UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN BOSNIA -HERZEGOVINA.

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect our own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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The operational framework proposed in this paper is focused on U.S. participation as a component of U.N. coalition forces. The operational emphasis of this proposal is joint-maritime operations to provide humanitarian relief for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is assumed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) will serve as the military organization through which the U.N. imposes, supervises and enforces a cease-fire agreement. This paper concludes that stability in the post cold war world can be managed through the U.N.; however,
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II THE DOMINICAN CRISIS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Situation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV COALITION CONCEPT PLAN</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. POLICY OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Force</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE YUGOSLAV THREAT</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Estimates (Serbia)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerabilities (Serbia)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Estimates (Croatia)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerabilities (Croatia)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Estimates (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerabilities (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTERS OF GRAVITY</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATER STRATEGY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Initiatives</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Initiatives</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Initiatives</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Initiatives</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT OF OPERATION</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR PHASE CAMPAIGN PLAN</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase One</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Two</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Three</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase Four</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR PLAN OVERVIEW</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase One</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase two</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V COUNTERARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I--SERBIAN ORDER OF BATTLE</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II--CROATIAN ORDER OF BATTLE</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX III--BOSNIAN ORDER OF BATTLE</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ethnic Breakdown of Bosnia-Herzegovina .......... 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Notional Command Structure (EUCOM Option) .......... 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Command Relationships (EUCOM Option) .............. 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Notional Command Structure (NATO) .................. 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>U.S. Force list for U.N. Intervention into Bosnia- Herzegovina ...................................... 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Concept of Operations .................................. 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Supply Routes Crossing from Serbia into Bosnia- Herzegovina ............................................. 44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

With the end of the cold war and the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, as well as the former Soviet Union, a political and economic vacuum has surfaced in many areas of the world. Chaos caused by ethnic, religious and nationalistic violence has erupted in countries which were dependent on the former Soviet empire for stability. In the past, repressive communist regimes tended to restrain ethnic, religious and nationalistic differences through the legitimacy of communist ideology and governmental authority.

The instability and violence that characterizes the world today is not unprecedented and it should be viewed within the historical context of post-war, political, economic, and military adjustment. In contrast to the events of today, the decline of the western colonial powers, following the end of World War II, also contributed to the destabilizing tendencies in regional areas, as the colonial empires of Britain, France and Belgium receded. Great transfers of populations along with ethnic and religious violence were characteristic of conflicts in India, Pakistan, Cyprus, and Israel. In the case of the former Yugoslav republics, extreme nationalism and Croatian/Bosnian resistance to
Serbian political domination are the primary reasons for the current conflict that engulfs Bosnia-Herzegovina and threatens the entire Balkan region. The realignment of territorial borders along nationalistic lines is the key aim of the major combatants (Croats and Serbs); large segments of the Yugoslav population have been displaced and are resettling within newly defined ethnic and nationalistic boundaries. Unfortunately, not all of the refugees have been able to resettle within the territorial boundaries of the former Yugoslav state and this situation has caused friction and destabilization in neighboring countries.

The challenges confronting the U.S. and its prospective coalition partners should be viewed in the following context: first, to ease the suffering of the non-combatants and refugees; second, to prevent ethnic cleansing; and third, to promote regional stability by containing the conflict and fostering political engagement to resolve the crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight salient background issues surrounding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to propose an operational framework for U.S. participation as part of a multi-national peacemaking force. A brief examination of U.S. operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (POWER PACK) will also be provided as a comparative model for coalition intervention. The specific emphasis of the operational framework proposed in this paper is joint-maritime force employment for humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As Carl Von Clausewitz has stated in his book *On War:*

"War plans cover every aspect of war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective, in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale and means of effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail."
CHAPTER II

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS

The Dominican crisis of 1965-1966 and the decision to intervene with military force offer a worthwhile perspective in analyzing the costs and benefits of military intervention in the current Balkan crisis. The military role in the Dominican Republic graphically illustrates how military intervention can be effectively utilized to stabilize a battlefield situation. The massive introduction of the 82nd Airborne Division halted the Dominican revolution, protected civilian lives and protected the country against possible communist domination.2

To many people, not only in the U.S. but throughout the world, direct military intervention should generally be avoided. Intervention may be contemplated when lesser means have failed to control a problem and a sense of international consensus prevails which demands action. There is no doubt that U.S. forces were a key factor in stabilizing the violent situation in Santo Domingo in April 1965; the most important element for consideration in this intervention is not the effectiveness of military operations but the success of diplomatic and political activities. In 1965, policy makers used military force to create an environment where diplomatic resolution of the crisis could be achieved.3 The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while infinitely more complex, may require a similar operational perspective by policy-strategy decision makers.
President Johnson's objectives in the Dominican Intervention were to prevent the establishment of a radical communist government, similar to Cuba, to promote a stable and democratic regime, and to pressure the Organization of American States (OAS) to undertake collective action against communist expansion in the region.4 The problems that President Johnson encountered in his endeavor were that he failed to make an adequate case regarding communist linkage to the Dominican crisis and he failed to build the requisite national and international consensus for military force, prior to the intervention. Some may argue that he built consensus after the fact and others may argue that he never properly justified U.S. actions; the controversy, nevertheless, resulted in a loss of presidential credibility and provided the backdrop for the debate of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.5

A vital component of POWER PACK's successful diplomatic-military approach was the perception of neutrality. A second diplomatic-military component was the phased introduction of decisive force to minimize the possibility of negative world opinion. Perhaps the most important aspect of political-military effectiveness was the guidance provided by President Johnson to General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: to get enough force into the Dominican Republic, to do the job quickly and decisively, and to obtain the best general possible to command forces in Santo Domingo.6

Forces were built up in Santo Domingo in April and May of 1965; the force structure included assets from all services under the
command of a joint task force commander, General Bruce Palmer. Once the battlefield situation stabilized, as a result of decisive military presence and limited combat with insurgents, General Palmer shifted his emphasis to neutrality, civil affairs, and humanitarian aid. U.S. forces assisted relief agencies in restoring public services and delivering medical supplies.\(^7\) The introduction of a disciplined and restrained force, capable of shifting its focus from combat operations to civil concerns enabled political negotiations to take primacy in resolving the conflict.\(^8\)

While there were noteworthy operational strengths to be found in the Dominican Intervention, a discussion of several of its operational shortcomings adds valuable insight for future operations. The determination of strategic objectives for POWER PACK was kept within the proper domain of political authorities, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Consensus within the national security establishment broke down over the question of political authority and the degree to which it would exercise direct operational control over U.S. forces, circumventing control that should have been exercised by the unified commander (CINCLANT).\(^9\) The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 should alleviate future problems of this nature with regard to U.S. forces, but problems associated with command and control will be found in future coalition military operations as a result of their politically charged nature.
Intelligence activities associated with the operational level of war were a failure and this area has continued to be particularly weak in every military operation since POWER PACK. Assessments contained in State Department and the CIA cables were often unsubstantiated, biased, or irrelevant; in many cases accurate political and mission oriented information that did exist was withheld from key officers due to an obsession with security. Military intelligence officers criticized the emphasis placed on intelligence obtained from technical sources at the expense of human sources (HUMINT). Valuable time was later expended, after U.S. forces had entered the country, in setting up networks and facilities for collecting, processing, and analyzing information gained from HUMINT.

