THE UNITED NATIONS:
TOWARDS BEING AN EFFECTIVE WORLD POLICEMAN

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93-09584

93 5 04 125
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THE UNITED NATIONS: TOWARDS BEING AN EFFECTIVE WORLD POLICEMAN

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ACKNOWLEDGES

The author acknowledges Colonel Douglas Fraser and Major Stuart Jeffrey of the Canadian Mission to the United Nations for their vital assistance in providing the various United Nations documents referred to in this research paper.

The support provided by the library staff of the U.S. Army War College was also of great help, particularly, when the author failed to note the source of some of his reference material. A special note of thanks goes to Mrs. Dorothy Finkenbinder of the International Fellows Office at the War College who managed to wade through the author's scrawl to produce this quality document.

A final acknowledgment goes to the author's seminar, which he used as a sounding board for many of the ideas presented in this paper.
INTRODUCTION

The Charter of the United Nations was approved and signed by the 51 original signatories on 26 June 1945. Since that date an additional 128 "peace-loving states" have accepted the obligations of the United Nations Charter which among other things states "all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and all members are "to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."\(^1\)

Article 42 of the Charter calls upon member nations to:

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Make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.\(^2\)
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At best, virtually all United Nations military operations mounted since the Charter was enacted have been ad hoc, come-as-you-are affairs. Sir Brian Urquhart, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for military affairs for approximately 40 years, suggests that the United Nations "has so far not provided a system for peace and security so much as a last resort, or safety net." He contends the actions of the United Nations have been "spasmodic and reactive" and that a system based on reacting to a situation once it has broken out cannot guarantee international peace and security.\(^3\)

With the demise of the Cold War and its recent success in the Persian Gulf, the United Nations now appears to be poised, as Churchill suggested, to become "the constabulary power before which barbaric and atavistic forces will stand in awe."\(^4\) Indeed the unprecedented multinational response to Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait suggests that an opportunity now exists for other than great powers to play a role in maintaining peace and security. John Lewis Gaddis suggests that the world now has an opportunity to give...
Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective international action to deter aggression

a third chance or as Gaddis says:

To give Wilson’s plan the fair test it has never received, and fate has even provided an appropriate occasion: successful UN action to restore Kuwaiti independence sets a powerful example that could advance us some distance towards bringing the conduct of international relations within the framework of international law that has long existed alongside it, but too often apart from it.5

United Nations failures in the past, particularly in the military field, have been justifiably laid at the feet of the superpowers who used the Security Council as a stage to play out their competing ideologies and philosophies. Unfortunately, during the approximate 46 years of near paralysis, the mechanisms and institutions within the United Nations were allowed to atrophy and to become bureaucratically ponderous. As a result the United Nations ability to react, or as Urquhart puts it "to anticipate and to prevent breaches of the peace are severely limited and are certainly not in keeping with the expectations of the world at large."6

It is the author’s contention that the United Nations is neither militarily nor administratively sound enough to effectively sustain or expand its present commitments without major reform to its structures, finances, and its military arm. Carlos P. Romulo, a past President of the United Nations General Assembly, supports this argument by suggesting "there is little question that the United Nations is in need of drastic reform if it is to play the peacekeeping role we envisioned for it 40 years ago."7 Retired Secretary-General Perez de Cueller acknowledged the need for change during an address to the 37th General Assembly when he commented "that our most urgent need is to reconstruct the Charter concept of collective action for peace and security so as to render the United Nations more capable of carrying out its primary mandate."8 Urquhart is a major supporter of United Nations reform
and suggests it is "in the interest of all governments, not to mention peoples, to strengthen the UN system and reform it as necessary for the vital tasks ahead." 

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THE PEACEMAKING/PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCEMENT DILEMMA

Before a discussion of appropriate reforms required of the United Nations can take place, one must examine what it is that the United Nations is required to do. This paper will concentrate on the field of military activities; however, a discussion of administrative and structural failings within the United Nations, where these failings impact on military operations, will also be included.

It is interesting to note that two chapters of the United Nations Charter denote two very different approaches. Chapter VI deals specifically with peacekeeping or "pacific settlements of disputes." Chapter VII on the other hand deals with peacemaking and peace enforcement or "action with respect to threats to the peace, and acts of aggression." 10 Peacekeeping was not envisioned in the original Charter but came into being as a result of the initiative of a Canadian, Lester Pearson, who stood up in the General Assembly in the midst of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 and suggested the formation of an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. What Pearson wanted was an international military presence which was strong enough to enforce a cease-fire while a political settlement was negotiated. While Pearson's force (as ad hoc and reactive as it was) has served as a model for all subsequent peacekeeping efforts, the lines between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement have inevitably become blurred with time.

