Mission Complete?:
Tactical Intelligence during the Transition from
War to Peace

A Monograph
by
Major Timothy D. Bloechl
Military Intelligence

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 92–93

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
**Title:** MISSION COMPLETE?: TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE (U)

**Authors:** MAJ TIMOTHY D. BLOECHL, USA

**Performing Organization:** SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

**Performing Organization Address:**
ATTN: ATZL-SWV
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900
COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437

**Distribution Statement:**
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

**Abstract:**
SEE ATTACHED

**Subject Terms:**
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
OPERATION JUST CAUSE
RESTORATION OPERATIONS

**Security Classification:**
UNCLASSIFIED

**Pages:** 66

**Price Code:** UNLIMITED

---

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
Mission Complete?: Tactical Intelligence during the Transition from War to Peace

A Monograph
by
Major Timothy D. Bloechl
Military Intelligence

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 92-93

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Timothy D. Bloechl

Title of Monograph: Mission Complete?: Tactical Intelligence during the Transition from War to Peace

Approved by:

LTC Ben L. Elley, MA

COL James R. McDonough, MS

Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.

Monograph Director

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 19th day of December 1992
ABSTRACT

MISSION COMPLETE?: TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE by Major Timothy D. Bloechl, USA, 66 pages.

This monograph describes the stability phase of Operation Just Cause and its associated intelligence operations. It focuses on the intelligence aspects of the operation to answer the question: Does military doctrine adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace?

The monograph first provides a possible definition for the term stability operations, and describes the Just Cause stability phase and its related goals and tasks. Next, the paper examines stability phase-related tactical intelligence tasks and characteristics. The paper then provides an assessment of the relevancy of the data to future operations. Finally, this monograph evaluates current and emerging doctrine to determine if it adequately addresses tactical intelligence operations vis-a-vis stability operations.

The monograph concludes that current doctrine does not adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace. Current doctrine fails to define and describe the environment associated with this transition and, subsequently, does not foster improvements in intelligence doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Emerging doctrine, on the other hand, provides greater focus on this transitional period, thus improving the likelihood for corresponding action from proponents for the intelligence battlefield operating system. Emerging intelligence publications, while improving TTP for low intensity conflict stability operations, still lack the details necessary to prepare intelligence personnel properly for the tasks they may have to perform during this phase of operations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Stability Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Just Cause Stability Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Intelligence Support to Stability Operations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Search Operations</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Hostage Rescue Operations</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Law and Order Restoration Operations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Civil Military Operations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support Operations</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of Support in the Stability Phase</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Doctrinal Implications</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Doctrine</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging Doctrine</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Summary</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map: Panama</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Theoretical Model of a Stability Phase</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Operation Just Cause Stability Phase</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix: Operation Just Cause Task Organization</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An army's doctrine is inseparable from its past; therefore, rigorous study of the past is as important to articulating a credible doctrine as is the forecasting of future trends and threats.¹

I. Introduction

President Bush ordered U.S. military forces to conduct combat operations in Panama on December 20, 1989 to:

protect American lives, to defend democracy in Panama, to apprehend Noriega [General Manuel Noriega, the un-elected dictator of Panama] and bring him to trial on the drug-related charges for which he was indicted in 1988, and to ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties.²
The operation, codenamed Just Cause, fell within the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) theater of operations. The U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO), General Maxwell R. Thurman, assumed combatant command of the operation. His subordinate, LTG Carl W. Stiner, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, led the tactical execution of Operation Just Cause. He commanded a force designated Joint Task Force South (JTFSO).

U.S. combat forces available to LTG Stiner included elements of the 82d Airborne Division, the 7th Infantry Division (Light), and the Panama-based 193d Infantry Brigade (Light). Additionally, Stiner had operational control of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), consisting of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Navy Seal teams, and other United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) forces. Other joint service Panama and CONUS-based combat, combat support, and combat service support units rounded out JTFSO. (See Appendix A for the JTFSO command structure and task organization).

The key planning documents for the operation, USCINCSO Operations Order (OPORD) 1-90' and JTFSO Operations Plan (OPLAN) 90-2, identified a multitude of tasks for execution by Just Cause forces. Essential tasks included: neutralizing Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and other combatants; protecting U.S. lives and property; capturing General Noriega; restoring law and order; and supporting the installation of a democratic government in Panama. Other
specified tasks included: resolving potential hostage situations; capturing enemy leaders, armas, and documents; establishing a police force from the remnants of the PDF; and conducting nation building operations to help in restoring Panama to its pre-Noriega state.5

The primary objective of initial combat operations was to neutralize the PDF near Panama City, Colon, and the Panama Canal. "Follow-on operations envisioned occupation of Panama City to restore law and order and movement to the interior of Panama to neutralize PDF elements located there."6 Planners envisioned neutralizing the PDF in three days with follow-on or stability operations lasting thirty days.7

Initial combat operations on December 20, 1989 successfully dismantled the PDF command and control structure and neutralized primary enemy force targets. By the 21st, U.S. forces faced scattered and disorganized opposition throughout Panama. Although limited combat operations continued well into January, JTFSO essentially entered the stability phase of Operation Just Cause on approximately D+2 (December 22, 1989).8

The stability phase of Operation Just Cause provides the framework for this paper. Lessons learned from operations in the recent past suggest U.S. military forces have difficulty executing stability operations. Possible causes of the problem include inadequate doctrine, lack of training, incomplete planning, and late arrival of units specialized in executing these missions (civil affairs, military police, etc.). Assuming tactical forces will continue to execute
stability functions in the future, it is important to prepare for these operations in peacetime to reduce problems in war. Doctrine serves as a useful starting point in this endeavor. Toward this end, this monograph compares doctrine to the realities of stability operations during Operation Just Cause by focusing on one of the Battlefield Operating Systems - intelligence - to answer the following question: Does military doctrine adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace?

To answer the question, this monograph first provides a possible definition for the term stability operations, and describes the Just Cause stability phase and its related goals and tasks. Next, the paper examines stability phase-related tactical intelligence tasks and characteristics. The paper then provides an assessment of the relevancy of the data to future operations. Finally, this monograph evaluates current and emerging doctrine to determine if it adequately addresses tactical intelligence operations vis-a-vis stability operations.

II. Stability Operations

Those who attempt to find a description of, or definition for, stability operations in U.S. military publications face a difficult challenge. This term, applied to operations during Just Cause, is absent from current doctrine. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the term and the Just Cause stability
environment before attempting to identify intelligence missions or tasks related to these operations.

The word *stability*, in a physical sense, implies restoring something to its original state after an outside force disturbs it. When couched in terms of combat operations, *stability* may mean returning the area of operations to some level of normalcy in the aftermath of war. Just as a doctor attempts to stabilize a patient after a traumatic experience, military forces want to bring an end to violence and suffering after war. One possible definition for stability operations, albeit lacking doctrinal support, is that they are *operations designed to pacify a vanquished enemy and end violence or disorder in an area of operations to facilitate the return to peace*. In other words, stability operations represent the *transitional period from war to peace*.

Considering the preceding definition for stability operations, Figure 1 graphically depicts the theoretical position of these operations as a function of time in relation to combat operations and nation building activities. The figure also shows a declining level of military responsibility and an increasing amount of U.S. State Department responsibility as war progresses.
transitions to e. The dashed lines represent that there is no clear time when combat operations end and stability operations begin or, likewise, when stability operations end and nation building activities begin. Except for cases involving a declared and honored truce between belligerent parties, it is realistic to assume that a tactical military force may conduct combat and stability operations simultaneously in an area of operations. Additionally, it is equally realistic to assume that, pending the arrival of sufficient civil affairs units and special operations personnel, tactical forces may find themselves engaged in nation building activities.

**Operation Just Cause Stability Operations.**

Although the stability phase of Operation Just Cause is consistent with the preceding description of stability operations, a graphic timeline (Figure 2) highlights differences between actual events and the theoretical model (Figure 1).