A salient issue of concern at the operational level that will have a dramatic impact on operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be the military’s relationship with the media. President Johnson was not the first American president to be criticized in the press, but military units engaged in combat were generally not subjected to such critical analysis prior to April 1965. The military’s relationship with the media was adversarial during POWER PACK due to military insensitivity in dealing with reporters’ questions and access to information. Some news people chose not to believe information released by military authorities and others distorted news for the sake of a good story. Military relations with the press have continued to be problematic, especially during the war in Vietnam and controversy.
exists over the military’s handling of the press during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

In summary, the military came out of the Dominican Intervention with mixed views over the degree and effectiveness of operational control exercised by political authorities - President Johnson and Secretary of Defense MacNamara were looked upon with extreme contempt. It must be emphasized that the primary purpose of military operations is to support and enhance efforts to secure political ends. POWER PACK should be viewed cautiously as a comparative model for future operations and each potential operation should be evaluated based on the situation and the costs/benefits associated with contemplated action. A useful framework for humanitarian relief/peacemaking operations does emerge from a study of POWER PACK and can be viewed as follows:

- Clearly stated and attainable objectives.
- National and international consensus for action prior to intervention.
- Military objectives consistent with near-term and long-term political goals.
- Decisive military force introduced to stabilize the battlefield situation.
- Timely intervention to contain regional destabilization.
- Intelligence requirements (technical and HUMINT) identified and satisfied prior to intervention.
- Emphasis on civic action, civil affairs, and humanitarian relief.
- Effective use of psychological warfare and special operations.
- Well defined command and control structure.
- Military leadership that conceptualizes and facilitates military-political effectiveness.
- Flexibility and adaptability of tactical commanders to cope with local security problems.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Balkans have historically been associated with pronounced ethnic and religious diversity; stability has traditionally been maintained through foreign domination and authoritarian rule. After World War II, the region was united under the communist leadership of Josip Tito and a unified Yugoslav state emerged. This state relied upon a strong central government to maintain national unity, but incessant friction amongst the diverse population always lurked beneath the surface. Recently, Yugoslavia has undergone a massive political, social, and economic upheaval that has displaced the communist controlled central government and the unified state has been replaced by the independent republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. These republics are currently involved in a bloody intra-state conflict which is threatening to escalate across international borders.

Prior to the unification of Yugoslavia, each of the republics had an independent history with indigenous cultural and religious identities influenced by distinct elements of foreign domination. The Slovems, a primarily Roman Catholic people, were controlled by the Frankish Kingdom and the Austrian Empire. The Croats of Croatia and Slovenia came under Austrian and Hungarian influence, while the Croats of Dalmatia were influenced more diversely by Byzantine, Hungarian, Venetian, French and Austrian dominance. The Croats were predominately Roman Catholic but had a large
Serbian-Orthodox minority. In comparison, the Serbs, who had been historically under Turkish dominance, were primarily Orthodox as were the Montenegrins, who were ruled by a dynasty of bishop-priests. The Bosnians also had been ruled by the Turks but were converted to Islam in great numbers; Macedonia has been historically a mixture of minority ethnic groups dominated to a large extent by the Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman empires.¹⁴

At the turn of the twentieth century, the land mass that today represents Yugoslavia, was largely controlled by the Serbian and Ottoman empires, but strong nationalist feelings combined with waning Turkish power resulted in popular discontent and open rebellion. Eventually all of the major south Slavic groups (the Croats, Slovens, Serbs, and Bulgars) united and expelled the Turks; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovens was created (later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia).¹⁵

The country was initially characterized by bitter political, ethnic, and religious infighting. The main rivalry was between the Serbs, who promoted the control of a strong centralized government, and the Croats, who demanded regional autonomy. The government sought desperately to unify the country, but a lack of political experience and reluctance to compromise amongst the diverse groups caused the country to remain politically fragmented as World War II began.¹⁶

The effects of World War II in Yugoslavia were devastating; the Germans occupied the country, which resulted in fighting between the German army and Yugoslav partisans. In addition, the
occupation generated substantial ethnic fighting on the part of indigenous forces, which in the aftermath accounted for the death of nearly two million people (Jews, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs). During this period, a group of communist partisans, led by Josip Tito, established themselves as the most powerful resistance movement and emerged from the war in control of the country.17 This communist element was able to reestablish a unified Yugoslav Federation; in March of 1945, with Tito as prime minister, a single provisional Yugoslav government took office.

Tito’s regime adopted a Soviet style constitution which incorporated a republic/nation concept to control its diverse population. It formed six republics and two autonomous regions, which included Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo plus "the three nations"*, (the Serbs, Croats and Muslim Slavs). This concept prevented Serbian and Croatian claims to disputed territory and stabilized the fragmented population.

The communist regime also instituted a Soviet style economic system which relied upon a strong central government for planning and executing economic policy, thus enabling Tito’s government to transition the country from an agrarian to an industrial based economy. The early years of communist rule enjoyed some popular support as a result of marginal improvement in the standard of living.

* The term "nation" was used in reference to ethnic groups whose traditional territorial homelands lay within Yugoslavia.
Due to European economic sluggishness in the late 1960's, the country experienced severe economic stagnation and the communist leadership was forced to introduce sweeping reforms. These reforms became known as the workers' self-management system. State ownership was replaced by a concept of social ownership and corresponding political reform resulted in an independent foreign policy and nonalignment with the Soviet Union. These changes dramatically moved Yugoslavia towards an open market system and invited free foreign trade, but the changes also had negative effects: rampant inflation and a foreign trade deficit. The communist regime instituted measures to control these economic problems, but it failed to recognize and resolve the widening economic gap between the prosperous northern republics and the underdeveloped southern republics.

During the 1970's, in the last decade of the Tito government, the negative effects of inefficient economic policy and regional disparity became more pronounced. Yugoslavia was experiencing social and economic friction to the degree that the integrity of the unified state was at stake. Tito, who sensed trouble, reinstituted strict centralized rule; the communist party reassumed tight political/economic control and purged reformist party leaders in Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Vojvodina.

After Tito's death in 1980, the authority and stature of the communist party began to gradually erode due to a lack of national and regional credibility. This lack of credibility, combined with the failure of communism in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, forced the Yugoslav communists to relinquish control of the government. At different times during 1990, multiparty elections were held throughout Yugoslavia and several republics soundly rejected communist rule, (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia); the republics of Serbia and Montenegro along with the autonomous region of Vojvodina retained communist rule. By the fall of 1990, over two hundred political parties had been formed and the country had become more politically fragmented than it had been before communist rule.

