The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAREUR
COMMAND CHALLENGES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM G. DOYNE
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

USAWC CLASS OF 1993
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93 10552
The world has changed drastically during the last decade and Europe has unquestionably been an epicenter of change. Similarly, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) has been an epicenter for change in the Army. This paper discusses change as realities and focuses on drawdown in Europe, the reorganization of military communities (MILCOM) into area support groups (ASG) and base support battalions (BSB), USAREUR training considerations, NATO vs. regional operations and USAREUR personnel strength. The drawdown was a juncture in the history of USAREUR. It was the effect of a myriad of causes and the cause of a significant number of subsequent events -- some complete and some still ongoing. The drawdown is vital to comprehending the origins of the current
environment and will probably be repeated. Hence, understanding the drawdown philosophy, the level of detail and leader involvement, and the standards of the process will assist future commanders and staff officers prepare for their assignments. The transition from MILCOMs to ASGs/BSBs was a drastic change in the way base operations (BASOPS) and life support is accomplished in USAREUR. It has had an effect on almost every aspect of a soldier's life and has achieved the efficiencies for which it was designed. Understanding the nature of the organizations and the systems involved will enhance the performance of future commanders and staff officers. For future challenging task they'll face but unquestionably the most rewarding. Simulations will be an integral part of USAREUR training. In light of constrained resources, there will be little time for experimentation, making mentoring and tutoring more critical than ever. When the bipolar world of the US and the USSR dissolved, and the threat diminished in size but grew in scope, the national strategy, as well as USAREUR's mission and focus, and staff officers is to understand the nuances of the new NATO orientations and the nature of regional operations. USAREUR as a Priority three unit can no longer count on being kept filled to 100 percent to 102 percent assigned strength. As a result, personnel will also have to be intensely managed. Understanding these aspects of change will significantly lower the slope of the learning curve for those officers being assigned to USAREUR.
UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAREUR COMMAND CHALLENGES
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel William G. Doyne
United States Army
Dr. J. W. Williams
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

UNCLASSIFIED
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: William G. Doyne, LTC, USA

TITLE: USAREUR Command Challenges

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The world has changed drastically during the last decade and Europe has unquestionably been an epicenter of change. Similarly, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) has been an epicenter for change in the Army. This paper discusses change as realities and focuses on drawdown in Europe, the reorganization of military communities (MILCOM) into area support groups (ASG) and base support battalions (BSB), USAREUR training considerations, NATO vs. regional operations and USAREUR personnel strength. The drawdown was a juncture in the history of USAREUR. It was the effect of a myriad of causes and the cause of a significant number of subsequent events -- some complete and some still ongoing. The drawdown is vital to comprehending the origins of the current environment and will probably be repeated. Hence, understanding the drawdown philosophy, the level of detail and leader involvement, and the standards of the process will assist future commanders and staff officers prepare for their assignments. The transition from MILCOMs to ASGs/BSBs was a drastic change in the way base operations (BASOPS) and life support is accomplished in USAREUR. It has had an effect on almost every aspect of a soldier's life and has achieved the efficiencies for which it was designed. Understanding the nature of the organizations and the systems involved will enhance the performance of future commanders and staff officers. For future USAREUR commanders and staff officers, training will be the most challenging task they'll face but unquestionably the most rewarding. Simulations will be an integral part of USAREUR training. In light of constrained resources, there will be little time for experimentation, making mentoring and tutoring more critical than ever. When the bipolar world of the US and the USSR dissolved, and the threat diminished in size but grew in scope, the national strategy, as well as USAREUR's mission and focus, became more complex. The challenge for future USAREUR commanders and staff officers is to understand the nuances of the new NATO orientations and the nature of regional operations. USAREUR as a Priority Three unit can no longer count on being kept filled to 100 to 102+ percent assigned strength. As a result, personnel will also have to be intensely managed. Understanding these aspects of change will significantly lower the slope of the learning curve for those officers being assigned to USAREUR.
Although the world has never remained constant, there have been very few periods when the world has changed so drastically in so many ways as during the last half decade. Events have occurred that just a decade ago were considered highly improbable if not impossible. Change has occurred throughout the world but Europe has unquestionably been an epicenter of change. During this period, Europe has witnessed the Soviet release of control of East Germany, the subsequent unification of the two Germanies, and its associated strain on the German economy, the disintegration of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, and the resultant East European instability. European nationalism reemerged along with new economic, political, and military alliances and organizations.

With Europe an epicenter of politico-military change, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) has been an epicenter for change in the Army. Ever since the reduction of tensions between the US and the USSR, but especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall, USAREUR has been in a tremendous state of flux. For those soldiers who were in Germany before but left prior to 1989 and those who have never been in Germany, USAREUR is an absolutely different world. The purpose of this paper is to discuss change as realities that new or incoming commanders or staff officers must understand as they prepare to assume their command or staff positions. This discussion will focus on the drawdown in Europe, the reorganization of military communities (MILCOM) into area support groups (ASG) and base support battalions (BSB), USAREUR training considerations, NATO vs. regional operations, and
USAREUR personnel strength.

**DRAWDOWN IN EUROPE**

By the start of FY 93, turmoil caused by the drawdown in Europe was essentially over, but the residual effects will be apparent for some time. I will present a great deal of detail for several reasons. The current organizations, locations, and level of equipment fills are direct results of the drawdown. Moreover, the story of the drawdown shows the US Army at its peacetime best. Though less visible than the concurrent events in Southwest Asia, the drawdown was a gut wrenching, challenging, unpleasant mission. Having said this, it was a mission superbly executed through outstanding planning, preparation and execution by professional officers, noncommissioned officers (NCO), soldiers, and civilian employees. Considering that the focus of the initial drawdown was to reduce USAREUR to a personnel strength of 92.2K by FY 95 and that it is now being discussed to further reduce USAREUR to a personnel strength of 65K by FY 97, the potential for further troop cuts in Europe and USAREUR is extremely high. It is safe to assume that the drawdown philosophy, commander's intent, and the situation within the drawdown battalions will remain nearly the same. Hence, it is crucial that future USAREUR commanders and staff officers understand the magnitude of the mission, the level of detail required, the expected guidance, and the performance standard previously established.