Unfortunately there are no common definitions for military operations conducted under United Nations auspices. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali in his recent paper, *An Agenda for Peace*, refers to five categories of operations: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. The United States military appears to be moving towards adopting categories of peace operations similar to those proposed by the Secretary-General. Until it does, however, the definitions used by the United States Army as they are taught in the Course 4 curriculum of the Army War College are at odds with those of the United Nations as illustrated below:

**United Nations**
- Peacekeeping involves the use of military forces in support of diplomatic efforts to supervise a cease-fire and maintain peace between consenting belligerent parties.
- Peacemaking involves efforts to resolve conflict through mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.
- Peace enforcement involves military operations to forcibly separate combatants.

**United States**
- Peacekeeping involves efforts taken with the consent of belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce.
- Peacemaking involves a peacetime contingency operation to establish or restore peace through the use of force, i.e., Korea and Iraq.
- The United States has no definition for peace enforcing as it is considered to be synonymous with peacemaking.

The United Nations Association of the United States has attempted to redefine United Nations military operations in an effort to determine what the appropriate responses should be to different situations. The author has chosen to adopt these definitions as they provide a good starting point for a
discussion of the types of military forces which may be required to conduct
the various types of operations envisaged. The definitions are as follows:

- Peacekeeping involves the use of military forces in a noncombatant
capacity to monitor a cease-fire, serve as a buffer between adversaries, or
help with disarming of rival forces pursuant to a wider peace agreement. The
essential prerequisite of peacekeeping is the consent of the hostile parties;
peacekeeping forces are stationed to help keep a precarious peace once the
belligerents agree to stop shooting each other. Lightly armed, they may fire
only in self-defense when fired upon. Because peacekeeping units are
unequipped to defend themselves against a determined military opponent, their
position is untenable when one party rejects their presence;

- Peacemaking, a term particularly subject to misinterpretation, refers
to the full range of activities involved in the peaceful resolution of
disputes: It is the process by which an outside agent helps warring parties
to "make peace," i.e., to reach agreement not only on an end to the fighting
but also on a settlement to resolve their dispute. Peacemaking involves a
wide range of activities, such as mediation, conciliation, shuttle diplomacy,
and confidence-building actions, as envisioned in Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. A peace settlement will often call for the deployment of
peacekeeping forces during its implementation; and

- Peace enforcement, by contrast, refers to actions taken to compel a
recalcitrant belligerent to take steps demanded by the international body--the
function dealt with in Chapter VII of the Charter. The means of coercion may
be political or economic--the complete or partial interruption of economic
relations, transportation and communications links, and diplomatic relations
or the means may be military, as envisaged in Article 42.12
TYPES OF MILITARY FORCES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

It would appear then that a single force, on call to the Security Council as envisaged by Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, would not necessarily cater for all possible United Nations contingencies. Peacekeeping forces, by virtue of their likely tasks, need only be lightly armed and equipped. On the other hand peace enforcing forces may out of necessity have to be modern all arms armored and mechanized forces, capable of conducting mid to high intensity operations. The United Nations Association of the United States suggests that if the Security Council could readily tap the force capability envisioned by the United Nations founders, the United Nations could act quickly when necessary to prevent a wide conflict. Such a force in being would also serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors.

The Association suggests a three-tiered structure for a United Nations Army. The first would be a standing force that would be small, highly trained, easily deployable and ready for immediate dispatch to a trouble spot whether it be for humanitarian or peacekeeping duties, or as a toehold for peace enforcement operations.

The second tier would be what the association refers to as "rapid deployment forces." These would be national military units, on call to the Secretary-General, which would be capable of deployment within 48-72 hours. These forces would be similar to the existing Allied Command Europe Mobile Force that is commonly referred to as Supreme Allied Commander Europe's fire-fighting force, designated for employment in a number of contingency areas in the NATO sphere.

The third element of the triad would be large-scale augmentation forces required for major military operations such as those conducted in Korea and Iraq.13
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognizes the requirement for two distinct types of forces in his An Agenda for Peace. He states that peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces "should not be confused." He contends peace enforcement forces must be "more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces." He acknowledges that if a nation is willing to commit forces to a standing peacekeeping army, it does not necessarily follow that the nation concerned will allow its forces to be employed on peace enforcement operations.14

The formation of a standing United Nations army, no matter what form it takes, is a matter which is not easily resolved. United States Ambassador Hicks, when addressing the U.S. Army War College Class of 1993 at United Nations Headquarters, stated "how to bring a standing army into being is a very complicated issue."15 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali alludes to this problem in his An Agenda for Peace when he writes "the United Nations is a gathering of sovereign states and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them."16 He does emphasize, however, that it is essential for sovereign states to make forces, facilities and assistance available "not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis"17 if the United Nations is to realize its full potential. Singapore’s United Nations Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, in an article dealing specifically with United Nations military operations, suggests:

Countries are reluctant to commit troops in any open-ended way for peacekeeping purposes or enforcement action in conflicts when their prior agreement for a specific action is not required. Even countries that are willing to contribute a significant number of troops and sophisticated equipment to a project are reluctant to put their soldiers under a unified command.18
Many suggest a partial solution to the problem is the employment of regional forces, authorized under Article 47 of the United Nations, to conduct peacekeeping operations. In his *An Agenda for Peace* Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggests that:

Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage states outside the region to act supportably. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within a region, it would serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort.\(^{19}\)

Ambassador Petrovsky, the former United Nations Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, suggests that "burden sharing by regional organizations is essential, particularly European organizations."\(^{20}\) Ambassador Hicks alluded to this fact when he stated "regions must share more of the burden"\(^{21}\) but he added that unfortunately they are not doing so. Ambassador Chan suggests European involvement in Yugoslavia, such as it is, and the Economic Community of West African States' involvement in Liberia may "presage a new mode for sharing the burden of maintaining peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizations."\(^{22}\)

**ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF A UNITED NATIONS STANDING ARMY**

Many nations, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, to name a few, have traditionally volunteered combat forces for operations and willingly placed them under command of a unified United Nations command. Russia and France, both permanent members of the Security Council, have publicly offered to contribute combat forces to a United Nations standing army.\(^{23}\) While the United States has been reluctant to commit combat forces to serve under United Nations command, other than combat forces including military observers have been employed in areas such as Yugoslavia, Palestine, the Western Sahara, and
Kuwait. There have also been recent suggestions that a residual force of approximately 5,000 American soldiers may be left behind under United Nations command in Somalia. Britain has been a regular participant on United Nations missions and China has recently joined the club with observers deployed to Kuwait, the Western Sahara, and Cambodia. Most of the ingredients for a consensus on the formation of a standing army appear to be in place; it remains to develop a model which suits the desires of the world community at large.

A possible option for the establishment of a standing army for peacekeeping is to base it on the forces from those nations who will willingly place their forces under a unified United Nations command. This Army would have to have a permanent headquarters, even if only manned on a skeleton basis, and be lightly equipped, easily deployable by air and trained and equipped to as common a standard as possible based on United Nations established guidelines.

Peace enforcement operations present a different set of problems given their potential size and scope. A possible option is to establish a lead nation concept, whereby one nation undertakes command and control of an operation under United Nations authority with other coalition partners as necessary. The value of such an approach has been successfully demonstrated by the recent operations in Iraq and Somalia. The United Nations Association of the United States has considered this approach in their three-tiered army and suggests "member states with the larger contribution of forces would normally be called upon to supply the leadership."\(^{24}\)

It is unlikely, however, that the world can continue to rely on the United States to undertake such adventures, particularly if the American people perceive that they alone are contributing to world peace and stability. A
possible alternative which would also assist in resolving the burden-sharing debate is the designation of regional leaders based on treaty, geographic or other types of arrangements. This approach is provided for in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and is strongly endorsed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali:

Regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.25

Examples of this type of arrangement would be India undertaking a leadership role in Southeast Asia while Brazil undertakes a similar role in South America. The price which these regional leaders may demand in return, however, is a permanent seat on the Security Council . . . a subject which has been written about extensively and which is under active consideration within the United Nations but will not be addressed in this paper.

The only obstacle to establishing an effective United Nations Army, whether it be standing or on call, are the members of the United Nations themselves. Urquhart puts it quite simply when he states "governments will also have to be prepared to support and put adequate resources behind both global and regional security systems."26 He also adds that 46 years after its inception, the United Nations "remains the sole global framework for maintaining international peace and security."27

Inhibitors to Timely Collective Action

The discussion of the establishment of a United Nations standing army, as important as it is, makes little sense if one is not confident that the force can be effectively deployed in a timely manner and sustained for protracted periods during operations. Colonel Douglas Fraser, the military representative to the Canadian Mission to the United Nations, offers some
insights into the problems facing United Nations forces deploying to the field. He suggests the United Nations "needs to sort out its internal mechanisms in order to allow quicker reaction." He sights the example of Somalia "where it took five weeks for the organization to mount a reconnaissance party" into that country, despite the urgency of the need for intervention. He refers to the financial system within the United Nations, that he considers to be complicated and slow, and the difficulty of getting cash at the outset of operations when it is most needed. The Field Operations Division of the United Nations provides all financial and administrative support to operations; however, there is no branch of this division in the Department of Peacekeeping. Command and control of the military aspects of operations on a day-to-day basis from New York are nonexistent. Intelligence gathering, despite the Secretary-General's recent emphasis on "preventive diplomacy," falls well short of the requirement. While the Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace addresses many of these issues, he unfortunately does not offer a vision for change with regard to these critical shortcomings.28 The former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Marrack Goulding, has allowed that "with only 19 professionals on my staff, the ability of the United Nations to manage peacekeeping operations on their present scale" is difficult. He added that it is taking "longer and longer to get units deployed."29 A number of these issues will be examined in detail with a view to suggesting possible ways of improving the efficiency with which the United Nations mounts and controls its operations.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Effective command and control of any military operation is essential. It is recognized that most modern United Nations operations involve more than just the military component; however, the military is usually the major player
in most of them. Professional military officers on the staff of the Department of Peacekeeping number only eight at present. Their activities have traditionally been confined to the planning of United Nations operations and provision of advise, while other divisions within the United Nations have provided the necessary support. There has until recently been no operations center and virtually no coordination on a day-to-day basis of operations being conducted in the field. Secure strategic communications to the field are modern and functional but, with very little staff capacity to react, they have not been employed to their full capacity. Colonel Christopher Wellwood, a Canadian peacekeeping veteran, suggests that as a result "the military staff appears to have little credibility with the deployed forces, as it does not deal with forces in the field; and it apparently has little credibility with its civilian masters in New York."  