Yugoslavia's Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, attempted to implement wide spread reform but was consistently stymied by the competing interests of ethnic, religious, and regional factions. As the situation deteriorated in the summer of 1990, two republics, Slovenia and Croatia, sought independent sovereignty from the Yugoslav Federation and proposed that the country be restructured into a confederation of independent states. Serbia, led by communist Slobodan Milosevic, immediately blocked the proposal, arguing that Serbs in other republics would become citizens of foreign countries. The Milosevic regime was determined to preserve the federal state and to enhance Serbian influence by calling for the support and unity of all Serbs to protect the Serbian communities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This action encouraged local fighting and set the stage for a full scale intra-state conflict. Additionally, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which is dominated and controlled by Serbs, was ordered by the federal government into Slovenian
territory on the pretext of illegal secession. When Croatia and Slovenia officially declared their independence in June 1991, fighting immediately erupted between the two republics and Serbia. The European Community intervened diplomatically in an attempt to negotiate a cease fire, but the negotiated settlement, as well as numerous others, rapidly collapsed.\textsuperscript{23}

As the conflict increased in intensity, the remaining Yugoslav republics were attempting to implement economic and social reforms, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has "long been recognized as the Balkans most explosive ethnic powderkeg, (in 1991 its population was 43.7 percent Muslim, 31.4 percent Serb, 17.3 percent Croat)"\textsuperscript{24}. When Bosnia-Herzegovina voted overwhelmingly for independent sovereignty in May 1991, the Serbian government immediately responded that they would use whatever force was necessary to prevent Bosnian secession.

\textbf{CURRENT SITUATION}

The Serbs currently possess a sizable and powerful military force and have seized over two-thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory. Open fighting has been taking place since June of 1991, including daily bombardment of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. Additionally, Croats living in Bosnia have also been involved in open fighting with Serb and Muslim forces.

The ethnic composition of the former Yugoslav republic is extremely diverse and ethnic friction is a complicating factor to what is largely a political struggle. The Serbs constitute the bulk of the population (45.4\%), the Croats (19.7\%), Muslim Slavs
(8.9%), Slovens (7.8%), Albanians (7.7%), Macedonians (6.0%), Montenegrins (2.6%), and Hungarians (1.9%). Bosnia-Herzegovina is comprised of Muslim Slavs, Serbs, and Croats without any single group constituting a majority. Serbia, Slovenia, and Montenegro are homogenous, additionally, only 60% of the Serbian population lives in Serbia. A geographical illustration of ethnic groups is provided in figure 1.

The current political situation is highly volatile and emotionally charged as a result of the atrocities committed by the warring factions. Economically, the entire region is on the verge of collapse, especially Serbia, where industrial production has declined by 18 percent since 1991, unemployment is over 20 percent, and inflation is at an annual rate of over 1,900 percent.
FIGURE 1

KEY

NON-YUGOSLAV GROUPS
WITH OVER 10,000 MEMBERS

Serbs
Croats
Slovenes
Macedonians
Montenegrins
Moslems
Yugoslavs

S Slovaks
A Albanians
M Hungarians
T Turks
R Romanians
B Bulgarians
I Italians
Cz Czechs
U Ruthenians
G Gypsies (Romi)
D Germans

ASSUMPTIONS. Events during the last several months in Yugoslavia indicate a pattern of intense combat followed by a lull in action, during which political negotiations have brokered nineteen cease fires as of January 1993. No substantial progress has been made in resolving the Balkan crisis in the last eighteen months, and it is apparent that all combatants have been less than sincere in their willingness to accept a negotiated peace settlement. Short lived cease-fires have been used by the warring factions to make military and political consolidations as we have seen most recently in the December 1992 Serbian elections; Slobodan Milosevic consolidated his hard-line domestic power-base by defeating the less conservative candidate, Milan Panic. It is assumed that this pattern of activity will continue, causing further violence and regional destabilization. In order to contain the destabilizing effects of the conflict within the former Yugoslav republic and to provide humanitarian relief for civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is anticipated that a substantial, multi-national, military intervention will be sponsored by the United Nations. It is further anticipated that the decision for the introduction of decisive military force will be made during the late spring of 1993, after lesser demonstrations of political and military power fail to convince the combatants of U.N. resolve (i.e. enforcement of the "no-fly zone").
The course of action advanced in this paper emphasizes joint-maritime operations by the U.S. as a component of U.N. humanitarian relief operations in the former Yugoslav Republic. In view of the intense political debate regarding the Balkan crisis and the call for U.S. leadership to help resolve the matter, either NATO or the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) will serve as the military organization through which the U.N. imposes, supervises and enforces a cease-fire agreement. A joint coalition task force will be provided to the U.N., with an appropriate commander, staff and command/control framework decided upon by member nations. The command issue will be decided based on the country contributing the most forces; this was the precedent set in the Korean War and seen again most recently in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.26

U.N. POLICY OBJECTIVES

The recommended U.N. policy objectives are as follows:

1. To provide humanitarian relief and assistance to civilians at risk in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2. To constrain ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3. To supervise and protect the return of refugees as stipulated by diplomatic agreement.
4. To create a diplomatic and military climate that enables a negotiated end to hostilities and restores stability to the Balkan region.
5. To create an economic and security arrangement that satisfies long-term stability concerns for the Balkan region.

PRINCIPLES OF PLANNING

Decisive Force

In order to achieve assigned goals with minimum coalition casualties, operational planners must apply the principle of introducing a decisive number of military forces. This guiding principle stands in contrast not only to the incremental attrition warfare which characterized U.S. operations in Vietnam but also to the meager commitment of U.N. peacekeeping forces that have so far characterized U.N. operations in the former Yugoslav republic. The speed and violence of action that characterized coalition operations in DESERT STORM need not be viewed as integral to a successful intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, unless Serbian, Muslim and Croat forces fail to adhere to the mandates of an imposed U.N. cease-fire agreement.

