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COMBAT MEDIA COVERAGE PRINCIPLES:
DOOMED TO FAILURE

BY

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Ronald L. Shultz

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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COMBAT MEDIA COVERAGE PRINCIPLES:
DOOMED TO FAILURE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

The military and the media have experienced a rocky partnership since the beginning of this country. Very few military operations received favorable media coverage, even fewer operations witnessed good relations. Perhaps the greatest single breach between the military and the media occurred during the Vietnam war. However, military operations since then deepened the chasm between these great organizations. In an effort to bridge the gap between the military and the media, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the media pool and used it during several operations including Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm. A firestorm of media criticism followed each operation. The media criticism prompted another DOD attempt to improve media/military relations and resulted in the latest DOD principles of media coverage of combat operations. This paper presents the history of the military/media relations and analyses the latest principles for combat coverage. It provides recommendations to balance three different, but interrelated, requirements, desires, and rights including the following: the military's need to control military operations, the media's desire to report on military operations, and the American public's right to know about military operations.
COMBAT MEDIA COVERAGE PRINCIPLES: DOOMED TO FAILURE

INTRODUCTION

Reporters are seldom characterized as being neutral on an issue. More often they are characterized as prejudicial or biased. Disagreements among reporters and their "victims" have been around forever and have resulted in several Supreme Court cases. Most of these cases were important as First Amendment issues and all were important to the individual plaintiffs. The most important, however, were those involving first amendment rights as they applied to military operations and the U.S. National Security.

First Amendment rights and military operations security have been at odds since the beginning of our country. However, the media continues reporting accounts of military operations to the American public with what amounts to total impunity. Only during war time, and very rarely then, was any punishment imposed on reporters. Historically, the relationship between the military and reporters has been mixed. During the revolution, George Washington was astutely aware of the media's heavily favorable response to the revolution and made it a point to feed reporters with information. However, reporters in other conflicts didn't always enjoy the same relationship with the military. Some of the reporting in other conflicts was simply embarrassing to the military organization; some was risky to military personnel; some was perilous to military operations and some was potentially disastrous to the U.S. National Security. In this paper I will
present significant history of the media as it reported on military actions of this country. This brief history includes several iterations of Government efforts to control the media’s coverage of war. It will terminate with a review of the current, May 92, Department Of Defense (DOD) principles governing the future combat press coverage (Appendix 1).

Following the historical background, I will examine the current DOD principles using the following five benchmarks: 1. Do both parties accept the principles? 2. DO the principles apply to battlefield conditions? 3. Can both parties, the military and media, implement the principles with reasonable preparation? 4. Can both parties enforce the principles? 5. Will the principles help settle the disputes between the parties and avoid future confusion in the battlefield? When measured against these five benchmarks, my thesis is that the principles fall miserably short of what is necessary. I will discuss the shortcomings and provide recommendations for improvement.

My research included both published material and interviews with civilian newsmen and military personnel involved in public affairs. I have included these thoughts throughout the paper.

MEDIA HISTORY

Since freedom was an underlying principle of the U.S. Revolution, official media censorship by the existing government was practically non existent during the revolutionary war. However, the patriot fervor of the time provided a type of self
censorship by the newspapers. In addition, the cause for freedom overwhelmed the minority pro-British newspapers, and threats by patriotic mobs ensured an overall favorable press. It's not surprising that newspapers at the time were very favorable to the revolution - a fact that General Washington understood very well. He also understood that public opinion was extremely important to his success as a military leader. Based on that belief, he used patriotic speeches, churches, local governments and the press to garner support. In one instance, he accepted exaggerated enemy casualty reports without dispute and relayed them to the press to help appear more victorious to the American people.

War news was sometimes old and sometimes prophetic or speculative. At times it was hard to differentiate. The unorganized and haphazard coverage of the revolution posed little security threat to military operations, nor was accuracy a prerequisite for publication. A republished account from a month old newspaper in 1776 included a second hand story about a letter from one American officer to another. It boldly proclaimed France and Spain had declared war on England. The story was before France officially declared war and over a year before Spain declared war on England.

While the revolution galvanized Americans against the British, the Civil War tore Americans apart. However, in the time from the revolutionary war to the civil war, freedom of the press became a fixed American tradition and a necessary factor in the American democracy. Eyewitness correspondents, called
"specials", offered the preponderance of published newspaper reports about the Civil War. These reporters were not recognized as non-combatants and were equally liable to attack by the enemy as the actual soldiers. Improvements in communications speed, opposing principles of government, improved organization of the news coverage, large interest in the war and the large number of war correspondents obviously posed a more serious threat to the military in the Civil War than in the Revolutionary War. The Lincoln administration felt some obligation to restrict the press and provided court-martial, with possible death, for anyone, civilian or military, giving military information to the enemy. Although not specifically addressed to the press, this was an attempt to demand responsible reporting that was sensitive to military security. Individual commanders imposed their own restrictions. General McClellan required a gentlemen's agreement from all correspondents who traveled with him. This approach had limited success. Telegraph lines from Washington were controlled by the State Department, which censored information about Army movements and actions. By the end of the Civil War, control was transferred to the War Department and a special position, Military Superintendent of all telegraphic line and offices in the United States, was created.

The next major epoch in journalism spans the years 1892-1914 and was labeled "yellow journalism". This was a period marked by sensationalism and a frenzy to increase circulation. A form of decadence perhaps, yellow journalism responded to the
insatiable public desire for something different than plain facts reported with editorial interpretation. Also during this period, the European press seemed to advance way beyond the American press in war reporting and a form of jealousy may have developed. These two factors may be the cause for feverish press coverage of the Cuban rebellion against Spanish control. Whatever the cause, journalism seemed to turn a bit sinister about its coverage of the Cuban rebellion against the Spanish in 1896-1897. Newspapers were concerned with sales, not responsible reporting. A common story abounds about the renowned publisher, William Randolph Hearst, and his lust for sensationalism and circulation. Some people credit Hearst with inciting the American people to go to war with Spain. When one of his reporters in Cuba telegraphed that all was quiet in Cuba and he wanted to return to New York, Hearst supposedly replied:

PLEASE REMAIN. YOU FURNISH PICTURES. I WILL FURNISH WAR.

Hearst seemed to do just that. When the U.S. battleship "Maine" blew up in a Cuban harbor, Hearst immediately blamed the Spanish. A patriotic chant, "Remember the Maine" was plastered in all the headlines and appeared to be the catalyst to propel the U.S. into a war with Spain. Hearst had his war. Although most papers fed the American frenzy for war, some newspapers held their ground against yellow journalism and sensationalism for profit. They were too late, however, to alter public opinion. Although expenses skyrocketed during this period, profits from increased
circulation more than covered the costs. Sensationalism proved its worth financially.

In time, the United States became slightly more interested in the effects of the media on military operations. The Government took very limited steps to censor the reports from the battlefield by controlling the cables from the Key West islands to mainland Florida. This effort did little to actually control the reporting and did nothing to control the actual publishing. Reporters used carrier pigeons and other schemes to get the reports to Florida. Even without reports from the field, yellow journalism spawned its own stories based on rumors, speculations, and misinformation. The inability of our foes to collect, interpret and disseminate intelligence very quickly seemed to minimize the negative effects that uncensored reporting may have created. That may have been the reason the U.S. Government took so few actions to censor battlefield reporting. For reasons unexplained, near the end of the Spanish American War, most newspapers abandoned yellow journalism. Even Hearst converted to more responsible reporting in the early 1900's.

As the speed and capabilities of communications improved, the potential effects of battlefield reporting on military operational security became very important. Also, through improved communications, the world had become a much smaller place. Using the wire services, the media quickly brought the war in Europe to the Americans. Although in operation at the time, radio had not become a major form of communication.
Newspapers still reigned supreme and relied primarily on intercontinental cables for their news around the world. When the British cut the cable between Germany and the United States, leaving only the cable between England and the United States, British censorship commenced immediately. As the war escalated, U.S. reporters were dispatched to Europe. Here reporters encountered Lord Kitchener, who permitted only one accredited reporter to accompany the British forces in France. Freelance reporters were scattered across Europe, including Paris. Accreditation could not stop the onslaught of reporters in the battle areas. However, official restrictions on reporters' movements, censorship at every point, and the size and nature of the conflict effectively hampered war correspondents trying to get headline stories.

