The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

PEACE OPERATIONS:
FORGING THE INSTRUMENTS
AND KEEPING THE EDGE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LARRY M. FORSTER
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC ELECTED
MAY 14 1993

USAWC CLASS OF 1993

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
PEACE OPERATIONS: FORGING THE INSTRUMENTS AND KEEPING THE EDGE (UNCLASSIFIED)

LARRY M. FORSTER, LTC, MP

STUDY REPORT

FROM 93 04 02 TO 93 04 02

See reverse for abstract
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Larry M. Forster, LTC, MP

TITLE: Peace Operations: Forging the Instruments and Keeping the Edge

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 2 April 1993 PAGES: 38 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

There is a strong likelihood that the emerging national strategy to meet the challenges of the post Cold War era will encompass, at least in part, peace operations under the imprimatur of the United Nations. Peace operations (a collective term for the instruments of conflict resolution such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, and peace-building) offer a relatively cost effective means to cope with the myriad threats to international peace, and provide a way for the US to remain collectively engaged with the moral backing of the international community. This study focuses on the measures required by both the US and the UN to ensure that peace operations fulfill their potential by discussing concepts, suggesting initiatives for enhanced preparedness, and highlighting training requirements. For in order for peace operations to be more effective instruments of US foreign policy, the US must encourage selective reforms in the UN, synchronize interagency and DOD concepts and employment of peace instruments, and hone the military instruments of peace through dynamic training. Innovations such as the creation of a "Peace Center" and the more widespread use of Military Police for peacekeeping (freeing combat forces for peace-enforcement and combat operations) should be considered. As important as peace operations may become to cost effectively maintain the preeminent position of the US in the world and to promote certain vital interests, the United States must now take the initiative and forge the quintessence of peace operations instruments—ones that will play a part in shaping the world of the future.
PEACE OPERATIONS: FORGING THE INSTRUMENTS AND KEEPING THE EDGE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Larry M. Forster
United States Army

Colonel William J. Flavin
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
There is a strong likelihood that the emerging national strategy to meet the challenges of the post Cold War era will encompass, at least in part, peace operations under the imprimatur of the United Nations. Peace operations (a collective term for the instruments of conflict resolution such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, and peace-building) offer a relatively cost effective means to cope with the myriad threats to international peace, and provide a way for the US to remain collectively engaged with the moral backing of the international community. This study focuses on the measures required by both the US and the UN to ensure that peace operations fulfill their potential by discussing concepts, suggesting initiatives for enhanced preparedness, and highlighting training requirements. For in order for peace operations to be more effective instruments of US foreign policy, the US must encourage selective reforms in the UN, synchronize interagency and DOD concepts and employment of peace instruments, and hone the military instruments of peace through dynamic training. Innovations such as the creation of a "Peace Center" and the more widespread use of Military Police for peacekeeping (freeing combat forces for peace-enforcement and combat operations) should be considered. As important as peace operations may become to cost effectively maintain the preeminent position of the US in the world and to promote certain vital interests, the United States must now take the initiative and forge the quintessence of peace operations instruments—ones that will play a part in shaping the world of the future.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION I: CONCEPT OF PEACE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Traditional Peacekeeping</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peace-enforcement</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coercive Peacekeeping</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN Military Forces</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION II: FORGING BETTER INSTRUMENTS FOR PEACE</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Required UN Reforms</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reforms for US Peace Operations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION III: TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Education</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Functional Courses</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unit Training</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A: Definitions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- B: Peacekeeping Organizations Past and Present</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- C: Peacekeeping Training in Nordic Countries</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOT USED
INTRODUCTION

As the United States seeks a comprehensive national strategy to meet the challenges of the post Cold War era, there is a strong likelihood that such a strategy will embrace, at least in part, multilateral operations under the imprimatur of the United Nations. President Clinton has endorsed the idea of a greater UN military role, and one of his advisors is an advocate of a "practical internationalism" that relies on an UN rapid reaction force for peace operations. The United Nations appears to provide an attractive framework through which the US could pursue certain national interests, because it has the stature to be a forum for conflict resolution and the structure to channel resources to needy nations and groups.

Particularly with respect to peacekeeping and related operations, the United Nations offers a means to cope with ethnic turmoil and threats to international peace and stability. Through the UN, the United States could enjoy certain economies of scale, enhance the credibility of its foreign policy, and remain "collectively engaged" (selective multilateral involvement) while pursuing national interests. As a result, a more intensive US-UN partnership for the promotion of peace (defined as an absence of conflict) and other mutual interests will be a likely feature of future US foreign policy.

In many respects, the end of the Cold War has revitalized the reputation and potential of United Nations peace operations (collective term for all instruments to promote peace) as symbolized by the award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeepers. Now, with a more congenial Security Council freed from the Cold War superpower rivalry and with many situations amenable to the strategies of peace operations, UN operations have proliferated—fourteen new missions since 1988.
While it is demonstratively desirable to participate in multilateral United Nations peace operations when US interests are involved, there are issues concerning such involvement that must be addressed. To be a truly effective forum for peace, the UN must adapt its institutions and practices to the post Cold War world, eliminate much of its corruption and much of its inefficiency, and reorganize the Secretariat to better manage a multitude of peace-related missions around the globe. The United States should encourage needed reforms and improve its own coordination with the organization through various initiatives without destroying the UN's credibility as an autonomous organization.

For its part, the United States must clarify its own vision of the new world order, especially with respect to peace operations and the role of the US military in future international efforts at conflict resolution. Internally, however, the US government must develop interagency consensus and coordination for the use of the military, and the Armed Forces must earnestly revisit the issue of peace operations to prepare for likely employment under UN control. Currently, US concepts, doctrine, and training for peace operations are in disarray. There has not been widespread understanding of the subtleties and unique challenges of peace operations; and the concepts, doctrine, organizational and training implications of these operations have yet to be fully addressed. These issues must be addressed soon, for as General Colin Powell has stated with respect to future military operations, "peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given."

