Mobilization of RT-12 Soldiers: The Citizen Soldier

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DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited
**Title:** Mobilization of RT-12 Soldiers: The Citizen Soldier

**Author:** Walter F. Yarham

**Type of Report:** Research

**Date of Report:** April 92

**Source of Funding Numbers:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Element No.</th>
<th>Project No.</th>
<th>Task No.</th>
<th>Work Unit Accession No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Supplementary Notation:**

**Abstract:**

SEE ATTACHED

**Distribution/Availability of Abstract:** Unclassified/Unlimited

**Telephone:** (202) 475-1889

**Office Symbol:** ICAF-FAP

**Personal Security Classification of This Page:** Unclassified

**Distribution/Availability of Report:**

- Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
- Distribution Statement A

**Monitoring Organization Report Number(s):**

- Same

**MONITORING ORGANIZATION:**

**ADDRESS:**

- Fort Lesley J. McNair
- Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

**Funding Sponsor:**

**OFFICE SYMBOL:**

**Address:**

- Fort Lesley J. McNair
- Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

**Page Count:** 50

**Supplementary Notation:** 16.5

**Subject Terms:**

**COSATI Codes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>SUB-GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Abstract (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number):**

SEE ATTACHED

**Name of Responsible Individual:** Judy Clark
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During Operation Desert Shield/Storm a category of Reserve soldiers who departed active duty or Reserve unit duty within the preceding 12 months of the operation, were mobilized to meet critical or anticipated shortages. These soldiers exceeded everyone's expectations. Although these soldiers are not part of an official program they have become an important element for future rapid mobilizations. There are many lessons learned from this PT-12 mobilization which will enhance future deployments. As the Army downsizes it is more important than ever that we maximize our use of personnel resources and promote the Total Army concept.
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Mobilization of the RT-12 Soldier:
The Citizen Soldier

During recent operations in Southwest Asia, the President of the United States called upon a group of its citizens to return to uniform and answer the call to arms. These soldiers, identified as RT-12, had already met their active duty or reserve unit obligations, but because of a remaining service obligation in their enlistment contracts with the United States Army, they were obligated to an eight year total service obligation.

Most of these soldiers were out of the active Army for less than a year. They had left the military behind them and had begun their new lives. Some took advantage of the Montgomery G.I. Bill and enrolled in college, others started their lifelong careers, many had just married and most had young children. The one thing they all had in common was skills that were critically short and needed to support the war effort in Southwest Asia.

It has been well over twenty years since the Army involuntarily recalled this kind of soldier. No one knew if he would return, what his attitude might be and if he would even be competent. But the Army had no choice. It needed soldiers with selected critical skills and it needed them yesterday. The soldiers returned in far greater numbers than anyone could have imagined. Their attitudes ranged through the whole gamut, but the bottom line was they were
there, there was a job to be done and they were going to do it and then get on with their lives. Most retained their skills and after some refresher training, they were ready and able to perform their duties.

From an Army point of view, the mobilization of the RT-12s was highly successful, but it had its problems and pitfalls. What was not viewed as an official category of Reserve soldiers before Desert Shield, is now being recognized as a valuable pool of available, individual and trained soldiers that the Army can call upon in times of crisis. The Army of today and more so the Army of the future, will not have the luxury of having excess soldiers waiting to fill critical needs. The RT-12 soldier ideally fits that requirement without taxing active and reserve units and it can be accomplished for very little cost.

What is the RT-12 soldier and what lessons did we learn during Desert Storm, are some of the questions I intend to explore. There is a rich history of the use of individual soldier since the Second World War that sets the stage for Desert Storm. We need to look at this perspective and understand the Individual Ready Reserve, the laws that govern its use and the events that led up to this most recent mobilization.

**What Is the RT-12 Soldier?**

Every soldier, officer and enlisted, who enters active duty or joins a Reserve unit has a basic eight year
obligation. Most soldiers serve two to four years of that obligation on active duty or in a reserve unit. During this initial tour, soldiers complete basic combat training, advanced individual training and serve in a unit assignment until they fulfill their initial obligation.

**Active Duty to IRR**

After the soldier serves his initial tour of two to four years on active duty, he has three options:

* The soldier may reenlist for another tour and continue to serve on active duty.

* End his current tour of service and leave active duty (ETS). In order to fulfill the remainder of his eight year obligation he may join a reserve unit. If he joins a reserve unit, the soldier will mandatorily train two weeks per year plus he must attend 48 drill sessions with his unit.

* End his current tour of service and leave active duty (ETS). The remainder of his eight year obligation is served in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). If he joins the IRR, he has no mandatory training requirements but he must keep the Army Reserve Personnel Command (ARPERCEN) in Saint Louis, MO informed of his whereabouts.

**Reserve Units to IRR**

Soldiers who initially enlist for a reserve unit also have two options at the end of their initial tour:

* They may reenlist again in their reserve unit.
* Or they may end their tour of service and be transferred to the IRR.

In both cases, if initial active duty or reserve unit tours add up to less than eight years, the remaining obligated time will be spent in the IRR.

**The Individual Ready Reserve**

"The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) has been called the most important source of pretrained individual manpower. Of all the PIM (pretrained individual manpower) categories, IRR members are among the best trained and are readily available for mobilization during a national emergency. They are primarily individuals who have served up to four years on active duty and are serving the remainder of their military service obligation in the IRR element. About 24% of IRR members have elected to remain in the Individual Ready Reserve beyond their statutory obligation. About 90% of IRR members originally joined the military through the active force, while most of the remaining members originally joined through the Selected Reserve unit program."