Prior to entering the war in Europe, U.S. government censorship of war stories was virtually non-existent. However, once President Wilson declared war on Germany, government censorship quickly assumed a greater importance in controlling American newspapers. President Wilson established a Committee on Public Information (CPI) that served as a liaison between the government and the newspapers. Frank Mott described the committee as "primarily a propaganda bureau and not a censorship division. Their material was colored with patriotic propaganda: but it was, on the whole, accurate and full of news value." This committee was extremely open to correspondents and withheld only specific military information on troop movements, ships
sailings, etc. The committee asked for voluntary censorship of military information from the newspaper publishers. Despite this overwhelming majority of publishers complied. Despite this voluntary support, shortly after the committee was established, Congress passed the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 which prohibited willful false reporting designed to interfere with military operations. In October 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act authorized censorship of all communications moving in or out of the United States including magazines in foreign languages. The Sedition Act of May 1918 broadened the Espionage Act to prohibit any disloyal, profane, abusive or scurrilous language about the U.S., constitution, military forces, flag, or uniform.

World War (WWI) was the first conflict in which the U.S. Government required American reporters to become accredited as a war correspondent. The procedure was lengthy, expensive and somewhat arbitrary. James Knightly described the rules of accreditation as unbelievable. Accreditation included a personal appearance before the Secretary of War, where the correspondent would swear to convey the truth to the people of the United States, but refrain from disclosing facts that might aid the enemy. Then he had to hand write an autobiographical sketch to include his work, experience, character, health, plans for the war coverage and locations he planned to work. If accredited he had to pay $1,000 to the Army for equipment, and post a $10,000 bond to ensure he would work as a gentleman of the press. Infractions of the expectations resulted in forfeiture of the
Although over 500 American correspondents were in Europe to cover the war, only about 40 actually covered the actions of the American Expeditionary Force.

Military censorship for WWII picked up from WWI with the added problem of radio. Going into WWII, the Espionage Act and Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 were still on the statute books. The Sedition Act had been repealed. The CPI had been dismantled and a new Office of Censorship was created. On 15 January 1942, the Office of Censorship issued a Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press which applied to printed, radio, photographic, and video material about the war effort. No statutory sanctions or legal penalties accompanied this code. It was a Government lead self-discipline system. In 1942, an executive order established the Office of War Information (OWI). It was completely separate from the Office of Censorship. In many of its activities, it was essentially a propaganda organization. However, it also functioned as a channel for straight news about the progress of war operations. The military accredited over 1600 correspondents and reporters for WWII. Like George Washington in the Revolutionary War, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower understood the importance of public opinion. He told American newspaper editors, "I have always considered as quasi-staff officer, correspondents accredited to my headquarters." Controlling correspondents and public opinion became an integral part of military planning. Censorship procedures actually contributed to better informed correspondents. Since all copy
was submitted to censors before transmission, soldiers were confident in the system and felt free to discuss top secret material with reporters.\textsuperscript{16} The multiple fronts of the war encountered many different approaches to controlling correspondents and the release of military information. Censorship in the field varied greatly in efficiency and reasonableness. On the homefront, a number of periodicals were suppressed for disloyalty during WW II.\textsuperscript{17}

A form of Press pools was used in WW II. Even radio used a pool system for the first time in covering D-Day, June 6, 1944. Reporters who actually covered stories had to share information with their colleagues. The Navy created a censorship system that permitted a press relations division to make its own decisions about censorship. Also, individual commanders, like General MacArthur, created their own public relations stories. For the first time in history, radio brought a war, live, to tens of thousands of listeners all around the world. A British Broadcasting Corporation reporter made a live broadcast of the Normandy invasion from an air force bomber, while an American CBS reporter gave live accounts of the invasion from a flag ship off the coast.

Not all people were satisfied with the censorship process. W.W. Chaplin of NBC wrote a bitter account of censorship and its intolerance of the dark side of war. While covering a speech by General de Gaulle in a little town in Normandy, a peasant lady carrying her dead child in a wheelbarrow, the victim of Allied
bombing, was censored out of the coverage. Some people criticized correspondents for becoming too close to the events that they were reporting and for becoming directly involved in military affairs. Some reporters lost sight of their objectivity and in an effort to boost national pride, exaggerated successes and minimized set-backs. Generals Bradley and Patton played unashamedly to public opinion as a part of their own power struggle. Correspondents were taken into a general's confidence which created a sort of loyalty of the reporter to the general. As a result, reporters sometimes blatantly slanted the stories to enhance the general's image. WW II witnessed a bonding between the military and correspondents, possibly an outgrowth of a form of a national crusade against evil. Some discord occurred but generally relations between correspondents and the military were mutually supportive and kept the American public honestly informed.

WW II proved a combination censorship by Government and correspondents. Charles Lynch, a Canadian accredited by the British Army for Reuters looked back with these words,

It's humiliating to look back at what we wrote during the war. It was crap—and I don't exclude the Ernie Pyles or the Alan Mooreheads. We were a propaganda arm of our governments. At the start the censors enforced that, but by the end we were our own censors. We were cheerleaders. I suppose there wasn't an alternative at the time. It was total war. But, for God's sake, let's not glorify our role. It wasn't good journalism. It wasn't journalism at all.
I think Mr. Lynch's remarks subtly voice the idea of an eternal enmity between journalists and soldiers regardless of objectives or causes.

The Korean War started when the North Korean Communist's attacked deep into South Korea. Initially only a handful of journalists were there to tell the stories of American troops, armed with only carbines, crushed by North Korean tanks and troops. Under voluntary censorship, journalists refrained from revealing any military secrets. They did not refrain, however, from telling about our poorly equipped troops and the terrible massacres they encountered. These stories upset General MacArthur who had a flare for publicity, and reminded the correspondents that they had "an important responsibility in the matter of psychological warfare." Rather than yield to his appeal for self censorship of embarrassing information, the correspondents generated an unusual request for full, official, and compulsory censorship. The Government was unwilling to invoke official censorship at that time, but clearly disliked negative accounts going to the American people. MacArthur's flare for publicity quickly faded when reporters' stories continued to contain tales of defeat and atrocities committed by South Korean police on women and children. Subsequently, full censorship was invoked and strictly enforced. MacArthur's removal from Korea was followed by an easing of censorship. The United Nations Command insisted that correspondents cover the truce talks. Prisoner of War talks prompted another bout of censorship.
Although television arrived in the United States at the same time as the Korean War occurred, its audience was too small and technology too elementary to capture the Korean War stories. Overall, the Korean war was always Government censored in some manner, but the degree of censorship changed based on how favorable the press reported on the war, and how well the U.S. progress was going.

Unlike Korea, official U.S. government censorship was only a very small part of Vietnam War reporting. No official committees were appointed, nor did the military establish any strict field press censorship policies. A short news blackout preceding the Cambodia and Laos invasions in 1970 and 1971 was the only exception. Journalists had to become accredited, which was a simple, mechanical process: apply to the Vietnamese Embassy for a visa; arrive in country with a letter from the media organization represented; present the letter to the U.S. authorities in Vietnam; and receive accreditation. Accreditation came with a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) card that read:

The bearer of this card should be accorded full cooperation and assistance...to assure the successful completion of his mission. Bearer is authorized rations and quarters on a reimbursable basis. Upon presentation of this card, bearer is entitled to air, water, and ground transportation under a priority of 3....

With accreditation, reporters were required to sign an agreement to abide by 15 ground rules designed to preserve military security. With the accreditation and the card, they
were on their way. The ground rules included such things as barring disclosure of military plans about strikes and operations, size and location of troop movements, exact casualty figures prior to official release by MACV, and aerial photography of fixed based operations.25

Reporter could get their news first hand from the field or second hand from daily briefings conducted by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). The JUSPAO was created to handle press relations and psychological warfare. The credibility of these briefings was destroyed over time by the discrepancies in what they reported to the press corps, and what reporters actually experienced in the field. One reporter said he never met anyone in JUSPAO who knew the difference between press relations and psychological warfare.26

Although official censorship was not employed, subtle pressure was applied by the Kennedy and subsequent administrations to keep the news from Vietnam positive and pro-military. Also, under President Diem’s control, South Vietnam enforced their own form of censorship by expelling reporters who published articles criticizing any of the military operations or tactics. More internal conflicts within the press corps were evident in the Vietnam War. Old and seasoned reporters from WW II and Korea disagreed with younger and less seasoned reporters who criticized U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Even the American public was critical of the press in the early 1960’s.
These factors created a form of control over the press corps for the first few years of the 1960’s.27

By 1968, however, public opinion was less critical and more trusting of the press. When the Tet offensive occurred, the press reported it as a miserable U.S. military defeat. Public opinion changed 20 percentage points from support for the war to questioning why we were fighting in Vietnam. Looking back, journalist Robert Elegant noted,

During the later half of the 15-year American involvement in Vietnam, the media became the primary battlefield. For the first time in modern history, the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield, but on the printed page and, above all, on the television screen. Looking back coolly, I believe it can be said (surprising as it may still sound) that South Vietnamese and American forces actually won the limited military struggle. None the less, the War was finally lost to the invaders after the US disengagement because the political pressures built up by the media had made it quite impossible for Washington to attain even the minimal material and moral support that would have enabled the Saigon regime to continue effective resistance.28

Television (TV) was in a large majority of households in the sixties and brought the Vietnam War into millions of American families’ living rooms. Vivid pictures of the atrocities of war became a nightly intrusion into American minds. The impact of television and reporting in general on the public cannot be overstated. One picture of a South Vietnamese police officer committing a cold blooded execution undermined a hundred stories justifying the war and the American lives lost in the cause for freedom. Short pictorial segments demanded by television’s news programs could easily distort the full story. A single frame of
a burning building might leave the viewer with the impression an entire village was in flaming destruction. General Westmoreland, in particular, believed TV could be, and was, very deceptive. However, even television was virtually free from censorship and provided more and more action film coverage of the battles.