There was no clear division between combat, stability, and nation building operations during the first thirty days of the operation. Limited combat operations continued throughout Panama until the end of January 1990. Stability and nation building operations began almost simultaneously in the first 48 hours of the operation. Although there
was no clear end to the stability phase, the redeployment of remaining CONUS-based combat units in early February suggests a marked decline in stability operations.\textsuperscript{13}

The shift of responsibilities between the military and the U.S. State Department is also graphically depicted in Figure 2. The State Department axis shows the author's "best guess" based on available data. The arrival of a State Department Survey Team in Panama on January 2, 1990,\textsuperscript{14} suggests an increase in diplomatic responsibility for U.S. actions in Panama. On January 23, 1990, command authority over the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), the organization responsible for the execution of military-led nation building activities, reverted to the U.S. Military Support Group (USMSG) in Panama. The USMSG increased coordination with the U.S. Ambassador and his embassy, thus indicating a gradual transference of responsibility to the State Department.\textsuperscript{15} The departure of remaining CONUS-based combat forces in late January and early February signaled a decline in military responsibility for actions in Panama following Just Cause.\textsuperscript{16}

The goals associated with the Just Cause stability phase were:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Capture or neutralize the PDF and Dignity Battalion leadership.
  \item Restore law and order in the Panama Canal area.
  \item Eliminate pockets of resistance remaining in the country of Panama.
  \item Continue to protect U.S. lives and property.
  \item Continue to support the installation of a democratic government in Panama.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{itemize}

Major missions or tasks related to the successful accomplishment of these goals
included: capture Noriega; capture the senior leadership of the PDF and the Dignity Battalions; resolve hostage situations; capture weapons and munitions caches; secure U.S. and Panamanian facilities; form, equip, and train a new Panamanian police force; and support civil military operations (CMO). 20

Taken together, these goals and missions provide a framework for describing the stability phase, in general, and related intelligence operations, in particular. Before delving into the intelligence aspects of the stability phase, it is important to understand the stability environment faced by U.S. forces during Just Cause. This paper provides a description of these operations by answering the following question: Why did stability operations last so long (over 40 days) and what were the activities or events associated with them?

Many factors combined to prolong the stability phase and serve to clarify the nature of these operations during Just Cause. These included inadequate planning, lack of training, the failure to capture Noriega on D-Day, hostage situations, and other tasks associated with the conduct of stability operations. Also, the slow execution of civil affairs (CA) and nation building operations further hampered resolution of this phase of Operation Just Cause.

Planning deficiencies, although quickly corrected by improvisation during the operation, had an impact on prolonging the stability phase. JTFSO OPLAN 90-2 concentrated on obtaining decisive victory in the first days, if not hours, of the operation. 21 The success of the initial combat effort is highly commendable and clearly serves as an example of how to execute a coup de
main. What these operations left in their wake is another matter.

Under Noriega's leadership, it [the PDF] had taken over the functions of the traffic police, the regular police, the forest rangers, . . . the immigration officials, the internal revenue service and all government regulatory agencies. By quickly neutralizing PDF command and control and selected combat elements, U.S. forces essentially dislocated the people of Panama from any semblance of government and law and order. Although the plan acknowledged that a breakdown in law and order was likely, it did not address in any detail the actions U.S. forces would have to take to bring order to the situation. Also, planners underestimated the impact the plan would have on the people of Panama, particularly in Panama City and Colon.

The U.S. invasion left a power vacuum in the country — one that the deviant elements of the society filled quickly. Disorganized PDF remnants, elements of paramilitary forces, and common criminals ruled, albeit temporarily, in areas devoid of a U.S. troop presence. Former PDF soldiers shed their uniforms, melted into the populace, and took out their frustrations on the people. Members of the Dignity Battalions (Digbots), a paramilitary force loyal to Noriega, took to the streets by the thousands. Their activities surprised senior U.S. military leaders. While U.S. forces continued combat operations against remaining PDF strongholds, ex-PDF and Digbots, coupled with Panama's criminal element (if one can tell the difference between the three groups), led a campaign of terror in Panama City and Colon. Their acts of violence included taking hostages, looting stores, arson and sniper attacks,
and drive-by shootings.24

The situation quickly deteriorated causing political and military headaches for the U.S. According to LTG Stiner,

A stable situation within that city [Panama City] was absolutely paramount to being able to stand up the new government and have it function the way it should.25

Only a stable police force could quell the violence in the cities. With no such Panamanian organization to turn to, the task fell to U.S. military police and combat units.

JTFSO lacked sufficient military police (MP) forces to handle the situation. Excluding organic MP units deployed with CONUS-based warfighters or assigned to units in Panama, tactical forces received a total of two additional MP companies in the initial JTFSO task organization. An additional MP battalion and brigade headquarters deployed to Panama by D+2, but its assigned missions vastly exceeded its capabilities. Its missions included enemy prisoner of war (EPW) control, security of key facilities and convoys, support to civil-military operations, weapons collection, and the reestablishment of law and order.26 With over one million people residing in Panama City alone,27 the available MPs could not conceivably handle the situation alone.

To end the violence, it was necessary to use most of the available combat units in a constabulary role throughout January. Training infantry units to execute police functions is not a standard task within the U.S. Army and many soldiers found themselves in an awkward position. One division commander
explained "it was not a mission we expected to get," while others believed soldiers "deserve more detailed training" in preparation for this type of mission." Apparently the upper levels of the Army agreed with this sentiment. After the operation, Department of the Army officials stated the Army "must increase the training of troops in police functions." Despite a lack of training, many combat units performed a military police mission for most of their combat tours in Panama. Efforts to train, equip, and organize the new Panamanian police force took time. In their stead, the combat soldier dutifully met the challenge. Eventually these units, with a new Panamanian police force formed from the old PDF, restored law and order.11

The failure to capture Noriega and other senior PDF leaders early in the operation also served to prolong stability operations. A key task in the early stages of the operation was to take down the PDF command and control structure. Those who evaded capture, particularly Noriega, retained the capability to organize a resistance movement that could threaten the legitimacy of the new government. Intelligence reports of supposed PDF plans "to take to the mountains to conduct guerrilla warfare" concerned Just Cause leaders and planners.

JTFSO tasked the JSOTF to capture the general, but subsequent search operations required the use of other combat units. Also, tactical forces searched for other key Noriega supporters and contributed quick reaction teams to assist JSOTF or military police personnel engaged in seizure operations.
Additionally, some Panamanians the U.S. sought took refuge in foreign embassies in hope of obtaining political asylum. To prevent their escape, JTFSO tasked additional combat and military police units to maintain cordons around the embassies. These endeavors reduced the force available to reestablish order in Panama, thus protracting the stability effort.

A key objective of Operation Just Cause was to protect U.S. citizens. In the two years preceding the operation, U.S. citizens were the targets of over 900 incidents of harassment, short-term abduction, and other acts by the PDF. Intelligence officials heard rumors of PDF plans "Genesis" and "Exodus" which called for the kidnapping of U.S. citizens should the Americans attack. Additionally, Noriega made a speech on December 15th, 1989, claiming "they [the Panamanians] would sit on the banks of the Canal and watch the bodies of our enemies float by." Forearmed with this knowledge, Just Cause planners appropriately tasked JSOTF elements to respond to hostage barricade situations or rescue operations.

Almost immediately after H-Hour, the worst fears of U.S. military commanders came true. After their initial assault into Panama City's Tocumen International Airport, elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment ran into a hostage situation at the airport's terminal. Luckily, they talked the PDF abductors into releasing their civilian victims. Across town, Dighats and possible members of the PDF anti-terrorist unit (UESAT), stormed the Marriott Hotel. They took several American citizens and other noncombatants captive and hustled
them away from the hotel."

Elsewhere in downtown Panama City, armed Panamanians abducted a U.S. Department of Defense employee, Raymond Dragseth, from his apartment. Also, at San Blas Island on the Atlantic Ocean side of Panama, probable PDF members kidnapped several members of a Smithsonian Institution research group and took them into the jungles of central Panama. By December 22d the number of incidents reached a peak with the U.S. military reporting 37-45 Americans missing and considered possible hostages. These reports did not include the number of noncombatants taken from the Marriott Hotel or San Blas Island.

These known or suspected hostage situations, plus additional reports of trapped noncombatants, added to the strain of regaining stability in Panama City. Again, forces earmarked to handle this type of situation, the JSOTF, required assistance from tactical maneuver elements. For example, elements of the 82d Airborne Division conducted an assault to rescue Americans trapped at the Marriott. With one exception, JTFSO successfully resolved all hostage situations by the end of December. Dragseth was the only casualty, reportedly murdered by his abductors shortly after H-Hour. Although the hostage episode of the stability phase lasted about one week, the diversion of combat units and special operations assets served to prolong the stability effort.