The importance of the IRR is twofold. First, very few active duty and reserve units are maintained at 100% operating strength. The IRR can be used quickly to bring units to full combat strength or used across the board to increase selected skills. As an example, during Desert Storm, there was a shortage of truck drivers, Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) 88M. The Army Reserve Personnel
Center in Saint Louis was specifically tasked to provide 1,000 truck drivers for duty in Southwest Asia. The IRR was selected for this mission. Initially this was a volunteer program but was expanded as part of the 20,000 call up.

Armor crewmen, MOS 19K, were also needed, but they were predominately used as backfill for units in Europe. As European based units rapidly deployed from Europe to Southwest Asia, they crossleveled from other European units to insure deploying units were at maximum strength. Plus replacement tank crews were formed in United States Army Europe and deployed to Southwest Asia, further depleting Army Europe assets. The IRR Armored crewmen then backfilled the units that remained in Europe. Similar actions were taken for MOS 11M, 11c and 13S.

Secondly, units that engage in combat and sustain causalities will need trained personnel as replacements. During Operation Desert Shield, the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) developed a casualty estimate that allowed the planners to forecast the need for replacements and push them into the personnel pipeline. Having a personnel replacement stream that can quickly backfill casualties improves unit sustainability and effectiveness on the battlefield.

A recent report by the Army Research Institute further highlights this point: "The average age of an IRR soldier when released from active duty is 21 years, with four to six
years of military service still obligated by law. Considering that these IPP soldiers have received at least two years of active duty military training and experience in an MOS, this pool of prior service personnel provides the Army with a substantial means of meeting force requirements during the early phase of mobilization."

From IRR to RT-12

At present, there are over 300,000 soldiers in the IPP. During Desert Shield/Storm, the Army decided to recall from the IRR those soldiers with specific skills based upon critical shortages and the casualty projections. The Army also needed soldiers proficient in their basic combat skills and military occupation specialties. The Army didn't have the luxury to provide long train up time; therefore, only soldiers who had departed from active duty or transferred from a reserve unit in the preceding twelve months from the call up date of 19 January 1991 were used. These soldiers were designated as Recently Trained - 12 months (RT-12).

Yield Rates

Based upon the Military Manpower Mobilization and Accession Report (MOBREP) the highwater mark for the RT-12 call up was 20,921 soldiers on 14 March 1991. Of those called, 17,180 reported for a yield of 82.1%, far greater than anyone anticipated. The Comptroller General, in a report to the Congress in June 1979, reported that estimated yield rates for the IRR could be as high as 70%.
expected yield rates were developed during 1975-1976 as part of the DOD research effort on the 'Guard and Reserve in the Total Force.' Based primarily on the limited experience of the services in the Korean, Berlin and VietNam call-ups, yield rates were established for the Selected Reserve and the IRR."

These estimated yield rates, although not very scientific, do say something about the soldiers. In previous call ups, the IRR was composed mainly of drafted soldiers, while the Southwest Asia call up was a totally volunteer force. I believe the significantly higher yield is directly attributable to the quality of the soldier and the service instilled "duty, honor, country" ethos of the volunteer force.

The Laws that Govern

The IRR evolved from two modifications of the United States Code. These modifications were the result of Congressional testimony to insure equal burdens were placed upon draft eligible citizens and World War II veterans that occurred during the Korean Conflict. "The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 provided the statutory structure of the Reserve components as they exist today. It established Ready, Standby and Retired categories as descending levels of liability for recall to active duty and required that the recall of veterans and non-veterans would insure as far as possible, a fair 'sharing of hazardous exposure'."
issue of fair sharing was expounded upon by Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr. from North Carolina, during hearings of the Committee on Armed Services, of the United States Senate on September 10, 1962. Senator Ervin said,

"...I have had a lot of misgivings about the way our Reserves have been treated. I know a lot of them came out of the Second World War and, they were requested to stay in the Reserves and were assured they would not be called back into active service except in the event of war or all-out mobilization. The Government breached faith with them, I think, in the Korean conflict. We called back thousands of them to the service after the Second World War, while at the same time we allowed millions to escape serving their country a single day."

The issue of fair sharing is viewed in a different light today as there is no draft and all members of the IPP volunteered. It does however, place a burden upon our citizen soldiers who must attempt to juggle their civilian occupations with their Reserve responsibilities.

As we downsize our Army, there will be more reliance upon the Reserves for rapid mobilizations. Many employers will not take kindly to repetitive call-ups. The second piece of legislation was the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. This act required a Reserve obligation following active duty. It also ensured that soldiers joining Reserve Units received individual entry training (IET) from three to six months. This provision ensured the Reserves had individually trained soldiers that were prepared for combat. Further amendments during the past thirty years have strengthened the quality and standardization of individual
training, thus improving the overall quality of the IPP soldier.

**Calling up the Reserves**

Upon heightened tensions, "the President may authorize the recall to active duty of up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days, plus an additional 90 days without declaring a national emergency (10 USC. 637b.)." During this initial call up, the Department of Defense can activate units and individuals in the Selected Reserve needed to fulfill requirements to meet that contingency (when it is considered in the best interest of national security.) It does not allow for the call up for that portion of the Ready Reserve not in the Selected Reserves, which means, the IPP cannot be called-up under this provision of the law.