Some people in and out of the military attribute the turning of public opinion against the war as the fault of the media. Perhaps this was the basis for the antagonism that developed between the media and the military toward the end of the Vietnam war. Whatever the reasons, antagonism did develop and probably formed the basis for the military’s policy for media coverage of the Grenada Operation, "Urgent Fury".

Urgent Fury was the first invasion in American history in which the media was not present for the initial military operations. Was this media exclusion calculated or accidental? Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger clearly stated the ban on reporters in Urgent Fury resulted from operations security and personnel safety considerations. However, he attributed the decision for the ban to the task force commander, Vice Adm, Joseph W. Metcalf III.

The decision was made by the commander to whom we entrusted this dangerous mission to withhold from the press advance notification of the Grenada operation and to keep reporters and other noncombatants off the island until the American citizens were safe.... Admiral Metcalf corroborates Secretary Weinberger’s statement, but offers some insight into the decision:

The lapse of time between the notification that I was to lead the Grenada operation and the first landing of
troops was 39 hours. In this brief period before combat the only consideration that I gave to the media occurred at about six hours into the 39. A lieutenant commander, a CINCLANT public affairs officer (PAO), came to me and said, 'there will be no press, do you have any problems with this?' I said I did not. My answer came more from attention to urgent operational matters rather than a thought out position on the issue of the press. Was this formulation of media policy by acquiescence or did I have an option? I suspect the policy was de facto but the truth is I do not know."

Although not officially sanctioned by the military, at least one journalist beat the Marines and Rangers to the invasion. The Marines quickly escorted the journalist to the Navy's Flag ship off shore for his safety, where he demanded Admiral Metcalf send his story to the paper. When notified about the journalist intruder, the Pentagon reaffirmed the "no press policy" and admonished Admiral Metcalf for allowing the reporter on the ship. Two hours later the Pentagon demanded to know when Admiral Metcalf would permit an estimated 400 reporters to join the war. A pool of reporters was permitted to arrive in Grenada on the afternoon of the third day of operations. Although the press was not at the initial operations, they had plenty of opportunity to gather the story and report it to the American public. Admiral Metcalf believes the press spent more time and space defending their prerogatives to witness military operations, than they did reporting the story to the American people. Grenada marked the first time that reporters were grouped together- pooled- and officially escorted into a battle area. As described by Admiral Metcalf, the pool evolved more by accident than by design.
However, the future would see an official press pool designed by the Department of Defense.

In 1984, MG Winant Sidle, USA (Ret.) convened a panel to investigate and recommend ways to improve media coverage of military operations (See Appendix 2 for recommendations). Perhaps the most important recommendation called for a media pool. Over the next two years, two separate panels concluded that a pool system would best serve the media in initial military operations coverage. In April 1985, the Secretary of Defense formed the DOD National Media Pool. The pool included a pre-established group of reporters from both print and TV. It was designed to provide the media access to military operations not otherwise accessible to the general public. DOD tested the pool over the next few years in several military deployments, including the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf Operations to prevent Iranian missile attacks on oil tankers transiting Gulf waters.32

The press pool concept received mixed reviews. Its success or failure was usually tied to the definition of success. If success for a press pool is an informed public, the press pools were successful. If the definition is real time, totally independent reporting, free of all military restrictions and gauged from a single reporter's perspective, pools were probably not termed successful. One reporter determined that the press pools in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf operations were very successful. His assessment was based on a few primary criteria: he was permitted to join the pool of only a handful of reporters;
he was provided observation privileges from the ship's highest point; he was allowed to witness actual destruction of an oil platform; and he felt a part of the action. Other accounts were not so kind to the press pool tests in the 1980's. During the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf operations, "reporters complained that they were isolated from the action and kept ignorant of events. Many complained that their military hosts were more interested in brainwashing them than exposing them to the news." Personal perspective seemed to be the discriminator of good or bad.

Good or bad, the press pool was the method of media coverage that took us into Panama in "Just Cause" and into Saudi Arabia in "Desert Shield/Storm" (DS/S). In Panama the press was very critical of the press pool. They argued that DOD formed and deployed the press pool too late to be effective. Journalists not in the pool were arriving in Panama on their own and reporting vivid, first hand accounts of the fighting. Meanwhile, pool reporters were stuck away from the action.

Criticism from the media precipitated still another DOD review of the press pool. Fred Hoffman, a retired former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, identified several problems in an after action report prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. He concluded that the pool concept was good, but DOD had implemented it very poorly. The pool should have utilized news personnel already in Panama, not Washington. One could question this assessment, however, considering the Siddle Panel recommended implementing
pools only when media access was unavailable without military assistance—which was not the case in Just Cause. Also, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs may have been unprepared to manage the press coverage of Just Cause (See Appendix 3 for recommendations). Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney recognized a conflict between safeguarding the operations security and getting the pool to Panama for the first action. Although a public affairs annex was included as part of the operations plan for Just Cause, it subsequently became entangled in administrative concern for operations security and was buried in a safe. Consequently, no one followed up on the annex until just hours before the operations commenced. By then, insufficient time remained to insure adequate transportation, escorts, facilities, and communications for the press pool.\(^3\)

Just Cause was a very short operation which did not provide sufficient time to respond to the press's criticisms. Questions about DOD's responsibility to the media, responsibility to the American people, and need to reconcile the potential conflict between operations security and reporter's rights to access information, still remained.

A short eight months separated Just Cause from Desert Shield. The press pool was still DOD's only official method to integrate the press into military operations, and DOD was still terribly unprepared to manage military-media relations. Despite their unpreparedness, when President Bush ordered U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia on 12 Aug 1990, the DOD also deployed the news
media pool from Washington D.C. to Saudi Arabia. This timely transportation of the media pool into Saudi Arabia was no small feat, since Western journalists are normally barred from entering Saudi Arabia. While it attests to DOD's concern for media coverage of military operations, it speaks poorly of DOD's planning.  

Over the ensuing months, the Saudi government allowed more than 2500 media personnel into their country to cover the war. Of that number, only 5-10% were officially accepted into the DOD press pool and traveled with a military unit during actual combat operations. The others found themselves bucking a system inadequate to accommodate them.

To implement the pool system and interface with the hundreds of non-pool reporters that eventually arrived in country, and the hundreds more asking for entry, DOD established the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in the Dhahran International Hotel. The JIB later formed another office in Riyadh, but arriving media personnel registrations remained centralized at Dhahran. The JIB served as media coordinator and information release agency for the U.S., Great Britain, and Saudi Arabia. Press pool reporters entering Saudi Arabia were housed in hotels in Dhahran and Riyadh when they weren't in the field or the Gulf with military units. From August through December 1990, the JIB coordinated literally thousands of interviews, visits and stories between the press pool and the military. However, not all pool reporters gained access to the field. Many reporters were stuck in the hotels
based on the Saudi travel restrictions, lack of transportation and escort officers, unrestricted reporter registrations and the overwhelming number of reporters demanding a limited DOD assistance capability.

Although during Desert Shield reporters were permitted to file their stories directly to their own news organizations, they were still restricted by the limited access to the field. During the entire period of DS/S, major print and broadcast news organizations were putting pressure on the Pentagon to eliminate the press pool concept. That did not happen. DOD determined that military areas were still unsafe and potentially explosive. Instead of eliminating the pool, the potential battle with Iraq prompted the Pentagon to prepare ground rules for press coverage of the war—ground rules which would have already been in place as part of the OPLAN. On 7 January 91, after several meetings between Mr. Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and media representatives, Mr. Williams issued the final version of the ground rules for media personnel in the Gulf region. The press pool was central to the ground rules and would remain in effect throughout the war. The media immediately attacked the rules as too restrictive, particularly the requirement for all broadcast reporters to participate in the pool system and the requirement for blanket security review. A 14 January 91 supplement did not remove any of the restrictions opposed by the press and specifically included all forms of
imagery in the blanket security review\textsuperscript{39} (a copy of the basic rules and supplement are attached as Appendices 4 and 5).

