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THE FEASIBILITY OF A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHAPLAINCY

BY

CHAPLAIN (COLONEL) WILLIAM L. HUFHAM
United States Army

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
The consolidation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy would seem on the surface to be a measure that would improve effectiveness and increase efficiency. A study of the history of the three chaplaincies reveals a completely different environment for ministry for the three chaplaincies. The Army chaplain works primarily in a land force medium of war, serving soldiers and their families who have developed a distinctive culture through 200 years of service. The Navy chaplain works primarily in a sea force which operates away from support and linkage with the American Society. The independence of sea command distinguishes the Navy. The Air Force chaplain prepares airmen to deploy to war and provides spiritual comfort when they return. He is a vital part of the support team that stays behind. Technology and equipment distinguish this Service. Each chaplaincy identifies with the service personality of the particular Service. The ministry of chaplains is enhanced by this identity. The formation of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy would remove chaplains from their Service identity. They would become

(see reverse side)

The Feasibility of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy

Chaplain (COL) William L. Hufham

Chaplains are expected to remain a part of the military's combat teams and must be prepared to deploy anywhere at a moment's notice. In peacetime, chaplains serve in military hospitals, religious centers, and other locations where soldiers and their families may need spiritual guidance and support. In times of conflict, chaplains are often deployed with military units, providing spiritual care and support to soldiers on the battlefield. The consolidation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of these services.

The consolidation would likely involve the following steps:

1. **Organizational Change:** The three existing chaplaincies would be merged into a single, unified Department of Defense Chaplaincy. This would involve restructuring existing chaplaincy programs and streamlining operational procedures.

2. **Standardization:** Uniform standards would be established for spiritual care and support, ensuring consistency across the three services. This could include common policies, training, and resources.

3. **Resource Allocation:** Increased resources would be allocated to support the Department of Defense Chaplaincy, allowing for enhanced capability and effectiveness.

4. **Communication and Coordination:** Improved communication and coordination mechanisms would be established to facilitate collaboration and information sharing among the different Services.

5. **Training and Development:** Enhanced training programs would be implemented to prepare chaplains for the demands of modern warfare. This could include new techniques for deploying chaplains in diverse locations and situations.

6. **Technology Integration:** The integration of new technologies, such as telecommunication tools and digital resources, would be explored to support chaplains in remote or challenging environments.

The consolidation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy would require careful planning and coordination to ensure that the transition is smooth and successful. By combining the resources and expertise of the three Services, the Department of Defense Chaplaincy would be better positioned to provide effective spiritual care and support to military personnel and their families in times of peace and war.
outsiders, unfamiliar with the mission, staff procedures, and personnel problems that are endemic to each Service. Ministry would be diminished by this change. This study recommends increasing joint and unified training opportunities, sharing resources, and increasing joint Service billets for chaplains to improve operational readiness for the next war. The study recommends against a radical restructure of the Service chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy. Real savings would be minimal; cost in effectiveness would be great.
THE FEASIBILITY OF A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHAPLAINCY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Chaplain (Colonel) William L. Hufham
United States Army

Chaplain (Colonel) Thomas H. Norton
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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THE FEASIBILITY OF A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHAPLAINCY

This is a feasibility study regarding the unification of all military chaplaincies. The study will show the development of the three service chaplaincies through the nation's history of warfare and peace. Two primary concerns must be the guiding principles for judging the feasibility of uniting the three military chaplaincies: First, will the unified chaplaincy be a better organization for providing ministry to the members of the armed forces and their families; and second, will the unified chaplaincy be more cost efficient in terms of saving the nation money and allocating resources. A third concern will be addressed in the process: Are there areas of common concern and activity that can be improved by joining the efforts of the three chaplaincies? The idea of sharing ministry in joint operations is not new to the three chaplaincies. Developing doctrine to support these joint efforts is ongoing. The idea of uniting training, resourcing activities, assigning personnel, and supervising a chaplain school under one central authority is attractive in a time of diminishing resources. This study will address both the feasibility and desirability of such a unification as well as the impact on future effectiveness if such a combining of the chaplaincies occurred.
INTRODUCTION: DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

Logic would seem to dictate that there should be only one chaplaincy serving our nation's defense forces. The vision of providing ministry to service personnel and their families is common to all branches of service, regardless of the color of the uniform, or the individual chaplaincy. Would there not be a greater efficiency in having one chaplaincy - a Department of Defense Chaplaincy - to do the work currently accomplished by three? Such a combined chaplaincy would appear to reduce the administrative and headquarters activity overhead. It would reduce the number of chaplains needed to serve the American military by a small number, most of whom would be in senior officer and general officer ranks. It would reduce the three chaplain schools to one. It would unify the efforts of religious support provided by the hundreds of denominations in the American religious scene under one control headquarters at Department of Defense level. It would eliminate service competition for scarce denominational resources experienced in the Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, and Jewish faiths. It would further allow the sharing of ministry resources and eliminate duplicate training currently conducted by all three services.

Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a floor speech to the U.S. Senate on July 2, 1992, addressed the issue of a "thorough overhaul of the services roles and missions." In the speech he cited The
Goldwater-Nichols Act as guidance for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider. Specifically, he noted:

- changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States;
- changes in the technology that can be applied effectively to warfare; and
- unnecessary duplication of effort among the Armed Forces.2

Addressing the need for services to reduce their numbers and modify their functions, Senator Nunn indicated that this is being done individually by each service. "But there are virtually no major changes that cross service line. For all practical purposes, each service is designing its own smaller future."3 Later in the speech Senator Nunn cited specific examples of duplication and redundancy among the branches of the services. In the broad area of functional organizations and activities he singles out the Medical Corps, Chaplains Corps, and Legal Departments of the three services:

   Each service has its own medical corps, chaplain corps, legal corps, and so forth. I am certain that each of the services would have valid arguments why it must have its own doctors, nurses, chaplains and lawyers....
   Can we eliminate needless overhead by consolidating the administrative elements of the medical corps, the chaplains corps, the nursing corps, the judge advocate general corps, and other such administrative service organizations?
   ....The question is what is best for America?4

Senator Nunn's primary concern in this portion of his address to the Senate is the reduction of service overhead or administrative functional areas which are duplicated across service lines. This study will raise the question to a second level. Should there be a unified chaplaincy organization that serves across the military
in the place of the current system of three distinct service chaplaincies? The discussion will concentrate on the issues regarding the chaplaincies, although some of the considerations may be applicable to the other special branches addressed by Senator Nunn.

The attractiveness of Senator Nunn's proposal is the immediate payoff in reduction of administrative overhead in the chaplaincies. Each of the service chaplaincies has a major general chief of chaplains authorized by Title 10, USC, and each service has a brigadier general deputy chief. The senior Marine chaplain is the senior chaplain colonel assigned to the Marine Corps Staff. He is a Navy chaplain detailed to the U.S. Marine Corps.

The first area of saving would be in the number of personnel in the administrative headquarters of the services. Conceivably, a unified staff would reduce the number of flag rank officers in the chaplaincy from the current number of six to four or less. The personnel could be reduced by approximately one-half, including secretaries, civilian staff, and functional area directors. Uniting these director positions could save additional personnel.

A second area of potential saving would be in the chaplain schools. A unified Department of Defense school could reduce the chaplain faculty and staff from approximately 145 in the three schools to 60-75, if the enlisted training conducted at the Army Chaplain School were moved to another enlisted branch school.
Most of the personnel reductions would be in the officer ranks and civilian personnel.

A third area of saving would be in the combination of the field operating agencies of the services. The Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency is responsible for assignments, future studies, family ministry and branch proponency issues. The Air Force and Navy operating agencies have different missions, but the separate organizations could be combined into one Defense Chaplaincy Agency which would make assignments, coordinate issues between the three services, and set total chaplaincy goals and doctrine. A skeleton organization in the Department of Defense already exists in the form of the Armed Forces Chaplain Board.

A fourth area of benefit for the three services would be the equitable distribution of shortage faith groups (primarily Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, and Jewish chaplains) among the three services. Currently, the Navy and Air Force have twice as many more chaplains from these denominations in comparison with the Army while servicing 30% fewer personnel. The distribution of chaplains by the denominations has been a responsibility of the leadership of the denominations, not the military. In fact, the services have found themselves competing with each other for shortage faith group chaplains. Most denominational leaders have allowed individual chaplain candidates to choose their service without regard to the denominational balance among the services. A Department of Defense chaplaincy would place the responsibility of faith group balance in the hands of the Department of Defense
Chief of Chaplains, instead of leaving it in the hands of the "churches."

The *prima facie* evidence would appear to lead the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a unified chaplaincy. Cost savings in personnel, headquarters overhead, schools, and flag rank billets added together would be a significant saving to the nation, as Senator Nunn has indicated. Not addressed so far are the negative effects, if any. Such a significant change in the system currently in operation would possibly bring about second and third order effects, or ripples throughout the military system, many of which may be detrimental to the work of chaplains.

Before drawing conclusions prematurely in favor of a Department of Defense chaplaincy, this study will explore some of the short term and long term implications of modifying the service chaplaincies. The study will look at the historical bases for the three service chaplaincies; service institutions and religious support of the members of these institutions; training required to provide effective religious support in war and peace; doctrinal and policy differences between the service chaplaincies; the impact on specialty assignments within the three services - Special Forces units, Airborne, Rangers, Navy SEALS, Marines, Submarine Navy, etc.; the impact on the largest component of the United States military service, the Reserve Components; the effectiveness of ministry to the organization as well as to the individual members; and the impact on service
commanders, personnel, and families. Any one of these issues alone would, perhaps, not significantly affect the religious support provided by chaplains within the military services, but cumulatively, the effect would be enormous.

Some of the key questions that need to be considered by the decision-makers are: Will the consolidation of the three chaplaincies improve the religious support provided by the current three service system? Will it save money, significant numbers of personnel without degrading the accomplishment of the mission, provide more efficiency in response to military requirements, and produce better stewardship of resources? Is the current system broken or significantly inefficient? Can critical resources in shortage denominations be shared across service lines without restructuring the entire system? If the best option is not to combine all of the chaplaincies, are there areas where joint and unified are recommended? These questions will be addressed in the course of this study.

Radical changes in any system should be undertaken with extreme caution, especially one that has proved itself able to accomplish its mission through a century marked by two world wars, a dozen major combat operations, and hundreds of hostile engagements. Each military deployment has required the spiritual strengthening of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines sent into harm's way by the Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, to preserve the current system, if it proves to be less efficient and costly to the American people, would be ill-advised. All
leaders involved need to see the issues involved dispassionately and disinterestedly before making their decisions. This study will attempt to present the issues clearly and objectively, with conclusions and recommendations.

This paper is not a polemic in defense of the system as it currently exists. The excellent performance of the three service chaplaincies as they have evolved historically to their present state is ample testimony that the current system is not broken. Whether consolidation would bring about improvement is the question the study wants to explore. Several options for change will be offered. The conclusions will be based on logical considerations, hopefully in the best interest of the service personnel and families who will be affected directly.

