Base Closure and Realignment
A Case Study

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BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

by

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ABSTRACT

As part of the fiscal 1991 defense authorization bill, Congress established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In 1991, 1993 and 1995, eight presidential appointees would consider a Department of Defense (DOD) list of base closure and realignment nominees and subsequently submit their version to the President for approval. After his approval, Congress could approve or disapprove the list only in its entirety.

In April 1991, DOD nominated to the 1991 Commission 43 installations for closure and 29 for realignment. Over a period of two and a half months, the Commission conducted 15 open hearings in Washington, D.C., 14 regional and site hearings across the country, and several televised deliberations with its research staff. All commission proceedings were noted for their openness, attention to due process, and a demand for accuracy.

The final list, which was approved by the President and Congress, recommended 34 bases for closure and 48 activities for realignment.
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BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

INTRODUCTION

As part of the fiscal 1991 (FY 1991) defense authorization bill (Public Law 101-510 of November 5, 1990), Congress established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In 1991, 1993 and 1995, eight presidential appointees would consider a Department of Defense (DOD) list of base closure and realignment nominees and subsequently submit their version to the President for approval. After his approval or the established presidential amendment process, Congress could approve or disapprove the list only in its entirety.

In April 1991, DOD nominated to the 1991 Commission 43 installations for closure and 29 for realignment. Over a period of two and a half months, the Commission conducted 15 open hearings in Washington, D.C., for inputs from Congress, GAO, DOD, and others; 14 regional and site hearings across the country for inputs from communities affected by the potential closings; and several televised deliberations with its research staff. All commission proceedings were noted for their openness, attention to due process, and a demand for accuracy. About midway through its review process, the Commission itself added 35 installations for closure and realignment consideration.

The final list, which was approved by the President and Congress, recommended 34 bases for closure and 48 activities for realignment.
During the early 1960's, DOD executed hundreds of base closures and realignments to reduce military overhead. Criteria governing these changes were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with little or no consultation with either the military departments or Congress. Congress had anticipated neither the broad extent of these actions, nor their cumulative substantial political impact. With very few exceptions, the closure actions were viewed negatively by Congress.¹

Between 1965 and 1977 several rounds of congressional legislation and presidential vetoes underscored the increasing influence of politics in the base closure process. In 1977 the President approved legislation that required congressional notification by DOD whenever a base was nominated for closure or reduction; thus, base closures were effectively halted.

After the peak of military spending in the 1980's, both the executive and legislative branches recognized, albeit not in conjunction, DOD's excess base capacity. The defense secretary submitted an "illustrative" list of 22 nominees for closure to Congress, but no effective action followed the subsequent Congressional hearing.
Driven largely by the need to streamline an infrastructure bloated due to a reduced threat and an altered force structure, the Secretary of Defense chartered on May 3, 1988 a DOD base closure commission to conduct an independent study of the department's domestic base structure and to make recommendations for closures and realignments. The 1988 commission recommended 86 base closures and 59 partial closures and realignments which were anticipated to generate an annual savings of approximately $700 million. Congress passed and President Reagan signed Public Law 100-526 of October 1988 to effect in toto the commission recommendations.

The process of governing by commission was not without its critics. In 1989, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, D-IL, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, called the process a "profile of congressional cowardice. It makes our constituents back home wonder why we came to Washington. They elected us to make the decisions in their behalf, not to come up with clever devices that allow us to duck those decisions."²

Critics leveled five main charges against the 1988 process:

* chartered by and reported to the Secretary of Defense;
* closed hearings and difficult-to-obtain transcripts gave the process an aura of secrecy;
* many of the affected facilities were never visited by the commissioners, thus making them totally reliant on second-hand
information;

* faulty data was used during the recommendation process, with no mechanism established for an independent verification of accuracy; and

* the mandate to recover all costs within six years was too restrictive and prevented the closing of several obsolete bases.

Driven by further reductions in DOD budgets and dramatic changes in eastern Europe, Secretary of Defense Cheney in January 1990 proposed closing 35 bases and reducing or realigning more than 20 others to reshape and reduce the military infrastructure. Some congressional critics cried foul, complaining that Democratic districts were unfairly targeted. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Les Aspin, D-WI, said that Secretary Cheney's process "stinks, because it risks making members hostages for the administration. Vote against an override, your base is safe. Vote to override, your base is threatened. This puts a political gun to the head of a member with a base in his or her district." Subsequently attributed to Aspin was a desire to create another independent base closing commission that would come up with a new list of bases and force Congress to vote up or down on the entire package. Secretary Cheney's list was not formally acted on by Congress.