Several other essential activities contributed to prolonging the stability phase. These included: the hunt for and seizure of enemy weapons and
ammunition caches; the processing of detainees; the collection and exploitation of enemy documents; and providing security for members of the new Panamanian government, and Panamanian and U.S. facilities.

To help stem the violence in the cities and thwart potential guerrilla activity, it was necessary to find and collect enemy weapons and ammunition. JTFSO tasked its combat units to "capture weapons and munitions caches within [the] AO [area of operations]." To aid in locating weapons, the Department of Defense sponsored a "Muskets for Money" program that offered dollars for weapons voluntarily turned in by Panamanians. Although a good idea, officials in Washington made a public announcement before units in Panama could prepare to implement the program. There were no plans for weapons turn-in sites, nor funds available to pay the people who took advantage of the offer.

The number of weapons eventually recovered through this program and tactical unit search operations greatly exceeded intelligence estimates. In all, over 56,000 weapons found their way into U.S. hands. The size of the weapons and ammunition haul strained an already overtasked combat force. While contributing to the stability effort, the search for weapons, with implied tasks to guard and transport them, diverted additional forces from other missions.

Although the processing of EPWs is a common combat task, the Just Cause stability phase offered combat forces some interesting challenges. The
number of captured Panamanians, although minuscule in proportion to operations such as Desert Storm, were difficult to transport and control. Most JTFSO forces were light infantry units with little to no organic transportation to move the prisoners. Additionally, as former PDF and Digbat personnel melted into the Panamanian populace, it became difficult to separate friend from foe. The situation forced the U.S. military to call Panamanians they held "detainees" (vice EPWs). This was necessary as those held included members of the PDF and Dignity Battalions, common criminals, and a few unlucky noncombatants.

Despite these difficulties, there was an underlying urgency to screen and interrogate detainees rapidly in support of other stability-related operations. Before Noriega appeared at the Papal Nunciatura on December 24th, there were hopes of obtaining information about his whereabouts. Also, the Americans wanted to know the locations of weapons caches and other PDF and Digbat leaders. Finally, the new Panamanian government decided to create its new police force using personnel from the former PDF. As those detained were the potential police force of the immediate future, it was imperative to identify those whom the government could use in the new force. The longer it took to form, equip, and train them, the longer the need for U.S. combat forces to act as surrogate policemen. Therefore, Just Cause EPW operations played an important role in the stability effort. Problems with moving the detainees, however, coupled with time-consuming efforts to screen them
(described later), frustrated attempts to end the stability phase of operations.30

While searching for enemy personnel and weapons, U.S. troops uncovered tons of government and military related documents. Again, the limited mobility of the tactical force hampered efforts to evacuate the material to intelligence units. The situation forced combat units to guard the captured material for inordinate amounts of time, thereby further reducing the number of personnel available for other stability operations.31

Other security missions drained the force of available combat power. Besides securing U.S installations in Panama, tactical forces guarded Panamanian government buildings and key utilities and communications sites. They also formed security teams to protect Panama’s president and two vice presidents. Again, the lack of a Panamanian police force to execute such functions hindered U.S. efforts to focus the combat force on restoring order in Panama.52

By their very nature, civil affairs and nation building operations complement stability operations during the transition from war to peace. As shown earlier, the stability and nation building phases of Operation Just Cause began almost concurrently. The disorganized nature of early nation building efforts, however, reduced the relative value that these operations should have had on the stability situation.

There were several reasons for the slow execution of nation building activities. First, JTFSO OPORD 90-2 lacked synchronization with the
USCINCSO plan for the nation building phase, OPORD 1-88, codenamed BLIND LOGIC. JTFSO planned for the deployment of a reserve component civil affairs brigade and stressed limiting the involvement of combat units in the CA effort. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved deployment of the brigade, opting to piecemeal CA personnel into Panama, an unprepared JTFSO suddenly found itself deeply engaged in these operations. Additionally, problems with the BLIND LOGIC plan added further confusion to the nation building effort. General Thurman had not fully reviewed the plan before the initiation of hostilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not approved the operations order, and JTFSO disregarded it as a tasking document.

Next, the U.S. State Department was slow to take responsibility for the nation building effort. Due to the compartmented nature of Just Cause planning within military channels, planning for the post-conflict period had not included department officials. Additionally, an understaffed U.S. Embassy in Panama lacked the capability to take an aggressive lead at the start of these operations. Finally, activity in Washington, D.C., went forward at a snail’s pace. The first State Department team sent to evaluate the situation arrived in Panama on January 2d. The first Presidential request to Congress for funds to support the nation building operation occurred on January 24. The U.S. Congress finally passed the measure on February 7th.

Finally, the command structure responsible for CA units and the nation building operation, renamed Promote Liberty, was not firmly established until
January 23d, over one month after D-Day. To summarize, a poorly synchronized and coordinated plan, combined with a sluggish State Department response and changes to the command and control of CA units, led to a disorganized civil affairs and nation building effort in the early days of Operation Just Cause. Combat forces, faced with over 10,000 displaced civilians by December 23d, herein found yet another impediment to the quick resolution of the Just Cause stability phase.

Summary.

The Operation Just Cause stability phase represented the transition from war to peace in Panama. It included the restoration of law and order in Panama, the neutralization of the PDF and Dignity Battalions, the institution of a democratic government, and all the associated activities inherent to accomplishing these tasks. Stability operations occurred concurrently with nation building activities designed to foster democracy in Panama and reduce the divisiveness related to Noriega's years in power.

To execute the stability-related operations described above, JTFSO needed tailored and continuous tactical intelligence support. The next section of this monograph looks at the intelligence battlefield operating system. It describes the intelligence tasks associated with the stability phase and highlights several characteristics exhibited during mission execution.
III. Intelligence Support to Stability Operations

In Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Sherman Kent provides a succinct definition of intelligence—"Intelligence means knowledge." Such knowledge, particularly of enemy intentions, capabilities, and the terrain upon which they fight, is critical to the successful execution of friendly military operations. At the tactical level, Kent’s definition holds true.

Commanders need knowledge of the enemy force, their weapons, organization, tactics, and dispositions to win battles and engagements. Yet, what happens when an enemy force is soundly defeated on the conventional battlefield, but maintains a capability to thwart efforts to terminate the fight? How does tactical intelligence support the commander in this situation?

One can find a possible answer to this question by using the Just Cause stability phase as a case in point. Despite the rapid neutralization of PDF command and control and major combat units, U.S. forces faced weeks of violence in Panama’s city streets. Now the enemy was civil unrest and a potential guerrilla force. Decisive combat actions suddenly gave way to stability operations - operations designed to expedite the transition from war to peace. This section describes the tactical intelligence tasks of the stability phase. It does so by categorizing them in terms of the overarching missions assigned to JTFSO during Just Cause and corresponding stability phase tasks. This section concludes by identifying several characteristics related to the
execution of these intelligence tasks."

Support to Search Operations.

The JTFSO mission to "neutralize the PDF" required conducting several major search operations during the stability phase. These included the hunt for Noriega, searches for PDF and Digbat leaders, and operations to find and capture weapons and ammunition caches. These operations severely tested the capabilities of tactical intelligence units and staffs.

The search for Noriega, although technically a USSOUTHCOM action, required tactical intelligence support. A special multi-agency cell at USSOUTHCOM conducted the primary analytical work supporting the search. The cell's mission was to identify the General's possible location and to provide the information to JSOTF elements tasked to capture him. Tactical units became involved in the hunt as information conduits and by providing search teams.