Forces should not be oriented for ground combat use or as a buffer between the warring factions; the protection of international zones and corridors should be the operational focus of U.N. military forces. The emphasis for coalition planners in framing military response to cease-fire violations should underscore restraint and the use of naval and air forces.
STRENGTH

The overall military strategy should be designed to stalemate the warring factions with a massive introduction of military strength and political resolve. While U.N. forces will be operating in a high threat environment with extended lines of communication, the U.N., nevertheless, should be able to exploit the following military, political, economic, and psychological strengths:

* Widespread political and economic support.
* High caliber coalition political and military leadership.
* Unity of effort.
* Superior military personnel and training.
* Technologically advanced weaponry.
* Superior intelligence.
* Recent UN success in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

THE YUGOSLAV THREAT

Intelligence Estimates (Serbia):

There is considerable disagreement concerning the actual number of Serbian ground troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an accurate number is estimated at 80,000. These forces are organized as I Krajina Corps in Banja Luka, II Krajina Corps in Drvar, III North Bosnian Group near Bijeljina, IV East Bosnian Group and the Herzegovinian Corps are located near Grahovo and Bileca.
The Serbian Air Force operates over fifty combat aircraft and 20 helicopters. The aircraft are comprised of Orao-2s, MIG-21s, and MIG-29s, and operated out of bases at Batajnica (near Belgrade), Nis, Ponikve (near Uzice), Pristina, and Podgorica (for combat missions into Bosnia-Herzegovina); the Serbians are also using the Bosnian airfield at Mahovljani (near Banja Luka). The Serbian air defense network is anchored around the air base at Banja Luka and comprised of one division of SA-2’s, a single battery SA-6, and 40mm anti-aircraft (AA) guns. Unconfirmed reports also list possible missiles around Sarajevo. Troops in the field are equipped with large numbers of Soviet SA-7 shouldered fired infra-red (IR) missiles and a large number of AA guns up to 30mm, but none of these weapons are radar controlled. The Serbian forces are reported to have sufficient supply of weapons and ammunition to fight at the current level of intensity for two years. (For the Serbian order of battle see Appendix-I.)

Vulnerabilities (Serbia):

Despite Serbian numerical superiority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs have significant weaknesses:

* A rigid top-down command and control structure and a reluctance by tactical commanders to exercise initiative. Operations are controlled by Slobodan Milosevic and the General Staff located in Belgrade.

* Vulnerable logistics network. The primary resupply routes are across the Drina River to Bijeljina then to Banja Luka,
across the Drina River at Loznica, Bralinac, Visegrad and from Scepan Polje (Montenegro) to Sarajevo.  

* Limited offensive air and defensive air capabilities. The majority of the air defense network is built around the Soviet made SA-2 and SA-6 Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) systems. Although formidable, these SAMs could be systematically defeated or negated through U.S. and coalition electronic countermeasures, anti-radiation missiles, and special forces. The SA-7 and AA threats could be negated through high altitude tactics and flare counter-measures. Even though the offensive air capability is credible, it is extremely restricted due to parts availability and in the Bosnian theater it is primarily a day threat (MIG-21). These capabilities would not pose a serious threat to U.S. and coalition air and naval forces.

* Poor state of training and morale. Forces are poorly trained at the tactical level; this has resulted in a lack of small unit cohesiveness and poor morale.

Intelligence Estimates (Croatia):

The Croatian forces total 45,000 men: 20,000 deployed in western Herzegovina and the Neretun River Valley; 10,000-12,000 in northern Bosnia, 6,000-8,000 in central Bosnia, 1,000 in eastern Bosnia, 2,000 in Sarajevo and 2,000 in northwestern Bosnia (Bihac enclave).

The Croats lack heavy weapons, especially howitzers and AA missiles and guns. These forces use a variety of automatic
rifles (Romanian AK-47s, Yugoslav M70B AK-74s and M-16s); mortars (50mm, 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm); and anti-tank (AT) weapons (Soviet RPG-7s and PTUR-64s, Yugoslav 64mm M80, 90mm M79 and the 120mm AT rocket grenade launchers, and German "Armburst").

The Croats also operate 50-60 tanks, mostly Soviet designed T-54s and T-55s. (For the Croatian order of battle see Appendix-II.)

Vulnerabilities (Croatia):

Croatian forces have significant weaknesses:

* Insufficient supply of consumables and ammunition. While the Croats control the large explosives plant located at Vitez in central Bosnia, it is insufficient to substantially provide for the needs of Croatian forces.

* Fragmented command and control structure. The functional chain of command runs from the commander in the main headquarters in Grude to individual commanders in the field, while the main headquarters in Zagreb controls operational level force movements and deployments. This has made it difficult for Croatian forces to exploit tactical success.

Intelligence Estimates (Bosnia-Herzegovina):

The army of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of the territorial defense force (TDF) and the air defense force. The TDF contains 80,000 soldiers (40,000 men fully armed) and is organized into five corps: 1st Corps located at Sarajevo, 2nd Corps located at
Tuzla, 3rd Corps located at Zenica, 4th Corps located at Mostar and the 5th Corps located at Bihac.  

The air defense force does not have any fixed wing aircraft or helicopters but there are two operational air bases located at Dubrava near Tuzla and Zeljava near Bihac.

The Muslim forces are poorly armed and possess severe deficiencies in mortars, large caliber field guns, armored vehicles and anti-armor weapons. The majority of the small arms are old Romanian AK-47's, Yugoslav AK-74's and G-3 sniper rifles. The Muslims are reported to have obtained shoulder fired infra-red missiles of American and Soviet design. (For the Bosnian order of battle see Appendix-III.)

Vulnerabilities (Bosnia-Herzegovina):

The forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina have several weaknesses:

* Poorly organized command and control network. Operations cannot be coordinated due to a lack of infrastructure for centralized control. The Supreme Commander, Defense Minister and Staff, located in Sarajevo, exercise virtually no control beyond their local area.

* Poor level of training at all levels.

* Shortage of arms and ammunition. Forces are dependent on external resupply, which is extremely difficult to accomplish in view of the arms embargo. The distribution of supplies is hampered by a poor logistics network.
CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Clausewitz defined an opponent’s center of gravity (COG) as the "...hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends," and he stated that the military must focus its efforts on attacking these COG’s." The overall coalition strategy should be based on marshalling political, military, economic and psychological power to deal effectively with the following COG’s:

STRATEGIC

While it is recognized that Serbia is not the only republic involved in open fighting, curtailing Serbian desires for political domination is pivotal to ending the violent confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The strategic COG is the political and military leadership of Serbia. Slobodan Milosevic exercises control through a strong centralized government and through the military which is doctrinally tied to centralized command and control. The coalition will not be able to attack Serbian leadership directly but can degrade its effectiveness by destroying its command, control and communication system. The Serbian leadership can also be isolated internationally through diplomacy and destabilized internally through military, economic and psychological efforts.

OPERATIONAL

The Operational COG is the civilian population located in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If required, coalition air forces would easily be able to establish air supremacy and would be able to directly attack hostile ground troops and supporting
resupply/logistic networks. Protection of international zones and corridors should be the focus of the ground forces.

TACTICAL

The Tactical COG is geographically oriented to the security of established international zones and corridors. These locations will protect refugees/local populations and will be used as a means for distribution of humanitarian aid. Decisive military presence should be used to impose a battlefield stalemate and decrease the current level of violence in these areas. Limited tactical counterattack may be required to ensure a large-scale cessation of hostilities.