The assessment of how well the military and the press interfaced in DS/S spans a range from terrible to very well. In general the military reports the interface as very successful and the media reports the interface as failing miserably. Both sides identified some common problems in the military/media relations during the Gulf war. Mr. Pete Williams listed the following as some things the DOD could have done better: helping journalists in the field, transporting journalists for eyewitness accounts, providing better communications links for reporters from the field activities, and selecting the media members to be included in the press pools vice allowing the media to decide its own membership.\textsuperscript{39}

The Gannett Foundation Report also listed the problems between the military and the media. The report listed all the things Mr. Williams listed plus a few more: the security review system caused unacceptable delays in getting stories to the news organizations; the press pools were too small for the numbers of reporters who wanted to be included; the public affairs officers sometimes inappropriately applied the ground rules to censor information; and the requirement for the reporters to have military escorts was unnecessary and over burdening.\textsuperscript{40}

The DOD restrictions on the press prompted three separate law suits against the DOD from 10 Jan 91 thru 22 Feb 91. In two of the three cases, the Judge ruled the suits moot because the
Gulf war had ended prior to the court date. The third suit was decided in favor of the Government. 41

These were not the first suits filed against the U.S. Government over censorship. However, with the exception of President Lincoln’s suppression of some northern critics of Government policy during the Civil War, the national government did little prior to WW I to provoke first amendment discussion. In 1919, Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis created a "clear and present danger" test to define and restrict the governmental control over free expression. Although revised slightly in the last 70 years, the courts have consistently supported the government’s right to balance first amendment rights with the need to protect national security. 42

In one of the most important cases pertaining to military restrictions of first amendment rights, the "Pentagon Papers" case, New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the Supreme Court ruled that the Government has its heaviest burden when attempting to impose prior restraint over publishing information. 43 This precedence seems to have set the conditions upon which the DOD balances the media ground rules. In Desert Storm, the media had an appeal process up through DOD. At the end of that process, the media was free to publish material which the DOD declared fell inside the restricted information parameters. Each organization was libel for a suit and personal criminal action filed by the DOD if they chose to ignore DOD objections to publishing the material. 44
In *Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co.*, the Supreme Court ruled, "The Constitution does not require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally." This case also set a precedent that has not been reversed. The case appears to destroy the notion that the DOD must provide the media access to the battlefield simply because the press demands access.

Despite the lawsuits and the media's contention that the DOD unjustly restricted the media during the Gulf war, the American public supported DOD. A *Washington Post*-ABC opinion poll showed that 80% of Americans supported the DOD restrictions and a whopping 60% thought DOD should place more restrictions on the media.

The end of the Gulf War did not end the long standing military-media debate on press restrictions during military crises, especially war. In response to the latest media criticism and in an effort to promote the very rights it was established to defend, the military reviewed its policies concerning the media's coverage of U.S. military operations. Representatives of the military and major U.S. news organizations developed nine principles for news media coverage of DOD operations. They developed these principles to improve future combat news coverage. The media suggested a tenth principle that prohibited security reviews of news material, but the military would not accept it. Although both media and military expressed their approval of the principles, I believe the
principles completely ignore the lessons of history, particularly the last ten years. The principles continue to masquerade behind an untenable notion that combat coverage can be open. If we should have learned anything from our past history of the military/media relations, we should have learned this—open coverage cannot work on the battlefield!

Open coverage attempts to avoid the real issue—military operations cannot coexist with open reporting without grave consequences to the soldiers, reporters, and ultimately, the American people. I will illustrate this point in the remainder of this paper.

Also in the remainder of this paper, I will discuss not just the nine, but the ten principles. I will cite shortcomings of the principles and provide recommendations. The recommendations will strive to improve the military’s response to three obligations outlined in DOD Directive 5122.5: inform the American citizens about military operations, provide reasonable assistance to the media during operations that require restricted access to the general public, and minimize, if not eliminate, military/media confrontations during future military operations.47

DISCUSSION

To complement a discussion of the principles and the benchmarks, page 28 contains a matrix that summarizes which principles met the various benchmarks. I will examine each
principle as it applies to the five basic benchmarks listed in the matrix. For ease of discussion, some principles will be summarized in this discussion, but the full text of the principles is included in Appendix 1. Since the first nine principles met the first benchmark on acceptability, they will only be measured against benchmarks two through five.

Benchmark two asks, Do the principles apply to battlefield conditions? Principle one states, "Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations." Before comparing principle one to benchmark two, some questions must be answered. What does open and independent mean? Open reporting must be defined as permitting reporters to go where they want to go, when they want to go, and report on what they choose. Anything less would not be open. Although the actual reports might be subject to security ground rules in combat under principle four, the where, when and subject of reports would be necessarily unrestricted in open reporting. Most of the military people interviewed believed open reporting was more restrictive than I defined above; most of the civilians interviewed agreed that open coverage meant a totally open reporting environment. All of those interviewed recognized that open coverage was definitely subject to different interpretations. What, then, is the value of the principle? Agreeing to a principle of open coverage without defining open coverage does nothing to settle the long standing dispute between the military and the media over battlefield access. It simply
# DOD Media Combat Coverage Principles

**KEY**
- S - Satisfactory
- P - Partially Sat.
- N - Not applied
- Blank - Unsatisfactory

## Principles

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<td>7. Media pool transportation</td>
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postpones the dispute and confusion until the next military operation, which is the least desirable time to pursue resolution. Also, developing eight or nine other principles around a principle that is not defined, extremely subjective, and practicably unworkable is nonsense. Control and coordination over battlefield activity are critical elements in successful combat. Open reporting by its very nature conflicts with these critical elements. Some would argue that open coverage can be controlled and coordinated. However, defining open in terms that include control and coordination creates an oxymoron. Based on approximately 400 reporters attempting to cover Grenada, over 250 reporters attempting to cover Panama, and over 1400 reporters that tried to cover Desert Shield and Desert Storm, does either side really believe that this principle will fit the battlefield? In his remarks to the Congress after Desert Storm, Pentagon spokesman Williams said that the number of reporters on the battlefield must be limited.4 As described previously, retired Vice Adm. Metcalf experienced the problems and concerns open coverage can generate. Although the press was excluded from the Grenada operations, an enterprising reporter unexpectedly arrived at the flag ship on the first day's operations. He was confined to the ship, but not without causing concern and confusion for the commander about security of the area, the reporters safety, transporting the reporter from the theater, and other logistics.49 Unexpected reporters' visits, under open coverage,
will create the same problems for commanders, but on a much larger scale.

Independent reporting presents a different problem. Again, a definition is in order. Independent simply means that reporters do not share their reports with others, press pool or not. This part of the principle is not only workable, but desirable. Both the military and the media benefit from this for several reasons: independent reporting promotes pride of authorship among the reporters; generates more information for the American public; increases first hand reporting; and generally enhances the reporters' accuracy and accountability.

Open and independent reporting are not synonymous, co-dependent, or in any other way necessarily connected; nor should they be connected. However, principle one seems to infer open and independent are inseparable. That premise severely restricts DOD's flexibility and must be completely abandoned if we hope to implement any part of principle one.

That brings us to the second benchmark, implementation. Can both parties implement principle one without unreasonable preparation and interference? For open coverage, no, but for independent coverage, yes. Open reporting by its nature could not restrict the numbers of reporters entering the operational area. Independent reporting is not in any way connected to the number of reporters accessing the area. In Grenada, the Pentagon asked Vice Adm Metcalf if he could accommodate 400 journalists, about one reporter for every 18 troops. That number of
reporters would have totally overloaded the military's capability
to provide the required logistics, security systems,
identification procedure, etc. This problem would have been
worse in Desert Storm for the 1400 reporters wanting to
investigate the battlefield. The media also has implementation
problems. Reporters do not have all the equipment and
information needed to survive in a hostile combat environment,
ie., chemical gear, enemy locations, adequate transportation,
sufficient food and shelter, etc.? Independent reporting is not
a slave to the same implementation considerations because it
depends on flow of information, not access to information.

Is principle one enforceable? Can either side successfully
prosecute the enforceability of this principle? Would a judge
seriously demand that the military open up the battlefield or
exercise training areas to uncontrolled access by the press? No!
The courts have consistently shown tolerance, if not support, for
military restrictions of reporters' access to the battlefield.
The most recent case concerning access was filed January 1991 by
various members of the press. They challenged DOD regulations
governing coverage of military activities overseas. In the court
opinion, Judge Leonard B. Sand, U.S.D.J., stated in part,

The activities of the press are subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions....There is little
disagreement, even from plaintiffs, that DOD may place
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the
press upon showing that there is a significant
governmental interest."