Understanding the genesis of the drawdown is an essential
first step to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the drawdown mission. The drawdown in Europe resulted from a combination of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement, fiscal constraints and changing environment, requirements, and missions. The objectives of CFE are to establish a secure, stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large scale offensive actions. The treaty deals with Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) and established NATO TLE ceilings at 20K main battle tanks (M1A1 - M47), 20K artillery pieces (M30, MLRS - M110), 30K armored carrier vehicles (M2, M3, M113), and 2K combat helicopters (AH64, AH1, OH58). CFE involves detailed record keeping and being constantly ready for both scheduled and surprise inspections. In concert with the reductions necessary to meet CFE requirements was the reduction to the FY 95 USAREUR personnel end strength requirement of 92.2K established by the US leadership to meet budget cuts and personnel ceilings. All of these factors translated into a personnel reduction of 120.8K from the FY 90 personnel end strength of 213K in USAREUR to the 92.2K in FY 95.

In order to accomplish the mission, USAREUR developed its drawdown philosophy and a detailed plan for a gradual reduction of generally equal increments from 1991 to 1995. The tenets of the USAREUR reduction philosophy are as shown in Table I. The drawdown began according to plan with the Increment 1 drawdown
units being notified in September 1989 with an E-date (effective date of everything and everybody in the unit to be gone) of 1 March 1990. At that point, two events caused the plan to change. The first was the transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm and the associated requirement to deploy forces from USAREUR to Southwest Asia (SWA). The second was that the requirement to meet the 92.2K ceiling was accelerated from FY 95 to FY 93. The acceleration was driven by the Army budget shortfall and the need to take advantage of paying for the drawdown from other projects. It severely stretched USAREUR capabilities and systems -- for example, logistic units' capabilities to keep up with the accelerated equipment turn in and all systems' abilities to handle the accelerated installation turn over. In addition, the drawdown sequencing had to be adjusted to maintain synchronization with all the other drawdown pieces. Since the VII (US) Corps deployed to SWA, the V (US) Corps became the headquarters primarily concerned with the drawdown. For V Corps, the impact of the acceleration on the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table I USAREUR REDUCTION PHILOSOPHY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Release facilities to the German government (as opposed to local governments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Retain best quality of life facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Retain local training areas (LTA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Protect major training areas (MTA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Hohenfels Training Area (HTA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Grafenwoehr Training Area (GTA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- Wildflecken Training Area (WTA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Keep needed government housing within commuting distance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
number of battalions and spaces is shown in Table II. In addition, some drawdown units were designated to deploy to SWA -- a fact that caused the schedule to change.

By December 1989, almost every USAREUR unit was in a state of flux. Units were in the process of drawing down, deploying to SWA, supporting the SWA deployment, preparing to move to a different installation, preparing to be reflagged, receiving people and equipment from drawdown units, or a combination of several of these actions. For example, V Corps drew down 55 battalions and 54 companies, moved 18 battalions and 25 companies within USAREUR, rotated 4 battalions and 33 companies back to the continental United States (CONUS) as EC3 units and reorganized 18 battalions and 33 companies. In addition, V Corps closed 188 of its 386 installations.

Upon receipt of the mission to stand down, the drawdown unit had to completely reorient and refocus on the new mission. Even if the parent division and brigade were eventually going to draw down, until announced their primary focus was on warfighting, with drawdown as a minor focus. An example was the 1st Brigade of

### Table II DRAWDOWN - Post Desert Storm Plan (Accelerated Plan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>FY 91</th>
<th>FY 92</th>
<th>FY 93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Bn (8 Bn)</td>
<td>35 Bn (49 Bn)</td>
<td>17 Bn (3 Bn)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Co (1 Co)</td>
<td>31 Co (44 Co)</td>
<td>39 Co (26 Co)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPACES</th>
<th>FY 91</th>
<th>FY 92</th>
<th>FY 93</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,245 (5,245)</td>
<td>25,755 (36,833)</td>
<td>16,201 (5,123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the 8th Infantry Division (8th ID), which was scheduled to stand down in FY 92. The brigade had the 5th Battalion 8th Infantry (5-8 In) and the 1st Battalion 68th Armor (1-68 Ar) drawing down as Increment 1 drawdown units and the 4-34 Ar deploying to SWA with the 3rd Armor Division (3rd AD). At same time, the brigade deployed to a gunnery density at Grafenwoehr Training Area (GTA) with the 3-8 In and the 2-32 Ar (attached from the 3rd AD) and then served as the opposing force (OPFOR) at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) for the other brigades of 8th ID. The requirement for the higher headquarters to have the primary focus of warfighting essentially left the designated drawdown battalion commander in charge of his drawdown. The drawdown mission required a new mission statement, a new mission essential task list (METL), and a detailed plan. Merely successfully meeting the E-date did not define success. The drawdown battalion commander had to also meet the V Corps commander’s intent, which included the following:

* Troops must understand reductions are because of success and victory in the Cold War, not poor performance!
* Commanders must provide factual and timely information/guidance.
* German officials must receive prior notification, in order not to be surprised.
* Chain of command must speak with one voice and not provide conflicting information.
* Commanders must understand that builddown is a mission, which requires detailed planning and disciplined, high standard execution.
* Departing/transferring soldiers and family members must be treated with dignity and respect.
* Commanders must prepare equipment/facilities for subsequent use/turn over.

The drawdown battalion commander had 180 days to complete the
mission according to the schedule of 30 days for planning, 120
days for execution, and 30 days to close out."