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990

As part of the FY1991 defense authorization bill (Public Law
4. Cost and manpower implications.

**RETURN ON INVESTMENT**

5. Extent and timing of the potential costs and savings.

**IMPACTS**


7. Ability of the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support the forces, mission, and personnel.

8. Environmental impact.⁵

**THE BASE CLOSURE SELECTION PROCESS**

**SELECTION OF THE COMMISSION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ITS STAFF**

The commissioners were chosen for their distinguished legislative, business, military, and diplomatic backgrounds. Six were appointed by President Bush - four in consultation with the House and Senate majority leaders and two with the advice of House and Senate minority leaders. The other appointments were made independently by the President.⁶ Commission members were:

* Jim Courter, chairman - former Representative, R-NJ, and member of House Armed Services Committee (HASC); a senior partner in a New Jersey law firm.

* William L. Ball - former Secretary of the Navy and staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC); president
of the National Soft Drink Association in Washington, D.C.

* Howard H. "Bo" Calloway - former Secretary of the Army and Representative, R-GA; chairman of GOPAC in Washington, D.C.

* General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (Retired) - former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and of the Military Airlift Command; executive for CSX Corporation in Richmond, Virginia.

* Arthur Levitt, Jr. - chairman of the board of the Levitt Media Company; former chairman and chief executive officer of the American Stock Exchange.

* James C. Smith II - executive for Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc., an international Houston-based engineering and construction firm; a member of the 1988 base closure commission and former SASC staff member.

* Robert D. Stuart - former ambassador to Norway; past chief executive officer of Quaker Oats Company.

* Alexander B. Trowbridge - former Secretary of Commerce and past president of the National Association of Manufacturers. He resigned due to a potential conflict of interest and was not replaced.

The staff was drawn from backgrounds encompassing government, business, law, journalism, academia, and the military. Some were hired directly by the Commission, while others were detailed from DOD, GAO, FEMA, and the EPA. Under the Commission's founding legislation, no more than one-third of the staff could be detailed from DOD (since amended, see Epilogue). Division
directors (including the staff director) were civilians hired directly by the Commission. The Commission also hired independent consultants from the Logistics Management Institute, who helped design the analysis process and then participated in the review and analysis of the services' recommendations.7

Although no one raised questions about the objectivity of commission members, several members of Congress expressed concern over the extent of the military influence on the Commission's staff. "I think they're trying to be impartial but it's so hard to forget that your promotion comes from the people who put the numbers together," said Representative Pat Schroeder, D-CO, who helped write the base closure law. In some critics' view, the military presence was undermining the credibility of the Commission. But Mr. Cary Walker, spokesman for the Commission, said the process was working. He added, "As you can see, the commissioners are very independent. They are quick to test the assertions of staff members and are just as quick to demand new information." Chairman Jim Courter said it was necessary to have the help of the Pentagon staff members because the Commission needed the military expertise.8 "If there hadn't been [military] officers on the commission staff, the charge would be, 'They're neophytes. They don't even know the language. They were pushed and shoved around by the experts'." According to Chairman Courter, there is only one way to remove every potential conflict of interest from the next base-closing commission. "You'd have to get people who were never in the services, never
sat on the [armed services] committee, and didn't live in America," he said. "You'd have to have all Frenchmen.""9

DOD RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

The Commission received DOD's proposed list of closures and realignments from the Secretary of Defense on April 12, 1991. The proposal recommended that 43 bases be closed and 29 realigned. The individual service procedures follow.

The Navy began in February 1990 by empowering a Base Closure Advisory Committee. All facilities were evaluated for their ability to support Navy missions, availability of other naval facilities performing the same work, condition of facilities, quality of life for sailors and dependents, and local community support. The study group completed its report shortly before the Pentagon instructed the services to prepare new lists to comply with the FY1991 defense bill. The Navy subsequently appointed a Base Structure Committee (BSC) which started where the previous study group left off, applying the Pentagon criteria, and taking additional "expert" testimony. During the first of two phases, the committee grouped all facilities into similar categories, including naval stations, naval shipyards, medical facilities, naval air stations, training facilities, and research facilities. The BSC applied the DOD criteria to each facility individually, and then grouped all facilities by category. To get expert opinion, the BSC took testimony from commanders and senior
officials from the Navy's systems commands, fleets, platform type commands and laboratories. This phase culminated in two lists: one containing facilities that could not be closed for strategic or geographical reasons and the other containing potential nominees for closure or realignment. During the second phase, the BSC again measured the eight DOD criteria against all facilities on the nominee list. Some were removed at this stage because of their unique military value or location. Lastly, the BSC reviewed two Navy data bases which predict military construction and operating budgets and use fleet size to predict the required shore infrastructure.¹⁰

