, espionage against US businesses, problems of trade balance, control of debt, sophisticated and newly integrated financial markets, and multinational ownership of business, commerce, and industry. These all pose difficult problems that require the full attention of the government in a global economy, but perhaps the most serious relate to integrated markets and multinational ownership. Director Webster recognized the instability these problems generate:

Traditional distinctions have been blurred between domestic and international markets, between the different kinds of financial transactions, and even between who is a market participant and who is not. The transformation of international financial markets is clear when you look at the numbers: foreign exchange transactions now exceed 300 billion dollars per day, and one week of funds transferred on the international market is larger than the size of the third world debt. The number of international banks is now in the hundreds, up from just a handful in the 1970s; and new financial instruments, such as currency and interest rate swaps, are growing in the market faster than either the traders or the regulators can fully understand them.

The realities of the global economy have spurred companies to become international or sign agreements with similar companies in other countries to gain access to advanced technologies, gain a foothold in foreign markets such as EC 92, and spread financing risks and costs. A recent example is Boeing Aircraft's working closely with
Japanese industry to produce a new generation of airliners, the 767-X. Japanese industry will hold about a 10 percent share—the greatest percentage of participation that Boeing ever has allowed another entity, particularly a foreign entity, in a commercial transport effort. Another example is the agreement between Mitsubishi, the largest industry group in Japan, and West German industrial giant Daimler-Benz on cooperative aerospace research ventures. Such linkups of large, privately held corporations puts particular pressure on nationalized companies such as France’s Aerospatiale, which are more constrained in seeking international business agreements. It also puts more pressure on (in the case of Aerospatiale) the French government to find ways to keep the company competitive against international conglomerates.

For all of the benefits of the global economy, there are also negative aspects with national security implications. One example is Japan’s penchant for trying to buy and control US semiconductor toolmaking firms such as Perkin-Elmer and Semi-Gas. Semiconductors are critical components of high-technology computer, military, and telecommunication systems. US defense interests would clearly be at stake if Japan or any other foreign government or multinational corporation were to gain control of the semiconductor industry. Another example is the potentially adverse effect on the United States of the unification of West German and East German currencies. US policymakers were concerned about the generosity of the exchange. An increase in the German money supply would cause inflation in the united Germany—along with a corresponding rise in German interest rates—making it harder for the US Federal Reserve to lower US interest rates. Such uncertainty was motivation enough for President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, Commerce Secretary Mosbacher, and Director Webster to seek economic intelligence about potential damage to the US economy from German currency unification.
Economic or political developments in one country, one region, or one industry have quickly transmitted, worldwide implications. Such developments—even rumors of such developments—can send financial markets on a roller coaster ride. In late 1989 Director Webster remarked,

Just a few years ago, a rumor spread though the market that there would be an emergency “Group of Five” meeting to stabilize the US dollar. Within 30 minutes the deutsche mark and the yen dropped more than two percent against the dollar. Given the size of outstanding foreign exchange positions, the drop represented a shift in wealth of about 1 billion dollars on the market. Sudden shifts in exchange rates as a result of political events can stimulate further speculative attacks on a country’s currency—quickly draining foreign exchange reserves if a government chooses to insulate itself from currency changes.\(^{15}\)

Clearly, groups and governments are now capable of using international financial markets for their own ends—ends that may destabilize the global economy and threaten US national security interests. It is becoming much harder to determine the national identities of companies in many important industries and on many important projects. It is also becoming much harder to tie national interests to corporate interests and the directions of global markets. Add to this uncertainty the implications of Third World debt, narco-dollars, gray arms purchases, international lending to rebuild Eastern Europe, trade imbalances, the relentless quest for technologies—especially nuclear technologies—by hook or crook, and declining US market shares in many industries, and it is easy to understand the concerns expressed by William Webster.

President Bush, himself a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recognizes the need to keep an eye on economic rivals as well as military adversaries. Clearly, economic intelligence is one of the measures that
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US policymakers will use to protect national interests where economic matters are of strategic importance. How the United States responds to the reality of a rival’s ability to capture and control markets will be as important as the nation’s efforts in arms reductions and defense.

PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE ECONOMY IN A CHANGING WORLD

For the last 50 years the United States has focused principally on military adversaries. Although the country has prevailed in these struggles, many have said that the United States lost the peace to Japan and Germany. Now, having prevailed in the Cold War and war in the Middle East, might we expect to hear the same derogatory claim repeated about the peace in the 1990s? As Megatrends 2000 notes, “Among the world’s forty-four richest countries there has been no war since 1945.”

That is, none of those richest countries was directly at war with another rich country. While superpowers tested each other in places like Southeast Asia, many of these rich countries were free to develop economically. Because of alliances with the United States and the security of a US nuclear umbrella, many of these rich countries did not need massive defense establishments, freeing capital and energy for commercial advancement. Military power in the 1990s may play an even smaller role in promoting, protecting, and enhancing the security of nations. The battlefield of the foreseeable future is becoming economic, and possibly environmental, rather than military. Because the United States has devoted so much to the defense effort, the nation needs to marshal resources to improve education, basic scientific research, industrial development, resource conservation, and intelligence collection and dissemination to prepare for the marketplace that is today’s and tomorrow’s battlefield.

The United States enters the 1990s with an enormous national debt, a serious trade imbalance, a low individual
savings rate, a deficient public education system, a profound drug problem, the lowest level of voter participation among the democracies, and defense and intelligence establishments rooted solidly in the past rather than the needs of the future. In the words of Senator Boren,

Where do we stand in terms of the economic strength of this country? In a very different position than we stood in 1950 at the beginning of the Cold War, when we had nine of the largest banks in the world—now we have none of the top 20 banks in the world—when we had 70 percent share of world assets and world markets, now we’re down in the 18 and 19 percent range. And so we have an urgent need to repair the economic strength of this country if we’re going to play a role in the next century—a leadership role—and have as great an impact on the world as we’ve [had] in the last century.¹⁷

The European Community, a united Germany, Japan, and the Four Dragons of the Pacific Rim—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea—will be the chief economic threats or rivals to the United States. To help meet the challenge, the United States has a capability of great potential that has never been fully utilized—vast and powerful resources in information and intelligence.

The nation’s intelligence sources, methods, and organizations were critical to the containment of the Soviet Union and the furthering of peace and democracy during the past four decades. The information and intelligence available to US leaders affected decisions about selling grain to the USSR or pursuing disarmament. These resources now can affect US economic prosperity in the next four decades of keen competition between Japan, the Four Dragons, the European Community, and the United States. The strategy of containment is giving way to a strategy of successful economic competition.
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Few nations have a more comprehensive information industry than the United States. Both public- and private-sector information and research industries (news media, trade groups, interest groups, and research services) are international in scope and enormous in scale. The government has a massive investment in collecting and analyzing data and in disseminating information, some of it produced by the various agencies of the intelligence community. But much of the information useful to business and commercial activities is not routinely or readily available to those activities. US business and commerce rely almost exclusively on information gleaned from the information "marketplace" of the private sector. Though quality information is available from this marketplace, it is neither as complete nor as timely as that developed by, for instance, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry or by the intelligence services of many other nations.

Another problem is that the excellent information processed by the United States is, in a sense, one of the country’s most valuable “crops.” As Michelle Van Cleave of the Office of Science and Technology Policy put it, "While technology proliferation has made information more available, it has also made information more vulnerable." Numerous foreign governments, international businesses, criminal cartels, and terrorist organizations have within their reach sophisticated tools for manipulating federal and private-sector data bases. Furthermore, in such countries as Japan and France the government appears to freely funnel information—unclassified, proprietary, and even classified information—to businesses for the greater national good. Van Cleave continued, "Hostile intelligence interests are not limited to national security and foreign policy secrets, but increasingly encompass business and financial data as well. Nor are the East Bloc countries the only powers that seek American business data. What many may not realize
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is that other nations frequently share this data with their private businesses both formally and informally—competitors of US commerce and industry."^{19} The role of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry in fostering economic activities, encouraging market research, and pursuing markets has no real equal in the United States.^{20} Japanese diplomacy is likewise centered on economics, whereas US diplomacy is focused on politics and defense issues. In this respect the United States is significantly behind Japan.

The Bush administration did take steps to help AT&T in the company's effort to win an Indonesian telecommunication contract against NEC of Japan. The administration entered the competition when it learned that the Japanese government was exerting strong pressure on behalf of NEC with the Indonesian government. In the words of Commerce Under Secretary J. Michael Farren, "In every other country, you see heads of government actively engaged in commercial activities for their companies. If the US government doesn't show an interest [in] making sure the game is played fairly, our firms are at a distinct disadvantage given the way world trade operates today."^{21} But the policy of government support for business will be a success only if the goal is to help all US commercial and business activities overseas, not just Fortune 500 companies like AT&T. Revitalizing this policy can begin within the Department of State. Senator Boren suggests why:

It is extremely important that we begin to bring people into the Foreign Service who have capability in the economic areas; who have degrees, for example, in business; who have experience in business; who understand the importance of using our embassies to develop economic opportunities and economic relationships for our country in the future. . . . We have to change the attitude in our embassies. We can no longer regard the commercial section as something that ought to be in the basement or preferably in
an annex that really shouldn’t be at the embassy at all. It becomes part and parcel to the total operation and the skill base needed in any kind of diplomatic mission in any country round the world if we’re going to spread American influence and have political influence in the future.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{SHARING THE CROWN JEWELS: GIVING INTELLIGENCE TO BUSINESS}

Japan’s embassies provide extraordinary support to the Japanese business community. US embassies are infamous for the low level and quality of support provided to US businesses trying to compete for overseas markets.\textsuperscript{23} The Department of State has taken only minor steps to remedy this shortcoming. The US government needs to decide which agency (State, Treasury, or Commerce, for instance) is responsible, accountable, and first among equals for fostering US economic interests and competitiveness in the global economy.

Recognized inside and outside the government is the tremendous influence that media outlets such as Cable News Network (CNN) exert on American and foreign leaders. CNN’s coverage of the events centered on Tienanmen Square did a lot to influence public and congressional sentiments regarding China. Likewise, it brought the day-to-day, even hour-to-hour events of the Persian Gulf war to Saddam Hussein, the Pentagon, and the world community. The CNN signal is now available to key leaders in the Kremlin as well as most key offices in Washington. It is an example of the growth and maturity of information media that now work so very well outside of government-controlled press releases and the constraints of foreign censorship. In a sense CNN operates as a private-sector intelligence agency, providing key business and government leaders with “instant” access to news that might influence markets and economic decisions. LANDSAT and French SPOT satellite imagery have made “spy” satellite products
available on a commercial basis to governments as well as businesses and non-profit groups. It was difficult, for example, for the Kremlin to cover up the Chernobyl disaster when news organizations and environmental groups had satellite imagery of the burning facility.

Intelligence contributes to the viability of many goods and services considered in computing the Gross National Product. Certainly the analysis of world crops, markets, and economies helps improve agricultural planning, economic forecasting, and market decisions such as whether to sell grain to the USSR. The US government can detect when the Soviet Union's wheat production appears to be far below Soviet projections—and it can pass such information more rapidly to farmers, giving them better planning intelligence. The government should also make available sooner information on environmental pollution, such as the dumping of toxic wastes, and earth resources treaty violations, such as the illegal fishing activities of foreign fishing fleets. For example, people along the Gulf Coast need to know of toxic waste discharges into the Caribbean Sea or Gulf of Mexico by Cuba or Mexico. The nation in general needs to be advised when Japan exceeds treaty limits on the catching, killing, or importation of endangered species, and the US fishing industry has a crucial interest in knowing of the intentions or actions of foreign fleets such as Poland's or Korea's to violate international agreements on catch limits.

It is time to offer the government's remote sensing and imagery systems for use by industry, universities, and private businesses. To do so is no more shocking than allowing corporations to launch rockets and orbit satellites or to develop and test private space launch vehicles. The successful launch of the privately developed Pegasus vehicle and two satellites on 5 April 1990 was a major advance in the commercialization of space and launching of satellites. Giving remote sensing and imaging systems to business is no more shocking than the proposed Open Skies
treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that, if ratified, will allow 23 nations surveillance rights over Europe, North America, and the USSR. Serious consideration should be given to also using remote sensing technology to foster commerce and economic activities.²⁵ To do so would not be an immoral linking of government and industry that runs counter to US free market principals. What I propose is that US industries have access through user fees to many forms of intelligence currently withheld from them. The US government needs to provide the same high-quality support that other governments, such as the Japanese and French, provide to their industries. Japan will undoubtedly have remote sensing or intelligence collection satellites in orbit before the century ends. Is there any doubt that they will be used to enhance Japan Inc?

Improved intelligence on friendly nations such as Japan and the members of the European Community will become as important in the 1990s as knowledge of what was going on within the Soviet Union was in the 1980s. Shifting the emphasis of the intelligence community away from an exclusive emphasis on defense and politics to a balanced approach concerning economics, politics, and defense will be difficult. But the worldwide information explosion means that much of the information needed to drive political and economic decisions will be available from open sources in the 1990s. Information gathering and intelligence collection and analysis by non-governmental activities will increase, particularly in scientific, economic, environmental, and cultural areas. News services such as the Associated Press, financial research organizations such as those that are parts of international banks, trade groups such as the US Automobile Manufactures Association, and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace will for the most part overtly gain and analyze information. This information can become a greater basis for both government and non-governmental decisionmaking and, in con-
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cert with government intelligence, contribute to US security and prosperity.

A DOD ROLE IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Spies, satellites, listening posts, overt collection, covert collection, and intelligence analysis will remain major factors in the relations of the superpowers and most of the other nations of the world. In fact, they may surpass the defense forces of the United States and the USSR in importance in “winning the peace.” But in the 1990s these capabilities will be or should be targeted against different aspects of superpower relationships than they were in the 1980s. In the 1990s US security and national interests will require intelligence on emerging technologies in countries such as Japan or Czechoslovakia, the political leanings of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia or Thailand, the direction of extremist or fundamental religious groups in Iran or Indonesia, and the locations where the French or Estonians are dumping toxic or radioactive waste—as well as knowledge of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. The US intelligence community—whose resources, agencies, and heritages are dominated by work on the armed forces, government, and economy of the Soviet Union—recognizes that there is a greater world out there filled with challenges and opportunities for the United States that require a new view of intelligence. The community is capable of meeting the challenge. CIA Director Webster, as head of the US intelligence community, recognized this capability and has put together a task force on international economic competition. It is probable that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will also delve into the same issue.

The reconnaissance, surveillance, signals intelligence, photographic intelligence, and human intelligence resources of DOD are useful in a variety of missions from tracking earth resources to the activities of foreign economic activities. A majority of the US intelligence man-

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power and technical collection means are within the Department of Defense in the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence elements of the military services, and other DOD offices for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence. These resources are already supporting the nation's war on drugs. In essence DOD is already working against commercial and business activity—the production, transportation, and distribution of illegal drugs. After a long battle with Congress over getting involved in the drug war, DOD has committed its multifaceted assets to this national priority. These intelligence assets are equally available to information gathering on other economic activities posing threats to the nation.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

While US decisionmakers are only beginning to debate the idea of using US intelligence to economic advantage, other countries are already heavily involved in intelligence collection to support their economies. Truly, the growth in size and sophistication of the foreign intelligence threat to US public institutions and the business sector represents a strategic threat significant to US economic vitality. The most pervasive intelligence threat continues to be the KGB. We can expect KGB collection efforts to increase as exchanges, business contacts, and technology transfer between the USSR and the United States increase—particularly since President Bush and President Gorbachev signed a trade agreement during their 1990 summit meeting in Washington. Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB and a member of the Communist Party's ruling Politburo, has said quite clearly that Soviet business firms will be helped by the KGB:

Western companies have many years of experience of commercial operations. Many of them have their own intelli-
gence and counterintelligence services. They were forced to introduce them by competition. Our companies that are gaining access to the external market do not have such services, and since they have little experience they are vulnerable. I believe the KGB must help them acquire appropriate experience.29

Particularly vulnerable to exploitation is the extensive use of computers and telephones, especially cellular telephones, by US businesses. Tapping into such systems is not a sophisticated undertaking. The Soviet Union continues to improve the telecommunication intercept capabilities of its embassies and the very active communication intercept facilities in Cuba. Precise measurement of the economic harm caused by such foreign intercepts is difficult, but without question the dollar value and effect on US economic viability—considerable now—will increase.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William S. Sessions, glasnost and perestroika have not in any way decreased Soviet espionage activities against the United States:

While current US-Soviet relations represent an unprecedented climate of cooperation, the FBI has documented the reality that the Soviet intelligence operations have increased in sophistication, scope, and number, and it is our assessment that Soviet espionage activity will continue to increase in the future. However, there is an inaccurate public perception that events in the Soviet Union equate to a decreasing intelligence threat to our nation. Accordingly, this has created an environment in which intelligence operations are easier for the Soviets to initiate, harder for the FBI to identify and neutralize, and increasingly more difficult for the FBI to explain to the public and some sectors of government the threat of Soviet intelligence activities.30

Much work remains to create a counterintelligence effort that protects government, scientific, and business
secrets from exploitation by foreign governments and businesses. The fall of the Berlin Wall has substantially altered the spy game between the USSR and the West. Alex Leamas would not have a wall to climb if John Le Carré’s *The Spy Who Came In From the Cold* were set in the 1990s, but colleagues of Leamas would be serving both governments and businesses. The United States should anticipate that the KGB will step up its already high level of espionage to obtain technology and economic information that will aid in the rebuilding of the Soviet economy. A major alteration to the spy game is that the USSR may no longer control and direct the efforts of the intelligence services of the East European countries.31

One of the more pressing problems facing the United States is the espionage threat posed by the explosion in foreign visitors and immigrants. Now that the Cold War is over, there is an additional flood of people entering the United States as visitors from Eastern Europe and the USSR. A major portion of the burden of protecting US businesses and commerce from espionage falls on the shoulders of the FBI, but the number of FBI agents is inadequate to handle the counterintelligence threat posed by this increase in the number of foreign government officials, businessmen, and tourists entering the country. Since 1980 the number of FBI agents has increased only 24 percent—from 7,885 to 9,801.32 This increase in personnel over the last decade is dwarfed by the increase in the number of foreign visitors entering the United States during the same period—11.7 million nonimmigrants in 1981 increased 54 percent to an estimated 18 million in 1990. What is important is knowing which of the millions are engaged in espionage. With its agents spread thin by work on its six priority programs (organized crime, drug enforcement, counterterrorism, white-collar crime, crimes of violence, and counterintelligence), the Bureau is hard-pressed to track those millions.33 Furthermore, growing competition in the global economy may well make white-collar crime and foreign
counterintelligence even greater priorities for the FBI in the years ahead. Likewise the counterintelligence assets within DOD and the armed services are not keeping pace with the expanded numbers and technical capabilities of foreign intelligence personnel.\(^{34}\) It is safe to assume that the counterintelligence efforts of industry are likewise in serious need of overhaul and upgrade.

In 1988 the Soviet Union issued 27,592 visas for travel to the United States. For 1989 that figure had increased to more than 50,000. Add to this increase the possibility of up to 70,500 emigres from the Soviet Union, and you can appreciate the explosion in the number of aliens from the USSR that the FBI has to be concerned about.\(^{35}\) The People's Republic of China also uses nonimmigrants and immigrants for espionage. The number of PRC nationals in the United States in 1989 exceeded the number of Soviets. The PRC had more than 2,600 diplomatic and commercial officials in the United States, more than 8,000 delegations with about 25,000 members, 40,000 students and scholars, plus the up to 20,000 PRC emigres allowed to enter the United States each year. In the words of the FBI director, “This large presence of PRC nationals creates a tremendous need for a counterintelligence response as the FBI has documented the widespread use of these PRC nationals by the PRC government for intelligence collection.”\(^{36}\) We can assume that the PRC will find fertile ground in the United States for obtaining industrial, technological, and commercial secrets from US and foreign businessmen and firms operating on US soil. China probably cannot resist the opportunity to gain information from US, Japanese, and European firms competing in the economically rich but security poor United States.

THE FUTURE

As the United States reduces the size of its military defenses, particularly those tied to land warfare in Europe,
US decisionmakers should look seriously at increasing the ranks of the FBI. Bear in mind recent espionage such as the Walker spy case that resulted in serious strategic damage to US national security. FBI Director Sessions believes, "This damage effectively nullified the benefits of huge expenditures in defense and intelligence collection programs and will require massive additional expenditures if these losses are to be rectified." In the 1990s there will probably be more John Walkers, Jerry Whitworths, and Jonathan Pollards trading America’s secrets for money. But in this decade they will most likely trade industrial, commercial, and technological secrets as well as defense secrets. The recipients of this information will not be just the USSR or Israel but other nations who are economic rivals—as well as multinational companies whose allegiances are at times hard to determine.

It would be prudent for the US government and US industries to thwart or neutralize this threat. A strategic advantage will go to the nation that most rapidly adjusts to the economic challenges of the future rather than continuing the Cold War. The Executive Branch and Congress—despite continuing deliberations on the federal budget, the so-called “peace dividend,” and major revisions to the armed forces—ought not to forget the debate on intelligence amid the clamor over base closings, budget deficits, apartheid, abortion, Lithuania, elections, and political and economic uncertainties in Europe.

As a nation we must decide what contributes more to our well-being during the next decade: another aircraft carrier or combat division, or an increase in our diplomatic, intelligence, and internal security forces? In the 1980s we chose aircraft carriers and combat divisions, but in the 1990s the best choice might be to devote resources to aggressive diplomatic, scientific, economic, and intelligence programs. A few more diplomats in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas, a few more FBI agents in Silicon Valley, a few more CIA agents in the Middle East, and a few more
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customs agents in Miami are alternatives that should be explored.

The world is changing quickly. We need a leaner and meaner defense establishment that frees up resources for pursuits that improve our economic well-being as well as the environment. We also need an intelligence and information gathering apparatus that supports economic activity as well as defense and political needs. The second, in fact, supports the first. In other words, a billion dollars worth of FBI, NSA, and CIA manpower might add more to our security than a billion dollars worth of weapons. That much money would buy the nation only a few weapons, but it could buy an entire “corps” of men and women to work the complex intelligence, counterintelligence, and counternarcotics programs critically important to US security and growth. In essence, the nation must recognize and get to work on its greatest problem—economic competitiveness. A well-financed, high-quality intelligence program aimed at economic competitiveness might be the most important new development in US national security for the years ahead.

NOTES


6. William H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, remarks to the Jefferson Club, University of Missouri, 27 April 1990 (Washington: Public Affairs-Central Intelligence Agency).

7. An excellent description of the Toshiba case and the struggle within the United States Government to make a case against Toshiba is found in "Taking Toshiba Public," a Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government 1988 case study written by Anna M. Warrock and Howard Husosk. The case study was developed with support from the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. CIA Director Webster, remarks at the World Affairs Council of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, 12 April 1990 (Washington: Public Affairs-Central Intelligence Agency).


10. CIA Director Webster, remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California, 19 September 1989 (Washington: Public Affairs-Central Intelligence Agency).


13. According to Scott Stevens, a spokesman for SEMATECH, the sale of Semi-Gas has substantial national security implications as it would give Japan control over a critical element of the semiconductor manufacturing process. See also "SEMATECH Fights to Block a Sale to Japanese," Investor's Daily, 20 April 1990, p. 19. SEMATECH (SEMiconductor MAnufacturing TECHnology) is a consortium of 14 US semiconductor manufacturers determined to provide US industry the domestic capability for world leadership in semiconductor manufacturing. DOD helps fund SEMATECH and DARPA represents DOD on the SEMATECH Board. "SEMATECH is a unique example of industry/government cooperation forged in an alarming environment. Due to Japanese
targeting and illegal dumping practices, the US lost its technical and economic advantage in the semiconductor industry to foreign competitors," from the SEMATECH Handbook 1989.

