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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Colonel Chris Shaw, USAF

Abstract

The national imperatives of our economy reflect directly on military budget austerity and manpower drawdowns, yet the education of officers must not and should not suffer. The history and evolution of PME and a different approach can provide the answers to the "where and how" the PME system should proceed. What results from this prescribed alternative approach is an educated officer versed in the various levels of war, capable of participating directly in the formulation of national security policy.
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PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Confucius: If you plan for 1 year, plant rice.
          If you plan for 10 years, plant trees.
          If you plan for 100 years, educate men.

Introduction

Today's military truly reflects society's mores, culture and values. Indeed, through public trust and confidence, the military directly embodies one of the four components of our nation's power. The military cannot, however, be totally separated from the other three (political, economic and diplomatic) since all four are interwoven. International events are so rapidly changing the world that the future is far less certain than it had been during the bi-polar Cold War. The leadership in the military must be trained and educated in order to participate fully in molding and securing the direction this nation must travel. Professional Military Education (PME) is the system which provides the skills and knowledge required to assume greater responsibilities that accompany advancement in rank.

The national imperatives of our economy reflect directly on military budget austerity and manpower drawdowns, yet the education of officers must not and should not suffer. Reduced spending and fewer people mean that more will be expected and demanded from those remaining. The military must closely scrutinize the PME system in order to provide the necessary education for future military officers to stay ahead. Selected
personnel with proven potential must be afforded the opportunity to stay abreast of world events, broaden their intellect and prepare to directly contribute to the formulation of national security policy. PME should be considered a force multiplier and not be weakened by an illegitimate, unenlightened slash of a budget-reducing pen. The history and evolution of PME and a different approach can provide the answers to the "where and how" the PME system should proceed.

What results from this prescribed alternative approach to PME is a highly educated professional military officer versed in the various levels of war capable of participating directly in the formulation of national security policy. He will learn operating jointly at a younger age, when he is most likely to serve as a participant and perhaps as a leader.

Where and When Did Formal PME Begin?

Europe. In 1810, the Prussian Kriegsakademie provided officers, with over 5 years of experience, an opportunity to study the art of war. Enhancement of an individual's general understanding and theoretical ability was the focus. The French recognized similar military value by establishing the Ecole d' Application d' Etat Major only 8 years later. These were the first schools set forth primarily for the purpose of studying the art of war, hence a realistic professional military education, vice "training." Various militaries throughout the world all had training programs, such as the staff duty training initiated in
1799 by the Duke of York. The military of the United States entered the picture halfway between the "training and education" sides.

In 1867, the Artillery School of the U.S. Army began at Fort Monroe, Virginia. This was a functional school training the conduct of war from a particular point of view, i.e. for the artillery officer. General William Tecumsah Sherman then left his mark on Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, when he created both the Infantry and Calvary Schools in 1881. The U.S. Navy was soon to follow.

Not to be outdone, Admiral Stephen B. Luce opened the Naval War College in 1884, with the help of a relatively established academician by the name of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. The bent was on naval power as a component of national power. Not to be second class, Luce and Mahan saw fit to attempt to elevate the school's status by hiring an Army officer to teach a course on the Art of War. Both Luce and Mahan saw the need for such a course and wanted it taught by someone who had studied the subject abroad. This, they explained, would add to the currency of thought. Lt Bliss had been the adjutant to the Artillery School at Ft Monroe and had just returned from study in Europe. Lt Bliss filled the bill! The Naval War College was off and running. The Army, however, failed to grasp the importance of a higher focus for their schools.

Between 1875 and 1904, the Army training and education systems struggled. General Emery Upton embarked (1875) on a
Among his findings was that the U.S. Military Academy was far superior to any academy abroad for preparatory training. This was the Army's only lead. Throughout Europe, the study of war from a broad perspective was far ahead of anything being taught in the Army. Something had to be done with the Army's education programs. The slow pace of bureaucratic debate ensued. The result emerged with the establishment in 1903 of the Army War College at Ft McNair, Washington, D.C. This was a war academy focused on "strategy" for senior officers (20 years of service). Both the Army and Navy had targeted the same age group for professional military education. The face of airpower was soon to appear.