Change does appear to be on the horizon. Brigadier General Maurice Baril, a Canadian, has recently been appointed the Chief United Nations military planner. One of his first acts was to withdraw five United Nations military observers from the field in order to establish a 24-hour operations center within the military cell at United Nations Headquarters. He is also undertaking many more initiatives to get the military activities within the United Nations on to firmer planning, procedural, financial, and training grounds.  

The Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, at a meeting on 6 November 1992, proposed a number of specific initiatives for improving peacekeeping activities to the Secretary-General. The committee suggested:

An enhanced peacekeeping planning staff and an operations center be established within the secretariat in order to deal with the growing complexity of initial planning and control of peacekeeping operations in the field.
The report of the committee goes on to say the Secretary-General should:

Consider the creation of a unified, integrated structure within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to establish clear lines of responsibility and accountability which are essential for the effective and efficient management of peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{33}

This committee also makes a strong case for the transfer of relevant parts of the Field Operations Division to the Peacekeeping Department. If those recommendations are acted upon, as they should be, many of the problems associated with command and control of United Nations operations would be resolved. The increased magnitude of United Nations military operations alone dictates that changes to the established ways are long over due. In 1988 only 9,666 peacekeepers were deployed to the field. By mid-1992, the number stood at 38,144\textsuperscript{34} and it was anticipated that by the end of 1992, in excess of 50,000 troops would be deployed.\textsuperscript{35} Colonel Wellwood contends:

An international military staff, fully manned by peacekeeping veterans and dealing with forces in the field would gain credibility with the deployed forces and thus with the Security Council.\textsuperscript{36}

**INTELLIGENCE GATHERING**

Until recently, intelligence gathering has not been actively pursued by the United Nations. In its desire to be totally impartial in the field, the United Nations directed field commanders to refrain from any intelligence gathering activities. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, in his testimony before the United States Senate Armed Forces Committee in August 1992, answered a question on intelligence gathering while he was commander of United Nations forces in Bosnia as follows:

Sir, the United Nations . . . it's a very hard rule . . . is not involved in any type of intelligence gathering. Information comes from the open media, and there's not much open media in that part of the world (Bosnia), radio or television.\textsuperscript{37}
That this attitude has changed is illustrated by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's emphasis, in *An Agenda for Peace*, on preventive diplomacy and the intelligence gathering required if preventive diplomacy is to be effective. He envisages that in some circumstances preventive deployment of United Nations forces may take place "to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence." These actions presuppose that sufficient information is available to allow the United Nations to react in a timely manner. The Secretary-General does not refer to intelligence gathering directly; however, he does say that "the information now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions." As to how this intelligence will be gathered is left rather vague. Diplomatic missions of fact-finding, representation and good offices are the information gathering tools normally employed by the United Nations. These missions unfortunately rely on the cooperation of the host nation(s) to be effective, which is regularly not the case. Ambassador Chan makes the point that "there are and can be situations in which one or another party to a potential impending conflict does not choose to bring the issue to the attention of the Council." The Secretary-General does go beyond these measures when he allows that he "will supplement my own contacts by regularly sending senior officials on missions for consultations in capitals and other locations."

It is readily apparent that most sovereign states will not divulge information based on intelligence, particularly sensitive information, for fear that their sources will be compromised. However, there does exist within the United Nations' structure an organization which, if employed as it was meant to be employed, could prove to be an invaluable source of nonattributable intelligence. It is called the Military Staff Committee.
The Military Staff Committee was established under Article 47(1) of the United Nations Charter. Its duties, as prescribed, are to advise and assist the Security Council with regard to all the Council's military requirements. The composition of the Military Staff Committee was to be at the Chief of Staff level of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The committee was designed to be similar in scope and duties to its Military Committee of NATO counterpart. The onset of the Cold War meant that this key committee did not get off the ground. Today's improved climate has allowed military representatives of the five permanent members to meet often; however, it is usually at the Colonel level with no real status or responsibility being accorded to the group.

The Secretary-General mentions the employment of the Military Staff Committee in an advisory capacity in his *An Agenda for Peace* but offers no proposals for enhancing its representation or status. The United Nations Association of the United States suggests:

> NATO provides the model of the appropriate role of the Military Staff Committee. The Military Committee of NATO was set up to advise the ministerial representatives of the alliance but it doesn't command anything.

The resurrection of an appropriately structured Military Staff Committee would be a singular step that would enhance the United Nations credibility and capability to operate effectively on all fronts enormously, particularly in the area of intelligence. Unfortunately as Chan puts it:

> There seems to be no urgency on the part of the permanent five to utilize the MSC in any significant way and it is unlikely the committee will be used in the future.