The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group of five general officers and five senior civilian officials was appointed in December 1990. The panel determined initially that there were six more strategic and five more tactical bases than the smaller Air Force would need. Sixteen tactical and 21 strategic bases were considered for closure nomination.¹¹ Each base was judged using the eight DOD criteria, as well as about 80 subcategories. The main factors leading to the final list of recommendations were encroachment by local communities, airspace crowding, poor access or distance to ranges or training areas, low peacetime usage of aerial refueling tankers, and the relatively poor conditions of the facilities.

The Army evaluated bases that historically performed the same types of missions and determined their military value relative to the entire service. Each installation was measured against a set
of uniform attributes and judged on its relative overall value in a category rather than by its capacity for current mission needs. The Army weighted the attributes to assess a starting point in the evaluation of base structure. Finally, the eight DOD criteria were applied to each installation.

While presenting the DOD closure list, Defense Secretary Cheney commented, "By 1995, the number of people in the U.S. military will be about one-fourth smaller than it is today. Smaller forces need fewer bases. It's as simple as that." But nothing was simple about a decision that sent shivers of economic uncertainty through communities that stood to lose their long-established Army, Navy, or Air Force facility. Members of Congress from some of the hardest hit areas vowed to work to reverse Secretary Cheney's recommendations. Some congressional Democrats charged that the new list was tilted against their districts or states. "There is treachery here, frankly," said Sen. John Kerry, D-MA. But Secretary Cheney insisted that "there is no political spin, if you will, involved in this effort." His assessment won important support from HASC Chairman Les Aspin.12

Failure to close military bases could recreate the "hollow force" of the 1970's, Secretary Cheney warned. This "hollow force" was a military with ships that couldn't steam, planes that couldn't fly, and troops who lived on food stamps. This situation stemmed in part from the post-Vietnam defense budget cuts, which were not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the size of the military infrastructure. "It is not my intention
to preside over a department as secretary where we let the quality of the force suffer the way it has in the past because we didn't have the guts to make the kinds of tough decisions that are required if we're going to protect and preserve the quality of the force," Secretary Cheney emphasized.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{THE COMMISSION PROCESS}

In January 1991, the initial cadre of the Defense Closure and Realignment Commission went into business in a suite of offices on Washington's K Street. "We intend, obviously, to take a total fresh look at the data and the work and the process that the Pentagon went through and render our own independent nonpartisan judgments," said Chairman Jim Courter. "This is not going to be a Washington show - this is going to be on the road, to make sure that people recognize that we know where they are. We want to be exposed to their legitimate concerns and legitimate arguments."\textsuperscript{14} Ironically, Chairman Courter, a former Republican congressman from New Jersey, while fighting to keep Fort Dix open, was the only member of a House Armed Services subcommittee to vote against the base shutdowns. In his new position, Chairman Courter vowed that his commission "will not play politics with America's national security." He promised "conscientious evaluation and absolute integrity."\textsuperscript{15} For example, despite having already successfully undergone a close review of his personal finances as part of the appointment
process, Chairman Courter later voluntarily canceled a $3000-a-month contract with the Grumman Corporation, a major defense contractor, to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest.16

Four concurrent activities provided the Commission with the breadth and depth of information that they sought. First, the Commission held 15 hearings in Washington, D.C., to receive information from DOD, legislators, and other experts. Second, the Commission actively sought public comments and perspectives by holding 14 regional and site hearings, where testimonials for bases under consideration were received. Third, one or more commissioners visited every major facility proposed for closure. Finally, the Commission's research staff reviewed the services' processes and data to ensure accuracy, fairness, and legislative adherence.17

WASHINGTON D.C. HEARINGS

Over two days, 150 lawmakers representing 30 states stepped up to the podium in hearing rooms on Capitol Hill to ask the Commission to take a hard look at their endangered local installations. Their lobbying techniques ranged from solo efforts to sophisticated group presentations by city/state delegations. Confronted with so many members seeking to plead their cases, the Commission allotted only 5 minutes per person and enforced the limit with a red light and a bell. Although accustomed to far greater deference, most members observed the
rule. Occasionally dogged determination and unbridled enthusiasm got the better of a presenter. For example, it took at least two bells and a gentle admonition from Chairman Courter before Representative McCollum, R-FL, wrapped it up. He had spent the better part of a month preparing his speech, and he wasn't going to let an arbitrarily assigned time limit deny him his full opportunity and responsibility to defend the survival of the Orlando Naval Training Center.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{GAO REPORT}