Given the likelihood of future US military involvement in peace operations, this paper will focus on measures required by both the US and the UN to successfully accomplish these missions. Specifically, it will address peace operations concepts in section one, suggest desirable initiatives for enhanced preparedness in section two, and highlight general training and
education needs in section three. Peacekeeping and related operations will require much greater attention now and in the immediate future if they are to fulfill their full potential as instruments of both US and UN policy.

SECTION I: CONCEPT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The United Nations has developed a number of instruments to resolve conflict, enhance communication, and build trust between belligerents. These "peace operations" are preventive diplomacy, traditional peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building (see Appendix A for definitions). More recently, consideration has been given to a modification of peacekeeping that would employ coercive measures. Collectively, these operations have permitted the UN to enjoy some success in promoting peace, and promise continued utility in the future, especially if supported by the United States. To work effectively with the United Nations in these operations, US policy makers and military leaders must understand the underlying concepts and adopt appropriate doctrine for US forces.

Doctrinally, the United Nations desires to apply negotiation and arbitration skills to incipient conflicts before hostilities develop through preventive diplomacy. Once a conflict has begun, the UN practices peacemaking diplomacy to bring an end to the dispute and solve the underlying causes. When peacemaking efforts result in a cease-fire, or the parties to the conflict request assistance, a peacekeeping force may be established.

However, if one state acts as a rogue nation to the detriment of international security or a group threatens the security of a defenseless population, the United Nations may consider a peace-enforcement operation without the concurrence of the target state or group.
Peace-enforcement has the attributes of a multilateral military operation that carefully uses force to coercively bring about a desired end state that will permit a future peace.

Whether the result of coercive or noncoercive factors, once a foundation for peace has been laid, the UN desires to employ *peace-building* initiatives such as monitoring free elections. These measures identify and reinforce structures which tend to strengthen a state of peace within or between states.

Collectively, these peace operations constitute a spectrum between strictly diplomatic activity and the pure use of force. They are often performed concurrently with respect to a given conflict, and emphasis on a particular type of operation (and the employment of force vs. diplomacy) may shift with the circumstances. Military personnel are most closely associated with peacekeeping and peace enforcement (although not exclusively). A particular UN mission may concurrently employ more than one instrument, indeed it is highly desirable to do so. Each activity relies on the success of the other initiatives for its success, and, in turn, contributes to the success of the other efforts.

**Traditional Peacekeeping**

While preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building are primarily diplomatic activities usually carried out by the Secretary General or his Special Envoy, traditional peacekeeping uses soldiers in noncoercive ways with the consent of the belligerents to facilitate dialogue and to strengthen trust-building measures. Peacekeeping, then, reinforces the peacemaking efforts of the diplomats (once a conflict has begun) and the peace-building efforts of those desiring a lasting peace.
United Nations peacekeeping evolved as a substitute for the collective security apparatus originally envisioned in Chapter 7 of its charter. This was necessary to circumvent the Cold War gridlock in the Security Council that normally prevented the application of collective security measures. UN peacekeepers acted as a "sheriff's posse" mustered at the last minute to alleviate the worst consequences of conflict around the world. As practiced, peacekeeping involved military personnel as unarmed observers or in armed units consentually positioned between the parties to the conflict. Of the 13 UN peacekeeping missions established between 1947 and 1988, six were observer missions and seven consisted of armed peacekeeping troops (See Appendix B).

Traditionally, peacekeeping forces verified the terms of a cease-fire, supervised prisoner exchanges, maintained an exclusion zone, investigated truce violations, and aided civilian victims of war. These actions were to suppress violence and encourage dialogue between adversaries so that the conditions for lasting peace could be established.

At the heart of the peacekeeping concept is the utility of an impartial "outside party" desired by the belligerents to insure compliance with the truce or agreement which has temporarily stopped hostilities. In a situation in which the parties to a conflict do not trust each other, or have difficulties disengaging without "losing face," a multilateral peacekeeping force composed of personnel from acceptable countries may be the only mechanism through which the conflict can be stopped or at least contained.

While traditional peacekeeping is meant to be a flexible mechanism specifically configured and empowered to act in each unique situation, there are certain prerequisites which must be met in order for the operation to be successful. These conditions include: 1) consent of the parties to the conflict; 2) a clear and appropriate mandate; 3) impartiality by the
peacekeepers; 4) limited use of force only for self-defense; 5) freedom of movement in the area of operations; 6) unity of command; and 7) a sound financial basis. The extent to which these conditions are not met is the degree to which an operation is at risk.

Although it is unlikely that all of these prerequisites will be perfectly fulfilled before the initiation of a peacekeeping operation (there are no historical examples of perfect fulfillment) they should be met as fully as possible. The key variable is the mandate. As the peacekeeping force's authorization document, it must closely match the required resources with the mission's terms of reference, be clearly agreed to by all the parties to the conflict, and provide for an appropriate "status of forces agreement." This mandate should also include a "sunset clause" which specifies the duration of the mission, or at least when the operation will be reviewed.

The importance of the mandate is illustrated by the very different experiences of two UN peacekeeping forces in the same region. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) met few of the prerequisites when established in 1978 (there was no universal consent, no legitimate government to support in S. Lebanon, and no way to maintain the demilitarized zone against the Israeli Defense Forces, etc.). Unfortunately, it has failed to accomplish its mission after the loss of more than 180 UN lives. In contrast, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria has become a model of peacekeeping practice by having a more realistic mandate and a less complicated situation with which to contend. Even under ideal conditions, however, the tendency to expect a quick solution and a lasting peace should be resisted. Ultimately, the success of the mission will depend solely on the contending parties to reach an accommodation with the opportunity provided by peacekeeping forces.