To appreciate the magnitude of the battalion commander’s
task, it is beneficial to examine a typical mechanized infantry
battalion at E-date minus 180. The authorized strength is 838. Of
the 838, 249 are married and have their families with them in
Germany (accompanied). The remaining 589 are single or
unaccompanied and living in the barracks. The 249 accompanied
soldiers have 249 spouses, some of whom are also soldiers and who
may or may not be on a joint domicile assignment. These 249
soldiers also have 590 family members. Of the 249 spouses, 50 are
foreign nationals. Among the family members and foreign national
spouses, there is a percentage who require immigration papers and
may or may not have the documentation necessary to get passports
and/or visas. Also of the 249 spouses, 99 are working. Some of
the working spouses are critical to both the community and the
drawdown and five of the 249 spouses are pregnant. Both of these
situations affect port calls and departure dates. Of the 838
authorized, 527 are eligible for permanent change of station
(PCS). The other 311 are required to make an intratheater
transfer (ITT) or request a consecutive overseas tour (COT)."
Thus, the various conditions set up complex, highly individual
sets of demands on the commander and his staff. Associated with
the personnel move, the commander must also orchestrate the
shipment of 2.7 million pounds of household goods and 342
privately owned vehicles (POV), the proper disposition of 99 non-
shippable POVs, and the shipment of 25 pets (from snakes to birds). In addition, the commander must clear 25 buildings, turn in 11K family housing items, 3K unaccompanied housing furniture items, 2K domestic appliances, 200 food service equipment items from the dining facility; inventory and transfer or ship 10K - 12K pieces of MTO&E equipment and 5K pieces of installation property to as many as 450 receiving agencies. In order to meet both the E-date and the commander’s intent, these actions required a tremendous level of detailed planning and synchronized execution by leaders at every level, and a transition of focus from groups/systems to micromanagement of item-level details.

This picture describes the typical mechanized infantry battalion that stayed in Germany. Another type battalion was the "touch-and-go" units, which created still more, non-standard situations to handle. Touch-and-go units were the units that were identified for drawdown but deployed to SWA. Some of these battalions left their equipment in SWA. They then redeployed back to Germany and completed drawdown but without the MTO&E equipment turn in. Other battalions returned and went through the entire process as described. Still others had to move to another installation as a result of installation closure, consolidation and/or a change in command and control headquarters. For example, 1st Brigade 3rd AD in Kirchgeons and 3rd Brigade 3rd AD in Friedberg combined and drew down to a three battalion brigade of the 1st AD as part of 8th ID until the division flag changed from 8th ID to 1st AD.
The drawdown of 1 corps, 2 divisions, 1 armored cavalry regiment (ACR), 2 division forwards, 1 engineer and 1 ordnance brigade (or battalion equivalents) equates to a tremendous amount of change, stress and turbulence. Table III gives a sense of the scale of this change.12

The drawdown was a juncture in the history of USAREUR. It was the effect of CFE, of fiscal constraints, and of the changing environment, requirements, and mission. But the drawdown was also the cause of a significant number of subsequent events -- some complete and some still ongoing. Thus, it is vital to understand the drawdown in order to comprehend the origins of the current environment. More importantly, the drawdown is germane to future USAREUR commanders and staff officers because the drawdown will probably be repeated in the near future. During the first round of drawdowns, there was a great deal of trial and error. As the lessons of the drawdown process were learned, they were passed on to the next drawdown increment commanders during the CINCUSAREUR drawdown briefings. As a result, the drawdown process was a maturation process of gradual refinements rather than a series of changes. The current more senior USAREUR commanders were directly
involved in the process. "The standard" was the final product. Thus, future USAREUR commanders and staff officers probably will not have the luxury of experimentation because, although it will be a new process to them, to USAREUR it will be Round Two -- merely picking the process up where it was left at the end of Round One. Hence understanding the drawdown philosophy, the level of detail and leader involvement, and the standards of the process is vital to future commanders and staff officers who will be involved in the process again. Other commanders may have the multiple focuses of warfighting, realignment of command and control headquarters, and/or relocation to another installation.

**AREA SUPPORT GROUPS (ASG) AND BASE SUPPORT BATTALIONS (BSB)**

The transition from military communities to ASGs and BSBs resulted in a quantum change in base operations (BASOPS) and life support in USAREUR. As a result, future USAREUR commanders and staff officers must understand the derivation and nature of these organizations and their associated systems in order to have a foundation upon which they are able to base their expectations as well as to fathom the current environment and constraints.

Prior to the drawdown and its associated base closures, the organization responsible for administering the American enclaves in Germany was the military community (MILCOM). The MILCOM was responsible for the normal day to day activities necessary to sustain the soldiers and their families living in Germany. The MILCOM was responsible for the services provided by the post exchange (PX) and the commissary, government housing and
furniture, school buses, transportation of personnel and household goods, etc. The USAREUR deputy commander in chief (DCINC), the corps deputy commanding generals (DCG), and assistant division commanders (ADC) were ordinarily responsible for the MILCOMs. For example, in the 8th ID, one ADC was the Mainz MILCOM commander; the other ADC was the Baumholder MILCOM commander. In the 3rd AD, one ADC was the Giessen MILCOM commander, while the brigade commanders in Friedberg and Kirchgeons were the subcommunity commanders for their respective communities within the Giessen MILCOM. The two corps, through their DCGs, provided guidance and resources to their MILCOMs. As a result, essentially all tactical commanders from brigade through corps were involved in base operations (BASOPS). Because commanders rotated in and out of Germany so frequently, the MILCOMs grew into top heavy bureaucracies and entities unto themselves. The continuity and management were provided by officers and NCOs who had spent too much time in this environment, and by civilians who had worked in the MILCOMs forever. Neither group was very receptive to change or sensitive to the soldiers' needs.

As the drawdown proceeded, the MILCOM system became unmanageable. In addition, due to constraints, both in people and dollars, MILCOMs became too expensive. As a response, USAREUR developed the Community Command Plan (CCP). The CCP objectives are listed in Table IV.13

In order to meet the CCP objectives, to gain the
Table IV CCP OBJECTIVES

1. Consolidate/eliminate redundant functions, personnel and equipment across the theater.

2. Convert TDA (MILCOMs) structure to MTOE structure (ASG/BSB) to preserve military personnel & equipment authorizations, & operating dollars.