"GAO considers the closure and realignment recommendations made by the Army and Air Force to be adequately supported," its congressionally mandated report concluded. It faulted the Navy for providing "insufficient documentation to support its efforts" and added that the Navy may not have gone far enough in paring its bases. "The Navy will have significant excess berthing capacity if only the recommended facilities are closed," the report said. The GAO said that the Navy's process appeared to be "biased in favor of keeping bases open." Some of the excess capacity was the result of the Navy's strategic homeporting program, in which naval bases were being built on the east, west, and Gulf coasts. However, the GAO did not study the individual bases and did not identify additional naval stations that it thought could be abandoned.\textsuperscript{19}

The GAO said that the Army's base selection process was "well
supported." The Army proposed closing six large bases, a depot, and a research facility. The GAO said that the Army based its decisions primarily on the military value of its bases, but also considered how long it would take for the cost of closing each base to be recovered and the economic and environmental impacts.

The Air Force proposed closing 14 air bases. The GAO said that the Air Force's "rationale was adequately supported by documentation." The Air Force evaluated its bases first in terms of capacity and whether mission-essential, and then on the basis of about 80 other criteria, the GAO reported.

Auditors found that each of the services failed to translate all cost and savings estimates into 1991 dollars. "These errors could reduce the estimated annual savings and lengthen the payback period" for some closures, the agency said.

The GAO also criticized DOD, saying that the department did not give explicit enough instructions to the services. "Although recognizing that differences exist in the composition and function of each service's bases, GAO is concerned that DOD's guidance allowed estimating processes and cost factors used by the services to vary," the report said. DOD did not actively oversee the services as they drafted proposals for closures and realignments, and what guidance DOD did provide was applied differently by each service, the GAO said.

COMMUNITY INPUT
The affected communities were innovative and energetic in defense of "their" bases. During the 2.5 months of the reviewal process, the Commission received more than 143,000 letters and more than 100 daily phone calls. This unsolicited level of effort assured that the commissioners were fully apprised of all the arguments on behalf of the nominated installations.22

In Texas, Chairman Courter called the standing-room-only crowd of 1200 at the Will Rogers Memorial Complex the largest of any of the four public hearings held up until that time. Governor Ann Richards pleaded the case for all three Texas bases on the DOD closure list - Carswell AFB, Bergstrom AFB, and NAS Chase Field. The gathering heard the Carswell Task Force present its arguments and supporting statistics to the three commissioners present. "I would frankly be surprised if all the work, all the [Air Force] data were totally beyond reproach," Chairman Courter told the audience. "Based on what I heard here this morning, we certainly have to go back and ask the Air Force some questions."23

Chairman Courter also went to Philadelphia to tour the Naval Shipyard, which employs about 10,000 people. "You don't fix what isn't broken," Mayor Goode told Chairman Courter before the tour. "There are a lot of congressmen and mayors who feel grieved that their facilities have been targeted for closure," Chairman Courter said. "There are a number of factors that will go into the ultimate decision, and most will deal with money and what is essential for the future of the country. We are going to have
less ships in the future, and so we need fewer facilities. The argument that the Philadelphia shipyard is the most efficient is not contested by anybody." But he said that that isn't the only factor, noting that the yard is not equipped to handle nuclear-powered ships, which would play a significant role in the Navy's future plans for shipyards.24

Two commissioners said that their visit to the Naval Training Center and Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego corrected several misconceptions concerning the bases' growth potential and the value of their location. Commissioner Calloway said, "The city made a very persuasive case for collocating [the fleet] with the training center," a fact that came as a surprise to the two panelists. They also acknowledged that encroachment was not nearly as big an impediment to the facilities' expansion as they had previously been led to believe.25

New York State and New York City officials presented conflicting economic analyses and assessments of public opinion to the Commission regarding the Staten Island homeport. The disagreement over the port's costs, benefits, and safety pitted Governor Cuomo and Senator D'Amato, R-NY, against Mayor Dinkins and Representative Weiss, D-NY. The mayor stated that the port would cost the city $85 million over the next 15 years and that it should be closed. He also opposed the port because nuclear-armed vessels might be docked there. Officials who wanted to keep the port open appeared to have found a supporter in one commission member. Commissioner Levitt said, "I have difficulty
in accepting the fact that the largest port in the nation would have no naval presence. 26