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE THREE SERVICES

A. THE UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY:

The history of the three services is linked inextricably with the mission of each service. The oldest chaplaincy service dates to 1775 when the Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington, asked the Continental Congress to approve the appointment of chaplains to serve the ground forces of the Continental Army. The Colonies were at war with England. Seeing the wisdom of General Washington's request, the Congress appointed chaplains. The precedent had roots in chaplaincies in the European armies and the various militia of the colonies. A
few years earlier Colonel George Washington of the Virginia Militia petitioned Governor Dinwiddie of the Commonwealth:

The want of a chaplain does, I humbly conceive, reflect dishonor upon the regiment, as all other officers are allowed. The gentlemen of the corps are sensible to this, and did propose to support one at their private expense. But I think it would have a more graceful appearance were he appointed as others are.5

In a letter several months later, no ... ion having been taken by the governor or the Virginia Legislature, Colonel Washington implored:

It is a hardship upon the Regiment, I think, to be denied a Chaplain.... We shou'd also be glad if our Chaplain was appointed, and that a Gentleman of sober, serious and religious deportment were chosen for this important Trust!6

Other colonies provided chaplains for their various regiments after similar entreaties from their leaders. Some hoped that the need could be met by employing civilian clergy on a rotating basis, but this plan was quickly abandoned in favor of unit chaplains who moved with the forces themselves under the supervision of the regimental commander.7

On July 14, 1775, the Congress established the Continental Army. The Army was comprised of soldiers obligated to the emerging nation for a longer term than the various militia which the Congress called into duty. On July 29, 1775, the Congress voted to pay chaplains in the ranks, thus establishing the first Continental Army Chaplaincy.8 By August 15, 1775, General Washington counted 15 chaplains in his ranks. He would later ask for one chaplain for each regiment in the Continental Army.9
Throughout the Revolutionary War period ministry was provided to soldiers of the Continental Army and the state militias by means of chaplains who were members of the armies as well as by volunteer clergy from the area of the states where the forces maneuvered. Their duties included caring for the sick, wounded, and dying; baptizing and burying members of the units; and conducting "divine services." Counseling for soldiers addressed the ubiquitous problems of pay, hardships imposed on families by the absence of the soldier-father-breadwinner, patriotism and loyalty to the crown. Chaplain Parker Thompson summarizes the new American army chaplaincy this way:

Congress was neither opposed to religion nor to a governmental chaplaincy, but only to the domination of one denomination to the exclusion or detriment of others. Our Founding Fathers made the military chaplaincy a vital part of the Army.... They were not advocates of freedom from religion, as their actions give evidence, but certainly demanded and practiced freedom of religion in their official assemblies. (emphasis added)

Throughout the war Army chaplains moved with the soldiers from battlefield to battlefield, lived in camps and endured the hardships of soldier life, ministered to the troops in their environment, sometimes even taking up arms and joining the battle at critical times, and becoming prisoners of war.

Following the Revolutionary War the Congress reduced the number of chaplains in accordance with the number of brigades remaining in the Army, while the state militias set their own standards for chaplain positions and duties. There was no organized chaplaincy to coordinate the various clergymen serving...
in the force. Every chaplain was responsible directly to the commander and negotiated his duties with the commander. Guidance from General Washington for the chaplains came in these words:

The Commander in Chief also desires and expects the Chaplains in addition to their public functions will in turn constantly attend the Hospitals and visit the sick, while they are thus publickly and privately engaged in performing the sacred duties of their office they may depend upon his utmost encouragement and support on all occasions, and that they will be considered in a very respectable point of light by the whole Army.14

Generally, the Revolutionary War chaplains established the pattern of ministry provided to the ground forces of the new American Army. They moved with the units, lived in the harsh conditions of the battlefield, provided ministry where the soldiers were, and by their presence cared for the soldier’s spirit. There were few controls over these men of God except their own religious vocation, a personal sense of duty and the commander’s guidance.

During the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, the active military was reduced at times to one regiment, but pressures from the western frontier engagements with hostile Indians forced the Congress to increase the size of the active army to a brigade. With that, the Congress also authorized a chaplain to serve the force. State militias continued to employ regimental chaplains in their units. The armed forces chaplaincy began to take on a shape that would endure - few active duty chaplains and numerous state militia chaplains.15 The chaplain was an integral member of the citizen-soldier army.
The War of 1812 saw the call of over 400,000 American soldiers to arms. However, at any given time the active army never exceeded 20,000.\textsuperscript{16} The Congress organized the military into nine districts, each headquarters having a staff chaplain whose function was coordinate religious services of the chaplains in units assigned to their district. This was a major shift, both in the military organization and the function of chaplains. Staff chaplains in the districts had oversight of the various unit chaplains assigned to brigades and regiments from the active force and the militia. In many instances the plan failed because the state militia chaplains refused to follow the guidance of the district staff chaplain.\textsuperscript{17} The War of 1812 was an extremely unpopular war for many regions of the United States. The clergy from the various areas of the nation responded with regional sympathies to the central government; thus, the varied responses of the state militia chaplains.

Following the War of 1812, America’s penchant for a small standing force was witnessed in the radical military reductions of 1818. The state militias continued their chaplaincies, but the active army eliminated chaplains, surgeons and judge advocates from the staffs.\textsuperscript{18} Except for the chaplain-instructor at the United States Military Academy, no federal force chaplain position existed for several decades. During these years the small garrisons of soldiers scattered across the American frontier had their religious needs met by civilian clergymen and missionaries who moved west with the growing westward moving
population. Some commanders hired clergymen in a contractual service capacity, while others simply depended on the voluntary good will of the religious leaders and organizations in their area. Religious needs were met on an ad hoc basis.

In 1838 the Army officially appointed a chaplain to Ft. Crawford, Wisconsin, inaugurating the frontier ministry of active Army chaplains.\textsuperscript{19} The number of these active duty frontier post chaplains ranged from 20 to 40, depending on requisitions by post commanders and the growing number of garrisons. Their quality varied greatly. Some were "a superannuated sergeant or sometimes even a retired cook" who felt called to provide religious ministrations.\textsuperscript{20} The majority of the frontier chaplains, however, were clergymen from recognized denominations and men of noble character. Their duties extended to ministering to the civilian communities around the garrisons, as well as the Indians.\textsuperscript{21} Frequently, the religious duties of the chaplains were augmented by schoolmaster responsibilities, post librarian, gardener, and occasionally riding with soldiers on their patrols.\textsuperscript{22}

There was a constant tenuousness in the chaplain's position. Commanders and garrison councils of administration could, on a whim, refuse to reappoint the chaplain, thus sending him packing. Denominations represented in the frontier chaplaincy included Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, and one Roman Catholic.\textsuperscript{23}
The turmoil that would divide the nation in 1861 was felt in the frontier chaplaincy of the 1850s. With no centralized leadership for chaplains in the small Army headquarters of the period, chaplain ministry varied greatly from individual to individual and post to post.

The Mexican War disclosed a weakness in the structure of the frontier chaplaincy. Units were mobilized and deployed to Mexico without chaplains in their ranks. The Congress had provided positions for chaplains on the frontier but none for Army units. The chaplaincy was part of the force structure of the Army. In Mexico Catholic priests and political leaders immediately seized on the absence of chaplains in the American Army to proclaim that a godless force of Protestants was invading Roman Catholic Mexico. It was quickly proclaimed a religious war of Protestants against Catholics by the Mexicans, bringing confusion to the American Roman Catholic soldiers, now accounting for approximately twenty-five percent of the men serving in the ranks. Using his discretionary power, President Tyler quickly corrected this by asking the Bishop of Baltimore to provide him two priests to serve as chaplains. The action created some furor among American Protestants who felt that religious ministrations for Protestant soldiers were not being provided. Congress corrected the problem by authorizing chaplains to serve in every active brigade of soldiers. They also deployed frontier post chaplains to Mexico when their frontier garrison fell below fifty percent in strength. By the end of the Mexican War chaplains...
had proved their worth to soldiers and commanders, strengthening the spiritual commitment of soldiers and raising the moral climate of their units.

Following the war with Mexico the standing Army reverted quickly back to the peacetime Army of coastal fortifications and Indian frontier posts. Chaplain positions reverted to 30 frontier post chaplains. Lorenzo D. Johnson, a Washington, D.C., Episcopalian layman, initiated a reform movement to bring better quality ministers into the military chaplaincy. He pointed out weaknesses in the current system of selecting and appointing chaplains. He recommended a "board of commission for government chaplains" comprised of denominational representatives to examine candidates for the chaplaincy and approve them for service. This board would also receive annual reports from chaplains "containing statistical facts and general results, whether at a fort, on a campaign...or on a cruise at sea." Johnson’s initiatives were the first effort to give some overarching structure to the Army chaplaincy, albeit outside the military. It was a step in the right direction. However, the board was not formed. Consequently, the nation would enter the decade of the Civil War just as it had begun the century with regard to the leadership and quality of the Army chaplaincy.

The American Civil War brought into service soldiers by the hundreds of thousands on both sides. Generally, units activated from state militias brought their chaplains with them. The rapidly expanding Regular Army had no provision for unit
chaplains until legislation of August 3, 1861. This action appointed chaplains approved by the President to every regiment. The legislation provided no standards, age limits, physical condition, or training for these chaplains. As a result, the Army received a mixed bag of clergymen to serve as chaplains. Their ages ranged from teenagers to men in their seventies. Education ranged from the illiterate to college professors. Many were physically unfit; others were self-ordained religious charlatans. Too many were undesirable for the ranks of the chaplaincy.

Many drifters, misfits, and ne'er-do-wells among the clergy wormed their way into the chaplaincy... The unworthy stood out like sore thumbs because of their activities and the distinctive uniform worn by chaplains....

Regiments could still choose their chaplains in the state forces, and the active army had no mechanism to control quality.

On July 17, 1862, Congress took action to correct the problem. It passed legislation requiring chaplains to be "a regularly ordained minister of some religious denomination...with recommendations for his appointment as an army chaplain from some authorized ecclesiastical body...." The process of weeding out substandard chaplains was accomplished through additional legislation and the publishing of a general order. In due time, Army leaders complied with the order, and the quality of the active force chaplaincy began to improve. It was during the Civil War that Jewish chaplains were included in the ranks. The wording of the new law required chaplains to be members of a
"religious denomination," rather than a "Christian denomination," as one of the qualifications for appointment.\textsuperscript{28}

While the soldiers on both sides in the Civil War did not lack religious ministrations during the conflict, there was a definite range of quality and direction for the ministry. Some chaplains were purely religious practitioners conducting civilian style worship services in a military context. Others became an integral part of their unit and the commanders' advisor on morale and morality in the camps. Some chaplains were confused about their role and took up arms to fight beside their troops.\textsuperscript{30} One soldier described his chaplain this way: "During the week he ministered to us physically, and on Sunday's spiritually. He was one of the purest and best men I ever knew."\textsuperscript{31} What emerged clearly from this war was the need for religious ministration and strengthening of faith in the ranks of fighting soldiers. The chaplain's contribution to the troops engaged in combat was decidedly positive when evaluated by soldiers, commanders and civilian ministers who voluntarily visited the battlefields.

The number of chaplains who served on Union and Confederate sides during the Civil War varies greatly in war records. The Confederate war records were incomplete and many clergymen had "unofficial chaplain" status conferred on them. Comparing unit records with those of religious denominations increases the confusion. Estimates ranged from 600-1000 serving the Confederate forces. The Union Army records were more complete, but still inexact. These records identify 2,300 Union Army
chaplains, which were supplemented by state chaplain appointments and regimental chaplains who also served in the capacity of commanding officer. The more likely number for the Union Army was 3000.32

Following the Civil War, the Confederate military was disestablished. The "ironclad oath" disqualified many clergymen who had served as chaplains for the Rebel forces from future military service. The Union military cut back to the frontier army with chaplains stationed at key forts along the coast and across the western plains and units involved in the reconstruction of the South. By 1869 there were 30 frontier post chaplains, four regimental chaplains, and one instructor/chaplain at the Military Academy in active service. Of these 21 were from the Episcopal Church; none were Roman Catholic, the largest single denomination in the nation. Petitions to Congress sought redress for the imbalance of religious representation. The Legislature did so by removing the appointment of chaplains from post councils of administration and giving it to the President. The Adjutant General of the Army received reports and accounted for duties performed by chaplains.

Frontier chaplains' duties fell into a general pattern: conducting religious services, providing ministrations to soldiers and families, supervising and teaching school, post librarian duties, trail defense counsel in courts-martial and, frequently, the post gardener. Some of the onerous tasks that fell into the chaplain's area were praying for convicted outlaws.
at their hanging, burying Indians and soldiers following hostile engagements, and keeping civility among bored and restless troops. The vices chaplains combated were alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. Many chaplains conducted religious services and educational classes on Indian Reservations. A few accompanied Troops of Cavalry on patrols.