A cautionary note is necessary at this point. Experience indicates that a successful peacekeeping operation may in fact inhibit the long-term resolution of conflict if it is not
accompanied by vigorous peace-building initiatives. As the crisis atmosphere settles down and the attention of the world is directed elsewhere, often the contending parties become less inclined to consider painful concessions necessary for long-term peace. The peacekeepers, then, provide some security and stability in their area of operation, but this condition only lasts as long as the peacekeepers remain. This situation results in a prolonged mandate as reflected in the experiences of the five UN peacekeeping operations established before 1979 (See Appendix B) and still in operation today. This tendency for prolonged mandates also underscores the requirement for continued diplomatic efforts and the need for peace-building initiatives to augment peacekeeping measures in order to hasten progress toward self-sustaining stability in the area.

The partial success of some peacekeeping operations in the past, the new needs of the present, and the evident potential to accomplish ambitious undertakings in the future, has led to the recent expansion of the scope of UN peace operations. Besides traditional peacekeeping tasks, peacekeepers are now involved in peace-building efforts by organizing and monitoring free elections (as in El Salvador, Western Sahara, and Cambodia), and, as with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and as planned for Somalia, even establishing and administering an interim government. In addition, peacekeepers have been involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Somalia.

These additional tasks add even more to the complexities of peacekeeping by placing demands for concurrent diplomatic and institution-creating efforts (to use just the Cambodian example: both peacemaking with the Khmer Rouge to contain the conflict, and peace-building to prepare for elections). Obviously, peacekeeping soldiers, today, must have the knowledge and
skills to integrate their efforts with those of the civilian members of the organization to fulfill the ambitious mandates of UN forces.

Unlike peace enforcement actions in which participants draw primarily on traditional soldier skills as applied by the rules of engagement (ROE), peacekeeping operations require additional skills and a special mindset. Soldiers performing peacekeeping duty must overlay basic military competency with heightened cultural awareness, demonstrate highly developed interpersonal skills, and possess the attitude for the minimum use of force and the prevention of collateral damage. In short, peacekeeping requires what Charles Moskos calls a "constabulary ethic." The presence or absence of these attributes account for the great disparities in performance by the different national contingents in UNIFIL and other controversial UN operations. For the United States, this suggests the heightened utility of Military Police soldiers whose branch-related skills most closely reflect the desired attributes.

Peace-enforcement

The conscious use of force, or threat of force, to bring an end to hostilities differentiates peace-enforcement from peacekeeping. The critical distinction is the absence of peace at the beginning of the operation. In peace-enforcement, the desire is to be impartial in the application of force, but the use of force will almost certainly be reciprocated by the target group. Thus, it is vitally important that a plan for conflict resolution be carefully considered before a peace-enforcement action is initiated. Optimally, the enforcers will end hostilities quickly with minimum civilian causalities and little collateral damage.

As a result, peace-enforcers will need to be primarily combat forces configured for the specific mission. While these forces apply standard tactical techniques and procedures (TTP),
but with more restrictive ROE, the operational environment will provide different challenges than for normal combat operations. Peace-enforcement thus requires highly disciplined soldiers, properly trained leaders, and others (foreign area officers (FAOs) and linguists, etc.) to operate within often complex political situations in an unfamiliar environment. Of course, as with all peace operations, professionalism (adherence to respected standards of appearance, conduct, and effectiveness) is mandatory, especially since the likely presence of news media potentially gives every incident global coverage and strategic importance.

Coercive Peacekeeping

The inappropriateness of both traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in many contemporary situations demanding UN intervention has led some to advocate peacekeeping with the added dynamic of force—peacekeeping with coercive capability. While strictly speaking a contradiction in terms, coercive peacekeeping (also called "forward-looking" or "second generation" peacekeeping) promises some utility in intrastate conflicts in which splinter groups use terrorism and violence against peacekeepers to undermine the peace process. Such an approach to peacekeeping could offer a solution to UN problems in Somalia, Western Sahara, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia in which reluctance to respond to violations of the cease-fires and attacks on UN troops has led to widespread disaffection among peacekeepers and failing missions. Coercive peacekeeping, however, is not a panacea; it would only be appropriate for situations meeting very rigid criteria, and even then, there must be a readiness to transition to a peace enforcement operation.

To be effective, coercive peacekeeping would have to initially meet all of the prerequisites of traditional peacekeeping, but with a clear agreement among the parties that
force will be used as necessary to fulfill the mandate. The mandate would have to be quite specific, and all the major belligerents would have to agree to its provisions. Peacekeepers with this type of mandate would be equipped with more firepower, and could apply force not only to protect themselves, but also to stop terrorism, maintain order, protect humanitarian relief efforts, and as a deterrent to would be truce breakers.

For US forces, the core of this type of contingent would ideally be military police, augmented by a combat arms reaction force to flex the muscle necessary to stop the spread of violence and to keep signatories to the agreement honest. Generally, MPs would continue to perform basic peacekeeping missions, but with greater reliance on their organic firepower and communications. These coercive peacekeepers would rely on combat assets to augment MP resources, to conduct carefully controlled combat operations, and to constitute a powerful reserve.

The peacekeeping operation, if well led and discreet, would undoubtedly gain respect from the parties to the conflict. However, US experience in Beirut underscored the danger inherent in the use of force by peacekeepers for other than strict self defense—it invariably erodes the perception of "outside party neutrality" upon which successful peacekeeping is based. Coercion, if used, must be applied with extreme care in accordance with the mandate and ROE, be backed by immediate peacemaking efforts, and be undertaken with careful reflection on the probable end-state.

Ultimately, coercive peacekeeping may be transformed into a peace-enforcement operation if the violence spreads and the peacekeepers are unable to contain it. In some present situations, the UN force, like UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate a mismatch between mandate, structure, and mission. In this particular situation, the objectives and
operational concepts of the force need to be reviewed, and it may be necessary to reconfigure the organization for peace-enforcement to insure humanitarian relief and to prevent further "ethnic cleansing." In all peace operations there must be a careful ongoing review of objectives, means, risk, and resources to ensure the right approach to conflict resolution—especially since these situations are dynamic and subject to abrupt change.