14. The economic union of the two German states is set for 1 July 1990. Wages and pension benefits will exchange at a 1-to-1 rate. This will cause Bonn to increase the money supply by about 10 percent but this potentially inflationary process should be offset by the grafting onto the FRG economy the GDR economy which is roughly 10 percent the size of the FRG. German and US officials are generally optimistic that the economic and currency merger will have only a minimal effect on German inflation partially because of their confidence in the monetary controls of the Bundesbank. The German central bank (Bundesbank) is most concerned about inflation and is likely to control interest rates to hold down inflationary pressures. Interviews with John Sammis, Department of State, Office of Central European Affairs and Joseph Eichenberger, Department of the Treasury, 20 June 1990. See also Charles Fenyvesi, Editor, "Washington Whispers: What the US may pay for German unification," U.S. News & World Report, 23 April 1990, p. 18 and Marc Fisher, "Two Germanys Set July 1 as Date for Monetary Merger," Washington Post, 25 April 1990, sec. A, p. 33.

15. CIA Director Webster, remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 19 September 1989.


19. Ibid.

20. The argument is made that the Pentagon, through the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency and funding of national laboratories and independent contractor research and development, is the US equivalent of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry and that since World War II we have had an unacknowledged industrial policy organization—the Pentagon. See Robert Kuttner, "Industry Needs A Better Incubator Than the Pentagon," Business Week, 30 April 1990, p. 16. For gaining insights into the MITI see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982). This book is a history of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The final three chapters are particularly useful in understanding the role of
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the MITI in pursuing technologies, markets, and Japanese industrial policy.

21. Stuart Auerbach, "Bush Leads Bid to help AT&T in Indonesia Pact," Washington Post, 14 February 1990, sec. D, p. 1. "In the AT&T case, top administration officials said that they acted following reports from Jakarta that Japan might be using its $2.1 billion in annual aid to Indonesia as leverage to swing the contract to NEC."


23. Many US businessmen want nothing to do with the American embassies. They never seek US official contacts or help. This is understandable and appropriate as many businesses compete quite well in foreign markets without the assistance of their government. But there are foreign markets such as those of Japan which are generally impenetrable in many sectors without government assistance.

24. Bruce A. Smith, "Pegasus Completes First Operational Flight, Places Payload in Earth Orbit," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 April 1990, p. 22-23. "Pegasus was developed in a privately funded joint venture between Orbital Science Corp. and Hercules Aerospace Inc. which together funded the nonrecurring costs for development. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has funded nonrecurring costs for initial launch vehicles and demonstration and test and evaluation programs." The three stage Pegasus vehicle was carried to 43,000 ft by the NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility B-52 where it was launched. Though Pegasus is a "private sector" venture it is a venture that rides on the back (the belly to be precise) of NASA with a "boost" from DARPA also. See also Bruce A. Smith, "Pegasus Booster Proves to Be Highly Accurate in Its First Launch," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 16 April 1990, pp. 24-25.

25. Remote sensing would also be valuable in analyzing the environment. "Each day thousands of aerial photos and multisensor images of Earth are acquired from platforms in the atmosphere or space. These images constitute valuable sources of data for analyzing environmental conditions and for making recommendations about alleviating Earth resource problems. Aerial photography and multisensor imagery have seven important roles to play relative to protecting life on this planet: (1) providing an historical record, (2) as an inventory and assessment tool, (3) a mapping and charting source, (4) a change detection vehicle, (5) a predictive instrument, (6) a planning and management vehicle, and (7) serendipitous effects." Dino A. Brugioni, "The Impact and Social Implications of Commercial Remote-Sensing Satellites," Technology in Science, vol. 11 (1989), p. 1.

26. CIA Director Webster, Remarks to the Jefferson Club, University of Missouri, 27 April 1990.
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27. "The Intelligence community refers in aggregate to those Executive Branch agencies and organizations that conduct the variety of intelligence activities which comprise the total U.S. national intelligence effort. The Community included the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the Department of Defense for collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department; intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and the Intelligence Community Staff." Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book on Intelligence, May 1989, p. 19.

28. Congress must approve the trade agreement. The Bush Administration will not forward the trade agreement until the Soviets codify free emigration, thus allowing the president to waive the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment by certifying that Soviet citizens can emigrate freely. It is also doubtful that the US Congress will approve the trade agreement until there is clear evidence of Soviet actions to allow the independence of the Baltic States, particularly Lithuania. With or without a trade agreement or even Most Favored Nation status for the USSR, KGB efforts and activities against the US will probably increase. Van Cleave, "A National Perspective on Corporate Information Security," Stuart Auerbach, "U.S., Soviets Complete Bulk of Trade Accord," Washington Post, 27 April 1990, Sec. A, p. 31, and interview with Michael Brownrigg, Office of European Affairs-United States Trade Representative, 20 June 1990.


30. William S. Sessions, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, opening statement before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 5 April 1990, p. 9.


33. FBI Director Sessions, opening statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, p. 3.
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35. FBI Director Sessions, opening statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, p. 9.


37. Ibid.
IN THE IMMORTAL WORDS OF YOGI BERRA, “IT WAS DÉJÀ VU ALL
over again,” as President Bush resurrected the Open Skies
proposal originally conceived by the Eisenhower adminis-
tration in 1955. Unlike the earlier Eisenhower-Khrushchev
face-off in Geneva, today the Open Skies proposal seems
to be rushing toward completion as another in a long list of
arms control agreements and CSBMs (confidence- and
security-building measures) that are likely to be imple-
mented in the coming years.

The Open Skies proposal being negotiated by the War-
saw Pact and NATO nations would, in essence, “open the
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skies" of each bloc to inspection flights by aircraft from the other bloc. Its purpose is to improve each side's confidence that the other side is not secretly preparing for war and, proponents expect, thus lead to lower tensions between East and West.

Acknowledging that the political issues and benefits would be paramount in an Open Skies treaty, in this essay we are focusing primarily on rather limited and somewhat technical aspects of the proposals—mainly in regard to the intelligence communities. More specifically, this essay examines the Open Skies CSBM proposal from five different perspectives:

1. What the historical parallels and dissimilarities are between the circumstances of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bush proposal.
2. How US and Soviet concerns and hopes mirror each other about the possible ramifications of the treaty and intelligence opportunities that the treaty might provide.
3. How one can use a bureaucratic analysis of the two nations' Open Skies proposals to achieve a greater understanding of national decisionmaking and the differing balances of power between competing elements of each nation's intelligence interests. (Essentially, we are concerned with two general groups: intelligence gatherers and counterintelligence forces—in other words, the "collectors" and the "protectors.")
4. Why we think that it is not in the US interest to pursue such a treaty.
5. Why, if the US government continues to pursue a treaty, a compromise position composed of elements from both the Soviet and US positions will better serve US interests than the current NATO proposal.

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We work from each of these five perspectives, in order, with each analysis building upon the previous ones.\textsuperscript{2}

**HISTORICAL PARALLELS**

Just days after Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney urged him to do so, President Bush proposed a modified version of President Eisenhower's 1955 Open Skies plan to a receptive audience at Texas A\&M's 1989 commencement ceremony.\textsuperscript{3} Unlike 1955, this time the concept fell upon receptive ears and rapidly gained support.\textsuperscript{4} (See table 1 for an Open Skies chronology.)

Despite the enormous changes that have occurred in the world over the past 35 years, in examining the two proposals one quickly is struck by the parallels between both the milieus in which the proposals were made and the rationales behind the decisions to make the proposals. In addition to discussing these commonalities, this section will conclude with some of the differences that have led to the positive reception the proposal has received in 1989–90 as opposed to 1955.

**Similarities**

From the US perspective, there are four basic similarities between the two periods: change in central Europe; a changing and, at least potentially, reform-minded Soviet leadership; a perception that the Soviet Union was gaining in the battle for favorable world public opinion; and a perception that the United States—as an open society—suffered in comparison to the Soviet Union—a closed society—in intelligence collection possibilities.

Thirty-five years ago, Europe—especially Central Europe—was in the midst of significant change. The Bundeswehr was formed in 1955 as the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO. In response, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was formed. On a more peaceful note, the Soviets acceded to the Austrian State Treaty, in which
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TABLE 1: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 July 1955</td>
<td>Eisenhower presents Open Skies at Four Power Summit Meeting in Geneva; Soviets quickly reject proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1989</td>
<td>Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, during discussions in Washington, urges President Bush to re-propose Open Skies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Bush proposes modified Open Skies plan at Texas A &amp; M commencement address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 September</td>
<td>Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze indicates Soviet willingness to discuss Open Skies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September</td>
<td>Canada offers to act as host to an Open Skies Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January 1990</td>
<td>A Canadian Air Force Hercules transport aircraft makes a test flight over Hungary (carrying no sensor package)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January–1 February</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting in Budapest, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–28 Feb</td>
<td>Conference in Ottawa, Canada. First three days were attended by Foreign Ministers, expert meetings followed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April–12 May</td>
<td>Scheduled follow-on meeting in Budapest; initial plans called for a 12 May signing of a treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they agreed to remove their forces from the eastern half of Austria in return for similar US withdrawal from Austria and guarantees of future Austrian neutrality. The Soviet leadership itself was in the midst of change—two years earlier, Stalin had died after decades as the Soviet Union’s absolute leader and, over the next two years, the West had been unable to decipher the politics of the triumvirate that replaced Stalin at the helm of power in the Soviet Union.
There was, however, a common perception that Stalin's death was a good thing for the West and that new leadership would be more accommodating to proposals for peaceful relations between the two superpowers. There were a number of concerns in the West about this leadership, and one of them was, simply, that the NATO nations did not know who was truly in charge.

In 1989, when President Bush made his proposal, there were similar winds of change in Europe. In many Eastern bloc nations, there was an easing of internal controls, exemplified most by the growing role of the Solidarity Union movement in the Polish government and the economic reforms being pursued by the Hungarian government. The Soviet leadership itself had changed greatly as well. After two decades of stagnation under Brezhnev and his geriatric successors, Gorbachev had been testing the fabric of Soviet society for four years with one new reform idea after another. In the two months before Bush's proposal, the Soviet Union had held its first (partially) free elections in more than 70 years. Among the many issues that the Bush administration faced in dealing with the Soviet Union was a fear that Gorbachev had a tenuous hold on power and that the drive for reform depended solely on his continuation in power—which many of Bush's advisors considered uncertain.

Just as there are similarities in the two eras, there are similarities between the two administrations' stated and implied reasons for proposing Open Skies. Amidst the preparations for the Geneva summit in 1955, there were a number of concerns paramount among Eisenhower's advisors—two of which led directly to the proposal, one of which was resolved by the Soviet reaction to the proposal. In their deliberations, Eisenhower's advisors, most importantly his special assistant Nelson A. Rockefeller, searched for a means to test Soviet sincerity on arms control. The administration also sought to counter the increasing Soviet propaganda successes.
Following the Austrian State Treaty agreement, the Soviets had indicated a willingness to adopt verification measures that seemed very appealing. The most important of these was a 10 May Soviet proposal for intrusive on-site verification facilities for monitoring the movement of forces. This proposal would have established fixed sites for the monitoring stations, which were considered unacceptable by the Eisenhower administration based on the experiences in Korea and Indochina with similar agreements. (In Korea, for example, Chinese forces had simply moved around established truce monitoring stations.) Eisenhower's advisors believed that the Soviets would be able (and more than willing) to evade the intent of such an agreement in a similar manner.

Thus, Eisenhower's advisors looked elsewhere for a proposal to test Soviet intentions. In their deliberations they aimed for a wide range of proposals, from the extreme end of the earlier-proposed Atoms for Peace concept to a series of cultural exchanges that they viewed as essentially meaningless. The intellectual genesis of the Open Skies proposal can be found in the administration's search for a proposal that fell between these extremes. The proposal quickly gained favor within the administration because it would solve both dilemmas—it was a moderate proposal for testing the Soviets that would also help in the battle for world public opinion. In addition, they believed it had a number of essential additional benefits if accepted. For example, Open Skies would fill in an important intelligence gap because it was generally agreed that the United States (and NATO) suffered in comparison to the Soviet Union in its ability to gather intelligence information. Additionally, a successful Open Skies treaty could have led to lower defense budgets through a lowered risk of a bolt-from-the-blue attack into Western Europe.

President Eisenhower proposed Open Skies in a rather dramatic fashion at the Geneva summit. Several days into the summit, Eisenhower put forward his concept of a bilat-
eral program for aerial inspections. At the close of his statement, as Eisenhower describes,

Without warning, and simultaneous with my closing words, the loudest clap of thunder I have ever heard roared into the room, and the conference was plunged into Stygian darkness. . . . For a moment there was stunned silence. Then I remarked that I had not dreamed I was so eloquent as to put the lights out.10

At first, the Soviet response was positive; Chairman Nikolai Bulganin spoke encouragingly of the possibilities of the treaty. The optimism was short-lived, however, as Khrushchev soon told Eisenhower that he did not agree with Bulganin. Khrushchev’s rejection of the proposal, however, solved one of Eisenhower’s most serious dilemmas—he now knew who was in charge in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev revealed his status as the true holder of power by his emphatic rejection of Eisenhower’s proposal so shortly after Bulganin’s public comments. Thus, Open Skies was quickly put to rest. As one Soviet commentator recently noted,

It was originally proposed by American President Eisenhower during a Geneva summit meeting. . . . However, the condition of relations between the East and the West at that period did not permit the implementation of the idea. In the following years both superpowers developed effective means of receiving information about one another. At first high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were used, and later complex spy satellites. As a result everyone, it seems, forgot about the Geneva proposal.11

Someone, however, did remember, and 34 years after the original proposal was developed, President Bush echoed many of the Eisenhower themes when he re-proposed Open Skies. It is worth quoting extensively from the President’s statement:
Thirty-four years ago, President Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet leaders who, after the death of Stalin, promised a new approach toward the West. He proposed a plan called Open Skies, which would allow unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over the territory of the other country. This would open up military activities to regular scrutiny and, as President Eisenhower put it, "convince the world that we are lessening danger and relaxing tension." President Eisenhower's suggestion tested the Soviet readiness to open their society. And the Kremlin failed that test. Now, let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis, one which I hope would include allies on both sides. We suggest that those countries that wish to examine this proposal meet soon to work out the necessary operational details, separately from other arms control negotiations. Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular scrutiny for both sides. Such unprecedented territorial access would show the world the true meaning of the concept of openness. The very Soviet willingness to embrace such a concept would reveal their commitment to change.12

As one can surmise from President Bush's remarks, the stated motivations for the proposal were the same in 1989 as they were in 1955: to test Soviet willingness to accede to measures that would truly lead to a more peaceful and safer world. The unstated motivations remained much the same as well. Despite the advent of satellites and their impressive capabilities, the US national security community remains convinced that because the United States is an open society it suffers in relation to the Soviet Union in its ability to gather information. Therefore, some US officials believe that Soviet agreement to Open Skies would allow the United States to, in a paraphrasing of Winston Churchill, peel one more layer from the onion that represents the enigma of the Soviet Union to the West. Also, just as in 1955, the White House was concerned about the Soviet
TABLE 2: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO ERAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Arms Control</td>
<td>INF treaty implemented; decades of experience in arms control (SALT, Test Ban Treaty, for example) and treaties being negotiated (START and CFE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No surveillance coverage of Soviet Union; no strategic warning capability, little intelligence gathering capability against Soviet strategic forces</td>
<td>Satellite coverage: provides both strategic warning and intelligence capability on Soviet strategic forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet intentions unknown; seriousness of desire to participate in arms control could not be fathomed</td>
<td>Arms control progressing in many forums; little to no need seen for test of Soviet good faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower administration looking forward to deployment of U-2 spy aircraft and satellites—wanted to establish good faith by offering equal access to both sides</td>
<td>No such good faith measure needed; “Open Space” already exists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leadership’s favorable public opinion poll results in Western Europe. Open Skies was turned to as a means of reversing this trend.

Differences
Despite these similarities, there are a number of differences between the periods that are worth considering (see table 2). In essence, the principal differences are these:

1. In 1955, there had been no attempts at arms control between the two superpowers, no ongoing negotia-
tions nor working precedents, and therefore Open Skies was useful for testing the water between the two superpowers—in 1989 the two superpowers had 30 years of experience in superpower arms control and had both working treaties and suitably progressing treaty negotiations.

2. Perhaps more important, in 1955 the United States had no reliable intelligence coverage of Soviet territory, thus no accurate information on Soviet strategic forces. In 1989 both superpowers had extensive satellite networks providing both early warning capabilities and information on deployments and numbers of the other side’s strategic forces.

In addition to these factors, in 1955 the Eisenhower administration was looking forward to a number of programs that would allow the United States unilateral surveillance coverage of Soviet territory. Part of the intent behind the Open Skies proposal was for the United States to seize the moral high ground. If the Soviets acceded to Open Skies, then the balloon, U-2, and satellite programs would be less of a priority. If, on the other hand, the Soviets rejected Open Skies, the United States would have demonstrated a willingness to grant surveillance access when it began to utilize its unilateral capabilities. Today, obviously, no such demonstration is needed. Mutual acceptance of satellite overflight is more than 30 years old and no such propaganda demonstration is needed.

In the mid-1950s, US defense planners feared that the Soviet Union was quickly gaining on the United States in technology and feared that the Soviets might surpass the United States in important areas (such as rocketry, as Sputnik later graphically displayed). Eisenhower viewed Open Skies as a means to monitor Soviet defense programs to lower the possibility of any such breakthrough. By mid-1989, on the other hand, it was clear that the Soviet economy was in dire straits and the military was being re-
trenched to some degree. Fears of a Soviet breakout, perhaps prominent in the early 1980s, had by the end of the decade become peripheral for US defense planning.

Assessing the Historical Parallel
When one considers the Open Skies proposal, in many ways it does seem like déjá vu. It was not just random timing that facilitated a reintroduction of the proposal 34 years later by President Bush. There are a surprising number of similarities between the two eras—change in Eastern Europe, economic problems in the Soviet Union and turmoil amidst the Soviet leadership, and a feeling that the Soviets are winning the war for world public opinion. At the same time, there are significant differences—the existence of arms control treaties and progressing negotiations, and sophisticated satellite coverage by both sides in 1989 among the most important. The one difference, however, which has led to the differing fates of the proposal is, in our opinion, simply the major change in the attitude of the Soviet leadership to arms control and to relations with the West. In the words of a senior Soviet military officer,

[In 1955] the cold war was at its height and the concept could not be implemented. It was rejected by the Soviet side virtually without discussion. But the years have passed and our approaches to many problems—including security and secrecy—have altered. Therefore, when President Bush proposed . . . that the subject be discussed again, the seed, as they say, fell on fertile ground.14

MIRROR IMAGING
Americans frequently engage in mirror imaging, projecting one's own way of thinking onto another party, when attempting to fathom Soviet decisionmaking. This is almost always dangerous and misleading. This case, though, might prove an exception. Mirror imaging can be useful in
improving one's understanding of Open Skies issues. With this in mind, the following section examines the intelligence issues involved in an Open Skies treaty using mirror imaging techniques.

In essence, we have separated the intelligence issues for both sides into two categories: potential gains through the overflights that the treaty will allow, and risks created by agreement to overflights. Thus, one creates a four-sector box analysis: 1. US gains, 2. US risks, 3. Soviet gains, and 4. Soviet risks (see table 3).

Though somewhat simplistic, table 3 captures the essence of the intelligence issues for both the Soviet Union and the United States in the consideration of an Open Skies treaty. Essentially, both sides have similar potential gains if allowed to fly surveillance aircraft, at short notice, over the territory of the other. As noted in Sector 1, the potential intelligence windfall includes very-high-resolution photography (useful, for example, for cruise missile guidance), an ability to acquire low-altitude photographs of sites that information derived from other national technical means indicates require inspection, a potential for surprising normally hidden activities because of the short-notice nature of the flights, a possibility for gaining intelligence on mobile strategic forces (and other high-value, secretive items), and an ability to conduct analysis of a target with many different collection tools simultaneously.

After examining potential US gains, one quickly comes to the realization that potential threats are virtually identical—with priorities somewhat modified (for example, the high US fear that the Soviets would cheat by collecting SIGINT against the low possibility that the United States would cheat in a similar fashion). The potential Soviet gains and threats from an Open Skies treaty seem very similar to those of the United States.

Thus, when considering the issue of potential gains and risks from entering into this treaty, one need only consider one of the four sectors to gain a reasonable first-
### TABLE 3: MIRROR IMAGING OF OPEN SKIES
#### INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector 1: US Gains</th>
<th>Sector 2: Threats to United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-resolution, low-level photography (could be useful for intelligence collection and improved cruise missile targeting, for example)</td>
<td>High-resolution, low-level Soviet photography (threat of intelligence collection and use for guidance of Soviet missiles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased flexibility of aircraft vs. satellites means potential surprise viewing of Soviet targets and capabilities (and also might ease demands on other national technical means)</td>
<td>Risk that Soviets will surprise tests, etc. in overflights; many tests or exercises likely to be canceled due to Soviet overflights (at high monetary cost)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-spectral analysis of targets</td>
<td>Soviet multi-spectral analysis of targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater intelligence on Soviet forces, especially mobile strategic forces</td>
<td>Soviet ability to gather information on such US capabilities as stealth aircraft and future mobile strategic forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tremendous SIGINT potential (if US cheats, which seems unlikely); overflight access, at short notice, to closed Soviet territory for high-resolution photography based on satellite cuing</td>
<td>Greater fear that Soviets will cheat and install SIGINT capabilities on aircraft the Soviets use for overflight, at short notice, of restricted US airspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved knowledge of Soviet capabilities through inspection of hardware during pre-flight check of Soviet overflight aircraft</td>
<td>Technology transfer of surveillance capabilities (either direct through licensed export of sensors or indirect through Soviet inspection of Western hardware)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector 3: Soviet Gains</th>
<th>Sector 4: Threats to Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essentially the same as US gains; most important, multi-spectral analysis of US sites. In addition:</td>
<td>Essentially a mirror of US gains and essentially the same as Sector 2; in addition:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology transfer (either direct or through inspection of Western hardware)</td>
<td>New mind-set required: opening of a traditionally closed society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential for espionage through increased Soviet presence in the United States and other Western countries</td>
<td>Psychological fear of German (i.e., Luftwaffe) aircraft flying over Soviet territory again (issue often raised by Soviets)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
order understanding of the benefits and problems that will be highlighted in the other three.

Mirror imaging remains useful, however, only for the first step; it is not an answer by itself. But it is a viable tool for gaining a greater understanding of the range of Soviet and US concerns about the implications of Open Skies. As one examines the issues more closely, it can be seen that priorities and possibilities differ in degree and scope. For example, it seems certain that both the Soviet and US intelligence communities desire the higher resolution photography that would result from an Open Skies regime. It also seems certain that the Soviets would have a vast improvement in their imagery because their satellite capabilities are far less advanced than those of the West according to open-source analyses. Thus, in this area, the treaty would benefit the Soviet Union much more than the United States.

Despite the degree of differences that one finds upon detailed analysis, the usually dangerous analytical tool of mirror imaging seems surprisingly useful in the search for a basic outlining of the potential intelligence benefits and counter-intelligence fears of both the United States and the Soviet Union in deliberations over the Open Skies proposal.