Once airpower became a growing entity, it too experienced functional training just as the other branches in the Army had. The Army Air Corps Tactical School (AACTS) at Langley Field, Virginia, began teaching the employment of airpower as early as 1920. This was a functional school for captains with about 10 years of service. They studied aerial combat, leadership, and command and staff functions. These captains were to be the leaders identified to train and direct the staff. Such accomplishments as the infamous 1921 aerial bombardment exercises against the ex-German cruiser Frankfurt and the battleship Ostfriesland were conducted by these captains. The functional side of training within the Air Corps had earned its wings.

AACTS expanded and later moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama,
but continued to concentrate on the employment of airpower. The World War II tactical doctrine of high altitude daylight formation bombing was developed at Maxwell. What AACTS and the Army War College offered was a formal training and education system for a career Air Corps officer. His career track would look something like the following:

- initial flying training,
- operational flying duty with a squadron
- advancement through attendance of the AACTS
- operational flying duty with a squadron
- selected officers to attend the newly established Army Command and General Staff College (Ft Leavenworth)
- operational duty (perhaps followed by command)
- exceptional senior officers attended Army War College

This track produced an educated force competent in their career field as well as capable of performing at higher levels of command and staff. The head of the Air Corps saw an opening and had a vision.

General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz wanted something more. He wanted to let the major commands concentrate on their primary missions and let an integrated, progressive educational plan grow at a central location. Thus the evolution of Air University: to focus both training and education of air force officers in a "three-tier" professional approach. He wanted it this way in order to better control conflicting operational theories, to avoid duplication and to fill the absence of instruction in
certain areas unique to air operations.

The U.S. then had professional military education in all three services. They offered training at the functional level, staff training and senior level education covering the art of war and the development of strategy. None, however, were accomplishing them in the same way.

The lessons of World War I, in regard to mobilization and logistics, led to the establishment of the Army Industrial College at Ft. McNair as early as 1924. Ft. McNair, therefore, was the site for advanced military education, housing both the Army War College and the Army Industrial College. These two colleges and the Naval War College comprised senior level education up to World War II. There was no joint (multi-service) school studying integrated land, sea and air operations. The outbreak of war soon produced the opportunity.

Classes at the functional and intermediate level schools were reduced in size in order to fulfill officer requirements for the war. Classes at the Army War College were suspended altogether. The Naval War College remained open only to teach the intermediate level courses.

General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold saw the need and recommended that a multi-service "joint" school be established. The JCS agreed and established the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL). Interestingly, the State Department started sending students to ANSCOL in 1944. ANSCOL's purpose was to "train officers of the arms in.....duties in unified and coordinated Army and Navy
Commands.

ANSCOL was not large enough to produce the number of senior officers trained to employ joint forces in theater command needed for war. Though the services were still operating their intermediate schools, another school was needed. The Joint Chiefs allocated the necessary funding to establish one.

General Eisenhower did not reconvene the Army War College in 1947. The JCS, with co-sponsorship with the State Department, established the National War College (NWC) on 1 July 1946, as the institutional successor to the Army-Navy Staff College. He then provided the AWC facilities at Ft. McNair to the newly established National War College. NWC students were to "study national security policy and strategy formulation and implementation" and "application of military power," focusing on "national strategy" and "a joint multi-service perspective." Students were selected from other parts of the government in order to facilitate better understanding of all the agencies that would be called upon to contribute to a war effort. This was the broadest perspective of any senior service school to date.

Military education underwent more change following the lessons learned from World War II. April 11, 1946 is the date which the Army Industrial College officially converted to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAf). The mission remained the same. Later that year, in August, another intermediate school was developed as the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). Its mission was to "perform the same role in the joint education arena as the Command and Staff Schools of the
The Air War College was established, also in 1946, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, with a logical airpower focus. The resultant: many institutions, all with unique curriculum.

**How has PME Progressed?**

The system of PME has changed four times since 1946. The most recent was caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. The following charts will provide a quick review of the PME system as it progressed through the years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level III</th>
<th>NWC or Forces</th>
<th>ICAF Staff</th>
<th>College (AFSC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level II</th>
<th>Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC)</th>
<th>Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)</th>
<th>Navy Command and Staff College (NCSC)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Command and General Staff College (ACGSC)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Level I</th>
<th>Amphibious Branch Schools</th>
<th>Squadron Officers School (SOS)</th>
<th>Surface, Sub, or Aviation Specialty Training</th>
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**Chart I: PME 1946**

Mid-1946 saw the creation of Air War College at Maxwell AFB. The Army War College did not reconvene until 1950. Without facilities at Ft. McNair, in Washington, the Army had to search for a location. Having some professional military education
already on "campus" at Ft. Leavenworth, Army War College found a temporary home. The following year, AWC moved to its current location at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Naval War College resumed senior level classes after the war. Attendance of senior PME remained service oriented.