UN Forces

Besides the doctrinal debate over the capability and nature of peacekeeping forces, there is ongoing ferment over the need for permanent UN peacekeeping forces. Echoing the demands for reform by those who call for greater professionalism, competence, responsiveness, and uniformity for UN peacekeepers; the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has called for a UN military force for rapid deployment in his "Agenda for Peace."\(^3\) He recognizes the potential for the more proactive use of UN military forces with "preventive deployments" to deter aggression against threatened states and he sees the need to tap more thoroughly the military capabilities of member states to heighten UN effectiveness.

This call for the creation of a United Nations military force has met with a mixed response. The mission, expense, stationing, training, transport, and command would be difficult issues to resolve. This force could range from a small professional cadre recruited from around the world, to large contingents from member states earmarked and specially trained, or some combination of both elements. Many nations, though, would be uneasy with any regularized UN force whose use could jeopardize their traditional exercise of sovereignty. To these nations, this would be reminiscent of colonialism.\(^4\) Other nations, like the United States, would be uncomfortable with its troops serving under foreign commanders\(^5\) and with their soldiers possibly owing a degree of allegiance to another entity.
Whatever the future of the United Nations is in this respect, the United States will play a key role in the eventual outcome. The interrelationship between the long-term effectiveness of the UN and the probable national strategy of the Clinton Administration makes the clarification of the US-UN relationship important. Undoubtedly, the creation and use of US military peace instruments will play an important part in US national strategy and the eventual form of the post Cold War world.

SECTION II: FORGING BETTER INSTRUMENTS FOR PEACE

While peace operations have had some utility for the United Nations, its continued usefulness will depend on certain reforms in UN practice as influenced by the United States and other permanent Security Council members. For the US, a greater commitment to UN peace operations will spread the burden of global policing, provide moral legitimacy from the world community, and permit US interests to be pursued without constant unilateral effort. However, the United States must encourage UN reforms, commit to peacekeeping and related concepts, gain interagency consensus on doctrine and definitions, and prepare its armed forces to be effective peacekeepers.

Required UN Reforms

As it is currently organized and configured, the United Nations is far from the optimum organization to sponsor widespread and diverse peacekeeping operations. In this organization run by diplomats and staffed by many senior officials from third world countries (without managerial training or experience), there are widespread instances of inefficiencies, waste, and corruption. The United Nations has grown into a ramshackle organization of over 51,000
employees and 9,600 consultants in which agencies, committees, and programs—once created—never seem to go away. These types of UN organs seem to be "sustained chiefly by bureaucratic vested interests, [and they] have become mired in what UN critics euphemistically call marginal activities." Admittedly, there are many UN organizations that do perform valuable services, but even they are affected by the peculiar brand of UN politics, lack of oversight, inefficiency, corruption, and immunity from even the Secretary-General's reforming zeal.

United Nations peacekeeping operations, however, seem to be less afflicted by the UN malaise than many other parts of the organization. While benefiting from the professionalism exhibited in many of the national contingents, these operations do suffer by what Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, noted was an under-staffing at UN headquarters. He commented that he has a very small staff (19 persons) to oversee more than 45,000 UN peacekeepers and an annual budget of approximately $2.7 billion.

In addition, UN peacekeeping organizations in the field contend with the ad hoc nature of their establishment, the skill and equipment differentials between the contingents, the lack of continuity due to a normal six month rotation schedule, command and control problems, and interference from the home governments. For the force commander, the challenge of fulfilling the mandate is great even if (miraculously) everything else is quiet in his area of operation.

For all of its faults and shortcomings, the UN remains a vital organization—and one for which there is no ready substitute. The US must learn to work more effectively within the UN to accomplish certain American policy objectives in a manner that receives the support of the world body. As a founder and prime financial supporter ($20.3 billion in contributions since 1946) the United States is uniquely placed as a superpower and patron to influence necessary
reforms of the United Nations. Since the size, diverse membership, and inertia of the organization defy a complete overhaul, the US and its major power partners must focus on those parts of the organization that directly affect their interests. This need for focus is especially true for matters pertaining to peacekeeping and related activities.

Due to the current interest in UN peace operations, now is the time for the habitual peacekeeping contributors to agree on doctrine, principles of organization, training standards, equipment, general operating procedures, and financing. Each participant in these operations has a vested interest in greater UN efficiency and should strive to ensure that peace operations reach their full potential. The influence of the United States and the nature of its interests mandate that it assume a leading role in consensus-building on these vital issues.

Within the UN Headquarters, the Secretariat must be given the resources for solid military advice, good staffing, and supervision of the organization's far-flung peacekeeping operations. Even if the functionally defunct Military Staff Committee (MSC), as a military advisory body to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, cannot be immediately revitalized, the number of experienced senior officers advising the Secretary General and his deputies must be increased. This is imperative for adequate review of proposed mandates, evaluation of developments in a peacekeeping area of operations, formulation of response options, and general oversight of peacekeeping missions.

In addition, the military staff must be given the resources to make informed decisions, communicate with the field organizations, and conduct an effective liaison with the military staffs of the contributing nations. The UN Headquarters needs an operations center, perhaps manned by officers from the troop contributing nations, with state-of-the-art communications and automation. The staff also requires an information center ("military intelligence" has
negative connotations for peace operations) as a repository of critical data provided by the collection agencies of the major powers and by UN sources that apply to ongoing or potential peacekeeping operations. Since the UN does not have organic heavy lift capability to deploy forces rapidly, arrangements with the United States (and perhaps Russia, if reimbursed) will be necessary to move forces and material as quickly as may be required. With enhanced capability, the military staff of the United Nations could provide more effective support to the Secretary-General and to the peace forces in the field to put UN efforts on a more professional footing.