This does not assure a successful military defense of limited
coverage of military operations, but it surely suggests the
possibility. It also shows that limited access enjoys wide acceptance, regardless how distasteful it may be to some people. Concerning the independent reporting part of this principle, as stated before, it does not confront the same problems and could be enforceable by both parties. This does not mean that methods for sharing news could not or should not be developed. In fact, in his same opinion, Judge Sand stated:

> In reviewing regulations..., the Court would inquire whether they ... serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.52

The recommendations will discuss this possibility in greater detail.

Finally, will principle one settle future disputes between the military and the media? Absolutely not. On the contrary, it will create future disputes by perpetuating the absurd notion that the principle is a possibility. The media will disdain the military and see non-compliance as a willful departure from the principle vs. an operational reality of military conflict. Not a single conflict in U.S. history provided open and independent reporting for the media. Although Vietnam probably provided the most open and independent reporting system in our history, even that conflict saw restrictions, ground rules, and Vietnamese censorship of the U.S. media. In his comments to Congress following Desert Storm, GEN (Ret) Sidle acknowledged the folly of principle one when he said, "The fact is that security, safety,
and operational considerations preclude absolutely providing the press full coverage."³

Why, then, are we still holding onto such a ludicrous principle, because it postpones grappling the issue of first amendment rights. Apparently neither the military nor the media is confident they will prevail in an argument about long term restricted access to the battlefield. However, no single issue concerning the military/media relations is more important than the idea that reporters are entitled to unrestricted battlefield access- more about this in my recommendations.

Principle two establishes media pools on a temporary basis; provides a time parameter for the pool’s existence; and prohibits cancelling independent reporting for reporters already in the area. What is a media pool? It is a pre-determined group of media people selected to accompany the military on operations. How does it operate? The Sidle Panel seems to have coined the term "media pool" in their recommendations. However, they did not provide details on developing or implementing the pool; nor did they specifically recommend that pool members share information with non-pool members."⁴ Fred Hoffman saw things differently after "Just Cause." In recommendation 14 of his report, Mr. Hoffman tried to close what he perceived to be a gap in the media pool system. He included a requirement that, all pool participant organizations...share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry. Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requesters should be dropped from the
pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time-honored pool practices."

Sharing may have occurred sporadically through history, but I question if it was a time-honored practice. It is certainly not so today. WW II was the first time the Government required a reporter to share news, and that was basically a one time requirement until DS/S. Today, communications is international, immediate, and expensive. If it ever existed, the time-honored practice of sharing has gone by the way of company picnics and should be remembered fondly, but not mandated. Today organizations routinely buy news from other organizations, ie., API, UPI, Rueters, etc., but they certainly don't "share" news. Arbitrarily requiring pool members to share news products is not only unnecessary, but also undesirable for both the military and the media. It places media personnel in a completely unfamiliar practice that only denigrates military/media relations, media product quality, and media pool operations in general. The military can implement pools for coordination, assistance, safety, security, logistics, etc., without demanding they share products. In an interview, Joe Galloway, U.S. News and World Report correspondent, said, "the idea of sharing data is alien to me." He is not alone in that idea. John Lee, Assistant Managing Editor, New York Times, also said virtually the same thing in a separate interview. Universally, the media does not share news and the military must not impose that requirement on the media. The military must, however, develop a procedure that overcomes a court concern expressed by Judge Sand in his opinion cited
"...Once the government does so (open the battlefield to
the press as representatives of the public) it is bound to do so
in a nondiscriminatory manner...." I believe this can be done
without sharing data; more about this in my recommendations.

Is this principle applicable to the battlefield? Using
pools, as it was defined above, is applicable because it provides
control for the operation and assistance to the media. Requiring
the pool to share information and disbanding it are not
applicable. Sharing information not only presents the
disadvantages discussed previously, it also creates extremely
burdensome information management problems for DOD. DOD assumes
the following problems: DOD becomes the watchdog over pool
reporters to insure the reporters "share" information; DOD
assumes responsibility to get copy to a central distribution
point for other reporters; and DOD takes responsibility to have
adequate equipment to transmit pool material (see principle
eight). DOD puts itself in the middle of a complex information
gathering, sharing, and dissemination system. Disbanding pools
is also a bad idea. If DOD disbands pools at any time, not just
at the earliest opportunity or within 24 to 36 hours when
possible, what system replaces the pool, open reporting? Not a
chance!

Can this principle be implemented without unreasonable
preparations and interference? No. This principle leads back to
open reporting which is not reasonable for military operations.
It interferes with both the military's command and control and
the media's normal direct reporting procedure vs. sharing information. Benchmark four deals with enforcement. Neither side can enforce this principle because it is filled with nebulous terms such as sometimes, as possible, earliest opportunity, and should. Will this principle settle future disputes and avoid confusion? No. Again, as in principle one, principle two actually promotes dispute and confusion by the wording and the erroneous premise that open and independent reporting is an alternative. Also, inherent in this principle is an understanding that pools cannot exist with independent reporting, which is not true. In Desert Storm, reporters frequently violated the requirement to share stories with other reporters in the pool.7 The JIB did miraculous work, but they were not staffed to police the pool, nor should they be staffed for that purpose. Pools can and should be organized for purposes other than sharing news. A pool system may provide the only means to control, coordinate, and provide security for the media on the battlefield. Whether the reporters share news is not germane to those objectives for a pool system. In addition to failing all the benchmarks, principle two contradicts the original and primary basis for establishing a pool. The Sidle Panel intended that DOD establish pools and provide media access to areas inaccessible to the general public. If journalists are already in the area, why make a pool? I believe pools should be established for all military operations, and I will discuss this in my recommendations.
Principle two states in part, "Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation." Principle three states, "Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited." Principle three is redundant with principle two and therefore fails the benchmarks that principle two failed. I view a specific event and military operation synonymously and therefore, principle three is redundant.

Principle four states in summary that journalists will be credentialed and bound by security ground rules. It continues that violations of ground rules can result in suspension or expulsion from the combat area. Principle four concludes that news organizations will make a best effort to assign experienced journalists to the operations. Is this applicable to the battlefield? Partially. Establishing credentials is applicable only if it includes specific minimum criteria that all media personnel must meet. Minimum criteria would enforce the requirement for news organizations to assign experienced journalists. My research and interviews revealed little concern about establishing minimum criteria for reporter credentials. Tom Bowman, Patriot News writer, said "DOD must have experienced journalists, otherwise they might get the fatal 10% that doesn’t understand the criticality of the information and events they witness." This principle may also have peacetime application. Georgie Anne Geyer, syndicated columnist, recently wrote,
There is clearly a mismatch between the military and the press. ...as in the Gulf War, many journalists understand little about the complexities and convolutions of military strategy. It is an honorable practice to criticize strategy that you understand but foolish to criticize what you do not understand."

Can the parties implement this principle without unreasonable preparation and interference? Yes. Both parties have successfully implemented this principle in Desert Shield/Storm. Can both parties enforce this principle? No. The parties have not mutually defined the different terms and phrases in the principle, i.e., "credentialed, clear, can result in, best efforts, and experienced." The fifth benchmark asks, will the principle settle disputes and avoid future battlefield confusion? No. However, this principle makes a good attempt to establish important parts of a good military/media relationship. If clearly defined and firmly established as policy and doctrine, these important aspects of battlefield reporting could easily meet all the benchmarks.

Principle five states "Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations restriction may limit access in some cases." Concerning battlefield applicability, this principle meets the benchmark and must become an operational imperative for future operations. However, this principle cannot meet benchmark three without a clarification. The word "journalists" is not sufficiently definitive and infers an unlimited number. Principle four did not suffer the same deficiency by its use of the word "journalists" for several reasons: credentialing is an administrative process; it can be
accomplished before the military operation commences; it does not affect the operation’s logistics, security, or planning; and it requires little, if any, follow on support after the initial action. Principle five, however, is significantly more burdensome to the military. The military’s capability to implement this principle is heavily dependent on the number of reporters demanding access. The military could never implement principle five for the 1400 journalists who appeared in Desert Storm. The overwhelming number of reporters seeking access to military units appears to be a common thread in the last three military conflicts. Is this principle enforceable? Not unless it is further defined and quantified. Enforcement becomes unreasonable once demand for access goes beyond a certain number which can be, but has not been, defined. Will disputes be settled and confusion avoided? Yes, if it is defined and quantified. Access is one of the primary gripes the media has with the military. If the media is granted access in definitive numbers that are objectively established by the military, adjudicated in the courts as necessary, and included in OPLANS, CONPLANS and JOPES, both parties could avoid most disputes and confusion in future military operations.