Once a senior officer had attended PME through the respective service, he could be selected to receive "joint" training at one of the two joint schools -- NWC or ICAF. Chart II depicts the trend of training to the early 1950s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level IV</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level III ICAF</td>
<td>Army War College</td>
<td>Air War College</td>
<td>Naval War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>MCCSC</td>
<td>ACSC</td>
<td>NCSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>ACGSC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>Amphib Branch</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Sub. Surf Aviation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the mid-50s, the services had changed their approach to PME. Too much time out of a career was being spent sending a select few senior officers to both a service senior level school and then on to a joint one. The services adjusted around this by selecting officers to attend any senior level course. Primarily, the "chosen" few would only attend the joint school to meet the senior level PME criteria -- hence bypassing their service
school. By the early 1960s, hardly any officers were attending both their service schools and the joint schools. This was also true at the intermediate level.

The Army and the Marine Corps stopped sending their officers to both their intermediate schools and AFSC sometime in the late 1960s. The same argument of lost operational career time was the culprit. Not everyone agreed with this philosophy. Many senior level officers felt that much was gained by an officer who attended the joint AFSC -- after first becoming totally knowledgeable with their own service doctrines and employment criteria. The multi-service "jointness" learned by all was more enhanced this way.

A DOD study in 1975 noted the convergence of curriculum among the service schools. The Clements Committee offered a different opinion -- that each of the five senior schools should have a different focus. It was recommended that all five should have a common core, mission-specific courses and an elective program from which students could tailor their course study. Thus the Army War College would focus on land warfare; the Air War College on aerospace warfare; the Naval on naval warfare; ICAF on defense management and materiel acquisition; and National War College on national security formulation. This was seen to develop PME into "five coequal intermediate and five coequal senior schools, each with a distinct mission and faculty and an appropriately oriented student body."

The structure of curriculum as explained above and Chart III
is how PME was focused when the 100th Congress undertook the initiative required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level III</th>
<th>Army WC</th>
<th>Air WC</th>
<th>Naval WC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>ICAF</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Level II</th>
<th>ACGSC</th>
<th>ACSC</th>
<th>NCSC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>MCCSC</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level I</th>
<th>Branch Sch</th>
<th>SOS</th>
<th>Surf, Sub, Aviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphib</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Chart III PME (1960 to 1988)

[Note: Senior officers could attend any one of the five schools to complete Level III PME. Mid-level officers could attend any one of the five intermediate service schools for Level II ISS completion.]

House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Les Aspin appointed Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) to be the Chairman of a Panel on Military Education. This panel was to specifically assess DOD PME in developing officers competent in both strategy and joint matters. All ten intermediate, senior PME and Capstone courses were the targets.

After thorough review, DOD PME was considered to be "sound" as a system. A positive light was shed when US programs appeared to be equal to even the most prestigious foreign military programs. Nonetheless, the Panel offered several recommendations which it felt should be made in order to improve PME. These were formalized in the Panel's report dated 18 November 1988."

11
SKELTON COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS:

Recommendation 1. Establish a PME framework for Department of Defense schools that specifies and relates the primary educational objectives of each PME level.

Recommendation 2. Improve the quality of faculty (1) by amending present law to facilitate hiring civilian faculty and (2) through actions by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the service chiefs to ensure that only high-quality military officers are assigned to faculties.

Recommendation 3. Establish a two-phase Joint Specialist Officer (JSO) education process with Phase I taught in service colleges and a follow-on, temporary duty Phase II taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

Recommendation 4. Adopt the proposal being developed by the Chairman, JCS, that the National War College be converted to a National Center for Strategic Studies, as both a research and educational system.

Recommendation 5. At the senior service colleges (1) make national military strategy the primary focus and (2) increase the mix by service of both the military faculty and military students.

Recommendation 6. Implement a substantive Capstone course that includes the study of national security strategy and national military strategy.

Recommendation 7. Review the Navy military education system to determine whether Navy officers should and can attend both intermediate and senior colleges and whether each Naval War College school should have a more distinct curriculum.