BUREAUCRATIC ANALYSIS

Another interesting way to look at the Open Skies proposals is to compare the potential gains and risks identified in the preceding analysis to some of the differences between the two sides' proposals. This comparison can be used to gain insight into the relative strength of various sections of the intelligence community in each nation. Essentially, we can determine who had the greatest influence on the treaty proposals: those concerned with intelligence collection (the "gatherers") or those concerned with counterintelligence (the "protectors").
**TABLE 4: AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT IN OPEN SKIES PROPOSALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Each party responsible for providing its own aircraft for an overflight; inspected party would have the right to inspect the aircraft</td>
<td>1. Either all parties share common airframes or inspected nation provides airframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Data collected is property of collecting party</td>
<td>2. Shared data bank, with all parties having access to all collected data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overflights of all territory except where air safety precludes them</td>
<td>3. Overflight areas to be restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Each nation should provide its own sensor suite</td>
<td>4. A common sensor suite should be made available to all parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sensor package should be all-weather, including optical, electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar</td>
<td>5. Sensor package should be optical only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Many flights a month over a large country (such as the USSR)</td>
<td>6. Minimal number of flights, e.g., 15 a year over the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Flight duration based on country size (over USSR perhaps 20 hours)</td>
<td>7. Minimal flight duration, perhaps just 3 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This examination is based on a simple concept: if the treaty proposals put forward by one side seem to maximize the intelligence gathering capability of Open Skies aircraft, then the "gatherers" dominated the intelligence community's input into the decisionmaking for that party; if, on the other hand, the proposals seem to minimize the intelli-
gence capability of Open Skies flights, the "protectors" likely dominated the intelligence input to the decision-making process. The seven differences highlighted in Table 4 provide the basis for just such an analysis.\textsuperscript{16}

In essence, the US or NATO position is that each nation should provide its own aircraft, have proprietary control of all data collected by its inspection flight, provide its own sensor package (essentially only SIGINT excluded), be able to fly over all territory with virtually no exceptions, be able to conduct numerous flights a month, and establish flight durations long enough so that a large percentage of territory could be covered by each flight.

The NATO position seems to be one aimed at maximizing the intelligence-gathering opportunities under the treaty. With each nation supplying its own aircraft there is an increased opportunity for SIGINT capability to be covertly built into the airframe. An extensive sensor package would obviously lead to greater information flow which, if the data are proprietary, would prevent the inspected party from reacting to intelligence leaks (and thus cutting the flow of information). The requirement that all territory be open to overflight, the large number of flights, and the long duration of flights would also serve to increase the information flow.

The Soviet proposal would, in brief, have all the nations involved share a pool of aircraft (or have the inspected party provide an airframe), and implies common, very limited sensor packages (optics only)\textsuperscript{17} with all collected data stored in a common data bank. The Soviets would also introduce restricted areas where Open Skies flights would not be allowed, and would allow just a token number of flights each year (perhaps one or two a month over Soviet territory).

The Soviet position seems to be one aimed at minimizing the information-gathering capabilities of either side under an Open Skies regime. Common airframes would
minimize the potential for covert SIGINT collection. An optics-only sensor package would mean that Open Skies flights would only be useful for clear-day imagery collection, and a common data bank would allow each side to determine what assets might need more extensive protection. The restricted flight areas, minimum number of flights, and short flight duration would serve to protect sensitive facilities (and equipment) from short-warning overflights and would minimize the total flow of information from the treaty. The Soviet proposals would reduce any intelligence capabilities inherent in an Open Skies regime to such a degree that the flights would be essentially token in nature.

As can be seen, the proposals on the table from the Soviet Union would lead to a minimum amount of information gathering, while the US proposals would allow greater amounts of information to be gathered and present the greatest possibilities for unequal amounts of collection by the various parties. On this basis, therefore, it seems (once the political decision was made to move forward on the treaty) that in the Soviet Union the "protectors" have been critical in the formulation of Open Skies proposals, while in the United States the "gatherers" have been the driving force. This conclusion reinforces the traditional perception that in the US intelligence community the intelligence collectors are more powerful than the counter-intelligence organizations and that in the Soviet Union there is a greater balance of power between these competing elements of their intelligence community.

**IS THE TREATY IN THE US INTEREST?**

In 1955, Eisenhower's advisors spent several months preparing for the Geneva summit. Work on a potential Open Skies proposal was a substantial element in their considerations. Before President Bush's reintroduction of Open Skies, no such long, in-depth consideration of the issues
involved took place. If the Canadian assertions are correct—that Prime Minister Mulroney suggested Open Skies to the president on 4 May—there were, at most, just eight days to consider the issues before the president’s speech. This was simply not enough time to do the job right.18

Although there are a number of similarities between the two eras, it is the differences that are more important. A major factor behind the 1955 proposal was the need to test Soviet sincerity about real arms control measures. In 1989, with a number of working treaties in effect (including the 1987 INF Treaty) and on-going negotiations on a wide-range of arms control issues, such a test seems senseless. Another major issue, lack of intelligence coverage of the Soviet Union in 1955, is also not a consideration today if the much-touted capabilities of our “national technical means” are to be believed. Thus, the only major factor driving the proposal in 1955 that remained true in 1989 was the need for a public relations coup to counter Soviet successes in the battle for favorable world public opinion. We are forced to ask, Would the political gain in public opinion be enough of a reason to go forward with a treaty that is otherwise not in the US interest? We believe the answer to this is no. Therefore, this section examines the potential gains and risks of an Open Skies treaty to assess whether the treaty truly is in the national interest.

The treaty is meant, in theory, to improve each side’s confidence in the other side’s goodwill by providing a means of detecting hostile military preparations. This basic provision, a means of gaining I&W (indications and warning) of preparations for a major military action, would perhaps be the most important Open Skies benefit. In fact, the 10 May 1955 Soviet inspection proposals that prompted the deliberations leading to Eisenhower’s Open Skies proposals had just that aim: “to ensure that no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces takes place.”19 The potentially important I&W benefit of Open Skies is, however, mainly irrelevant; strategic
forces I&W is already provided by satellite coverage, and I&W of a conventional attack will be an integral part of the Conference on Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement currently being negotiated. In fact, the verification regime of CFE will involve overflights of the European territory of NATO and WTO countries similar to those that would result from an Open Skies treaty. We see little real improvement in confidence and security from Open Skies except from the simple fact that each nation will allow overflights of its territory.

Another major driver behind the 1955 treaty proposal seems to be fading as well. For a number of reasons, the world is not nearly as closed as it was 35 years ago. Today we have "open space" (satellites), better communications (including a CNN bureau in Moscow), and freer access to Soviet society with each passing day. Thus, the need for Open Skies to peel a layer from the Soviet enigma seems marginal at best.

As can often be the case, the US negotiating position on Open Skies (following President Bush's May 1989 speech) seems to have been driven by one bureaucratic interest group—those in the intelligence community responsible for gathering information on the Soviet Union who view Open Skies as an invitation to raid the candy store (according to individuals close to the negotiations). Those who are drawing up dream lists of potential intelligence gains seem to underestimate the significant risks of Soviet intelligence gains. In essence, they ignore the fact that the Soviets have more to gain than the United States from low-altitude flights (due to likely US superiority in satellite imagery), from potential technology transfer (due to the compromising of more advanced US Open Skies sensor equipment), and from improved intelligence on US research and development (we assume US and NATO research and development to be more advanced than Soviet research and development). While US intelligence services might appreciate (and could use) more information on the
equivalent Soviet targets, the potential gains for the Soviets are much greater than for the United States. In addition, although implementation of an Open Skies regime might lead to better US intelligence collection capabilities against Soviet hardware, this might not be the area of greatest need. The US technical collection capability has been adequate for years and Open Skies might provide only marginal improvement. The weakest US intelligence has been political (intentions as opposed to capabilities), which will not be affected by Open Skies.

Another issue that should be considered is the potential monetary cost of implementing Open Skies. The Soviets are constantly raising this issue in the press. As Major General Kuklev stated,

The country is short of money. Defense spending is being strictly controlled. Additional money cannot be "extracted" even for confidence-building measures. . . . We literally have to count every ruble.20

Kuklev's comment could have been made within the Pentagon as well. Costs for implementing Open Skies would be high—the tally of expenses includes, in addition to the aircraft and aircrews that would conduct overflights and the bureaucracy likely to build up around treaty implementation, the costs of canceling sensitive tests and exercises at short notice, and of developing countermeasures to protect sensitive sites against the intelligence collection capabilities of the Soviet Open Skies flights. The question of financing should not be discounted—while the Soviet Ministry of Defense might be forced to count every ruble, the Department of Defense should be counting every dime as the United States enters an era of greatly reduced defense budgets. As Open Skies does not, on balance, present real benefits for improving US national security, the treaty's potentially high cost makes it even more imperative to reconsider the issues involved in the treaty.
Despite the number of arguments against continuing with the Open Skies proposal, President Bush is unlikely to back away from the idea. The realities of world politics make such a reversal a costly, if not impossible, maneuver. Thus, if a treaty seems inevitable, then a series of proposals more in line with US national security concerns should be developed.

A PROPOSED COMPROMISE APPROACH

The US arms control and intelligence communities should reexamine the issues involved in a potential Open Skies agreement before any further negotiating rounds. This section presents our concept for an alternative approach to Open Skies that would produce a treaty closer to the president's stated intent and remain in line with national security concerns. Our proposals derive from one basic assumption: that the president's intent was that Open Skies would be primarily a confidence-building measure, not primarily an intelligence-gathering tool.

With this in mind, we examined the two sides' proposals to discern the needs and means that most closely matched this goal. The following points focus solely on areas of disagreement between the two sides in our search for an acceptable compromise that would be in the US national interest. We therefore propose the following five modifications to the US negotiating position:

1. Open Skies aircraft should be common and shared among nations in the treaty, with joint crews. This would minimize the possibility of cheating on the SIGINT restriction in the treaty, and would lessen the chance of serious problems during pre-overflight inspection of the aircraft. Common aircraft and aircrews would also lessen the cost of implementing the treaty.
2. **Sensors should also be common and should have an all-weather capability.** This again would reduce the temptation for cheating. The all-weather capability (as opposed to the Soviet proposal for optics only) is necessary due to the differing weather conditions over the Soviet Union and the United States.

3. **Raw data should be shared, but processing should be a national or alliance responsibility.** Creating a common pool of raw data would improve confidence in the treaty. A common data base would also encourage greater communication between participating nations. Separate processing would be required to protect each party's specific interests and collection priorities, and to minimize the effects of counter-measures.

4. **US negotiators should compromise on the number of flights.** The NATO proposal's high number of flights (averaging more than two a week over Soviet territory) would increase the intelligence-gathering aspects of Open Skies without greatly increasing the confidence-building element of the treaty. The low number in the Soviet proposal (a total of 30 flights, with no more than 15 over any single signatory) would eliminate much of the uncertainty that makes aircraft overflights valuable in the space age. A compromise (perhaps 50 flights over Soviet territory and 30 over the United States per year) on this issue seems a sensible and likely approach. Soviet proposals on the length of flights (3 hours) are clearly not reasonable for significant overflight operations and the NATO position on flight length should not be compromised.

5. **Exclusion zones should be allowed.** NATO is currently pushing for absolutely no exclusion zones, yet it is clear that some areas will be restricted for flight safety concerns (such as the airspace around cities, nuclear power plants, chemical plants, and,
perhaps, over the White House). In addition, each nation should be allowed to exclude some small additional amount of territory for national security reasons. The Soviet proposal that the inspection regime include oversea bases should rightly be rejected. The treaty deals solely with the territory of each signatory nation—US bases overseas are not US territory.

The first three proposed alterations to the US negotiating position are vital to bringing the proposed treaty in line with our understanding of the president’s intent that Open Skies should serve to improve confidence. A heavy emphasis on intelligence collection is more likely to increase tension than confidence. The fourth and fifth modifications are important for minimizing Soviet collection capabilities against sensitive US facilities and should lead to significantly lower costs for implementation of the treaty (through a lower number of canceled tests and a lower number of sites that need to be protected against airborne collection efforts).

Thirty-five years after it was first proposed, Open Skies remains an alluring concept but not necessarily a sensible one. In 1955, there were a large number of factors that made this proposal quite desirable, but the most important ones (specifically, a lack of reconnaissance coverage of most Soviet territory and a total lack of understanding concerning Soviet willingness to discuss arms control despite their significant public relations campaigns) had disappeared by 1989.

In preparing his proposal, President Bush’s advisors evidently failed to analyze the significant differences between the two eras and, instead, focused upon the similarities. Those involved in the decisionmaking process further failed the president by their focus on the potential intelli-
gence gains from the treaty and their down-playing of the significant compromise to national security resulting from an extensive overflight program.

In light of these factors, from a national security standpoint alone, it would be sensible for the president to recognize that Open Skies was an innovative idea whose time has come and passed. Instead, he should devote his administration to proposals that would have a more fruitful outcome for the United States and truly move us further down the road to world peace.

Such a reversal of the process seems unlikely in the light of day—the political world simply does not work that way. Too many interests are already intertwined in the pursuit of the treaty and too many European nations are strongly supportive of the concept for the president to simply walk away from his own proposal. Thus, we recommend that the president direct the US arms control and intelligence communities to reexamine the issues involved in Open Skies. We believe that after detailed reflection they will reach the conclusion that compromises between Soviet and US proposals on many of the remaining stumbling blocks in the Open Skies negotiations would be in the national interest. The US approach to Open Skies should be re-examined and re-worked before it is too late.

NOTES

1. In this paper, we will be concentrating most heavily upon the United States and the Soviet Union as the principal parties in the two alliances. There is, however, dissent between the partners in each of the treaty organizations. In general, when the term NATO or WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) is used rather than United States or Soviet Union, it is because it is our understanding that there is general agreement within the treaty organization on the issue under discussion.

2. There are a wide range of other issues that one could focus on in examining the treaty (such as comparing the various proposals that have been tabled or examining in detail the intelligence implications of the
treaty). Although we may touch on some of these, we decided to focus on these five interrelated concepts.

3. For Bush's 12 May speech, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 25, n. 20, 22 May 1989, pp. 669-702. For information on Mulroney's role, see comments by the Canadian "general secretary of the Open Skies proposal," F. Bild, in Pravda, 10 February 1990, p. 4.


5. The changes that began throughout Eastern Europe in Fall 1989 are relevant for how fast the treaty moved forward. In addition, the significant governmental changes quickly transformed Open Skies into a multinational vice bloc-to-bloc negotiation. In this essay, we are concerned with the events leading to the treaty proposal. Thus, those subsequent events are not relevant in this consideration, though they are an important contributor to the pace and growing complexity of the treaty negotiations.


7. Interestingly, another major player was Andrew Goodpaster, now head of the Washington-based Atlantic Council. Goodpaster is reportedly a confidant of the president's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft.


9. This test element of the proposal was considered to be very important. If the Soviets displayed a genuine willingness to discuss arms control, then perhaps the defense budget could be held steady. If, on the other hand, the Soviets displayed belligerence, then the resources devoted to defense would have to be increased significantly.


12. From remarks by President Bush at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station, Texas, 12 May 1989, as
13. The balloon program (in which the United States launched high-altitude, unmanned reconnaissance balloons carrying cameras over the Soviet Union) ran from November 1955 to the spring of 1956; the U-2 was test-flown on 6 August 1955 and made its first overflight of the Soviet Union in July 1956; and satellite photography was conducted successfully for the first time on 18 August 1960. W. W. Rostow, Open Skies, pp. 9-10.


15. This section does not attempt to tackle political or other non-intelligence issues of an Open Skies treaty (such as a possible US desire to lock the Soviets into an Open Skies treaty for fear that Gorbachev might be overthrown by conservative forces who might be less forthcoming on arms control). Our approach has been to use generic rather than specific examples of intelligence concerns and to use only unclassified source materials on treaty proposals and sensor capabilities (see note 16 for these sources). Because of this, we have likely missed (or misstated) specific issues critical to US intelligence. Some of the greatest differences between the two sides' proposals are in the area of the surveillance equipment the aircraft will be able to carry. The Soviets proposed, essentially, optical equipment only, while the NATO proposal included a much broader array of equipment. Both sides did, however, agree that no SIGINT (signals intelligence) equipment was to be carried by Open Skies aircraft. We have used the NATO proposals (each side provides surveillance aircraft and the sensor package should include a wide range of capabilities excluding only SIGINT) for our evaluation of the intelligence issues. In our analysis, for example, we considered the potential benefits of having high-quality photographic equipment aboard an aircraft flying at low (10,000–20,000 ft.) altitudes. Obviously, this would mean that the aircraft would have the capability to take high-resolution photographs that would likely be of higher quality than those from satellites. Such high-quality imagery would be useful for a wide range of tasks.

16. A summary of some of the major Open Skies disagreements can be found in David Hughes, “U.S., Soviet Differences Could Prevent Planned Signing of Open Skies Treaty,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 April 1990, pp. 41-43; and Barbara Starr, “'Open Skies' hangs on four key issues,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 7 April 1990, p. 620. See also interviews with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor P. Karpov in Pravda, 4 March 1990, p. 6, and Izvestiya, 5 March 1990, p. 3; and with Major General V. Kuklev, first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff,
in *Trud*, 27 March 1990, p. 3 (as translated in FBIS-SOV-90-063, 2 April 1990, pp. 2-4). The authors also conducted interviews with a number of individuals involved in the Open Skies negotiations process. (The unclassified nature of the work was emphasized before these discussions.)

17. There are some indications that the Soviets are compromising slightly on this issue. According to one press report, the Soviets have agreed that radars can be carried as well. Celestine Bohlen, “Open Skies’ Talks Hit Snag, Cutting Chances of Pact in May,” *New York Times*, 26 April 1990, p. A14. The authors were unable to confirm this information.

18. The authors were told that many offices had 24 hours or less to prepare position papers on the subject with no warning time to gather information about the potential pitfalls and benefits of such a treaty.


21. For example, a shared database would facilitate use of Open Skies data for discussing potential violations of other arms control and CSBM treaties. The dilemma of not wanting to divulge intelligence capabilities to prove “violations” would be eliminated if the data were common to all parties.
US-PANAMA RELATIONS
DEVELOPING A POST-NORIEGA STRATEGY

DOUGLAS J. NAQUIN

The United States has entered its tenth and perhaps final decade as the ultimate arbiter of Panama’s affairs. If the two 1977 Panama Canal treaties are implemented on schedule, Panama will assume full responsibility for the Canal’s operation and maintenance at noon on 31 December 1999. Also by this date, all US military installations on the isthmus will have transferred to Panama, and all US military forces will have departed. The impending 10-year transition had already promised to be difficult in view of the Canal’s long substantive and emotional association with US interests. This transition has been further complicated by Operation Just Cause, the 20 December 1989 US invasion of Panama.

Within the historical context of US-Panama relations, Just Cause marked the culmination of the United States’ pre-1977 Panama policy. Although the Canal treaties called for changes in the US approach to Panama policy, no such changes occurred. In fact, several years passed before we realized the Panamanian political system we had

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tolerated for 80 years in the name of stability no longer served our interests. The confrontation with General Manuel Antonio Noriega and the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) only clouded the issue, because Noriega simply personified the weakness of this longstanding US policy. The roots of the United States' problems in Panama are much deeper. In removing Noriega and dismantling the institutions he established, Just Cause opened the door for a new US approach to Panama but in no way guaranteed we will not repeat past mistakes.

Should the treaties be implemented on schedule, future US attempts to exert influence, from diplomatic pressure to military action, will prove increasingly costly in political, economic, and military terms. Ad hoc or short-term solutions to perceived threats may no longer be possible, let alone be sufficient, as the US presence draws down. For these reasons, the United States must develop a strategy for Panama that focuses on the long term. Before we can do this, however, we must acknowledge the changes in the US-Panama relationship brought about by the Canal treaties and, now, Just Cause.

UNCHANGING US INTERESTS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

US interests in Panama have not changed since 1903. Before the 1977 treaties, however, the United States did not need to worry about a long-term Panama strategy, because Panama was a virtual US protectorate. Concern for Panamanian government did not go further than its effect on Canal operations and the safety of US citizens and property. Threats to those interests were generally met through the application of short-term remedies, ranging from economic and military assistance to implicit military threats. With the treaties, however, came the US acknowledgment of full Panamanian sovereignty over Panamanian territory. The framework of our relationship was thus
changed: an informal colonial relationship\(^1\) was to become one of legal equality, even if the treaties allowed 23 years for the complete transition.

The United States has been slow to deal with Panama within this new context. Although primary interests have remained constant, US pursuit of these interests needs to be reviewed. Before 1977, it appeared that the treaties were an end in themselves. And aside from a vague promise from Panama’s then “maximum leader,” Omar Torrijos, that Panama would democratize, little thought was given to any aspect of the US-Panama relationship other than the Canal. Therefore, once the treaties were ratified in 1978, many considered the Panama issue resolved and Panama was soon overshadowed by other regional challenges. Many statesmen in the hemisphere believed the Panama Canal issue had only distracted us from more important inter-American issues. As Just Cause has proved, however, our interests in Panama are still compelling and warrant greater consideration.

**The Canal**

The primary US national security interest in Panama has always been uninterrupted access to an efficient and secure Canal. Former President Jimmy Carter and his Joint Chiefs of Staff believed this access was better protected through dependence on a friendly Panama, whose stake in the Canal’s smooth operation was vital, rather than on US troops stationed in a hostile environment.\(^2\) Carter also saw the treaties as a way to generally improve Latin American relations. As long as the Canal remained a source of contention between Panama and the United States, any Latin American states forced to choose sides would inevitably choose Panama’s. Therefore, as long as US-Panama relations were confrontational, the United States would find it difficult to improve ties with other states in the region. US policy since 1977 has consistently maintained that the treaties are in our best interest.
The problem with making treaties that entail a 23-year implementation period, however, is that the world changes in the interim. Global and Latin American political and economic dynamics are different now from what they were in 1977 and they will likely have changed again by 1999. Although the principles upon which Carter justified the Canal treaties remain valid, his successors have inherited a commitment to conclude what was begun in 1977 while dealing with new regional challenges and shifting global priorities. There is a danger that such shifts in priorities could raise second thoughts about the relevance of treaties signed in 1977.

Also, the treaties have never enjoyed overwhelming support. Even in 1978, after a year of heated debate and a massive education campaign by the Carter administration, the treaties passed the Senate by only one vote. Today, opposition to turning the Canal over to Panama remains. It is conceivable that a groundswell of political and popular support to abrogate or renegotiate the treaties could arise as 1999 approaches. Aside from the Canal’s tangible benefits, many in the United States assign to it an emotional importance as a symbol of US status. Depending on developments in Panama and the rest of the region, it may become more difficult to uphold President Carter’s contention that the treaties are in the United States’ best long-term interest. Increasingly, the importance we give the Canal is linked to, and possibly dependent on, our other interests in the region.

**US Military Bases**

There are currently 13,600 US military personnel permanently stationed among eight installations in Panama. It is possible that as withdrawal becomes a reality, the United States will wish to keep at least some military presence beyond the year 2000. In any case, the question of whether we can adequately protect our security and economic interests in Latin America without a military presence in Pan-
US-PANAMA RELATIONS

ama is likely to resurface. If we proceed on the assumption that US troops will be out of Panama by 31 December 1999, we would be ignoring the possibility that a post-2000 US military presence would bring benefits that would outweigh the cost of an effort to retain this presence. We must decide if such an effort is worthwhile and base our Panama strategy on this decision.

All troops stationed in Panama come under the umbrella of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for US military affairs in Latin America south of Mexico. Although SOUTHCOM is headquartered in Panama, only half the Command—contained in US Army South—is specifically designated to protect the Canal. In fact, because SOUTHCOM itself does not exist solely for the Canal’s defense, its headquarters’ location in Panama is technically not justified by the Canal treaties (a point Noriega repeatedly made). Plans to move SOUTHCOM’s headquarters to the United States have been under way for some time as part of a “phased withdrawal.” Although this move was scheduled to occur “well before” the expiration of the treaties, according to a SOUTHCOM spokesman in the spring of 1989, the departure has probably been affected by both the protracted conflict with Noriega and Just Cause. If the withdrawal had occurred during US attempts to pressure Noriega from power, it might have given him a psychological boost. A withdrawal soon after the US invasion could leave the Bush administration politically vulnerable by raising questions about the extent of our commitment following the sacrifice of US lives. On the other hand, a near-term SOUTHCOM departure would send a positive signal to Panama, providing tangible proof of our intention to comply with the Canal treaties and probably aiding the Endara government in establishing legitimacy. Our handling of this issue will provide an early clue as to the interests driving our strategy.
DOUGLAS J. NAQUIN

Originally established to defend the Canal, US bases in Panama have now surpassed this function and become a separate strategic asset and issue. From a security standpoint, these bases represent forward staging areas in a region that, because of the drug problem, low-intensity conflict, the debt issue, and the reduction in East-West tension, will require greater attention. One need only look at Just Cause and consider whether similar success could have been expected had not Howard Air Force Base been available or 16,000 troops already been on-site. For the large number of business and banking enterprises that have been attracted to Panama, the US military bases also serve as guarantors of stability. Should a total departure of US military presence create doubt about the US commitment to this stability, Panama's attraction as an investment and banking center could suffer. These are all issues the US government must address early in the 1990s if it wishes either to compensate for the loss of these bases or to begin the extremely sensitive undertaking to reach an agreement with Panama about a post-1999 US military presence.

Panamanian Stability
Despite the substantial effects the transfer of the Canal and loss of military bases portends, stated US policy has remained consistent. It is this commitment, in fact, that has most likely intensified US interest in the way Panama governs itself. On 30 June 1987, at the outset of the US-Noriega confrontation, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams prefaced his remarks to the Washington World Affairs Council by noting, "the commitment to the Canal Treaties is firm." He then outlined US interests in Panama as centering on Panama's democratization, to include free elections, a free press, and an apolitical military. This speech indicated how the emphasis in US interests was changing. Whereas the United States had historically placed the efficient functioning of the Canal ahead of Panama's political development, as
evidenced by the governments the United States had tolerated or helped maneuver into power, our continued commitment to the treaties now called for placing Panama’s government in the forefront of US interests. A democratic Panama became an important goal, for we have determined that only a democratic Panama can provide the long-term stability necessary to guarantee the Canal’s efficient operation.

Through our support of democracy in Panama, however, we are making yet another commitment. Having now invaded Panama at least in part to promote democracy, we must be prepared to accept the various possible outcomes. There is no guarantee that a democratic system will produce governments consistently supportive of US interests.

We have thus introduced a moral element into our Panama policy. In 1977, Senator Jacob Javits expressed the general attitude of treaty supporters when he noted, “it is not necessary to prove that Torrijos is an angel.” Javits claimed the importance lay in whether the treaties were in the United States’ best interest, and he believed they were. In the years since Javits’ remarks, however, we have discovered that we can no longer divorce Panama’s government from the Canal. Now and throughout the 1990s, it may be necessary to prove that whoever is running Panama is, in fact, an “angel.”

**OVERCOMING YEARS OF MUTUAL DISTRUST**

Since the treaties, US and Panamanian interests have been largely compatible. In resolving the issue of Panamanian sovereignty, the treaties removed the one obstacle that precluded any chance of long-term cooperation between the two countries. Both seek a stable and economically prosperous Panama, and despite Panama’s 21-year (1968–89) experience with military autocracy, both profess belief in democracy. The major challenge to the US-Panama relationship since the treaties has not been divergent interests;
it has been distrust. After nearly a century of protecting its own interests in Panama, the United States may be reluctant to transfer that responsibility to Panama. Similarly, after a century of enduring heavy US influence in their affairs, many Panamanians doubt the US willingness to follow through on treaty commitments. Some Panamanians believe the isthmus is too important to the United States for it to leave. Reducing these misgivings over the next ten years would contribute greatly toward forging a long-term cooperative relationship.

However, changing perceptions will not be easy. From Panama's independence to the recent US invasion, the United States' view of its role in Panama has been that of patron and keeper of the Canal. Thus far, the treaties have done little to change this view. The obstacles this 86-year-old attitude poses, however, are self-perpetuating. As long as the United States sees itself as \textit{de facto} sovereign over the Canal, it will attempt to mold Panama's political infrastructure in its best interest. In turn, as long as the United States exerts influence on the Panamanian political infrastructure, the issue of legitimacy will haunt the Panamanian political process. The result thus far has been a weak Panamanian political infrastructure that the United States continuously deems necessary to fine tune. Thus, the cycle is repeated "in perpetuity." As the United States and Panama face the 1990s and the aftermath of "Just Cause," both countries must confront these ingrained US attitudes and undeveloped Panamanian political infrastructure. These are the primary obstacles that lie in the way of both rebuilding Panama and safeguarding long-term US and Panamanian interests.

\textbf{The US Legacy}

In 1904, when President William Howard Taft referred to Panama as "a kind of \textit{Opéra Bouffe} republic and nation,"\textsuperscript{7} he essentially set the tone for the next 85 years of US policy. Even today, the first (and sometimes only) thing
most North Americans learn about Panama is that Teddy Roosevelt “invented” the country so he could build a canal through it. Such a simplistic view belittles Panamanian nationalism, which existed long before Teddy Roosevelt, and attaches an artificial label to the country. As a result, the United States historically has had a difficult time taking Panama seriously. Although Panama gained independence in 1903, US representation there was not raised to embassy status until 1938. Nearly fifteen years after the Panama Canal treaties of 1977, vestiges of this patronizing US attitude remain.

Much of this attitude stems from the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which gave the United States tremendous influence, if not outright authority, over Panama’s economy, immigration, city services, and foreign policy. In 1904, Panama’s currency was tied to the US dollar. The 1903 treaty not only gave the United States use of the Canal and a five-mile-wide zone on either side, but also provided for the United States to occupy any lands outside this zone it deemed necessary.

With order and Canal safety our overriding concerns, we wanted cooperative Panamanian regimes. To this end, we accepted election fraud (1908, 1948, 1984) and coups (1931, 1941, 1949, 1968). Until Noriega, in fact, the goal of democratic process had been subordinated to the larger US interest of maintaining order. Ironically, in light of recent events, even the use of US troops has been viewed as destabilizing; Just Cause was the first time the US military was used to influence Panamanian politics directly in almost 70 years. A further irony is that the United States bequeathed the burden of policing Panamanian politics to the Panamanian National Guard. Following the US decision not to use troops in quashing a 1931 coup, the Guard, with US encouragement, began to fill the void of political power broker and keeper of the peace. In the 20 years that followed, the Guard evolved into a powerful political en-
tity in its own right. By 1968, it had become the most powerful political institution in the country.

The 1977 treaties did not slow down US attempts to influence Panamanian politics or greatly affect US attitudes toward Panamanian self-determination. In fact, they helped to promote the National Guard's legitimacy. First, the terms of the treaties included $50 million in US military assistance to the Guard over a ten-year period. More significant, however, was that the treaties helped define the Guard as the voice of the Panamanian government in dealing with the United States. The treaties placed the most important bilateral issue of treaty implementation in the hands of a combined military board made up of US and Panamanian military officers. This provision gave the Guard a virtual monopoly on conducting foreign and defense policies with the United States. This monopoly resulted in enormous leverage being exerted on both the US and Panamanian political processes.

On the civilian side, the AFL–CIO continues to have interest in Panama by virtue of the US workers who remain in the former Canal Zone. In 1984 the union donated $20,000 to Noriega's hand-picked presidential candidate, Nicky Barletta. The union presumably considered Barletta less a threat to democracy than his opponent and three-time president, Arnulfo Arias Madrid. Even more recently, according to The Washington Post, US government officials spent 1989 discussing detailed proposals for changing Panama's constitution, judiciary, civil administration, and tax system in the event of Noriega's ouster. Thus, it does not appear the end of direct US involvement in Panamanian politics is at hand.

Another latent danger to the future of the US-Panama relationship is the historic influence of US domestic politics on Panamanian issues. The existence of a US enclave—in what used to be the Canal Zone—in a foreign country is going to result in the involvement of US institutions and interest groups not normally associated with foreign policy.
In Panama, even those US presidents—FDR, Johnson, Ford, and Carter—who favored concessions or conciliatory policies have faced formidable opposition from groups ranging from shippers and labor unions to the Zone presidents themselves. The subsequent influence these groups wield with Congress and other elected officials can cause Panama to be viewed more from a special interest rather than foreign policy perspective.

Politicians themselves have used the Panama issue for domestic political purposes. After an incident at the US Canal Zone high school in 1964 led to serious riots, President Lyndon Johnson was advised that making concessions to Panama would give the Republicans their “first real solid muscled hit at the Administration” and create a “ready-made ‘wrap us in the flag’ situation.” During the 1977 treaties debate, according to President Carter, the archconservatives in the Republican Party saw the controversy as a way to capture control of the party, especially as early polls showed 78 percent of the US people against “giving up” the Canal and only 8 percent in favor.

**Panamanian Political Culture**

Equally important to the future of the US-Panama relationship, however, is Panamanian political culture. Nominal democratic institutions and processes have existed in Panama from the beginning, but Panamanians themselves have traditionally opted for personal, charismatic leadership rather than cohesive party systems. Such a tendency has occasionally resulted, as in the case of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, in a democratically elected leader who is not entirely dedicated to democratic ideals. A second troublesome aspect of Panamanian politics is explained by the popular phrase, “He who counts, elects.” Few elections in Panama’s history have been fraud-free. Viewed in this light, the current US emphasis on “democracy” as a solution to Panama’s political woes contains certain pitfalls.
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Until 20 December 1989, Panama's political history had been guided by three forces: the oligarchy, the military, and Arnulfo Arias. Their influences will be found in any post-Noriega political environment.

The oligarchy descended largely from Panama's founding fathers and was the benefactor of early US political support. Largely Caucasian, urban, and family-based, the wealthy businessmen and landowners who comprised the oligarchy supported the status quo and thus attracted support from a US government that wanted little more than the maintenance of order. Although this group eventually split into various liberal and conservative factions, no faction seriously addressed itself to social or economic issues outside the major cities of Panama City and Colon. Nor did any faction pose a challenge to US authority. Although the oligarchy's political supremacy began to wane with the rise of the military and Arnulfo Arias in the 1930s, it remained a dominant political force until 1968 and continues to wield influence, largely through its economic weight. The oligarchy's problems have centered on legitimacy and political constituency; its record of focusing on the interests of the elite and its ties with the United States make it difficult for the Panamanian people to accept parties or individuals they perceive as representing this group. Nevertheless, because wealth is often a prerequisite for mounting election campaigns in a democracy, the descendants of the oligarchy will likely continue to play an important political role.

The Panamanian military, whether called the Public Force, National Guard, or Panama Defense Forces, has been influential throughout Panama's history. Unlike many other Latin American militaries, however, Panama's has maintained no permanent links with ideologies or political factions. Under Jose "Chichi" Remon in 1947 and later under Torrijos and Noriega, the Panamanian military was a de facto political organization. Departing from the stereotype of the right-wing Latin American military re-
gime, Panamanian military regimes have often served as an alternative to oligarchic rule and have attracted support from among the poorer elements of Panamanian society. The ideologies Panamanian military regimes have espoused have reflected, for the most part, the philosophies of whoever happened to head the military at the time. In addition, the Panamanian military has no history of subordination to civilian authority.

As early as 1904, Panamanian founding father Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero referred to the Panamanian Army of 250 men as a “Frankenstein” and claimed that only the United States could control it. With the National Guard’s first military coup in 1941 (toppling Arnulfo Arias) and gradual ascension to the presidency of Remon in 1947, the military consolidated its position as the “guardian of order.” Civilian governments and democratic processes remained in place, however, and the military did not achieve a monopoly on Panamanian political leadership until another military coup against Arias brought Torrijos to power in 1968. Between October 1968 and December 1989, the military had a stranglehold on Panamanian politics.

Although charges of involvement in the drug trade and other illegal activities have been leveled against the Panamanian military since Remon’s era, the Panamanian military has often initiated popular social and economic reform programs at home. For example, during his tenure in the 1950s, Remon equalized the tax structure, raised the status of blacks, and accelerated agricultural and industrial production. Similarly, Torrijos’ charismatic leadership and civic action and social reform programs made him one of Panama’s most popular leaders until the global recession in the late 1970s began to highlight the weaknesses of his economic policies. Even Noriega maintained pockets of support in poor areas where he continued programs Torrijos had initiated.
Whether the Panamanian military acted out of genuine concern for social issues or out of pragmatism, the fact remains that it found support among a large segment of the population (the poor, blacks, immigrants) that had been ignored or alienated by the other political entities. Under Remon and Torrijos, efficiency was associated more with the military than with civilian leaders. Furthermore, aside from the last few years of the Noriega regime, the military has also enjoyed a degree of political legitimacy by simply capitalizing on the failings of the political alternatives. Despite attempts to limit the political role of the military following Noriega's departure, should large segments of the population become disenchanted there is no guarantee people will not look to a police force for solutions, particularly once US troops depart.

The third political influence likely to reemerge is the legacy of President Arnulfo Arias Madrid. The Harvard-educated Arias, who was elected president three times (1941, 1948 and 1968) and was likely denied a fourth election through fraud (1984), influenced Panamanian political development more than any other individual. He and his brother, Harmodio, provided the Panamanian middle class with its first political voice and established a nationalistic and anti-Yankee party in the 1920s that served as an alternative to the irresponsible and increasingly ineffective oligarchy. In creating the concept of “Panamenismo,” Arias combined social change with nationalism and gave political meaning to the Panamanian identity.

Arias was not a Jeffersonian democrat. His populism was tainted by fascism and racism (particularly in the 1940s) that put him at odds with the United States and other elements of Panamanian society. He persecuted Chinese, Jewish, and Indian businessmen and proposed deporting all West Indians to “purify” Panamanian bloodlines. These policies and Arias' less than subtle attempts to curb the power of the Panamanian military doomed any sustained political tenure. Three times elected, he was
three times deposed through coups, each within two years of his assuming office. He remained popular among the Panamanian masses, however, as illustrated through his many political resurrections. At his death in August 1988 at age 86, he was still the most popular Panamanian political figure, which was not exactly a testament to Noriega’s younger political opposition. Arias’ funeral drew tens of thousands, considerably more than Torrijos’ 1981 funeral. Even the Noriega-controlled newspaper *Critica*, which was staunchly anti-Arias, noted his “unequalled popularity.”

Arias and his charisma are gone, but the concept of Panamenismo is not. Although Arias designated no political heir, his influence can be seen in current President Guillermo Endara Galimany. Endara was selected to oppose Noriega’s presidential candidate in the May 1989 election solely because of his former position as Arias’ spokesman, a strategy Noriega tried to counter by creating a split in Arias’ Panamanista Party and declaring it illegal for Endara to use that party’s name or symbol. As Panama attempts to rebuild, many of the nationalistic precepts Arias espoused will probably resurface. It is also likely that whoever takes up the Panamenismo banner will have substantial popular support and be highly suspicious of US intentions.

It is difficult to predict exactly how Panamanian political lines will be drawn in the wake of Just Cause. In addition to the three political influences discussed above, the further roles of such diverse forces as the Catholic Church and the student population should be considered. Although the Church traditionally has played less of a political role in Panama than it has in other Central American states, it may emerge as a mediator in a post-Noriega society. As for the students, the University of Panama and Panama City’s numerous secondary schools have a history of political activism, largely antimilitary or antigriego. Although Noriega successfully neutralized this force by virtually shutting down the university, the middle-
working-class students who comprise the bulk of Panama City's scholastic community could now serve as a base for a new Panamenista initiative of similar ideological movement. All these influences, if allowed to flourish under democracy, will result in a broad political landscape. Those in charge of US policy must be prepared to deal with various political scenarios.

**IMPLICATIONS OF JUST CAUSE**

From a strategic perspective, Just Cause did not resolve Panama's problems so much as it provided the opportunity to address them. In removing Noriega and, more importantly, dismantling the institutions he established, the United States finally accepted responsibility for reversing 85 years of policies that subordinated the question of how Panama is governed to the Canal's security. At the same time, however, the United States has heightened its commitment at a time when its treaty obligations indicate direct US influence should be waning. Much of the success of a post-Noriega strategy depends on balancing these seemingly contradictory commitments.

**The Quest for Legitimacy**

The foremost political challenge the new Panamanian government faces is legitimacy. Although Endara is widely acknowledged as the winner of May 1989's annulled election, his legitimacy has come into question. Part of the problem centers on the conditions under which he assumed office. A second factor is the nature of the election, which was treated by most Panamanians as a rejection of Noriega rather than a mandate for Endara.

This questionable legitimacy places Endara and his government in an awkward position. Having now been denied election twice—1984 and 1989—through fraud, the coalition of parties (Authentic Panamenistas, Christian Democrats, MOLIRENA) forming the current government
must believe it has earned legitimacy. In reality, however, if Endara wishes to be viewed as more than the head of a provisional government, he must avoid actions that enhance any image of him as another US pawn. In fact, immediately following the invasion, he tried to distance himself from the United States. He stated that he would not have consented to the US invasion had he been consulted, and his government quickly reaffirmed that it would not renegotiate with the United States on ceding Panamanian territory (i.e., base rights). He must continue to appear in the vanguard on the issue of Panamanian sovereignty.

The US invasion also tarnished Endara’s image abroad. Despite the region’s general antipathy toward Noriega, many countries have had difficulty swallowing the image of Endara and his vice presidents seeking shelter on a US military base as their country was being invaded. Although several countries have come to accept Endara’s de facto rule, the Rio Group (formerly the Group of Eight) continues to pressure Endara to hold new elections and has refused Panama’s readmittance. Furthermore, Endara’s recent questioning of the Mexican government’s legitimacy has now personalized Mexico’s distaste for the Endara government. Although it is possible the legitimacy issue abroad will dissipate as the new government consolidates its power, Just Cause and Endara’s gaffe have proved to be substantial obstacles.

The new government’s domestic challenges are much more serious. Political opposition has begun to organize, and other traditional Panamanian political forces are making themselves noticed.

The Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), used by Torrijos and Noriega as a civilian front for their respective regimes, is politically experienced and potentially cohesive. It is made up of many former cabinet officials who served under Noriega, including Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter and Treasury Minister Mario Rognoni. In their first news con-
ference after the invasion, PRD leaders continued to focus on the illegitimacy of Endara’s government but also signaled a willingness to work as the “democratic opposition.” Although many see the PRD as merely a party of opportunists, this characteristic might make them a potent threat. Should popular discontent with the Endara government emerge, the PRD would not be above exploiting dissatisfaction within the new Public Force as well as other political groups, including communists, students, and fringe parties, to create a formidable opposition coalition. The reemergence of “Torrijismo,” a blend of populism and nationalism established by Torrijos but kept under control by Noriega, would be a possible rallying point as the PRD strives to portray itself as the party of the masses and Endara’s government as the new oligarchy and US tool.

Even within his own coalition, Endara faces potential threats. His “Democratic Government of National Reconstruction and Reconciliation” emerged from a three-party coalition that was formed to provide a viable alternative to military rule. It was this necessity, rather than common political agendas, that caused these parties to come together. Now that their unifying force, Noriega, is gone, Panama’s history of factional politics looms ominously.

Because Panama’s new government is little more than an executive branch at this point, the development of Panamanian democracy rests largely on the president and two vice presidents who head this government. Endara, as noted earlier, is untested as a leader. His second vice president, Guillermo “Billy” Ford, is perhaps the most charismatic of the three senior executives but is primarily a businessman with little political experience prior to his placement on the ticket for the May 1989 election. The most politically astute of the three is First Vice President Ricardo Arias Calderon, who also heads Panama’s Christian Democratic Party. Arias is doubling as the government and justice minister, which is arguably the most important cabinet position in the new government. In addition to building a
judiciary virtually from scratch, Arias must now oversee many of the functions previously controlled by the PDF, including immigration and internal investigations. Arias will be the key to the new government, not only in how he performs his duties but in how he keeps his and his party’s ambitions in check.

As for the new incarnation of the Panamanian military, it is unclear whether any Panamanian armed force, military or police, will remain content in an apolitical role under civilian authority. With the military having served as political arbiter for almost 60 years, the former PDF members who now make up the bulk of the new Public Force might not readily accept their sudden loss of influence. Despite limitations placed on the Public Force, writing it off as a political threat is premature. The support of a lawful armed group, no matter how small, is required for a government to maintain legitimacy and security. With no history of subservience to civilian rule, the military might not fully appreciate the concept of neutrality once political opposition groups begin offering deals. The civilian authority, for its part, will need to prevent the Public Force from ever reaching a position where it could be viewed as the political savior of the country.

The government has already taken steps in this direction. In addition to disbanding the PDF and placing former PDF units under jurisdiction of the Government and Justice Ministry, the term of the new Public Force commander is now limited to two years, and mandatory retirement after 25 total years of service will be enforced. The key to these new restrictions, however, will be Arias Calderon’s ability to enforce his authority, particularly once US troops no longer serve as the PDF’s conscience.

The size of the new Public Force has also become a topic of debate. With Panama gradually assuming control of the Canal, one argument holds that a military limited strictly to a police function similar to the Costa Rican model would not be adequate to defend the Canal. The
subsequent argument is that this inadequacy would entice the United States to attempt to maintain a military presence past the year 2000 in order to fill the void. On the other hand, the United States has already established that its own troops could not guarantee the Canal's defense against a determined attack.\(^{26}\) Even Torrijos alleged that all Panama would need to guard the Canal would be 200 to 300 "bilingual policemen" backed by the US strategic umbrella from bases located outside Panama.\(^{27}\) In the end, the eventual size of Panama's military will depend largely on the nature of the security relationship Panama wishes to maintain with the United States. The decision will be Panama's, not the United States'.

**Reconstruction**

Panama once possessed one of Latin America's healthiest economies. Its prolonged political crisis and almost two years of US sanctions, however, greatly aggravated conditions that were already undermining economic growth. The US release of $444 million in frozen Canal revenues in addition to the $500 million supplemental aid program announced by President Bush\(^{28}\) should provide a helpful boost to a service economy marked by 25 percent unemployment, massive capital flight, and a GNP that plummeted 22 percent in 1988 alone.\(^{29}\) Nevertheless, the future of Panama's economy, and hence political evolution, will be significantly affected by the emerging battle over public versus private sector economic control.

When Torrijos assumed power in 1968, he hoped to address Panama's economic problems through increased government involvement. He transferred investment from domestic private enterprise to the state, significantly weakening the private sector. He then hoped to finance public spending through foreign exchange attracted by an environment relatively free of regulations and taxes.\(^{30}\) The result was an economy based on a high level of public spend-
ing financed by external borrowing and Panama’s emergence as a financial center.

Torrijos’ economic model was hurt badly by the 1982 Latin American debt crisis. Panama’s international banking center began losing funds ($49 billion to $39 billion between 1982 and 1987), and the economy in general found itself without new sources of growth. In fact, it is alleged that the PDF regularly stole from the national coffers, including the social security fund.

Thus, at the outset of political unrest in June 1987, the private sector as well as large numbers of people among the lower and middle classes had an added incentive to oppose Noriega’s regime. Now that this opposition is in power, the changes in the management of Panama’s economy should be dramatic.

The initial indications are that Panama will shift drastically to privatization. Second Vice President and Economy and Planning Minister Guillermo Ford has announced that 100 percent of the reconstruction effort will be directed at the private sector and that the government will privatize all enterprises, including Canal ports, through public bids. He also announced that the private sector will control the social fund through civic groups such as the Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs. The reaction to 21 years of public sector control of the economy and the accompanying corruption has been intense.

The political and economic effects of such a drastic change in philosophy will be difficult to judge, particularly given factors such as the influx of US money and the challenge of reconstruction. Endara still faces the task of building a broad base of support among the labor sector and lower classes, who historically harbor a distrust toward those currently in power. He also faces a large problem in what to do with the bloated government workforce he wishes to reduce. Given Panama’s history, many may eventually see the issue of private versus public control of the economy as a sequel to the old battle between the
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oligarchy and “Torrijisomo.” The Endara government must prove itself socially responsible and sensitive to the needs of all Panamanian classes. If it does not, pressure may again mount for a new, more responsive government.

The US Role

Just Cause has provided the United States a chance to attempt what may be the impossible: the establishment of Panamanian representative democracy that will produce governments continuously inclined to act in the best US interest. It appears we will accept nothing less than a government that is democratic, stable, and cooperative.

This is a tall order. By embarking on what we call “nation building,” a presumptuous term that implies Panamanians do not currently merit nation status, we may only be guaranteeing continuous US involvement until our notion of success is achieved. This course would, in turn, set the stage for future bilateral confrontation as Panamanians wilt under US expectations. Thus, the most difficult decision regarding Panama over the next ten years is not how much to increase US help, but when to withdraw it.

Still, having invaded Panama, the United States is obligated to help with its economic and political reconstruction. In our eagerness, however, we must realize that in the end, Panamanians will decide Panama’s future. This was one of the primary objectives of the Panama invasion. Therefore, while we should take advantage of the opportunity to exert our influence, we do not want to repeat past mistakes through overcommitment and too much control.

First, the United States must respect the new government’s position by not forcing it into a corner on treaty issues. Statements such as those by former Canal Administrator and SOUTHCOM Commander Dennis McAuliffe in January 1990 implying that a new treaty might be in order to allow for a post-2000 US presence could work against any such goal. It is essential that the United States leave no doubt about its intentions to honor all treaty commit-
ments. Should it become clear that a continued US military presence after the year 2000 is in both countries' interest, discussions could be held at the appropriate time. To raise the issue publicly now would only further jeopardize Endara's legitimacy.

Second, the United States must maintain contact with all Panamanian political elements and gradually withdraw explicit support for any one political entity. Part of the failure of past US policy has been the tendency to become too firmly associated with one political group. This has restricted the flexibility and objectivity of US policy, alienated domestic opposition, and automatically made an issue of the legitimacy of the political element we supported.

Much of the disunity some observers attributed to US policymaking during the two-year Noriega conflict might be attributed to this tendency. The US-Panamanian military relationship was so entrenched that several US government entities, including the military, found it difficult to adjust following the State Department's relatively sudden shift to an anti-PDF stance in 1986.\textsuperscript{36} It had long been acknowledged (and accepted) that the PDF ran the country; thus, most US equities lay with the PDF. Yet once the pendulum shifted and we became firmly identified as backers of the opposition, US policy cut off all working-level contacts with regime officials, thereby tying the opposition to the United States and precluding chances of at least tacit understanding between the United States and groups that now form Panama's political opposition. Therefore, the United States should begin to establish ties among broad sectors of the Panamanian populace and to transfer its commitment from the Endara government to the broader concept of democratic development.

Third, the United States should not confuse the euphoria Panamanians have expressed at Noriega's removal with a new mandate to referee Panamanian affairs. US military leaders have referred to the invasion as a "one-of-a-kind war" that is now entering its most uncertain stage:
that of transferring control of the country's security to Panamanian elements. Once this change is effected, the United States should begin finding ways not to help. In an interview before the May 1989 election, Endara himself said, "if the United States invades Panama, it will find a people who would welcome it with open arms out of sheer frustration or desperation... but 30 days later they would be throwing stones at US soldiers and telling them gringo go home." The first stone may have been thrown on 2 March 1990. It was in the form of a hand grenade tossed into a Panama City disco frequented by US servicemembers. One soldier died and sixteen were injured.

THE COURSE OF US POLICY following Just Cause will determine if the invasion was just another short-term US solution or an inevitable step toward realizing a Panama with which the United States can deal out of mutual respect. The challenge we face over the next decade lies in knowing how and how not to use the substantial influence that accompanies 86 years of close historical ties. We must also realize, however, that as 31 December 1999 approaches, the nature of this influence will change. It will be based more on similar interests and values than on the existence of US military bases running through the middle of the country. Although there is general agreement that the US-Panama relationship is at a crossroads, there needs to be greater understanding of the past and future influences on our relationship if the United States wishes to develop a policy that matches substance to rhetoric.

If there is long-term thinking on Panama, it currently appears to be limited to those who see Noriega’s ouster as a chance to maintain a US military presence after the year 2000. Such an approach reflects the old patronizing US attitude toward Panama, not only in its apparent disregard for Panama’s interests but in the assumption that Panamanian civilian leaders would (or could) be less rigid on sov-
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ereignty than someone like Noriega. The problem is that as we unilaterally look for treaty loopholes and interpretations to permit us to maintain a presence, we needlessly view Panama as a potential adversary. We also treat Panama on unequal terms, for we imply that we can unilaterally enforce our interpretations.

This is not to say the United States should not attempt to maintain a military presence or otherwise pursue its interests in Panama when the treaties expire. We must simply realize we will no longer be able to do so without Panama’s consent. Panama’s recently liberated press has already begun calling for SOUTHCOM’s departure, and as the euphoria over Noriega’s downfall fades, these calls are likely to become louder and more frequent. If we see a post-2000 presence in our best interest, we will have to lay the groundwork now for proving that such a presence will be in Panama’s best interest as well. Through diplomacy, rather than by threats or bribes, is how such work is done.

Much has been made of the morality and legality of the US intervention in Panama. The invasion is a fait accompli, however, and the morality of our Panama strategy is now tied to whether we can help achieve a better state of the peace—the only “moral” goal of any military action. We have deemed it in our interest to provide a country with a chance to govern itself, a decision that required the sacrifice of both Panamanian and US lives. The real meaning of this sacrifice, as well as the final verdict on Just Cause, will come in the course of the 1990s.

NOTES

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7. Ibid., p. 50.
8. Ibid., p. 91.
9. Ibid., p. 69.
12. LaFeber, p. 143.
14. LaFeber, p. 166.
15. Ibid., p. 48.
16. Ibid., p. 113.
17. Ibid., p. 96.
23. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 338
34. Ropp, p. 20.
CLOSING US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
A CHANCE FOR IMPROVEMENTS

BRUCE H. SENFT

THE TERM OF THE CURRENT MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT between the US government and the government of the Philippines becomes indefinite after 16 September 1991. Thereafter, either party may terminate the agreement, giving the other party one year's notice. There is the distinct possibility that US-Philippine negotiations may not produce a long-term renewal of the Base Agreement.

The United States has enjoyed extensive access to Philippine territory and has performed unrestricted military operations there. Filipino nationalists have viewed these practices as infringements on sovereignty. Since fiscal year 1980, the United States has made increasing "best effort" pledges of security assistance to the Philippine government in exchange for continued access to facilities in the

Bruce H. Senft, Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force, was a student at the Army War College when he wrote this essay, which won recognition in the 1990 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition. Since this essay was written, the United States has been told it must vacate Subic Bay Naval Base by the end of 1992; Clark Air Base, badly damaged by the June 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo, has already been abandoned. These developments make all the more important Lieutenant Colonel Senft's consideration of how the United States can deploy its forces in and around Southeast Asia to best support US objectives and strategy.
Philippines. The Philippines' expectations concerning this "rent" have outgrown the capabilities of a US federal budget squeezed by a cumulative $3 trillion debt. Other issues, such as differing perceptions of external threat and criminal jurisdiction, further complicate the relationship between the two nations.

For the first time since liberating the Philippine Islands from the Japanese in 1945, the United States faces the real possibility of having to withdraw its military forces from the Philippines. On the other hand, this situation presents the United States with an opportunity to shape events. If the United States can prudently disperse its forces in the region and stimulate greater security collaboration from its Asian allies, it might end up forming a better guarantee for its critical stabilizing role in the region. However, alternatives to keeping US facilities in the Philippines must be credible, sustainable, and fully supportive of US military strategy in Southeast Asia.

The question becomes whether US military strategy can be executed if the US facilities in the Philippines are closed. Current strategy rests on three pillars: military objectives, resources, and operational concepts. If our nation is to remain effective in Southeast Asia, the three pillars must remain balanced and compatible. US strategic military objectives (deter aggression, protect lines of communication, and defend the homeland) are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, military resources are likely to be significantly reduced in a Five Year Defense Plan that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has asserted will include an annual dollar decline of 2 percent after inflation and a 10 percent troop reduction in the Pacific. The United States will need to reshape its strategic military concepts (forward defense, collective security, reinforcement, sustainment, and security assistance) to maintain balance with the nation's regional military objectives and resources if US facilities in the Philippines are closed.
CLOSING US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

To help focus on the problem, I will proceed on the following assumptions:

- US national security objectives in the Pacific—to preserve the territorial integrity of the United States and its allies and to allow unencumbered US access to world markets and sources of strategic resources—will not change.

- The US military strategic concepts of forward basing or deployments and collective security arrangements with allies and friends will not change. On the other hand, the numbers of US forces deployed forward will likely decrease.

- The result of US-Philippine negotiations on the Military Bases Agreement will be a terminal bases agreement that allows the US military a final ten years' use of the US facilities in the Philippines. [As of the end of 1991, the US Air Force has abandoned volcano-damaged Clark Air Base, and the US Navy has been told to withdraw from Subic Bay by the end of 1992—ed.] Before the year 2000, all permanently based US personnel and equipment will relocate.

- During the phaseout of US military forces in the Philippines, no general war or serious global economic reversals will be experienced. Also, the Southeast Asia region will remain politically stable.

US NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of having US forces in Southeast Asia can be traced to the basic national interests of the United States: survival of the nation, a healthy US economy, a stable world that allows democratic institutions and free trade, and healthy alliances. From these interests, certain national objectives are derived. Those that are especially pertinent to Southeast Asia include the following:

- Ensuring access to foreign markets, energy and mineral resources, the oceans, and space.
• Encouraging and supporting aid, trade, and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.
• Combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, and subversion.
• Maintaining stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance.
• Establishing a more balanced partnership with allies and a greater sharing of global leadership.5

The United States has strong diplomatic and economic instruments of power at its disposal, but it must also remain ready to employ its military forces in coordination with those other instruments of power. Therefore, the United States has professed a national policy of deterrence in Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the globe. Over the years, the United States has made it clear that it will respond to coercion or aggression against its security interests.

US MILITARY STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Historically, US national security strategy has been based on the concepts of forward defense and alliance solidarity. The objective of this strategy is to deter war. But if deterrence fails, the objective is to terminate armed conflict quickly on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. In peacetime, the strategy works toward development of self-sufficient allies. Consistent with that intent, the United States has maintained forward-deployed forces at sea and on the territory of Asian allies in times of peace. This practice has served many purposes.

Forward forces have maintained the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia to preclude domination by countries such as the Soviet Union or China. Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific are politically volatile, geographically congested island and archipelago zones through which the oil lifelines of US Pacific allies pass.
SOUTHEAST ASIA

US MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
These sea lines of communication, or SLOCs, constitute the strategic jugular veins of these countries; for example, 75 percent of Japan's oil flows through the Malacca Straits. Forward-deployed naval forces in the area have enabled the United States to patrol these critical SLOCs and have allowed the economies of East Asia to prosper in a relatively secure environment. Additionally, forward US bases have served US interests in other theaters; recent efforts in the Persian Gulf, for example, would have been considerably more difficult without the access the United States enjoys through the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Above all, a forward US military presence signals US commitment, bolstering confidence in the United States as a reliable ally and friend. Such perceptions are extremely important when we consider the diversity of Pacific—especially Southeast Asian—nations. Differences in threat perceptions, political sensitivities, and economic and military capabilities preclude a coalition approach as used in NATO, leading to reliance on bilateral, rather than multilateral, relationships. Organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations promote common economic and political goals in Southeast Asia, but the US presence acts as the glue binding individual countries to a common regional security perspective.

HOW US FACILITIES CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRATEGY

Admiral Alfred Mahan, the great naval strategist, believed that victory in the Spanish-American War and acquisition of strategic bases in the Philippines gave the United States a chance to establish economic and naval support roles for itself in the Western Pacific. Over the years, as Evelyn Colbert notes, the bases in the Philippines have met that expectation:
Today the American facilities at Subic, Clark, and their smaller associated installations support the operations of the Seventh Fleet and other U.S. forces through the narrow straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans to the northernmost reaches of the Japanese archipelago. Their central location along this arc is a major asset. . . . Extensive and sophisticated capabilities for maintenance, repair, supply, and training complement the bases' geographic advantages and contribute greatly to military readiness. Advanced communications capabilities form an important part of the regional network.\(^8\)

These advantages, combined with the low-cost Filipino labor force and the high cost of replicating the facilities elsewhere, demonstrate the Philippine bases' importance as large, centrally located hubs.

If deterrence fails and the United States and its allies are involved in hostilities in the Pacific, the US facilities in the Philippines (see the appendix, beginning on p. 113) would support the war effort in at least three ways. First, US Navy P-3s based at Cubi Point and US Navy battle groups supported out of Subic Bay would patrol and protect the critical SLOCs in the South China Sea, ensuring continued logistical support of operations in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Second, US Air Force and Navy assets stationed in the Philippines would police the Southeast Asia region, cutting short any outbreaks of hostilities in the area and defending the sovereignty of the Philippines. And third, the facilities would take on the role of a forward repair and staging area, much as they did during both the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s.\(^9\) The ship repair facility at Subic Bay would become a major refit location; the naval magazine at Subic and the ammunition bunkers at Clark Air Base would supply the necessary ordnance for warfighting. The naval supply depot at Subic and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) aerial port at Clark Air Base
would funnel personnel and equipment to the front in the Pacific or Indian Ocean. As it did during the Vietnam War, the regional medical center at Clark Air Base could be used as a rear-area facility to handle combat casualties. US communications and intelligence facilities in the Philippines would facilitate the war effort.

EFFECTS OF US FORCES LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES

US withdrawal from the facilities poses serious problems for strategic planning and Philippine internal development. Liabilities and uncertainties need to be addressed bilaterally and multilateral. The effect of US withdrawal can be projected on three levels: (1) the national level—in the United States and in the Philippines; (2) the regional level—Southeast Asian considerations and Northeast Asian reactions; and (3) the global level—primarily the interaction between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.¹⁰

Effect on the Philippines

Politically, the withdrawal of US forces will finally fulfill the Philippine claim to national sovereignty and "cut the American father down to brotherly size."¹¹ On the other hand, the removal of US forces could also allow the nation's unstable domestic political environment to degenerate. Members of the right wing Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) or communist insurgents could precipitate an uprising or coup d'état that would propel the Philippines into anarchy and economic ruin. Diplomatically, the Philippines' relations with its partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could take a turn for the worse, due to a perception that the Philippine government had not supported the political and economic stability of the Southeast Asia region by allowing the US facilities to remain.
Most certainly, withdrawal of the US forces would remove the direct economic benefits generated by the US facilities. (Filipinos working at the facilities draw the second largest payroll in the Philippines after employees of the Philippine government.) In FY 1988 the US military spent more than $531 million in the Philippines, which equated to 1.6 percent of the 1988 Philippine gross national product. When secondary jobs and revenues created by the bases are included, the Filipinos themselves estimate the loss of 300,000 jobs and $1 billion from the nation's $38 billion GNP if the bases close. Also, it is hard to imagine that business confidence and foreign investment would remain stable after a withdrawal of US forces.

Under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States provides a radar screen and tactical aircraft for air defense, since the Philippine Air Force has few modern aircraft or reliable radars to detect intruders. Additionally, the Philippine Navy, with its 3 aging frigates, 51 patrol craft, and 65 Coast Guard craft, is very small, in poor repair, and does not provide a credible coast guard function (much less a blue water capability). In fact, the armed forces of the Philippines could require as much as $2 billion to protect the nation's airspace and seas, without considering follow-on annual costs of operation. Since the Philippine defense budget of $766 million (1987 figures) already consumes more than 13 percent of the government's budget, it is hard to believe that the Filipinos will address external defense in the near future.

For the time being, the Philippine government is correctly focusing on the communist insurgency. The removal of some Soviet aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay has reduced the external threat in the South China Sea. However, every nation that wishes to remain free and independent must be able to defend its national airspace and territorial seas. Withdrawal of US forces would remove the few assets
available in-country to provide for external defense of the Philippines.

Effect on the United States
The United States stands to "lose face" in the East Asia and Pacific community by withdrawing forces from the Philippines. Removal of US forces will probably increase apprehension, and lead to questioning of the reliability of the United States. Although removal of US forces from the Philippine bases will not change the US military strategy in the Pacific, it could adversely affect continued US military presence in the Southeast Asia region—especially if credible, sustainable alternatives are not found.

Because the United States has enjoyed nearly a century of close ties with the Philippines, and because US national interests in "the growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies" will remain, the United States will very likely reaffirm healthy political and economic ties with the Philippines, even if it withdraws forces. The problems of the Philippine economy and the communist insurgency will not disappear with the removal of US forces. They will likely increase. As long as the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines is accomplished amicably, the United States will probably continue its economic and military assistance to the Philippines, although at a reduced level.

Regional Effects
Although the US facilities' importance to the security and welfare of the Philippines is widely recognized, the comparable importance of the bases to the peace and stability of the entire Southwest Pacific basin is often overlooked. Removal of permanently based US forces in the Philippines could contribute to flare-ups in the continuing disputes among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands. Reduced US military presence in the South China Sea could also cause the Japanese
to consider extending their SLOC protection role beyond the current range of 1,000 nautical miles. With removal of the US forces from the Philippines, other nations in the area would have to pick up some of the responsibilities for security or host US functions to maintain regional stability.

Global Effects
The removal of US forces from the Philippines could cause subtle changes in the balance of power among the world powers in the area—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Although the Soviets have their own political and economic problems, and they have made some unilateral reduction of troops on the Mongolian border and have removed some aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay, they retain a formidable, modern Pacific force. Anticipating a decrease in US influence, the Soviets have already made numerous diplomatic overtures to the Philippines (e.g., for use of shipyards, to help rehabilitate Philippine infrastructure, and for exportation of Filipino labor). At the same time, decreased US military presence might allow the Chinese navy greater relative power in the South China Sea, complementing China’s increasing role in Southeast Asian economics.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PHILIPPINE BASES
As James Fallows noted in his February 1988 article “The Bases Dilemma,” most military studies on alternatives to the Philippine bases recognize three options: (1) shift US forces and facilities to US bases that already exist in the Western Pacific—in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and Guam; (2) build new bases in the Micronesian islands, east of the Philippines, where the United States has federal land; and (3) make new arrangements elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In a February 1986 Congressional Research Service report, Alva Bowen explored these three basic options and concluded that using only existing facilities in the Western
Pacific would not be effective; the United States would need alternative sites in Micronesia or Southeast Asia. The report also estimated that the political feasibility of all three options seemed doubtful, being especially uncertain for Southeast Asia. Bowen recommended a combination of all three options to minimize new military construction and increased operating costs. However, a need for several additional naval battle groups, costing upwards of $60 billion, was anticipated to compensate for increased distances between ports and operations areas.²²

During the final month of negotiations in the 1988 review of the US-Philippines Bases Agreement, then-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci told Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus that it would cost about $2.5 billion to move the bases elsewhere, plus about $590 million yearly in additional operating costs. These estimates were drawn from a new Joint Chiefs of Staff study that also estimated a cost of approximately $5 billion to create new facilities elsewhere—including at US territories in Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.²³

A review of potential host nations in East Asia and the Pacific will shed further light on possible options for the United States.

**Republic of Singapore**

In August 1989, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced an offer to host some of the US forces currently based in the Philippines. His offer reduced left-wing pressure on President Corazon Aquino while attempting to ensure continued US presence in Southeast Asia. The former British naval base at Sembawang offers an excellent location and ship repair facilities that are currently used on a commercial basis by the US Navy (some 80 port calls a year).²⁴ On the other hand, the base would be vulnerable in a crisis and lacks significant fuel storage and warehouse facilities. Tengah and Paya Lebar Airfields can accommodate any US
military aircraft and are occasionally used by US Navy P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and US transports.25

**Thailand**

Thailand is a staunch anti-communist member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The United States maintains an official security relationship with Thailand through the Manila Pact of 1954 and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Accord.26 Although no US forces are permanently based in Thailand, the US-Thai military relationship remains strong through numerous combined exercises such as COBRA GOLD. Recognizing Thailand's frontline status adjacent to Cambodia, the United States authorized delivery of twelve F-16A/Bs to Thailand in 1988 for $318 million.27 In January 1987, the United States and Thailand signed an agreement that allows a stockpile of munitions to be kept at selected sites for Thai use.28 Sattahip Harbor has minor ship repair capability and is currently visited by US Navy vessels.

Overall, the political climate in Thailand would seem to indicate that at least periodic access to airfields and ports can continue. However, Thailand will not provide permanent basing of US forces displaced from the Philippines. This was made clear in the Thai government's response to the US-Singapore alternative basing initiative.29

**Republic of Indonesia**

Indonesia provides a natural barrier between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, Indonesia maintains a non-aligned policy, being one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Due to its large Muslim population and membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Indonesia must consider the effects of its foreign policy decisions on Islamic solidarity. Partly as a result of detecting numerous violations of Indonesian airspace by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft from Cam Ranh Bay, the United States agreed to sell twelve F-16A/Bs to Indonesia,
to be operational in late 1990. Although the Indonesian government might allow continued US ship visits and use of range airspace, Indonesia cannot be expected to offer any permanent bases for US forces because of its policies of non-alignment.

**Malaysia**

Strategically located on the north shore of the Strait of Malacca and astride the South China Sea at East Malaysia (Borneo Island), this constitutional monarchy strongly supports regional cooperation. Malaysia is a charter member of ASEAN and a moderate member of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Along with Singapore, Malaysia has defense ties with the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA: Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia), and allows Australian F-18s and P-3Cs to deploy frequently to its Butterworth Air Base.

In August 1989, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad responded to Singapore's offer to support US forces in Southeast Asia by saying he was opposed to "actual basing of American troops ... [or] squadrons of American planes ... or the American Navy converting part of Singapore into a naval base ... the way they are stationed in the Philippines." On the other hand, the prime minister openly backed continued presence of US forces in the region, noting that the US military presence should gradually be drawn down only after corresponding Soviet steps, such as withdrawal of forces from Cam Ranh Bay. He added, though, that he had no objections to Singapore providing repair facilities and other services to US forces. As a matter of fact, he said that Malaysia would be willing to provide such services, since the nation currently allows the joint use of military facilities with members of the FPDA. Certainly, access to Malaysia's airfields or naval bases would enhance the US security posture in the region.
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Australia

Australia is the staunchest US ally in the South Pacific and strongly supports continued US presence in the region. Through the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) Treaty, the United States and Australia have a close security relationship and share a number of joint facilities. Australia allows US Air Force B-52s to fly out of Darwin to perform maritime surveillance of the Indian Ocean. Royal Australian Navy vessels cooperate with US Navy assets in patrolling portions of the Indian Ocean. Additionally, US Navy ships routinely enter Australian ports, including Cockburn Sound on the west coast and Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane in the southeast. Australia is also home to some very important US communications and intelligence posts at the Northwest Cape Communications Station, Tennant Creek, Alice Springs, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar.