3. Realign support requirements based on USAREUR force deployments at Drawdown/Restationing/CFE end state.

required efficiencies, and to take the tactical commanders out of the BASOPS function, USAREUR established Area Support Groups (ASG) and Base Support Battalions (BSB). BSBs, with significant internal modifications, replaced the old MILCOMs at the installation level, while ASGs were totally new structures. Doctrinally, an ASG is "a logistics headquarters in the theater rear area (COMMZ) which commands and controls assigned and attached units. An ASG's mission is based on service support needs of the units in the theater, and it provides support in a geographic area, based on population." In USAREUR, ASGs are brigade sized headquarters that command and control clusters of BSBs and are responsible for providing policy, guidance and resources to the BSBs, which are the operators. ASGs and BSBs are commanded by centrally-selected command-designated colonels and lieutenant colonels respectively.

There are 12 ASGs and 26 BSBs in Europe with seven ASGs in USAREUR. Five of the seven ASGs are in the V Corps footprint. The V Corps ASGs are the 53rd ASG in Bad Kruznach, the 98th ASG in Wurzburg, the 99th ASG in Nurnberg, the 103rd ASG in
Frankfurt, and the 104th ASG in Hanau. As an example of the span of control and responsibility, it is worth looking at the 98th and 99th ASGs. The 98th ASG has the 280th BSB which is responsible for Schweinfurt and Bad Kissingen and the 417th BSB which is responsible for Wurzburg, Giebelstadt, Kitzingen, and Wertheim. The 99th ASG has four BSBs. The 235th BSB is responsible for Ansbach, Crailsheim, Illesheim, and Schwabisch Hall. The 236th BSB is responsible for Augsburg, Munich, and Garmisch. The 279th BSB is responsible for Bamberg, and the 416th BSB is responsible for Nurnberg, Erlangen, Furth, and Zirndorf.

On the macro level, all ASGs and BSBs are essentially the same. On the micro level, they are structured to meet the particular needs and requirements of their geographical area, as the 98th ASG’s mission statement shows:

The 98th ASG provides command and control of assigned units and community support on an area basis. On order of CINCUSAREUR, 98th ASG: deploys tenant units; transitions communities; receives and/or provides onward movement support for reinforcing forces; provides area support in theater. On order of CINCUSAREUR, within a specified number of days of notification, 98 ASG deploys to contingency area of operations and provides area support to US forces.

The 98th ASG commander’s daily focus is quality of life and training support, but his major functions are shown in Table V.

The ASG commander’s command and control system is split between the senior tactical commander and USAREUR. USAREUR is the ASG’s functional headquarters, administrative and reporting higher headquarters, and the source of guidance and resources. The ASG directorate counterparts are on the USAREUR staff with
Table V ASG MAJOR FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engineering and Housing</th>
<th>Training Area Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>Fleet NTV Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>In and Out Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation Services</td>
<td>Religious Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Base Ops Resourcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Management</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Training Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Opportunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the DCINC having primary responsibility for the community command plan (CCP). The senior tactical commander influences the system as the ASG commander’s rater and the BSB commander’s senior rater. Although the exact relationship is a function of the personalities involved, normally the senior tactical commander stays out of the nuts and bolts of the BASOPS function but maintains overwatch on the quality of life and other aspects that directly affect soldiers and their families. Thus the ASG commander receives guidance and resources from USAREUR, translates them into policy within the ASG in accordance with the peculiarities of the area and the senior tactical commander’s intent. The ASG commander then propagates the policy to the BSB commanders for execution. For example, USAREUR guidance might be that money for civilian salaries must be cut equating to x number of positions. USAREUR will not say cut x number of kitchen police (KP). The ASG commander must decide how to implement the cuts. If his solution is to cut x number of KPs, he will go to the senior tactical commander because the cut will affect soldiers. If his
solution is to consolidate the Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) and Directorate of Logistics (DOL) motor pools, he may not involve the senior tactical commander. General Keller, the CG of 3rd ID and senior tactical commander of the 98th ASG, has a semiannual meeting of all his tactical commanders (down to battalion) and all his ASG and BSB commanders. At this meeting, they exchange information and provide each other feedback. The commanders rate a series of quality of life issues as red, amber or green. They set priorities and agree on expenditures. If USAREUR money is not available, General Keller can provide additional funds to meet the agreed upon requirements.

The benefits reaped from the CCP have been tremendous. There is now a clear chain of command for the BASOPS function and commanders whose sole purpose is BASOPS. The system is resourced centrally by USAREUR so all ASGs are resourced according to a common standard. Tactical commanders are involved with ASG commanders -- not as an additional duty but rather with the same relationship that they have with their subordinate tactical commanders. The CCP streamlined the BASOPS system and made it more efficient by eliminating bureaucracy and redundancies, reducing the cost of doing business and clearly fixing responsibilities. More importantly, without the ASGs and BSBs, the reorganization of facilities and installations as a result of the drawdown would have had a negative impact on the quality of life. Tactical commanders and BASOPS commanders are proud of the fact that the quality of life in USAREUR is the best it has ever
been. The drawdown left only the best facilities and sufficient equipment to fully stock them. One aspect that has changed is convenience. Prior to the drawdown, every installation had some facilities, perhaps not the best but usually conveniently close. Now the best facilities are available, perhaps not as convenient but always within 45 to 60 minutes. Another aspect is the lack of funding for the niceties that were common before the drawdown. For example, most installations and housing areas used to have contracted grounds maintenance for the common areas. Now commanders will have to provide this service either directly or through borrowed military manpower (BMM).

Thus, this transition from MILCOMs to 3Gs/BSBs was a drastic change from the way BASOPS and life support used to be accomplished in USAREUR. It has had an effect on almost every aspect of a soldier’s life in USAREUR. The transition has achieved the efficiencies for which it was designed. It fixed responsibility for BASOPS to a commander and took the tactical commanders out of the direct involvement of the BASOPS function. As with any system/process, future USAREUR commanders and staff officers must understand the nature of the organizations and the systems derived from the CCP in order make it work effectively and efficiently. In addition, they must base their expectations on the current environment and constraints and realize that cooperation, effective communication and exchange of information will be the key to success from the BASOPS perspective.