The chaplaincy of the frontier provided effective ministry to outposts of the Army, but suffered from coordinated leadership and oversight from the highest headquarters. Local councils and commanders frequently neglected or ignored the religious program for soldiers, or directed and dictated it to the detriment of free religious expression. Appointments were still granted as favors to influential politicians and individuals. The next war and increase in military personnel would demonstrate once again the systemic and organizational weaknesses in the Army chaplaincy.

Prior to the Spanish-American War the Regular Army was composed of just over 28,000 soldiers. These men were assigned to 80 garrisons scattered across the United States. Thirty-four chaplains provided ministry to these soldiers. In the course of four months, the Army would increase to 275,000 Regular and Volunteer soldiers deployed to battlefields around the world. Fortunately, the enemy forces were weak and ill-trained. Except for actions in the Philippines, combat operations were concluded in a matter of weeks. Nevertheless, the unpreparedness of the military for large wars beyond the American borders stood out in
this war. America, now a global power, had to change its military to meet the new direction it was taking.

During the Spanish-American War, chaplains who had been serving on frontier duty found themselves deployed to combat in hot jungles, mosquito infested swamps, inadequately equipped and poorly trained for these environments. More soldiers died of disease and non-battle injury than in combat during the war. Civilian populations in Cuba and the Philippines were hostile to the victorious Americans. They had to be pacified. The American public was deeply divided over the necessity of this war and its objectives. American citizens were incensed by the loss of life caused by poor leadership, training, equipment, and preparations for combat. Eighty percent of the combatants were from volunteer forces, served by chaplains from their militias. Some of the unit clergymen were detailed to duty as recruiters, commissary officers, and recreation directors. Some voluntarily gave speeches in defense of the war. Others openly opposed it. The rapid spread of yellow fever in the ranks of the soldiers caused the hospitals to fill. Chaplains provided some of their best recorded ministry among those hospitalized with this disease. However, the Spanish-American War demonstrated that drastic reform within the military was needed. The "splendid little war" opened the way for the Elihu Root reforms of the military."

After the turn of the century President McKinley's Secretary of War, Elihu Root, began a systematic transformation of the military. His reforms included a larger Regular Army, the
creation of a general staff, merit promotions instead of seniority advances, an expanded education system for officer development, and the creation of a Chief of Staff to replace the Commanding General of the Army.

The Root reforms had a positive impact on the Army chaplaincy. Mental competency, moral fitness, physical ability and age standards for Regular Army appointments were established to be administered by the Adjutant General. Promotions to the rank of major was authorized after chaplains reached 10 years of service. A *Manual for U.S. Army Chaplains* provided some guidance for performing military ministry. In 1909 a chaplain assistant was assigned to every chaplain to assist with his duties. This improvement became the model for officer and enlisted team ministry in the Army.

At the same time, recommendations were received directly from chaplains by the War Department to establish a Board of Chaplains under the Adjutant General to advise the Army Staff on matters relating to religion and the chaplaincy service. At first disapproved, the revised plan for an advisory board to increase the efficiency of Army chaplains was later approved. This Board of Six met at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, in April 1909 and submitted 12 recommendations to the Secretary of War to improve the Army chaplaincy. Six were adopted. For the first time religious issues were addressed by the Army rather than by post councils of administration or the executive and legislative branches of government.
Religious denominations began cooperative efforts to improve the ministry provided by chaplains. The Federal Council of Churches, through the member churches, became the agency to fill vacancies for Protestant chaplains. Denominational commissions worked with the Federal Council to improve the quality of the candidates for the military chaplaincies. Their efforts awoke the religious communities of America to the need to send quality ministers to provide for the religious and moral welfare of service personnel.\textsuperscript{40}

World War I again revealed weaknesses in the Army chaplaincy. The active Army grew from 127,000 soldiers served by 74 chaplains to 3.6 million troops served by 2,200 chaplains. In the battlefields of Europe over 2 million troops went to war accompanied by 1,200 chaplains. By normal reckoning Pershing's senior chaplain, Bishop Charles H. Brent, estimated a need for 1,800 chaplains in the battlefields of Europe.\textsuperscript{41} General Pershing wanted to form a European Chaplain Corps with Bishop Brent as its leader. Brent was in Europe with the Y.M.C.A. assisting in ministry to the troops when Pershing had him commissioned as an Adjutant General Corps major and assigned him the responsibility organizing and supervising the American Expeditionary Force chaplaincy.\textsuperscript{42}

No system existed to recruit, train, equip or prepare chaplains for the rigors and horrors of trench warfare. Brent set up a battlefield school for chaplains. New chaplains arriving in the war zone attended battlefield schools, just like
many other branches of service. These schools prepared the new arrivals for the demands of war.

Massive artillery strikes, the machine gun and gas warfare introduced elements of terror into the battlefield that American soldiers had never experienced and chaplains had never addressed for ministry. In just over a year of combat, 106,000 American soldiers died, among whom were 23 chaplains. Many were decorated for valor and many suffered multiple wounds from enemy fire. There were hundreds of individual stories of bravery and exceptional ministry in the trenches. The most famous was Father Francis P. Duffy of the Irish 69th Regiment in the 42d Division. He is honored with a bronze statue in Times Square for his great ministry to all of his soldiers - Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish - in the "Rainbow Division." The chaplaincy again proved itself to be an integral part of the fighting army. It still lacked the structure of leadership needed to provide continuity and direction between wars.

In the continental United States the shortage of uniformed clergymen was felt acutely around mobilization, training and movement centers. Civilian religious organizations helped to meet the needs of soldiers and families in these circumstances. The Y.M.C.A., Salvation Army, Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board and numerous local religious groups set up off-post meeting places and social centers for troops. Their services were needed and valuable, particularly during the days of severe shortage of chaplains; but their presence at times caused friction. Some
were guilty of "indiscretions" and preyed on the soldiers and families in times of great hardship and stress. The Adjutant General attempted to close all military installations to civilian clergy, but the General War-Time Commission on Religion intervened with a compromise agreement: Those invited by the commander and agreeing to work under the supervision of the chaplains could assist in meeting the needs of ministry. This proved to be a good working relationship between civilian and military organizations. It still exists today.45

Following the war came the inevitable force reductions and mustering out of millions of soldiers. The absence of leadership in the chaplaincy had been addressed in Europe by General Pershing with the work of his friend Bishop Brent. With Pershing's endorsement Brent managed the ministry of the chaplains assigned to the war zone. Working with Brent were Chaplain Francis B. Dougherty, a Roman Catholic, and Paul A. Moody. These men had oversight not only of the chaplains in the theater but also the multiple welfare and religious agencies that sent representatives to the trenches.46 No similar chaplain organization existed in the United States to direct the word of the chaplaincy. The British Army had a Chaplain General who had oversight of the ministry of all of the chaplains in the British Army. The adoption of the British model of military chaplains was a clear option for the American Army. Chaplain Brent and his chaplains had worked well with the British Chaplain General in the war zone. However, both Brent and Pershing opposed the idea
of adopting the British system, where chaplains wore rank. They believed it was by force of personality, not rank, that chaplains would gain respect from soldiers. Uniform and rank for chaplains became an issue that would not finally be settled until 1926. Unit chaplains in the trenches found that wearing the same uniform as their men gained them respect and acceptance, whereas clerical attire increased the distance between them. Pershing's commissioning of Bishop Brent clearly demonstrated this.  

The establishment of an American Army chaplain corps apart from the Adjutant General was resisted by the Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton March. He was in favor of establishing a rank structure through the grade of colonel for chaplains, but saw no reason for a staff chaplain on the Army Staff. Congress, however, after hearing testimony from the Protestant and Roman Catholic church leaders, saw the wisdom of providing religious leadership for all chaplains with a representative on the Army Staff. The National Defense Act of 1920 authorized the appointment of a Chief of Chaplains in the grade of colonel. He would investigate "the qualifications of candidates for appointment as chaplain, and [provide] general coordination and supervision of the work of the chaplains." The Army Chaplaincy, finally, had the senior level leadership to provide coordination and give direction for the care of souls.

General John J. Pershing is generally credited with supporting the efforts to elevate the status of chaplains from their former work as "handymen" to the commander to a
professional staff officer for religion. Pershing insisted that chaplains "be allowed to minister as clergymen" as their first duty. In 1923 the new Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (COL) John T. Axton, Jr., provided a significant change to Army regulations:

Chaplain: will be employed on no duties other than those require of them by law, or pertaining to their profession as clergymen, except when an exigency of the service... shall make it necessary. (AR 60-5)

Reports from chaplains serving around the world now came to the Chief of Chaplains Office, allowing him to monitor all duties performed by Army chaplains. Many of the ancillary duties that had accrued to the chaplain were handed off slowly to other Army staff officers.

The Army Chaplaincy emerged from World War I with positional leadership and a positive identity with the American soldier. General Pershing was so positively impressed with the efforts of Chaplain Brent, his A.E.F. Chaplain, that he wrote the Secretary of War:

To secure greater efficiency it has been necessary to have supervisory chaplains in each division and in each corps as well as the larger hospitals. It is fitting that chaplains assigned to these duties should have rank commensurate with their responsibilities.

When the recommendation was adopted, chaplains had an immediate identity with the members and leadership of the Army. Bishop Brent described the effect of this difference in his final report to the Adjutant General:

Both in theory and experience the truth has been driven home that the chaplain must be an integral part of the military establishment which he serves if he is going to reach his highest effectiveness. (emphasis added)
Supported by religious organizations which were anxious to enhance the professional competency of their clergymen in uniform and to assure quality ministry to the young soldiers of the nation, the post World War I changes were most significant: (1) establishment of a Chaplain School for induction, indoctrination, and training; (2) regulations to define duties and responsibilities; (3) a Chief of Chaplains to provide leadership for the branch; (4) a rank structure comparable to lawyers and physicians, and (5) a branch of service with their own insignia.

Between World War I and World War II the Army and the Chaplaincy reduced their numbers significantly. The branch was reduced to 125 active duty chaplains, while over 1,000 served in the Reserve Components of the Army. During these years, Active Duty chaplains served exceedingly well in the Civilian Conservation Corps camps, providing spiritual guidance to the young men of the nation who were so employed. Chaplain Gushwa summarized their efforts this way: "No experience of the Army chaplaincy could be looked on with more satisfaction than its service to the Civilian Conservation Corps."53

World War II saw the Army increase the ranks of chaplains from 125 to over 8,000, serving a 12 million man fighting force. There were no contingency plans to increase the chaplains in these proportions. Neglect of the military in the 1930s left the nation ill-prepared to fight a war on two oceans and three continents against two seasoned and ready enemy forces. However,
the citizen Army responded, as did the nation, to the call of the Commander-in-Chief. The forces of tyranny and aggression had to be halted.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, identified the need for quality clergymen in the ranks of the military with these words:

I am deeply concerned as to the type of chaplain we get into the Army, for I look upon the spiritual life of the soldier as even more important than his physical equipment. A good chaplain does not require a church; a poor one will empty a cathedral.

The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him, he cannot be relied upon and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.

It is morale - and I mean spiritual morale - which wins the victory in the ultimate, and that type of morale can only come out of the religious nature of the soldier who knows God and who had the spirit of religious fervor in his soul."

With support like this from the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Chaplains, now a major general by law, could procure chaplains who were trained, equipped, and prepared for the battlefields of North Africa, Europe and the Far East. New regulations, supplies, chapels, training funds, and a chaplain school gave testimony that the Chaplaincy had matured to the new demands of the Army.