Currently, the lack of adequate military staffing has resulted in the abrogation of UN responsibility to define concepts, publish adequate operational guidelines, and be proactive in devising new peacekeeping practices. This void in operational guidance, for the most part, has been filled by private organizations, such as the International Peace Academy as the publishers of the Peacekeeper's Handbook, and by influential individuals. With the change from the stultifying situation of the Cold War era, the opportunity for the UN, at least within the Secretariat, to confront real issues, address problems, and agree on solutions for the benefit of the whole organization should be enthusiastically grasped. Hopefully, the major powers and the consistently contributing nations will engage in an ongoing and productive dialogue to work out support agreements, doctrine, interoperability issues, funding, equipment stockpiles, and operating principles for the use of military forces under the UN banner.

In this situation, the US should seize the initiative and be a catalyst for positive change. Through consensus building, and other methods of persuasion, the US must encourage a new rationality in UN operations. Certainly, the US must lead by its own example with more
initiatives such as those begun by President Bush in his offer of expertise, facilities, and support for the training of UN peacekeepers. Additional measures to improve the prospects for UN peacekeeping success could include the assignment of capable senior officers to the Office of the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping, the fostering of military-to-military contacts to clarify international peacekeeping doctrine, and the sponsoring of combined peacekeeping exercises and simulations to promote unity and uniformity.

Reform for US Peace Operations

Perhaps it is more important, however, for the United States to work internally to coordinate interagency policy and to synchronize efforts to perfect military peace instruments. With these instruments perfected, the US would be a more credible contributor to United Nations operations, or, alternatively, would be better able to participate as part of non-UN peace operations.

The issue of peace operations doctrine and practices will likely be reviewed by the National Command Authority as part of the new administration's foreign policy development process. Perhaps as a study of National Security Council Principles Committee (PC), with the addition of the Ambassador to the UN, the requisite level of authority and expertise would result in interagency agreement on peace operations and operations with the United Nations. The retention of the UN Ambassador, Madeleine Albright, in a cabinet status may illustrate President Clinton's intent to work more closely with the United Nations. Once the President makes a final decision on the national strategy with the benefit of the interagency study and recommendations, coordinated actions to perfect military peace instruments and to operate within the UN framework would be more likely to succeed.
Since knowledge of peace operations and the part played by each agency has been limited, the communication and infusion of these concepts to all concerned policy makers will be important. Ideally, Congress and all affected executive agencies (and especially the Department of Defense and the State Department) will be supportive of the emerging consensus on peace operations and will participate together in a synergetic effort to make US participation in UN peace operations successful.

With the main burden of peace operations on the Department of Defense, its actions to develop this capability is crucial for preparedness. With broad agreement on the nature and efficacy of peace operations, the concepts must be further refined as a matter of both combined (since peace operations will almost always be a multilateral activity) and joint (since it may involve, directly or indirectly, all the armed services) concern. Agreement on these operations would be facilitated by the creation of a "Peace Center" at the National Defense University (NDU) to operate as a joint, combined, and interagency brain trust to oversee and coordinate the development of military peace operations concepts.

This Peace Center would be the Department of Defense's repository of peace operations expertise—able to conduct requested studies, be a point of contact to work with the UN and other countries, and act as the coordination agency to broadly synchronize all DOD actions on this subject. With senior representatives on the staff from the State Department and other affected agencies, the Center could also facilitate interagency agreement on a wide range of issues pertaining to this subject. Other consistently contributing nations to peace operations should be invited to assign experienced personnel to the center to provide new ideas and to convey their experience and perspective to the US military. Close liaison with the UN would link this center with UN Headquarters and regional UN Training Centers such as those in Scandinavia.
At the NDU, the Peace Center could tap the experience, maturity and expertise of faculty and students; and it could coordinate with the other senior service colleges as required for specified research and publications. This institution would need to collect peace operations lessons learned, and facilitate military-to-military contacts (and contacts with the UN) to resolve combined doctrinal issues and promote agreements on combined exercises and simulations.

Following the precedence established for much of the development of joint doctrine, one service, to work in consort with the Peace Center, should be selected to be DOD's executive agent for peace operations matters. With the realization that the Navy must input for naval operations in support of peacekeeping (blockades, littoral sea control, etc.), and the Air Force has additional concerns such as "no fly zones," peace operations remain primarily a land force operation (mostly Army, with some Marine involvement in coastal areas). Tradition and the close relationship to other "operations other than war" in which the Army is primarily involved, make the Army the most logical choice to lead in the resolution of specific peace operations issues.

Within the US Army, the Military Police School (USAMPS) would be a logical proponent for peacekeeping, while the Infantry School would be the appropriate organization to deal with peace-enforcement. Each proponent would work through the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), other branches (such as Engineers and Special Forces), other entities (such as the Center for Low Intensity Conflict), and the Peace Center to produce joint tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate to a given operation. Also, they would oversee the development of training products for units, support the appropriate integration of peace operations in the military education system, provide functional training courses, and assist joint and combined peace operation exercises.
With respect to peacekeeping (both traditional and coercive), the military police have the greatest transference of branch related skills. Military police (MP) have already proven to be the "force of choice" for many contingency operations due to their wide spectrum of capability and suitability in ambiguous situations. Furthermore, their law enforcement mindset (minimum use of force, force protection and investigation expertise, service to the community, etc.) combined with proven battlefield utility (soldier skills, deployability, mobility, information gathering, communications capability, and firepower if required) make Military Police the natural repository of peacekeeping capability and expertise. Already, USAMPS has stressed in all of its training task and skill proficiency, understanding of the human dimension, teambuilding, and leadership that would be appropriate to both law enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

Conceptually, the US could field peacekeeping contingents as part of a UN force, or even as part of other multilateral forces, with the same basic forces as are currently in being. For the core of the US contingent, a MP combat support battalion (or brigade depending on the size of the US contribution) task force with attachments as required by the mandate and anticipated circumstances should be deployed. This force would provide the capability and flexibility desired for most peacekeeping situations (anticipated coercive requirements in the mission would require additional light infantry elements along with intelligence, engineer, and other assets). It would also create the maximum positive impact in the first crucial hours in the area of operation. The use of predominately MP units for peacekeeping operations would ensure that trained and ready combat forces are available for more high intensity combat and enforcement operations.
For peace-enforcement operations, combat forces task organized and resourced for the specific mission should be employed. Depending on the command arrangements and the other participating forces (either as a UN or non-UN coalition), speed, interoperability and common doctrine will be essential—especially if the target group is capable and potent. In this type of operation, careful selection of support assets like MPs, engineers, aviation, etc. will be important. Preferably before a short notice requirement to deploy, staff arrangements for the multinational force, lift assets, logistic support, and all the myriad details of operations and sustainment will be addressed and elements of the force will have gained mutual knowledge and skill through combined training exercises. American forces must maintain their durability as peace instruments due to their particular utility for the UN as enforcers and as an "over the horizon presence" to reinforce peacekeeping and related operations.