TRAINING

16
Training to win on the battlefield is still the highest priority in USAREUR. The USAREUR challenge has been to adapt the training strategy to a highly dynamic environment. Most recently, the training environment has been influenced by increasingly stringent environmental constraints; ever changing technologies, involving both modernization of equipment and sophistication of simulations and simulators; uncertain adversaries; and most importantly, limited resources available for training. In order to decrease the slope of their learning curves, future commanders and staff officers must understand this dynamic environment and the adaptations that have been initiated and that are under development. Therefore, this section will discuss the USAREUR training strategy and its components.

Increasing weapons system technologies and capabilities argue for more sophisticated, longer-range complexes. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that with "the change in the political climate, the host nation population can no longer readily accept the need for the noise and inconvenience of large scale troop training." The USAREUR training strategy has four components: local training areas (LTA), maneuver rights areas (MRA), simulations/simulators, and major training areas (MTA). The trend has always been toward more efficient ways to use these components to effectively train. Because of the change in political climate and the tighter budget, USAREUR was compelled to more quickly adapt its training strategy. USAREUR needed to minimize the impact of training on host nation sensitivities, to
upgrade ranges, to integrate battle simulations and simulators into fire and maneuver training, to train intensely to meet short notice contingencies, and above all, to maximize the amount of training for each dollar spent. This set of requirements translates into a program that accomplishes individual, crew, squad, and platoon train up at home station LTAs; executes crew, squad, platoon and company team gunnery and maneuver at GTA and WTA; and culminates in battalion and brigade maneuver at CMTC at HTA. Simulations and simulators must be fully integrated at all levels.28

The discussion of the USAREUR Battalion Training Strategy model will be enhanced if training dollars and the components of the system are first discussed in more detail. When compared to FY 92, the FY 93 training dollars seem to have decreased. For example, last year one division in V Corps was funded for training and operations at $103 million. The division was initially funded at $60 million, and then received $30 million from Desert Shield/Storm (DSS) monies and $13 million in credits. This year, the same division was funded at $49.1 million. If the credits remain about the same, the total amount will exceed last year’s budgeted amount.29 This means that the division must use its money more smartly, since it doesn’t have the DSS cushion. Even without initiating additional cost cutting measures, this funding level allows every battalion/task force (Bn/TF) in the division to go full-up once a year to CMTC. It will also allow all Bn/TFs one full-up trip to GTA and 78 percent of the Bn/TFs a
second trip. The budget fulfills the CINCUSAREUR’s promise to fund all training required by USAREUR Reg 350-1, USAREUR Training Directive, and provides for a ground operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of 650 miles per combat vehicle. Twenty-two of the top thirty items on USAREUR’s Integrated Priority List for the FY 93 budget directly support training. The bottom line on training dollars is that — if you assume that the money spent the previous year was spent as efficiently as possible, that requirements remained constant, and that this year’s budget is less — then you can’t do as much this year as you did last year. Until everyone believes that the paradigm no longer operates that if you save money this year and use less, you don’t get as much next year, the first assumption will rarely be true. The solution is to change the way you do business in order to get the biggest bang for your buck.

USAREUR still has the best ranges and major training areas (MTA) in the world. Prior to the drawdown, the problems at the MTAs were scheduling, congestion, overuse, and lack of flexibility of use. GTA used to be strictly for gunnery, with training densities (windows) scheduled by tank, mechanized infantry, and artillery battalions, often not from the same division, and with combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) battalions superimposed on top of the scheduled densities. This arrangement detracted from training because units could not develop a detailed training plan until the short term range conference when they bid for and were allocated the minor ranges.
The training density was scheduled by major ranges -- a method that left little flexibility for their use. The training unit throughput was so great that maneuver training at GTA was essentially nonexistent. USAREUR has changed this. Since there are fewer allied and US units, the number of units scheduled at both GTA and HTA has decreased and densities are now allocated to divisions and separate brigades. An example of the FY 93 GTA and HTA schedule for V corps is shown in Table VI.

Table VI FY 93 V CORPS HTA/GTA SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>GTA DENSITY</th>
<th>HTA DENSITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12AB</td>
<td>1 Oct-12 Sept</td>
<td>13 Sept-12 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11ACR</td>
<td>6 Oct-1 Nov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1AD</td>
<td>22 Oct-9 Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps*</td>
<td>6 Jan-1 Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3ID</td>
<td>1 Feb-11 Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3ID</td>
<td>14 Mar-29 Mar</td>
<td>18 Mar-20 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1AD</td>
<td>3 May-28 Jun</td>
<td>3 Jun-14 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3ID</td>
<td>6 Jul-17 Aug</td>
<td>12 Aug-10 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps*</td>
<td>15 Aug-7 Sept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11ACR</td>
<td>3 Sept-1 Oct</td>
<td>26 Sept-27 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1AD</td>
<td>30 Sept-19 Nov</td>
<td>25 Oct-23 Nov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* means Corp Artillery and Aviation

This method of scheduling allows tremendous flexibility and time for detailed planning and preparation. For example, one battalion conducted Tank Table V (TT V) through Co/TM combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX) on GTA Range 301, avoiding all the tank trail miles normally used moving between ranges and between ranges and cantonment. Another battalion commander owned GTA Ranges 117 and 118 for TT VIII. He assessed each platoon leader and platoon to determine which of three scenarios the platoons would run. For his newest lieutenants and least experienced platoons, they executed TT VIII on Range 117. For the next most experienced lieutenants and platoons, he started them on Range...
117 and then repositioned them to Range 118. For the most experienced lieutenants and platoons, he started them out on Range 117, repositioned them to Range 118 and then back again to Range 117. All the platoons qualified TT VIII, but the objective was not just qualification achieved by throughput. The objective was training platoons to their maximum potential and was possible because of innovative use of the flexible range scheduling. A battalion commander can deploy his entire battalion to the field at GTA. He can set up his field trains in the bivouac, rendezvous, or maintenance areas; his combat trains in a rendezvous area near an ammo holding area (AHA); and his tactical operations center (TOC) on a range or rendezvous area. So doing, he can run his entire battalion tactically from the field.