Out of the war came an almost universal positive image of the chaplain as a uniformed man of God. In a 1944 article by an Army sergeant, "The Chaplain" is described this way:

He's the man who just a few months ago gave up a nice congregation, comparative luxury, and his loved ones to serve your sons in the armed forces anywhere on this earth that Uncle Sam might place him....
He's the man to whom the soldiers brings his troubles and problems for a sensible solution because the chaplain knows that beneath his uniform each soldier is a precious soul.... He's the man our armed forces couldn't get along without. He's the Chaplain, United States Army - God bless him.55

Exceptions to this attitude were rare. Reports praising the work of Army chaplains outnumbered the complaints by thirty to forty to one.56 As an illustration of the general support from the American people for the war effort and the military, one-half of the ordained rabbis in the United States volunteered to serve in the military. Over 2,400 Army chaplains were decorated for bravery to include the Congressional Medal of Honor. In terms of quality and effectiveness of the World War II chaplains, one statistic is a favorable indicator of the progress that had been made: In World War I, 220 chaplains were dismissed from the ranks of 2,500 chaplains for unsuitability; in World War II, 23 chaplains were so disciplined out of 5,000 on duty in 1943.57 The Army Chaplaincy had come of age.

B. THE UNITED STATES NAVY CHAPLAINCY

The Continental Navy Chaplaincy find its roots in the British Navy. The Continental Congress took care to direct ship commanders to conduct worship services weekly on board their ships and authorized pay for chaplains. John Paul Jones' correspondence describes the type of chaplain he wanted on his ship:

In the selection of a Chaplain the following qualifications are deemed requisite "I could wish him
to be a man of reading and of letters who understands, speaks and writes the French & English with elegance and propriety: For political reasons it would be well if he were a clergyman of the Protestant profession whose sanctity of manners and happy natural principles would diffuse unanimity and cheerfulness thro' the ship. 

During the Revolutionary War period the active duty Navy remained small, augmented by privateers. The only surviving records of active duty chaplains indicate that two were appointed. There were cases of the ship's surgeon serving also as religious leader, and many officers had this function as an extra duty.

In 1798 the Department of the Navy was separated from the War Department. The first United States Navy chaplain was commissioned in 1799 by President John Adams. He was instructioned to conduct divine services on board ships. The practice of hiring clergymen and schoolmasters by the ship's captain continued for 25 more years.

During the decade following the authorization of Navy chaplains, their numbers remained relatively few, never exceeding 12 in active service. This reflected President Jefferson's policy of maintaining a small Navy. The chaplains were predominately Episcopalian clergymen, and their duties were performed primarily on board ship - reading prayers at appropriate periods, conducting worship services and funeral ceremonies, teaching the young sailors, and writing logs and correspondence for the captain. The appointment of non-ordained persons as chaplains gradually disappeared as the ships' captains found the services of clergymen preferable to those of untrained laymen.
Some of the positive effects of having chaplains on sea duty were the changes witnessed in disciplinary measures and conduct. Flogging was a common means of disciplining intractable seamen. In reports, letters and published diaries chaplains disclosed to the general public the brutality of this punishment, engendering a ground swell of public outrage. To make matters worst, floggings were usually scheduled following Sunday church services. Although this tradition passed slowly, Navy chaplains were instrumental in its demise. The abuse of alcohol on board ships and the introduction of "abandoned ladies" in foreign ports, a euphemism for prostitutes, were also a part of chaplain's reports and letters. These reports incited pressure from the Congress to tighten Navy Regulations on such practices.62

Navy chaplains performed duties in addition to their ministrations similar to those in the 19th Century Army chaplaincy. Their teaching abilities made them natural educators. On board ship, the idea of collateral duties evolved for the chaplain, some of which are still performed today. Navy chaplains were the ship's librarian, recreation officer, published the ship's paper, and were often in charge of welfare and recreational activities. One chaplain reported his duties this way:

...[T]he Chaplain was not only the religious teacher but welfare officer, Athletic officer, frequently stood outlook watch, was one of Communicating Officers, and was Decoding Board.... It was up to him to provide entertainment..., boxing bouts, minstrel shows or in any other way that would meet the demands of the
situation. Vast reading matter was given him for distribution and many other comforts provide by civilian organizations were passed through his hand..."^^^63

Chaplains had to resist the temptation to become something other than clergymen in performing these ancillary duties. However, most Navy chaplains considered these efforts as extensions of their ministry. They willingly met the needs of sailors and officers on their ships performing these auxiliary duties.

The growth of the Navy chaplaincy took different directions from the Army. While the Army of the 19th Century was primarily the Army of the American frontier, the Navy was focused overseas. The number of Navy chaplains was linked directly with the number of warships in the fleet. Very few in their ranks performed shore duty.

When the American Civil War began there were 24 chaplains in the Navy. The war only added 12 additional chaplains to their ranks, whereas the Army chaplaincy grew to thousands. Navy chaplains, through appeals to the Secretary of the Navy, were granted the privilege of wearing a distinctive Navy uniform with their rank and a cross during this war. Support for religious services came from President Lincoln himself:

The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, desires and enjoins the orderly observance of the Sabbath by the officers and men in the military and naval service....

The discipline and character of the national forces should not suffer, nor the cause they defend be imperiled, by the profanation of the day or name of the Most High....

Abraham Lincoln"^^^64

Navy Regulations began to reflect the President’s desire.
The issue of relative rank for the Navy chaplains emerged shortly after the Civil War. The Navy officer corps is distinguished by a sharp division between "officers of the line" and "staff officers." Chaplains, medical officers, and lawyers clearly were staff officers, but by virtue of their education, length of service and experience, they frequently wore relative rank superior to the line officers on the ship. The key issues were living accommodations and respect accorded to these officers. At one point a number of chaplains were appointed to the Navy exceeding of the 18 ranked billets. They were simply assigned to ships as "chaplains" without rank. Not being "officers," the captain gave them accommodations in the ship's steerage. The matter was appealed to the Secretary of the Navy and corrected by general order:

...Chaplains whose relative rank is not fixed by law will, in the assignment of quarters, - in the matter of uniform, - & in all cases affecting their official status, be regarded & treated as having the relative rank of Lieutenants."

Reforms in the Navy Chaplaincy following the Civil War were far more progressive than in the Army. Standards of age, physical health, education, and ecclesiastical qualifications were far more important to the Navy than those enacted by the Army. The Navy Chaplain's ranks were thinned following the war by cuts in military spending, but in most cases those retired from the ranks were the older and less fit chaplains. Mandatory attendance at Divine Services on ships was eliminated, and denominational needs were met by the offering of General Worship.
opportunities which could be conducted by Protestant or Roman Catholic chaplains. The first Roman Catholic priest entered the Navy chaplaincy in 1888.\textsuperscript{67} In general, the latter half of the 19th century witnessed a small, stable, but very effective Navy Chaplaincy.\textsuperscript{68}

The Navy Chaplaincy of the 19th Century still lacked leadership from the top. Like the Army Chaplaincy there were many good clergymen in uniform, but no guiding principles of operation and no official leadership to coordinate their efforts. The manuals that helped them with their duties were largely those records passed down from prior generations of chaplains. These had no official standing. Ship captains had directives from the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander-in-Chief on the support of religion on ships, but these were engendered largely by direct appeals from individual chaplains or civilian clergymen.

By its very nature the Navy formed a closed society. Those in its ranks served on repeated tenures of sea duty and bonded together as an institution of personnel with similar experiences. Outsiders were not welcomed in this society, and newcomers had to undergo formal and informal rites of initiation. It was only natural that chaplains serving in the ranks of the Navy had similar experiences. One chaplain writing to the \textit{Army and Navy Journal} in 1877 describes well the life of a Navy chaplain:

A man-of-war is not like a village parish, and its work is radically different from that on shore. It is a little monarchy, with its own laws and customs; these are so numerous that two years will not suffice to learn them all, and until they are learned every chaplain must needs work to some disadvantage. ...
chaplain who is himself a sailor will have the most influence with the men, and can reach them when no one else can. He will become a sailor by going to sea, and not by being appointed for a single cruise. (emphasis added)  

Even more than the Army, the Navy was a closed social group. By its very nature, sea duty separated sailors from civilian society. The most effective chaplains in both services were those who could identify directly with the men they served in lifestyle, living arrangements, and appearance. Almost all commanders appreciated and supported their efforts among the crew, raising morale and providing a superior moral climate. Identity with these men was one key to their success.  

The Spanish-American War was primarily a Naval conflict. The Navy increased the numbers of personnel in its ranks, but not the number of chaplains. Twenty-four chaplains filled out the chaplain quota of officers. Shortfalls became obvious when ministry to combat casualties and death notifications taxed the ability of these 24 men of God. No state militia chaplains were available to swell the ranks of the Navy chaplaincy as was the common practice in Army mobilizations. Drury accurately identified the weaknesses in the Navy system that this war proved:

There was no organized Chaplain Corps to build up an esprit de corps; no Director or Chief in Washington to intercede on their behalf; no medium through which they could exchange helpful ideas and methods of work; and little if any interest in their work on the part of the denominations from which they came. With conditions so discouraging, it is understandable that several able chaplains resigned their commissions.  

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After the turn of the century the Navy, under the direction of President Theodore Roosevelt, became the premier arm of service. He doubled the size of the force, but the ranks of the chaplains remained constant at 24. Their number had not increased in nearly seventy-two years. While the quality of chaplains improved with the selection better clergymen and requirements for ecclesiastical endorsement, their numbers were woefully lacking. Retired Navy leaders and concerned churchmen petitioned the Congress for more chaplains. As a result, the apportionment of chaplains was established by law as one chaplain for each 1,250 sailor or marine, "including midshipmen, apprentice seamen, and naval prisoners...." This provision in law would accommodate wartime fluctuations.

Petitions for a Chief of Navy Chaplains fell on deaf ears until 1917. Efforts had been underway since 1871 to have senior chaplain leadership on the Navy Staff, but they were ignored. The chaplain assignment process demonstrated this weakness vividly. Older, more experienced chaplains served on smaller vassals, while newer less experienced chaplains were assigned to the new battleship fleets. A Chief of Chaplains would not only improve the assignment process, but he would also become instrumental in selecting and training new chaplains for the Corps. There is no question that the early phases of World War I in Europe awakened the Department of the Navy to America's future involvement and necessary changes needed in the Navy.

On November 5, 1917, the Secretary of the Navy appointed
Chaplain John B. Frazier as head of the Chaplain Corps. Frazier was a well-respected Navy chaplain of many years service and a close associate of the Secretary. He was assigned to the Bureau of Navigation (personnel and assignments), but his friendship with the Secretary of the Navy and his own personal influence and efficiency caused immediate changes for the better in the midst of the war. The wartime growth of the Navy Chaplaincy under the leadership of Chaplain Frazier was much more effective and efficient than that experienced by the Army in Europe.

Navy chaplains had provided ministry to the Marines on their vessels and bases continuously since the earliest days of the Navy. The assignment of a chaplain exclusively to the U.S. Marine Corps first occurred in 1912 during an operation in Nicaragua. This Navy chaplain went ashore with the fighting force, buried their dead, and ministered to their wounded in the field hospitals. The natural, long term association of the Marines with Navy chaplains elicited no efforts to form a Marine Corps chaplaincy.

During World War I, the Navy grew from 87,000 to 150,000 and the Marine Corps from 17,400 to 30,000. The Navy Chaplaincy began the war with 40 chaplains. By the end of the war 533,000 Navy, Marine, Coast Guard, and Reserve forces were under the supervision of the Department of the Navy. To increase the ranks of the Navy Chaplaincy, the Chief of Chaplains activated the few reserve and naval militia chaplains. He also appointed acting chaplains, temporary acting chaplains, and temporary chaplains.
By the end of the war there were 203 chaplains of various types in the Navy, including 44 Roman Catholic priests and one rabbi. Those who went ashore with the Marines found their closest allies among the Army chaplains who were in their area of operations. The number of the Army chaplains, while insufficient for the large number of troops, was far higher proportionally than the Navy chaplains serving with the Marines.