Recommendation 8. Establish the position of Director of Military Education on the staff of the Chairman, JCS, to support his responsibilities for joint PME and for formulating policies to coordinate all military education.

Recommendation 9. Require students at both intermediate and senior PME schools complete frequent essay-type examinations and to write papers and reports that are thoroughly reviewed, critiqued, and graded by faculty.
The complete justification for each of the recommendations is found in the Panel's full report. Much has been done with all 9 of the recommendations, some of which follows:

- A PME framework is outlined.
- Title 10 authorized the Secretary of Defense to use personal service contracts to hire civilians for faculty.
- The two-phase JSO process is activated.
- Still under review is the conversion of National War College into a National Center for Strategic Study.
- All senior service schools focus on national strategy and national military strategy.
- All senior service schools have become more "joint" in the mix of faculty and students.
- Capstone now focuses on the study of national security strategy.
- The Navy has separated the intermediate and senior courses with new designations.
- CJCS established the position of the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education.
- Essay-type examinations, papers, and reports are all required at intermediate and senior PME schools.

Congress, somewhat less than satisfied with the pace and process of DOD implementation, has continued to monitor the DOD PME establishment. The HASC Panel on Military Education expanded on their recommendations in their report in April 1989. The most
encompassing change to DOD PME was the publication by the Chairman, JCS, of CM 344-90, the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) on 1 May 1990. The General Accounting Office (GAO) entered into the process when it conducted a review of the DOD implementation of the HASC recommendations."

The basic assessment was that roughly 90% of the applicable Panel recommendations had received some positive action, as listed above. GAO further realized that there were differences between what the Panel had recommended and what the MEPD accomplished. These differences were caused by the fact that the Panel's recommendations and the MEPD were both written with different purposes in mind. Specifically, the Panel's purpose, as stated earlier, was to assess PME's ability to develop joint specialty officers. The MEPD's purpose, broader in scope, was to define the objectives and policies regarding all institutions making up the military education system." In essence, DOD, through the MEPD, is improving toward achieving the desired educational goals. What we want is competence in our military officers.

Is There a Better Way?

Yes. First, we must decide on exactly what we want and then establish when and how we can develop this "product" called the competent military officer. This democracy of ours places the military officer in somewhat a unique position. The Constitution dictates civilian control of the military. That control is
sometimes not thoroughly understood, appreciated, nor felt immediately by the lower ranks. It takes the training and education systems within the military to "remind and reinforce" the meaning and wisdom of such an important facet of our national power. Once an officer thoroughly understands his position and its relation to national security, he can be more productive as both a participant and as a leader.

This "production" can take on the face of advisor, leader or decision-maker. Few officers arise to the position of military advisor to a civilian official. Yet those who do are in a unique position to both assist in the development of national security policy as well as articulate that policy to the military for execution.

Little has been written on how we must prepare our officers for such responsibility. Mr. Martin van Creveld has offered such a critique with a solution toward longer schools and entry/selection to those schools at an earlier age in an officer's career. Though interesting in comment, the recommendations are not compelling. It becomes extremely difficult to start at an earlier age with an officer who has had the opportunities to gain the insights necessary to build upon in senior level schools. Furthermore, not many officers have the time to spend two years in school during a most critical time in their career. Since the publishing of his book, Mr. van Creveld has altered his approach and now feels that U.S. DOD PME should be entirely refocused on what he calls "non-military wars" --
most commonly known as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). This would appear to be most easily accomplished through curriculum changes, rather than total re-alignment of senior PME, which he had earlier proposed.

In this era of decreasing budgets, education and training can become long-term leverage points in upgrading the military profession. By refocusing intermediate and senior level PME, DOD can better produce those key officers who will be called upon to lead in combat and advise on security policy at the national level. Several basic approaches must be considered. Course content, student selection criteria, timing and course accreditation are all factors for concern. These cannot be adjusted in a piecemeal fashion, but must be reworked as a whole in order to vastly improve the product.

The education process today can be changed in order to better prepare a select few for the opportunities which lie in the future. I will offer an alternative approach to the current PME system in order to develop the type of officer required for our future. The education, training, opportunities for leadership and the experience of command all combine to develop an individual capable of assuming higher responsibility. The current tiered PME approach is close, but is still in need of revision/improvement. This tiered approach, whether called levels or phases, is correct. I will address them as phases, adjust each with the goal of improvement, and add a fourth phase of PME education to "top off" a limited number of general
officers to work key specific issues.