Many reports concerning Noriega's whereabouts originated at the tactical level. The United States offered a $1 Million dollar reward to anyone providing information that led to Noriega's capture. The U.S. offer triggered an enormous response from the Panamanian populace. Combat units received reports from Panamanians on the street, while other sources called in their tips to JTFSO, USSOUTHCOM, or any other U.S.-associated phone number they knew in Panama. The number of Noriega "sightings" exceeded JSOTF's capability to respond. This problem forced JTFSO to task combat units to
check many reported locations. As a result, tactical intelligence support to the Noriega hunt required completing two tasks: 1) collect information about Noriega's location and pass it through channels to the USSOUTHCOM analysis cell; and 2) respond to intelligence requests from those units tasked to search possible Noriega locations. *

Units needed similar tactical intelligence support to find PDF and Dignity Battalion leaders, and enemy weapons and ammunition caches. The intelligence tasks were: 1) collect information and analyze it to identify locations of leaders or caches sites; and 2) meet the intelligence requirements of units sent to search for leaders and arms caches. Again, information came primarily from the people of Panama, either over the phone or via combat patrols. On December 24, the U.S. Government instituted its "Muskets for Money" program. The program offered varying amounts of cash to those who brought weapons or ammunition in to collection points, or provided information leading to the location of cache sites. Using money as bait, U.S. forces reaped a rich harvest of both information and weapons. *

**Support to Hostage Rescue Operations.**

A key mission for all command levels during Operation Just Cause was to "protect U.S. lives." Hostage situations that developed during the first week of Just Cause jeopardized mission success. Although planners anticipated the potential threat, the number of cases exceeded their expectations and added an undesired amount of friction to the plan. Intelligence analytical support was
critical to the successful resolution of these situations.

Again, the Panamanian populace was largely responsible for passing information concerning potential hostage situations to JTFSO. Combat units passed reports received from people on the streets, while other reports filtered in by telephone. It was often difficult to determine if the information revealed an actual abduction. Some sources feared for the safety of friends, while others saw events suggesting a hostage situation. Additionally, some reports suggested people were simply trapped between converging military forces. To further complicate the situation, other reports suggested the enemy moved certain groups of hostages from one location to another, yet, there was no way to be sure there was a relationship between the reports. Despite report content, each piece of information generated tracking a potentially new case until further analysis and information proved otherwise.\textsuperscript{71}

The tactical intelligence tasks associated with the hostage crisis were similar to those related to Just Cause search operations. JTFSO had to collect and analyze information related to the potential hostage cases to develop an actual picture of events. Intelligence staffs also had to meet the intelligence requirements of units sent to rescue hostages or trapped noncombatants.

While these intelligence tasks were similar to tasks associated with search operations for enemy leaders and weapons, a subtle difference makes them unique. Tactical forces required detailed analysis of each situation and the area of operations before executing rescue operations. JSOTF, already fully
committed to the search for Noriega, required "almost perfect information" from intelligence operatives before dedicating scarce resources to rescue operations. There was also concern that elements of the PDF or Digbats planned to ambush JSOTF elements. Knowing U.S. sensitivities toward the safety of American citizens, operators believed the enemy might use fake hostage reports to lure special operations forces into a trap.79

Intelligence staffs could not always meet JSOTF's information needs, therefore, JTFSO normally tasked combat units to verify reported information and provide further details to aid in hostage rescue. Fortunately, actual hostage situations ended without the use of force because kidnappers lacked commands from the PDF command structure and freed their captives. JTFSO and USSOUTHCOM discarded other potential hostage cases through a combination of intelligence analysis and reconnaissance by combat units. In any event, the hostage episode of Operation Just Cause served to highlight the detailed intelligence analysis requirements associated with verifying information and preparing for hostage rescue operations.74

Support to Law and Order Restoration Operations.

JTFSO follow-on operations envisioned the requirement to "restore law and order" in Panama.79 Mission accomplishment required execution of an additional task - to transform the PDF into a police force. Tactical intelligence support to the law and order mission relied heavily on EPW operations and combat reporting from tactical units.
Tactical intelligence tasks related to forming the new Panamanian police force fell within the realm of counterintelligence operations. First, USSOUTHCOM and JTFSO had to develop an extensive Black-White-Gray (BWG) list in coordination with the newly installed Panamanian government. This list identified those individuals who were: considered criminals; former PDF or Dignity Battalion members of particular prominence; of questionable loyalty to the new government; or under indictment by the U.S. for drug-related offenses. Additionally, on the positive side, the list provided names of individuals who U.S. forces should release if detained.

Next came the task of screening the detainees. This process included checking persons held at detainee holding facilities. The task was to identify those persons whom the U.S. should release from custody or transfer to the JTFSO EPW facility. Finally, as part of the screening process, combined efforts by U.S. and Panamanian officials vetted former members of the PDF for entry into the new police force. The intent of the vetting process was to determine a person's reliability and suitability for police duties.

Combat units and MPs conducting law and order missions also used the BWG list. Although the list lacked many details needed to make positive identification of a person, it gave troops in the field some means of identifying renegade PDF or Dignity Battalion members. Units detained and evacuated persons whose name was on the list to detention facilities for further processing. Despite an occasional case of misidentification, this activity helped
to bring order to the streets.79

The final tactical intelligence task related to the law and order mission involved tracking reports of violence and looting. Again the sources of information included combat spot reports and telephone calls from concerned Panamanian citizens. Analytical efforts focused on developing trends or patterns associated with the violence, identifying the organization and capabilities of violent groups (if any), and providing warning to U.S. units operating near or in possibly violent areas of Panama.79

**Support to Civil Military Operations.**

While limited combat operations continued in the Panamanian countryside, and as U.S. forces sought to restore law and order in the former Canal Zone, civil affairs (CA) units began the arduous task of supporting the establishment of the new government. Although intelligence efforts focused on supporting combat and stability operations, Just Cause civil military operations (CMO) revealed several tasks for tactical intelligence.

First, as part of the EPW effort, former PDF members and individuals on the BWG list sought refuge from the fighting by going to U.S.-organized, displaced civilian (DC) camps. These camps, under the supervision of the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), provided shelter, food, water, and medical care to over 10,000 noncombatants during Just Cause.80 The task for tactical intelligence was to identify and detain former PDF and Digbat members, and persons named on the BWG list. Again law-abiding
Panamanian citizens aided the intelligence effort by gladly identifying many people the U.S. sought.  

Additionally, people housed in these camps, and others who contacted CA elements operating throughout Panama, provided information of possible intelligence value. Reports included locations of arms, PDF leaders, and other information. Some people brought weapons to the camps to turn them in under the "Muskets for Money" program. It was quickly apparent that the camps, and other CA activities, offered the opportunity to collect valuable intelligence. The resulting intelligence task was to exploit this opportunity by quietly collecting information.  

Finally, the CMOTF needed tactical intelligence information to execute their mission effectively. Unfortunately, the CMOTF had an undermanned intelligence staff, its CA-related intelligence requirements had limited priority, and JTFSO failed to disseminate standard intelligence reports to them. In hindsight, tactical intelligence staffs need to provide the same type of support to CA units as they do to combat forces. CMO activities offer additional sources of intelligence information and require basic support from tactical intelligence staffs and units.

**General Support Operations.**

The Just Cause stability phase highlighted some additional tactical intelligence tasks of a general support (GS) nature. These tasks included the exploitation of captured documents and arms, and the interrogation of EPWs.
Preceding paragraphs highlight the key intelligence requirements associated with the EPW effort, and describe some aspects of the detention screening process. It is also important to note the size of the operation. By D+2, December 22d, over 1,400 detainees were in U.S. hands. On January 3d, the number rose to about 2,300. The number of detainees pushed JTFSO's interrogation capabilities to the limit.

Efforts to exploit captured documents and weapons also stressed, if not exceeded, JTFSO's intelligence capabilities. U.S forces were "overwhelmed by the number of weapons turned in" or found in caches throughout Panama. The number of weapons (over 56,000), combined with about 120 tons of captured enemy documents, placed an enormous exploitation burden on JTFSO's undermanned Joint Document and Material Exploitation Center. The Department of Defense recognized this fact and quickly dispatched an interagency team to Panama to help with the situation.

Large numbers of captured prisoners, documents, and arms posed a difficult exploitation challenge to JTFSO during the Just Cause stability phase. The ability to gain timely and valuable information from these sources in a rapidly changing tactical situation remains questionable. Intelligence planners should anticipate capturing large numbers of EPWs, documents and weapons during stability operations, and ensure that initial exploitation operations focus on current Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).
Characteristics of Support in the Stability Phase.

Intelligence operations during the stability phase featured several characteristics that affected accomplishing most of the intelligence tasks described above. The list of characteristics includes: a heavy reliance on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources; an overwhelming amount of intelligence reporting; a lack of time to analyze the information; poor intelligence dissemination to tactical units; an inadequate number of linguists and counterintelligence personnel; and problems with the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process.