In order for the IRR to be activated, there must be a national emergency and either the President or Congress must declare the emergency. As the code states,

"When the President declares a national emergency because of potential hostilities, he may order units and individuals of the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 months. However, no more than one million members of the Ready Reserve of all the Services may be or involuntary active duty at the same time without the consent of Congress. (10 USC. 673a and c.)"

During the past two decades, the President and Congress have been at odds over the use of military power. Congress wants a more active role in committing U.S. soldiers and wants to reduce the likelihood of escalation of war. In 1976
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) was passed. This act provides for greater Congressional oversight and gives the President a wider range of military options.

"The declaration of a national emergency is no longer an all-or-nothing situation. The Act provides that when the President declares a national emergency, he must specify in the declaration or subsequent executive orders the specific authorities he is invoking...Thus a set of national emergency powers must be constructed to meet the needs of a Presidential-declared emergency. Congress may terminate the President's declaration of a national emergency at any time by concurrent resolution and will review the declaration and situation every six months. This means that, while declaring a national emergency remains an important decision, the United States can now temporize and send small, incremental signals that may help deescalate a crisis or allow us to take certain necessary actions with a minimum of provocation."

Under the present laws the IRR cannot be used in its primary mission of providing unit fillers and casualty replacements during the initial phases of a 200,000 personnel call-up. If actions rapidly accelerate as they did in Southwest Asia, the Army is forced to crosslevel personnel from existing reinforcement units (active and Reserve component) to fill the needs of higher priority units. This action reduces the readiness posture and combat effectiveness of reinforcement units and under utilizes the IRR. As the active Army and Reserves downsize, allowing the IRR to be activated during the 200,000 personnel call up is an inexpensive action that gives the Army more "punch" and the President a more lethal threat.
IRR USE IN THE PAST

The IRR as we know it today has been called upon four times since World War II (see Figure 1). During Desert Shield and Desert Storm 20,921 IRR were called. Previous to that, President Johnson declared a partial mobilization in 1968, when he activated 2,752 IRR for Vietnam. The primary purpose of the IRR call-up was to serve as filler personnel. 1,692 were assigned to mobilized Reserve and Guard units and 1,060 were assigned to active Army units.

IRR recalled upon Partial Mobilization

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<td>June 1950</td>
<td>168,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Conflict</td>
<td>August 1961</td>
<td>15,234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>April 1968</td>
<td>2,752</td>
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<td>Southwest Asia</td>
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Figure 1

Berlin Crisis

During the 1961 Berlin crisis, President Eisenhower ordered a partial mobilization. In addition to the recalled units, 15,234 individual Reservists were called. They were used to bring the mobilized units to full strength and to fill units not mobilized but subject to recall. An interesting point mentioned at the September 10, 1962 Armed Services Committee hearings, Authorizing the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty
for not more than 12 months and for other purposes, was "to meet all the needs for trained fillers. It was necessary to call individual Reservists who had served 2 or more years of active duty, because men with only 6 months of active duty for training did not have the specialized training to permit the recalled units to attain combat readiness rapidly."

This has been a point of contention with Congress and impacted on the 1965 legislation. Soldiers must be fully trained before engaging in combat. Under the current all volunteer system, this issue has been resolved. All soldiers serving in active or reserve units must complete a minimum of twelve weeks of Initial Entry Training (IET). If a reserve unit is mobilized with new soldiers who have not completed IET and the unit is deployed, these new soldiers will not be deployed with their units, but sent to the required Army training school.

Korean Conflict

In June 1950, Congress authorized the call up of volunteer and inactive individual Reserves. 168,470 were activated. "Many were recalled based on World War II military skills for which a requirement no longer existed. Other reservists were recalled based on MOS requirements that could have been satisfied with available men and minor on-the-job training....The decision not to employ all Reserve Component units, because of the possible need to meet contingencies in areas other then Korea, resulted in
the unplanned utilization of the volunteer and inactive reserves. The poorly planned use of these pools of veterans caused many hardships and laid the basis for the policy subsequently announced by the Congress that the Reserve Component units would be called up in national emergencies prior to any levies on Reserve manpower pools.\textsuperscript{15}

This is still in evidence today in the United States Code that allows for a 200,000 selected Reserve (TPU/IMA) personnel call up but does not provide for IRR call up until partial mobilization. The Army, intentionally followed the intent of this Congressional guidance in Southwest Asia by only activating the most recently trained soldier: RT-12. This represents only a small percent of the total IRR force. By activation of only the RT-12, the window of opportunity at being recalled is greatly reduced. Those who were activated will be out of this window by June 1992.

A question that has been debated and not resolved is what portion of the IRR should be recalled and still meet the Congressional intent. Could the size be increased by changing the parameters, let's say to RT-18 or RT-24. If more IRR were needed, how far could you go and still meet the intent of the law? If there was another national emergency would it be fair to call up those same soldiers again? The complexity of the question is complicated by the skill decay experienced by soldiers not receiving repetitive training and the ongoing force reductions of the active
duty forces that will decrease the pool of future IRR members.

**DOCTRINE and PLANNING**

Throughout all the mobilizations of the IRR in the past fifty years, none have gone as planned and in some cases, plans didn’t exist. Doctrine and planning have improved over the years but the emphasis has been on the use of the IRR in a full European mobilization scenario in support of NATO against the Warsaw Pact. Even in that arena, little has been done beyond computer testing and modeling of the IRR.