Once the peace instruments are forged, the commitment of US forces to these types of operations will add superpower prestige (and leadership) to the endeavor and increase the probability of success. For the United States, however, there will be a need to resolve command relationships and, for service under the United Nations, a requirement to give partial allegiance to another entity. In this process, the level and manner of integration of US forces into the UN force will need to be determined, and the prospect of service under a foreign commander will need to be faced. Contingents from the US will likely serve, at least part of the time, under foreign commanders (ideally those with great experience in complex peace operations) with US representation on their staffs. The US contingent commander will be responsible only for the US forces under his direct command, and the area Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) will be in supporting roles. A satisfactory resolution of these issues will be important to the long-term utility of the concept of peace operations in US foreign policy.
SECTION III: TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Based on the probability that peace operations may employ a sizable portion of the Armed Forces (especially the land forces) in the future; decisions must be made soon concerning the focus, level, type, extent and location of required preparations (and the extent to which reserve components may be involved) to insure a trained and ready force. The specific training required would be dependent, of course, on the type of mission, area of operation, and the overall state of unit readiness. As in most training conducted by the US military, the proponent will develop the standards, conduct, and content of training; and other personnel (US and foreign) will engage in this training as appropriate.

Training for peace operations must start with the premise that the mindset and skills required are distinct from those inherent in other military missions. The degree of difference, however, varies with each type of peace mission. As US forces become more involved in these operations, senior leaders must understand the specific dynamics of each type of mission and insure that US forces are trained to the standards required. This is especially important given the expectations of success inherent in any US military operation and the expected attention such operations invariably receive from the news media.

Education for Peace Operations

Clearly, there is a need for an orientation on military peace producing activities, including peacekeeping, within the officer and NCO education systems of all services. Currently, there is no such emphasis on this specialized subject in professional development courses. Ideally, appropriate coverage of peace operations will be generated from the Peace Center to be integrated into the curriculums of the senior service colleges, the Command and
Staff Colleges, the officer advanced and basic courses, and the NCO Education System. Given the lack of direct US experience in this area, the maximum integration of appropriate foreign exchange officers as faculty in the US military education system and on the staff of the Peace Center would greatly enrich this process.

The specific content and instruction methodology for peace operations in these courses should be determined from a task selection and review process, guidance from senior leaders, input from proponent support packages, and the lessons learned from past and future experience (to include that of the UN). All instruction and exercises in these courses should strive to impart a full understanding of peace operations as conducted within the framework of the United Nations.

Training on specific peace operations tasks (such as incident investigations, "peace patrols", interpersonal skills, minimum use of force, etc.) will, of course, be dependent upon the final formulation of concepts and doctrine. These tasks should be determined by the senior leadership—perhaps as coordinated through the Peace Center and with input from all the services (primarily the Army, but with additives reflecting the other services' interests and needs). Some of these tasks are best taught in functional courses for specific categories of individuals, and some (both individual and collective) must be learned in unit training programs. Where possible, the skill acquired in peace operations training should be honed in realistic combined training exercises and enhanced by military-to-military contacts with nations that consistently participate in these types of missions.

**Functional Courses**

For peacekeeping, a functional course for key unit leaders and battalion and brigade staff officers would be highly desirable to quickly impart a degree of expertise in those who will
conduct unit training and direct operations. This joint course should be developed and be taught by the proponent for peacekeeping at the Military Police School (USAMPS) and be based on US and UN experiences plus the TTP in Joint Pub 3-07.3 and some of FM 7-98, and the published UN guidance to contributing nations. In addition, certain subjects and the long experience reflected in the Nordic training programs (Appendix C) should be incorporated as appropriate. This course would initially be for officers and staff down to the platoon leader level and for senior NCOs involved in training and operations functions. Its duration would be for one to two weeks and focus on the following topics (with additional topics added as the need is identified):

- Peace operations concepts and practices
- History of UN operations
- Peacekeeping lessons learned
- Area studies, basic language terms, and cultural orientation (area manuals could be prepared and provided to students based on interest or need)
- Explosive device recognition and identification procedures
- Incident identification, observation, and reporting procedures
- Determination of weapon category by sound
- Combating terrorism techniques and physical security measures
- Patrolling in the operational environment
- Training on specialized equipment such as sensors and ground surveillance radar, etc.
- Riot control techniques
- Psychological operations
- Media relations and live TV interviews
- The conduct of training in the mission area
- Legal issues
- Peacekeeping specific subjects and techniques to include:

- Observation Post (OP) operations
- Check Point procedures
- Conduct of investigations
- Evidence awareness
- Controlled use of force
- Weapons identification
- Negotiation & mediation
- Control of fear and boredom

- UN operations

- Mandate & Rules of Engagement
- Status of Forces Agreement
- Staff organization & procedures
- Standard Operating Procedures
- Obligations to the UN
- Contracting & logistical support

A similar functional course for the combat arms would be desirable to sensitize leaders to some of the unique aspects of peace-enforcement compared to traditional combat operations. Some of the same topics taught in the peacekeeping course would be appropriate to teach to peace-enforcers such as area studies and cultural orientation, controlled use of force, ROE, and UN procedures. The central focus of this course, however, would be the precise and appropriate use of force within the strict rules of engagement common to these operations.