Principle six states, "Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons, but should not interfere with the reporting process." This principle meets benchmarks two, three, and five. It easily applies to the battlefield and can be easily implemented since normally each division and many smaller size
units have a public affairs officer (PAO). It would probably settle the continued debate over interference and avoid future confusion, if PAO’s strictly adhered to the principle. PAO’s will probably need more definitive guidance and training to understand and implement the principle’s intent. Also the media needs to understand the intent to prevent unrealistic expectations. Intent is crucial to benchmark four. Unless the principle is clearly stated, it cannot meet benchmark four. Words like "liaison, interfere, and reporting process" must be specifically defined and put into policy. Only then will this principle serve to improve the military/media relations.

Principle seven states that under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. This principle fails the battlefield applicability benchmark for essentially the same reason as principle five. Commanders cannot possibly accommodate the media under this principle unless the word "journalists" is defined and quantified. The number of reporters showing up to access vehicles and aircraft would be unannounced, disruptive to security, totally unacceptable, and incompatible with the control necessary in conflict. Does this principle meet benchmark three? For the military, no; for the media, yes. The military portion of this principle might meet benchmark three under the following conditions: it establishes a specific number of media personnel
to travel with a certain size unit; it places that number in its doctrine for automatic commander implementation; and it includes the principle in plans and budgets for funding. In his presentation to members of the Army War College on 3 February 93, Keith Martin, Newscaster, Scranton and Wilkesbarre TV, remarked that a "Televised news conference can be more dangerous than an armored battalion." Clearly the media has a grave and very influential role in successful military operations. DOD must accept this reality and aggressively pursue leadership in media/military relations. Until the DOD and the media clearly define the terms, this principle cannot meet benchmark four or five. Clarification will convert this principle to one that meets all the benchmarks.

Principle eight requires Public Affairs Officers (PAO) to provide communications equipment to the media as available for both shared and independent reports. When equipment is not available, the media may file by any means available. Electromagnetic security may ban certain types of transmissions, as the situation dictates. This principle fails the battlefield applicability benchmark by its reliance on the premise that information must be shared. If reporters are operating independently, the responsibility for transmitting information to the home office becomes their own responsibility. Furthermore, this principle appears unreasonable. If the media is at liberty to use any means available when government facilities are not available, are they then prohibited from using any means
available just because government facilities are available? The military must abandon the notion that the military has some responsibility for interfacing between reporters and their home organizations or other reporters. Pools must not be synonymous with sharing information or military responsibility for communications. Lt. Gen. Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret.) clearly recognized this when he exhorted the military with these words,

Implicit in the military attitude toward the pool is not only its institutional sense of responsibility, but also its lack of understanding of journalists. If the pool is to work better, the services must recognize that they have no obligation to the pool other than to get them to the scene of the action and brief them on the situation.6

This principle also seems to overlook the technological superiority the media generally enjoys over most PAO available facilities. In the future, PAO facilities will probably only hinder the media in their communications efforts. Stephen Aubin agrees. As Deputy Director at the Center for Defense Journalism at Boston University, he wrote,

One aspect of the military-media clash in the Gulf that never received any attention in the press was the media’s technological superiority over the military’s public affairs establishment. From satellite phones to editing equipment, the media outclassed their Coalition minders.41

Can the parties implement this principle without unreasonable preparation and interference? Yes. The principle is so vague, neither side is really responsible for anything specific. Next is the question of enforceability. Here the principle miserably fails the benchmark except for the very specific enforcement of restricting electromagnetic communications systems. Otherwise
the principle lacks specificity. How can the media demand the PAO provide anything when the whole principle begins with, "Consistent with its capabilities...."? In considering the fifth benchmark, I found little that would settle future disputes and avoid confusion. If the military doesn't permit the media to use its own communications in future operations, this principle will probably create more disputes and confusion. Let the media be responsible for its own communications in the next operation.

Principle nine states, "These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system." This principle, like many others, seems to lack purpose and focus. How can principle one apply to principle nine when the standing National Media Pool system is invoked to limit access? One or two people interviewed did not see any inconsistency between principles one and nine. They remarked that principles by their nature are usually broad and inclusive, not exclusive. However, broad principles lead to controversy and argument over intent, which usually occurs in the midst of implementation— the wrong time to discover disagreement. Since this principle simply applies the other eight principles to itself, the benchmark analysis is inappropriate and no further comment is provided.

The news media proposed a principle ten which stated, "News material—words and pictures—will not be subject to prior military security review." This principle speaks of the distrust between the military and the media. Next to access, it is perhaps
the biggest problem between them. In my interview with Joe Galloway, he said that security reviews should be abandoned for good ground rules. He referred to his years in Vietnam where ground rules controlled the media’s activity with extremely few violations. MG Winant Sidle seems to agree with Mr. Galloway. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concerning Desert Shield he said,

If and when the ground war begins.... I recommend that the security review system be replaced by a ground rule system similar to that we used with considerable success in Vietnam. The ground rules should be short and simple.\(^6\)

Not everyone remembers the Vietnam media coverage with the same success. General Westmoreland recalled that a single frame of a burning building might leave the viewer with the impression an entire village was in flaming destruction.\(^6\) Perhaps General Westmoreland saw not the failure of the press to follow ground rules, but the failure of the military to establish adequate ground rules. Based on the disagreement between the military and the media, the security principle does not meet benchmark one. Limited security reviews may gain acceptance but ground rules, not principles, are the most likely vehicle to invoke any type of security review. The principle, if invoked, is most applicable to the battlefield but also the most difficult to monitor during the fog of war. Benchmark three presents problems for both the media and the military. The media sees any security review as interference and the military uses too many people to conduct 100% security reviews. Can both parties enforce the principle?
The answer to this benchmark question lies in the courts. To date, however, the court decision is still unknown. As discussed previously, Desert Storm took us close to one court’s opinion, but the verdict is still unknown. Will the principle settle future disputes and avoid confusion? No, not unless we establish firm policies that are debated and decided in finality. In his portrayal of a possible 1995 military scenario, William A. Rusher vividly illustrates the potential conflict between First Amendment rights and the President’s responsibility as Commander-in-Chief for the safety of the people. He suggests that we should "... face the matter now, and thrash it out as far as possible before the event, or we may find ourselves confronting it someday under far more urgent and much less satisfactory circumstances."

History shows us a future fraught with military conflicts around the globe and periods of unpreparedness as a nation. What it can’t show us, however, are the impacts of our unpreparedness. Only the future will provide those details. But with or without the details, the military must take action now to mitigate the potential effects of the future’s unknowns. One area that requires our immediate action is media coverage of military operations. As discussed previously, the nine or ten principles for battlefield coverage of the US military in combat don’t prepare us for the future. We need simple but direct procedures that are negotiated fully, litigated as necessary, and finalized.
RECOMMENDATIONS

My recommendations will provide only limited detail to illustrate the intent of the recommendation. This lack of detail is obviated by the magnitude of the project and the requirement to negotiate and litigate the procedures with the media, which is far beyond the purpose of this endeavor.

Recommendation 1. The concept of a National Media Pool should be further developed. However, DOD must abandon the part of the concept that combines reporters’ privileges of access with requirements to share products. Pools must be established to determine access only and by the very nature of the media’s coverage of military operations, membership must be limited. DOD must come to grips with a basic question: can DOD limit the number of media personnel that have access to military operations? This recommendation is based on a "yes" answer. Previous discussion showed that most people accept the reality of limited pool membership. Although such limitations would surely be challenged, they are not necessarily fatal to defending against those challenges; nor do they automatically invoke discrimination, which would be contrary to the court’s general direction. Limited membership, based on legitimate and reasonable criteria, is not discriminatory. On the contrary, perhaps deliberate criteria offer the best defense against claims of discrimination. Also, non-pool media organizations could get information from existing, commercially shared products such as API, UPI, Reuters, CNN, etc. Therefore, non-pool organizations
would not be excluded from access to information, only access to the actual operations. The expense of the subscription to those services would probably be less than actual expenses typically associated with sending reporters to military operations. This provides an incentive to utilize those sources versus sending reporters. Including a commercial source of shared information in the media pool would also contribute to satisfying the court's concerns about equal access.

Pools should include two categories of organizations, general and specific. General pools should be larger organizations that have broad based interest audiences over wide geographic areas, i.e., New York Times, USA Today, the major TV networks, and national news magazines. Specific pools would include organizations with specific unit interests, i.e., local papers around military units, both active and reserve/guard. DOD must decide what minimum criteria organizations and reporters must meet to qualify for different pool membership. DOD must develop criteria that can stand court tests of essentiality, reasonableness, and fairness, not necessarily inclusiveness. To meet these tests, the criteria must be based on an analysis of how many and which types of media the military can permit into the military operating area (MOA) without jeopardizing the operation's success. This analysis should be balanced against an analysis of the number and type media personnel needed to adequately inform the American public about military operations. Judgements are essential and expected in this approach. However,
since challenges are probable, the most critical aspect of these analyses are sound and logical bases that can be explained and defended. The criteria should include the reporter’s experience, the organization’s ability to independently process the communications from domestic and overseas locations, the audience size, the reporter’s availability, etc. Perhaps the current criteria for membership in the National Media Pool could serve as a starting point for the membership criteria for the new pools. Ground rules, excluding the requirement to share products, provide the specifics of what can be reported and must also accompany membership criteria. Basic ground rules can and should be developed for general media coverage of all military operations. Additionally, ground rules can be added as required to address unique features of future operations.