Doctrine, up to 1986, was based upon our experiences in Vietnam. IRR soldiers that were to be recalled, were to report to selected mobilization sites. A mobilization system called Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPEPS) would preassign IRR soldiers to the specific mobilization stations and earmark them for specific units or to the installation. While at these sites, they would receive their uniforms, be processed for overseas movement assigned to active or reserve units through the Mobilization Crossleveling System (MCL) and then deployed to the theater of operation.

Casualty replacements would be sent from the mobilization sites to the theater of operation where they would be given their equipment and reassigned, based upon operational necessities. Training or refreshing of skills
for all the IRR was primarily the responsibility of the gaining overseas commands.

As AirLand Battle 2000 concepts became doctrine, personnel doctrine was rewritten to accommodate the changes. Personnel doctrine is outlined in Field Manual 12-6 Personnel Operations, but as Desert Shield kicked off the "how to" manuals were just being written and many of the concepts had not been shared with the field. LTC Jerry Etheridge, who in 1987, was Chief of the Proponenty and Doctrine Office for the Adjutant General School helped create the new doctrine. As fate would have it, Colonel Etheridge was assigned to the Army Training and Doctrine Command in August 1990. In this position he would be responsible for rapidly educating the field and implementing the new doctrine. LTC Etheridge is quoted in the Fall 1991 issue of "1775" The Journal of the Adjutant General's Corps Regimental Association explaining what transpired.

"Little did I know back in 1987... that the concepts of replacement operations which Col.(ret.) Ed Strong, Col. Frank Foster and others and I wrote in the first edition of FM 12-6 Personnel Operations would become reality in 1990 during Operation Desert Storm. Concepts were developed and it was agreed that procedures and policies would be developed later. Unfortunately, in the case of the activation and operation of CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) that policy and those procedures were not finalized when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The concept of CRC's was approved by the VCSA in 1986. Four years later, the Army was in the midst of converting the USAR P&A Battalions to Replacement Battalions (CRC) and RRD's into Replacement Companies. The TOE's for the Repl. Bns. had not been converted when the order went out to activate CRCs in support of Operation DESERT STORM. But
this was just one minor hurdle which had to be cleared. Other hurdles followed and many of the solutions were accomplished by "seat of the pants" management."

LTC Etheridge's comments echo what transpired throughout the whole IRR mobilization effort. Also BG Thomas Sikora summoned it up best, "Did everything work according to doctrine? Absolutely not. Communications and transportation limitations imposed serious constraints right from the start. Strength Accounting was extremely difficult and Replacement Operations struggled to secure the Life Support facilities and other assets needed to receive and distribute the thousand or more soldiers arriving every day."

But it worked, not because of the planning, but because the doctrine was sound and the operators of the systems used ingenuity, dedication and lots of hard work.

Now is the time to capitalize on the lessons learned from the desert and improve upon our doctrine, rewrite our plans and most important of all, practice and train.

CHRONOLOGY OF DESERT STORM

As we reflect back upon Desert Storm, it is of value to review the key events. In order to plan for the future we must have a firm understanding of what happened and how it unfolded. In Appendix A is a chronology of actions and events that affected the IRR Mobilization extracted from the Total Army Personnel Command Afteraction Report and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, J4 Desert Storm Mobilization. Reference books.

LESSONS LEARNED

Without question the mobilization of IRR during Operation Desert Storm was a resounding success. Many dedicated people made systems work and things to happen that probably under normal times never would have functioned. These people have a wealth of knowledge that can provide an insight on how to make everyone's jobs easier next time we have to mobilize. Having conducted numerous interviews with operators of the systems, planners, staff officers and most important of all, the IRR soldiers who went through the system, I have taken their comments and have developed lessons learned. Criticism is not meant to be aimed at any particular person or command nor taken away from the many successes. What it is meant to do is to highlight areas of concern so that energies can be directed in a meaningful direction.

Who is in charge? Lesson #1

Issue: Throughout the complete operation, it was difficult if not downright impossible to find someone who understood doctrine, policy or operating plans. Each and every headquarters involved issued their own guidance, rarely ever coordinated with the others and in many cases the guidance was contradictory.
Discussion: As mentioned earlier, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved the new personnel doctrine concept in 1986. Implementing guidance and procedures were still in draft version of the CRC handbook. As Operation Desert Shield began, the first draft on CRC operations became the primary guidance for those TRADOC installations that had to implement the CRCs. As a side note, discussions with the Adjutant General's School at Ft. Harrison, IN. indicated that the school, which is responsible for personnel doctrine, was unaware that a draft CRC handbook existed.

As the CRCs came on line and RT-12 soldiers began to arrive, many questions arose concerning the deployability and disposition of non qualified RT-12 soldiers. Soldiers were arriving at the mobilization stations, who were medically unfit, previously discharged from the service with less than honorable discharges or already on the retirement rolls. Detailed instructions were received at the Mobilization sites and CRCs from FORSCOM, TRADOC, ARCENT, CENTCOM, PERSCOM and DCSPER. Much of the guidance was contradictory and commanders at the Mobilization sites and CRC's had to rely on common sense to make the best decisions. In one instance, there were three different instructions just for handling pregnant soldiers.

With the volume of soldiers arriving in such short periods of time, the systems were highly dependent upon
automation to gather data and transmit it to the decision makers. Many of the systems did not exist until the last minute nor were they tested. Mobilization stations received a computer software change package to allow IPR soldiers to be entered into the active duty data base two days after soldiers began to arrive. When the change package was uploaded, it shut the system down at three different locations. Through the hard efforts of the DOIM community, they were all back up and running in a relatively short period of time.