From World War I many positive lessons emerged for the Navy Chaplaincy. First, the appointment of a Chief of Chaplains gave the Navy a decided advantage over the Army in giving direction for ministry and standardizing chaplain duties. Second, chaplain procurement was under the oversight of the Chief of Chaplains. He set high standards and coordinated with religious organizations to meet the needs of the Navy. Third, a system of technical supervision was established to monitor and direct the work of chaplains in the fleets. Fourth, the requirement for a pool of reserve Navy chaplains to be called up in wartime was definitely established. Finally, the work of Navy chaplains universally won the acclaim of sailors and officers alike throughout the Navy.

Between World War I and World II America significantly demobilized its naval forces. A strong peace sentiment in the Nation kept defense budgets low and personnel authorizations minimal. The Navy chaplaincy was cut back to just under 100 and maintained an end strength of 80-90 chaplains for the twenty year interwar period. The ratio of one chaplain for each 1,250 Navy
personnel was never realized in the Navy chaplaincy of the 1920s and 1930s. The Secretary of the Navy identified the problem as a shortage of qualified clergymen applying for service in the Navy:

There seems to be little desire on the part of clergy to enter this field. The life and work are such as to require men of particular temperament and equipment. An appeal has been made to all the leading theological seminaries of the country, requesting that the attention of their student bodies be directed to the vacancies existing in the Navy....

The number of reserve chaplains did increase during these years. By 1939 there were 63 chaplains on the roles of the Reserve Chaplain Corps, 32 of whom were veterans of World War I. Age would become a problem for the next mobilization.

The Navy chaplaincy was not immune to the pacifism that became popular among Christian churches in the interwar years. Criticisms of clergymen in uniform by pacifist groups were rampant. The Federal Council of Churches spearheaded an effort to divorce its member denominations from the evils of war by exposing the faults of having clergy in uniform. The results of their study, however, had the opposite effect:

[The chaplain] is very much a part of the military or naval establishment. He has, it is true, a strong sense of religious vocation. One cannot read the statements of these men about their calling without being impressed with the authentic pastoral conscientiousness which they reveal. The chaplain has quite a definite sense of "belonging" to the service and he believes that the wearing of the uniform is essential to his efficiency. He believes that as a civilian he would be an outsider.... The chaplains unconsciously reflect it in their characterization of their own office. They become assimilated to the establishment of which they are a part and they take the regimen as a matter of course. They are in and of the service; they believe in it profoundly and are happy in their belief. (emphasis added)
No significant negative results could be identified by the study resulting from uniformed clergy providing for the religious needs of the American military forces. The efforts of pacifist groups waned.

World War II witnessed the rapid expansion of the Navy from its interwar strength of 150,000 to 4 million. The Navy chaplaincy expanded to a wartime high of 2,811. Ninety-six percent of the Navy chaplains who served in World War II did so with Reserve Commissions. The Regular Navy only added 109 chaplains during the war.

The Navy Chaplaincy reveals many individual incidents of distinguished service. One chaplain was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry in the face of enemy fire. Five chaplains were interned as prisoners of war by the Japanese, but only two survived. Twenty-four chaplains died in action with their men, four perishing in the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Throughout World War II the Navy Chief of Chaplains, operating under the Bureau of Navigation (later Personnel), demonstrated his efficiency. Chaplain Robert D. Workman, the sixth Chief of Chaplains, was responsible for coordinating all chaplaincy matters with other Navy agencies. He managed such things as procurement, welfare, planning and control. Recruiting, induction, training and assignment of new chaplains were his direct responsibility, as well as maintaining direct contact with civilian religious leaders who would provide the
young ministers he needed in the chaplaincy. Workman had to make sure that the Navy's religious needs were met through a careful balancing of denominations represented in the ranks. His policies short-circuited public criticism and created a more efficient chaplaincy. Frequently, he was called to Capitol Hill to testify before Congressional oversight committees, and just as often he provided the news media with information concerning the spiritual well-being of the nation's sons and daughters in the Navy. He made sure that supervisory positions were filled with properly experienced senior chaplains. In addition to these administrative responsibilities, Chaplain Workman made frequent inspection and encouragement visits to chaplains in assignments around the world. During one of these visits to Saipan, he was greeted by the commanding officer as Admiral Workman. Before Chaplain Workman could correct him, General Kimball showed him a dispatch announcing his promotion to Rear Admiral, appointing him Navy Chief of Chaplains. Workman's staff would continue to work as a division of the Bureau of Personnel for several years, but the Navy Chaplaincy achieved status as an official branch of the Navy within a year.

The Navy Chaplaincy developed a distinctive personality through its history of sea duty. Its chaplains moved back and forth between shore and sea duty, and Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard assignments. They adapted to the demands of separation and the hardships of sea life. They had no civilian community to turn to for support in the absence of specific
denominational groups. These chaplains became flexible in their ministry, providing for all of their service members.

C. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE CHAPLAINCY

Nowadays, anyone considering land and sea operations of any importance must of necessity remember that above the land and sea is the air.

- Giulio Douhet

The United States Air Force did not become a separate branch of service until 1947, but its chaplaincy did not separate from the Army Chaplaincy until 1949. The wartime application of air power had long historical roots, linked to the development of the airplane as an instrument of war. The earliest Army aviators served in the Signal Corps. They flew in observation and communication air bags in the Civil War. Not until World War I did aviation become a significant facet of the fighting force. There were very few chaplains who served with Army aviation during this war because air bases were located far in the rear of the combat forces, and the priority of the A.E.F. Chaplain, Bishop Charles H. Brent, was to place chaplains in the front line units. For this reason, civilian auxiliary agencies like the Y.M.C.A., the Knights of Columbus and the Red Cross provided religious services, generally, to Air Base personnel. The strength of Bishop Brent’s personality and his tremendous leadership made this arrangement work, even though it was less than ideal. The A.E.F. Chaplain was short approximately one-third of the chaplains he needed to provide complete ministry to the forces in Europe.

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Between the World Wars, aviation units continued to be a part of the Army. Many air bases were too small to warrant the assignment of an Army chaplain. As a result, these bases and air fields went without religious services. The active duty Army chaplaincy was reduced to 125 chaplains, 33 of whom were in overseas assignments. Only three air bases had chaplains on their table of organization during the 1930s. 81

Before the Second World War began the Army airmen numbered 26,000. Their ranks would swell to 2.4 million before the end of the war. General George C. Marshall saw the benefit of a unified and independent air service. He divided the Army into three commands - Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Support Forces. General H.H. "Hap" Arnold became the first leader of the Air Forces of the Army.

The Army Chief of Chaplains was a Roman Catholic priest - Colonel William R. Arnold. General "Hap" Arnold and Chaplain Bill Arnold developed a close friendship that aided greatly in the religious support for airmen. This personal confidence would eventually bring about the creation of the Air Force Chaplaincy. Chaplain Arnold also had a close personal friendship with General Marshall. General Marshall frequently sought Chaplain Arnold to offer support for his chaplains.

Chaplain Arnold created a position in the Chief of Chaplains Office entitled the "Air Liaison Chaplain." The chaplain in this position communicated directly with chaplains assigned to air bases and identified their special needs. Chaplain Arnold also
created a position on General Arnold's Air Staff called the "Air Chaplain." His job was to provide direct coordination with the Air Staff on matters of religion, chaplain support, and assignments. Chaplain Charles I. Carpenter was selected for this position. Carpenter had already established himself as a very capable organizer and energetic worker in previous Army Air Corps assignments. He had the unenviable task of organizing a new staff section and defining roles and responsibilities in the midst of a war! Within a year Chaplain Carpenter was promoted from captain to colonel. He built a staff around three areas: personnel functions; plans, training and support functions; and a Deputy Air Chaplain. Chaplains assigned to the Army Air Force increased from 268 to 1,249 within a year.82

The Air Liaison Chaplain in the Chief of Chaplains Office described himself as a "shock absorber between the Chief of Chaplains and the Air Chaplain offices.83 The Air Chaplain reported directly to the Commander of the Army Air Forces, but relied on the Army Chief of Chaplains to procure, train, and assign chaplains to his force. Problems that emerged between the two offices centered around reports and lines of communication. By the end of the war these had been solved by common agreement.

The end of the Second World War saw the elevation of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Chaplains to flag rank, giving them equity with other members of the service staffs. When Chaplain Arnold retired, his successor, Chaplain Luther D. Miller, had the responsibility of drawing down the Chaplaincy from its wartime
high of over 8,000 clergymen to its post war number of 1,200. The Army and its chaplains had world-wide responsibilities, serving troops in occupation of Japan and Germany, as well as on Army posts and air bases throughout the United States.

The establishment of a separate Air Force and the creation of an Air Force Chaplaincy were linked directly to the leadership of the post war organizations. When the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 became law, the U.S. Air Force was created from the ranks of Army personnel. By agreement of the two services, medical, legal, engineering, and chaplain support for the Air Force would be provided by the U.S. Army. General Carl Spaatz, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was happy with this arrangement in spite of the recommendation of his Air Chaplain to the contrary. General Spaatz met with Chaplain Miller, the Army Chief of Chaplains, to discuss the arrangement. Army chaplains were to be detailed to the Air Force for three to four year tours of duty and then rotated back to the Army. General Spaatz immediately saw that he would have no control over chaplain assignments or choosing personnel to provide spiritual guidance to his airmen. In the course of one conversation with Chaplain Miller, he reversed his decision and bid for a separate Air Force Chaplaincy. It became effective in 1949.

Why had there been this sudden reversal? Most of the factors in General Spaatz' decision remain between himself and Chaplain Miller. However, this was a decision that benefitted both services. The words of Chaplain Maurice Reynolds, who had
served as General Spaatz' Eighth Air Force Chaplain, capture the essence of Spaatz' decision:

The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force work in three different mediums — sea, land, and air — and there are problems which are distinct and different in each of these components, with the result that the greatest efficiency for the chaplaincy can be obtained from men who are thoroughly familiar with the peculiar problems and difficulties which confront these various services. There is a difference in language...customs ...and discipline. (emphasis added)

The Air Force Chaplaincy had already begun to take on a personality of its own. Airmen had been served by Army chaplains since World War I. These chaplains identified with their parishioners, knew their work environment, and built special programs that addressed them in their milieu of warfare. So much were they a part of the lives of these men and women that when the chaplaincies split, of the 458 Army chaplains assigned to Air Force billets, fewer than 10 elected to remain with the Army. The United States Air Force Chaplaincy began with an experienced, seasoned group of clergymen.

In 1950 the Air Force Chaplaincy raised the question of establishing a unified chaplain school. The Army Air Corps had conducted a two week orientation course for Army chaplains assigned to the air service since 1943. During the transition period after World War II, Air Force chaplains continued to receive basic chaplain training with the Army. The Air Force Chief of Chaplains petitioned the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, a new Department of Defense Agency created to address religious issues that affected all branches of service, to recommend to the
Secretary of Defense that a unified chaplain school be established under the primary oversight of the Army. The Navy dissented because the Under Secretary of the Navy considered that the primary mission of the branch school was to familiarize students with the mission and functions of the particular branch of service. That familiarization could not take place in another service chaplain school. Efforts to unite the two chaplain schools faded, but the Air Force continued to train their chaplains at the Army Chaplain School through the decade of the 1950's.

In May 1960 the Secretary of the Air Force established the United States Air Force Chaplain School. This formal recognition of this Air Force school ended the debates that had been going on for a decade about curriculum, special education needs of Air Force Chaplains, and faculty membership.

D. SUMMARY HISTORICAL REMARKS:

The history and growth of the three branches of service are tied directly to the growth of the nation and the increasing requirement of the people to defend themselves on land, sea and air. The Founding Fathers of the Nation identified the need to provide for the spiritual welfare of its fighting citizens. At no time or place were these needs more intense than when these brave citizens confronted their own mortality in war. Efforts by the Congress and the leadership of the military had fits and starts that did not always hit the mark, but gradually there
emerged in all three American fighting forces a trained, dedicated, well-lead uniformed clergy which represented the cross-section of the American people. Each service would have its own character and institutional identity, not unlike the medium of war in which it functioned. Effective ministry required each chaplaincy to learn to live and operate in that medium.