MacDill AFB supporters presented an intriguing argument. During the June 10 visit to the base, Chairman Courter and other commission members got an impromptu 30-minute briefing on top-secret operations at the base previously unknown to them. A closed session in Washington a week later added more weight. The U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) dazzling array of super-sophisticated communications and intelligence-gathering gear, which was the subject of the briefing, would be very costly to duplicate and/or move, according to the MacDill Response Team chairman. 27

MENU OF OPTIONS

On May 31, the Commission announced that it was adding 35 installations to the base closure and realignment list in what it called a "menu of options," containing 20 Navy, 6 Air Force, and 9 Army facilities (see Table 2). Adding the new bases didn't necessarily mean that they were going to be closed, said Chairman Courter. To do a thorough job of deciding which bases should be closed, the Commission found it necessary to consider bases in addition to those selected by the military, he said. 28 In most cases, the Commission's new list included bases with missions similar to the bases on the original DOD list.

By expanding the list of candidates for closure, the
Commission also signaled its intention to consider more closely the geographical and political issues raised by the prospect of the most sweeping base closing action since World War II. The inclusion of several large naval facilities on the west coast, for example, gave the appearance that it was intended to diffuse complaints by the Pennsylvania and New Jersey congressional delegations that the Pentagon unfairly intended to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The inclusion of more Navy facilities than the Army or Air Force combined was attributed by some analysts to the apparent lack of enthusiasm that the Navy had shown for scaling back.

General Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, let his concerns be known that closure of four of the latest additions to the closure list could be "disruptive" to the military's sea, air, and recruitment operations. In response to two letters from OSD relaying the general's points, Chairman Courter said that the letters did not raise any issues that the Commission had not already considered regarding the subject bases.

STAFF REVIEW

The Commission established four review-and-analysis teams - Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special - to evaluate the services' data and processes. Each team focused on service adherence to statutory requirements. Each team was made up of at least two
service representatives, an analyst from the GAO and other
government agencies, and others hired by the Commission. Two of
the three service teams were headed by members of the military on
loan from the Pentagon. The Navy team was headed by a civilian
engineer hired directly by the Commission and who coincidentally
was a captain in the Naval Reserve.

The Army team determined whether the Army considered all
bases and whether its categorization of bases and use of
attributes were sound. The team did this by comparing the
"measures of merit" and attributes developed by the Army to the
eight selection criteria. The team then ensured that the Army's
proposals in terms of the capacity to house its forces in 1995
were in consonance with the DOD force-structure plan.

The Navy's selection process was more subjective and less
documented than either the Army or Air Force inputs. To
determine Navy compliance with all statutory requirements, the
staff director and the review-and-analysis team held a series of
meetings with members of the Navy's Base Structure Committee and
other high ranking naval officers - including the heads of naval
aviation, surface warfare, and personnel and training. The Navy
significantly supplemented the data originally available to the
team. With the GAO's assistance, the team analyzed several
hundred items of data for 29 domestic naval installations.
Additionally, the team examined in detail the Navy's ship
berthing capacity for compatibility with the DOD force-structure
plan.
The commission's Air Force team initiated its investigation by matching the Air Force bases' capacity to updated manpower documents. Then the team examined the categories and subcategories used by the Air Force to compare bases for fidelity of purpose and compatibility with all eight DOD selection criteria.\textsuperscript{31}

The commission staff prepared prior to the final voting three-columned comparisons of all relevant data for each base recommended for closure, representing the DOD's position, rebuttals by the communities, and the evaluation of the staff itself.

THE RESULTS

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended to the President on July 1, 1991 that 34 facilities be closed and 48 activities be realigned (see Table 1). These actions were anticipated to result in a FY 1992-97 net savings of $2.3 billion after one-time costs of $4.1 billion, with a subsequent annual savings of $1.5 billion.

The Commission, which had added 35 candidates for closing to the April recommendations made by the Pentagon, ended up voting to close only bases initially recommended by DOD. The Commission voted to keep open four major bases which DOD had nominated for closure: NAS Whidbey Island in Washington, Fort McClellan in Alabama, Moody AFB in Georgia, and Orlando Naval Training Center.
in Florida.