PHASE I: SERVICE FUNCTIONS. The services must continue to have time to educate and train young officers in their functional areas. The first few years of service are devoted to developing an officer's competence and leadership ability in their specific functional area -- pilot, logistician, administrator, maintenance, etc. More senior officers should be training these lieutenants in order to develop more capable warriors early on in their careers. An excellent approach toward such training was offered in a study at Air University in 1984." Once proficient and proven, Phase I PME can be productive for them.

The first few years in the grade of Captain (Lieutenant for the Navy) is the first time someone should be selected for Phase I PME. Commanders are the ones who should nominate only the most deserving young officers for Phase I PME attendance. Not every young captain should get to attend. Service central selection screening boards should serve as the selection process. The officer's record should speak for itself and meet the selection criteria.

The wrong approach is to select those who have done more extra-curricular activities than real accomplishment of being the best in their functional area. Achievement of higher levels of competence in their job skills, relative to their peers, should determine selection criteria. Only 75% of those eligible should have the opportunity to attend. Start the competition for PME early.
Course content in Phase I PME should include service history, traditions, a "must read" list of leadership references, familiarization with basic regulations (UCMJ, customs and courtesies, etc.) all taught under the auspices of Officership, Leadership and Communications Skills. The "must read" list can be broad or service specific." "Jointness" can also be introduced in the curriculum -- especially when discussions about leadership, based upon the "read list", occur in class. Joint organizations, missions and inter-service relationships should all be taught on a basic level. Learning about this should start earlier in a career.

Some expansion of current Phase I programs will naturally occur in order to accommodate these ideas. Eight or ten weeks of study will not be sufficient. The extra time spent, however, will develop a better officer just having learned how the service fits in the real world of warfighting -- i.e., joint. Armed with this basic education, warfighters will understand and continue to improve themselves by concentrating now on the tactical level of war.

The remaining years spent as a captain and young major should focus on that tactical level of war. Proficiency of warrior skills, coupled with the ability to teach and train those under their supervision, can then become milestones of measurement. The goal is an officer's complete understanding of how the service's tactical level of war unit of employment operates and how it is supported both within and jointly, in
order to accomplish assigned missions. Setting such a high standard adds to the selection criteria for further assignments. Only a few highly motivated, qualified warriors with a promise for the future will get the nod for Intermediate Service School (ISS) attendance.

Phase II: Intermediate Service School (ISS). ISS is where the education process starts to expand beyond the tactical level of war. Theater level operational art and composite warfare should become the basis of understanding, i.e., the operational level of war. Joint Doctrine, Planning (Deliberate/Time Sensitive), Joint Staff Operations and Crisis Action exercises become the curriculum of study. All of the ISS curriculum should address these along with the service's operational art. AFSC can continue to operate as an intermediate and senior joint staff top-off program as designed today.

Opportunities of assignments after ISS will range from tactical level operational units to major command staffs, service staffs, unified command staffs all the way up to the Joint Staff or OSD staff. Somewhere along the way, either before or after staff, opportunity to command should afford a select few to develop their leadership potential. This is where an officer breaks the ties of "being just one of the guys" and becomes one of "the few who make the decisions, set and enforce the policy". There will not be enough units for everyone to have the opportunity to command. Therefore, "command" experience cannot be the determining factor for further PME attendance. Leadership
is shown from any number of positions, and the right type of warrior will advance. Senior level PME must always continue to have a broad cross-section of officers who have demonstrated such an ability -- regardless whether from operations or support.

**Phase III: Senior Service School (SSS).** Senior level PME should then build upon ISS and the experience gained by officers nearing or just promoted to the rank of O-6. The number of officers eligible for SSS attendance is lower. Five senior service schools are no longer needed. A smaller force of the 21st century will yield smaller class sizes better optimized for educational development.

This smaller force will allow college student populations of approximately 180 students per year. Ideally, seminars of 10 - 12 students are the right size for concentration and the exchange of ideas of such a politico-military nature. Hence, student populations, joint in nature, would be the following:

- 25% Air Force
- 25% Army
- 25% Navy and Marine Corps
- 25% Other (State, CIA, FEMA, NSA, CRS, DIA, DOD civilians, etc.)

Numbers and funding can no longer justify the need for a separate and fourth SSS, namely the newly established Marine Corps program at Quantico, Virginia. The three SSS courses (Army War College, Air War College, Naval War College) should teach the same curriculum. The Skelton Committee's recommended mixed faculties
are the correct approach. Efforts to improve and maintain those quality staffs should continue.