DOD would determine limits on the number of reporters accompanying various military units. The number could be based on criteria such as unit mission, mobility, size, structure, and physical demands. If too many news organizations meet the criteria and apply for pool membership, a selection system must be developed. The system need not be exotic; a simple lottery system might well satisfy a fair and reasonable test along with a first amendment challenge. In another option, pool membership might include all organizations that meet the criteria, while the lottery system would decide which organizations go first. The lottery could also determine the order that organizations rotate into the MOA, assuming an extended military operation and a
rotation plan was implemented. Pool membership would not prohibit media organizations from developing individual relationships with specific units, active or reserve/guard. This relationship would be encouraged by the specific media pool concept. Under pre-determined criteria, if specific media organizations worked with individual military units prior to the unit's call up, the media could accompany the unit to the MOA. The unit would plan for and provide the media's support from its own internal resources, ie., food, shelter, transportation, protective gear, and common security. The unit PAO would be the media liaison. The media would supply their own communications links to home offices and pay for unit services rendered. Under this arrangement, the media would commit to staying with the unit for an indefinite time. If more than one local media organization met local pool criteria, a lottery or rotation system could be implemented as in the larger general pool. Also, rotations among different media personnel within the same organization might be possible, as arranged with local units. However, rotations would not be guaranteed, and each unit would limit the number of reporters accompanying the unit at any time.

Although some may criticize this type of system as unmanageable, arbitrary, or subject to local unit abuse, the system can work. Local military/media relations could become a very valuable tool in the next DS/S and more importantly, peace-time operations. The key to a workable local pool system
is still essential, reasonable, and fair membership criteria and selection.

**Recommendation 2.** DOD should not provide any communications links between the media in the MOA and home offices. Today's portable and miniaturized communications systems are available to every serious news organization in the United States. Adequate communications capabilities must be one of the criteria for pool membership, either general or specific. DOD should concentrate on providing access, not communications.

**Recommendation 3.** All military operations should include daily briefings for media members who did not travel with units and are in centralized briefing areas or in the United States. These briefings should be patterned after the briefings of DS/S. In an article for the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Master Gunnery Sergeant Renaldo R. Keene, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.) wrote, "The media may not like them, but briefings and media pools are a valuable and expedient means of releasing accurate information." 65

**Recommendation 4.** Ground rules should be sufficiently specific to clearly show what types of information cannot be publicized. DOD should rely on the media to censor itself under the ground rules. Violators of the ground rules should be subject to removal from the MOA and judicial prosecution, depending on the effects of the violation. Evidence to support prosecutions should be easily obtained from the media's reports. Smaller, more portable, and more powerful equipment combined with...
instantaneous international communications, puts censorship over media reports in the same category as dinosaurs- obsolete! DOD must become more visionary and grasp more realistic and palatable methods to protect military security.

**Recommendation 5.** DOD instructions, publications, directives, and memoranda must include strict requirements that all military OPLANS, CONPLANS, and JOPES contain media utilizations and interface plans. These requirements must be consistent with the implementation of recommendations one through four and DOD must strictly enforce them. Using OPLANS, CONPLANS, and JOPES would test the logistics support for the general and specific media pools, and force the commanders to plan for media presence in the next military operations. Although the DOD Directive 5000 series already requires that commanders prepare and submit military operations Public Affairs plans to ASD(PA), they do not incorporate a requirement to include media personnel in military operations. It appears this omission significantly contributed to the media's criticism of media pools and the subsequent strong discontent and court challenges filed by the media during DS/S.

**Recommendation 6.** DOD should develop eight hour mini-courses to orient the general and specific military media pools in military information. These courses should not be indoctrination courses or in any way attempt to influence the media personnel toward a particular view of the military. Instead, the courses should provide basic organization, mission,
operations, and miscellaneous training to prepare the media for a less intruding and awkward relationship with the military. Members of both the general and specific media pools would get the same basic courses, and specific pools would get another course or two from the specific unit they would cover. DOD could develop the general information for the courses. The courses could then become one of the media pool membership criteria. Specific units could develop the specific information courses, subject to DOD approval, which could also be included in the specific media pool membership criteria.

**Recommendation 7.** All military personnel should receive recurring training about military/media relations. The level and detail of the training would be commensurate with the rank of the individual. History has shown us that the media will always report something, if reporters don’t know the facts, they will report rumors, speculation, unconfirmed reports, or whatever is available. The military must recognize this unique aspect of the media and prepare its members to become the credibility factor in the media’s military coverage. Although DOD and individual services have begun some training and are on the right path, the program must be expanded immediately. The world situation promises that U.S. forces will remain involved in various military operations around the world including peace keeping, peace making, relief operations, dispute settlements, etc.

**Recommendation 8.** The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) should develop a palletized logistics box that contains all the
necessary supplies and equipment to manage theater military/media interface for non-members of the media pools. The JIB could manage daily briefings; assist non-pool media personnel as time permitted; and serve as central administration point for information on pool membership, locations, type media, etc. If the media pools are developed as recommended in this paper, the JIB and its support pallet could be small. The JIB would simply load up and move out with any military operation involving the media pools. Don Kirchoffner, former PAO, suggested a palletized "JIB in a Box". The idea has merit and was strongly endorsed by some of his colleagues.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the past, analyzed the present, and proposed the future military/media relationship and policies. The examination of the past is factual; the analysis of the present is subjective; and the proposal for the future is speculative and maybe unrealistic to some. However, the current media pool system and DOD media policies for military operations coverage have failed, and a different way of doing business with the media is sorely needed.

The recommendations in this paper offer something different. They offer a chance to define, adjudicate, and adopt access limitations for reporters that will be based on court rulings and constitutional clarity. DOD must seize this window of opportunity between major military operations to address the problems between the military and the media. In an address to a
group of officers at the USAWC on 15 January 93, MG Charles W. McClain said, "The real danger of military media relations is a failure of services to get their story to the American public."

Continued disputes over access clearly interferes with both the military's and media's desire to inform the public. It's time to settle the dispute!

This report does not purport that the task is easy, but that it is possible; not that the answers are apparent, but that they exist; not that the proposals won't be challenged, but that they can be supported; not that everyone will agree, but that the dispute can be settled; and finally, not that relations will be perfect, but that they will be better.
APPENDIX 1
Statement of Combat Coverage Principles

We believe these principles should govern future arrangements for news coverage of the United States military in combat:

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special Operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles will apply as well to the operation of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

Note: News organizations and the military could not agree on a principle, proposed by the news organizations, regarding security review. The news organizations wanted the following: "News material -- words and pictures -- will not be subject to security review." The Pentagon proposed a principle that said:
"Military operational security may require review of news material for conformance to reporting ground rules." An impasse resulted.
APPENDIX 2
Recommendations of the Sidle Panel

Recommendation 1:
That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with operational planning. This can be assured in the great majority of cases by implementing the following:

a. Review all joint planning documents to assure that JCS guidance in public affairs matters is adequate.

b. When sending implementing orders to Commanders-in-Chiefs in the field, direct CINC planners to include considerations of public information aspects.

c. Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) of an impending military operation at the earliest possible time. This information should appropriately come from the Secretary of Defense.

d. Complete the plan, currently being studied, to include a public affairs planning cell in the OJCS to help ensure adequate public affairs review of CINC plans.

Recommendation 2:
When it becomes necessary during military operational planning that news media pooling provides the only feasible means of furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning should provide for the largest possible press pool that is practical and minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before "full coverage" is feasible.

Recommendation 3:
That, in connection with use of pools, the Joint Chiefs of staff recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he study whether to use a pre-established and constantly updated accreditation or notification list of correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool is required or the establishment of news agency list for use in the same circumstances.

Recommendation 4:
That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and issued by the military. These rules should be as few as possible and should be worked out during the planning process for each operation. Violations would mean exclusion of the correspondents(s) concerned from further coverage of the operation.

Recommendation 5:
Public Affairs planning for military operations should include sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel whose function is to assist correspondents in covering the operation adequately.
Recommendation 6:
Planners should carefully consider media communication requirements to insure the earliest feasible availability. However, these communications must not interfere with combat and combat support operations. If necessary and feasible, plans should include communications facilities dedicated to the news media.