The argument from history alone cannot stand the scrutiny of meeting the current demands for change. The argument fails when one says, "We have always done it that way." At no point in their histories can the three chaplaincies declare that this is the way ministry was always done in the military. Ministry was done in many ways through the years in the Army and Navy, at times more effectively than others. Other factors will have to be considered along with historical precedence in designing the chaplaincy of the future.

MILITARY SERVICE PERSONALITIES AND INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITIES

The cappellanus was a member of one institution - a priest of the church - serving in another institution - the king's army. Definitions of the chaplaincy seldom take sufficient account of this fact of institutional duality.89

Institutional identity is one of the keys to the success of the military chaplaincy, maintains retired Navy chaplain RADM Richard Hutcheson, Jr. His thesis is that the chaplain must walk the fine line of identity so as not to lose his dual institutional identity - with the church that sends him into military ministry.
and the military that provides the nexus of this ministry.

The chaplain is not just half-military and half-church. He is fully a member of both institutions. Though he leaves the job environment of the church, he retains full institutional status. His function in the armed forces is that of a clergyman.\textsuperscript{90}

The chaplain’s entry into this institution requires a transformation. Chaplains must adapt to the totality of the institution of military service—uniforms, regulations, duties and responsibilities, customs and courtesies, structures and restrictions that have few civilian counterparts. To be effective as a minister in uniform, the clergyman must metamorphose into his new environment. Hutcheson states:

\begin{quote}
[T]here are some military chaplains who remain in culture shock for full twenty-year careers. For beneath the superficial level of adaptation to the external symbols and rituals, effective ministry as a military chaplain requires at a deeper level an understanding of the characteristics of the secular institution in which the ministry is to be offered. These characteristics are different from those of the civilian parish church, and unless the difference is understood, the chaplain may go on for years offering the kind of ministry which neither fits nor bears fruit in the institution he has joined.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

It follows that the chaplain who makes this transition and identifies closely with the institution he serves, is better able to provide ministry to both the members of the institution and to the institution itself.

Hutcheson adapts Erving Goffman’s characteristics of a "total institution" to his descriptions of the military.\textsuperscript{92} Total institutions control the lives of their constituent members. All of the features of the member’s lives are primarily with the members of the institution. Total institutions have a
bureaucratic superstructure that handles the needs of its members. A hierarchy of supervision assigns the work load, issuing commands and orders. Certain marks distinguish those who are in the institution and those who are outside - physical barriers, controlled entrances, dress codes, customs, procedures, and, in some, rites of entry and rites of passage.

Those who serve in the military recognize almost all of Goffman's total institution traits in describing military service. Upon entry into the service, all recruits enter basic training where they are stripped of all vestiges of the outside world - clothing, hair, dignity and worth. They learn that their leaders are now "their father, their mother, their sister and their brother." They immediately learn the "chain of command" that will get them up, put them to bed and fill every conscious moment with work and activity. They wear uniforms to identify them with their branch of the military institution, to include their underwear and socks. Their lives are managed from entry to discharge by others. Even after their time in service, they carry the marks of service. Numerous veterans organizations extend their identity with the brotherhood of soldiers, sailors and airmen into their civilian afterlife.

Within the total institution of the military there are four subcultures that have their own distinct characteristics - Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. Within these four subcultures there are tribal groups that cross the basic identity lines, but only for their specialty. The tribe of aviators has common identity
in all four service arms. Artillerymen perform the same basic function, whether delivered from the platform of a ship or a field artillery piece. Administrators and logisticians record and procure independent of their branch of service. Chaplains, lawyers, surgeons, engineers, and communicators share technical union, but this technical link is not as binding as their basic service identity. Paratroopers bond together around common danger; submariners alone know the long passages through the oceans; divers alone appreciate the lonely silence of the depths. However strong these bonds may be, their Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force identity marks them apart for life.

Chaplains serving in the four services identify with the people for whom they provide ministry. Navy chaplain Robert D. Workman states this philosophy best with these words: "Our chaplains do not wait for the men to come to them, although there is a time and a place set aside for such visits. They go to the men." Some of these clergymen become identified with the various service tribal identities and enhance their ministry by participating in training and deployments with these forces. Hutcheson described this identity well:

To share insider status with parishioners in a total institution is a condition of ministry of which the importance would be hard to overemphasize.... The serviceman knows by the uniform that they belong to the same club, that they have something in common. (emphasis added)

He described four ways this insider status enhances the ministry of the chaplain. First, it removes the artificiality of identity that distinguishes the civilian clergyman from his flock. The
local pastor frequently sees his membership only on Sunday, whereas the military chaplain lives, trains, and at times eats and sleeps with his members. Second, the serviceman and the chaplain share a lifestyle that is not comparable to the civilian pastor. Third, the chaplain is in daily contact with the churched as well as the unchurched population. The military chaplain is every soldier's chaplain, not just ministering to those who attend his chapel. Finally, the chaplain provides ministry to the institution itself, not just to the people who make up the organization. This will be explored more fully later.95

Carl Builder has provided exceptional insight into the institutional makeup of the three of the services in a recent study.96 His book advances three simple arguments:

1. Institutions, while composed of many, ever-changing individuals, have distinct and enduring personalities of their own that govern much of their behavior.

2. The most powerful institution in the American national security arena are the military services - the Army, Navy and Air Force - not the Department of Defense or Congress or even their commander in chief, the president.

3. To understand the distinct and enduring personalities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force is to understand much that has happened and much that will happen in the American military and national security arenas.97

These distinct personalities are keys to understanding the institutional behavior of the three service branches. "The personality differences of the three American services are profound, pervasive and persistent.... They will persist even through the trauma of war."98 The more common use of
"personality" is with individuals. Builder expands the usage to include institutions:

The problem, of course, is attributing a 'personality' to any body made up of individuals. The variance among individuals may be enormous, yet the institution may take on a distinctive personality. Few, perhaps none, of the individuals will have the same personality as the institution; but collectively, they take on a recognizable personality.

The distinctive personality of each service is derived from many factors: the history of the organization, the strong individual personalities of key leaders, the mission of the organization, the equipment it uses to accomplish the mission, and the relationship between the organization and the nation.

Like all individuals and durable groups, the military services have acquired personalities of their own that are shaped by their experiences and that, in turn, shape their behavior. And like individuals, the service personalities are likely to be significantly marked by the circumstances attending their early formation and their most recent traumas.

Builder justifies his application of a psychological concept to military organizations this way:

Personality characterizations are like analytical models: They cannot be perfect precisely because they are models. If they were perfect, they would not be models; they would be the modeled object itself. The utility of the model is not its perfection of the object but the capturing of essential and important features in something simpler than the object.

The personality model is useful as a tool for analyzing the salient characteristics which form the identity of each service. This sense of shared identity and the other characteristics of institutional personality strengthen the organizations themselves. Builder continues:
The Navy, more than any of the other services and over anything else, is an institution. That institution is marked by two strong senses of itself: its independence and stature....

The Navy alone of the three services possesses air, ground, and sea combat capability. All three capabilities are unified in their linkage to the sea. The sea is the platform for all Navy operations. Builder describes the personality of the Air Force this way:

The Air Force, conceived by the theorists of air power as an independent and decisive instrument of warfare, sees itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare.... The bond is not an institution, but the love of flying machines and flight.... It is the keeper and wielder of the decisive instruments of war - the technological marvels of flight that have been adapted to war.

The basic personality of the Army is described this way:

The Army sees itself, ultimately, as the essential artisans of war, still divided into their traditional combat arms...but forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually supportive brotherhood of guilds [branches].... The guilds are joined in a brotherhood because, like brothers, they have a common family bond (the Army) and a recognition of their dependency upon each other in combat.... It is about keeping itself prepared to meet the varied demands the American people have historically asked of it, but especially prepared to forge America's citizenry into an expeditionary force to defeat America's enemies overseas.

He describes five faces of service personality with which the reader can better understand each component: (1) Altars for worship, (2) concerns with self-measurement, (3) preoccupation with toys versus the arts, (4) degrees and extent of intraservice (or branch) distinctions, and (5) insecurities about service
legitimacy and relevancy. Exploring several of these faces would be instructive in understanding each service.

The Navy has always cherished and clung to tradition as its most important unifying altar; technology guides the future of the Air Force; and the Army is bound together by its history of service to the nation, its citizen-soldier roots, and its utter devotion to country.

In terms of self-measures, the Army defines its capabilities by its end strength, which translates into the number of divisions it can field. The Navy measures itself by the number of capital ships and submarines in the fleet. The Air Force views the quality of the aircraft as more important than the number of bombers and fighters available. Air wings are only as effective as the latest technological advances render them.

In the area of "toys verses arts," the Army has historically stressed soldier skills over equipment. The technological advances in tanks and weapons systems of the 1980s have modified this somewhat, but generally, a well-trained but poorly equipped force will be considered superior to a poorly trained but well-equipped force. The Navy values the sea and ships over the latest technology on the market. The Air Force values equipment over airman skill.

The three services derive their concept of war from their history, especially from their instances of successful warfare. For the Army, World War II in Europe demonstrated its ability to engage the enemy, maneuver against his forces, and defeat him on
the battlefield. It was a warfare of contact. The Navy's finest hour came in the Pacific when surface and subsurface ships engaged enemy fleets and Marine forces hopped from island to island pushing back the Empire of Japan onto its homeland. The air forces seized control of the air in Europe systematically bombed the German homeland with strategic bombing raids. These historical success stories provide the models for the current concept of war in the three services.\footnote{109}

Ministry to the personnel of the three forces has to take into cognizance the mission and concept of war of the service chaplains serve. Army chaplains move into the battlefield with the forces, set up their tents with the soldiers and bring ministry to the forward edge of battle where fear, suffering and death are most real. They are vulnerable to the same terrors of combat as their parishioners. They must have the same survival skills as the foot soldier. They must be able to move on the battlefield to where the hospitals, the casualty collection points, and the assembly areas are located. They must know maps and terrain. They must be able to advise the commander on the factors of combat that affect morale. They must know the religious factors of the indigenous populations of the combat zone as well as those of the enemy forces.

Navy chaplains move into combat with the crew of the ship to whom they minister. Theirs is a captive parish, circumscribed by the limits of the ship. For the ship to be an effective fighting instrument, the crew must be imbued with a sense of
teamwork. The Navy most frequently fights an enemy it never sees, and confronts a death that encompasses all of the crew. Officer and enlisted members of the crew face suffering and death by drowning, suffocation, or explosion, equally.

Air Force chaplains watch the fighting arm of the force fly away into the teeth of the enemy, but seldom face the imminent prospects of death themselves. Theirs is a ministry of preparation and recovery. They wait with the families and crew members for the return of the fighting arm. Lost pilots and crew members are seldom recovered for burial until long after their death. The fighting arm is largely comprised of the officer corps. The support arm is largely among the enlisted airmen. The pilot and his crew faces instant death in air combat. They can be at one moment in the cockpit of the most technologically advanced warfighting machine known to man and in the next instant on the ground with a broken bone in the most hostile, primitive environment imaginable, hunted by irate civilians who have just experienced the destructive force of their bombs. The chaplain must prepare the pilot and his crew for that possibility.