ICAF can continue to operate on a much smaller scale, mainly as the senior service school designed strictly for the education of senior level acquisition and program manager candidates. ICAF should continue to teach the same core curriculum that is taught during the first semester. All of the electives, however, should be defense acquisition related courses. Front loading most of those to the first semester will allow a shorter second semester, hence a school year of only 8 months, rather than 10.

Senior level PME should focus on the following areas:
- national security policy formulation,
- the concept and development of a national security strategy,
- warfighting at the strategic level of war.

The end of a 10-month course should result in a national security strategy, focused 10 years out. Such a strategy could not stand without validated funding and resourcing. Course accreditation with a degree in International Securities Study would also enhance the SSS program.

What is noticeably absent is the loss of National War College as a SSS institution. Not exactly, in literal terms. NWC should be the culmination of DOD PME. This would define a new PME phase, Phase IV.

Phase IV: National War College. Capstone is on the right track, but needs improvement. National War College should take on that
responsibility and further develop the potential. It should be a more refined course for a few O-7s and O-8s concentrating on national security policy formulation. Specifically, it should expand Capstone into an 8-month course for these senior leaders to work an issue given them by the CJCS or the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

Approximately 75 flag officers/Senior Executive Service (SES) equivalents should attend. Committees of 8-10 members would work a specific issue on national security. Both the CJCS and SECDEF would submit either current or future security issues for study. All committees could work on the same issue, or each could focus on separate options within a given issue. Core curriculum on national power and national security policy formulation would serve as background. Education accreditation would lean toward a degree in diplomacy.

*The Result of this Alternative Approach*

Given the smaller force structure with fewer operationally experienced officers, this PME structure reorganized into four phases develops a more highly educated professional at the most opportune times in a career. Chart IV, on the following page, summarizes the four phases:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>0-7/0-8</td>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>Nat’l Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>0-5/0-6</td>
<td>Air WC, Naval WC, Army WC</td>
<td>Strategic Level of War, Natl Sec Pol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-5/0-6</td>
<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-4/0-5</td>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>ACSC, ACGSC, NCSC, MCCSC</td>
<td>Operational Level of War, Joint, Combined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>SOS, Army Branch, Amphib, Surf, Sub, Aviation</td>
<td>Functional Expertise, Tactical Level of War, Intro to Joint and Combined War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart IV. Alternative Approach to PME

This approach develops a warfighter at an earlier age to understand and appreciate jointness. After training in the early years under service specific functions, a captain will gain firsthand knowledge in joint operations. This is even more true in light of the fact that anything the United States will do in the future, will be done jointly. There will not be enough force structure in any service to accomplish major objectives unilaterally nor independently. Furthermore, as experience is gained and insights expanded, officers from any service can be sent to any of the intermediate or senior service schools. They will be able to participate fully from both a service as well as
a joint perspective.

Thus, the above PME approach creates an officer skilled in the profession and built into a leader capable of operating at the national level of strategy formulation.


3. Ibid., pp. 10-12.


7. This U.S. Army officer was named Lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss. Lt Bliss later rose through the ranks to become the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, during World War I.


15. A primary objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to strengthen combined and joint operations of the various military services. To fulfill this objective, the House Armed Services Committee established the Panel on Military Education in November 1987 to report its findings and recommendations regarding DOD's
ability to develop joint specialty officers through its PME systems.


18. Ibid., pp. 2-7.

19. At this time, Admiral William Crowe was serving as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

20. The framework was established by the Chairman, JCS, in CM 344-90, the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD), on 1 May 1990.

21. Some will argue that the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), established in 1984, fulfills that need and that National War College shall not cease to exist -- based upon a glorified history and strong former student association. INSS continues as a multi-disciplinary research organization incorporating both military and civilian fellows.


23. Ibid., p. 2.


26. Discussions with Mr. van Creveld on 6 March 1992 at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C. These discussions focused on his new belief that all PME should be re-focused on LIC -- since over 65% of the conflicts fought after WWII have been "less than conventional war."

28. "Must read" lists should encompass articles, letters and books relative to the level of course content, focusing on officership and leadership of warfighters. Too long of a mandatory list will kill its readership. Select only a few in order to have it fully read and comprehended. Additionally, class time should be devoted for discussion.