**Unit Training**

Unit training programs should include many of the subject areas presented in functional courses, but would be oriented around FM 25-100 procedures. For units identified for rapid deployment for peace operations, appropriate tasks would be part of the mission essential task list (METL) to be trained to the standards articulated in a supplemental Mission Training Plan (MTP) to be published by USAIS (peace-enforcement) or USAMPS.
(peacekeeping) as appropriate. This MTP would include recommended command post exercises (CPXs), situational training exercises (STXs), Field Training Exercises (FTXs) and an Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) to evaluate mission readiness.

In addition, Soldiers Manuals (for the 95 and 11 series MOS) would outline individual peace operation tasks at the appropriate skill level. For tactical MP soldiers, for example, missions are usually done on a decentralized basis by three man teams requiring even skill level one soldiers to be proficient in all the basic peacekeeping tasks—especially as these tasks are often performed in the light of news media cameras.

For all peace operations, some individual and collective skills will need to be trained to higher standards. For example, a high degree of weapons proficiency is necessary to prevent unintentional injury and to reduce collateral damage if weapons must be used in the mission area. Also, special training for drivers, air crews, and special equipment operators may also be required, given the uniqueness of the mission and area of operations. Key unit trainers should be graduates of the appropriate functional course; and if necessary or desirable, mobile training teams (MTTs) must be ready to be sent from the proponent schools on short notice to assist in the unit training—until peace operations become fully integrated into the US military culture.

For units selected to be part of a rotational base to established peace operations, a focused training program should be developed which incorporates the latest lessons learned from the mission area. If peace operations requirements are as great as anticipated to warrant the investment, units preparing for these missions should be rotated through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The JRTC could acquire appropriate scenarios, possess observer-controllers who are well versed in peace operations TTP, and "aggressors" adaptable to the needs of peace operations training. A "peace-capable" JRTC would provide an optimum
location to conduct multilateral peacekeeping exercises. This would be a great opportunity for a US task force to train with other national contingents before deploying to the area of operations, and would provide foreign units with realistic training not readily available elsewhere. Opportunities should also be sought for US units to train in regional UN training centers, such as those in the Nordic countries.

To produce the immediate training products and support required to insure readiness for peace operations, the proponent schools would have to be properly resourced by TRADOC. In addition to the necessary augmentation to the instructor cadre, some added resources would be needed to support the Directorate of Combat Developments' efforts to refine concepts, consider force structure issues, evaluate the application of new technology to peace operations, and manage the acquisition of equipment such as the Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) that would be critical in some peacekeeping situations. Overall, though, the added resources required would be relatively small, and they should be applied where they would draw upon existing expertise to provide the greatest possible dividend for peacekeeping preparedness.

CONCLUSION

As the United States becomes more credible and capable to perform peace operations through reform and interagency cooperation, it is better positioned to influence needed reforms within the United Nations to enhance all UN operations. These reforms are of interest to the US to the extent the United States intends to rely on peace operations sponsored by the United Nations to cost effectively accomplish foreign policy objectives. Clearly, a stronger linkage between UN peace operations and the fulfillment of US interests for stability and the suppression of conflict mandate that attention be devoted to resolving outstanding peace
operation issues. By so doing, the United States may put into place an important foundation stone of a new national strategy in the emerging "new world order."

To properly support the National Command Authority, the US Armed Forces must forge the military instruments of peace. Building on the concepts and experience of the United Nations in this specialized area, the US military must properly educate its leaders and train its units to anticipate and meet the challenges of peace operations. Wherever possible, US forces should tap the peacekeeping expertise of the consistently contributing nations, participate in combined peace operations exercises, promote military-to-military contacts, and foster institutional expertise at UN Headquarters. A "Peace Center" should be established to coordinate these DOD efforts to enhance peace operations and to be a repository of expertise on the employment of military assets to resolve conflict.

Once committed to a specific peace operation, the United States should contribute commensurate with both its unsurpassed capabilities (heavy lift, intelligence, aviation, weapons systems, etc.) and its superior resources (trained manpower, equipment stocks, etc.) so that it maintains its position of global leadership without becoming the world's sole policeman. To do this well, the US must relook the structure, doctrine, and procedures of participating units. A primary role should be given to combat support units such as the Military Police for peacekeeping while retaining combat forces for deterrence, peace-enforcement, and combat operations.

The United States must take the initiative now and forge the quintessence of peace operation instruments—ones that will be effective if employed within the UN structure or if used separately to support unilateral US policy objectives. This capability to perform peacekeeping
and related operations may play a crucial role in the maintenance of US preeminence in the post Cold War era and in the shaping of a better future world.
APPENDIX A (Definitions)*

* Definitions of *peacemaking*, *peace-building*, and *preventive diplomacy* are taken from a Dec 92 revision of Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Draft), Aug 92, designed to align US military usage with those of the UN. The definitions of *peacekeeping* and *peace-enforcement* are those currently being considered by the Army Staff, and the definitions of *coercive peacekeeping* and *peace operations* are my own.

**peace operations.** A collective term for all activities, both military and diplomatic, designed to create, restore, or reinforce a state of peace between parties to a conflict.

**peacekeeping.** Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense actions) by outside forces conducted with the consent of all major belligerent parties involved in a conflict (or impending conflict) in order to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive peace settlement.

**coercive peacekeeping.** A variation of peacekeeping which carefully uses coercion, or the threat of force, to insure compliance with the terms of a truce, as initially agreed upon by all major belligerent parties, in ways broadly acceptable to the international community.

**peacemaking.** Diplomatic process of arranging an end to disputes and solving their underlying causes.

**peace-building.** Post-conflict diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

**peace-enforcement.** A form of armed intervention (or threatened armed intervention) pursuant to international license, in which military force is used coercively to compel compliance with internationally sanctioned resolutions or patterns of behavior, the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly acceptable to the international community.