**Recommendation:** A top to bottom coordinated look from doctrine to operating systems is needed. A step in the right direction is the creation of Army Doctrine in CAPSTONE regulation FM 100-17 *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment and Demobilization*. However, it can not take another four years to get from Doctrine to implementing instructions. All coordinating headquarters must become involved. "How to" manuals must be written and the units in the field must be educated, trained and proficient.

**Management and Quality of the IRR Data Base, Lesson #2**

**Issue:** When ARPERCEN received instructions to mobilize the RT-12 population of the IRR data base, the system didn't work as anticipated. Secondly, quality control of the soldiers records in the IRR data base leaves room for improvement.
Discussion: The Army Reserve Personnel Center in Saint Louis, MO maintains the records and manages the data base for all Reserve soldiers. It too, has more work than it has time and money with which to solve problems. One of the lower priorities is maintenance of the IRR records. That trend continues today. In recent guidance dated 23 Sept. 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Army Reserve, MG Roger W. Sandler, established his priorities for ARPERCEN. His first priority is to the Army Reserve Troop Program units (1FC) and their soldiers. In a recent letter he stated, "In order to satisfy this funding priority, we must decrease support for ARPERCEN's training of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers." Also, in his guidance, less than 9/10th of one percent of the FY92 budget, $1,586,000 will be dedicated to the IRR and to developing an IRR Screen plan. This dollar amount is about equal to what ARPERCEN will spend on its Chaplain candidate program ($1,627,000) or on boards and General Officer training ($1,082,000).

This funding level allows the problems that existed during Desert Shield/Storm to continue. As examples:

- The RT-12 data base contained names of individuals who had retired or were not RT-12.

- The system could not handle the 20,000 IRR. The system had to be hand fed.

- Many home telephone numbers and addresses were out of date.
- The original travel authorization was to be a travel warrant included within a mailgram. The mailgram was delayed and then finally used. Then, the travel warrant was not honored by the airlines—last minute fixes had to be implemented through use of an 800 telephone number.

- The orders had all soldiers arriving at the mobilization stations all on the same day.

- Funding constraints precluded MOBPERS modernization, which, will allow for more verification sorts, immediate visibility of in-bound soldiers to installations and near immediate changes to mobilization station designations.

Of the 17,180 IRR soldiers who reported, between 10 and 15% were discharged by the mobilization sites or CPCs. (The number varied at each site because of disposition instructions, see lesson learned #1). Soldiers who had been discharged from active duty in less than the past 12 months because of hardships, sole parenthood, Chapter 13 and medical reasons, were now back on active duty. Some of the blame can be placed on the improper screening of the database by ARPERCEN, but considerable blame lies with the last commander prior to their entering the IRR program. The best example of this is the Hospital Commander at Ft. Dix. His driver received a Chapter 13 discharge from active duty. Less than six months later, he returned as part of the PT-12
A review of his active duty discharge paperwork revealed that the Hospital Commander directed that he be placed in the IRP. While the soldier awaited his discharge from the IRP, it was only appropriate that he be assigned duty at the hospital much to the chagrin of the hospital commander.

**Recommendation:** The IRR program is a relatively inexpensive program that produces great results for the Army. For the minimal investment of manpower and Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) money the computer systems and the quality of the data base can be improved. Quality assurance must be established as part of the data base management. If current proposals are approved and the IRR is called up as part of the 200k call-up then management of the IRR must receive higher priority. Commanders of Reserve and Active Duty units also play an important part in improving the quality of the IRR. If you do not want the soldier in your unit, then you don't want him in that portion of the IRP that will be immediately recalled. With proper coding soldiers who are determined to be "unfit" by their commanders can be placed in a separate category of the IRR.

**Call-Up of USAR CRC Battalions, Lesson #3.**

**Issue:** The activation of USAR Replacement Battalions coincided with the call-up of the PT-12. The personnel
needed to manage the large influx of RT-12 were still inprocessing when the bulk of the RT-12 were standing on the doorstep.

**Discussion:** Mobilization stations that were to receive RT-12 soldiers were required to handle the mission with existing resources. "General Foss, the CG TRADOC, recognizing the need to ensure that the warfighting CINC got priority of all USAR units during a time that a manpower ceiling was imposed on the mobilization call-up, decided that no USAR unit would be called to do a TRADOC mission." As a result, the mobilization stations did not have the manpower or systems in place to properly receive the soldiers. General Foss changed his decision in late December just prior to the break out of hostilities. With the anticipated increase of activated soldiers, USAR Replacement Battalions or companies were activated.

Unfortunately, both the supporting units and the soldiers to be supported arrived simultaneously. The quality of service and reception that IRR soldiers received under these circumstances were not as professional as it could have been. There was too much waiting. At figure 2 is a piece of artwork given to me by a soldier who had to wait too long.

**Recommendation:** USAR CRC units and Reception battalions must be activated and in place prior to any large influx of mobilized IRR soldiers. I am in full agreement
with the TRADOC commander in supporting the CINC in the field, however, the morale and training of the CINC's replacements depends upon having the systems in place. The quality of our volunteer force demands that we place our best foot forward. Many of these soldiers were concerned how their families would be treated in their absence. If we don't take care of this soldier to the best of our ability, what kind of care can the soldier expect for his family?

**Issue:** Equipment to outfit IRR soldiers was late arriving at the CRCs and mobilization sites. There were also spot shortages of equipment that never did get fixed.