The Air Force Chaplain and his enlisted chapel manager must be able to function in remote areas, frequently in foreign lands among alien, non-Judeo-Christian populations. They will seldom fly air missions with the pilots and crews, but they must be thoroughly cognizant of the hazards of flight, if they are to provide meaningful ministry to these warriors.
The first portion of this study recounts the dynamic history of the three service chaplaincies. Change has been a constant part of each chaplaincy. Usually the changes offered improvements to the clergyman's ability to minister to servicemen and their families. However, change is disruptive to the life of an organization. It does not always improve its ability to function. Unless the change has a purpose based on improving ministry, or the change saves resources and economizes on the religious assets available, or the change produces a more efficient organization which is more responsive to the personnel in the organization, it can hardly produce better results. Ministry is both fragile and durable. Its immediate application is fragile - based on the union of the clergyman and his parishioner. That union is achieved by their common humanity, their habitual association, and the bonds of identity in an organization - church, chapel, parish, synagogue, community. In the military chaplaincy, the bonds of identity extend to the organization itself. But ministry is also durable. It continued through dark ages of church history, crossed intellectual and social barriers, transcended the cultural walls of Oriental, African, and Occidental continents. Ministry has endured persecutions and domestications. The chaplaincies have the same opportunities and limitations that define ministry.
A. Consolidation of All Chaplaincies into One Defense Chaplaincy:

Total consolidation is one option of change. The service chaplaincies could become one "purple suited" branch operating under the supervision of the Department of Defense. To accomplish this, a new office in the Department of Defense would have to be created. This new office could be manned by personnel from the three Chiefs of Chaplains offices, but their reporting line of communication would be to the Secretary of Defense or one of his undersecretaries.

**Advantages:** Consolidation would save some personnel spaces by creating one administrative headquarters activity. It would streamline the religious support to the services. It would enable the Defense Chief of Chaplains to cross-level chaplain resources in the shortage faith groups. It would give the civilian religious organizations one point of contact to reach their clergymen. It would immediately settle religious issues at the Department of Defense level, instead of allowing contending service chaplaincy positions and turf battles. The combined chaplain school would be a Department of Defense school. It would report directly to the Defense Chief of Chaplains, rather than through the service training commands. The chaplaincy would have more direct control over the curriculum, training, and activity in the school than currently exists.

**Disadvantages:** The chaplaincy would lose its service identity. The chaplain would always be considered an agent of
the Defense Department, rather than a member of the Armed Forces. He would be an outsider, intruding into the operational and support activities of the services. He would not be considered a member of the team. He would be in a position to by-pass the service chain of command since his reporting chain eventually reaches the Department of Defense Chaplain. At the consolidated chaplain school, the issue of curriculum would be problematic. It would have to be focused on four services, four different environments for ministry, four military cultures. At the current service chaplain schools, the core of the education and training attempts to bridge the gap between civilian ministry and the service in which the chaplain’s ministry will function. The consolidated school would have to incorporate all four services into the transition process. This could be done initially by tracks - Army track, Navy/Marine track, and Air Force track; but for chaplains to be able to cross the service lines in future assignment, additional training would be necessary. The issue of service doctrine would have to be settled.

Doctrine is an accepted body of professional knowledge. Military doctrine compromises fundamental principles by which the military forces...guide their actions in support of national objectives.... Moreover, it standardizes terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all U.S. forces.¹¹⁰

Services have their own doctrine, which should not be incompatible with Department of Defense doctrine. It will, however, have its own service component features. All of the services agree on the chaplains mission to provide essential...
elements of ministry to soldiers and service families. All agree that "free exercise of religion" as defined in the U.S. Constitution and interpreted by the courts and military regulations are essential parts of the chaplain's work. All services agree that chaplains are non-combatants and should work within the provisions of the laws of warfare and the Geneva and Hague conventions. All services agree that the chaplain is primarily a clergyman, representing his particular denomination on military duty, and able to function within the limits of the denomination's religious and legal tenets. All services agree that the chaplain is the commander's staff officer for religion and morality as affected by religion.

All services do not agree, however, on the duties and responsibilities of chaplains. As illustrated above, the Navy assigns auxiliary duties to chaplains on board ships that the other services detail to other staff officers. Army chaplains provide primarily a unit, post and hospital based ministry. Navy chaplains provide ship, hospital, and station ministry. Air Force chaplains provide community, family, unit and hospital based ministry. Supervisory chaplains in all three services provide ministry to the headquarters personnel, first, and then perform supervisory functions to the chaplains in their commands. All chaplains train to survive within their service medium in times of war, but the medium is vastly different, varying from sea, to air, to wide ranges of land conflict. All chaplains also provide ministry to the institution they serve.
The Navy, more than the other two services, experiences the ebb and flow of deployment by the very nature of its mission. Apart from crisis or training, the Army deploys infrequently. The Air Force operates from a stateside or overseas air base, and experiences the fewest long term deployments of the three services. The Navy, on the other hand, operates at sea on three to six month cruise cycles, separating families for repeated deployments throughout the sailor’s career. That which is crisis or training for the Army is routine for the Navy. Short-time separations are exceptional. For the Army, one to two year, unaccompanied hardship tours of duty occur once or twice in a soldier’s military life, unless there is a war.

Would consolidation improve ministry? Probably not. In fact, it would probably diminish the chaplain’s ability to perform ministry because of the artificial barriers created between himself and his congregation. He would be an outsider, without service identity, without support or operational linkage within the service. His role would be that of a religious functionary, instead of an integral member of the command team.

B. Maintain Three Service Chaplaincies with a Department of Defense Chaplain Administrative Headquarters:

The creation of a Department of Defense Staff Chaplain who would have technical supervision and control over three service staff chaplains is another option worth considering. This option would require the selection and appointment of a Defense Chief of
Chaplains, establishing this office with mission and functions, transfer of functions from service Chiefs of Chaplains to this new office, defining roles and relationships with civilian religious agencies and other Defense and service agencies, defining support and operational responsibilities, and finally manning and equipping this office. The mission and functions of the already existing Department of Defense Armed Forces Chaplains Board would probably be subsumed into this organization.

**Advantages:** This option has the attractiveness of reducing service staffs and unifying chaplaincy efforts. Two of the major general billets could be eliminated, a definite cost saving measure. The denominations that work with the service chaplains would have one single point of contact in accessioning and endorsing chaplains into the active force. The problem of faith balance among the services would be handled by this office, eliminating the problems of competition among the services for shortage faith group chaplains. There would be one single person responsible for all religious support to service personnel and their families. The services would retain their staff chaplains who would work with the various staffs on service specific issues.

**Disadvantages:** This option complicates the lines of responsibility. Are the service staff chaplains responsible to their Chiefs of Staff and service secretaries, or are they responsible to the Defense Chief of Chaplains? The obvious answer is "both." Chaplains always live with dual loyalty in
their roles as chaplains — loyalty to their religious organization and loyalty to the service. The new structure would split their loyalty three ways — to their service, the Defense Chief of Chaplains, and their denomination. The rub of this split loyalty does not become real until one looks at specific issues — balancing faith groups among the services, developing and appropriating resources for ministry, rotating the position of Defense Chief of Chaplains among the three services, giving the Defense Chief of Chaplains more than ceremonial and titular responsibilities, defining roles and missions for service chiefs, and operating in joint and combined operations. The functions that are currently done by the three service Chiefs of Chaplains would not diminish. They would become more complicated because of the three service budget system. Chapel construction, policy development, personnel assignments, recruiting and accessioning of chaplains, administrative procedures, professional development, school selection, promotion boards and other functions would continue in the service staff chaplain’s office, with some duplication of these in the Defense Chief of Chaplains Office. Rather than reducing redundancies, this new office would probably create more.

There would be some cost savings if this option were adopted. The cost saving would be in the elimination of two major general positions. However, this cost saving would be negated by the additional staff required to operate the new Defense Chief of Chaplains Office.
C. Consolidate Functional Areas Common to the Three Service Chaplaincies:

There are three chaplain schools that train clergymen to function as chaplains within their specific branch of service. The Army Chaplain School has the additional mission of training enlisted personnel to be chaplain assistants, MOS71M, operating a non-commissioned officer academy, and operating the Chaplain Center. Enlisted training for the Air Force and the Navy is conducted at other service schools. The Chaplains Boards of the three services have different missions, but the possibility of consolidating them into one Chaplains Resource Board would appear to be a cost saving measure.

Advantages: There are common areas of instruction found within the three service schools - the Uniform Code of Military Justice, physical training, religious pluralism, conscientious objection, counseling service members and their families, and military leadership. These could be conducted in a shared school environment more economically than in three separate chaplain schools. The faculty would be reduced, the overhead costs of operating three school would be reduced, and the students would benefit from shared experiences from the different services.

Disadvantages: Military schools educate and train to doctrinal standards and performance measures. The immediate problem of a consolidated chaplain school is the curriculum of instruction. The Army Chaplain School is a part of the Training and Doctrine Command school system. A consolidated school would
not remain under the responsibility of an Army agency, if it is to meet the training requirements of three services. The thrust of all training in the schools is service specific. Counseling is conducted by Air Force chaplains with Air Force families, facing Air Force institutional problems. Without this specificity in the instruction, the classes are reduced to generic courses having little or no application to specific situations.

Secondly, where would the consolidated chaplain school acquire its doctrine? Who would be the approving agent for the course content? To whom would the consolidated school commandant be responsible? The three Chiefs of Chaplains sit as members of the Armed Forces Chaplains Board, with the responsibility of Chairman rotating among the three services annually. Would the consolidated school be responsible to this agency of the Department of Defense? The only permanent member of this board is an executive secretary - a chaplain colonel assigned to this billet for four years. He has one staff member with him - a secretary. The current structure of the Armed Forces Chaplain Board is not such that it could oversee a consolidated chaplain school.

The three separate chaplain boards have widely differing missions. The Navy Chaplain Resource Board supports the Navy Chaplain Corps history project and archival efforts. It currently develops seasonal resource packets for all three services and functions as an audio-visual library for all service
chaplains. The Air Force Chaplain Board has been combined with the Air Force Chaplain School. The Army Chaplaincy Services Support Agency is responsible for chaplain assignments, future studies, and family ministry. There is no duplication or redundancy to consider in these activities.

D. Consolidate Chaplain Professional Development that Crosses Service Lines:

All three chaplaincies conduct continuing education opportunities for the professional development of the branch. Examples are homiletics, pastoral counseling, hospital ministry, clinical pastoral education, worship, multi-cultural and religious pluralism, suicide prevention, stress management, religious education, and total quality management and the chaplaincy.

The option of sending selected chaplains to other service school’s advanced training courses would be a positive step in cross service sharing of ministry. It would also follow the model already in practice among other service branches. Cross-service training exposes selected chaplains to the environments in which their fellow clergymen work.

**Advantages:** This option saves money and resources, shares ideas of ministry across service lines, and creates an atmosphere of cooperation among the services.

**Disadvantages:** None.
CONCLUSIONS

The military chaplaincies have reduced their numbers proportionally with the reduction of the respective service. This down-sizing has reached approximately 25% of the three chaplaincies. General Colin Powell, in a Pentagon briefing on the Joint Chiefs of Staff report on "Roles and Missions of the Services," (Cable News Network, February 12, 1993) reported that the American military had eliminated over 300,000 personnel. He stressed that any business in the United States that had that kind of work force layoff would have captured headlines in every newspaper in the nation. The press, however, did not even consider this military reduction a newsworthy item.

These reductions in the force require the services to look at more efficient ways to perform their missions. Chaplains in the three services have helped service members ease the pain of transition to civilian life when notices of termination - reductions in force, selective early retirements, non-continuations in service, passovers for promotion - reach the hands of military members and families. Almost one-fourth of the chaplain ranks are also leaving the service.

The two criteria this study has applied to the future changes possible for the military chaplaincies of the future are cost and effectiveness:

1. A unified Department of Defense Chaplaincy would cost very little less than the current three chaplaincy system. It
would lose in effectiveness immeasurably by moving the identity of the clergymen away from their congregations.

2. A modified chaplaincy with a Department of Defense Chief and service component Staff Chaplains would save little in cost, but would streamline relationships with civilian denominations and permit cross-leveling of assets. It would lose by complicating the chain of responsibility to the service Chiefs and Secretaries with dual reporting to the Secretary of Defense.

3. The union of the three chaplain schools into one is fraught with problems. Initial costs would be heavy, and cost savings would be minimal. The immovable obstacles in this option are the development of doctrine and approval of curriculum acceptable to the three services.

4. The best option is the joining of the three chaplaincies in common professional development training and increasing joint assignments at joint command headquarters. This option saves in costs and produces a more efficient chaplaincy.