She goes on to question "why the variety of means developed by modern technology cannot be employed in the cause of peace?"
Urquhart, while calling for a rejuvenated Military Staff Committee, sums up the contribution it could make to the United Nations intelligence gathering effort with his comment that:

The five permanent members of the Security Council have access to the world’s largest intelligence agencies, while the Military Staff Committee, composed, in theory at least, of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members, has access to the best military intelligence.46

FINANCES

The financing of the United Nations and its many activities and operations has likely been the most contentious issue surrounding the organization since its founding. The process by which the United Nations assesses, allocates and dispenses funds has created considerable tension over the years. A brief review of the process will be helpful to this discussion.

United Nations funds are divided into three categories; the regular budget, voluntary contributions, and peacekeeping. Assessments for both the regular budget and peacekeeping are mandatory and are based on each member’s ability to pay. At present approximately "10 percent of members pay 85 percent of the cost."47

The regular budget finances the day-to-day activities of the United Nations. This budget stood at approximately $2.1 billion for 1992 with the United States being assessed 25 percent of the total. With a budget of $2.7 billion in 1992, 30 percent of which is payed by the United States, peacekeeping assessments finance the plethora of peace operations deployed worldwide. Voluntary contributions that netted the United Nations approximately $1.5 billion in 1992, are used almost exclusively for humanitarian and voluntary work, however, some contributions are dedicated specifically by nations for peace operations.
The General Assembly approves the regular and peacekeeping budgets, determines member’s assessments and then authorizes all expenditures, including those for peace operations. However, power within the General Assembly is held by members who contribute less than 2 percent of the total budget. In the past, these nations at times used their budgetary power to authorize activities that were not necessarily supported by the major contributors. The United States, particularly during the period of the Reagan Administration, regularly withheld all or a portion of its contributions to the United Nations. The result is that the United States is at present approximately $733 million in arrears, with 40 percent of this total being funds dedicated to peacekeeping operations.

President Bush offered some encouragement to the United Nations during a speech to the General Assembly on 21 September 1992, when he undertook to pay the arrears over a five-year period. To be fair the United States is not the only indebted nation: Russia owes a total of $420.3 million and according to United Nations figures only 52 countries were fully paid up as of September 1992. This situation has prompted countries such as Canada, who pay their assessments on time and foot most of the costs for their peacekeeping commitments, to question whether they should continue to assume a disproportionate share of the burden.

Many consider peace operations conducted under the authority of the United Nations to be a bargain. Others complain of the high cost of the United Nations as a whole. These opposing views are illustrated by Ernest Van den Hagg who accuses “most agencies, as does the United Nations itself, of spending money with abandon.” While John Conrad puts the United Nations budget in perspective when he states “the total budget of the United Nations
would not maintain the United States Department of Defense for a single day. "51

There is little doubt that the mounting and sustainment of peacekeeping operations are inhibited by the failure of member nations to pay their assessments on time. More to the point, however, is the way in which the United Nations manages funds once they have been received by the organization. The Washington Post, in a series of four articles entitled The UN Empire, was very critical of most United Nations activities and cited "mismanagement and waste" as the root cause of most of its problems. The main sources of its financial inadequacies, as summarized from the first of these articles, are as follows:

- A largely uncontrolled bureaucracy, subject to abuses and deficiencies;
- Mismanagement, negligence and in some cases corruption in United Nations agencies or associated governmental bodies;
- Peacekeeping operations, some of which drag on for decades, become a source of soaring costs with minimal oversight;
- United Nations entities, that once formed are hardly ever disbanded, despite outgrowing their usefulness or achieving their mandate;
- Heavy spending on travel and conferences; and
- Heavy spending on publications designed to enhance budgets. 52

The article goes on to say budgets are "opaque and auditing inadequate" and that the United Nations suffers from being run almost exclusively by diplomats rather than managers and the result is that the organization is politically oriented. 53

The third article in the series looks at peacekeeping with specific emphasis on the ongoing operation in Cambodia. While strongly supporting the United Nations intervention in Cambodia, William Branigin questions why it
took five months for the operation to be mounted, given the urgency and
delicacy of the situation in that country. Branigin comments most unfavorably
with regard to the impact that the arrival of thousands of United Nations
personnel has had on the local economies. He also points out that only
$120,000 out of a total budget of $1.7 billion for 1992 had been set aside for
external auditing.54

Budgeting and auditing do not appear to be as major a concern to the
Secretary-General as they should be. Neither in his An Agenda for Peace nor
in his Report on the Work of the Organization, does he offer any hints as to
how he may improve the budgeting and auditing processes within the United
Nations. He makes vague comments about restructuring the organization "to
serve its new end"55 and how the organization must be managed with the
utmost efficiency and care and to this end he has "taken important steps to
streamline the Secretariat in order to avoid duplication and overlap while
increasing its productivity."56 The thrust of the Secretary-General’s
initiatives appear to be on how to make money, not manage it. That being
said, it seems to be universally accepted that the United Nations must have a
solid financial base if it is to carry out its mandate to the world community.