**Discussion:** Because of the lack of coordination when doctrine and operational guidance was being developed by the personnel community, the logistics community was not fully informed of the procedural changes. This was further aggravated by the bureaucracy not reacting to the changes nor requisitioning equipment when Desert Shield began. Requirements were not provided nor was it clearly delineated as to who had the responsibilities for this action. A closer look at the chronology of events shows this breakdown of communication and how the issue was elevated until it became a "show stopper." Neither FORSCOM, TRADOC, DCSPEP or DCSLOG took charge of the problem - no one wanted to pay the bill. The issue was finally resolved at a much higher cost in both production and transportation costs.

**Recommendation:** As the doctrine and implementing regulations are revised or written by the personnel community, there must be close coordination with the logistics community. A further step could be taken to explore opportunities to link the personnel estimating computer systems directly to the Army logistical systems.

**Skill Decay of the RT-12. Lesson #5**
Issue: soldiers who are in the IRR experience some skill decay, particularly for those skills that are not used in a civilian occupation.

Discussion: The Army Research Institute (ARI) was tasked to evaluate the Individual Ready Reserve call-up skill decay as soon as mobilization began. Their findings were released in June 1991. Skill decay was evident but to varying degrees based upon MOS, how they entered the IRR (active duty or Reserve unit) and their civilian career. The strongest predictor of skill and knowledge retention was the last Skill Qualification test administered followed by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) results. One problem with the study was the lack of a standard baseline from which to measure.

Recommendations: The ARI study implies that quality begets quality. By maintaining our high enlistment standards, we will get soldiers who retain and learn quickly the new skills. Down the road, this translates into a better trained IRR. This is not a time to lower our enlistment standards.

A weak correlation in the ARI study between active or reserve duty and skill retention, but a strong gut reaction on my part, indicates a strengthening of basic individual combat and MOS skills for the Reserves is needed. As IRR soldiers were processed back onto active duty, recertification began immediately. It varied from
Installation to installation. Emphasis needs to be placed on standardization of survival skills and recertification of MOS skills. Finally, ARI should conduct further studies. It was not evident if there were major differences between RT-12, RT-18 or RT-24. The base could be enlarged with minimal skill decay, particularly in light of the IRR base growing smaller through 1997.

RT-12 in Europe, Lesson #6

**Issue:** The RT-12 who were sent to Europe complained about being under utilized and not receiving training.

**Discussion:** After the RT-12 soldiers departed the training base, most combat arms soldiers were assigned to Europe. This is particularly true of Armor crews and Infantrymen. They served as backfill for soldiers who had been cross leveled to fill units deploying to SWA. The RT-12 soldiers complained that they were not received as equal partners. Ironically, many of these soldiers served in Europe when on active duty. Many expected to receive tough realistic training and to be integrated into units. They were disappointed and frustrated when it didn’t happen. Comments such as "temporary help" or "permanent police call" were not out of the ordinary.

**Recommendation:** Active duty and Reserve Component commanders need to receive all soldiers in the same manner. There cannot be differences in a unit that might affect its
morale and effectiveness. It calls for common sense and good leadership skills.

Commanders must evaluate their training posture and begin training programs. The TRADOC proponent schools are presently developing Rapid Train-up Programs (RTUP) for the IRR. These must be incorporated into the training programs of units that receive IRR soldiers.

CONCLUSION

It has been over twenty years since the Individual Ready Reserve was last activated. Many doubts existed about these soldiers, as to their abilities and if they would even return. Study after study at the Army War College came up inconclusive as to what to expect. It should not come as a surprise that the quality Army we have been building would trickle down to the IRR.

The Army of the last decade has been working hard, recruiting only the best, providing them with tough realistic training. We inculcated into our soldiers the ethos of duty, honor and country. We gave them the opportunity to succeed. For many, the Army was a stepping stone for their futures. After they completed their obligations, they returned back to their hometowns and began their careers - over one-third were attending college or other schooling.10

When called, they came, in far greater numbers than ever anticipated. No, they were not happy to be back on
active duty. The call up created a lot of uncertainty in their lives. Their attitudes rapidly changed from resentment to "now that we are here, let's get the job done and then go home." They were displaying the attitude of your everyday soldier.

The Army let these soldiers down. We didn't provide them with all that we could, but we did the best with what we had. Many lessons were learned and hopefully it will not happen again. Systems need to be fixed and in place if we ever rapidly mobilize again.

The quality of these soldiers was great. Over a third had been to the National Training Center. Yes, there was skill decay, but they were eager learners and recertification came quickly. In a much faster time than anticipated, they were reacclimated back into Army life.

Overall, the mobilization was a tremendous success. In many cases, filler personnel from the IRR could be requisitioned faster than active duty fillers. Within 14 days of receiving their orders the overwhelming majority of the IRR reported for duty, while active duty soldiers took over 30 days to report to their new units. The IRR soldiers were true minutemen.

The greatest strength was flexibility and the quality of the people who made the system work. In spite of the system failures, there was always a way of getting the job done. Dedicated people made it happen.
The Future

As the Army continues to downsize and the world situation continues to transition, the likelihood of needing the Reserves for future action will increase. The Total Army concept must continue to receive emphasis. The quality of equipment for active duty and Reserve Components must be the same if we intend to integrate on the battlefield. The same is true for personnel and training. We cannot afford to have two standards; It must be one Army.
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The Events

2 Aug. 90 - Iraq invades Kuwait.

3 Aug. 90 - Executive Order 12722 declaring a national emergency and invokes 50 USC 1701 et seq. From this E.O. other authorities would be invoked including Partial Mob (10 USC 673).