Almost since GTA was established as an American MTA, the number of units needing to fire required 24-hour firing 363 days a year. Only Christmas day and Easter were nonfiring days. The change in the political climate means the new status of forces agreement (SOFA) will probably limit the firing hours at GTA. Hours already have been limited at WTA. But this change is okay: not as many hours are needed because fewer units need to fire; thus the new SOFA will provide sufficient hours to meet requirements. Because a battalion training density will be longer in order to have the same number of firing hours with fewer firing hours per day, there will be ample time not only to maneuver but also to take advantage of simulations and simulators available at GTA. The reduced usage is good for the units and for
GTA. As one division commander commented, "There is even grass growing on some of the firing points at Graf instead of the usual sea of mud."35

While not the National Training Center (NTC), the combat maneuver training center (CMTC) at HTA has also evolved into a tremendous training experience. The maneuver box coincides with the Brigade/ Battalion Simulation (BBS) simulation box at HTA. The rotation schedule allows for two Bn/TFs to be in the maneuver box at one time while the third TF is in the simulation box. This permits the brigade commander and his staff to fight the entire brigade combat team. A full time opposing force (OPFOR) and observer/controllers (OC) complete the CMTC ensemble to assist the commander in training his staff and Bn/TFs.

Because of the lack of maneuver space and the intense competition for ranges, USAREUR has always been on the leading edge of simulations and simulators. With the change in political climate and the tightening budget, simulations/simulators have taken on a whole new urgency. At an initial cost of $335 million, USAREUR has integrated simulations and simulators into all levels from crew through corps and echelons above corps (EAC). The Bradley and tank crews hone their gunnery skills on the M1/M2 Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT). Platoons train gunnery skills on the M1/M2 Precision Gunnery Trainer (PGT). The platoon, company/team (Co/TM) or battery train on the Battle Focus Trainer (JANUS) and Simulation Network (SIMNET). Brigades and battalions train on BBS. Brigades, divisions, corps, and EAC units train on
Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM), and Naval War simulation (NAWSIM). As a result of the drawdown, there are sufficient simulations/simulators for all end state units to have easy access to all simulations/simulators. For example, in the 3rd ID, the maneuver brigades are currently in Schweinfurt, Erlangen, and Vilseck. All three brigades either have on station or ready access to Platoon/PRIME, Company/PRIME, Training Set Fire Observer (TFSO), PGT, COFT, JANUS, BBS AND CBS. Primary CBS sites are the Warrior Preparation Center (WPC) in Ramstein, the V Corps at Frankfurt, the 1st AD in Bad Kreuznach, the 32 ADDCOM in Darmstadt, the 3rd ID in Wurzburg and Schweinfurt. WPC, V Corps, 32 ADDCOM and 3rd ID are permanently linked.

Making a good thing better has been the simulation/simulator challenge in USAREUR. For example, JANUS is a good simulation. It has resolution down to individual soldier and combat vehicles and provides an excellent tool to validate SOPs, to work out time/distance problems, and to work drills and plays. Unfortunately, it looks at urban terrain as a block with no resolution available. USAREUR has developed a version of JANUS called urban combat computer assisted terrain system (UCCATS) with a focus at brigade and lower. The resolution of UCCATS is low enough to allow individual fights in multi-level buildings, floor to floor, and room to room. Similarly, at GTA a facility has been established that allows a Bn/TF to train on SIMNET. SIMNET boxes were moved from Fulda to GTA so that there are 44
tank and 18 BFV stations along with two controller stations available. In the same building, there are mock ups replicating a brigade tactical command post (TAC) and a Bn/TF tactical operations center (TOC). Outside the building, there are facilities available to set up the brigade TOC and ALOC. Units can deploy with their mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), maneuver control systems (MCS), and FM communications and exercise the entire Bn/TF from individual engagements to Bn/TF maneuver using the same command and control (C2) systems that they would use in combat. The package includes billet space and contractor support that permits continuous operations.

During Exercise Caravan Guard in July 1989, V Corps conducted the proof of principle for the integration of a field training exercise (FTX), a command field exercise (CFX), and a simulation driven command post exercise (CPX). This initial test evolved to the integration of several different simulations to provide resolution at different levels of command and enhanced training. The ultimate objective is to be able to interface and nest multiple simulations and simulators. This would allow an exercise in which a number of Bn/TFs in SIMNET, UCCATS, and JANUS would feed their data into BBS and then to CBS. When a unit moved in CBS it would be because individual tanks were moving in the simulation box in SIMNET, UCCATS or JANUS.

Simulations have become such a positive training event that the number of exercises has increased dramatically in frequency, scope, and duration. The V Corps Warfighter coincided with
Table VII FY 93 V CORPS
EXERCISES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>EXERCISE</th>
<th>DATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31D</td>
<td>Marne Campaign</td>
<td>12 - 19 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Cactus Juggler</td>
<td>10 - 18 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31D</td>
<td>BCT/ Warfighter</td>
<td>27 - 31 Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPS</td>
<td>Sticker Drill</td>
<td>24 - 28 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Central Fortress</td>
<td>15 - 22 Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Sticker Drill</td>
<td>14 - 16 Apr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>Reforger</td>
<td>5 - 19 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Sticker Drill</td>
<td>31 Aug-1 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Caravan Guard</td>
<td>14 - 17 Sept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REFORGER '92. The Corps and all its major subordinate units (MSU) deployed to conduct the Warfighter for seven days, then continued with REFORGER for seven days. Fourteen days of exercise stresses and effectively trains the participants. It also allows the corps to conduct the first fight, regenerate the corps, and fight the next fight. The days of sending player cells to participate in other units' exercises are over. Regardless of the level of the exercise, the exercising unit wants real commanders and staffs participating. For example, when a division is undergoing its Warfighter, it wants the other division really playing the adjacent division and the corps playing the higher headquarters. Table VII shows the exercises currently scheduled for V Corps. With the exception of Cactus Juggler, Table VII excludes EUCOM and classified exercises -- i.e. African Eagle, Alley Express, Ardent Ground, etc. Table VII superimposed on Table VI leads to the conclusion that the challenge may be to manage time and synchronize all training events so that they compliment each other rather than conflict.