The history of the chaplaincy has been one of change - adapting to the changing environment of the American military, moving with soldiers and families in their service environments, and providing ministry in response to the citizen-soldier’s right to free exercise of religion. Its early years demonstrated the frustrations of ill-defined roles and missions, lack of inclusion in the military force structure, and the absence of doctrine for ministry and direction from the top. The three chaplaincies that emerged from World War II were highly effective, especially in
the wartime environment that was their proving ground. The question of uniting the chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy has been explored through these pages. The recommendation is that the Congress not adopt this measure. It would diminish the effectiveness of the military clergy by removing chaplains from their respective constituents. Identity has been demonstrated to be critical to ministry. Ministry is critical to airmen, sailors, soldiers and their family members, especially in the hostile world in which they function. The current system of military chaplaincies meets this need most effectively.
ENDNOTES


3Ibid., 6.

4Ibid., 15.


6Ibid., II, 33, 56.


8Ibid., 106-07.

9Ibid., 109.

10Ibid., 115.

11Ibid., 116.

12Ibid., 132.

13"Chaplain John Gano was a fighting chaplain with a keen eye toward example and morale." Thompson describes his reasoning that he needed to be with the soldiers in the front line "for fear of dampening the spirits of the soldiers' or bringing a 'imputation of cowardice' upon himself." Ibid., 145-46.

14Fitzpatrick, XXVI, 136.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 19.

Ibid., 43-49.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 51-54.

Ibid., 55-58.

Ibid., 60.

Ibid., 64-76.

Ibid., 78-79.

Ibid., 84.

Ibid., 85-86.

Ibid., 89.

Ibid., 90-92.


Honeywell, 120-22.

The "ironclad oath" was a modified version of the 1802 oath of office sworn by all commissioned officers in service. It was used after 1862 to eliminate from federal service anyone who had taken up arms against the United States government, or "voluntarily given aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility" against the United States. Most southern clergymen were excluded by this provision of the oath. See Earl F. Stover, *Up from Handymen: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1865-1920* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1977), 4ff.
William L. Hufham, "A Report on the Army Chaplaincy of the Frontier, 1870-91" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), describes the struggles of frontier chaplains to work in sparse, hostile environments on the American frontier. Like the soldiers they ministered to, these chaplains suffered from boredom and loneliness. The excellent work performed by many of these frontier soldiers of God sustained the faith of many soldiers and families through some of the darkest days of American military service.

Stover, 79-86.

Hufham, 6-12, outlines many of the problems encountered by frontier post chaplains in gaining recognition and appointments.


George W. Simpson, Manual for U.S. Army Chaplains (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898) provides a collection of the current Army Regulations which have application to the chaplain's role and ministry. Such practical things as food and forage, fuel, uniforms, and hints on methods of work are addressed. It is more a chaplain's "smart book" than a piece of Army doctrine.

Stover, 150-55.

Ibid., 174.

Ibid., 188, 211f.


Ibid., 217.

The only manuals to assist chaplains with their duties and responsibilities were Nave's Handbook on the Army Chaplaincy (Los Angeles, California: Religious Welfare League, 1917) written by former Army Chaplain Orville Nave. He tries to help new chaplains make the transition from civilian ministry to the spiritual care of soldiers. The book is one chaplain's guidance and in no way forms Army doctrine for ministry. In the absence of the latter, it was very popular. Another handbook published in 1917 with the "War Department: Office of the Chief of Staff" heading was prepared by retired Post Chaplain George J. Waring (Chaplain's Duties and How Best to Accomplish His Work,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917). This document contains such sage advice as this:

No general rules can or ought to be laid down for any chaplain to follow. Each one must do the best he knows how, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances and conditions of his regiment or post. No two chaplains are alike, and no two will work alike. (pp. 15-16).

The lack of training and working doctrine would be a hinderance to the chaplains in the field.

45Ibid., 210-213.
46Ibid., 220-221.
47Honeywell, 178.
48Ibid., p. 223.
49Gushwa, 21.
50Quoted in Gushwa, 21.
51Quoted in Gushwa, 31.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., 67.
55Ibid., 167-69.
56A Chicago Sun combat correspondent in Europe describes the chaplains there this way:

The chaplains there have all taken courses in first aid and frequently they reach and bandage the wounded before the medics. But that's not their chief value. Their greatest work is in healing fear-torn hearts and giving hope to the hopeless. Most boys dying on the battlefield would rather see a chaplain than anyone else.

They may have never entered a church, never have spoken to a clergyman, but in that dread last moment they want someone to speak to them of God. (Nance, 152-53).
57Gushwa, 192.


60 The ages of the boys who served on the ships ranged from 14-18 years. The chaplains provided moral education in an environment that introduced these young men to alcohol and prostitutes at a very early age. Until 1818 wives of officers and other women were allowed on the ships, even when underway. (*Ibid.*, 51). A Navy Chaplain founded the first Academy for Midshipmen, which is usually considered the forerunner of the United States Naval Academy. (See *The Military Chaplaincy: A Report to the U.S. President’s Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces*, 8).

61 The 1950 report on *The Military Chaplaincy* indicates that the Navy chaplaincy sought only ordained clergy after 1818, but this became official policy only after 1841. See also Drury, 42-43.

62 Drury, 51-56.


65 At the time (1877) chaplains in the Navy were authorized up to the relative rank of commander. By 1883 they were authorized up to the rank of captain.


67 There are conflicting reports on this date. Drury (112, 117f) indicates that Chaplain Charles H. Parks was commissioned as the first Roman Catholic priest in the Navy on April 30, 1888, while *The Military Chaplaincy* (p. 9) indicates that the first Catholic chaplain was appointed in 1883. The former report is probably more reliable. Drury indicates that efforts to obtain a Roman Catholic in the Navy Chaplaincy began in 1846, but at the time there were no priests available.


69 "Chaplains in the Navy," by Onyx., N.A. Station, *Army and Navy Journal*, XIV (1877-78), 362

70 Drury, 133.

This figure is found in Drury, *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 1939-1949*, II, 1. The Military Chaplaincy, 9, gives a figure of 2,981.


*1. The Chaplain Corps, United States Army, will continue to furnish chaplains for duty within the United States Air Force.*

*2. Chaplains of the Army normally will be attached for duty with the United States Air Force for a three or four year period.*

*3. Policy promulgated by the Chief of Chaplains as it affects the United States Air Force will be coordinated with the United States Air Force prior to publication.*

*etc.* (Ibid., 5).

Goffman's work, Asylums (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1961) deals with total institutions like prisons, mental asylums, and some hospitals.

Nance, 116.

Hutcheson, 47.

Ibid., 48-50.


Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, The Eagle's Talons: The American Experience at War (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988) have an excellent discussion of the effects of technology on waging war. Their arguments are against technology as the "war-winner" for four reasons: cost, employment, counter-measures, and limits on its use. They cite numerous examples of technologically superior military forces failing to win the war. The American experience in Vietnam is just one example. (pp. 392-95)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Service Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 1993) recommends that the service chaplaincies remain as they are. The consolidation of these chaplaincies would save very little and would be costly in terms of accomplishing the chaplain’s mission.
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A. GENERAL WORKS:


Axton, John T. Brief History of Chaplains in the U.S. Army. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: General Service Schools, 1925.


The Military Chaplaincy: A Report to the President by the U.S. President's Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, October 1, 1950.


B. RELEVANT MILITARY PUBLICATIONS:


82
APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM OF PHONCON

TO: Chaplain Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., RADM, US Navy (Retired)
FROM: Chaplain (COL) William L. Hufham, US Army

DATE: 1 MAR 93
TIME: 1130 HRS

SUBJECT: The Feasibility of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy

1. I contacted Chaplain Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., RADM, US Navy (Retired), regarding a study he had published on in 1975 the military chaplaincy. He had served over 25 years as a Navy chaplain, and had done extensive research on institutional identity and ministry.

2. I described to Chaplain Hutcheson the work I had done on my military studies project at the US Army War College and the importance of his work, The Churches and the Chaplaincy (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975), in defining institutional identity by chaplains with their services.

3. I questioned Chaplain Hutcheson about the feasibility of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy. He responded that he believed such a restructure of the three chaplaincies would be feasible, but the cost savings involved in such a move would have to be measured against the change in effectiveness this restructure might bring about.

4. Chaplain Hutcheson said he believed all of the services needed to rethink their roles and functions in light of the change in the world situation which resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union. He said that the chaplaincies should study ways to improve the efficiency of the ministry, saving money where possible, without sacrificing effectiveness.

5. I asked him whether he thought there would be a loss of identity if the total chaplaincy served under the Department of Defense. He said that this had been the subject of a study conducted in the 1970s by the Armed Forces Chaplain Board. This study looked at combining chaplain schools and other areas of common interest for ministry. The recommendation at that time was for each service to keep its own school, because the primary purpose of the school was to indoctrinate the clergy entering active service into the culture of their armed service. The institutional and cultural identity remain important aspects of ministry in the armed forces. He pointed out that the Navy had provided chaplains to the U. S. Marine Corps, and that there were chaplains who spent a significant part of their career with that...
service, while others moved freely back and forth from Navy to Marine assignments. He pointed out that there was a lengthy history of association of the two branches of the Navy. Nothing new was created when Navy chaplains began to serve in Marine units.

6. Chaplain Hutcheson agreed with me that a Department of Defense Chaplaincy would have the benefit of the military being able to cross-level shortage denominations among the services.

7. He said that the unifying of the chaplaincies, while not providing great cost saving to the services, would be a symbolic positive step in terms of post Cold War reforms in military. He said that medical and legal services could probably accomplish this with less impact on their mission than the chaplaincies. He stressed that ministry is most effective when there is identity with those who are served. The current system provides that identity, but we should not be locked into past thinking.

8. Chaplain Hutcheson stressed that as long as there are institutional and cultural identities for three or four services, the ministry of the chaplaincy will benefit from maintaining that service identity.

WILLIAM L. HUFHAM
Chaplain (COL), USA
Student, US Army War College
APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Chaplain (BG) Wayne Hoffmann, Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization, U.S. Army Reserve

Date: 4 Mar 93
Time: 1400 Hrs

1. I interviewed Chaplain (BG) Wayne Hoffmann regarding the impact the restructuring of the military chaplaincies into a Department of Defense Chaplaincy on the U.S. Army Reserve.

2. Chaplain Hoffmann indicated that the Reserve Components of the Army (Army Reserve and Army National Guard) are mirror images of the active component in physical qualifications, doctrine, training, structure, organization and personality. The Reserve Components are trained and prepared to augment or replace active component units or individuals in combat. They have minimal exposure to other services. Reserve Component individuals train with their active counterparts, and USAR units fill out the active component support units. Hoffmann indicated that over 200 Reserve Component chaplains deployed to the Persian Gulf to fight in the Gulf War. Their effectiveness was high because of the one Army concept that united training and doctrine for all Army components.

3. Chaplain Hoffmann indicated that the identity chaplains have with their units would suffer if the branch were converted to a "purple suit" organization. Ministry to soldiers is linked directly with service identity. These chaplains are integral members of the commander’s staff, not just religious functionaries in their units. They must be knowledgeable of the mission of the unit, as well as the members and families. They must be able to operate in the same environment of any other staff officer on the commander’s staff.

4. I asked what he believed would be the most detrimental effect of a Department of Defense Chaplaincy. Chaplain Hoffmann indicated that the loss of service identity and cultural understanding would be the greatest detriment. Reserve Component chaplains balance the work load of full-time parish service with weekend duty with their Army Reserve units. Their’s is already a dual identity. Adding two other services would tax their abilities.

5. I asked what he believed would be the positive gains from such new structure in the chaplaincy. He said the unity of the three service chaplaincies would reduce the competition for Roman
Catholic priests and other shortage faith groups among the three chaplaincies.

6. Chaplain Hoffmann concluded that the loss in effective ministry would outweigh the gains that would result from a DOD chaplaincy.

WILLIAM L. HUFHAM
Chaplain (COL), USA
Student, US Army War College