7 Aug. 90 - The Joint Staff and ARSTAF finalizes plans for immediate reinforcements of Saudi Arabian forces.
- 82nd Airborne on full standby.
- President Bush orders U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia.

8 Aug. 90 - Deployment of U.S. forces begins.

9 Aug. 90 - OSD Crisis Mgmt System activated.
- 1st announcement call-up may be considered.
- Deployment officially named Operation Desert Shield.
- PERSCOM initiates coordination with the 3rd U.S. Army on replacement system concept.

- Letter to SECDEF from JCS requesting 200k call-up.
- Gen H. Norman Schwartzkopf appointed as Commander Operation Desert Shield.
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12 Aug. 90 - PERSCOM reviews 200K call-up list for CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) units.

13 Aug. 90 - PERSCOM accelerate development of Non Unit Related Flow Computer Assisted Program (FLOWCAP) system.


15 Aug. 90 - HGDA ODCSOPS questions need for CRC units in 200k call-up.
- PERSCOM begins coordination with MAC on channel airlift and replacement operations.

16 Aug. 90 - Wright Patterson AFB eliminated as APOE.
- PERSCOM TTAD volunteers begin arriving.
- PERSCOM casualty estimates developed.
- PERSCOM briefs DCSPER on PSS in the Theater (Doctrine).

17 Aug. 90 - The President decides to activate elements of the Reserve Components under Title 10 USC 673(B).
- TRADOC questions CRC locations and Aerial Ports of Embarkation.

18 Aug. 90 - PERSCOM projects Wartime Replacement/Peacetime Flow requirements.
- List of OCIE/CDE forwarded to ARCENT for approval.
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19 Aug. 90 - TRADOC requests FORSCOM/CDCSOPS remove CRC units from 200k call-up list.

21 Aug. 90 - TRADOC questions accuracy of casualty figures and locations of CRCs and APOEs.
- TRADOC requests projections on the number of RT-12's expected to flow through CRCs.

22 Aug. 90 - The President approves the 200k call-up of the Selected Reserve to active duty under Title 10 U.S.C. 637 (B.) and makes announcement.
- MAC directs that Non-Unit Related Personnel (NRP) flow through Dover AFB.

23 Aug. 90 - Units activated at C-3 for Personnel (cross leveling within 50 miles).
- PERSCOM completes stratification of MPM casualty estimates on AUTOREP.
- List of equipment requirements for CRCs given to ODCSLOG and TRADOC.

24 Aug. 90 - HQDA alerts selected Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) for possible call-up to active duty.

25 Aug. 90 - Phase 1 call-up starts - involves Reserve Components in 37 states.

30 Aug. 90 - CRC installations instructed to initiate CRC Capability Reports through TRADOC.
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31 Aug. 90 - TRANSCOM designates Charleston, S.C. as Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) for non-unit Related Personnel (NRP).

3 Sep. 90 - ARCENT forwards Theater Replacement System concept to PERSCOM.
- PERSCOM requests data from the Army Reserve Personnel Center on RT-12 assigned to CRC installations.

5 Sep. 90 - PERSCOM Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) begin to arrive.

6 Sep. 90 - TRADOC authorizes direct coordination between PERSCOM and CRC units.

7 Sep. 90 - PERSCOM provides initial CRC flow estimates to TRANSCOM and ODCSLOG.

9 Sep. 90 - PERSCOM forwards to ARCENT the replacement personnel system for review.

11 Sep. 90 - Involuntary retiree recall authorized.

15 Sep. 90 - PERSCOM receives ARCENT Commander's Guidance for Operation Desert Shield peacetime replacement operations.


18 Sep. 90 - 22nd Replacement Detachment arrives in SWA with 29 personnel
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- J4 and J7 discuss issues of Mobilization Stations vs APOE pick up points and Central Command's role in requirement determination for call-up.

21 Sep. 90 - FORSCOM nonconcurs on funding of OCIE for CRCs.

24 Sep. 90 - HODA, ODCSLOG confirms no action taken to identify or fence OCIE, CDE and weapons to support replacement operations. TRADOC and ODCSPER asked to become involved.


16 Oct. 90 - Presidential call-up of Reserve Component and individuals extended beyond 90 days.

17 Oct. 90 - Ft. Knox CRC is designated as third CRC for wartime operations if needed.

26 Oct. 90 - Massive driver requirement initiated by ARCENT - PERSCOM requests TRANSCOM assist in having Charleston AFB and McGuire AFB designated as Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) for CRC operations.

27 Oct. 90 - FORSCOM initiates query on use of CRCs for unit replacement.

29 Oct. 90 - Headquarters, Military Airlift Command develops concept to support replacement operations at Charleston AFB and McGuire AFB.
APPENDIX A

30 Oct. 90 - TRANS over takes action to establish Charleston
AFB as the primary Aerial Point of Embarkation
(APOE) and McGuire AFB as the secondary APOE
to support operations.

1 Nov. 90 - DCSPER clarifies organizational and command
relationships governing CRC operations.

5 Nov. 90 - XVIII Airborne Corps requests prepositioned
casualty replacements.

8 Nov. 90 - President Bush announces additional forces to
be deployed to SWA. VII Corps moves from
Europe.

10 Nov. 90 - Casualty estimates reworked based on seven plus
divisions.

13 Nov. 90 - Presidential Executive orders announced - Phase
II and Phase III authorizing the extension of
the period of active duty to 180 days.