Having discussed all the pieces, the USAREUR Battalion Training Strategy model can be effectively discussed. The strategy is a cycle composed of training events and gates, where
a gate is defined as "a task or tasks grouped in a training event that a soldier or unit must perform to standard prior to progressing to more complex tasks or events." The cycle starts with training on individual tasks and gunnery. To progress, crews must meet the COFT gates as established in UR 350-1. After passing the COFT gate, crews move to GTA where they complete TT V through TT VIII. After qualification on TT VII, crews and platoons must pass the PGT and SIMNET gates before the platoons qualify on TT XII. The Co/TM must complete the JANUS and TF SIMNET gates in order to move to the Co/TM CALFEX. Prior to moving to CMTC and the force on force exercise against the OPFOR, the Bn/TF must complete the BBS gate. This is shown pictorially below:
For future USAREUR commanders and staff officers, training will be the most challenging task they'll face but unquestionably the most rewarding. One of the keys is knowing what simulations can do and, more importantly, cannot do. After making the assessment to determine which tasks must be trained and which must be sustained, and knowing what can be trained using simulations/simulators -- commanders and staff officers can develop an efficient and effective training plan. What cannot be trained on simulations or simulators will require a work-around to use them or boots on the ground. Knowing how to use simulations/simulators effectively is also critical. For example, if a platoon goes to the PGT and the platoon leader gets in the PGT, he is being trained not training his platoon. If training the platoon is the task, then the company commander and 1st sergeant need to be there. The next piece is control of the scarcest resource -- TIME. Commanders and staff must be imaginative and innovative to squeeze training out of every single training event, tasking, and support requirement.

The training plan must take advantage of higher and adjacent headquarters' scheduled events. If the division has scheduled a CPX using CBS and BBS, and if battalion commanders must be in a cell in the simulation center -- can the battalion commander take advantage of this event to support the battalion's training plan rather than schedule a separate event later? In light of the constrained time and dollars, there is little opportunity for experimentation. This means that at the bottom of the training
pyramid -- the squad and platoon -- where there is little experience, much is expected. As a result, senior commanders and their staffs must stay plugged in to monitor the training pace and to ensure that the planned training is executed to standard. Senior commanders must also ensure that the mentoring and tutoring provided by the battalion commanders to the company commanders and platoon leaders is more effective than it has ever been.47

NATO/REGIONAL OPERATIONS

When the bipolar world of the US and the USSR dissolved, so did the elegantly simple strategy of containment. As the threat diminished in size but grew in scope, the national strategy became more complex. So, too, did the USAREUR focus and mission. The challenge for future USAREUR commanders and staff officers is to understand the nuances associated with the new NATO orientations and the nature of regional operations, as well as, their implications on all aspects of serving in USAREUR.

Table VIII USAREUR MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRE 1990</th>
<th>POST 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To deter war through</td>
<td>To deter war through</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Forward deployment</td>
<td>-Forward presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Accept reinforcements</td>
<td>-Accept reinforcements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-NATO vs Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>-Operate in multi-national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>formations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Deploy to meet crises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28
Prior to 1990, the USAREUR focus was simply NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Since 1990, the USAREUR focus must include Eastern and Western Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, the East Mediterranean littoral, Turkey, Southwest Asia, and Africa. The USAREUR missions are compared in Table VIII.48

V Corps and its MSUs must now orient toward both NATO and regional operations. Both the corps and its MSUs must be capable of combat operations as part of NATO and prepared to react to the likely threat to U.S. interests, which will be military operations short of war. This dual capability requires "the corps to be capable of conducting operations across the operational continuum -- peacetime competition, conflict, and war."49

The post-1990 NATO orientation is different from the NATO orientation prior to 1990. Rather than being defensive in nature, the corps must now be able to employ high technology sensors and command and control (C2) systems to find the enemy and determine intent. The corps must be capable of attacking the enemy in depth and set the conditions for decisive attacks. These operations will probably involve an extended move of up to 200 km, followed by a movement to contact and hasty attack from the march or hasty defense. After the first battle, the corps must be able to regenerate combat power and fight again.50 These operations also have the potential to be joint and combined as part of a multinational corps in the main defense force or as part of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). In addition, NATO flank considerations dictate that the corps must be capable of
deploying advanced C2 systems as the army force (ARFOR), or as part of a joint or combined headquarters, as well as forces to conduct operations across the operational continuum.51

For regional operations, the corps can expect to form or participate as a joint or combined headquarters, and to deploy forces to operate in either the joint or combined arena. Regional contingency operations will be characterized by little to no warning or advanced planning. The location will probably lack a suitable infrastructure, and forward deployed forces, supplies, logistic bases or communications. V Corps envisions regional operations to occur in the five phases: predeployment/ crisis action; deployment/ initial combat actions; force buildup/ combat operation; decisive combat operations; redeployment.52 The Corps can expect to have to deploy and employ coincidentally, requiring the deploying force to complete unit deployment and to be able to transition quickly to combat operations. Potential regional operations are shown in Table IX.53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IX</th>
<th>V CORPS REGIONAL OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evacuation of noncombatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Permissive/ nonpermissive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Manmade/ natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure national interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After taking these two requirements into consideration, the unclassified V Corps mission statement is: "On order, V (US) Corps conducts transition to war and deploys to staging areas or rapidly deploys to other areas as specified by higher
headquarters. Prepares to execute noncombatant or combat missions to include defensive and offensive operations. In order to accomplish its wartime missions, the V Corps identified the following tasks as its Mission Essential Task List (METL):

- TRANSITION TO WAR/ CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
- MOVE THE CORPS/ FORCE
- CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
- REGENERATE COMBAT POWER (TG)

The METL tasks that are applicable to both NATO and regional operations have conditions and standards for each focus. For example, MOVE THE CORPS is oriented on the 200 km move from home station to the corps staging area (CSA) or the forward tactical assembly areas (TAA). This movement culminates in either a passage of lines or movement to contact. The regional operations is oriented on "a strategic move from ADOEs/SPOEs through APODs/SPODs and onward to a TAA in the theater of operations."