The United Nations Association of the United States recognizes the cost
effectiveness of United Nations peace operations and contends the costs are
"virtually negligible when compared to national defense budgets and national
defense operations."57 In so far as management of its financial resources
is concerned the Association suggests the United States continue to take the
lead "in insisting on management reform that weeds out waste and ensures
maximum efficiency, including an effective and thorough inspection and
auditing system."58 Indeed in comments on oversight functions, the United
States Mission to the United Nations commented that:
Established mechanisms for ensuring that UN resources are used with maximum effectiveness and efficiency are inadequate. Resources allocated to UN internal auditing, in particular, are insufficient to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Internal audit reports are not available to member states, thus it is not possible to know whether management pays sufficient attention to their findings. The director of internal audit does not have the stature required to ensure that corrective action has been taken. Other mechanisms for program and financial review—the Board of Auditors, the Joint Inspection Unit, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and the Committee for Program and Coordination—are similarly inadequate. Given the very substantial increases in resources, assessed and voluntary, made available to UN programs in recent years, it is imperative that new mechanisms and procedures be considered to safeguard physical and financial assets, and to ensure that programs are implemented in the most cost-effective manner possible.

As important as financial management within the United Nations is in a global sense, it will not help resolve the immediate problems of mounting and sustaining peace operations in a timely and efficient manner. Funds must be available at the outset of an operation to deploy forces and once in theatre, commanders must have sufficient financial independence to ensure forces are sustained in an effective way.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his An Agenda for Peace proposes the establishment of a $1 billion endowment fund with the interest from it being used to finance the initial costs of peacekeeping and other operations. He also recommends the establishment of a revolving peacekeeping reserve of $50 million. His main recommendation is that the General Assembly agree:

That one-third of the estimated cost of new peacekeeping operations be appropriated as soon as the Security Council decides to establish the operation; this would give the Secretary-General the necessary commitment authority and assure an adequate cash flow.

At the operational level United Nations commanders in the field have traditionally been hampered in the conduct and sustainment of their operations.
because of the lack of any control over financial resources. In an operational area, financial control was, as a matter of policy, left in the hands of a civilian Chief Administrative Officer who worked strictly within the civilian staff which had very little military input. The introduction of a combined civilian and military staff for the Namibia and Western Sahara operations helped to partially resolve this problem. The move of elements associated with peacekeeping from the Field Operations Division to the Peacekeeping Department, if it should happen, would also assist in improving the situation. That commanders should have more financial authority is supported by the General Assembly Special Political Committee who have stated that there is a:

Need to delegate increased financial and administrative authority to force commanders in order to increase the mission’s capacity to adjust to new situations and specific requirements.61

There is an urgent need for the United Nations to get its financial house in order. The priority for reform must be given to the long-term financing of peace operations. The proposals of the Secretary-General and General Assembly Special Political Committee, coupled with initiatives and incentives designed to encourage member nations to pay their peacekeeping assessments on time, are simple remedies that if adopted would ensure financial stability and viability.

LOGISTICS

A discussion of logistics is virtually absent from the research documents available to the author. While this is not surprising, it does serve to illustrate why most peacekeeping operations have been logistical nightmares, particularly at their outset.
The traditional method of initiating a United Nations operation has been to do it from scratch. The Security Council decides where an operation is to be conducted then it is up to the Field Operations Division to do its best to gather the resources necessary to deploy and sustain the force. While a certain amount of concurrent activity is conducted, for the most part detailed logistical planning is done after the fact, thus causing an inevitable delay in deployment. With no ready pool of ships or aircraft available, the United Nations has to rely on nations to self deploy, with costs being reimbursed to that nation, charter or if possible engage third-party nations who have military aircraft or merchant ships available to assist.

Equipment has posed similar problems. The United Nations has traditionally had no central or dispersed pools of resources. In the past vehicles, prefabricated accommodation and the like have been purchased new at the outset of an operation with all of the delays that entails. On completion of the operation it has been normal practice to hand the equipment over to the host nation(s), at no or little cost, or to simply abandon it in place. It was believed that it was cheaper to do this than to pay the costs of redeploying or storing the equipment elsewhere. Donating the resources to the host nation(s) was also viewed as being a form of developmental aid. This policy, in addition to being inefficient, has added enormously to the overall costs of United Nations operations over the years.