Planning and execution of initial Just Cause combat operations relied on all possible sources of intelligence - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and HUMINT. The Just Cause stability phase, however, was predominantly a HUMINT environment. U.S. neutralization of the PDF command and control process effectively eliminated SIGINT as a major tactical source. IMINT, although valuable in providing visual orientation of selected areas to tactical units during mission planning, was not the type of intelligence needed to execute the intelligence tasks of the stability phase. Thus, with a lack of SIGINT, and the limited utility of IMINT, intelligence units and staffs had to rely on HUMINT to meet the requirements of Just Cause stability operations."

There was no shortage of HUMINT-derived information during the operation. The amount of information provided by the people of Panama was
overwhelming. One commander exclaimed, "They [the Panamanian people] are killing us with information." LTG Stiner said the amount of information just about buried his J2 staff. Indeed, the number of HUMINT spot reports was enormous. Some estimates place the number of reports at 75-80 per day at battalion level, and up to a peak of 400 in an hour at brigade level.

The number of HUMINT reports did little to clarify the intelligence picture during the stability phase. Clausewitz in On War wrote, "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain." His analysis of the quality of intelligence information definitely applied to Just Cause stability operations. Reports from a sample of unit S2's indicate that HUMINT-derived information received at their headquarters was accurate only about one to ten percent of the time.

The quantity and quality of intelligence information limited the intelligence analysis process and, consequently, impeded the flow of intelligence products to tactical units. Battalion and brigade-size units lacked the analytical capability to deal with the massive influx of spot reports. In turn, unit intelligence staffs pushed the information up to the JTF level, assuming the larger intelligence staff could make some sense out of the information. The lack of analysis at lower unit levels simply exacerbated the situation at JTFSO. The J2 element barely had enough time to log all the reports; the personnel analyzed and processed only those reports that seemed critically important to the operation. As a result, the downward dissemination of processed
intelligence was a rarity during the first weeks of the stability phase. Another problem that hindered the intelligence effort was a lack of counterintelligence (CI) personnel and linguists. The HUMINT-intensive conditions of the Just Cause stability phase required a proportional augmentation of CI personnel and linguists at all levels of command. Just Cause planners didn’t anticipate this need. OPLAN 90-2 placed the responsibility for intelligence collection and analysis support on the component commands. The OPLAN tasked the Panama-based military intelligence (MI) brigade to provide direct support (DS) CI teams to component commands, but did not identify the number of teams. Furthermore, the OPLAN task organization did not provide any MI assets to subordinate units. Although there was some talk of providing additional MI assets to combat units during the operation, there was never any action to do so. Units had to rely on organic CI assets and pooled their Spanish-speakers to meet the needs of the operation.

Finally, intelligence operations during the stability phase suggest a lack of understanding of IPB techniques. General Thurman asserted, "in every case one must do the adequate intelligence preparation of the battlefield. And in this case, it worked." Perhaps this was true in preparation for initial combat operations but, among the sources for this paper, there is no mention of intelligence personnel using IPB during the stability phase. One commander was particularly critical of the IPB process, claiming doctrine did not address
the procedures for conducting IPB in a stability environment. Finally, an intelligence officer succinctly summed up his view of the situation by saying, "The MI manuals stink." 

**Summary.**

Tactical intelligence tasks during the stability phase of Operation Just Cause supported efforts to restore law and order, neutralize the PDF, and resolve hostage situations. JTFSO units and staffs accomplished these tasks amidst the concurrent execution of nation building and limited combat operations in the Panamanian countryside. Intelligence objectives for this period were:

- Find Noriega.
- Find personnel on the BWG list.
- Identify weapons and arms cache sites.
- Identify persons suitable for the new police force.
- Exploit captured arms and documents.
- Exploit information obtained from Enemy prisoners of War (EPWs).
- Support civil affairs operations.

When attempting to meet these objectives, intelligence staffs and units relied heavily on HUMINT, lacked adequate CI and linguist assets, and were overwhelmed by a flood of intelligence information. These aspects of the situation resulted in faulty to nonexistent analysis of intelligence data, and poor dissemination of intelligence products to combat units. Finally, the IPB
process, while vital to the success of initial combat operations, did not play a major role during the stability phase.

IV. Doctrinal Implications

Doctrine:

is the condensed expression of its [the Army's] approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, support structures, equipment, and training must all derive from it.

Doctrine is dynamic, evolving from the careful study of military history and theory. Operation Just Cause warranted inclusion in doctrine. The history of U.S. military operations in this century, and the similarities between the Just Cause stability phase and recent U.S. operations, make the operation relevant for doctrinal analysis.

Operation Just Cause, when considered in a general sense, was not an historical aberration. According to John Collins, in his book America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future, the U.S. military has engaged in about 64 conflicts and wars since 1899. Of these operations, two were high-intensity conflicts (WWI and WWII), two were mid-intensity conflicts (Korea and Vietnam-excluding Desert Storm), and the remainder were low-intensity conflicts (LIC). He includes Just Cause in the latter category. Of the 60 LIC cases he examined, 20 involved the use of conventional force operations. Therefore, approximately one-third of the U.S. military operations in the last
century were conventional force, LIC operations. Indeed, of the last five major military operations (Vietnam, Dominican Republic (Operation Power Pack, 1965), Grenada (operation Urgent Fury, 1983), Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Storm), three were LIC cases involving conventional combat operations. Although it is impossible to forecast the future accurately, the data suggest operations like Just Cause will happen again, and in greater proportion to the mid and high-intensity conflict varieties.

As for stability phase-like operations, historical evidence again suggests Operation Just Cause was no aberration. COL Alexander Walczak, in a study project for the U.S. Army War College, shows that the Just Cause stability phase was remarkably similar to other recent U.S. operations. In operations Power Pack and Urgent Fury, combat forces executed CA and MP tasks during and after combat operations. He also contends that soldiers involved in Desert Storm performed similar chores.

A closer look at Urgent Fury and Desert Shield/Storm reveals repetition of many situations prevalent during the Just Cause stability phase. U.S. forces in Grenada: rescued American citizens who U.S. forces believed were potential hostages; searched for and detained enemy leaders; collected and exploited tons of documents and arms; and restored order in the tiny Caribbean nation. Additionally, the Grenadian people passed intelligence to American units in a way similar to Just Cause. Although a mid-intensity conflict, American units in Desert Shield/Storm: faced the possibility of having to resolve
multiple hostage situations; collected and exploited thousands of captured enemy vehicles and weapons; assisted in restoring order within Kuwait City; and, to this day, continue to exploit documents and material to end Iraq's potential for a nuclear-biological-chemical capability.

The history of U.S. military operations suggests Just Cause stability operations were not an historical aberration and, therefore, rate inclusion in doctrine. Does doctrine express the Army's approach to conducting tactical intelligence operations during stability operations - the transitional period from war to peace? The answer is a qualified no. Current doctrine does not emphasize stability-like operations and, as a result, does not drive development of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary to conduct tactical intelligence operations. However, emerging doctrine found in draft military publications improves the focus on the nature of stability-like operations, thus establishing conditions to drive improvement in intelligence doctrine and TTP.

Current Doctrine.112

Clausewitz wrote,

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.113

This statement also holds true for commanders and their intelligence personnel today. To accomplish the tactical intelligence tasks described in the preceding discussion, intelligence personnel must understand the nature of the transition from war to peace. Current doctrine is their primary source of obtaining this
knowledge before a crisis begins. Regrettably, it does not prove adequate to the challenge.

Current manuals do not address the general aspects of the Just Cause stability period. JCS PUB 1.02, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not define the term "stability operation," nor does it address this type of operation by any other term. Other publications that might serve to clarify the situation remain in varying stages of coordination.

Army-level, capstone publications fare a little better. FM 100-5, *Operations*, provides a general description for the conduct of contingency operations and briefly mentions LIC, but instead refers the reader to FM 100-20 for more information on the subject. FM 100-5, however, does not specifically identify a stability or similar phase in conflict; instead, it concentrates on the conventional aspects of war.

FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, partially describes the stability situation that faced Just Cause participants. It would categorize Just Cause as a "Peacemaking Operation," designed to "achieve peace" by protecting U.S. citizens, establishing and maintaining law and order, and by forcing a return to political and diplomatic methods.