THEATER STRATEGY

Recommended Political Initiatives:

The multi-national military force should be used as a vehicle to build international consensus and to obtain international participation in the U.N. humanitarian relief effort. The U.S. should be prepared to provide the bulk of military force in order to be in a position of political primacy within the coalition structure. The U.S. and U.N. negotiators should ensure that the former Yugoslav republics disengage militarily and initiate viable political dialogue to resolve the conflict through negotiation. The long term U.S. and U.N. goal should be directed to establishing a regional (European) approach to manage the long term peacekeeping activities and the economic rehabilitation of the area. Should the Serbian government fail to abide by U.N.
resolutions associated with short term and long term U.N. policy goals, the government should be isolated and destabilized by use of war crimes tribunals, allowing for more moderate elements within Serbia to take power. Reinforcing U.N. political credibility and authority in dealing with regional crises are key elements for political success.

Gaining the cooperation of the regional powers (i.e. Russia, Turkey and Greece) in the U.N. effort should also be viewed as a vital component of a successful political strategy. The Russians have historic links with the Serbs as a result of slavic culture. An examination of events leading up to World War I will reinforce the notion that the Russians have to be involved in managing the Yugoslav problem rather than becoming part of the problem itself. Turkey’s muslim culture and its historic ties to Bosnia-Herzegovina make the Turkish government a pivotal agent for Muslim as well as Arab interests. Greece’s common border and Orthodox religious relationship with the former Yugoslav republic make Greek cooperation in a regional plan extremely important.

**Recommended Economic Initiatives:**

Countries not able to participate with military forces should be encouraged to help defray the costs of relief operations. Russian, Turkish and Greek acquiescence to the U.N. effort could be guaranteed through manipulation of economic assistance. Chinese agreement to the U.N. effort should be secured by reinforcing current U.S. trade policy (most favored nation
status) and toning down inflammatory political rhetoric regarding human rights. The European Community (EC) should be compelled to establish a standing organization to assist and monitor the long term economic rehabilitation of the former Yugoslav republics. Redeveloping the economic viability of the Balkans is a key element in achieving long-term stability in the region. An arms embargo should remain in effect but the economic embargo should be lifted as soon as possible.

**Recommended Psychological Initiatives:**

The U.N. must be authoritative and credible in dealing with the warring factions. This can be achieved through the unity of political, economic, and military effort on the part of the U.N. coalition. In addition, individuals or groups suspected of war crimes must be brought to justice. The long term psychological effect of legal accountability and punishment, administered by an international tribunal, will act as a forceful deterrent to potential aggressors. The gains earned through the judicious application of political, military and economic power need to be sustained over time by psychological power. If required, efforts can be directed to isolate and discredit regional aggressors in the eyes of the world community. State sponsored aggression could further be addressed by discrediting ruling factions in the eyes of the indigenous population via leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspapers. The media should be viewed as a powerful ally in
the U.N. effort; responsible treatment of the press and access to information will facilitate highly effective media relations.

**Recommended Military Initiatives:**

Military force, by itself, will not be able to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslav republic; therefore, a defensive military strategy aimed at containing the violence and destabilization within the region should be employed. The main effort of U.S. military participation in the U.N. coalition should be directed towards civil affairs and humanitarian relief. The delivery of humanitarian relief/assistance to the indigenous population and the restoration of public services also should be the focus of the U.N. military effort. A large number of security forces will be required to protect international zones and corridors in order to guarantee the delivery of relief supplies and to prevent further, large-scale, ethnic cleansing. U.N. ground forces should not act as a buffer between warring factions. Hostile forces should be used as a counter-balance for one another on the battlefield, this will stalemate resources and prevent the warring factions from concentrating forces elsewhere. Limited offensive operations, if required, should be tailored in such a way that prevents general escalation and minimizes collateral damage; air power and special operations forces should form the nucleus of U.N. striking power.
CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The concept of the U.N. military intervention plan is geared to a permissive environment and would be accomplished in four phases: preparatory phase, execution phase, consolidation phase and withdrawal phase. In addition, a contingency air plan would be available for execution in the event the environment was non-permissive or became non-permissive. The air plan can be executed following phase one of the operation or at any time during the subsequent phases.

From the outset of the intervention, the operational deployment and employment of forces would emphasize neutrality, restraint, and military discipline. The military cannot solve the problems of the Balkan region; its purpose is to serve as an enabling tool for regional political engagement. Tactical counterattack will probably be required at some point during the course of the U.N. deployment and these operations should underscore the use of air and special operations forces.

Phase one of the U.N. plan provides the opportunity to refine intelligence networks, to confirm the location of potentially hostile forces, to confirm the location of international zones/corridors, and to identify regular/irregular forces suspected of war crimes. Phase two of the operation would be dedicated to the establishment of international zones/corridors and the neutralization/apprehension of war criminals. The third phase would focus on the delivery of humanitarian aid, restoring public services, constraining large-scale fighting and providing
security for international zones/corridors. The final phase would be oriented towards phased redeployment of peacemaking forces, deployment of long-term peacekeeping forces, monitoring of political agreements and economic rehabilitation of the area.

Ground forces should look to rotary wing assets to help offset the effects of difficult terrain. Ground force missions should stay focused on the operational center of gravity, which is the civilian and returning refugee population. Direct action missions would be used to the greatest extent possible in the neutralization/apprehension of suspected war criminals. There will be a requirement for language support and legal support that will far extend beyond the military's capability to provide.

Naval forces would be employed in the effort to strictly enforce the provisions of U.N. embargoes on military supplies and equipment. Naval air forces would be used to provide surveillance of over-land smuggling routes, enforce "no fly zones", and attack ground/naval targets as tasked. Naval forces would be responsible to provide assets for the logistic and sustainment effort as required.

Air forces would be employed to complement strategic lift requirements and to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid. In addition, air assets would be used for the attack of selected targets, area reconnaissance/surveillance and support of psychological operations.

In conclusion, discipline and flexibility on the part of tactical commanders will be essential in creating a viable
political-military relationship. U.N. forces must resist the tendency to treat the civilian population with indifference and disdain. The military can greatly enhance political effectiveness by gaining the confidence and support of the local population, (focusing on the Operational COG). See figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 for proposed force list and command/control recommendations.
NOTIONAL U.N. COMMAND STRUCTURE
(EUCOM OPTION)

JTF COMMANDER
(USA)

DEPUTY COMMANDER
(EUROPEAN)

J-1  J-2  J-3  J-4  J-5  J-6

FRENCH CDR  BRITISH CDR  U.S CDR  TURKISH CDR  DUTCH CDR

AIR ELEMENT  GROUND ELEMENT  NAVAL ELEMENT  SPECIAL OPS
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
(EUCOM OPTION)

SUPPORTED CINC
USEUCOM

SUPPORTING CINC'S
USSOCOM
USLANTCOM
USTRANSCOM
USSPACECOM

SPECIFIED COMMAND
FORSCOM

SERVICE COMPONENTS
NAVY MARINES
ARMY AIR FORCE

JTF COMMANDER
OPCON COCOM
ADMIN LOGISTIC INTEL
### Recommends U.S. Force List

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FOUR PHASE CAMPAIGN PLAN

PHASE ONE: PREPARATORY PHASE

* Initiate the collection of HUMINT by use of indigenous sources.
* Special operations forces confirm locations of potentially hostile combat forces and their capabilities/intentions.
* Locate irregular indigenous forces suspected of war crimes for apprehension and prosecution.
* Confirm proposed locations for international security zones and international corridors.
* Make liaison with current U.N. peacekeeping forces to accommodate expansion of military effort.
* Ensure political-military unity of effort through coordinated planning.

PHASE TWO: EXECUTION PHASE

* Secure through host nation agreement the port facilities of Ploce and Split on the Adriatic coast. Establish these ports as international security zones (figure 6).
* Establish two overland international corridors by road/rail to Sarajevo (figure 6).
* Establish an international relief zone around Sarajevo, Zenica and Doboj (figure 6).
* Establish air facilities at Banja Luka and Tuzla as international security zones (figure 6).
* Establish international corridor north of Sarajevo to Doboj (figure 6).
* Conduct combat operations as required.
* Continue to apprehend suspected war criminals.

**PHASE THREE: CONSOLIDATION PHASE**

* Deliver humanitarian relief supplies.
* Assist in restoration of public services.
* Establish international corridors to and international zones at Visegrad and Bihac (figure 6).
* Provide security for international zones and corridors.

**PHASE FOUR: WITHDRAWAL PHASE**

* Turn over peacekeeping command and control to a European force commander with U.N. approved timetable.
* Withdraw and redeploy forces no longer required.
* Monitor political negotiations to ensure conflict resolution.
FIGURE 6

[Map of a region with various cities and towns labeled, including Zagreb, Vukovar, Novigrad, Poreč, Pula, Rijeka, Dubrovnik, and others.]
Air Plan Overview:

If the environment is/or becomes nonpermissive, an intensive and comprehensive air plan would be carried out in two phases. In the first phase, U.N. forces would attack hostile military targets throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, focusing on air defense installations, air bases, command centers, communications centers, missile sites, supply stockpiles and supply lines (i.e. bridges across the Drina River). This phase would isolate hostile ground forces and destroy their vital logistics network; concurrently, air supremacy would be established. This phase could last over four weeks but it would establish air supremacy and destroy the air defense network within the first 48 hours.

The second phase would begin immediately after the isolation of hostile ground forces was accomplished and would focus on the neutralization hostile ground forces located in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina. In terrain that does not favor air attacks there would be a heavy dependence on intelligence and extensive use of special operations forces for laser designation missions and for terminal control of air strikes. The purpose of this phase would be to destroy organizational resistance by hostile ground forces. This phase would incorporate elements of psychological warfare, through leaflet drops and media broadcasts. Hostile forces would be encouraged to surrender to coalition forces; these forces would be interned by the U.N. until a political settlement was achieved.
Air Plan Phase One:

The first phase of the air plan would be devoted to destroying the Serbian (or Croatian) air warfare capabilities and at the same time depriving that nation of its ability to resupply its forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see figure 7).

The targets of this phase in order of priority are as follows:

* Serbian Air Force and its bases located at Tuzla and Banja Luka.
* Air defense installations including SAMs and AA sites.
* Command, control and communication sites.
* Roads and railroad network; especially the bridges crossing the Drina River (figure 7).
* Military logistical facilities located in or near Bosnia-Herzegovina.
* Production facilities for weapons and ammunition.

Crucial to the success of this phase would be surprise in the initial attack which would focus on the Serbian/Croatian airfields and those fields being used by the Serbian Air Force in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Air Plan Phase Two:

After isolation of the battlefield, the air campaign would focus its efforts on destroying the effectiveness of hostile Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian forces, while simultaneously isolating these forces and cutting off avenues of escape (see figure 7).
Allied air resources would be sufficient to attack all the targets sets in both phase one and two. A variety of aircraft would be available including aircraft from two CVBG's (A-6E's and F/A-18's) and from Italy (F-16's and F-15E's). Other coalition assets would include British and French tactical aircraft.
Source: Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUROPE - JANES INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, October 1992, p. 446.
CHAPTER V
COUNTERARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION

No matter where one stands on the Yugoslav issue, no point of view is unassailable and this paper does not seek to promote intervention in the Balkans. There are numerous arguments that can be offered in opposition to U.S. participation as part of a multi-national military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Quagmire, European problem, civil-war, historic ethnic strife, and difficult terrain are but a few of the emotional arguments. In contrast, vital interests, national/international will, cost/benefit and effectiveness of military force in solving the Balkan crisis represent the more rational elements of the counterargument—a formal array of counterarguments by any assessment!

While the purpose of this paper has been to outline a framework for intervention, based solely on policy guidance, there is a compelling rationale to support U.N. intervention and for the U.S. to participate with a large number of forces within that coalition framework. Two U.S. led coalitions have achieved commendable success since August of 1990: OPERATION DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD and OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. U.S. leadership has been a galvanizing element in building national and international resolve to act in the post cold war world, in one case for vital interests and in the other case for humanitarian reasons. Coalition military forces have been used as powerful political, psychological and military tools; as an example, the
mere establishment and sustainment of a coalition framework
requires a great measure of national and international consensus.
U.S. experience during the twentieth century has not been
positive with regard to the European community's ability to
manage its own affairs, yet we have remained committed to the
belief that a stable Europe is vital to our interests. If the
violence continues to hemorrhage, the crisis that engulfs the
former Yugoslav republic has serious implications for: stability
in Europe, viability of the NATO alliance, and economic
rehabilitation of Eastern Europe. Decisive leadership and
action, applied in the Balkan region in a timely enough manner,
could avert the cost and magnitude of violence associated with an
expanded conflict.

Whether Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes a quagmire, another Vietnam,
depends in large part on national/international will and
political-military effectiveness. Military operations need to
stay focused on the centers of gravity at all three levels of
war. Protection of the civilian population and refugees must be
the military goal at the operational level with the political
goal focused on stabilization and containment of the conflict
within the region. If the U.N. chooses to act, war criminals
must be held accountable, not only individually, but as nation
states as well.

As a separate case in point, Serbian forces are being used as
a vehicle for political domination in the Balkan region;
ultimately decisive force may be the only way to stop this
behavior. Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian army (former YPA), and the Serbian people may have to be taught a hard lesson in civics; a lesson that could well call for war crimes prosecution, a change in government, and limitations on the size and composition of Serbian military forces. In the decade preceding World War II, Germany and Japan surfaced as countries that had lost their ability to act responsibly in the world community. These countries have been rehabilitated and are now responsible members and leaders in the world community; this should be the goal of all nations.