For the future USAREUR commander or staff officer, the addition of the subtle nuances to the new NATO mission and of the regional operations means an exciting and challenging experience. "Many of the center pieces are the same -- be lethal against the most difficult threat you will oppose." But the sidebars are worth thinking about. For example, when the extended range fuel systems (ERFS) were distributed to Corps units in 1990, they were distributed equally to all aviation units because several real world regional operations (i.e. Provide Comfort, Positive Force and several classified missions) were being supported, and
because the support requirement rotated among all Corps aviation units. Since then, several of these requirements have been eliminated; when the Corps was asked to look at deploying an aviation unit with ERFs to support a recent operation, only a composite unit could be considered. The requirement to deploy on short notice for regional operations adds new meaning to the process for overseas movement (POM) process. For some units in USAREUR, it is almost a monthly update process. Likewise, family care and support plans are more important because the service member may deploy from Germany, while the spouse and children stay behind in a foreign country without the local and state support agencies found around most CONUS installations. The type unit data files (TUCHA) must be kept current and preparation for air and sea deployment must be trained. Identification of the threat and its order of battle, doctrine and equipment are now significantly more difficult. Finally, it must be realized that these changes are not just supposition. Exercise Dragon Hammer '92 deployed a significant force from the Central Region to Sardinia, with V Corps providing the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander and the core of the headquarters. In addition, REFORGER '93 will also be in the Southern Region. USAREUR has played a role and USAREUR soldiers have participated in every operation east of the Atlantic Ocean in recent history. Since USAREUR will always be an ocean closer, it probably always will. Training and sustaining skills to be proficient in NATO operations, regional operations, as well as joint/combined headquarters and
operations, will challenge future USAREUR commanders and staff.

**PERSONNEL**

Prior to 1989, USAREUR was a Priority One unit and could count on being kept filled to 100 percent to 102+ percent. Since USAREUR is now a Priority Three unit, this is no longer the case. As a result, USAREUR is now experiencing what FORSCOM units experienced prior to 1988. At V Corps, the Adjutant General (AG) and the 5th Personnel Group are managing every MOS by MOS. "Even though 3rd ID, 1st AD and 11ACR have their own personnel accounts, the AG looks at the Corps in total and works directly with 1st PERSCOM and gives guidance on how 1st PERSCOM will distribute fill to the Divisions and 11ACR while managing the nondivision accounts directly." This fact combined, with the discussion on ASGs/BSBs and simulation work-arounds means that personnel -- like time and dollars -- will have to be intensely managed.

**CONCLUSION**

In closing, I want to reiterate several facts. The world is changing and USAREUR will continue to change to adapt to the changing environment. Anyone going to Europe must be cognizant of this fact and must accept it. The US is no longer lord of the realm, the protector and defender of the faith on the cutting edge of freedom. This doesn't mean that because Europe was good before that it can't be better because of the changes taking place. What it will mean is reduced personnel, not as much money, and doing more because there are fewer units to draw upon. It
means the German people still want the US presence and the stability it provides; they just don’t want US tanks running down their village streets and maneuvering across their fields. It means that although Round One of the drawdown is over, Round Two may be just around the corner. It means simulations and simulators will be not only an integral part but also a critical part of training. The mission focus is diffused over the entire EUCOM theater. Most importantly, it means that future USAREUR commanders and staff officers must understand their environment and realize that they will experience intense competition for limited resources. Consequently in order to make the most of each dollar, each hour, each gallon of JP8 and each round of ammunition, they must be more innovative, creative and efficient than ever to take advantage of every opportunity presented.
ENDNOTES

1. V(US) Corps, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Section, V Corps CFE Drawdown Briefing, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides (Frankfurt, Germany: 4 December 1992), 3.

2. Ibid., 6.

3. HQ USAREUR, USAREUR In the 90’s, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides (Heidelberg, Germany: 12 November 1992), 12.

4. Ibid., 11.

5. V (US) Corps, NBC, V Corps CFE Drawdown Briefing, 9,10,11.

6. Ibid., 25.

7. Ibid., 27.

8. Ibid., 18,19.

9. Ibid., 20.

10. Ibid., 24.

11. HQ USAREUR, USAREUR In the 90’s, 13.

12. Ibid., 15.

13. 98th Area Support Group (ASG), Draft Command Brief, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides (Wurzburg, Germany), 6.


15. 98th ASG, Draft Command Brief, 7.


18. Colonel William A. Alexander interview.

19. HQ USAREUR, USAREUR In THE 90’S, 19.

20. 98th ASG, Draft Command Brief, 21.

21. Ibid., 15.
22. Colonel William A. Alexander interview.

23. Ibid.


25. HQ USAREUR, Training In USAREUR, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides, (Grafenwoehr, Germany), 3.

26. Ibid., 5.

27. Ibid., 7.

28. Ibid., 16.


30. Major General Richard F. Keller interview.


34. Major Richard F. Keller interview.

35. Ibid.

36. HQ USAREUR, Training In Europe, 16.

37. 3rd Infantry Division, Training and Simulation, paper copies of briefing slides (Wurzburg, Germany), 1,2.

38. Colonel William J. Densberger interview.

39. Ibid.


41. Colonel William J. Densberger interview.

43. HQ USAREUR, *Training In USAREUR*, 17.

44. Ibid., 18.

45. Doug Nolen interview.

46. Colonel William J. Densberger interview.

47. Major General Richard F. Keller interview.


50. Ibid., 2,3.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., B2-3.


54. Ibid., 1.

55. Ibid., 3.

56. Major General Richard F. Keller interview.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


HQ USAREUR. Training In USAREUR, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Grafenwoehr, Germany.

HQ USAREUR. USAREUR In The 90’s, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Heidelberg, Germany, 12 November 1992.


V (US) Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff G3. NATO vs. Regional Operations, (unclassified portion only) paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Frankfurt, Germany.

V (US) Corps, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Section. V Corps CFE Drawdown Briefing, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Frankfurt, Germany, 4 December 1992.


3rd Infantry Division. Rock of the Marne Command Brief, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Wurzburg, Germany.

3rd Infantry Division. Training and Simulation, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Wurzburg, Germany.

3rd Infantry Division, 3ID (M) Transition to Endstate in FY92, paper copies of vugraph briefing slides. Wurzburg, Germany.