FM 100-20 also provides a description of operations similar to those of the Just Cause stability phase, but discusses these operations in terms of a host nation-led, counterinsurgency fight. The operations, entitled "Consolidation,"
address many Just Cause missions and objectives. Consolidation operations seek to: "integrate counterinsurgency activities to restore government control of an area and its people" by combining "military action to destroy and drive out the insurgents with programs for social, political, and economic development." These operations feature conventional military operations in unsecured areas, with police securing the rest of the area of operations. Additionally, the description of consolidation operations highlights many Just Cause intelligence-related, stability phase tasks including support to: hostage rescue, finding material storage [weapons and arms caches], other search operations, military reinforcement of police, and CA activities. If the "host nation-led, counterinsurgency" affiliation is removed from the description of consolidation operations, it appears to describe Just Cause stability phase conditions.

Although the document does not couch LIC consolidation operations in terms of U.S. military contingency operations, the description does provide the basis for developing military intelligence TTP. The U.S. Army Military Intelligence branch has recognized for years that it has a responsibility for developing LIC-related TTP for tactical intelligence operations - in particular, the requirement for LIC IPB. Despite MI efforts in this area, current intelligence publications do not adequately address the subject. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides a general description of LIC IPB, but lacks the details of its conventional operations counterpart.
FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, provides an overview of IPB, but only for conventional, force-on-force operations.\(^{121}\) LIC IPB again appears in FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, but this coverage is no more than a review of FM 34-130.\(^{122}\) Remaining MI publications, while providing solid overviews for the conduct of basic intelligence tasks and processes, do little to enhance the understanding of LIC-specific tasks.\(^{123}\)

**Emerging Doctrine.**

Emerging doctrinal publications begin to fill the doctrinal void related to the Just Cause stability environment. Future MI publications also serve to improve stability operations-related TTP, but still lack the detail needed to prepare the intelligence specialist for this type of situation.

Several draft JCS publications touch the periphery of stability phase related issues, but still do not provide the focus necessary to guide service-level action. Joint Test Pub 3-07, *Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, discusses "operations to restore order" during contingency, peacemaking operations. Such restoration operations, undertaken "at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state [Urgent Fury] or to protect US citizens [Just Cause]," are designed to "halt violence and reinstitute more normal civil activities."\(^{124}\) The manual's portrayal of restoration operations appears to describe the general nature of Just Cause stability operations.
The Army’s emerging capstone document, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Preliminary Draft), begins where Joint Test Pub 3-07 ends, adding more substance and clarity to the description of restoration operations. The manual provides the following description of these operations:

The *restoration phase* [emphasis added] of the operation focuses on those activities that occur following the cessation of open conflict. The emphasis in this phase is on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing host nation infrastructure, and preparing forces for redeployment . . . Army forces are uniquely suited to assist in restoration operations.21

The activities normally associated with this phase include: "nation assistance, civil affairs and similar programs to reduce post-conflict or post-crisis turmoil, and stabilize a situation until the Department of State resumes control [emphasis added]."126 This description of restoration operations, in concert with the overarching JCS use of the term, may fill the doctrinal void associated with the Just Cause stability phase.127

The preliminary draft of the new FM 100-5 also makes other contributions to understanding the stability (read: restoration) environment. It recognizes the importance of conflict termination issues, and addresses "simultaneity of operations" as a factor commanders and staffs must consider when planning for war.128 These are important additions for two reasons. First, the manual acknowledges the Army’s mission to help secure the political end state in war to decrease the potential for future crises. Secondly, it recognizes that combat, stability (read: restoration), and nation assistance operations can occur simultaneously; thus, planners must look beyond the first battle and plan for
these future operations.

Emerging intelligence publications improve coverage of TTP items related to stability operations, but still lack details for associated tactical intelligence tasks. FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations (Final Draft), discusses LIC IPB in greater depth than FM 34-130 and identifies restoration activities as a phase on the "continuum of military operations in LIC." It calls for organizing MI assets at the Task Force level and recognizes that "MI LIC missions are HUMINT intensive." FM 34-7 also acknowledges that document exploitation is "useful" in this environment.

While FM 34-7 improves coverage of MI TTP related to stability operations, its contents still fall short in several areas. First, its expanded view of LIC IPB does not incorporate many of the tasks executed during Just Cause. For example, it does not address how to use IPB to support law and order missions; nor does it mention tactical intelligence support to hostage rescue operations. Secondly, LIC IPB coverage in the manual focuses primarily on counterinsurgency operations in sparsely populated regions. It lacks supporting details for operations in large cities. Finally, the FM provides a good laundry list of civil affairs needs in the LIC environment, but lacks the graphic support measures to assist in focusing these operations.
Conclusions.

Current doctrine does not adequately address tactical intelligence operations during the transition from war to peace. It fails to define and describe the environment associated with this transition and, subsequently, does not foster improvements in intelligence doctrine and TTP. Emerging doctrine, however, provides greater focus on this transitional period, thus improving the likelihood for corresponding action from proponents for the intelligence battlefield operating system. Emerging intelligence publications, while improving TTP for LIC stability or restoration operations, still lack the details necessary to prepare intelligence personnel for the tasks they may have to perform during this phase of operations.

V. Summary

Army doctrine should fully accommodate post-conflict stability responsibilities and prioritize stability missions and assets into contingency plans.

COL Alexander M. Walczak

Operation Just Cause successfully neutralized the Panama Defense Force, allowing for the restoration of democracy in Panama. After completing decisive combat operations, JTFSO forces entered the "stability phase" of the operation. During this phase, combat units conducted limited combat operations throughout Panama, continued to neutralize remaining enemy elements, and fought to restore law and order. Throughout this process,
tactical intelligence units and staffs provided support to aid the U.S. force in making the transition from war to peace.

Tactical intelligence operations during Operation Just Cause involved completing a myriad of support tasks. Intelligence operations helped bring Noriega to justice and assisted in locating former PDF and Dignity Battalion leaders. It provided time-sensitive support to hostage rescue operations and assisted units in their efforts to restore law and order in the cities. Tactical intelligence operations also assisted in the recovery and exploitation of enemy arms caches and documents, and provided support to civil affairs operations.

Current U.S. military doctrine does not adequately express the conduct of operations similar to those executed by Just Cause participants during the stability phase. Doctrine does not recognize this phase of operations and, as a result, does not foster the development of related intelligence doctrine and TTP.

Emerging doctrine, however, attempts to fill part of this doctrinal void. It defines the stability phase as "restoration operations" and offers a good description of events that occur during this period of diminishing conflict. Possible future changes to intelligence doctrine and TTP also reflect some of the tasks and conditions of the restoration phase. Future publications offer refined intelligence preparation of the battlefield techniques to support restoration operations, and begin to address many of its associated tasks in detail.
As doctrine evolves, the Army must continue to focus attention on the stability phase of operations. MI publications require revision to identify and explore the tasks inherent with this mission. IPB techniques need further adjustment to aid in executing these tasks. The successful execution of stability operations is critical to winning the peace. Failure to plan and conduct these operations properly can prolong the conflict, inhibit long-term U.S. influence and credibility, and possibly lead to renewed violence. Today’s leaders and planners must do the job right to lessen the potential impact on future generations.
### Appendix - Operation Just Cause Task Organization

**USSOUTHCOM**

**JOINT TASK FORCE SOUTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Task Force Pacific</strong></th>
<th><strong>Task Force Atlantic</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82nd Airborne Division</td>
<td>3d Bde (-) 7th Inf Div (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde (+) DRB</td>
<td>4-17th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-504th PIR</td>
<td>3-504th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-504th PIR</td>
<td><strong>Task Force Bayonet</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-325th AIR</td>
<td>193d Infantry Bde (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Infantry Division (L)</td>
<td>5-87th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>1-508th Inf (ABN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-27th Inf</td>
<td>4-6th Inf (M) 5th Inf Div (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-27th Inf</td>
<td>92d MP Bn (Prov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-21st Inf</td>
<td><strong>Joint Intelligence Task Force</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>7th SF GRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9th Inf</td>
<td>1-7th SF Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-9th Inf</td>
<td>A/1-7th SF Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9th Inf</td>
<td>75th Ranger Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICATF</strong></td>
<td>1-75th Rgr Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th CA Bn (-)</td>
<td>2-75th Rgr Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-75th Rgr Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Intelligence Task Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>Joint Psychological Ops TF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>470th MI Bde</td>
<td>1-4th Psyop Grp (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525th MI Bde (-)</td>
<td><strong>Task Force Aviation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th Avn Bde (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18th Avn Bde (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-82d Avn (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-228th Avn (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-123d Avn (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-123d Avn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Joint Task Force South Control</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>536th Eng Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16th MP Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st COSCOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENDNOTES


2. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Deployment of United States Forces to Panama, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., December 21, 1989, communication from the President of the United States to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1.