With the smaller scale United Nations operations of the past, some with no urgency attached, this state of affairs may have been tolerable. However, today's peacekeeping operations are generally speaking much larger and the sense of urgency is greater. The old ways of doing business logistically within the United Nations are simply not good enough. Urquhart makes a very
valid point when he strongly suggests peacekeeping will "need a much more solid logistical, financial, and training basis." 62

The United Nations Charter, as pointed out in the introduction, calls upon member states not only to provide forces but also "assistance and facilities" on call to the Secretary-General. 63 The General Assembly in its comprehensive review of peacekeeping calls upon the Secretary-General to promote:

On a voluntary basis among member states of a pool of resources, including military units, military observers, civil police, key staff personnel and humanitarian material, that might be readily available to the United Nations peacekeeping operations subject to national approval. 64

Colonel Fraser suggested that the United Nations is making some progress in overcoming its lack of readily available resources. There is strong support for the establishment of a permanent equipment pool specifically for peacekeeping operations. He stated that a number of nations have already identified equipment which they possess and will make available to the United Nations on demand for future operations. The move of the logistics elements of the Field Operations Division into the Peacekeeping Department is viewed as a major step forward if that move were to take place. Colonel Fraser summed up his comments on this subject by suggesting that if the United Nations is going to be able to react in a timely manner to crisis situations, it will take "the big time logistics" capability of the United States to make it work. 65

The UNA-USA devotes a few sentences to the discussion of logistics in their general review of special arrangements considered to be required for the successful implementation of United Nations military operations. They suggest nations should not only earmark troops but also "the logistics of transport and support supplies and (others provide facilities for) a series of depots
maintained in readiness." However, they go on to say the United States will likely be the linchpin in this area due to the "extraordinary advantages over virtually every other (nation) in such vital capabilities as airlift and sealift."66

Ambassador Petrovsky acknowledges that the United Nations is "overextended in human and material resources."67 Mr. Goulding, referring specifically to peacekeeping operations, warns that the United Nations "is stretched to the breaking point, in resources and finances in particular."68 With in excess of 50,000 troops deployed to the field and a promised 8,000 more for Mozambique in 1993, the United Nations must develop a solid logistics base, on an urgent basis, for all of its present and future operations. The consequences are continued delays in deployment to hot spots requiring immediate remedies and a lack of proper administrative support to the troops in the field with all that that entails.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has set forth several recommendations that, if adopted, would have a major impact on the effectiveness with which the United Nations conducts its military operations. Some of these recommendations are well within the ability of the United Nations to act upon immediately, while the others will likely require time for discussion and negotiation of the various alternatives available. A summary of the key recommendations that the author believes are achievable in the short-and-long-term follows:

Short-term

- A military staff of sufficient size and talent and with a clear chain of command must be established to plan and administer ongoing and future United Nations military operations;
o An operations center must be established within the Department of Peacekeeping and manned on a 24-hour basis so as to facilitate communications with commanders in the field;

o The elements of the Field Operations Division charged with providing financial and administrative support in peacekeeping operations must be transferred to the Department of Peacekeeping;

o The initiatives being taken to have nations place resources and facilities on call for United Nations military operations worldwide must be accelerated;

o The senseless practice of leaving useable resources behind upon completion of a military operation must cease. These resources must be husbanded for future deployments;

o Field commanders must be given control of financial resources commensurate with their tasks so as to allow them the necessary freedom to purchase the resources required to support their mission;

o The practice of establishing separate military and civilian staff organizations in a theatre of operations must cease. This practice is inefficient and decisive;

o In order to improve reaction time the Security Council must include a provision for the immediate financial support of a United Nations military operation the moment the operation is authorized; and

o Ad hoc and reactive military operations which are obviously not viable from the outset must be avoided despite political pressures to the contrary. The United Nations operations in Southern Lebanon and the Western Sahara are two ongoing examples. Cambodia has the potential to develop into another.
Long-term

- A model for a standing peacekeeping army should be developed by the enhanced United Nations military staff as a priority;
- Nations who have willingly committed combat forces to serve under a unified United Nations command in the past and others who may be interested, should be encouraged to contribute to the standing army either on a regional or worldwide basis;
- Regional leaders should be encouraged to agree to undertake United Nations peace enforcement operations as part of either their regional grouping or a coalition;
- The Military Staff Committee must be reconstituted in order to provide effective leadership and advise on military matters at the appropriate level within the United Nations; and
- The financial inadequacies of the United Nations must be addressed particularly in the areas of accounting and in the long-term financing of military operations.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the United Nations is a growth industry particularly in the area of military operations. The budget for peacekeeping operations quadrupled last year from $700 million to $2.7 billion. The total number of operations initiated from 1945-1988 was 13 whereas 14 new ones have been undertaken since the beginning of 1989 alone.69  McGeorge Bundy comments on "the astonishing role that has been played—and is still being played by the Security Council" since the Gulf War in particular and suggests there is a "demonstrated cause for hope in the cooperative performance at the United Nations."70
But as this paper has set out to prove, this hope will be quickly extinguished if the United Nations does not carry out a major overhaul of its organizations, finances, and procedures. Ambassador Ridgway, in her address to the Army War College, suggested the United Nations must revamp "its 1945 configuration if it is to enjoy any degree of success in the post-Cold War era."71

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace addresses many of the shortfalls within the United Nations but unfortunately it is short on concrete suggestions for improvement. It has, however, served as a vehicle for debate both within and outside of the United Nations with many useful recommendations resulting. The Secretary-General, who is very much an interventionist, has been successful in reducing the number of staff heads within the United Nations Secretariat reporting directly to him from 23 to 7, thus streamlining the chain of command and setting an example for others. He states "improvement can have no limit" and calls upon the United Nations to increase the pace of reform so as to complete the renewal of the organization by 1995.72 But reform will be no easy task, particularly in matters of the Charter and Security Council where the status quo of its five permanent members is under threat. As Ambassador Chan explains:

The improved international climate has generated new expectations of the UN. Ultimately, however, the UN only reflects the consensus and the will of its members. It cannot move faster or change more radically than they will allow. In that light, although the potential of the UN is enormous, it cannot succeed without the political will and support of its members. The international community should not let such an opportunity pass by.73

The United Nations is not without its detractors, particularly within the United States. One such individual is Charles Krauthammer who strongly contends "the United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal
sense, it can hardly said to exist.”74 His view, fortunately, is in the minority. Robert Art expresses optimism when he states, the United Nations has not yet demonstrated that it can become an effective global collective security force though its record in peacekeeping actions and in voting sanctions since 1989 has been impressive.75

Most wish the United Nations well if for no other reason, as Urquhart so aptly puts it “the search for peace, justice, and equity, and for a world in which a better life in the 21st century will be possible, is the essence of the mission of the United Nations.”76

Our choices appear to be quite simple. We capitalize on the opportunity that history has given us to develop effective regional and global security systems or we risk tumbling into an increasing spiral of instability and conflict. As idealistic as this may seem, “in such circumstances an international system that really does provide a degree of peace and security is quite literally vital.”77
ENDNOTES

1The Charter of the United Nations, Preamble.

2Ibid., Article 43.

3Brian Urquhart, "The United Nations: Peacekeeping to a Collective System?" Adelphi Papers No. 265 (Winter 1991/92), 2. Brian Urquhart is a World War II veteran who is a leading expert of United Nations military and political activities. Examples of ad hoc United Nations operations which were reactive and to this day have not achieved their mandate are the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the long-standing United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).


6Urquhart, 2.

7Carlos P. Romulo, Forty Years a Third World Soldier at the UN, Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 188.

8Ibid., 202.

9Urquhart, "The UN's Crucial Choice," Foreign Policy, No. 84 (Fall 1991), 157.

10The Charter of the United Nations, Chapters VI and VII.


12United Nations Association of the United States of America, "Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century," A Position Paper, New York: UNA-USA, 1992, 4-5. The UNA-USA is a national organization which has active chapters and divisions throughout the United States. It is dedicated to "strengthening the U.N. system and to enhancing U.S. participation in that system."

13Ibid., 32-33.

14An Agenda for Peace, 13.


16An Agenda for Peace, 1.

17Ibid., 13.

19 An Agenda for Peace, 18.


21 Hicks, Speech to Army War College.

22 Chan, 40.


24 UNA-USA, 36.

25 An Agenda for Peace, 18.

26 Urquhart, Adelphi Papers, 2.

27 Ibid., 1.

28 Colonel Douglas Fraser, Canadian Peacekeeping Role, Briefing to Seminar 14, Army War College, New York, 14 October 1992. Colonel Fraser is a graduate of the Army War College and is in his fourth and final year as the military adviser to the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations.


31 Major Stuart Jeffrey, telephone interview with the author, 8 December 1992. Major Jeffrey is the Assistant to Colonel Fraser at the Canadian United Nations Mission in New York.


33 Ibid., 5.


35 Goulding, Speech to Army War College.
Wellwood, 22.

General Lewis MacKenzie, "Situation in Bosnia and Appropriate U.S. and Western Responses," Testimony Before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 11 August 1992. Major General MacKenzie is Canada's most decorated peacekeeper with nine missions to his credit. He is also a graduate of the Army War College.

An Agenda for Peace, 8.

Ibid., 7.

Chan, 37.

An Agenda for Peace, 7.

The Charter of the United Nations, Article 47.

UNA-USA, 36-37.

Chan, 35.

Ibid., 37.

Urquhart, Adelphi Papers, 4.

Romulo, 197.


Conrad and Van den Hagg, 304.

Ibid., 290.

William Branigin, "The U.N. Empire: As the U.N. Expands so do its Problems," The Washington Post, 20 September 1992, A1. The series of four articles, as I mentioned, is very critical of the United Nations. It is the author's view that the arguments presented are one-sided and as usual with journalists, the writers offer no concrete recommendations for change.

Ibid., A26.


Report of the Secretary-General on the Workings of the Organization, 11.
56. An Agenda for Peace, 21.

57. UNA-USA, 63.

58. Ibid, 64.


60. An Agenda for Peace, 20-21.


63. The Charter of the United Nations, Article 43.

64. Comprehensive Review of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, 3.

65. Fraser, Briefing to Army War College.

66. UNA-USA, 31.

67. Petrovsky, Speech to Army War College.

68. Goulding, Speech to Army War College.

69. Ibid.


72. An Agenda for Peace, 23.

73. Chan, 40.


76. Urquhart, Foreign Policy, 165.

77. Ibid., Adelphi Papers, 10.
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SPEECHES