Although Australia is considerably south of the South China Sea, its northern coast is relatively close to the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Aircraft can fly direct routes to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean from Australian air bases. Following a drawdown of the Philippine bases, the United States could expect continued access to Australia's ports and possibly temporary stationing of US air assets at bases like Darwin and Tindal on the northern coast. The nation's Labor Party would probably balk, though, at permanent basing of US forces on the continent.

Japan

Japan, the largest creditor nation in the world, and with the second largest GNP (more than $1.8 trillion in 1988), is the cornerstone of the US Pacific Command's forward-deployed strategy. Besides hosting US forces, Japan also carries much of its own weight in external defense. Departing from the National Defense Program Outline of 1976, Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981 promised to expand Japan's
defense responsibilities to include protection of the sea and airspace within a 1,000 nautical mile radius of Honshu.\textsuperscript{35}

Some US personnel and equipment withdrawn from the Philippines could be stationed in Japan. US forces stationed in Northeast Asia, however, must remain below a congressionally mandated level.\textsuperscript{36} The United States must also remain mindful of political sensitivities to additional US forces in Japan, especially on Okinawa. As an alternative, the United States could ask Japan to expand its 1,000 nautical mile responsibility for maritime patrol. In the ASEAN countries, though, there are great concerns over such an increased Japanese role. As noted by the US Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy in October 1988, "Japan's greatest incremental contribution can come from economic help to such strategically important countries as the Philippines."\textsuperscript{37}

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea, another strongly anti-communist nation, is linked to the United States by a long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty. With a GNP of $156 billion and an economic growth rate of 12 percent in 1988, the Republic's economy is strong and viable. The United States has maintained a large presence on the peninsula since the 1953 armistice ending the Korean War. Although the Clark-based F-4 tactical fighters could be moved to the Republic of Korea, US defense budgeting trends call for a scaling back of forces on the peninsula. In fact, the FY 1991 budget called for shutting down Air Force operations at three bases in South Korea and pulling out 2,000 Air Force personnel.\textsuperscript{38} Additionally, political initiatives in the Republic of Korea call for making its military forces more self-sufficient. Additional US fighter squadrons would hardly contribute to that initiative.\textsuperscript{39} Increased US military presence in South Korea would undoubtedly frustrate Korean unification negotiations.
Guam
Located 1,500 miles east of the Philippines, Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States and the site of the nation's westernmost military bases. Andersen Air Force Base, which supported more than 150 B-52s during the Vietnam War, is presently the home of the Strategic Air Command's 43d Bombardment Wing, with fourteen B-52Gs (scheduled for deactivation in FY 1991) and six DC-135s. The base incorporates all of the normal support functions for both day-to-day operations and combat sorties. Guam's US Navy ship repair facility is smaller than the Subic Bay facility and has only one floating drydock at its disposal. The naval supply depot on Guam meets all US military requirements in the area and includes four cargo wharves in Apra Harbor as well as a significant POL storage capacity that services all DOD agencies on the island. The Nafal magazine, occupying 8,800 acres on the south end of the island, can store all types of US munitions. In the center of the island is Naval Air Station Agana, which is home to a helicopter combat support squadron and a fleet air reconnaissance squadron. It also serves as a forward base for P-3C detachments. The naval communications area master station on Guam serves as a hub for communications bound for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Although Guam seems to offer the most promising alternative location, especially for US Navy assets, it is not without its potential problems. First, Guam has a significant labor shortage, which will be exacerbated into the 1990s with the construction by Japanese corporations of some 1,400 hotel rooms on the island. In order to build up the ship repair facility at Guam, skilled and semi-skilled labor would be required, and DOD would be competing with the private sector. DOD holds some 3,500 acres of undeveloped land on Guam, which might be needed to relocate facilities now in the Philippines; the government
of Guam, however, is petitioning DOD through Congress to turn this land over to Guam.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Rota, Saipan, and Tinian (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands)}

These three islands, which are all within 100 miles of Guam, have undeveloped areas that could be used for facilities displaced from the Philippines. Since 1983 the US government has leased lands on Tinian for C-130 training on the World War II runways and for Guam National Guard field maneuvers.\textsuperscript{44} The island has no facility infrastructure, however, and construction would require a major capital investment. There are no military facilities on Rota or Saipan, and Japanese investors are rapidly expanding the tourist industry on both islands.

\textbf{Palau}

Palau is a 180-square-mile archipelago of eight islands located approximately 700 miles southwest of Guam, 900 miles southeast of Subic Bay. The Palauns negotiated a Compact of Free Association with the United States in 1982. It granted the United States rights for a naval facility and joint use of several airfields, as well as 2,000 acres for logistics purposes.\textsuperscript{45} The compact was to become effective in 1986, but the Palau constitution contained an anti-nuclear provision. This situation has not been resolved and remains entangled in political processes.\textsuperscript{46} Any development of facilities on Palau would, as on Tinian, involve extensive capital investment.

\textbf{RECOMMENDATIONS}

The United States should not completely withdraw from the Southeast Asia region, nor should the United States construct duplicates of the Philippine bases in another Pacific location. Rather, it should disperse forward-deployed assets throughout the Western Pacific and encourage the
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ASEAN nations and the ANZUS partners to share an increased role in maintaining the region's stability. Such rearrangements should not necessitate revised security arrangements. Rather, these changes call for enhanced political and military cooperation in shared air and naval surveillance or training exercises. A major benefit of new arrangements that disperse US involvement and responsibility in the region would be decreased US dependence on any one nation. The United States could thus signal the end of "colonialism" in the Philippines without isolating itself from Southeast Asia. Further, US chances for survival during the initial stage of hostilities in the region would be increased through a dispersed forward-deployed force.

I propose that a small portion of the ship repair and the cruiser located at Subic go to Yokosuka in Japan, a number of organizations relocate to Guam, and a large number of facilities disperse to new locations in the Southeast Asia region, where they will be close to potential hotspots. Let's now consider this proposal in the framework of current US military strategic concepts.

Forward Defense
Following the US withdrawal from Subic Bay and its airfield at Cubi Point, the US Navy must find other locations for launching and recovering P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to monitor the South China Sea and the chokepoints leading to the Indian Ocean. A number of strategically located airfields in ASEAN countries could provide the needed bases of support. Bases I recommend include the following: Tengah Airfield in Singapore, which has supported US P-3Cs, U-Taphao Air Base in Thailand, and Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia, which is used by Australian P-3Cs. Also, since the Philippines will remain a strategically located ASEAN nation, P-3 operations out of a Filipino-controlled Cubi Point should not be ruled out.

Another dimension of the US Navy's ability to control the SLOCs in the region includes battle groups present in
the area. Although dispersal of the centrally located ship repair and supply facilities at Subic may cause increased operating costs for these ships, the US withdrawal from the Philippines will also showcase the battle group's centerpiece, the aircraft carrier. In his FY 1990 report to Congress, Admiral Carlisle Trost stressed this point: "The essential value of naval forces—an ability to operate autonomously in areas where we have no permanent base structure—is unlikely to change." His follow-on example was particularly relevant. In the 1960s the United States funded both the aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* and the bases at Cam Ranh Bay. He noted that we now operate from only one of those facilities.\(^7\) I recommend continuing with a viable US Navy aircraft carrier program. We must recognize, however, that US carrier battle groups are not always in the South China Sea.

US presence in the Southeast Asia region must also provide the capability for fast reaction to unexpected crises. I agree with Admiral Stansfield Turner that some of the monies forecast for large aircraft carriers be used to build a "larger number of amphibious ships deployed in brigade-sized units so US Marine Corps or US Army units could move rapidly to trouble spots without the need for permanent overseas bases."\(^8\)

Part of the United States' ability to react quickly in Southeast Asia has also been based on the presence of a tactical fighter wing stationed at Clark Air Base. Although facilities for stationing these fighters exist in Korea and Japan, US fiscal trends and host nation political sensitivities may eliminate these options. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has offered use of his nation's airfields, but Singapore does not have adequate airspace for fighter operations. Further, both Indonesia and Malaysia have discouraged permanent basing of US fighters in neighboring Singapore. Opportunities exist in Thailand, Australia, and even Malaysia and Indonesia for continued or future tem-
porary deployments (such as exercises) of US fighters, but not for permanent basing.

All of these conditions point to the now quite empty ramps at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. The area surrounding Guam obviously provides no low-level training opportunities, but most of the ASEAN states do have training areas that US fighters could use. Regardless of US air presence in the region, by the turn of the century the air forces of ASEAN and Australia will, if present trends continue, have become a much more modern and integrated force.

Collective Security
Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand have all bought F-16A/Bs, a total of 50, including 18 aircraft that were delivered to Thailand in 1991. These tactical fighters are Block 15 operational capability upgrade (OCU) aircraft that have similar features. As they acquire additional F-16s through the 1990s, the ASEAN states will develop a need for a parts and repair facilities in the region so they can reduce unit costs through bulk purchases and eliminate ferrying aircraft back to the United States for major depot repairs. Although this concept is only at the discussion stage among the ASEAN countries, Clark Air Base would offer a good location. [Of course, damage from the Mount Pinatubo eruption would require, at the very least, major clean-up and repairs to return Clark to usable condition—ed.] Establishment of a major ASEAN F-16 depot at Clark would also help to offset the tremendous loss of Filipino employment as the US Air Force departed.

In addition to Clark's potential as an F-16 logistics center, the base is also well known for its excellent location for tactical air operations training. In the interest of the region's collective security, steps could be taken to make Clark Air Base an ASEAN training base, plus a multilateral use airfield. A first step in that process could be taken as the United States draws down at Clark: the Philippine Air
Force 5 Fighter Wing could relocate at Clark in the relatively near future [if facilities could be repaired]. Toward the end of the 1990s Clark could provide one of several sites for ASEAN aircrews to train routinely. The precedent for this is, of course, the nearly permanent Singapore Air Force detachment at Clark Air Base, which has used the Crow Valley range for air-to-ground practice. Likewise, Australian and Thai aircrews have used the ranges during frequent exercises sponsored by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces. Naturally, the US Air Force in the Western Pacific would like to share opportunities to use both the depot and training ranges in the Philippines.

Similar cooperation and multilateral use of the ship repair facility at Subic Bay could join the ASEAN nations and the United States in a commercial agreement with the Philippines. A ready labor force would be in place. Further, many of the ships owned by the ASEAN nations are of either US or British design, so the facility would be familiar with their repair needs.

Tying these multilateral logistics and training efforts together with cooperative maritime surveillance (like the Thai-Malaysian joint patrol of their gas production areas in the Gulf of Thailand) and command and control (e.g., the FPDA's integrated air defense system) would enhance the stability of Southeast Asia.

Reinforcement
Withdrawal of US forces from Clark Air Base and Naval Air Station Cubi Point will deprive the United States of important aerial ports linking it to the rest of Southeast Asia and to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Certain alternatives, however, might actually offer improvements. The Clark to Diego Garcia leg of the Western Pacific resupply route is more than 3,300 nautical miles long. This is just about as far as a C-141 or C-5 can go with enough cargo to make the flight worthwhile. By splitting the total distance between Guam and Diego Garcia at Singapore...
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instead of Clark, the legs become more nearly equal in length, thereby allowing more cargo to be transported. Bases like U-Taphao in Thailand or Darwin in Australia offer alternatives for US resupply of the Indian Ocean outpost. This concept of strategic airlift in the region would involve small aerial port operations, requiring small numbers of personnel.

Reinforcement for any contingency in the region would also depend on strategic sealift. With US forces withdrawn to either Guam or the Continental United States, the initiatives for strategic sealift, including new 50-knot surface effect ships, become more critical. This US withdrawal alternative, like those that will be faced in NATO as a result of Conventional Forces Europe negotiations, argues for a defense budget that heavily emphasizes strategic airlift and sealift.

Sustainment
Guam offers the best compromise for the bulk of the Seventh Fleet's repairs. Since the four floating drydocks at Subic Bay do not come under the purview of structures that must be left by the United States, military officials are already planning for their removal. Guam would seem a likely location for some. Although Guam has a labor shortage problem that could intensify by the turn of the century, the United States has a decade to develop a pool of trained repairmen who can bolster the workforce at the ship repair facility in Apra Harbor. Some willing Filipino workers from Subic Bay could form an initial cadre of laborers in Guam.

Although labor rates at Sembawang, in Singapore, are high, they are lower than those in Guam, Hawaii, or Japan. Therefore, the United States should accept Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's offer for increased use of Sembawang. The accommodations and facilities that were vacated by New Zealand's 700-man battalion in 1989 could be used by a small contingent of US Navy personnel to monitor
commercial repairs and to stock necessary warehouses.\(^{57}\) Additionally, the United States should negotiate to make repairs in Malaysian ports, in positive response to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s remarks in August 1989 concerning Malaysia’s willingness to support US presence in the region.\(^{58}\) Of course, the United States should also use repair facilities available in Australian ports.

To sustain the Seventh Fleet and US Air Forces, the United States will also need to rely on a network of depots, including those on Guam and in other Southeast Asian nations. With its large munitions storage area and POL storage capabilities, Guam Naval Supply Depot is the natural alternative for warehousing a good portion of stores now maintained at Subic Bay and Clark, especially sensitive munitions.\(^{59}\) However, other locations in the region are needed. One possibility would be to expand the joint Thai-US war reserve stockpile in Thailand, using Sattahip as a possible on-load point for the US Navy. Another location for Seventh Fleet stores could be the Darwin port, where fuel and consumables could be stored.\(^{60}\)

In addition to repair and supply, communications facilities at San Miguel Naval Communications Station, transmitters at Capas-Tarlac, and communication facilities at Clark Air Base would need to be relocated following US withdrawal from the Philippines. The current communications stations in Australia and Guam seem to offer the best sites, because communications networks have been established at those locations.

Beyond this range of alternatives, the United States should work actively to retain land rights on Guam and Tinian for needs such as family housing, a medical center, and training. The United States should also preserve rights for a naval facility and joint use of airfields in Palau. Additionally, the United States could explore joint restoration of Udorn Air Base and U-Taphao Air Base in Thailand, to be maintained in readiness for contingencies by small teams of US personnel.\(^{61}\)
CLOSING US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Security Assistance
During the 1990s and possibly into the next century, the United States must continue its significant security assistance program to the Republic of the Philippines. To do so requires that Congress reevaluate the dispersal of foreign aid, which totaled $11.8 billion in the FY 1990 administration request. Almost half of that aid goes to Israel ($3 billion) and Egypt ($2.1 billion). Despite the addition of other competitors for aid (the East European nations, Panama, and Nicaragua), the Philippines must not lose significant ground.

The drawdown and closure of the US facilities must be counteracted by a continued strong economic aid program for the Philippines. The targets of that aid should be adjusted, however, as A. James Gregor noted in 1984:

The expansion of direct U.S. economic aid would serve little purpose if that aid failed to reach the regions most in need. In the past, U.S. economic aid . . . has been disbursed only to areas immediately adjacent to the bases. Now, however, such assistance is most needed in the Visayas and in Mindanao, where the seriously impaired economy has provided communist insurgents with profitable opportunities for mischief.

US military assistance to the Philippine armed forces is also vital to the survival of democracy in the Philippines. The maintenance of military assistance to the Philippine military, managed by the Joint US Military Assistance Group, is important for the defeat of the communist insurgency. As long as the Philippine administration provides prudent direction for the military effort against the New People's Army, the United States should continue to supply the basic equipment that the government forces need.
Withdrawal of US military forces from the Philippine facilities will not signal the collapse of US influence in Southeast Asia. Nor will it mean that US forward-deployed forces remaining in the region will be any less credible or sustainable. In fact, the closure of the US bases presents opportunities for the United States to help improve the security and stability of the region. Using access to a network of ports and airfields in the region, the US Navy and Air Force will be able to patrol and control the sea lanes and to react quickly to whatever contingencies arise. Some of the ASEAN countries and Australia will share a greater portion of security responsibilities for the area. The Philippines can contribute, as in the past, by providing a location for logistics and training for nations in the region, as well as for the United States. Closure of the US facilities will also change the flow of US security assistance. Thereafter, US aid will be tied to the Philippine government’s economic reform and defeat of the communist insurgency.

Withdrawal from the Philippine facilities will allow US forces to be dispersed throughout the region without overwhelming any one host nation. Moreover, the relocations should save money in the long run and contribute to reducing the budget deficit. Indeed, a briefing on the possible DOD reductions in the Pacific theater, which include troop reduction in Korea and relocation of the forces in the Philippines by FY 1994, estimated a savings of $3.6 billion. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe noted in 1988, “It’s not going to be the end of the world” if the US military loses access to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. It is important for military planners to “face fiscal realities.” It is equally important to plan creatively to reduce future uncertainties.
CLOSING US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

APPENDIX: US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

SUBIC BAY COMPLEX—Deep natural harbor with three major wharves and mooring pier for aircraft carriers (one Seventh Fleet cruiser home ported)

Ship Repair Facility
- Includes four floating drydocks
- Performs major repairs on hulls and on mechanical, electrical, and combat systems
- Accomplishes approximately 60 percent of Seventh Fleet ship repairs

Naval Supply Depot
- Supplies needs of every ship and aircraft in Seventh Fleet
- Includes 180,000 items under 1.75 million square feet of storage space; transfers 1 million barrels of oil per month

Naval Magazine
- Receives, stores, repairs, and distributes Seventh Fleet ammunition
- Accommodates 46,000 tons of ammunition in 200 magazines

Naval Air Station Cubi Point—9,000-foot instrument runway
- Primary base for Seventh Fleet's carrier striking force
- Supports F-3 maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare
- Hub for all Pacific naval aviation major repair work
- Transits 3,500 passengers and 800 tons of air cargo monthly
- Hosts helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for carrier on-board delivery, target towing, and search and rescue

SAN MIGUEL AND CAPAS-TARLAC NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATIONS—Provide radio, teletype, microwave, and satellite connectivity to Seventh Fleet and higher headquarters

CLARK AIR BASE—10,500-foot instrument runway

Headquarters, 13th Air Force—Responsible for air defense of Western Pacific Air Defense Region

3rd Tactical Fighter Wing—Two 24-aircraft F-4 Phantom tactical fighter squadrons

6200th Tactical Fighter Training Group
- Hosts COPE THUNDER air combat exercise program sponsored by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces
- Conducts COMBAT SAGE air-to-air missile test program
BRUCE H. SENFT

- Mans Crow Valley bombing and electronic warfare range
  
  353rd Special Operations Wing—Three MC-130s and five H-3 helicopters for USAF Pacific special operations

Support Facilities

- Shuttles approximately two-thirds of Diego Garcia’s material support; can support up to 3,500 tons of air cargo daily
- Stores up to 11,000 tons of munitions in 45 magazines
- Can store 25 million gallons of fuel and 100.00 supply items
- 1961st Communications Group provides teletype, radio, and satellite connectivity
- Regional medical center for all US Western Pacific forces; 370-bed capacity

WALLACE AIR STATION—Primary air defense radar for Philippine Air Defense System; supports air traffic control and target drop and tracking facilities for COMBAT SAGE missile firings

CAMP JOHN HAY—US military rest and recreation center operated by US Air Force

BASE ECONOMICS

- Directly employ 79,000 Filipinos with an annual input of $531 million (second in country only to Philippine government)
- Revenues from direct transactions equal about $1 billion of Philippine $38 billion GNP, generating 300,000 jobs

NOTES

1. Dean Rusk, US Department of State, exchange of notes to Narciso Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, DC, 16 September 1966.


5. Ibid.
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17. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p. 91.

27. Ibid., p. 95
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30. Simon, p. 79.
33. Simon, p. 121.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 47.
42. Ibid., p. D-9.
44. US Department of the Navy, Navy Activities Guam Regional Profile, p. D-15.
50. Simon, pp. 83, 97.
52. Simon, p. 91.
53. Simon, pp. 82, 113.
57. Simon, p. 131.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
5

CONCEPTS OF MAN
AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND FRANCE

JAN DE WILDE

This essay examines the proposition that different concepts of man in different countries provide a useful perspective from which to understand their public policies. It does not assume, nor try to demonstrate, that this perspective is predictive, nor even that it is a dominant determinant of how nations act. It simply examines, in brief, impressionistic form, the basic concept of man in the United States, China, and France, and speculates about how each nation’s concept seems related to the national style of public policy, both internally and externally. The illustrations chosen are eclectic and suggestive of the relationship the essay explores, but are not, I hope, tendentious.

The “concept of man” can cover immense ground. I have looked particularly at how three countries, or rather their cultures, conceive of man’s nature in terms of being good or evil, perfectible or not. How does each view man’s tendency on this scale? Is he irremediably sunk in sin and driven to evil? Is he prone to do good and is he perfectible by his own efforts? Or is he somewhere in between and in

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need of some kind and degree of state encouragement to improve himself?

Cultural assumptions about these questions, however complicated, help define what the state can and cannot do in the realm of public policy. An assumption that man is prone to good and perfectible through his own efforts would, it seems, argue for limited state action and greater latitude in the "private" sphere. The assumption of an inveterately evil nature might be reflected in a perceived need for strict state control, without which civil society would be thought impossible. An assumption that man is essentially malleable, capable of good or evil depending on his education, would assign the molding role to some organization, be it the state or private entities, and see the need for somewhat less severity of state control over the individual.

This essay assumes that what people think affects how they act. The cases of the United States, China, and France offer opportunities to explore the concept of man-public policy relationship in an old Western culture, a newer, hybrid Western culture, and an ancient, central Oriental one. There is, to be sure, a basic similarity among the three countries and cultures, as there is among all men. But there is also a sense, hard to define but persistent enough to be important, in which Chinese, French, and Americans are different. And because it is the differences, particularly those rooted in assumptions about the nature of man and society, which are most likely to cause misunderstanding and conflict, they deserve to be examined from whatever angles seem to offer illumination.

THE UNITED STATES

The US concept of man derived from European thought and practice. The early Puritan colonists in New England defined it most clearly and extremely: man was naturally prone to evil, and this original sin required a temporal
framework to keep it in check. This ancient Christian doctrine was nothing new to European political thought, but from the very beginning of the Christian era it had to relate to preexisting political institutions. Compromise with temporal interests was widespread even before the fragmentation of the Christian Church. This tendency prompted the Reformation and reinforced the idea that man required a better set of organizing principles to control his sin and cultivate his goodness.

The New World offered a fresh start to those who wanted to escape the oppression and compromises of the old, and a chance to create societies that corresponded more closely to various visions of the good life. In New England, this effort was generally intolerant and exclusive. The colonial Puritans had left behind doubt and speculative theology and were determined to apply what they already knew to be right. They wanted to build Zion as they saw it without compromising with those who did not share their vision and beliefs. In their colony, they established laws governing virtually all aspects of public and private life, accepting those who would submit to them and the concept of man they were based on, rigorously excluding those with different points of view, to the extent of severely persecuting those members of other religiously based colonies, such as Rhode Island, who might come to proselytize among them.¹

Such a system of thought and government made no universalistic claims on others who did not subscribe to it. Particularistic and exclusive, it aimed at the establishment of a new Zion that looked inward and attempted to keep the rest of the world, and the scope it gave for sin, clearly on the outside. As Isaac Norris, a Philadelphia Quaker, wrote in 1700,

Your New England ministers, so called, seem to have much zeal for religion, but have a peculiar talent in the application and practice; and by looking no farther than their own nar-
row limits, do not consider the universality of God's love to the creation.²

It was not an ideology at all suited to expansion of any sort—political, geographic, or intellectual.