4. Headquarters, United States Southern Command, "USCINCSO OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON)," declassified operations order (Quarry Heights, Panama: J3, USSOUTHCOM, October 30, 1989). (Hereafter cited as "OPORD 1-90").

5. Paraphrased from "OPORD 1-90," 3-4; and "OPLAN 90-2," 3-4.


Brigadier General William Hartzog, the former J3, USSOUTHCOM, placed the transition to nation building operations [and possibly stability operations] on D+1. Found in: COL Tom Braaten and BG William Hartzog, interview by Dr. Larry Yates, transcript, Quarry Heights, Panama, June 29, 1990, 34. President Bush stated, "Although most organized opposition has ceased . . ." on December 22, 1989. Found in: Deployment of United States Forces to Panama, 2. Whether the stability phase started on D+1 or D+2 is immaterial. These passages show the difficulty involved in establishing a date for the start or end of such operational phases.

9. Although Just Cause was by definition a "conflict" and not war, this monograph uses the term war in a more generic sense. Certainly Just Cause was "war" to those who fought and died during the operation.

10. Phase IV of JTFSO operations was entitled "Stabilizing Force Operations" per "OPLAN 90-2," 5. Numerous USSOUTHCOM and JTFSO documents refer to the operations conducted after December 21, 1989 as stability operations. Key Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and U.S. Army warfighting publications, as well as Low Intensity Conflict and Civil Affairs manuals, do not mention or provide a definition for the term "stability operations." All U.S. Army and Joint Chiefs of Staff manuals contained in the bibliography were checked for references to the term. It does not exist in any of the current or emerging doctrinal manuals reviewed. Emerging doctrine, discussed in Section IV, provides a comparative term for the period immediately following decisive combat -- restoration operations.


12. Figure 1 and the accompanying written description are drawn from Headquarters, United States Southern Command, [CMOTF Briefing Slide Packet], set of J5 and CMOTF paper briefing slides (Quarry Heights, Panama: J5, USSOUTHCOM, January 10, 1990), H-5.

13. The possible end date for combat operations is based on the summary of unit historical data contained in U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, "Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned: Volumes I-III," Bulletin 90-9 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 1990), I-6 thru I-12. (Hereafter
14. See note 8 above.


17. Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, "Organization of Nation Building Forces," memorandum and paper briefing slides (MacDill AFB, Florida: January 8, 1990), 32. (Hereafter cited as "Organization of Nation Building Forces").


19. There is no single source document listing the goals for the stability phase. The items listed are paraphrased from the following sources: "OPORD 1-90," 4; "Just Cause Command Briefing," 4; LTG Carl W. Stiner, interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., transcript, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, multiple dates, 87 and 96; MG James H. Johnson, Jr., interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., transcript, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 5, 1990, 39; and Headquarters, 193d Infantry Brigade, "Summary - Operation Just Cause - 193d Infantry Brigade (Light) (Task Force Bayonet)," typed after action review, with tabs (Fort Clayton, Panama: undated), 2. (Hereafter cited as "Summary - 193d Inf Bde").

20. There is no single document establishing missions for tactical units during the stability phase. Those missions provided here are paraphrased from: "OPORD 1-90," 4; "OPLAN 90-2," 3-4; Headquarters, Commander Joint Special Operations Task Force, "COMJSOTF OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON)," draft, declassified operations order (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: COMJSOTF, November 7, 1989), 2-3. (Hereafter cited as "JSOTF OPOPD 1-90"); and Headquarters, Joint Task Force South, [Meeting Notes - 251030 DEC 1989], typed notes from a meeting between Commander, Joint Task Force South, and Panamanian Vice President (Dr.) Arias Calderon, et. al. (Fort Clayton, Panama: December 25, 1989), all pages. (Hereafter cited as "Meeting Notes").

21. "OPLAN 90-2," Annex X. This annex was the execution checklist for the operation. Planned events ended at H+48.

23. Summary of the author's impressions of the OPLAN. For more specific details, see "OPLAN 90-2," 3 (Commander's Intent paragraph), and Annex X, "Execution Checklist." Page 11 of the checklist indicated that U.S. forces would secure Panama City and Colon by H+48. This entry indicates planners may have grossly underestimated the threat to the cities. In reality, it took weeks to control Panama City.


25. Stiner interview, 83.

26. The basic organization of MP units involved in Just Cause is found in "OPLAN 90-2," A-1 to A-3. Missions for the MPs, excluding the weapons collection mission, are paraphrased from page 11 of the OPLAN. The weapons collection mission, deployment information, and other historical data concerning the 16th MP Bde, are found in "CALL Bulletin 90-9," I-14.


31. For use of combat units in a constabulary role, see "CALL Bulletin 90-2," I-6 to I-13. This bulletin, plus the following documents, provides ample evidence that most combat units in Panama saw service in a military police role. For further details, see: U.S.
Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 156; COL Michael G. Snell, Commander, 193d Infantry Brigade, interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., transcript, Fort Clayton, Panama, January 1, 1990, 6; Headquarters, 193d Infantry Brigade, "Task Force Bayonet Summary of Operation Just Cause," handwritten and typed briefing notes (Fort Clayton, Panama, 193d Infantry Brigade, undated), 5-6. (Hereafter cited as "Task Force Bayonet Summary"); and Stiner interview, 87.

Reference efforts to train the new police force, see "Meeting Notes," all pages; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Committee Report, February 7, 1990, 3-4.


33. The JSOTF mission to capture Noriega is found in "JSOTF OPORD 1-90," 3 and 5.

For information on the potential threat posed to the new Panamanian government by pro-Noriega resistance movements, see "Meeting Notes." 2.


Additionally, according to Bernard Aronson, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, "I was in the situation room at the White House on the night that Operation Just Cause began, and a piece of intelligence came across our desk which reported that that very night Noriega had directed the Dignity Battalions to launch some attacks on civilian neighborhoods involving upwards of 250 Americans." U.S. Congress, Post Invasion Panama, 160.
37. Quote taken from tasking paragraph to TF Blue, "JSOTF OPORD 1-90," 45. Also, from the same source, TF Green was tasked to "resolve hostage barricade situations," (p. 5) and the JSOTF force as a whole received a mission to "be prepared to resolve multiple hostage barricade situations" (p. 3).

38. LTC Henry L. T. Koren, Jr., Deputy Regimental Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, interview by MAJ Larry G. Heystik, transcript, Fort Benning, Georgia, undated, 9.


42. According to Rear Admiral Ted Sheafer, Assistant Director for JCS Support (JS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), USSOUTHCOM reported 37 Americans as possible hostages, while DIA believed the number was 44-45. U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 119.

43. Stiner interview, 85; MAJ Jonathan P. Chase, S3, and 1LT Robert Cejka, S2, 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry Regiment, group interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., transcript, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, June 4 and 8, 1990, 61-86.

44. Blocher, 5.

45. Multiple entries found in the "Tasks" section of "OPLAN 90-2." 6-10.

46. The "Muskets for Money" program began on December 24, 1989, per "LIC Imperatives and Operations in Panama." 16.

For a description of problems associated with the
program, see MAJ John D. Knox, Commander, B Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, et. al., group interview by MAJ Robert P. Cook, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, transcript, April, 11, 1990, 12; and "Summary – 193d Inf Bde," E-23.


50. Summary and analysis of information provided in Section II. Also see: Stiner interview, 96; "Meeting Notes," 3-4; and Jeffrey Greenhut, "To Promote Liberty: Army Reserve Civil Affairs in the Invasion of Panama, December 1989-April 1990," unpublished draft manuscript, undated.


52. Summarized from: "Meeting Notes," 1 and 5; Snell interview, 6; and U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 127.