In conclusion, as one examines the merits and criticisms of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, there can be no mistaking that a world leadership role has been thrust upon the U.S.. This does not mean that the U.S. should be the world’s policeman, nor should the U.S. overextend itself militarily or economically. The U.S. and U.N. must forge a durable framework for post cold war international stability; this framework can be defined in terms of precedent, diplomatic/military intervention, and international law codified in U.N. resolutions. U.S. foreign policy can no longer be driven by the "Realpolitik" associated with the maintenance of cold war regional balances. In the future, U.S. foreign policy will have to embrace a more community oriented approach in diplomatic engagement. Coalition operations have immediate benefits for the U.S., because less overall resources will be required for decisive action and these operations inherently build regional confidence and an ability to
deal with complex post cold war issues. Multi-lateral engagement
to manage world security affairs is more durable and economically
healthier for the U.S.. Currently, the U.S. is the only nation
that has the power to help the U.N. establish conditions that
facilitate building effective coalitions to resolve regional
crises." The U.S. may now have to take a more moral view in
determining where and under what conditions it is willing to act
along with others.
APPENDIX I

SERBIAN ORDER OF BATTLE
Federal Army Deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina — August 1992

East: Northeastern Bosnia

III North Bosnian Corps*: (BiHja)
2nd Motorized Bde (Brcko)
145th Motorized Bde
195th Motorized Bde
6th Inf Bde
11th Partizan Bde*: (BiHja)
29th Partizan Div
417th Mixed Arty Regt
454th Mixed Arty Bde
17th Light AA Arty Regt
31th Light AA Arty Regt
17th Engr Regt (BiHja)
522nd Engr Regt
3x Border Troop sections
6x Independent bns
1x Military Police bn
Rear Service units

Western Bosnia

I Krajina Corps*: (Banja Luka)
140th Mech Bde (Banja Luka)
12th Motorized Bde (Prijedor)
149th Inf Bde (Derventa)
41st Partizan Div: (Mikanovic Grad)
5x Territorial Defence bdes (Mikanovic Grad)
2x Mountain bdes (Mikanovic Grad)
389th Rocket Arty Regt ('FROG-7') (Banja Luka)
5th Mixed Arty Regt: (Mech)
5th Mixed A-Tk Regt
149th Medium AA Arty Regt* (SA-6)
5th Light AA Arty Regt
5th Engr Regt
Several Independent bns
1x Military Police bns
3x Rear Service regts

II Krajina Corps*: (Drvar)
4th Arm Bde
140th Motorized Bde
257th Motorized Bde
127th Engr Regt
10th Mixed Arty Regt
580th Mixed Arty Bde (?)
10th Mixed A-TK Arty Regt
10th Light AA Arty Regt
471st Mixed A-Tk Regt (?)
513th Engr Regt
10th Bridge Laying Bn
6x Independent Special Purpose bns
42nd Border Troop Section
43rd Border Troop Section
374th Auto Vehicle Bn
940th Rear Base
97th Rear Base

Knin Operational Group*: (Bosansko Grahdovo?)
221th Arm Bde
189th Motorized Bde
316th Inf Bde
9th Mixed AA Arty Regt
9th Light AA Arty Regt
9th Engr Regt
1x Military Police bn
Several Independent bns
Rear Service units

East: Central Bosnia

IV East Bosnian Corps*: (Paz) 
49th Mech Bde
6th Motorized Bde (Debok)
7th Mountain Bde (Travnik)
13th Partizan Div (Debok)
1x Rocket bde ('FROG-7')
4th Mixed Arty Regt
4th Mixed A-Tk Regt
4th Light AA Arty Regt
4th Engr Regt
1x Military Police bn (Debok)
Several independent bns
Rear Service units

Ustice Corps*: (Nevesinje)
326th Arm Bde*
10th Motorized Bde* (Mostar)
5th Motorized Bde
6th Motorized Bde
145th Motorized Bde
437th Motorized Bde
19th Mountain Bde
215th Mountain Bde
216th Mountain Bde* (Romanja)
31st Arty Regt
268th Arty Regt
417th Mixed A-Tk Regt

Herzegovinan Corps*: (Bileca)
8th Motorized Bde
13th Motorized Bde
145th Motorized Bde
473d Motorized Bde* (Trebinje-Bileca)
5th Montenegro Mountain Bde (Niksic)
6th Montenegro Mountain Bde (Podgorica)
1x Partizan div
13th Mixed Arty Regt
13th A-Tk Arty Regt
13th Light AA Arty Regt
13th Engr Bn
Several Independent bns
1x Military Police bn
Rear Service units

Air Force and Air Defence
48 combat aircraft: (Craco-2 and Jastrebi fighter bombers,
MiG-21 reconnaissance aircraft)*
20 (+) helicopters

Air Bases
Banja Luka, fixed-wing aircraft
Zaluzani, helicopters
Udbina (transport) *

Air Defence
1x SAM division ('SA-2') (Banja Luka)
1x SAM battery ('SA-6') (Banja Luka)
1x AA Gun battery (40 mm L70 AA guns with Giraffe fire
control radar, Banja Luka)
2x SAM divisions ('SA-3, 9') (around Sarajevo)
Large number of the "SA-7, Strela-1/2M) missiles
Large number of the triple 20 mm AA guns and twin Czech
30 mm AA guns

Source: Federal Army Deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUROPE
APPENDIX II

CROATIAN ORDER OF BATTLE
THE CROATIAN FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(January 1993)

Force Composition

41,000-45,000 men
22 Brigades
5 Independent Regiments
1 1,000-men special purpose unit
2 Armored Companies

Deployments

Croatian Defense Council
(HVO) Croatia's Forces

Northern Bosnia

10,000-12,000 men
2,000-5,000 men

- Fifth "Operational Group"
  -- 102d Bde\(^1\)
  -- 103d Bde\(^3\)
  -- 105th Bde\(^6\)
  -- 107th Bde (Gradacac)\(^8\)

Croatian National Guard

The 102d, 103d, 105th, 109th, 111th, and 122d Bde were to be withdrawn from Bosnia by 28 November 1992 in accordance with the agreement between the Chief of Main Staff of the Croatian armed Forces General Janko Bobetko and the Serbian commander general Ratko Mladić signed on November 1992. However, this agreement was never carried out.

\(^1\) Manned by the Croatian citizens.
\(^3\) Manned with the Croatian citizens.
\(^4\) Croatian National Guard.
\(^5\) Formerly deployed in Bosanski Brod.
\(^6\) Manned with the Croatian citizens.
\(^7\) Formerly deployed in Osijek (Croatia).
\(^8\) Composite Croatian-Muslim unit.
\(^9\) The Croatian Army.