The political implication of the Puritan sense of original sin did not fit well with the expansionist tendency of the colonial situation. Colonial charters gave their western territorial boundaries as the Pacific Ocean, even though no one knew where the ocean was.³ Similarly, the human urge to move on and away from problems of debt, poor land, love, and business could, by virtue of the frontier, be indulged in a way unknown in Europe. All this challenged the concept of a self-contained theocracy designed to cope with original sin.

What began to occur was a modification of the idea of original sin and its political implications, which permitted the triumph of a universalistic American ideology. The Quaker idea that man was essentially good seemed more in keeping with the evidence of the New World's potential and its inhabitants' ability to organize themselves into communities before the establishment of political institutions.⁴ The Quakers insisted so strongly on their doctrine, however, that they had to abandon to others the business of actually governing Pennsylvania because of the need to coerce some people into civil behavior. The Quakers' emphasis on man's essential goodness permitted a political structure less regulating of human behavior—and more universally applicable—because it trusted it more.

Despite the existence of an established Anglican church and at least a formal commitment to the doctrine of original sin, in Virginia theology was tolerant enough to incorporate a wide variety of thought and practice, and encourage a government that depended less on regulating sin than on encouraging goodness through the wholesome physical surroundings of yeoman farming. In addition to these more latitudinarian approaches to the problem of
man's nature, the inability of the religious establishments to adjust to rapid and diffuse westward expansion encouraged the development of a more laissez-faire system.

It is hard to overestimate how the potential for expansion invigorated life in the American colonies and in the young United States. In 1776, William Drayton wrote, "The Almighty . . . has made choice of the present generation to erect the American Empire . . . by the blessing of God, to be the most glorious of any upon Record." As early as 1783 (four years before the constitution), Washington described the United States as a "rising empire." In an 1801 letter to Monroe, Jefferson said,

However our present interests may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication will expand it beyond those limits, cover the whole northern if not southern continent, with people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, and by similar laws.

If the Puritan notion of the need for a tightly regulated theocracy was beginning to break down in the face of the expansionist lure of an empty continent, the US Constitution was still the work of men who believed in original sin and were resolved to leave open for transgressors no door which they could possibly shut. . . . The aim of the constitution seems to be not so much to attain great common ends by securing a good government as to avert the evils which will grow not merely from a bad government but from any government strong enough to threaten the preexisting communities and individual citizens.

Madison's famous analysis of factions in the Federalist Papers may have been inspired by a study of Calvin's Institutes, which recommends that government be in the hands of many in order to assure "mutual admonition" of men's
"vice or imperfection." The constitutional system adopted by the United States in 1787 thus assumes enough original sin to require that it be checked and balanced by a division of power, but not enough that the government be obliged to intervene positively in order to control man’s penchant for evil in the way Puritan theocracy did.

Although not forgotten, the concept of man as essentially evil was giving way to one in which evil was recognized, but held to be ameliorable through education and changes in the external environment. In 1827, John Quincy Adams, himself a product of New England Puritanism, complained of a sermon that

dwelt largely and earnestly upon the universal depravity of mankind. It is a matter of curious speculation to me how men of good understanding and reasoning faculties can be drilled into the sincere belief of these absurdities. The scripture says that the heart is deceitful and desperately wicked. This is certainly true, and is a profound observation upon human character. But the language is figurative. By the heart is meant in this passage the selfish passions of man. But there is also in man a spirit, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding. It is the duty of man to discover the vicious propensities and deceits of his heart and to control them. This, with the grace of God, a large portion of the human race in Christian lands do accomplish.

In addition to being an impressive president, Adams was inarguably our greatest secretary of state. In reflecting and advancing the idea that man is perfectible, he was part of a trend that cleared the way for the territorial expansion of the United States—an expansion that would have taken a very different form, if it had occurred at all, under the original Puritan concept of man.

Adams’ view of human nature, which was similar to the views of his great contemporaries Jefferson and Madison, was sufficiently benign to allow that liberty would
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produce a desirable state of affairs. On 1 October 1822, Adams wrote, "individual liberty is individual power, and as the power of a community is a mass compounded of individual powers, the nation which enjoys the most freedom must necessarily be in proportion to its numbers the most powerful." Two months later, Adams' president, James Monroe, announced the doctrine that claimed the directing role in the Western Hemisphere for the United States. It was a natural expression of the widespread belief that the United States had a mission to advance democracy as the form of government best designed to maximize individual freedom.

The nature of man having been seen as perfectible through democracy, and the United States seeing itself as the primary exponent of democracy, the way was cleared for rapid territorial and political expansion, not only contiguously across the continent but also into Latin America. In 1848, Secretary of State James Buchanan said of Cuba, "under our government it would speedily be Americanized, as Louisiana has been. . . . Cuba, just appreciating the advantages of annexation, is now ready to rush into our arms." Being Americanized, Cuba would realize its greatest potential, becoming so like the United States that any of the traditional forms of control would be superfluous.

After the Mexican War and the acquisition of the Southwest and California, US ambition—at least rhetorically—became global. Senator William Seward (who, as secretary of state, bought Alaska and reset the United States on its expansionist course), after the check of the Civil War, said,

The world contains no seat of empire as magnificent as this. . . . The Atlantic States, through their commercial, social, and political affinities and sympathies, are steadily renovating the governments and social constitutions of Europe and Africa; the Pacific States must necessarily perform the same sublime and beneficent functions in Asia. If, then, the
American people shall remain an undivided nation, the ripening civilization of the West . . . will in its circuit of the world, meet again and mingle with the declining civilization of the East on our own free soil, and a new and more perfect civilization will arise to bless the earth, under the sway of our own cherished and beneficent democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{13}

Democracy, and the individual liberty it produced, thus came to be seen as the antidote to original sin. The view of sin as ineradicable gave way to a view of man as beset by sin, but essentially perfectible through his own devices. The feeling that there were no natural limits to what man could achieve through free cultivation of his talents became endemic to US society. According to this liberal dogma,

men are excessively selfish because they lack the intelligence to consider interests other than their own. But this higher intelligence can be supplied, of course, by education. Or they are betrayed into selfishness by unfavorable social and political environment. This can be remedied by the growth of scientifically perfected social institutions.\textsuperscript{14}

Domestically, this optimism took the form of a distrust of government, and the widespread feeling that political control should be limited. Not government but education and private institutions, freely formed, freely joined, and freely abandoned, were the means of perfectibility. Lectures flourished throughout the land. Institutions of “higher learning” were established in the most improbable locations. The opportunities for self-improvement afforded by this system seemed so indisputably superior that contiguous Indian entities were annihilated without a second thought.

Nineteenth-century expansion encountered no resistance to its momentum; nothing caused any real reconsideration of its assumptions nor its methods. Objections to statehood for Louisiana, to annexing of Hawaii, and to
annexing of the Philippines in 1899 on the grounds that “the constitution could not be stretched across the Pacific without snapping.”¹⁵ gave way before the overwhelming conviction that what we were doing was right for us, and right for those we incorporated. Protected by oceans and by the balance of power in Europe, the United States was left in peace to grow strong by digesting and fortifying relatively unresisting morsels of contiguous territory.

As a result, any sense of self-doubt weakened significantly as US successes seemed to argue that the nation’s actions were good, and that any tendency to evil was slight enough to be ignored. The idea that base and noble tendencies exist within the same individual—an idea that would brake actions prompted by an undiluted sense of self-righteousness and “manifest destiny”—vanished. During the late nineteenth century, evil was effectively expelled from the individual as social critics and novelists began externalizing the evil which Hawthorne and Melville had internalized. Many naturalists and realists emphasized a sordid environment, not “bad humors,” to explain man’s evil works. Howells neatly summarized this view of external evil in the preface to Main-Travelled Roads when he remarked about Garland’s characters, “They felt that something is wrong, and they know that the wrong is not theirs.”¹⁶

This increasing ability to see evil as largely external made possible the United States’ first real entry into world affairs in the form of a crusade for liberty—that antidote to evil—in World War I. The United States remained staunchly neutral until events permitted a view of the conflict as one with a moral claim on the nation. The use of unrestricted submarine warfare and Britain’s artful disclosure of the Zimmermann telegram allowed President Wilson to ask Congress for a declaration of war against a country that had suddenly become the “natural foe to liberty” against which the United States was willing to “spend
the whole force of the Nation . . . to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, and the German peoples included."\textsuperscript{17} It was, as the liberal \textit{New Republic} proclaimed, not "for the purpose of crushing Germany, but in order to encourage the forces of democracy against the forces of reaction."\textsuperscript{18} Wilson’s conservative secretary of state, Robert Lansing, similarly remarked that it was "the duty of this and every other democratic nation to suppress an autocratic government like the German."\textsuperscript{19}

Ironically, it was Wilson, the most intellectually Calvinist of US presidents, whose thought contained an implicit if never an outright repudiation of the classical Presbyterian emphasis on original sin, and a strong strain of nineteenth-century Christian optimism and Social Darwinism. To be sure, he never completely lost sight of man’s capacity for evil, but he seems often to have forgotten it, so strong was his faith in man’s inherent goodness and in the possibility of progress.\textsuperscript{20}

Like Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson believed that through education and hard experience all people were capable of self-government and self-perfection. No one was so beyond the pale, so "barbarian," as to be incapable of this. The \textit{New Republic} said on 7 April 1917 that the war would "dissolve into democratic revolution the world over."\textsuperscript{21} In his valiant attempt to establish the League of Nations as a part of the peace settlement, Wilson in effect claimed that US values were universalistic, applicable to the world at large.

Although the League was rejected by the very country whose moral pretensions spawned it, those pretensions were strengthened by World War II, during which the sense that the United States was leading a crusade of the righteous against evil incarnate solidified the concept of man and government that had been developing since the colonial period. It was only after the war, when the United
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States began its most sustained period of activity in the nation-state system, that the frustrations of limited wars and the evidence of fallibility they produced caused a resurgence of self-doubt of the kind originally associated with a concept of sinful individuals acting in an imperfect, perhaps not perfectible world. As we near the end of the twentieth century, the "Evil Empire" that has occupied US attention for nearly half a century seems no longer to exist. The United States might now find it harder to externalize evil and easier to view problems at home and abroad as complex combinations of characteristics that question the applicability of "universal" values.

CHINA

The concept of man in China has been explicitly and inextricably linked with politics for at least 2,500 years. Confucius (sixth century B.C.) and Mencius (fourth century B.C.) developed a philosophy that posited a moral order to nature, and saw man as disposed to put himself in tune with it. The state existed as a theocratic organization headed by the Emperor, whose responsibility was to be the link between the natural "heaven" and the world of men, and to encourage the development of their natural tendency toward goodness.

A competing philosophy, called Legalism, grew up at roughly the same time. It emphasized that man was so disposed to evil that a harsh government of strictly calibrated rewards and punishments was necessary for civil society. Although diametrically opposed in their assumptions about man's nature and the implications for government, the two philosophies merged over time so that classical Confucianism became State Confucianism—an ideology that relied on many Legalist measures to govern. This combination created a moral tension within the educated class that could be managed only by appeal to political authority. Without superior authority, the individual
lacked the autonomy—and alternative sources of legitimacy—to believe in his own ability to perfect himself, and to act upon such a belief. The risk of failure was too great, given the fear of chaos constant in Chinese history—a fear justified by the grisly results of frequent breakdowns of state authority.

Confucianism

Confucius (and his great disciple, Mencius) stated clearly and coherently a political philosophy based on the essential goodness of man. This had not been the dominant view in the earlier centuries of Chinese history. The Book of Documents quotes an early Shang (approximately 1766–1122 B.C.) minister: “Heaven has produced mankind with various inclinations, if there be none to govern them, they fall into confusion.” But this confusion is not a state of evil established by man’s nature. China’s “fall from grace” myths are few and sketchy, and evil is accepted not as punishment for some cosmic disobedience, but as the “inexorable concomitant of the rise of human civilization.” In other words, the very force that allows man to strive for perfection also gives expression to evil.

Confucius’ philosophy of man’s perfectibility is surprising given the chaotic political conditions of his time—the constant warfare and the daily reminders of human cruelty. Elaborating on the myths of ancient Emperors Yao and Shun, Confucius argued that virtue was the source of the only humane and effective way to govern men, and that a moral force of the universe would encourage men’s natural tendency toward goodness. He said,

Govern the people by regulation, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual, and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord."
Such moral force is not as fantastic nor as hard to attain as it might seem. "If we really wanted Goodness, we should find that it was at our very side." For Confucius, finding goodness and acting upon it are things man is disposed to want, but he needs help on both accounts. Despite a longing for goodness, and a capacity to be good, the greed and envy of human nature stand in the way—and, as the master said, he had "never yet seen any one whose desire to build up his moral power was as strong as sexual desire."

Perhaps because the effects of political turmoil were all around him, Confucius saw man's search for goodness as dependent on the state. Not for him was the even older Taoist tradition of man's innate goodness that would bloom best in political anarchy. Confucius saw the state as a necessary, if not sufficient, contributor to the nurture of goodness. At the top of the state was the emperor, who connected the human order with the natural order, and, by ordering the one to reflect the other, provided the ideal environment in which men could develop their goodness. The importance of environment is central to Confucianism. As a first century A.D. commentary put it,

Water amongst men is dirty and muddy; in the open country it is clear and limpid. It is all the same water and it flows from the confines of heaven; its dirtiness and limpidity are the effects of environment.

It was the responsibility of the state to cultivate officials who could rule by the power of their good example, to create an environment that cultivated man's virtue in ways appropriate to his position in society.

Legalism

Two centuries after Confucius, Mencius elaborated his doctrine in frontal opposition to the doctrine of Legalism, a widely popular philosophy at the time, which held that man only sought to satisfy his appetites for food and sex.
Mencius, like Confucius, recognized that these appetites were part but not all of man’s nature, since man also wanted to develop moral qualities. Confucius and Mencius saw man as perfectible through his own ability and, nurtured by his political environment, able to understand natural harmony and conduct himself in accord with it. Legalists saw men as egoistic and prone to the worst kinds of evil unless severely regulated by the state. The source of goodness, for them, was not beyond the state in some naturally moral order that the state tried to reflect, but in the state itself.

Legalism, as expressed by Hsun Tzu and Han Fei-tzu, was openly scornful of Confucian idealism. In a celebrated debate, the Legalist exponent listed the failures of Confucian scholars in statecraft: “If we judge by these examples, it seems that the Confucianist way of bringing peace to a country and honor to its ruler has as yet never proved to be very effective.”

The Confucian spokesman replied with a plaintive acknowledgment that this accusation was true, but attributed the failure to the Confucian officials’ lack of real power.

An Uneasy Marriage
These two opposing concepts of man and government merged to create an effective philosophy that governed China until the end of the Ch’ing, and still exerts remarkable, if informal, influence today. The fall of the first ruler of a unified China, Ch’in Shih Huang Ti (220–210 B.C.) appeared to demonstrate that the severe Legalist methods he employed could not govern successfully for long. The succeeding and long-lived Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) created a syncretic ideology incorporating much of Confucianism ideology. As Buddhism made its way to China during the first millennium, the dominant Ch’an sect’s concept of man as perfectible reinforced the similar Confucian view.
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By the seventh century, when Europe was in the Dark Ages, the Chinese central government had created the examination system: applicants for official life indoctrinated themselves by mastering the [Confucian] classics and proving loyalty to the principles of imperial Confucianism. Meanwhile, they learned how to have the population control itself through “Legalist” systems of mutual responsibility and therefore mutual surveillance.30

By the time the T’ang Dynasty (A.D. 618–906) ended, the long-popular Legalist philosophy, particularly as expressed by Hsun Tzu, had given way—at least in theory if not always in practice—to Mencian-Confucianism. The idea of man as inherently good and perfectible had triumphed over Legalism, and even over newer revolutionary ideologies, such as the religion of the late Han Yellow Turband revolt, which explicitly preached an idea of sin and confession.31

But the fact that “Confucian statecraft had, through the centuries, absorbed certain methods of Legalism, although not necessarily its aims,”32 created an ideological tension that tended to immobilize Chinese statecraft. On the surface, the triumphant State Confucianism emphasized the perfectibility of man through education, and organized the state to reward education. Underneath, however, Confucianism’s failure to deliver as promised (or to hold out the hope of delivery in another world) created a crisis of faith: “If Godlike power was available by tapping the force of the cosmos, the failure to tap it resulted in an impotent life of ‘fear and anxiety.’”33 In fact, the Confucian discipline failed to account for the continued prevalence of chaos and evil, against which only the coercive power of the state, rather than the example of government’s virtue, seemed to be sure proof.

Mencius said, “the trouble with man is surely not his lack of sufficient strength, but his refusal to make the effort.”34 The idea, that if government could not successfully
rule by the example of virtue, it was because of the insufficient human effort of members of the ruling class to set that example, was a heavy burden to bear. Man and the world were viewed "as constituting the central features of a spontaneously self-generating cosmos having no creator, god, ultimate cause, or will external to itself."35 If things fell apart, it was man's fault. Small wonder that Confucian officials judged by themselves and others for their ability to generate the cosmos in earthly form were torn between their own apparent inadequacy to rule by virtue, and the expedient of making up for that inadequacy by resort to force. Confucians believed, "the individual can and should summon a godlike flow of moral power within himself, but this belief was paradoxically combined with a fearful realization that [they] would be unable to do so, trapped in a fundamental predicament."36 "The idea of existing at a perilous moral intersection, was, therefore, extremely widespread."37

To escape from this predicament, as Metzger terms it, Confucian officials were forced to rely on the state. Even when their education and tradition called on them to criticize it, and even if exiled or put to death for their criticism, they continued to see the state as the sole source of legitimate order. Thus,

the Western concept of disputing a power holder's policies while remaining loyal to his institutional status is not intelligible to the Chinese. Critics are seen as enemies, for they discredit those in power and tear down the prestige by which their power is partially maintained.38

Chinese officials, and all who ascribed and aspired to the reigning Confucian doctrine, came to rely on others to get them out of their predicament. In pre-Ch'ing China, these others were almost always those superiors who spoke with the authority of the state. There were no other independent organizations that could even begin to provide alternative sources of legitimacy through which indi-
viduals could be less interdependent and more autonomous.

This reliance upon the state as the means of resolving the moral dilemma created a situation in which there was a powerful disposition to accept the state uncritically—to see it, in fact, as good and blameless. The previous dynasty was always cast by its successor as having lost the mandate of heaven. Each new dynasty painted a black picture of its predecessor and a bright one of itself in order to justify a change in the mandate of heaven. The moral system failed to prompt enough criticism to encourage critical reform.

This tendency to see things in extreme terms, as black or white, and to blame problems or factors outside the system for failures within became particularly acute and evident as China came into increasing contact with the West. Attempts, first, to use Western technology to defend traditional China and, later, to develop Western institutions to "self-strengthen" China failed. Dominant trends were either a rigid defense of tradition or advocacy of a wholesale Westernization that saw nothing worth preserving in China's ancient culture.

Marxism-Leninism, which came to China in the 1920s, provided an explanation of Chinese weakness vis-a-vis the West that responded to the tendency to blame outsiders. "The fault lay with the capitalist imperialism of the foreign powers who invaded China, secured special privileges under unequal treaties, exploited Chinese markets and resources, and suppressed the stirrings of Chinese capitalism." There was no need to look within.

With Mao's triumph in 1949, this ideology became state dogma. Maoism itself, with its contention that man, suitably educated, could overcome all kinds of physical limitations, was a fitting complement to Confucian ideology. It was evident in the hubris of the Great Leap Forward and in recurrent campaigns of thought reform that there was a need to purify the populace through constant indoctrination and self-examination.
Recent campaigns against bourgeois liberalization, spiritual pollution, and fear of the domestic implications of foreign events (the shock at developments in Eastern Europe in late 1989—particularly the fall of the Romanian regime—echoed the reaction to the Hungarian uprising of 1956) kept the combined party-state from looking critically at itself. The lack of non-state legitimizing organizations, together with a fear of chaos, ensure that criticism is ineffective.

China continues to maintain an ambiguous and equivocal attitude toward the foreign world, particularly the West. Historically, China had been content to assert its superiority over other nations and cultures, but rarely to impose it. China met foreigners as tributaries or as conquerors and usually absorbed them on its own terms. With the advent of contacts with the West, the Chinese gradually perceived that they faced a new kind of force, which challenged the basis of their civilization. They realized from the beginning that Western civilization could not be digested whole without transforming China, so the Chinese tried to use selectively those aspects—mainly science and technology—that they hoped might strengthen their traditional system without requiring the fundamental political and cultural changes that adoption of Christianity and democracy would entail.

The Chinese government today, as was the case in the nineteenth century during the Self-Strengthening Movement, wants foreign technology without the polluting aspects of liberalism. Technology is embraced, but its most modern forms are largely confined to the coastal provinces where foreign influence in general has historically been strongest.

As a result of China's concept of man being wed to the agency of the state, the state has been unable to tolerate significant criticism to this day. Blame for China's backwardness is not seen to lie with the party or government, but is attributed to foreign repression. Critics are "counter-
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... provoked by foreign ideas. Since the crackdown on nationwide demonstrations in June 1989 caused many foreign countries to cool their relations with Beijing, China has insisted that it was an internal affair, and that it is up to foreign governments, not China, to improve relations. The government continues to believe that it must be free to choose which influences it will accept and even welcome, and which are anathema. Whether it can ever accept a foreign model, especially one that institutionalizes criticism of the state as a means to perfect its own citizenry, remains to be seen.

FRANCE

Laurence Wylie, a particularly perceptive student of France, remarks,

It is surprising that a people so bent on analyzing and clarifying the phenomena of human experience as the French has not successfully analyzed and described its value system, [perhaps because] the French emphasize the variety of values within the social system rather than the unity of these values.41

Despite the implications of the statement, it is possible, precisely because the French have insisted on the reality of art, whether cultural or political, as a means of ordering life, to infer the French concept of man and to see how this concept has influenced French public policy.

Voltaire wrote, "Descartes made a philosophy the way a good novel is made. Everything was plausible but nothing was true."42 This type of thought created two worlds: one that was true, and one that was plausible—or true enough. The result, for the French, was a dual sort of reality. One is hidden, and not knowable through rational faculties but only imperfectly through the aesthetic dimensions of art and religion. The other reality is a more practi-
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cal, directly apprehensible one that is designed to meet the needs of practical life. "It is the world of law, of rules, of practical social restraints, a world the French see as full of injustice to the individual."43

Man's relationship with the perceptible reality, the reality that can be manipulated and made comprehensible by art, is, in normal times, the only thing to worry about. Montaigne believed,

In general, habituation or learning can have two effects upon man's senses, desires, bodily movements, and opinion; it can stupefy or root out, or it can intensify or develop. In either case, men do not actually need the pure truth in order to believe or act as they do; all they need is appropriate habits. Habitation exerts so great a force upon us that it requires no foundation deeper than itself.44

Man, then, is not tainted with an ineradicable original sin. He is capable, through learning, through the establishment of habit, of living together in tolerable comfort and security. His intelligence and creativity allow him to fashion a society in this world on the practicable side of a dual reality; this power of self-improvement and ability to create an environment that gives a feeling of belonging and of being human in an appropriate way, gives him a sense of control over life. However, this is a limited control, because "all individuals are on the whole malicious and since society never tames the deeper self, every individual is motivated by hidden forces which are probably hostile."45 Rousseau, when he said that man is naturally good,

meant only to deny original sin and to suggest that, if civilized man is now feeble, anxious, and unhappy, it is not because of any evil inherent in him, but because his social environment is not suited to his nature. Man is born neither good nor bad, but with certain potentialities which he strives to realize; and if he is thwarted, he acquires ambitions and needs which cannot satisfy him, either because
they are in themselves insatiable or because they bring him into conflict with other men.⁴⁶

Although Montaigne and Rousseau had wide influence in Europe, their thrust that man was perfectible, at least to a certain degree, found a particularly French expression in its juxtaposition with a society of pervasive mistrust. Society was both the agent of improvement and the embodiment of conflict and corruption. There have been times in the past when the state and its inhabitants were more virtuous and life more perfect. This past suggests that life can be lived better, and the historical memory of this possibility is essential to any successful contemporary effort at improvement.