Recommendation 7:
Planning factors should include provision for intro and inter-theater transportation support of the media.

Recommendation 8:
To improve media-military understanding and cooperation:

a. CJCS should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that a program be undertaken by ASD(PA) for top military public affairs representatives to meet with news organization leadership, to include meetings with individual news organizations, on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises. This program should begin as soon as possible.

b. Enlarge programs already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction in service school, to include media participation when possible.

c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through more visits by commanders and line officers to new organizations.

d. CJCS should recommend that the Secretary of Defense host at an early date a working meeting with representatives of the broadcast news media to explore the special problems of ensuring military security when and if there is a real-time or near real-time news media audiovisual coverage of a battlefield and, if special problems exist, how they can best be dealt with consistent with the basic principle set forth at the beginning of this section of the report.

The panel members fully support the statement of principle and the supporting recommendations listed above and so indicate by their signatures below: signed

Winant Sidle, Major General, USA, Retired, Chairman
Brent Baker, Captain, USN
Keyes Beech
Scott M. Cutlip
John T. Halbert
Billy Hunt
George Kirschenbauer, Colonel, USA

Fred Lash, Major, USMC
James Major, Captain, USN
Wendell S. Merick
Robert O’Brien, Colonel, USAF
Richard S. Salant
Barry Zorthian
A.J. Langguth
APPENDIX 3
Recommendations of the Hoffman Report

1. The Secretary of Defense should issue a policy directive, to be circulated throughout the Department and the Armed Services, stating explicitly his official sponsorship of the media pool and requiring full support for it. That policy statement should make it clear to all that the pool must be given every assistance to report combat by US troops from the start of operations.

2. All operational plans drafted by the Joint Staff must have an annex spelling out measure to assure that the pool will move with the lead elements of US forces and cover the earliest sages of operations. This principle should be incorporated in overall public affairs plans.

3. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should closely monitor development of operation-related public affairs plans to assure they fulfill all requirements for pool coverage. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public affairs (ASD-PA) should review all such plans. In advance of military action, those plans should be briefed to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with the operation plans.

Public affairs staff officers and key staff personnel representing policy offices, such as International Security Affairs, should be brought into the planning process at the very earliest stage. The practice of keeping key staff officers with high security clearances out of the planning process in order to limit access to sensitive information should be followed only sparingly and eliminated where possible.

4. In the run-up to a military operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should send out a message ordering all commanders to give full cooperation to the media pool and its escorts. This requirement should be spelled out unambiguously and should reach down through all echelons in the chain of command. Such a message should make clear that necessary resources, such as helicopters, ground vehicles, communications equipment, etc., must be earmarked specifically for pool use, that the pool must have ready access to the earliest action, and that the safety of the pool reporters must not be used as a reason to keep the pool from the action.

5. The ASD-PA must be prepared to weigh in aggressively with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman where necessary to overcome any secrecy or other obstacles blocking prompt deployment of a pool to the scene of action.

6. After a pool has been deployed the ASD-PA must be kept informed in a timely fashion of any hitches that may arise. He must be prepared to act immediately, to contact the JCS Chairman, the Joint Staff Director of Operations, obstacles to the pool. The ASD-PA should call on the Defense Secretary for help as needed.
7. The ASD-PA should study a proposal by several of the Panama poolers that further pools deploy in two sections. The first section would be very small and would include only reporters and photographers. The second section, coming later, would bring in supporting gear, such as satellite uplink equipment.

8. The national media pool should never again be herded as a single unwieldy unit. It should be broken up after arriving at the scene of action to cover a wider spectrum of the story and then be reassembled periodically to share the reporting results.

9. The pool should be exercised at least once during each quarterly rotation with airborne and other types of military units most likely to be sent on emergency combat missions.

10. During deployments, there should be regular briefings for pool news people by senior operations officers so the poolers will have an up-to-date and complete overview of the progress of an operation they are covering.

11. There is an urgent need for restructuring of the organization which has the responsibility for handling pool distribution. The ASD-PA must assure that there is adequate staffing and enough essential equipment to handle the task. The Director of Plans, so long as he has this responsibility, should clearly assign contingency duties among his staff to ensure timely handling of reports from the pool. Staffers from the Administration Office, Community Relations, and other divisions of Office of the ASD-PA should be mobilized to help in such a task as needed.

12. The ASD-PA should give serious consideration to a suggestion by some of the pool members to create a new pool slot for an editor who would come to the Pentagon during a deployment to lend professional journalism help to the staff officers handling pool reports. Such a pool editor could expedite distribution of the reports.

13. The pool escorting system needs overhauling as well. There is no logical reason for the Washington-based escorts to be drawn from the top of the Office of the ASD-PA Plans Division. The head of that division should remain in Washington to oversee getting out the pool products.

Pool escorts should be drawn from the most appropriate service, rather than limiting escort duty to officers of the Plans Division. The individual armed service public affairs offices should be required to assign military officers to the pool on a contingency basis. For example, if it's an Army operation, the escorts should be primarily Army officers. In the Panama deployment the three Washington-based escorts wore Air Force and Navy uniforms in what was an overwhelmingly Army operation.

Escorts should deploy in field uniforms or draw them from field commands soon after arriving. The Panama pool escorts wore uniforms befitting a day behind the desk at the Pentagon; this, I found, had a jarring effect on the Army people with whom it dealt.
14. The ASD-PA should close a major gap in the current system by requiring all pool participant organizations—whether print, still photo, TV, or radio—to share all pool products with all elements of the news industry. Pool participants must understand they represent the entire industry.

Any pool participant refusing to share with all legitimate requesters should be dropped from the pool and replaced by another organization that agrees to abide by time-honored pool practices.

15. There is merit in a suggestion by one of the pool photographers that participating news organizations share the cost of equipment such as a portable darkroom and a negative transmitter, which could be stored at Andrews AFB for ready access in a deployment. Other equipment essential for smooth transmission of pool products, such as satellite uplink gear, might also be acquired and stored in the same manner.

16. All pool-assigned reporters and photographers, not just bureau chiefs, should attend quarterly Pentagon sessions where problems can be discussed and rules and responsibilities understood.

17. Public Affairs Officers from Unified Commands should meet periodically with pool-assigned reporters and photographers with whom they might have to work in some future crisis.
APPENDIX 4
Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules and
Supplementary Guidelines - 7 January 1991

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multi-battalion," "multi-division," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information or photography, including aerial and satellite pictures, that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be dateline, "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless DOD has publicly acknowledged participation by that country.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security and lives. This would include unit designation, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air ops angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.
(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition nits, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

Guideline for News Media

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night operations - Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

You must remain with our military escort at all times, until released, and follow their instructions regarding your activities. These instructions are not intended to hinder your reporting. They are intended to facilitate movement, ensure safety, and protect operational security.

For new media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for explanation of pool operations.

(2) If you are unable to withstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with the forward deployed forces, you will be medically evacuated out of the area.

(3) Security at the source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to security review prior to release to determine if they contain information that would jeopardize an operation or the security of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will not be withheld just because it is embarrassing or contains criticism. The public affairs officer on the scene will conduct the security review. However, if a conflict arises, the product will be expeditiously sent to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director. If not agreement can be reached, the product will be expeditiously forwarded to OASD (PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value.
of the photograph, film or videotape. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified through the JIB Dhahran.
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multi-battalion," "multi-division," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information or photography, including aerial and satellite pictures, that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming "from the Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be dateline, "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security and lives. This would include unit designation, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air ops angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition nits, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

Guideline for News Media

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night operations - Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with our public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.W. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. New media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools.

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, new media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD (PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.
ENDNOTES


2Ibid., 2–3.


4Ibid., 332–333.

5Ibid., 338.


7Ibid., 249.


10Mott, 619.

11Ibid., 626.

12Emery, 330–331.

13Knightley, 124.

14Mott, 766–767.

15Knightley, 315.

16Knightley, 316.

17Mott, 764.

18Knightley, 323.

19Knightley, 324.

20Knightley, 333.

21Knightley, 337.

22Emery, 346.
23Rowland, 30-31.

24Knightley, 403.


26Knightley, 376-377.


39Williams, 14-15.
40Gannett, 18-20.
41Trainor, 23-24.
43The Media at War, p. 23.
44Gannett, 23.
49Metcalf, 170-171.
50Ibid., 170.
51Smith, 413.
52Ibid., 413.
53Ibid., 107.
55Matthews, 107.
56Smith, 413.
57Ibid., 19.
58Tom Bowman, Harrisburg Patriot News, Telephonic Interview with author, 26 Jan 93.
59Georgie Anne Geyer, "Gulf Analysis has been Skewed," Harrisburg Patriot News, 20 Jan 92.


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