-- 115th Bde "Zrinski" (Drenca) o 109th Bde HV
-- 131th Bde o 111th Bde ZNG
-- 139th Bde o 122th Bde

Northwestern Bosnia

2,000 men
o 101st Independent Rgt

Sarajevo Area

2,000 men (?)
o 1 Rgt (Stup)
o 1 Rgt (Kiseljak)

Central Bosnia

6,000-8,000 men
o 1 Bde (Travnik)
o 1 Bde (Vitez)
o 1 Bde (Gornji Vakuf)
o 1 Bde (Trnovaca)
o 1 Bde (Gracanica)
o 1 Bde "Rama" (?)

Eastern Bosnia

1,000 men (?)
o Gorazde Enclave
o Srebrenica Enclave

---

10 Formerly deployed in Slavonski Brod (Croatia)
11 Parts of brigade.
12 Independent unit with about 2,000 men (brigade size).
13 Suburb of Sarajevo.
14 This also includes several hundred HOS' fighters.
Western Herzegovina & Neretva River Valley

20,000 men 10,000 men

- 104th Bde
- 110th Bde
- 119th Bde (Neum-Citluk)
- 126th Bde
- 142d Bde
- 151st Bde
- 113th Bde
- 144th Bde
- 158th Bde
- "Plava Munja" (Blue Lightning) Armd Cpny
- "Pustinjska Lisica" (Desert Fox) Armd Cpny
- "Ante Bruno Busic" Rgt (Posusje)
- 1st Volunteer Rgt "Kralj Tomislav"
- Anti-terrorist Unit "Baja Kraljevic" (Posusje)

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15 In addition, several unidentified units of the Croatian National Guard are deployed in the Neum-Klek area and parts of eastern Herzegovina.

16 Former brigade of the Croatian Defense Forces. Includes a number of foreign mercenaries (from U.K., Germany, Hungary, etc.). Some of the brigades subordinate to the Croatian Defense Council apparently can have the same numerical designation if they operate in different geographic areas of the republic.

17 The former unit of the Croatian Defense Forces. Its strength correspond to a brigade of the Croatian Defense Council. The first unit organized in January 1992. Formally established as independent regiment composed of professional soldiers on 18 June 1992. Currently, composed of five battalions: "Ivica Jelic-Charles" (Siroki Brijeg); "Vitez Damir Martic" (Posusje); "Ferdo Sucic" (Livno); "Zvonko Krajina" (Gornji Vakuf); "Andrija Tadic" (Zepca); plus two recce-commando units (located in Capljina and Bijelo Polje, near Mostar).

18 Composed of professional soldiers.

19 Composed of professional soldiers.
APPENDIX III

BOSNIAN ORDER OF BATTLE
THE ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(January 1993)

- Supreme Commander (Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim)
- Defense Minister (Mr. Jerko Doko, a Croat)
- Main Staff (Sarajevo)
  -- Colonel Safir Halilovic, a Muslim
  -- Deputy Commander (Col. Stjepan Siber, a Croat)

- Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)
  80,000 men (44,000 men fully armed)
  -- 7 District Staffs (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zenica, Mostar, Tuzla, Livno, Bihac)
  -- 23 Municipal "Crisis Staffs"
  - 5 Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
    - 30-33 Brigades
    - 2 "Tactical Groups"
  - Special Forces
  - Military Police

- Air Force (LTC Salko Begic, a Muslim)
  - 1 J-2 "Jastreb" fighter-bomber
  - "Dubrava" airbase (Tuzla)
  - "Zeljava" airbase (Bihac)

 Deployment of Forces

Sarajevo Area
22,000 men (?)

- Ist Corps (Sarajevo)
  -- 3-4 Bdes (Sarajevo)
  -- 1 Bde (Visoko)

---

1 Many brigades are not larger than a battalion.
2 Observed at the "Dubrava" airbase. Probably non-operational.
3 Includes the besieged city of Sarajevo and some of unoccupied suburbs (totaling 380,000 people).
4 This number includes about 10,000 fighters currently concentrated on the Igman Mountain in preparation for the expected offensive to lift the siege of Sarajevo.
5 The name in parenthesis denotes the municipality where the unit was raised, but not necessarily its current deployment area.

--- 1st "Tactical Group" (Kiseljak)

**Central Bosnia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15,000 men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o 3d Corps (Zenica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Zenica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Zavidovici)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Maglaj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Vitez)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Kakanj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Vares)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| o "Kata'ib el-Mumanin" (Phalanx of Believers) (Novi Travnik) |
| (400-600 "Mojahideens") |

**Eastern Bosnia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10,000 men (?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o 2-3 Bdes (Gorazde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o 2-3 Bdes (Srebrenica)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Northern Bosnia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15,000 men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o 2nd Corps (Tuzla)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1st Bde (Tesanj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Teslic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Doboj)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Tuzla)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-- 1 Bde (Gracanica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 1 Bde (Banovici)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 The joint command of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council forces was established in November 1992.

7 Reportedly, several hundred fighters of the Croatian Defense Forces (HOS) (armed wing of the Croatian Party of Right) jointly operate with the Muslim forces in eastern Bosnia.

8 In addition, six brigades of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) are currently temporarily subordinate to 2nd Corps.
The Bihac Enclave (Northwestern Bosnia)\textsuperscript{9}
10,000 men (?)

- 5th Corps (Bihac)\textsuperscript{10}
  -- 2d Bde (Kljuc)
  -- 111th Bde (Bosanska Krupa)
  -- 3 Bdes (Bihac)
  -- 1 Bde (Cazin)
  -- 1 Bde (Velika Kladusa)

- Herzegovina
  8,000 men (?)

- 4th Corps (Mostar)
  -- 1st Bde (Mostar)
  -- 1 Bde (Jablanica)
  -- 1 Bde (Stolac ?)
  -- 4th Tactical Group "Igman" (Konjic)


\textsuperscript{9} The total population in the Bihac enclave (encompassing the municipalities of Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa, and Bosanska Krupa) is estimated at 400,000 (mostly Muslims).

\textsuperscript{10} Several of these brigades are organized into the "Una-Sana Operational Group."


3. IBID, p. viii.


7. IBID, p. 53.

8. IBID, p. 55.


10. IBID, p. 176.

11. IBID.

12. IBID, p. 175.

13. IBID, p. 178.


15. IBID, pp. 2-4.

16. IBID, p. 35.


19. IBID, p. 54.

20. IBID, p. xxviii.


22. IBID, p. 371.
23. IBID, p. 374.
24. IBID, p. 374.


28. IBID, p. 446.
29. IBID, p. 446.
30. IBID.
31. IBID.
32. IBID.
33. IBID.
34. IBID, p. 448.


36. IBID, p. 1.
37. IBID. p. 10.
38. IBID, p. 10.
39. IBID, p. 10.


41. IBID, p. 12.
42. IBID, p. 14.
44. IBID, p. 16.
45. Clausewitz, p 595.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