**preventive diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out.
## United Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Max. Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>India, Pakistan (UN Mil Obs Grp in India &amp; Pak.)</td>
<td>Jan 49-present</td>
<td>102 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>Suez Canal, Sinai (First UN Emerg Force)</td>
<td>Nov 56-Jun 67</td>
<td>3,378 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>Lebanon, Syria (UN Obs Grp in Lebanon)</td>
<td>Jun-Dec 58</td>
<td>591 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Congo (UN Oper. in the Congo)</td>
<td>Jun 60-Jun 64</td>
<td>19,828 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>W. New Guinea (Irian) (UN Security Force)</td>
<td>Oct 62-Apr 63</td>
<td>1,500 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>Yemen (UN Yemen Obs. Mission)</td>
<td>Jul 63-Sep 64</td>
<td>189 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus (UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus)</td>
<td>Mar 64-present</td>
<td>6,411 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOM</td>
<td>Dominican Republic (UN India-Pakistan Obs Mission)</td>
<td>May 65-Oct 66</td>
<td>2 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>Suez Canal, Sinai (Second UN Emerg Force)</td>
<td>Oct 73-Jul 79</td>
<td>6,973 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Syrian Golan Heights (UN Disengagement Obs Force)</td>
<td>Jun 74-present</td>
<td>1,450 tp &amp; ob</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Southern Lebanon (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)</td>
<td>Mar 78-present</td>
<td>7,000 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Code</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>Afghanistan &amp; Pakistan</td>
<td>May 88-Mar 90</td>
<td>50 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Good Offices Mission in Afghan. &amp; Pak.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIIMOG</td>
<td>Iran, Iraq</td>
<td>Aug 88-Feb 91</td>
<td>391 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Iran-Iraq Mil Obs Grp)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Jan 89-Jun 91</td>
<td>70 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(First UN Angola Verification Mission)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Namibia, Angola</td>
<td>Apr 89-Mar 90</td>
<td>4,493 tp/3,500 Civ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Transition Assistance Group)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Aug 89-Feb 90</td>
<td>Civ election monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Obs Mission to Verify the Election Process in Nicaragua)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>Nov 89-Jul 92</td>
<td>1,098 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Obs Grp in Central America)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUVEH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Jun 90-Jan 91</td>
<td>260 election obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Obs Grp for the Verification of Elections in Haiti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Apr 91-present</td>
<td>1,440 obs &amp; trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Iraq-Kuwait Obs Mission)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Jun 91-Nov 92</td>
<td>350 obs+90 police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Second UN Angola Verification Mission)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Jul 91-present</td>
<td>135 mil+ civ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Obs Mission in El Salvador)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>West Sahara</td>
<td>Sep 91-present</td>
<td>375 mil+civ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Oct 91-present</td>
<td>380 mil+civ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Advance Mission in Cambodia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Mar 92-present</td>
<td>14,400 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Protection Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mar 92-present</td>
<td>15,900 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2,400 civ |
Non-UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Rhodesia/Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Dec 79-Mar 80</td>
<td>1,548 obs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Commonwealth Monitoring Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Jul 87-Mar 90</td>
<td>60,000 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Indian Peace Keeping Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFO</td>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>Apr 82-present</td>
<td>2,675 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Multinational Force &amp; Obs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF I</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Aug-Sep 82</td>
<td>2,000 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(First Multinational Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF II</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Sep 82-Mar 84</td>
<td>3,810 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Second Multinational Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Aug 90-present</td>
<td>12,000 trps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Grp)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland have been regular participants in United Nations peacekeeping organizations. Since all four of these nations have small regular armies, they rely on conscripts, or ex-conscript, volunteers to man their UN Stand-by Forces. While training in soldier skills and in basic UN (peacekeeping) service is done separately by each country, economies of scale are realized by combined training for some UN service (this was initiated in 1968). This has resulted in the establishment of UN regional training centers that have some specialization by nation. These peacekeeping functional courses are offered as required (some of this information is based on the Peacekeeper's Handbook, which is dated):

- **UN Observer’s Course** (3 weeks). This is offered at different times by both Finland and Sweden to prepare selected Nordic officers for duty as UN Military Observers (UNMOs). The course focuses on the duties and required skills of UNMOs within a specific mission area, reviews the history of UN peace producing efforts, stresses the unique dynamics of peacekeeping, and reviews UN specific procedures. This course also stresses "military English."

- **UN Staff Officers Course** (3 weeks). This course is taught for Nordic officers in Sweden and is intended to prepare students for staff officer functions either as part of the force headquarters or as part of a contingent staff. This course is divided into five areas: general orientation, staff duties, military English, communications, and miscellaneous.

- **Military Police Course** (2 1/2 weeks). This course is taught in Denmark to train MPs for the Nordic countries, especially for UN duty. Soldiers are taught police skills and investigative techniques as part of a peacekeeping force. Specific subject areas include: peacekeeping orientation, MP service, MP administration, communications, military English, and case studies.

- **UN Movement Control Course** (2 1/2 weeks). This instruction in Norway is to train Nordic personnel on UN land, sea, and air movement control procedures—especially for peacekeeping operation.

- **UN Logistics Staff Course** (2 weeks). This course is taught in Norway to prepare officers to function as logistics specialists in UN peacekeeping operations and in international disaster relief missions.

As a whole, these courses taught over a period of 25 years demonstrate the utility of specialized training in order to conduct peacekeeping operations in a professional manner. Admittedly, some of the training is a refresher in basic military skills like map reading and first aide for former conscripts, but the core content focuses on the unique requirements of functioning in a peacekeeping environment within a UN framework.
ENDNOTES


15 Ibid., A 23

17 Ibid., A 4

18 Greenberger, p. 1.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Argersinger, Steven J. LTC. "Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and the US." Military Studies Project, USAWC, 1 May 1991.


Goulding, Marrack. Address to USAWC Class of 1993 at UN Headquarters, New York, 12 Oct 92.


Meacham, James. "From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: UN Faces a Changing Role." 


United Kingdom School of Infantry. "Commanders Cadre Training Handout." Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team (UKLF), 23 Apr 86.


38