Access to this golden age—in effect, the other reality—is provided, when history requires it, by a heroic leader whose prowess permits him to bring the ordered virtue of the other reality to bear on the reality of this world. Roland, Joan of Arc, Henri IV, Napoleon, and de Gaulle all had this ability. All were killed, defeated, or repudiated; none can be said to have achieved their goal. But all, in one way or another, restored a sense of unity, pride, and identity to France that had been acutely lacking before their arrival on the scene. Such leaders fulfill the French concept of “measure”—of society arranged such that everyone is in his proper place, performing his proper function, all in accord with the natural order. This had, in turn, permitted better general respect of the mutually recognized rights and responsibilities of the various groups that make up French society.

Such leaders usually come from outside the establishment of their day; they almost need to. Without them, French society is a complex balance of carefully defined and vested interests. Individuals act carefully on the basis of a pervasive suspicion that imbues French society. That suspicion—that man is malicious—is overcome in the formation of interest groups that exist to preserve the vested
interests of their members by representing them in the state. This system of interest groups produces what has been referred to by many scholars as a “stalemated,” “immobilized,” or “blocked” society. It reflects the widespread French view that no one can really be trusted not to improve his lot at your expense, particularly if he is not a member of your interest group. As an example, French sociologist Crozier has denounced a “will of separation” in French intellectual fashions, which preserves the distance between the intelligentsia and the rest of society and thus partakes of the characteristically French determination to preserve one’s vested rights.47

How does such a society, based on such a negative view of man, survive, let alone flourish, as France obviously has? The virtually unanimous answer, given by French and foreigners alike, is, its language and culture. Culture is what redeems France from the otherwise Hobbesian state of its society. These are the products of the positive side of its concept of man, the sense that “mankind is great because from chaos it has fashioned society and even art”48 that gives people a solidarity and identity beyond their mutual suspicion.

The concept of this language and culture is that it is in itself an art, which has been elaborated with great success not only within France but also abroad. The French believed with almost equal fervor the universality of France and civilization, [and] thought, with Durkheim, that French culture was the culture of civilized man everywhere and that France’s conception of patriotism reconciled the nation with mankind.49

There was, and is, a strong belief that other people can become French by speaking the language and participating in the culture. The attractiveness of both was sufficient to
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make them known, practiced, and appreciated by elites all over Europe beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. French alone was identified as the language of human civilization, and French culture was not merely national but universal.

It is remarkable enough that French culture managed to get itself accepted as such throughout the Western, white, Christian world. It is even more a testament to its power that Africans, Arab and black, found in it a second home, and a way of communicating with the rest of humanity, as a result of the second great wave of French colonization in the nineteenth century. While British and other colonizations also served as bridges to the outside world, they did not admit, nor emphasize, the ability of the colonized to achieve cultural equality in a universalistic culture.

For the purposes of this essay, though, we need to investigate the political manifestation of the French cultural character. How does the French concept of man affect French public policy? On the one hand, the French assume human behavior will be mean, self-promoting, and calculating. Man can, however, be at least partially perfected through the education and habits encouraged by society and its political organization. Exalted by language and culture, he can even tap a source—the "other reality," the golden age—that will improve him significantly. This potential is the positive side of man, the side which connects with others, even with others who do not share his goals and concerns.

The remarkable aspect of the French case is that while the suspicious, negative view of man has served to turn France into an often "stalemated" society, the concept of man as educable, as capable of creativity through language and culture, has enabled this closed and fragmented society to make a fair claim that its language and culture is a medium, if not the medium, of a universal civilization. There is almost an inverse relationship between the state of
France, with its society continually at war with its state, and its projection of a universal claim on human civilization. It was after France began to decline as a nation after the Franco-Prussian War, and particularly after the turn of the century, that there were "new drives into utopias, in an attempt to regain lost universality."\textsuperscript{50}

Illuminating examples of the negative concept of man can be found on the domestic side in the organization of politics, particularly in the Vichy period and in de Gaulle's attempt to renew France as a great power. The period of Vichy collaboration with Germany, and the way in which it was remembered and interpreted after the liberation of France, casts in stark relief the political implications of the French concept of man.

Basically, the Vichy regime justified its collaboration as a means to avoid "Polandization." It saw itself as the "shield protecting the French body politic while London and the Resistance forged the sword."\textsuperscript{51} In fact, the collaboration went far beyond the need to "shield" France, because the various interests that comprise French politics saw in the collaboration a means to advance their own domestic aims.\textsuperscript{52} Along with the heroism of the Resistance, we see the undeniable fact that a majority of Frenchmen found, in their own eyes, a convenient and often profitable rationalization for collaboration in the notion that everyone was out for himself. The always tenuous idea of an overarching common interest uniting all Frenchmen was lost, and with it went the glue that held French politics together.

It took de Gaulle to reestablish the bond. He found the French preoccupied with the selfishness and cupidity of man, unable to reach beyond narrow group interests. He succeeded, at least to a degree, in appealing to a larger idea of French grandeur, using this appeal as a means to adapt France to a changed world without losing the national identity. The process was not without pain, especially as the French tried to come to terms with their behavior under the Vichy leadership. "If other nations tended to project
their troubles on their neighbors and had to be forced to look at themselves, the French made the mistake of locking themselves in a cage and tearing themselves apart in it.\textsuperscript{53}

To the extent de Gaulle succeeded, he did so by reaching beyond the contentious present and into Wylie's second reality. He did this by first withdrawing from politics until 1958, when he judged the political situation sufficiently paralyzed to be receptive to his appeal to grandeur above vested interests. As de Gaulle viewed the French situation,

In order that the State should be, as it must be, the instrument of French unity, of the higher interests of the country, of continuity in national policy, I considered it necessary for the government to derive not from parliament, in other words the parties, but, over and above them, from a leader directly mandated by the nation as a whole and empowered to choose, to decide and to act.\textsuperscript{54}

To actually overcome political paralysis and restore unity borders on the miraculous. Commenting on France's perilous financial state by 1958, de Gaulle said, "All in all, it was a choice between a miracle or bankruptcy. But might not the psychological transformation produced by my return to power make a miracle possible?"\textsuperscript{55} The question seemed, at least to the man who posed it, rhetorical.

Hoffman points out how similar de Gaulle's concept of leadership was to Rousseau's. Both believed that once the best kind of leader had shown the people their higher interest, they would follow naturally and of their own accord.\textsuperscript{56} This process did not involve much compromise of the vision. De Gaulle saw the twelve years between his resignation as president of the provincial government in 1946 and his return to power in 1958 as a "shameful spectacle of 'governments' formed on the basis of compromise, attacked from all sides as soon as they were installed, split asunder by internal discord and dissent, overthrown before long."\textsuperscript{57}
Ironically, and perhaps predictably, such uncompromising leaders do not last long. After breaking the paralysis, vested interest groups soon reestablish themselves, and the leader who has given people a brief glimpse of how much better (or at least different) they might be is repudiated—sold to the enemy, like Joan of Arc; assassinated, like Henri IV; defeated, like Napoleon; or voted down, like de Gaulle. It is almost as if the French cannot bear this sort of leadership for longer than they have to. Nor are the French much interested in seeing the reasons for failure in themselves. The ambiguous view of man has created a feeling as pervasive during normal politics as under an heroic leader, that the French are “too immature or too fickle to face themselves without lapsing into demoralization or chaos.”

“Man,” said de Gaulle to Andre Malraux, “was not made to be guilty, sin is not interesting; the only ethics are those which lead man toward the greater things he carries in himself.” When things go wrong, man himself is to blame; in the case of France, usually not oneself, but some other Frenchman. De Gaulle blamed Vichy for the failure of France from 1940 to 1944, and those after de Gaulle have blamed him for France’s contemporary failures.

If domestic politics are most affected by the concept that man is malicious and needs constant checking to the point of political paralysis, the concept of man as creative and capable of establishing a universal ethic that perfects him is most evident in French colonial policy. Although there was an approach that promoted respect for native institutions and indirect rule (as was the case in British colonial policy), the dominant policy was one of assimilation. The effect, from the early colonial experience onward, was deep. Although the British occupied French Senegal three times, when the last period came to an end with the settlement of the Napoleonic wars, the French found the population’s attachment to French language and culture was not significantly weakened.
The insistence that acquisition of French language and culture conferred universal equality was evidenced by the fact that only France, among twentieth-century colonial powers, let colonial natives elect deputies, some of whom served as ministers, to the metropolitan parliament on an equal basis with their colonial masters. Race and original culture were no impediment, at least ideally, to self-improvement through French language and culture.

The central importance of language and culture is seen in the way France disposed of its empire. The first spasm of decolonization, in Indochina, was a bloody one in which France sought to maintain political dominion and gave it up only in defeat. In the late 1950s, only a rebel part of the French establishment tried to keep power over Algeria. De Gaulle, who came to power the second time with the Algerian crisis, realized that political control was no longer possible, and perhaps not even important. His policy of granting independence while maintaining close cultural links and cooperation between independent states was frustrated by the large number of French colonists in Algeria, but ultimately prevailed. Looking back, de Gaulle wrote,

Did this mean that, in allowing them henceforth to govern themselves, we should “sell out,” leave them in the lurch, dismiss them from our sight and from our hearts? Clearly not. Because of their long connection with us and the magnetic attraction exercised by the angels and demons of France upon them as upon all who come into contact with her, they were disposed to maintain close links with us.

After Algerian independence, the decolonization of the rest of the empire—mostly in black Africa—went smoothly, with the French overlords giving up their formal titles of dominion in favor of informal ones. Colonial officials became “technical counsellors,” and military, financial, commercial, and cultural links continued to give France the means of influence that easily survived the transition to independence.
In the French concept, man is able to perfect himself outside the political system—perhaps only there. Throughout their history, the French have excelled at establishing a cultural sphere of action in which whatever perfection man is capable of can take place. Often it takes place despite, or even because of, failure in the political realm. Caesar's defeat of Vercingetorix at Alesia has been metamorphosed by the French into a Gallic victory. When Charles V bested Francois I in a contest for the title of Holy Roman Emperor, Francois said, "All is lost save honor. The body conquered, the heart remains the victor." The French conception of man and how he can be good does not depend on the state in any positive way. The state is necessary to prevent man's selfish and malicious instincts from plunging society into chaos, but the state does not contribute much to man's actual improvement. Improvement comes from culture. Regimes and political philosophies come and go, but cultural identity is strong enough to underpin and outlast all political permutations. The heroic political leaders who are called forth from time to time to rescue the state from its paralysis are themselves disdainful of politics. They draw their strength from, and stake their fame on, a sense of being French, and the opportunities for all who learn the French language and culture to perfect themselves.

POSSIBLE GENERALIZATIONS

Whatever conclusions might be drawn from the above will necessarily be speculative and impressionistic. Relating certain actions to certain thoughts is difficult, and to generalize on the basis of nationality might seem to be beyond reason. Yet something curiously "common-sensical" about such impressions makes them hard to overlook. Without any fully formed reasons, we often say that something is "so French" or "so American" (or "so Chinese")—though
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we cannot accurately articulate why, we intuitively know there is some real truth to these characterizations.

Let me suggest how the concept of man in the three countries surveyed affects public policy in ways that are identifiably Chinese, French, or American. In general, all three nations believe that man is malleable and can be made better. The degree to which this improvement is believed possible, and by what means, differs from country to country, and affects public policies in different ways.

In China, the ancient debate between Confucianism, with its notion of man's natural tendency to be good, and Legalism, with its Hobbesian assumption of man's basic bestiality, was resolved in favor of Confucianism. Confucianism became so ingrained as the official state ideology for Imperial China that it continues to exercise an important, perhaps even dominant, influence today. At the same time, pessimistic Legalist assumptions continued to serve as the unacknowledged basis of much greater state control than would have been justified by pure classical Confucianism. As a result, a constant tension existed between the ideal of good government by virtuous example, and the reality that it was difficult to mobilize, let alone exploit people without coercion. The fact that man was supposed to be much better than he appeared to be, and that government was supposed to be more liberating and uplifting than it seemed to be, was a constant reproach to the literati governing class.

This tension could not be resolved; it persists today. In Imperial China, the virtuous (and hence effortless) government of the mythical Emperors Yao and Shun was the standard by which the governing class measured all rulers. When rulers fell egregiously short of this standard, Confucianism called on officials to criticize them. In communist China, campaigns to emulate virtuous individuals and organizations are frequent; and just as frequently, the emulation fails and punishment results.
In both cases, it is the party-state that steps in to square the circle: man should be good, but cannot be good, and the state makes good the difference by forcing a social order that would otherwise be impossible. The realization that the state is not only essential to the improvement of man's condition, but even essential to prevent nihilistic chaos, has made it at once the underwriter of Chinese civilization and a constant reminder of its failure to achieve the goals of a good society that Confucianism maintained were within the individual's power to reach.

The result has been a political paralysis that has prevented reform and adaptation in Chinese public policy. The continuity of Chinese civilization that this fostered, and which struck the first Western visitors, was indeed impressive. The West had evolved and changed; China had not. Its failure to adapt was not important as long as its foreign contacts (and domestic opponents) were not threatening in any fundamental way to the unitary system of society and government that organized China. But contact with the West was threatening in this way, largely because Western countries, through a system of differentiated interest groups with independent claims to legitimacy (guilds, churches, universities, classes) had produced organizational and technological competence that allowed the West to impose its will more than vice versa.

The Chinese system had not been strengthened by competing institutions with competing claims on men's allegiance. The possibilities for human improvement were linked to the state to a much greater degree than in the West. Man was perfectible, but only with the assistance of the state, without which chaos reigned. There were no other institutions that could provide order and orientation. The family itself was viewed as a miniature state, over which the patriarch ruled as emperor, and as such was a unit that reinforced rather than opposed the state. To risk reforms was to risk everything.
The French share a belief in the perfectibility of man, which might even be stronger than that of the Chinese because it lacks the equivalent of the dark underside of man's nature that Legalism provides in the Chinese tradition (and which Puritanism does in the United States). Perhaps because of this lack of a "dark" balancing feature, the French have not viewed the existence of groups separate from the state, but within the state, as a threat to fundamental order. French society has, in fact, spawned a variety of interest groups reflecting the pervasive mutual suspicion of those who do not share each other's interests. These groups have often been as responsible—or more responsible—for man's improvement as the state itself. Thus, perfectibility has not been as dependent on the state as it is in China, and public policy has been freer to adapt, to evolve, and to cope more effectively with challenges.

These same interest groups, and the mutual suspicion upon which they are based, have often been accused of creating a kind of gridlock, or "immobilism," in French society, paralyzing public policy. That France has retained a relatively greater measure of political adaptability than China is not because its society is susceptible to this kind of paralysis, but because there is a "second reality," a transcendent idea of French grandeur to which leaders can refer, and from which, if they are successful, the necessary power to break the gridlock can be drawn.

In China, there is no possibility of appeal to a common ideal distinct from the state when the state becomes sclerotic. Individuals may feel encouraged by the Confucian tradition to criticize the state, but there is no sense of China above and beyond the government in which they can take refuge. Either the authority accepts and acts upon their criticism (in which case the critic's standing is confirmed), or the criticism is rejected (in which case the critic's standing is totally denied).

French critics can and did find refuge, and a legitimate platform, through the church, the university, the law, or in

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exile as representatives of the true France. Alternative sources of legitimacy are available to Frenchmen, and provide a variety of fulcrums from which to move French society when it is paralyzed by its interest groups.

The existence of this "second reality" for the French allowed them to appeal successfully to non-French peoples who can become "French" through participation in a transcending French culture. Man is perfectible, not only through his membership in various interest groups in the country and society of France, but also by plugging into the second reality of French culture—its rayonnement, or radiance. Through this alternative source of "Frenchness," France has founded and perpetuated an influence in other countries that has not been possible for the Chinese. The idea of a black African minister or representative in China is inconceivable, but it happened in France.

The sense of Chinese culture did not exclude admiration by foreigners, but it allowed only the kind of hierarchical admiration inherent in the concept of lesser cultures paying tribute to Chinese culture. One could become sinicized, to be sure, but not to the extent nor the degree one could become "Frenchified." China's claim to a universalistic culture extends not far beyond the maximum extent of the historical Chinese borders; France's claim is worldwide, and admits not only ex-colonials but even Americans to the Academie Francaise.

The United States began, in New England, with a tradition of government based on a pessimistic view of man's nature and a desire to improve this nature as far as humanly possible within a particular theocratic framework, which members were free to accept or reject—but with rejection entailing exclusion from the theocracy. As in China, man's ability to improve himself was dependent on the state. Without it, he would give way before the bestial part of his nature. There were no independently legitimate organizations aside from the church-state (like the party-state). Consequently, public policy was an essential part of
private progress, but both were bound to a particular time and place, and made no pretense to universality in the sense of being an organizing and civilizing framework for everyone.

The latter claim was increasingly made by the United States, but only after a more optimistic view of man as perfectible without the aid of the state had prevailed over the view of the Puritan theocracy. The more optimistic view permitted a public policy of great adaptability as the country expanded, with settlement usually preceding government, and with private institutions in the form of clubs, churches, and schools springing up to encourage what was believed to be man's natural propensity to perfect himself. With the idea of man as tending toward evil, and needful of strong government to be good, relegated to backstage, if not completely dismissed, public policy was free to concentrate on providing a commonly accepted framework of the lowest common denominator within which private organizations were given great freedom to pursue their own notions of the good life. Their system seemed to work so well that it was propagated as applicable throughout the world. There was no need to subscribe to a particular culture, as in the French version of universality, but only to a set of "democratic principles" under which different cultures could presumably flourish as they had in the United States.

Like the French, the US concept of man emphasized his perfectibility through interest groups independent of the state, serving as important checks upon it. But the relative lack of mutual suspicion in the United States kept such groups from paralyzing gridlock, thus obviating the need to have recourse to a transcendent culture (a second reality) that, tapped by a hero sprung from difficult times, could provide renewed momentum to the society. Thus, France's greatest leaders are cast in a more heroic mold than the greatest US leaders: not that they are more heroic, but that they are perceived in the classical heroic mode of having made a quest on the part of the nation and returned
with a vision sufficient to save the nation and enlarge its grandeur.

In France, in the final analysis, the heroic leader shows Frenchmen how good they can be; in the United States, the leader and the state are barely necessary for individual improvement. Fulfilling one's potential to be good is ultimately something the individual can and should do by himself; public policy is not concerned with this education beyond a basic level, and has eschewed the inculcation of any particular values except the civic ones necessary for the continuity of the system. In France, the individual and culture are legitimate objects of public policy, and the state is expected to go much further, not so much in molding character, as in acting as an arbiter to prevent interest groups from falling into an immobilizing morass of mutual suspicion and recrimination.

In summation, it could be said that all three countries have a tradition of the perfectibility of man, even though earlier views emphasizing man's tendency to evil existed, particularly in China and the United States, and called for a severe and all-controlling government. The more benign view that prevailed in all three countries called for different degrees of state or other institutional involvement.

In China, perhaps because of the Legalist legacy, man's perfectibility was inextricably linked to the state, which was, paradoxically, necessary to encourage what was supposed to be, according to the classical Confucian tradition, a natural tendency toward goodness. The state was confirmed over time as the only independently legitimate organization and the sole agency capable of improving man. As a consequence, public policy acquired a virtually unlimited role, while the lack of competition from alternative sources of legitimacy and perfectibility made it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances, or to project itself as a universally applicable system.

In France, man's perfectibility was possible up to a limited point within the context of his interest group. But
this potential only went so far before being stopped by paralyzing pressure from other mutually mistrustful interest groups. Further progress depended on a galvanizing vision of French culture and its grandeur as presented by a heroic leader. The public policy of the state was essentially negative and time-serving: it could preserve, but not advance, man’s progress, and could go through dramatic changes—from monarchy to empire to commune to republic—and not affect the unifying element of French culture and the independent legitimacy it gave the constituent groups of French society. By its universal claims, that culture permitted a public policy that was adaptable and applicable to a wide range of human conditions, even when the system that produced the policy changed because of this transcendent culture and the independent legitimacy it conferred on competing groups.

In the United States, man’s nature came very early to be seen as so capable of progress and perfection that it needed no state or public policy beyond one that assured a maximum of individual freedom. The assumption that such a laissez-faire system would not result in rampant evil and anarchy was apparently justified, in a rather circular manner, by the speed and ease with which it spread over Indians and Latin Americans. Finally, during and after World War I, it became a universal system whose application would bring the greatest progress to those who embraced it. As in France, the system in the United States encouraged a variety of independently legitimate groups, but these expressed a much lower degree of mutual mistrust and consequently were capable of greater growth and adaptability.

The state was not generally required to act as the arbiter among US interest groups, but merely to set out and inculcate a set of ground rules by which all played. With the rules well established and perpetuated, there was no need to appeal to a transcendent culture, either as a unifier or as an encouragement to fulfill one’s potential. That im-
petus was found in sufficient quantity within the individual working alone or through a group.

The idea of being an American never had anywhere near the cultural component being French had. The cultural component was less and less important as the United States developed, to the point that today there is no common culture in the country, only a universal acceptance of a set of political ground rules. These ground rules are vigorously exported, and their adoption—particularly in countries with no common culture, like Australia or Canada—assures that they are as “American” as can be without the necessity of actually being part of the United States. By insisting on man’s individual perfectibility, by his own efforts, with only a minimal set of rules to put a floor under society, perhaps the United States has evolved the most exportable system in the history of the world. No one can really become Chinese. To become French involves accepting a culture with a pretense of universality. To become American involves nothing more—or less—than accepting a set of political rules.

The differing concepts of man and what it takes to fulfill his potential for good have influenced and been influenced by different kinds and degrees of political organization in the United States, France, and China. These concepts have also been associated with different degrees of adaptability and universal pretension. As concepts of man change—and they are the product of history—the kind of public policy that a country will choose will also change. The speed and efficiency with which public policy changes to adapt to new circumstances seems related to the number of independently legitimate organizations that the history and philosophy of a particular country have sanctioned (with the United States having the most, China the least), and to the extent to which culture is identified with the state (with China having the strongest identification, the United States the weakest). Together, non-state groups and culture seem to provide alternative platforms that, if they
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play a role in man's perfectibility, also permit the easiest adaptation to change.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 66.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 87.
9. Ibid., p. 97.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 146.
25. Ibid., bk. VI, v. 29.
26. Ibid., bk. IX, v. 17.
36. Metzger, p. 49.
37. Ibid., p. 178.
41. Wylie, p. 204.
43. Wylie, p. 200.
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49. Hoffmann, p. 131.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 51.
55. Ibid., p. 138.
56. Hoffmann, p. 195.
57. de Gaulle, p. 8.
58. Hoffmann, p. 51.
59. Ibid., p. 50.
61. Ibid., p. 5.
62. Ibid., p. 59.
63. de Gaulle, p. 38.
64. Rosenblum, p. 216.
65. Ibid., p. 82.
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