The decisions came after eleven and a half hours of televised deliberation and several split votes, in which the commissioners debated with one another over whether to preserve Carswell AFB in Fort Worth and England AFB in Louisiana, among others. The commissioners sat in open session on June 30 discussing, debating, and finally casting their fateful votes. It was high drama, and a rare display of decision-making in the open. And in the final polling, the commissioners had only their consciences to guide them. Objectivity was the goal; a degree of subjectivity was undeniable.

The biggest departure from DOD's closing recommendations was the decision to reduce or consolidate the headquarters and regional offices of the Army Corps of Engineers, which the Pentagon had deleted from the Army's recommendations. Members of Congress had argued that the future of the Corps should rest with the public works committees in the House and Senate, not with the Commission. Instead, the Commission set a deadline for lawmakers, voting to realign the Corps operations beginning in July 1992 unless Congress acted before then (since amended, see Epilogue).

Chairman Jim Courter said that the panel had "improved" the Pentagon's list. He also said that more bases should be recommended for closing by the Commission when it reconvenes in 1993. "This is one large crack at the apple," he said.32

The Commission's report to the President urged DOD to consult
with Congress about the future use and need for military hospitals prior to the next commission convening in 1993. The Commission's deliberations included much discussion of the problems created when hospitals were to be eliminated as part of a base closing (see Epilogue).

In its report, the Commission also noted that several of the installations scheduled to be closed bore the names of American heroes such as President Benjamin Harrison, astronaut Virgil "Gus" Grissom, and World War I pilot Eddie Rickenbacker. The Commission called on the President to find some other way to commemorate them.33

**EPILOGUE**

On July 10, 1991 President Bush approved the recommendations of the Commission.

On July 30, 1991 the House of Representatives crushed a resolution to keep the bases open by a vote of 364 - 60 and thus brought the legislative process to a close. A resolution to block the base closures was still pending in the Senate, but the House action rendered it moot since both chambers of Congress would have had to vote to block the closings to stop the closure process.34

Two remaining roadblocks to the closure of bases were lawsuits filed separately by members of a Pennsylvania delegation and a Maine delegation to block the closures of the Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard and Loring AFB respectively. A U.S. district court in Philadelphia ruled in favor of the government and the Pennsylvania delegation filed a subsequent appeal.

Congress made the following minor adjustments to the base-closing review process:

* Required the President to submit in January 1993 and 1995 a complete list of his nominees of commissioners for each year's base closure commission for Senate confirmation.

* Added one month to the Commission's review of the Pentagon's list of bases recommended for closure or realignment by requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit his recommendation by March 15.

* Required the Commission to publish no later than June 1 a listing of any facilities being recommended for addition to the Secretary's list and then to hold public hearings on the proposed change.

* Regarding DOD detailees on the staff:
  - may comprise no more than 20% of the review-and-analysis staff,
  - may not be assigned as a team leader,
  - performance cannot be evaluated by DOD for the period of the detail,
  - cannot have worked on the development of a DOD recommendation during the 12 months prior to being detailed.

* Excluded Army Corps of Engineers civil works activities from review by the Commission retroactive to November 5, 1990, thus
negating the Commission's recommendation for Corps realignment.

Additionally, Public Law 102-190 of December 6, 1991 reaffirmed that the Commission recommendations could not be challenged in court.

Congress directed DOD to conduct a comprehensive study of the military health care system and submit a report no later than December 15, 1992.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installations</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Vote*</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FT BENJAMIN HARRISON</td>
<td>INDIANA</td>
<td>7-0</td>
<td>CLOSURE, (2), CLOSE BLDG DOD WANTED OPEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORT CHAFFEE</td>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>6-1</td>
<td>CLOSURE</td>
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<td>5-2</td>
<td>CLOSURE</td>
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<td>FORT DIX***</td>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>7-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORT MCCLELLAN***</td>
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<td>5-2</td>
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**AIR FORCE**

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**NOTES:**
* COMMISSIONER LEVITT ABSENT FROM SOME VOTING SESSIONS; COMMISSIONER SMITH ABSTAINED ON NAS MOFFETT VOTE.
** NUMBER(S) IN PARENTHESES IS THE SELECTION CRITERION NUMBER FROM WHICH THE COMMISSION FOUND THAT DOD "SUBSTANTIALLY DEVIATED."
*** COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION DIFFERENT THAN DOD.
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**NOTE:**
* COMMISSIONER LEVITT ABSENT FROM SOME VOTING SESSIONS.
  COMMISSIONER SMITH ABSTAINED ON PASCAGOULA NAVAL STATION.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., 1-3.


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