53. Headquarters, United States Southern Command, "CMOTF OPORD 1-88 (BLIND LOGIC)," declassified, draft operations order, (Quarry Heights, Panama: Jr. USSOUTHCOM, August 15, 1988). (Hereafter cited as "CMOTF OPORD 1-88").

54. OPLAN 90-2 assumed "extended civil-military operations (CMO) will require mobilization of reserve component civil affairs personnel." The plan also stated "during the conduct of military operations in the JOA [joint operating area] every effort will be made to minimize commitment of US efforts to support CA operations." Finally, the BLIND LOGIC plan was not mentioned as a reference to the basic plan. See "OPLAN 90-2," 2, G-1, and G-3.

56. Fishel, 20, 23, 25, and 40; Snell interview, 11; "LIC Imperatives and Operations in Panama," 15.

57. The only non-Department of Defense agency on the distribution list for the operation prior to its execution was the Central Intelligence Agency. See "OPORD 1-90," Annex Z; "OPLAN 90-2," Annex Z; "CMOTF OPORD 1-88," Annex Z; and Fishel, 21.

58. Fishel, 33 and 38.


62. Command and control of the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) changed four times after D-Day. From December 26, 1989, to January 1, 1990, JTFSO commanded the CMOTF. From the 2d to the 15th of January, the J5, USSOUTHCOM controlled CMOTF operations. Then, until the 23d, Joint Task Force-Panama retained command. Finally, on January 23d, the newly formed U.S. Military Support Group-Panama controlled the CMOTF until the end of Operation Promote Liberty. "Organization of Nation Building Forces," 32.


65. As most Just Cause tactical intelligence-related documents remain classified, the tasks identified in this section are implied tasks based on stability phase missions, objectives, and historical narratives. This monograph does not provide a detailed analysis of problems experienced by those who had to execute the tasks. Such analysis exceeds the scope and intent of this paper. For an unclassified summary of...
intelligence lessons learned for this operation, see "CALL Bulletin 90-9," Volume III.


69. Summarized from many sources. Primary sources are: CPT Dwayne Kuizema, S2, 3d Battalion, 540th Infantry Regiment, et. al., group interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr., Fort Bragg, North Carolina, transcript, June 5, 1990, 72; MAJ Cal S. Lovering, former J3 Operations Officer, USSOUTHCOM, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 4, 1992; MAJ Alfred M. Memole, former J2 Operations Officer, USSOUTHCOM, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 4, 1992; and Trainor, 13.

70. Summary based on: U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 127; "LIC Imperatives and Operations in Panama," 16; Moore interview, 54; and Snell interview, 13.


72. Memole interview; Lovering interview; Burg interview.

73. Lovering interview.

74. Burg interview; Memole interview; Lovering interview.


77. Summarized from: "OPLAN 90-2," 14, B-5 and B-6; "Meeting Notes," 3; Greenhut, 74; Testimony of GEN Thurman contained in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Authorizations, FY 92, Part 2, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., Committee Hearing, March 8, 1990, 235; and James D. Drees, "MPs Take Charge of Captured Personnel, Arms,"
Tropic Times (Quarry Heights, Panama), December 29, 1989: 12.

78. Summarized based on: Moore interview, 55; Snell interview, 13; and Drees, 5.


80. Based on: "CMOTF Briefing Slide Packet," E-19; Greenhut, 60; Knox interview, 3.


82. Stiner interview, 94; U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 127.


84. "OPLAN 90-2," G-3; Greenhut, 53.

85. Greenhut, 53.

86. U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 133.

87. Block, 9.

88. Paraphrased from Kuizema interview, 43. Also based on author's assessment of CI assets available (see below).


92. U.S. Congress, 1989 Events in Panama, 120. Also, in testimony to Congress on December 22, 1989, LTG Kelly stated the intelligence analysts in Panama "are literally overwhelmed with the documentation, the weapons caches, the pictures and all the other things they are finding." (Same source, 124).

53
93. Cejka interview, 144; Memole interview.
94. Rohter, 1.
95. Stiner interview, 93.
96. Cejka interview, 143.
97. Donnelly, 358.
99. Cejka interview, 110 and 143; Snell interview, 13.
   Some units, despite a lack of analytical support, developed their own intelligence successfully. Methods used to do so included: tasking scouts to verify initial spot reports; intelligence liaison with adjacent units; trend analysis; adding to the data included in the BWG lists; and maintaining accurate logs. None of the sources, however, mentioned utilizing Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) IPB methods to analyze the data. See Moore interview, 55; "Task Force Bayonet Summary," 5; and Donnelly, 358.
102. Kuizema interview, 87.
103. Cejka interview, 36-37, and 144; Kuizema interview, 44; Moore interview, 54; and 1LT Johnson interview, 42-43.
105. Snell interview, 10-12.
106. Kuízema interview, 82. Standard IPB techniques did not apply to all intelligence operations during Just Cause. Instead, as the situation shifted from combat to stability, it resembled the characteristics of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). LIC IPB techniques, while available for use, were not firmly ingrained in doctrine at the time. See Section IV for further discussion on this subject.


111. Knox interview, 17.

112. This paper defines current doctrine as including only approved and officially sanctioned Army or JCS military publications.

113. Clausewitz, 88.


118. FM 100-20, E-4.

119. FM 100-20, E-8 thru E-11.


123. FM 34-60 provides a good discussion of "Black, Gray, White" list preparation, a general description of CI support to contingency operations, and recognizes that the LIC environment relies heavily on HUMINT as its most production source of information. See FM 34-60, Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1990), 6-2, 6-4 thru 6-6, and Appendix H. Note: This monograph transposes "Black, Gray, White" to Black, White, Gray based on terminology used in Just Cause source information.


126. FM 100-5, Operations (Preliminary Draft), 3-11.

127. FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations (Draft), also addresses stability-like operations, but refers to
them as "consolidation operations." To avoid confusion with FM 100-20 coverage of "consolidation operations" in a counterinsurgency setting, and to bring FM 100-7 in line with the emerging FM 100-5, the Army should change the FM 100-7 term to "restoration operations." See FM 100-7, The Army in Theater Operations (Draft), (Fort Monroe, Virginia, Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command, July 31, 1990), 7-21 thru 7-23.

128. FM 100-5 (Preliminary Draft), 1-6 and 2-6.

129. FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations (Final Draft), (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, October 1992), 1-15.

130. FM 34-7, 2-13.

131. Assessment of FM 34-7, with emphasis on LIC IPB as contained in: FM 34-7, Chapter 3.

132. Walczak, 29.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. Government Documents


Books


**Periodicals and Articles**


**Newspapers**

*The Baltimore Sun* (Baltimore, Maryland), December 24 and 26, 1989.

*The Boston Globe* (Boston, Massachusetts), December 24, 1989.

*The Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles, California), February 14, 1990.


Tropic Times (Quarry Heights, Panama), December 27 and 29, 1989; January 3, 5, 8, and 12, 1990.


Student Monographs and Theses


Unpublished Papers and Memorandums


Headquarters, United States Southern Command. "Operation Just Cause: Rebirth of a Nation." Paper briefing slides, undated. (Copy, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).


**Interviews**


U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Combat Studies Institute - Just Cause Archives

U.S. Government Documents


Unpublished Papers and Memorandums


Headquarters, Joint Task Force South. [Meeting Notes - 251030 DEC 1989]. Typed notes from a meeting between Commander, Joint Task Force South, and Panamanian Vice President (Dr.) Arias Calderon, et. al., Fort Clayton, Panama, December 25, 1989.

Headquarters, United States Southern Command. [CMOTF Briefing Slide Packet]. Set of J5 and CMOTF paper briefing slides, Quarry Heights, Panama, January 1, 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, and 13, 1990.


Oral History Interviews


Hale, COL David R. E., Commander, 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division. Interview by Bob Britton, staff writer for Panorama. Fort Ord, California, February 10, 1990.


Monell, CPT Stewart J., S2, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Interview by MAJ Larry G. Heystik. Fort Benning, Georgia, undated.


Snell, COL Michael G., Commander, 193d Infantry Brigade. Interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr. Fort Clayton, Panama, January 1, 1990. (JCIT 007).

Stiner, LTG Carl W., Commander, Joint Task Force South. Interview by Dr. Robert K. Wright, Jr. Fort Bragg, North Carolina, March 2, 7, and 27, and June 1, 1990. (JCIT 024).