14 Nov. 90 - Call-up authority increased to 80,000.

15 Nov. 90 - FORSCOM removes CRC units from 200k list.

20 Nov. 90 - HQDA ODCSOPS provides theater replacement
guidance.

21 Nov. 90 - Presidential call-up of Selected Reserve to
Active Federal Duty.

27 Nov. 90 - Lawson Army Airfield designated as APOE for
wartime replacement operations.

- Ft. Dix supports flow of Non-unit Related
APPENDIX A

Personnel (NPP) through McGuire AFB.

1 Dec. 90 - Secretary of Defense signs guidance for 10 USC 673(B) call-up authority to 115,000.
- DCSPER requests that OCAR and ARPERCEN brief plans to mobilize the IRR and retirees.

7 Dec. 90 - Army requests JCS activation of IRR
- Peacetime flow of personnel through the CRC begins.

9 Dec. 90 - USAR CRC units activated.

10 Dec. 90 - CRCs at Ft. Benning and Fort Jackson begin processing non-unit replacement personnel.

12 Dec. 90 - Desert Shield Personnel replacement policy during peacetime sustainment requires installations which have deployed units to SWA to provide replacements to those units in SWA.

13 Dec. 90 - During wartime, PERSCOM will coordinate the assignment and movement of AIT graduates and all other replacements as NRP from training centers or installations directly to SWA through the CRC.


12 Jan. 91 - The U.S. Congress grants President Bush the
APPENDIX A

authority to use military force.

16 Jan. 91 - Operation Desert Storm begins. A total of 1034 RC units mobilized to date.

18 Jan. 91 - The President declares Partial Mobilization. Reservists to remain on AD longer than 180 days.

19 Jan. 91 - IRR Call-up (Package A initiated) Executive order #12743.

- Secretary of Defense memorandum on call-up of Ready Reserve units and Personnel.

23 Jan. 91 - TRADOC develops plan to establish mini-CRCs at Ft. Leonard Wood and Ft. Sill.

24 Jan. 91 - TRADOC activates additional BCT companies at Ft. Jackson to assist CRC operations.

29 Jan. 91 - IRR call-up (Package A2)

2 Feb. 91 - Guidance provide by PERSCOM for assignment and processing of IRR Accessions.

14 Feb. 91 - FORSCOM sends message reinforcing the importance of soldiers reporting to CRCs on time, properly POR qualified.

18 Feb. 91 - Flow of Non-unit Related Personnel to SWA temporarily suspended effective 20 Feb. 91.

19 Feb. 91 - PERSCOM directs that IRR/NG volunteer officers at the CRCs be held in place.

20 Feb. 91 - CRC flow is suspended for enlisted soldiers.
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23 Feb. 91 - U.S. Forces initiate large scale ground offensive operations.

27 Feb. 91 - President orders cessation of offensive operations (end of 100 hour ground war).

28 Feb. 91 - AUTOCAP system validated to bridge AUTOREP and FLOWCAP system.

2 Mar. 91 - Guidance provided for out-processing of IFP soldiers from USAPEUR.

3 Mar. 91 - Guidance provided for demobilization of the IRP.

7 Mar. 91 - Secretary of Defense directs redeployment of U.S. Forces deployed in support of Operation Desert Storm.

11 Mar. 91 - Personnel records from all three CRCs consolidated at Ft. Jackson.


22 Mar. 91 - Guidance published for the release of RC soldiers from active duty.

25 Mar. 91 - TRADOC assumes coordinating mission of CRC flow.

26 Mar. 91 - USAR CRC companies deactivated.

17 May 91 - HQDA ODCSOPS initiates warning order for Southwest Asia Residual Force (SWARF).

25 May 91 - PERSCOM tasked to provide individual replacement packages for SWARF.
9 June 91 - First SWARP replacements flow through Ft. Dix
N.J.
NOTES


5. United States Congress Armed Services Committee Hearings, Authorizing the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 12 months and for other purposes. 87th Congress, S.J. Res 224. Washington:GPO September 10, 1962. page 27.

7. Ibid., page 15.

8. Ibid., page 4.

9. United States Congress Armed Services Committee Hearings, Authorizing the President to order units and members in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 12 months and for other purposes. 87th Congress, S.J. Res 224. Washington: GPO September 10, 1962. page 4-5.

10. Ibid., page 3-4.

11. Ibid., page 3-13.


personnel.


Acknowledgments

I would like to personally thank the following individuals who provided their time to help me with this project. I appreciate their insights and comments on this subject.

LTC(P) Glenn Cassidy, J4, Joint Staff
Col Jerry Mowrey, Director of Mobilization, ODCSPER, U.S. Army
Mr. Raymond Robinson, Senior Mobilization Planner, ODCSPER, U.S. Army
Maj Al Bailey, Mobilization Plans Office, ODCSPER, U.S. Army
CW4 Rick Gray, Replacement Operations Center, TAPA
Maj Gary Czvornyek, XO, 42nd AG BN., Ft. Dix.
LTC Bob Patrick, Chief of Proponenty, U.S. Army Soldier Support Center, Ft. Harrison, IN.
LTC Bruce J. Wasielewski, USAR Planner, Total Army Personnel Command
Maj Charles D. Rime, Chief, Replacement Operation Center, Total Army Personnel Command.
Col Duane A. Lempke, Chief, Accessions, Reserve Appointments and Management Div OPMD, TAPA
LTC Mike Hargett, Military Assistant, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs