THE RUSSIAN MILITARY
IN THE YEAR 2000

by

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and
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December, 1992

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Through the use of content analysis, this paper attempts to paint a picture of the Russian military in the year 2000 and its impact on the US national security strategy. The research begins by defining the origin of Russian national security policy and how that translates into military policy and doctrine. A framework for evaluating Russian military doctrines is provided with a chronology of the military reform process and the related doctrinal reforms that has its birth in the 1987 announcement of a "defensive-defense." Following from the doctrinal variant framework the new strategic missions of the 1992 draft military doctrine are presented with an analysis that shows they are a clear departure from the past and truly a "defensive-defense" type doctrine. Additionally a comparison is made between the current military reform ongoing in Russia and the historical precedent of the Russian military reform of 1924-25. A rough outline of the separate branches of the Russian military both present and future is provided based on the ongoing trends in the reform process. This thumbnail sketch of the Russian military then assists in the analysis and conclusion that even after a possible 50% cutback in US military spending, in the year 2000 the conventional Russian military will not pose a threat to US national security. The major caveat to this conclusion is in the realm of nuclear weapons and this issue is therefore discussed in some length.
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ABSTRACT

Through the use of content analysis, this paper attempts to paint a picture of the Russian military in the year 2000 and its impact on the US national security strategy. The research begins by defining the origin of Russian national security policy and how that translates into military policy and doctrine. A framework for evaluating Russian military doctrines is provided with a chronology of the military reform process and the related doctrinal reforms that has its birth in the 1987 announcement of a "defensive-defense." Following from the doctrinal variant framework the new strategic missions of the 1992 draft military doctrine are presented with an analysis that shows they are a clear departure from the past and truly represent a "defensive-defense" type doctrine. Additionally, a comparison is made with the current military reform ongoing in Russia with the historical precedent of the Russian military reform of 1924-25. A rough outline of the separate branches of the Russian military both present and future is provided based on the ongoing trends in the reform process. This thumbnail sketch of the Russian military then assists in the analysis and conclusion that even after a possible 50% cutback in US military spending, in the year 2000 the Russian military will not pose a threat to US national security. The major caveat to this conclusion is in the realm of nuclear weapons and this issue is therefore discussed in some length.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper attempts to paint a picture of the Russian military in the year 2000 and then to show the impact a reformed Russian military will have on the security of the US. The authors researched original source material from the former Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation. The source material included the writings of non-governmental officials as well as military and political leaders. From these sources the authors attempt to portray the trends and final destination that the current Russian military reform will arrive at in the year 2000. Then the probability that this military could pose a threat to the security of the US is explored, especially in light of current and proposed US defense cutbacks.

The authors first provide an explanation of the origin of Russian national security policy that is still in the process of being redefined since the dissolution of the Soviet State in December 1991. The Russian national security policy is being formulated in a new geo-strategic environment and this section explains the impact of both the conservative and reform minded individuals in the government.

Next, due to the importance that history plays in the Russian military planning, a historical predecessor to the current military reform is examined. The military reform of 1924-25 contained both interesting parallels and differences
compared with the current reform, and these are duly examined. The comparisons are examined primarily in the areas of the new geo-strategic environment and the impact of economics upon the reforms.

A rough sketch of the future missions and structure of the Russian armed forces is provided in order to lay the groundwork for an examination of the new national security strategy of the US. The authors then examine this strategy and the impact of the Russian military upon it. It is determined that the US will continue to be able to ensure its own security vis-avis the Russian military even with a 50% cut in the US defense budget. An appendix dealing with the Russian military budget is included because of the critical role that economics is playing, and will continue to play, in Russia.
I. INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union has left serious questions for US national security planners as to the fate of the armed forces of the once great Soviet Empire. US national security strategy has for the last fifty years dealt with the threat from the Soviet military machine. Now that the USSR has formally been dissolved what are the implications for future US national security planning? Are there any signs of a threat from Russia that will prohibit US defense budget cuts of as much as 50%? The republics that have emerged from the former USSR still possess formidable military might that is not only in search of a mission but an identity as well. While it is true that President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the United States and Great Britain are no longer the enemy, it is still prudent for US programming and war-planning purposes to study the evolution of the Russian military machine for three important reasons.

First of all, there still remains a considerable nuclear arsenal on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Even with arms control measures such as the START treaty, the capability of Russia to attack the US is still very real. Additionally, the latest agreements between US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin concerning further nuclear reductions have yet to be formalized and are under attack from the "hardliners" in Russia as well as some conservatives in the US.
Secondly, there is a distinct possibility that Russia might play a military role in a regional crisis that would force a military response by the US. Evidence that this type of scenario is a distinct possibility can be found in the Washington Post and New York Times story of February 1992 that disclosed US government plans for some seven different hypothetical scenarios that the US military might respond to. Specifically the so-called "Lithuania" scenario describes a Russian intervention in the Baltics which escalates and eventually a US/NATO military force responds in kind. Whether this is a credible scenario is open to question, but the fact that it was postulated at all makes it logical for the US to study the Russian military.

Lastly, as part of our published national security strategy, the US military must retain the capability, often with little warning, to demonstrate US commitment and, when necessary, to fight. A re-emergent reconstituted Russian military could possess the capability to threaten the vital interests of the US. The national military strategy continues by explaining:

It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically demonstrated by recent political and military crises in Liberia, Kuwait, Somalia, Iraq, and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and in the Philippines.  

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But more specifically the national military strategy goes on to say that:

We will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one emerge. However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.

This concept is closely related to the aforementioned article which was leaked from the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and defined the danger of a generic "resurgent/emergent global threat" (REGT) developing:

Into an 'authoritarian and strongly anti-democratic' government over about three years, beginning in 1994. After four or five years of military expansion, the REGT is ready to begin 'a Second Cold War' by the year 2001, or launch a major global war that could last for years...

The usual western practice of analyzing the military of the Soviet Union in the past was accomplished by observing a combination of primarily three different factors: literature, hardware, and exercises. The breakup of the USSR, has made the usual practice difficult. The previous monolithic nature of the Soviet Union made it simpler to study, largely due to its predictability, fairly strict adherence to doctrine, and hierarchical nature. There are several reasons why this is no longer the case.

First, the multitude of forces impacting on the power structures of the government have left the usual state of redundancy of foreign policy and military affairs quite unpredictable. Secondly, large scale exercises of the Russian military are now almost non-existent, with almost no forthcoming development of new equipment and hardware. The only alternative then is trend extrapolation, an in-

ibid. II.
depth analysis of literature, and examination of the remaining hardware despite the vast reductions in the Russian military.

Total dependency on literature, content analysis, and trend extrapolation for short term projections have their faults. An example of this problem with content analysis is the explanation given in the West for the firing of Marshal N. V. Ogarkov in 1984. Some Western experts claimed that Ogarkov was fired because of his outspoken criticism on cutbacks in the military budget and his support for increased spending on conventional weapons. On the other hand, his departure might have only been a simple retirement with no underlying reasons. Conversely the "military revolution" of the 1950's appears to have been accurately analyzed, although after the fact, through the use of formal content analysis. Today, the absence of other traditional methods of analysis mentioned above necessitates concentration on what the Russians, civilian and military, are publishing in the open literature.

As the year 2000 approaches the Russian military will have evolved beyond the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form, that may or may not come into competition with the US military. Therefore this thesis will explore the possible form of the main inheritor of the military assets of the former Soviet

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Union, which is Russia. The question, which this thesis proposes to explore and hopefully to answer, is whether the reformed Russian military in the year 2000 could pose a threat to the security of the US. We will attempt to answer this question in light of the ongoing and future proposed reductions in the US military.

To construct a composite of the Russian military in the year 2000 this thesis will first provide an analysis and definition of the current policy, doctrine, and strategy of Russia. Next there will be an analysis of the current military reform in relation to a historical predecessor, which will then lead to some general outlines of the different branches of the Russian military for the year 2000. Lastly, there will be a discussion on the new US national security strategy, and the implications to that strategy, in light of the facts and analysis presented. Additionally, an appendix that covers the Russian military budget and other economic considerations of the military is provided because of the crucial role the economy will play in Russia’s future. The research for the above stated goals will be based on data available till the end of October 1992.
II. RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY

A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICY

One of the chief concerns of any nation is its security. Without security it cannot ensure its very own survival let alone its continued prosperity and development. National security and military policies are the means that most nations use to set the priorities for securing this desire to survive and prosper. For the USSR the chief guarantor of security was the military strength of the nation/union. In Russia, now, that axiom is open to question. It is with this uncertainty that we will begin to examine national security and military policies for the future of Russia. National security policy will determine military policy in the future, thus the need to study both before we can make any suppositions as to defense policy of the year 2000.

To understand the important changes in security policy that are occurring in the Russia it is necessary to examine the policy definitions and past practices of the USSR. From this perspective the current debate in Russia will be more understandable and some useful projections will be able to be drawn for the future. The chief areas to examine are the political, diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of national security and military policy making. The degree to which these different areas affect the entirety of policy-making is significant and can be seen in the different periods of the Soviet era. Therefore, after some
definitions, we will trace the historical path that these policies have taken and then relate it to the debate of today.

National security policy can be described as the planned effort of a nation to protect and achieve its national interests and objectives. All nations have some interests and objectives that are essential to its character and survival as a distinct entity. How they choose to safeguard these is a function of the national security policy of that nation. The US for instance has a published a National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. In the USSR there was no separate national security policy, it was a constituent part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) total policy and it was overwhelmingly dominated by military policy. Military doctrine was derived from that military policy and equates to what we in the US would call a national military strategy. In Russia now, with the CPSU gone, there is growing recognition of the need for an over-arching national security policy with military policy subordinated to it. One Russian official has stated that the "concept of security of ideology is now being replaced by the concept of national security." Other aspects of security such as

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This comment was made by Sergey Stepashin the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and Security Affairs. Sergey Stepashin, "On the Future Defence Policy of Russia," RUSSIA Journal, April 1992, p. 35.
economics and environmental concerns are receiving more and more attention as the concept of national security expands.  

In the Soviet Union the higher and driving force for military doctrine was military policy, this will not change in Russia. Therefore to study the Russian military of the future, which will be done from a doctrinal context, we need to examine the military policy and the growing national security policy of today. Several definitions of military policy will be useful at this point. *Voennymy Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar* (VES), the Soviet military encyclopedia in 1978 defined military policy as follows:

Military policy, the relationships and activity of classes, states, parties, and other social-political institutions directly related to the creation of a military organization and the preparation and employment of means of armed violence to achieve political goals. In its essence and content, military policy acts as a component, organic part of the overall policy of classes and states. ... Military policy has as its primary object the sphere of people's social activity, which is directly connected with war and with its preparation and conduct. It is aimed at the creation and employment of the state's military might."

In the 1986 edition of the VES the definition of military policy had changed somewhat to include "the defense of revolutionary achievements and social

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progress, strengthening peace and avoiding nuclear-missile war". Christopher Donnelly also helps define military policy for us in his book Red Banner where he sets the place of military policy in overall Soviet policy:

...the Soviet (Marxist-Leninist) view of war holds that war is the continuation of policy by violent means; it is the continuation of domestic as well as foreign policy, it is fought primarily, but not exclusively, with armed forces; it is also fought by other means, economic, ideological, diplomatic, etc. It is policy therefore which plays the determining role in military doctrine. Policy provides the reason for going to war and influences the ways of waging it. It also influences the planning and conduct of war, determining, for example, when, where and how hard to hit the enemy.11

With these definitions in mind it is easy to see that the importance of military policy cannot be overstated. The definition of the policy has changed through the years as well, leaving the future policy of Russia open to question, especially as the ideological component from the Soviet era has disappeared.12

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That disappearance along with the changed economic, diplomatic, political, and military situations leaves many options open to the present day leaders of Russia. If a national security policy is developed, then it will probably take on a much broader scope than past security thinking which was usually narrowly defined in terms of the military policy of the CPSU. However these options will still derive from the historical precedents set by previous military policies. Therefore we now turn to the historical precedents for some illumination of today's debate.

1. Historical Background

In studying the military policies of the Soviet era we must first note that "policies" is indeed the correct word, for security planning and military policy have gone through changes throughout the period. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland in their article "Soviet Perspectives on Security" use the periods of the different leaders as convenient breakpoints for the changes that occurred in Soviet security thinking. They also state that the military component of power for the USSR "has long been considered the principal means of assuring survival and the creation of conditions in which the regime can pursue its domestic and other aims". This assertion that the military component of security was the dominant area of Soviet security thinking ties the study of national security policy and military policy together. From this point it will be the practice

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to use this theme as the outline of security policy for the Soviet state, although this is changing since the collapse of the USSR as we will see later.

The initial period of Soviet security thinking coincides with the revolution and its immediate aftermath. Lenin's belief in the spreading of the revolution and the inevitability of clashes with the capitalists were put into practice as the Bolsheviks attempted to spread revolution. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland see this as the impetus behind the linking of regime and national security. If the revolution was to succeed on a broader scale the society and state where it had already succeeded must be preserved for all to see. A traditional sense of survival was beginning to take hold. This has also been defined as the beginning of the era of isolation of the Soviet Union from international systems, an important factor in future security policies.

The Stalinist era continued the transition of Soviet security concerns to more traditional modes not so deeply associated with the spread of revolution. The traditional needs of physical security of the borders and territories coupled with the desire for regime security and to a lesser extent the desire to spread the revolution, led Josef Stalin to expand his borders and enter into alliances of convenience to ensure the Soviet Union's security. It can be seen that in this

"Ibid, 224.


Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, 226-7.
period that the primary emphasis of national security and military policy was directed against local, territorial, and regional threats. The chief concern of Stalin lay on his borders and within the regime itself. The economy after the revolution and civil war was in poor shape. The New Economic Policy (NEP) made a positive impact in the latter 1920's but this was cut short by other policies of Stalin, like collectivization. The collectivization of agriculture and forced industrialization would have a serious impact upon regime security, both good and bad. The rise of other power centers on the periphery and internal uprisings were of great concern also. Stalin even went so far as to ally himself with Germany and call for nationalism to defend the *rodina* when they attacked.

The question of whether the action of gaining buffer states and an expanded security zone actually made the USSR more secure by the end of the Stalinist era is open to debate. The direct confrontation with the West, the rearming of Germany, the Korean conflict and many other aspects of the cold war can be seen as not in the Soviets' interest. It is also extremely interesting that this situation bears some resemblance to the state of Russian security today. This will be examined more later.

The Khrushchev era has been seen by many scholars as the era when Soviet security concerns switched from strictly regional to more global, and with less of a concentration upon the military aspects of security. Seweryn Bialer

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*iibid, 232.*

*iibid, 231.*
presents an interesting argument that the desire for "total security" initiated by Stalin was not changed at all by Nikita Khrushchev's changes in military policy and ideology. The expansion of this concept of "total security" to a global scale may in fact have sown the seeds of destruction by laying the foundation for bankrupting the nation by competing with the West for this supposed "total security".\textsuperscript{14}

Some of Khrushchev's changes were significant such as his assertion that war was no longer inevitable between socialism and capitalism. While this had always been the Marxist/Leninist teaching, that war was inevitable, the effect upon policy of this shift was not enormous. The Soviets had to plan for the worst scenario - world nuclear war.\textsuperscript{20} Michael MccGwire asserts in his book \textit{Perestroika and Soviet National Security}, that another reason for the change in policy concerning the inevitability of war was the pressure of the huge defense budget on the Soviet economy. Saying that war was no longer inevitable and that nuclear war was taking precedence over conventional war were in fact arguments designed to allow the drastic reduction of the Soviet military.\textsuperscript{21}

Khrushchev had another method to replace the overdependence upon the military aspect of national security, going global through national liberation.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Bialer, 259.
  \item ibid, 100-102.
\end{itemize}
movements. The calculus for this policy called for encircling the capitalists, as they had encircled the USSR, and thus enhancing security at home by threatening the West from their blind side. While the logic of the policy was appealing, the practice was not so acceptable vis-a-vis Soviet security. The drains on the Soviet system from this global confrontation were very heavy and did not significantly weaken the West. It was a policy that in effect hurt more than it helped. This again fits the model that Bialer presents that the reaction of other powers to this desire for "total security" will in fact prove more detrimental to security than to not have embarked upon the policy at all.

With the fall of Khrushchev from power the emphasis on security turned even more towards military power as its chief guarantor. The military buildup under Brezhnev to ensure national security cemented the dominance of military policy in the national security architecture. Soviet military power grew immensely in the 1960-1970's and with this increased strength and sense of security some allowance was made for a "peaceful" approach to security through the detente initiatives. The attaining of military parity or even superiority with the US became a security goal of the USSR, despite the attempts at peaceful openings. The West responded to most of the Soviet escalations, with the consequent lowering of the benefit for security derived from the concentration on military parity. While the Soviets were indeed in a better position militarily it

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*Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, 232-233.*

*Bialer, 259.*

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was not a dominant position, and the other aspects of security such as economics and environmental safety were for the most part ignored. The peaceful solutions may have been the recognition by Brezhnev and friends of the problems brought on by military policy being dominant in security policy. In any event the status of the military and its impact on the security policy of the USSR was certainly great and of immense burden to the Soviet economy.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost would alter the security and military policy of the Soviet Union considerably. As Michael MccGwire states Gorbachev’s reasoning for the changes in security and defense policy were:

Democratization implied domestic destabilization, making a peaceful international environment absolutely essential. Economic perestroika would need assistance from the capitalist world. Both of these requirements meant that good relations with the United States became an imperative, rather than a policy option ... the two main obstacles were the size and shape of the Soviet armed forces and the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations. The former was by far the more important. ...economic perestroika, political democratization, changes in military doctrine, and new thinking in international relations became truly interdependent.

This explanation of the reasoning behind the changes made by Gorbachev makes it much easier to understand the changes themselves. The priority of economics driving the changes cannot be overstated, and this has serious implications for the changes occurring today.

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Some of the specific changes presented by Gorbachev are important for today and deserve some closer attention. Seweryn Bialer notes three specific areas of change that are especially significant:

The first is the idea of "nuclear sufficiency" which proclaims that nuclear buildup beyond mutual assured destruction is meaningless, and that a much lower level of nuclear weapons...will increase the security of both superpowers and the world. The second is the concept of "common security" (or "mutual security") that expresses in Soviet thinking a major departure from the practice of traditional Soviet defense policies. Gorbachev's redefinition of "national security" also concerns the inclusion of factors that are not directly military. The most obvious broadening of the notion...concerns economic power.26

These changes were of fundamental importance in the formulation of security and military policy under Gorbachev. All three carry over their importance into the post-Soviet era as well as some of the other concepts of his leadership. The concept of parity underwent a change from quantitative to qualitative paving the way for force reductions.27 The reaction of the Soviet military to the Gulf War and the success of precision guided munitions reinforced the movement toward quality over quantity.28 The change in the basic assumptions underlying security and military policy, the likelihood of war and

Bialer, 260.


the nature of war, from not inevitable and global nuclear, to not possible and conventional were key to the planning process for Soviet leaders.\textsuperscript{24} The change in Soviet doctrine in 1987 to include the prevention of war as a key goal of the Soviet military flows from these changed assumptions.\textsuperscript{30} And finally the concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and a defensive military doctrine allowed the reductions Gorbachev required and the lowering of tensions with the West.\textsuperscript{31} The broadening of the definition of national security to include the strong emphasis upon economics harkens back to Krushchev's attempts to lower the burden of the military on society. This emphasis continued after the Soviet Union dissolved and is the primary factor affecting the Russian military today. These concepts also carried over into the post-Soviet era and are helping shape the debate today. With these concepts to use as a reference point let us now turn to the post-Soviet debate on national security and military policy.

2. Post-Soviet Era

The events in Russia since the coup have been making the news on an almost daily basis. The obvious reason for the attention of the press is the instability of a nuclear armed super-power government as perceived by the rest of the world. The end of this military monolith has left an armed forces that was deployed world-wide in complete disarray. The majority of heads of state of the

\textsuperscript{24} McCrawire, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{30} ibid, p15.
\textsuperscript{31} Garthoff, 72.
new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Russia specifically, have been searching for the magic formula capable of maintaining a facade of unity.

Since the attempted coup in August of 1991 and Gorbachev’s departure in December 1991 the pace of events has been lightning quick compared to the past 74 years. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Slav States (Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus), met in Minsk to denounce the Treaty of 1922 which had created the Soviet Union.³² In Minsk the leaders also signed three documents, the first of which established a Commonwealth, with membership open to all former Soviet republics. The key part of this document was the agreement of single control of the nuclear arsenal. The second document laid out the principles tying the Commonwealth together with areas of cooperation. And the third document gave guidelines governing the coordination of economic activity. The most obvious omission was the lack of agreement on policy. Additionally, the Muslim states were conspicuously absent in Minsk. Then on December 21, in Alma Ata the Slav states, the five Muslim states, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, met and drew up a protocol which established the Commonwealth of 11 independent states (only Georgia and the Baltic nations remained outside the Commonwealth).³³ Also at the Alma Ata meeting was a declaration reaffirming Marshal of Aviation, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, former USSR Minister of Defense, (Stephen Foye "A Disgruntled Officer Corps Threatens Future Discord," FPS RL Daily Report, February 2, 1992.)
as Commander-in-Chief of the joint Commonwealth Armed Forces, pending their reorganization. Many other agreements were signed concerning ecology, control of airspace throughout the Commonwealth, transport and tariffs, exploration and use of space, and sharing out the former USSR property abroad. There was an agreement for a joint strategic nuclear command between the four nuclear states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) but no agreement was reached on single command of conventional forces. This was the high point of the Commonwealth.

Since the December summit, every other meeting of the Commonwealth states has been engulfed in controversy. Agreements on strategic forces that came out of summits on December 30, 1991 and February 14, 1992 failed to clarify the exact definition of these forces and left much room for the debate between Ukraine and Russia over division of forces.

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in Kiev on March 20, 1992 a more precise definition of the authority of the council of the heads of states placed policy, doctrine and nuclear strategy under their auspices. However the exact composition of the strategic forces could not be settled and Ukraine refused to sign a protocol on that issue. The situation for coherent policy formulation by the CIS has not improved since then.

It appears that the countries of the CIS have drifted into three different groups. The first group consists of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. This group of countries showed that they were prepared to remain in a union with Russia by signing the Union treaty proposed by former Soviet President Gorbachev. They have also signed agreements on subordinating general purpose forces to the CIS High Command and except for Belarus on collective security.

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The second group is comprised of the Baltics and Georgia, former republics that want a complete severing of ties to the old Soviet system. The third group consists of Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. This group has had many differences with Russia and has refused to sign numerous CIS agreements, including the collective security pact and documents on the joint armed forces, and have not approved the decision to create an inter-parliamentary assembly. Some of these problems have resulted from the division of the Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine, to the division of former Red Army assets for the establishment of national armies by member states. The death-knell of the Commonwealth for this third group was sounded when Russia decided to form its own armed forces in the summer of 1992 and subsequently Yeltsin appointed Colonel General Pavel Grachev to the post of Russian Minister of Defense.

As it stands now the Commonwealth exists mainly for the purpose of controlling the nuclear arsenal, for providing some economic interstate coordination (mainly for the first group mentioned above), and peacekeeping.

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forces. Once all of the nuclear weapons are destroyed or moved from the other three republics onto the territory of Russia, the Commonwealth will probably only exist for controlling peacekeeping forces and economic coordination.

Obviously the fall of the Soviet Union left security questions very much up in the air. With collective security being so difficult to implement among the newly independent states and Russia an examination of the post-Soviet military is important. What exactly are the national interests and objectives of the newly independent nations, most notably Russia? It seems logical that the development of security and military policy should conform to those interests, but no one was coming forward with a reasonable list of them. To be sure, the concepts of the Soviet era would carry over in Russian security thinking, after all the leaders of the new state were leaders in the old state in most cases, and all had been inculcated in socialism and its tenets.

The question of whether to create some kind of new union was answered to a great extent in the negative as we have already seen. Additionally the loss of allies in Eastern Europe, and the extreme difficulties it is having with Moldova, Georgia and especially Ukraine leaves the prospects of collective security on the western and southwestern borders unlikely for Russia. The CIS joint command of strategic forces is unlikely to provide the sense of security that
Russia hopes for in collective security agreements. This probably contributed to Russia's decision to create its own armed forces.

Clearly the issue of national security and military policy was one that had no ready answer but was of enormous consequence. We will look at the flow of ideas on security and defense policy to try and draw a coherent conclusion on the course of future Russian national security and military policy. We look specifically at Russia due to the overwhelming position she holds in the area and the vast majority of the military and security apparatus she possesses. In our look at Russia we will need to define her national interests to demonstrate on what principles her national security and defense policies will be based. Integral to this discussion is the examination of foreign policy and the question of expatriated Russians living in the former republics. We will also examine the state of the economy and the political landscape for their impacts upon policy formulation.

3. National Interests

The issue of national interests and objectives is central to formulation of security and military policy as we have noted previously. The May 1992 draft military doctrine of Russia states that:

The supreme goal of Russia's policy in the sphere of national security is to ensure favorable peaceful conditions for socioeconomic and spiritual
development and the creation of adequate living conditions for all its peoples.\textsuperscript{43}

This seems a relatively straightforward definition of objectives for Russian security policy. As far as enunciating national interests Colonel-General I.N. Rodionov, chief of the General Staff Military Academy, has divided interests into
global and regional categories. Globally he sees Russia's interests as:

- progressive development of civilization;
- strengthening economic, political, cultural, scientific and other relations with all countries;
- participating in existing international and regional organizations and creating new ones;
- contributing to strengthened peace and stability in international relations;
- and the establishment of it which would not rely on the domination and\textit{diktat} of one country or group with respect to other states, but on collective
resolution of urgent problems under UN auspices.\textsuperscript{44}

Rodionov then interprets these interests to include the neutrality of Eastern
Europe and the Baltics. The Baltics are also required to allow basing of Russian
naval forces and to guarantee the safety of the Russian expatriates living there.\textsuperscript{45}

However, the question of interests has, as Suzanne Crow puts it, become for Russia "much more complicated than that faced by the Soviet Union. Russia must now factor an entirely new region into its worldview, the former


\textsuperscript{44} "Colonel-General I.N. Rodionov "Approaches to Russian Military
Doctrine," Moscow, Voennaya Mysl, in Russian, Jul 92, Special

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
republics". Rodionov deals with this area in his regional view of national interests and states that "Relations with them are of paramount importance for Russia in the political, economic and military spheres". Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and President Boris Yeltsin have both addressed the question of interests with the need for such objectives as; a prosperous economy, observance of human rights, democracy, improved relations with the West, rule of international law, stability, no first use of force, lowering of confrontational nature of foreign relations, and good relations with the former republics. The Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship signed 17 June 1992 by Yeltsin and Bush codified this desire for better relations with the West.

The concern over Russian national interests was also addressed by Sergey Rogov of the United States and Canada Institute. Rogov in his 6 March 1992 article describes a concentric framework for delineating Russia's national interests. The first circle is stated as the relations with the former republics on Russia's periphery, which corresponds to Rodionov's regional category, and that

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'Rodionov, (JPRS) 3.

'Crow, 43-44.

Rogov sees as the primary interest of Russia. The second area seen by Rogov is the Near East, Far East and Eastern Europe. The last circle is the relations with Western Europe and the US. These last two circles would correspond with Rodionov’s global category of interests. Rogov states his belief that Russia has no pressing interests on a worldwide scale and the fear of foreign aggression on Russia itself is very low. Rodionov on the other hand sees the real military threat to Russia still existing and believes that the approach to security that states that there are no enemies of Russia is "profoundly erroneous".

This concept of the threat or danger to Russia is especially important to the formulation of policy for the future. Rodionov postulates four specific areas of threat to Russia: global nuclear war especially with the US; major conventional war, especially as the developed countries still posses such large arsenals; local wars on the borders of Russia and the CIS; and internal destabilization and uprisings on ethnic and religious grounds. Lieutenant-General N.P. Klokotov chief of the Strategy Faculty of the General Staff Academy went even further when he presented a conceptual framework for the topic of threat perception at the May Military-science conference. Klokotov addresses threat perception in terms of the status of the CIS and the Russian state:

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Rodionov, (JPRS) 4.

Ibid., (JPRS) 4-5.
disintegration into less developed countries; slow emergence from the economic
and political crisis it is now in with a gradual attainment of world power status;
and immediate recognition of Russia and the CIS as leaders in the world
community.⁵⁵

Klokotov then goes on to specifically delineate the threat of war in each
of these categories: in the first case he sees no major war by the US against a
weak and splintered CIS and Russia since the US can attain its goals through
other methods, but he calls for the study of low and high intensity conflicts on
the periphery; in the third case he sees no danger of a return to Cold War
confrontation or conflict; it is in the second case where he actually lists the
countries he sees as threats: the US, Germany, China, Japan, and the Muslim
world. In all of his cases it is worthy to note that he sees the US as the main
adversary.⁵⁴

The more reform minded civilian Deputy Defense Minister Andrei
Kokoshin has stated that the US and NATO are not Russia's adversaries and that
a "critical conflict zone" has developed in Central Asia.⁵⁵ Even President Yeltsin

Lieutenant-General N.P. Klokotov "Threat Perception for
Russia," Moscow, Voyennaya Mysl, in Russian, Jul 92, Special
⁵⁴This.

"Kokoshin, Dubynin on Strategic Forces in Byelarus," Moscow,
in Russian, Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program

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has declared that the US and Russia are no longer enemies. Despite this
difference in perception of the US threat, regional and internal matters are the top
concern of both conservatives and reformers. The use of a threat from the US
may very well be an attempt by the military to justify defense expenditures. The
concentration upon internal and regional threats has a direct affect upon the type
of policy to be followed. With the threat so close to home, a stable international
picture is critical.

The views expressed by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and Rogov are from the
moderate school of the current debate over national interests, those by Rodionov
and Klokov are from the more conservative school. This debate is closely
related to the question of orientation of Russian foreign policy, i.e. East or West.
The so-called "Atlanticist" faction is the one associated with Kozyrev and Prime
Minister Egor Gaydar and the other young reformers. The "Eurasianists" are led
by Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich. This faction calls for less
concentration on relations with the West and more concentration on relations with
Central Asia and the Moslem world. They see the tilt toward the West as having
gone too far and that it is ignoring the strong ties Russia always has had in the
Asian landmass. It is true that neither camp wants to totally renounce relations
or contacts with any part of the world, they just see Russian interests better

"BBC Asia Interview With Yeltsin," London, BBC Television
Network, in English, 2230 GMT 29 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-020, 30
served by their view of how to conduct foreign policy. The debate between the two camps would be merely a theoretical debate if not for the topic of the safety of Russian nationals living in the former republics.

The debate over Russian national interests, in the foreign policy arena, has been a major area of contention that separates the old line communists and nationalists, from the democratic reformers and the present government, one of the aforementioned expatriate Russians. The protection of expatriate Russians living in the former republics has the potential to redefine Russian national interests and therefore the security and military policy of the country as well. Sergei Stankevich of the Eurasian lobby has stated that the governments response to the Dniester situation has for example been "invariably dilatory, weak, and often, in my view, wrong". He goes on to say that, "all that this moderate line, ... promises the people of the Dniester Region is graveyard stability". This is the typical position of the opposition parties when looking at the government's programs to protect Russian nationals living in any of the former republics.

If the protection of these people is one of Russia's national interests then the question of how to protect them will have to be addressed in the security

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ibid.
and military policies. Significantly the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium did not include any reference to these expatriates in its statement and resolution on military priorities for the Russian Federation." While this is not an explicit military policy for Russia, it is the firm basis for the policy that is in formulation today. It is interesting to note that the conservative communist/nationalist faction of parliament has not had the influence to include this plank in the statement and resolution on military policy. Whether this signifies their weakness or some other agenda is unknowable at this point, however this subject will certainly be of great consequence in the future whichever way it is decided.

The debate over national interests has profound implications for the future of Russian national security policy and military policy. The goals and interests expressed by Yeltsin and Kozyrev hold sway as of now but there are areas of conflict and tension that could change composition of the government and therefore the policy that it will formulate. The questions of the expatriate Russians, and foreign policy orientation have already been mentioned. The other area of greatest conflict is of course the economy. The political battle over the economy has been underway since before the fall of the Soviet Union. The shock

of economic *perestroika* caused much discontent, but that was small when
compared to the political turmoil now underway in the country. The outcome of
Gaidar’s economic reforms and the political battle it has engendered are central
to what future security and military policy will look like. It is important to look
at the reform and how it will affect the formulation of policy. Once the economic
reform has been examined the political landscape will be mapped out to illustrate
where the power lies for the formulation of policy. With that accomplished we
will then attempt to define where security and defense policy are and where they
will likely go towards the year 2000.

4. Economy

In the Soviet Union the economy was structured for the sole purpose
of preparing the state for war. The ability to command the economy was crucial
to all Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev in enabling them to maintain the
military machine that was seen as the guarantor of the state’s security. That
command ability has now vanished and with it the underpinning of the military
might of the state. With market reforms the military may no longer be able to
count on the merchant marine fleet, Aeroflot or civilian trucks for transportation
in time of crisis. This may very well lead the government to establish programs
to deal with this as the West does, adding to the trouble of reduced budgets.
The economic restructuring underway now in Russia has in fact led to the greatest depression since the post-revolution era. The numbers that are reported in the press each day are mind-boggling by any standard, for example the price of a common basket load of foodstuffs has risen a reported 750% from December 1991 to September 1992. Inflation has been estimated for 1992 to be 8500% while GNP has dropped steeply with an estimated fall for the 1990-93 period of 40%. Repayment of foreign debt of the former Soviet Union is a serious problem, with Russia trying to reschedule their share of the already overdue payments. The value of the ruble continues its decline with the latest rate of 241 to the dollar quickly eating into the value of incomes and the ability of the state to conduct foreign trade. The news is indeed very gloomy.

However, there are aspects of the economy that are encouraging. The vast reserves of natural resources are a great positive for the future. Labor costs are low in relation to the rest of the world, and that labor force is fairly well

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Bush, 50.

educated. The population seems to be committed to reform also. Capitalist type free enterprise has appeared in many areas with the population selling a wide variety of goods openly. President Yeltsin has issued the decree on privatization coupons for a massive effort to involve the population in business ownership. The number of businesses privatized by the end of July was stated by the government to be 7,553, mostly of a small size. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and G-7 have also given conditional approval to the government's plans for reform, paving the way for the aid package put together by the West.

There are several problem areas though which offer serious concerns for the future of the reforms and of the government itself. The specific areas are; the need for foreign aid at a time of worldwide economic slowdown, the costs and feasibility of military-industrial conversion, the desire to increase arms sales at a time of an already very competitive world arms market, uncontrolled money supply and easing of credit controls by the head of the Central Bank, a lack of reform in the agricultural area, the slow pace of privatization despite the voucher giveaway, a decline in exports and imports and the consequent loss of revenue, supply interruptions accompanying the breakup of the Union, a steep drop in


industrial output, and looming unemployment for millions. This is not an all-inclusive list but it does go far in illustrating the wide range of problems still waiting to be solved in Russia.

The biggest problem facing the reform of the economy is pacing. The military-industrial complex, managers of state owned enterprises, and some labor unions have come closer together in a partnership trying to force the government to ease the pace of reform. This group is headed by Arkadii Volsky a military-industrial manager, described as one of the most powerful men in Russia. The group seeks a slowdown in the reforms or a "managed transition" to a market economy, and special treatment by the government to prevent the closing of factories, threatening massive unemployment and strikes if its demands are not met. This presents a very critical problem for the government’s reform program as the easing of credit and taxation of these industrial behemoths will fuel inflation past already very high levels. The power of this lobby is to be reckoned with. Yeltsin seems to be hearing the call of this lobby and has appointed more industrialists to government positions as opposition to the pace of reform has

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Bush, 53.


ibid, 4.

ibid, 3-5.
grown. Let us now examine the political spectrum to see where this challenge to the government fits in the overall picture.

5. **Internal Politics**

Since the fall of the USSR the political scene in Russia has become more and more fractured. The democratic forces that led the fight against the coup have separated into many different groups with varying degrees of support for the government and the rapid reforms it has put into practice. The many different parties range from the old communist and nationalists who have formed a "red-brown alliance", to the staunch supporters Yeltsin still has in parliament. The most notable political event of the past several months was the formulation of the Civic Union alliance. This alliance while ostensibly centrist has distinct disagreements with the Gaydar government and a clearly conservative tilt. The three heads of the alliance are the aforementioned Arkadii Volsky of the industrialist lobby, Nikolai Travikin of the best organized party in Russia, the Russian Democratic Party, and Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. This alliance professes its support for reform, democracy and Yeltsin but has much criticism for the Gaydar government and its methods.

Civic Union calls for the "managed transition" to a market economy that Volsky has espoused, a much more nationalistic trend in foreign and domestic policy, and stronger ties to the former Soviet Union republics through

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the CIS. The ability of this party to form a strong enough opposition to Gaydar's group while not becoming as overtly nationalistic as Zirinovsky or others of the "red-brown" faction, may well signal a basic change in how security and defense policy will be formed. This alliance is more chauvinistic in foreign policy than Kozyrev and more conservative in economic policy than Gaydar. With the larger place in security policy being taken by economics and the importance of relations with the former Soviet republics, the possibility of a less reform minded conservative security and military policy coming to the fore are strong. The real question is how long Yeltsin can or will withstand this push to the right by the Civic Union.

The other critical aspect of the political arena is the formation of the five member Security Council. The Security Council has the responsibility of:

Ensuring the realization of the functions of the Russian Federation president in managing the state, shaping domestic, foreign, and military policy in the sphere of security, preserving Russia's state sovereignty, maintaining sociopolitical stability and protecting citizen's rights and freedoms.

The power given to the council is enormous, it touches every aspect of Russian life. It has even been likened to the old Soviet Politburo. The membership of


the council is interesting also: Gaydar and First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Sergei Filatov, supporters of the radical reform program; Rutskoi and Security Council Chairman Yurii Skokov who are opposed to the radical reforms and are of a more nationalistic bend; and Yeltsin. This leaves Yeltsin as the fifth and hence deciding vote on any decisive issue, a tough spot for the President and one that may shift with the political winds. Not a position to be in for the formulation of coherent and lasting security and military policy.

The uncertainty of the political world in Russia, as well as the weak economy and halfhearted support at best for needed reforms leaves the question of security and military policy murky at best. What we will now try and do with this situation is to project where this confusing situation will go to facilitate our later construction of a model of the future Russian military.

6. Direction of National Security and Military Policy

National security and military policy in Russia appears to be expanding its definition and decreasing the importance or dominance of the military in security planning. This is in part due to the greater role that the economy has assumed in security thinking as well as the obvious decrease in tensions with the West. The decreasing role of the military in security policy as well as the dire economic situation of the country will lead to massive cuts in the military as well

"Yeltsin's Coup," The Economist, 1 August 1992, p. 41.
as strong attempts at military-industrial complex conversion to civilian uses. All of this is very reminiscent of Khrushchev and Gorbachev's policies. Arms sales will be used to bring hard currency into the country as much as possible but the decreased demand for Russian equipment will limit sales to a few select items, such as aircraft, ships and submarines. Much of this can also be drawn from inventory as the Russian military draws down.

The defense of the homeland will be the primary mission of the military establishment. The primary threat to this being seen as local and regional conflicts. Worldwide military commitments will not arise outside of the United Nations or other coalitions. Relations with the West will remain on a more or less positive level as it is definitely in Russia's interests to have no security concerns outside of its immediate region, and the influx of Western money is crucial to success of economic recovery whatever the pace of reform. Collective security under CIS auspices will be expedient for Russia in Central Asia but will not work in the West, most notably because of the differences with Ukraine. The question of defense of the expatriate Russians in the former republics is especially dangerous, all the more so if Yeltsin shows signs of shifting more towards the right. The major concern of the military will be with these peripheral conflicts which will not necessarily assume the character of war between nations but more

As we have attempted in the appendix to show the size of the military budget will decrease significantly. The actual size of the budget is unclear at this point but our postulated figure of 4.5% of GNP is in our opinion reasonable. It is worth noting that that is 4.5% of a GNP that has fallen by as much as 40% already.
that of civil and guerilla wars. The importance of the military in relation to society will decrease mainly due to the reductions and the overwhelming concern with the economy for most Russians. The concern for the social welfare of the servicemen will remain an important factor in Russian military policy, as the military is an important political constituency. Military doctrine will be promulgated but implementation of reforms within the military and the military-industrial complex will be slow and may not be achieved by the target date of the year 2000.

B. THE ROLE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

1. Introduction

Historically Soviet military doctrine was formulated from the military policy of the CPSU. Doctrine still applies not only to the concept of war itself but also to the entire Russian approach to warfare. According to Marshal Grechko, writing in 1975, and reiterated by Marshal Ogarkov in 1985, it is the function of military doctrine to establish:

- What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
- What is the nature of the war in which the State and its armed forces will have to take part?
- What armed forces are needed to perform the assigned missions and in what direction must military developments be carried out?
- How are preparations for war to be implemented?
What methods must be used to wage war?

These guidelines are still being utilized in Russia's search for the development of the correct and proper military doctrine for the country's defense. Additionally, it is from the prescribed doctrine that leads the way along which capabilities will follow. Military doctrine, derived from the military policy, is the master blueprint from which the armed forces will be shaped and built. Doctrine will define the size and structure of the armed forces and to ensure the integration of organizations, operational art, tactics and equipments, all of which enable the military forces to successfully wage war. In effect, doctrine is the glue that adheres politics to the military.

The term "military strategy", like all other Russian military terms, can be specifically defined. There is a great difference between doctrine and strategy and one method of defining it is:

...in wartime, military doctrine recedes somewhat into the background since, in armed conflict, we are guided primarily by military-political and military strategic considerations, conclusions and generalizations which stem from the conditions of the specific situation. Consequently, war is governed by strategy, not doctrine (emphasis added).\(^7\)

The quote is meant to emphasize the important relationship of strategy and doctrine, but it must be remembered that at all times in war and in peace, the actions of the government are guided by policy.

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Within the framework of strategy is the hierarchy of military art between high-level strategy and low-level tactics, and between these levels is the intermediate level of war - the operational level. The operational level of war is defined as the actions of a front or armies within a strategic theater striving to accomplish a strategic goal. The tactical level is defined as actions of divisional size units and below and includes the distinctive theory and practices of individual services and branches. Thus the term military art encompasses all three levels of warfare - strategic, operational, and tactical.

The "defensive" doctrine announced in the spring of 1987 initiated the military reform process of the then Soviet Union. Although today Russia is significantly different from the Soviet Union of 1987, many of the same military leaders and theorists that had laid the groundwork for the reform are still debating the issues in the press. Therefore, one can conclude that this reform process has and will play an important part in the future military-political landscape in Russia. The current reform process, which is an extension of the 1987 reform, resembles the military reform of 1924-25 because it is highly complex.

The correct Russian terminology for combat operations involving Ground, Air, PVO, and Navy uses the following scale:
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC = Front, Army, Group/Fleet/Air Defense District, OPERATIONAL = Army, Corps, Flotilla, and OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL = Corps, Fleet, Squadron.

and enigmatic. We will first analyze the factors impacting on the reform process associated with the lively debate that occurred after the 1987 public announcement of a "defensive" military doctrine, and then provide a useful framework for defining the Russian variants of military doctrine.

2. The 1987 Doctrine Reform

Although a new "defensive" doctrine was announced in 1987, there was not much public debate within the Soviet Union mainly because the effects perestroika and glasnost had not been fully felt by the Soviet society. The real debut of the reform debate was brought into the limelight by the September 1988 issue of the monthly magazine Twentieth Century and Peace. In this issue there was an enumerated round table discussion of the cadre-militia system. Participants in the discussion were members from the Main Political Administration (MPA), representatives of IMEMO and the Institute of the USA and Canada, and the journal International Affairs. The discussion centered on the basic question of: "What type of army do we need?" Some of the key issues that were raised by the participants included: How to understand the concepts of threat and security in the modern world? Whence the threat to the Soviet Union? Was it military, political, or economic? What did the Soviet Union need to meet

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This article is considered by many to be the first or one of the first discussing the new military doctrine.

this threat? What kinds of forces were necessary? These questions were not specifically answered in the article but they reappeared in almost identical context in the draft 1992 military reform text and have always been represented in some part of the formulation of doctrine in the Soviet Union. The presence of such a debate in the press managed to catapult the discussion of military reform into the forum of open public discussion and could possibly be seen as the basis for some of these questions in future doctrinal statements.

In November of 1988 LtCol Alexander Savinkin, who was part of the earlier round table discussion, published an article in the Moscow News titled "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?" In this article Savinkin accepted the premise of a "defensive doctrine" and went on to discuss the future structure of the armed forces. He presented the case that the USSR should adopt a cadre-militia system, consisting of "a relatively small, perfectly technically equipped, professionally trained and mainly voluntarily staffed military organization supported by a broad network of local militia formations." Savinkin's arguments were similar to those of Trotsky which were based on ideology and economics. Savinkin argued that a cadre system, founded on volunteerism, would

"Ibid., p.

LtCol Alexander Savinkin "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?" Moscow News, November 1988, no. 45, p. 1.

considerably reduce the military economic burden, and more importantly, that the reform is urgent because although the strength of the Armed Forces lies in its popular support, there is a "certain dislocation of relations between Soviet society and its armed forces." Savinkin blamed this dislocation on many factors including; the slower pace of perestroika in the military; the influence of the war in Afghanistan; and the lack of information in Soviet Society about defense policy and life in the armed forces.5

There was immediate reply from the military elite whom rejected the cadre-militia system for various reasons. The concept of volunteerism was attacked because instead of saving funds it would most likely increase military expenditures and furthermore, there would probably never be enough volunteers to man the large force that was outlined. The military elite were obviously still undecided on how large a force was needed for the defensive doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency." The opponents to a cadre-militia system went on to argue that if the armed forces consisted of a territorial-militia system and part-time soldiers, the majority of territorial militia troops would not be able to deal with the complexities of modern weapons and warfare. Savinkin defended his proposals with the help of the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" and "true" interpretations of the revolutionary experience. He explained that a proper application of Marxist-Leninist teachings mandates the replacement of a regular

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Holloway, op. cit., p. 17.
army with a militia. Furthermore, Savinkin explained, the establishment of a regular army during the civil war a temporary aberration resulting from the extreme circumstances of the times and was corrected by the military reform of 1924-25.

Another important article in the debate emerged in the late summer of 1990. Major-General V. Ivanov wrote an article titled "Proposed Reform of Armed Forces Outlined," in which he prescribed the reformed armed forces should consist of three contingents:

The first contingent comprising personnel, weapons, hardware, and military equipment and property will be kept in a state of permanent combat readiness and will always be ready for combat employment. It should combine nuclear and space-based weapons, the bulk of the Air Defense Forces, part of the Air Force, a specific section of the Navy and the highly-mobile Ground Forces. Its strength and composition could change depending on the military-political international situation and the economic situation in the country. In all cases, it should be sufficient in order to resolve a conflict in an individual region by emphasis on its defensive role and in order to ensure the deployment of the second contingent in the event of war. The second contingent will be the largest. It will include reserve personnel, weapons, hardware, and material and technical supplies intended for the formation of units, combined units, and large strategic formations in the event of war. Apart from the reserve elements, the units in this contingent will also include regular personnel. The latter will make up one-third of the first contingent. As regards the contingent's general numerical strength and composition, this will be determined by the strategic plans for the combat employment of the Armed Forces. The third contingent will focus on training and alternative service. Its principle function will be to ensure that all the country's citizens do regular military service on the basis of the Law on Military Service Obligation. Approximately 600,000-700,000 persons will make up this contingent. ...This contingent will be one of the main sources for bringing the first and second contingents up to full strength on a voluntary basis (according to contract) and in the transitional stage it
will be the main source. Civil defense units can be included in this contingent."

This article also made the point that the military needed to make transformation from the reliance of quantity to that of quality. Of the many problems plaguing the military, Major General Ivanov specifically identified cumbersome and overlapping forms of command and control of the different branches of the Armed Forces, poor maintenance of equipment, lack of social protection for servicemen, and lastly even a criticism of using the military to help with the agricultural work every year. This document was highly critical of the military and attempted to provide solutions for many of the problems the military had and also attempted to provide a rough outline of what the force structure of the military should be. Such specific proposals and public debate had never existed prior to this time.

3. Russian Variants of Military Doctrine

In mid-1988 Andrei Kokoshin (then a renowned civilian analyst and the current Russian Deputy Minister of Defense) and Major General Valentin Larionov put forth four variants that could be used in assessing the nature of future military doctrine for the USSR. These four variants were originally

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"Andrei Kokoshin and Valentin Larionov, "Counterpositioning Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniy World 46"
developed for evaluating the theoretical and schematic options that might be used for the draw down and stabilization of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. In evaluating the current reform package, the relevancy of the framework is still appropriate.

**Variant One:** Each side configures its forces to respond to an attack with an immediate strategic counteroffensive. Larionov and Kokoshin characterized this variant as one in which each side would "strive to transfer combat operations to enemy territory and airspace as rapidly as possible." This variant can be characterized by the Battle of Manchuria where the Soviet military pre-empted the Japanese with a attack that was a surprise on all three levels; strategic, operational, and tactical. The key to this operation was advances of between 30-80 kilometers per day in adverse weather over difficult terrain. Also much of the offensive was conducted at night with simultaneous operations. This variant was the predominant strategy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and apparently still has substantial support in Russia today, but is economically difficult if not impossible and geographically unnecessary. This variant is quite dangerous since once hostile actions are taken by one side or another, a chain of events could be unleashed that might inevitably lead to nuclear war. This variant is definitely not contained in the current draft doctrine.

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Variant Two: Each side renounces offensives in the initial stage of conflict and resorts only to defensive operations. This variant is best characterized by the Battle of Kursk in 1943. In Kursk, the Soviet Union absorbed the first blow and was on the operational defensive, shifted to a tactical counter-offensive, then they went to the operational counter-offensive, and eventually crossed the border in an operational-strategic offensive and fought and defeated the enemy on his own terrain. This variant is inherently less dangerous for escalation than the first variant, yet can still lead to nuclear actions through escalation. From the point of view of Kokoshin and Larionov, NATO's doctrine of flexible response falls into this category since a conventional war could eventually grow into a nuclear one. Additionally, the force structure needed for this variant is the same as that for variant one, thus making it less than satisfactory for the US.

Variant Three: Each side maintains forces sufficient only to rout an attacking formation on its own territory without initiating a counteroffensive beyond its own borders. This variant is epitomized by the Battle of Khalkin Gol of 1939 (or the third period of the Korean war), where General Zhukov pushed and ejected the invaders to the border but did not cross the border and carry the battle into enemy territory. General Zhukov was forced to do this since he did not have the capability to conduct an operational offensive. The danger in this variant lies in defining the size of the territory lost and whether each side will or will not agree to respond merely by restoring the status quo ante, and suppress
its thirst for vengeance. The advantage to this variant is that the force structure is observably different than that in variant two.

**Variant Four:** Each side agrees to settle for a purely defensive posture without any means for conducting offensive or counteroffensive operations. Napoleon's march on Moscow is the best historical example of this variant which could also be named "General Winter" or "Field Marshal Famine." In this variant, the enemy is attrited constantly with local/tactical counter-attacks, but defensive forces lack the military strength to eject or push the enemy back to his territory and cross the border. Kokoshin and Larionov suggested this was the variant that Gorbachev's doctrine should be. They also noted that such a balance "must not possess strike aviation or weapons that are sudden in effect (such as reconnaissance-strike complexes) or that have great mobility and striking power (tank and air-assault divisions)" - which were the main respective advantages of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They concluded that a military organized along the lines of this variant would constitute a genuine "non-offensive defense." in which "the concept of victory exists only on a tactical scale," and could be achieved by both sides.

4. **The 1990 Draft Military Doctrine and Reform**

The debate over doctrine, strategy and structure, was ongoing for the next eighteen months and finally resulted in the Ministry of Defense publishing a draft "law on defense" (which would codify the specifics of military reform). This law was then to be considered by the Defense and State Security committee.
of the Supreme Soviet. This draft military doctrine was published in a Special Issue of Voyennaya Mysl in 1990, and was a product of the public discussion of the previous two years. The draft stated that the content of the military reform is:

...creating a mechanism for ensuring national security and effective military organizational development and bringing the USSR Armed Forces into conformity with the level of real military danger and new political, economic and social conditions."

This military reform draft was then debated openly debated with the only real consensus being that the military should become "professionalized." There was still much disagreement on how large a military is needed for a doctrine founded on "reasonable sufficiency." It is important to note that the ongoing changes in Eastern Europe were having an effect on the debate by the "hawks" who were not happy with the loss of the military forces in the "buffer zone." The internal political struggles within the Kremlin were also pulling the military in different directions, as exemplified by the attempted coup in August of 1991.91

After the attempted coup, the question of military reform still remains and has probably moved to the forefront of any task facing Russia besides that of economic reform. The debate is still in the open forum and the Russian

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'Suffice it to say, most experts would agree that if the military had obeyed all their orders and performed their tasks as their superiors believed they would, the situation in Russia would be much different today.'
Ministry of Defense has published another revised draft military doctrine that superseded the 1990 draft. There are major changes in the content and some of the wording can be directly attributed to the new geo-strategic situation Russia finds itself in. Nevertheless, this new draft doctrine within the realm of military reform has been a matter for public discussion which until recently has been unprecedented in Russia.

5. The 1992 Draft Military Doctrine

The 1992 doctrine debate is just as lively as that which proceeded from the 1987 announcement of a "defensive" doctrine. A good sample of the public discussion on the reform process and the emerging doctrine and strategy can be found in almost any publication in Russia. For example, recently in the liberal newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta there was an article that was openly critical of the current military's forming of an overly aggressive doctrine and strategy which said:

Despite the large number of dangers and threats, the international situation for Russia on the whole now is more favorable than it has been at any other time in the 20th century. The main threats have shifted to within the CIS. There is no danger for example, that we are suddenly going to be attacked

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by American missiles or that the Bundeswehr is going to embark on a military campaign.\textsuperscript{34}

This open public discussion, with opinions coming from several government officials, is difficult to interpret due to the great variance in the tone and substance of the declarations. Obviously, some of the officials in the Russian government are pandering to the public's longing for the great imperial Russia, while other pragmatists are attempting to initiate genuine reform. This dichotomy of views can be seen clearly in the struggle between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Gaydar on one side, with Vice President Alexander Rutskoi and Arkadii Volsky (Head of the military industrial complex) on the other side.

Vice President Rutskoi is one of the many officials of the Russian government to discuss the reform process in public. Much of his interest in the military stems from the fact that he was a highly decorated fighter pilot in Afghanistan, and was probably put on the Yeltsin political ticket specifically to get the military vote. He does have the support of the military and sees eye to eye with the Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. Recently Vice-President Rutskoi outlined the three phases of military reform that he believes should take place. Although the term "three phases of reform" has been used frequently in Russian military literature in recent months, this outline was one of the most

specific yet outlining the reform schedule and agrees with the later published
draft military doctrine.⁶⁵

**First Stage** (during 1992): To set up the Russian Defense Ministry, while it obviously would be expedient to assign the functions of the General Staff to the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, with the subsequent withdrawal from its composition of the organ which will carry out the functions of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces Staff. To assume full jurisdiction over troops (forces) located on Russian territory and abroad, including troops on the territory of CIS states which do not form part of their national armies. To immediately create a system of social guarantees for servicemen and members of their families, as well as for persons who have either been discharged (including prematurely) from military service into the reserves or have retired on pension. It is important to speed up the elaboration and ratification of the numerical strength and structure of the Russian Armed Forces, and to define the procedure, stages, and deadlines for reforming and reducing them. Particular attention should be paid to creating a legal basis for the functioning of the Russian Army, taking due account of the norms of international law and the agreements reached within the CIS.

**Second Stage** (1993-1994): To continue reducing and reforming troops, and basically to conclude the withdrawal of troops onto Russian territory (from Germany, Poland, and Mongolia) and creating Armed Forces groupings. During this stage, it is necessary to stabilize the situation in the Armed Forces: To switch to a mixed acquisition system, combining the draft with voluntary entry into military service by citizens on a contract basis; to raise the prestige of military service through legal protection, preferential access to all material comforts, high wages in excess of, or commensurate with, those received in industry and taking account of the risk factor, and introduction of insurance policies providing not just an existence but a dignified life for servicemen and members of their families in cases of disability or death. The branch structure of the Armed Forces (Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense, Air Force and Navy) should be retained until the end of this stage. This will make it possible to preserve the existing system of command and control safety and

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combat ability while avoiding any extra expense. Clearly, at the least in the transition period, there is a need to retain military districts, given their important role in settling troops withdrawn onto Russian territory, organizing, and providing for them.

**Third Stage (1995-2000):** To completely withdraw the troops from the Northwestern Group of Forces (the Baltic countries). This process could be accelerated if these countries were to agree to reciprocal actions (that is, we leave garrison installations and housing facilities in the Baltic countries, and the Baltic countries build garrison installations and housing facilities in Russia for the troops being withdrawn.) Furthermore, it is necessary to complete the cutbacks in the Armed Forces in line with the START and CFE Treaties, and to reform them and transfer them to new organizational structures taking due account of the reorganization of the Armed Forces' branches and categories of troops. In particular, it is necessary to set about gradually reducing and reorganizing the command and control of military districts. And through this, to strengthen army and corps organs of command and control and their complement.

The predominant themes of this outline are the slow and methodical consolidation of former out-of-area Soviet forces onto Russian territory, combined with an orderly restructuring of the military from the top down. As one can see from this program, the Russian military has a very challenging task to complete by the year 2000. Also the timetable reference to the withdrawal of forces from the Baltics is being influenced by certain government officials wanting to ensure the safety and rights of ethnic Russians living in those countries. This is an ongoing point of contention between the Baltics and Moscow, and will no doubt continue in the near future.

The 1992 draft military doctrine appeared in a special edition of *Voenная Мысль* (Military Thought) in May. This draft was somewhat different
from the 1990 draft in that it was developed on the basis of defense documents that were approved by President Yeltsin and that it:

"...assumes cooperation with member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in accomplishing joint defense tasks based on bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental treaties and agreements."

The doctrine also includes the standard Soviet view that military doctrine is a "historical category" based on several factors, which include the state's domestic and foreign policy; its sociopolitical, economic, and geographic characteristics; and the level of development of science and production. Also the new doctrine adheres to the view that two integral parts of military doctrine are political and military-technical. The political aspect addresses issues such as the balance of forces in the world; the probability and sources of war; the sociopolitical dimension and goals of war; and the state's attitude toward war as an instrument of policy.

The military technical aspect is more concrete in that it defines the strategic assessment and planning; the employment and preparation of the armed forces; and the training, equipment and preparation of the armed forces. This doctrine like the 1990 predecessor, considers the political aspect to be more important than the military-technical aspect.

Not to be forgotten, is the possibility of another doctrine for the CIS joint forces. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turmenistan have announced
that they will form their own armed forces on the basis of the old Soviet army units that are deployed in their respective territories, but reportedly these units will remain under CIS joint command for several months. These joint forces will eventually become purely national forces but this transition is likely to last more than a few months, and consequently they will require a separate doctrine or these states will adopt Russia's new defensive doctrine. This concept does have a historical precedent since in the Civil War, such coalition forces existed.

The definition of a threat is key in formulating military doctrine, and this search has been ongoing in Russia. Some Russian literature implied that the prevailing mood of the Russian military was that the main threats to Russia existed mainly on the periphery and with internal conflicts. This view was immediately under attack when the Defense Planning Guidance scenarios were leaked in February of 1992. The so called "Lithuanian scenario" was directly aimed at Russia as was the definition of a possible future "re-emergent regional threat." The Russian literature immediately published responses to the article and the tone resembled the following excerpt:

...all the United States' actions and intentions unequivocally suggest that Russian is still its potential enemy, and only people totally devoid of patriotic feeling cannot see this.  

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This type of reaction in the open literature will no doubt have an impact on the future policy, strategy, and doctrine of Russia.

6. The New Strategic Missions of the Draft Doctrine

Previously the major strategic goals and strategic missions of the former Soviet armed forces were openly discussed in military literature. These had gone through visible changes in the past and US national security was influenced by these variations through the years. The traditional post World War II strategic missions of the USSR that were derived from military doctrine were clearly offensive. These missions were: (1) strategic nuclear strikes, (2) military operations (военные действия) in a land theatre, (3) defense of the nation from enemy strikes, and (4) military operations in a naval theater. The formula for defensive war in defense of the homeland could not be reduced to only defensive operations and it was necessary to defend one's land with offensive strategic operations (стратегическая операция) on foreign territory (variant one).

These strategic missions did not change greatly in the Brezhnev years. Since doctrine does serve as a blueprint for the development and strategy of military art this resulted in an armed forces organizational development practice which was clearly offensive.

Although there were attempts to conceal it, the offensive flavor of the military doctrine was present to the mid-1980's. The great change most likely occurred in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact that was adopted in May 1987. The new thesis of "preventing war and preserving peace" combined with
concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and a "defensive defense" appeared to be a clear departure from the previous offensive doctrine and strategic missions. The strategic missions in the mid to late 1980s were apparently changed to: (1) repelling enemy aerospace attack, (2) suppression of enemy military-economic potential, and (3) destruction of groupings of enemy armed forces. The missions included in the 1987 announcement and the draft doctrine that appeared in 1990 have been debated on both sides of the Atlantic as to their real meaning; defensive-defense or offensive-defense?

The new strategic missions of the 1992 draft doctrine has put that question to rest. Not only are the following missions defensive in nature, they also appear to be in harmony with the economic realities of Russia:

- (1) deterrence of a potential enemy from aggression;
- (2) the repelling of a surprise aviation-missile attack and protection of the main administrative-political and industrial centers and other important state installations;

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- (3) delivery of retaliatory strikes to deprive the aggressor of the opportunity to continue to conduct large-scale military actions, the disruption of his ability to reconstitute his armed forces, and the weakening of his military-economic potential;
- (4) the repelling of an invasion from land, sea and air, holding the most important areas of the country's territory, and the destruction of penetrating enemy groupings;
- (5) disruption of new attempts to renew the aggression.\(^\text{100}\)

These strategic missions and the doctrine they are derived from are clearly different than the pre-1987 strategic missions. Only the prevention of nuclear missile war has carried down from the previous doctrine (also the reference to high-technology is noteworthy).

Under this new 1992 defensive doctrine, James Tritten puts it best when he says "the revised military mission is to defeat the invading force and to prevent vertical and horizontal escalation or the escalation of the conflict over time." This is in compliance with the 1990 USSR draft and the previous 1987 announcement of a "defensive defense" but has visibly crossed the line into the defensive arena and does not even appear to include even a reference to an offensive-defense. Most importantly, the visible lack of emphasis upon the old theatre strategic offensive operations that warranted NATO and a strong US presence in Europe, is conspicuously absent. Admittedly, the authors of the 1992 draft see the prevention of war more economically feasible than preparing for and conducting war. The authors also regard political means as the most stable and reliable way of establishing security.

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Also noteworthy is that the new doctrine commits the Russian military to continue to support and participate in multinational security forums. Mutual security both within the CIS and globally is present and based on the assumption that security is established through mutual action and consideration. No state or coalition of states may seek to enhance its security at Russia's expense.

The possible threats to Russia present in this doctrine take basically two forms. First the statement of intent to protect ethnic Russians has never before been part of the tenets of any Soviet doctrine and is clearly aimed at the Baltic nations:

A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in former USSR republics can be a serious source of conflicts.ub1

The second threat is a reference to the danger and possible danger that can be expected if foreign states or coalitions station or build-up large concentrations of military forces near Russia's borders. This statement is probably intended to discourage the US, NATO, or any other country attempting to fill the vast vacuum created by the strategic withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. This is also most likely a veiled warning to the southern Muslim nations to discard any notions about interference within Russian/CIS affairs.

In sum, from the epoch of the October Revolution to 1987 Soviet military doctrine did not envisage preventive, predatory wars. It was always

based on the repulsing of possible aggression as the principal political goal which in the military-strategic aspect translated into varying offensive structures which could effectively enact a surprise strategic offensive on a global scale. The willingness to carry out the bulk of defensive operations on Russian territory in war of defense of the homeland has been the Wests' defining measure of a truly defensive doctrine. This change from an offensive doctrine probably changed in 1987 with the announcement of "defensive-defense" and with this new 1992 draft doctrine the debate has been adjourned; there is no question on its defensiveness.

C. SUMMARY

The future of the Russian military will be determined by the national security policy, military policy, doctrine and strategy adopted by the state. As we have seen the driving force for the changes that we see today and will most likely see in the future is the economy. From the economic perestroika of Gorbachev to the radical reforms of Gaydar the impact upon the military of economic change has been enormous. This will continue for the foreseeable future. The estimated budget from the appendix may be a rough guess but if the figures are anywhere near correct the Russian military faces continued inability to train, perform maintenance, construct new weapons and will even have difficulty in research and development. This will have a major impact upon the force structure as we will see in succeeding chapters.
The political changes in Russia will also have an enormous effect upon the policy and doctrine the military will operate under. The swing toward conservatism by the Yeltsin government carries with it the seeds of even worse economic and ethnic troubles. These factors will no doubt be reflected in the drastic reductions called for in the latest doctrine and the emphasis upon local and regional threats. Again these factors will help shape the force structure for the future. Also the temporary, and maybe longterm, presence of joint forces under CIS Russian command translates to a universal CIS doctrine or a variant doctrine specifically for these joint units.

The language of the 1992 draft doctrine and it's apparent adherence to the third variant has set the stage for the structural reform of the armed forces. It should be kept in mind that both variant three and four represent General Major Alexander Svechin's views of a "war of attrition" that will be discussed in the next chapter. It is with these thoughts in mind that we now examine a historical precedent for the current reform process.
III. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR CURRENT MILITARY REFORMS

A. INTRODUCTION

Currently in Russia there are at least three types of reform: political, economic, and military. Admittedly all three are intertwined but the latter clearly has the most pertinence to the national security of the United States. Russia is definitely not an economic power and her impact in the foreign policy arena has decreased significantly with the death of communism. For over four decades the US military was poised to act against Soviet and Warsaw Pact military aggression. Today it is a foregone conclusion that in the near future there is a greatly diminished chance of a coordinated operational-strategic level military offensive against the US or NATO by any military that was part of the former Soviet Union. It is also presumed that if such a threat to the US national security were to exist in the future there would be sufficient time to reconstitute the US military in order to respond to that threat, specifically "8-10 years." The next logical question then is whether the U.S. will have enough warning time to act against any threat and whether that threat will be posed by the reformed armed forces of the Russian Federation or any other former republics acting unilaterally or in a coalition. By understanding the dynamics and trends involved in the current

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Russian military reform, US policy-makers may be able to better address this question.

B. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

When the Soviet Union declared a move toward a more "defensive" doctrine in 1987, many western strategists in the world were puzzled and questioned whether this was just another form of Soviet "maskirovka." This doctrine, based on a concept of "reasonable sufficiency", was also analyzed by Soviet civilian and military theorists in order to determine the impact of such a doctrine on military art, strategy, structure, and equipment.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as the main inheritor of the armed forces of the USSR, Russian authorities have continued the discussion of military reform, mainly because of the new world security environment and the economic situation in their country. In typical Russian military fashion, many of the theorists attempting to define the new doctrine in

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*The concept of defensive sufficiency originated early in Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU. It provided a means by which to challenge the military's monopoly on national security policy. In its original life it was meant to describe a level of armed forces sufficient to 'repulse any possible aggression but incapable of being used for offensive purposes.' (Reply, dated 16 November 1987, from Mr. Gorbachev to a letter from four members of the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces in Europe. See, *Journal of the American Scientists*, vol 41, no. 2, February 1988.) 'Reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defence' was officially enshrined in Gorbachev's landmark UN speech in December 1988.*
specifics searched for an historical precedent for the current reform process and found it in the Soviet military reform of 1924-25.

The 1924-25 military reform has been a topic of study for many western analysts, as can be shown in the various references in this paper. Additionally, the use of the Soviet military reform of 1924-25 as an historical surrogate was discussed and recommended to the authors in Moscow, in July 1992. This recommendation was made by several high ranking officers of both the Military Historical Institute of Russia (which is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense), and the Frunze Military Academy.

The present military leadership in Russia will no doubt review the reform process of 1924-25 and try to reproduce its successful elements while ensuring that errors made earlier are corrected in the present reform process. The mixture of economics and politics today is admittedly quite different than the 1924-25 reform, yet the effects of both of these are most assuredly the driving forces in both reforms.

One of the major military theorists/strategists important to the 1924-25 reform was General-Major Alexander Svechin. His writings are enjoying a resurrection and are being studied by many authoritative figures in Russia.104

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104 General Alexander Svechin's book *Strategy*, (Minneapolis: Eastview Press, 1992, A translation of: *Strategia*, Moscow: Yenzyl vestnik, 1927. Edited by Kent D. Lee) has been republished in 1994 with forewords by General Lobov, former Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the current assistant Minister of Defense of Russia, Andrei Kokoshin. Additionally the rebirth of the writings of Svechin was evident in the discussions conducted
Additionally the lengthy debates between M.V. Frunze, Ye. Vorishilov, Leon Trotsky, and Alexander Svechin among others can also be used in a parallel manner to shed some light on the murky reform process that will have a direct impact on the Russian armed forces of the future. The study of the 1924-25 reform is even more appropriate today than in 1987 when the "defensive" military doctrine was announced. This is due to the many parallels, both internally and externally, that Russia finds itself in since the attempted putsch and the break-up of the Soviet Union.

This section will examine the military reform of 1924-25 in comparison to the ongoing military reform, and then analyze the parallels and differences of both reforms within the context of economics, politics, and geography. Lastly, this analysis will offer some conclusions about the outcome of the current reform process and its effect on the armed forces of the Russian Federation in terms of doctrine, strategy, and structure.

C. THE MILITARY REFORM OF 1924-25

The end of World War I and the subsequent end of the Civil War in Russia left the country in dire economic straits. Agricultural and industrial output by 1921 was less than 50% of prewar levels.14 A number of plants and factories


were not operating due to the lack of fuel and raw materials, and the agricultural output was devastated by a bad harvest. This appalling economic condition made it infeasible to maintain a 5.5 million man army. The Lenin government understood that it had to act quickly in order to keep the populace under control by improving economic conditions. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was put into effect while at the same time the strength of the army dropped to 516,000 men by October 1923. The move to reform the military for "peacetime" was also impacted by the more stable and less hostile international environment of the time. On the 16th of April, 1922, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the famous Treaty of Rapallo and by 1925, a sizeable number of Asian and American nations, and a majority of the European states, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

By the mid-twenties the domestic situation in the Soviet Union had considerably improved. The NEP was proving to be successful and this in turn insured the temporary control of the peasant population. This improvement,
though, was to be reversed in the near future due to a change in leadership. On 21 January 1924, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, founder and leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state died. The death of Lenin had a palpable effect on the military since he was also responsible for laying the foundations of the Soviet regular army and had shared many of Trotsky's views of reform in the context of the post civil-war environment.

1. The Debate

Throughout the 1920's there was extensive debate on the future role of the armed forces of the USSR and its military doctrine, strategy, and structure. As mentioned above, one of the key figures debating these issues was the former Imperial Army officer and General Staff Academy professor, General-Major Alexander Svechin. Another key figure in the debate was the People's Commissar of War, Leon Trotsky. Both had similar views on military concepts and both became political casualties of Stalin's rise to power.

Svechin agreed with Trotsky that the concept of offensive and defensive military actions were as important in the military as they were in the political sphere, claiming that the offense and defense were dialectically connected. Svechin also believed that a military strategy of attrition should be adopted by the Soviet Union because of the poor economic state of the country. This strategy of initially accepting the defensive and trading real estate for time was anathema to the majority of the Communist Party leadership and "Red
Commanders." The offense of World War I and the Civil War was still a vivid memory in the minds of the ruling elite and combined with the theory of the superiority of the socialist revolution, led to a preferred offensive military strategic concept. Furthermore, the proposition of trading space for time was a form of criticizing the state of economic affairs in the USSR with little faith for its improvement in the future.

Svechin and Trotsky also did not find the battle record of the Red Army in the civil war awe-inspiring. They both were wary of formulating a military strategy out of historical experiences, such as the Civil War. Instead, Svechin and Trotsky adhered to the belief that each military confrontation should be evaluated within the temporal and spatial context in which it occurs. In their opinion, strategy and doctrine should only have general guidelines since it is difficult to classify something that is ever-changing and fluid.

Whereas Svechin agreed with Trotsky on the view of the equality of offensive and defensive actions at the political and military level, he took the problem one step further with his views on "types of wars." In Svechin's opinion, 

* This was exemplified in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

* The offensive was conventional wisdom prior to World War I in the context of the czarist offensive strategy. Additionally the experience in the civil war illustrated that offensive action was needed to expel the "whites" and the intervening forces of the West and Japan.

the greatest military decision facing the political leadership was to decide whether to employ a war of attrition or a war of destruction. His view was that a war of attrition would be strategically correct for the Soviet Union. This belief would lead to his eventual demise in the late 1920's. (Coincidentally, this strategy was actually applied by Stalin during first two stages of the 2nd Great Patriotic War.) Svechin's writings and his ideas were under attack by the military establishment (most importantly Mikhail Tukhachevskii) and the majority of the military establishment while the socialist "offensive" military doctrine and strategy came into effect with the leadership change of the late 1920's.

2. The Gusev Commission

In an effort to resolve the problems of military reform, the plenary session of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RKP(b)) Central Committee, held in January 1924, appointed a special commission headed by S.I. Gusev to conduct an investigation on the situation in the Armed Forces and to recommend action to strengthen their combat efficiency.111 The commission noted many major discrepancies and concluded that "our Red Army at present does not exist as an organized, trained, [and] politically educated force supplied with mobilization reserves. At present, in its present form, the Red Army is not battle-worthy."112

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111 Frunze was then replaced by Voroshilov as head of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and A.S. Bubnov took over the post of People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

These deficiencies in the Armed Forces were ascribed to Trotsky, who was the head of both the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Most importantly, the Commission also decided that the structure (size) and combat training requirements of the Armed Forces was incompatible with the country's economic means. The measures proposed by the Commission and subsequently approved by a Central Committee Plenum became the program which was termed the military reform of 1924-25 (In practical terms the reform continued through 1928). The purpose of the military reform of 1924-25 was:

aimed at bringing the organization of the troops, the system of their manning, training and indoctrination into accord with the new conditions in the life of the Soviet State and the tasks of protecting the nation.

In May of 1924, the 13th RKP(b) Congress approved the resolutions of the Gusev Commission. The basic resolutions of reform were a reorganization in the leadership bodies of the Armed Forces, an improvement in the organizational structure of the military and the axioms of their training and indoctrination, the introduction of one-man leadership, and most importantly the conversion to a

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new manning system. The conversion to a new manning system was by far the most controversial reform presented and enacted on. The debates on the conversion to a new manning system would be prophetic for future reforms as well.

3. The Restructuring

During the reform there were several streamlining measures adopted, one of which was to have the RKKA (Worker-Peasant Red Army) Staff include the following directorates: Operations, Organizational-Mobilizational, Military Lines of Communications, Intelligence and Combat Training. Also the personnel strength and the bureaucracy of the higher command organizations was severely reduced leading to increased efficiency and a 70% reduction in reporting requirements for the army. Lastly, there was legislation introduced to render legitimacy on the structure of the Armed Forces.

Also, related to the leadership structure reform were similar initiatives in training and indoctrination. This took the form of formulating original regulations and manuals which had never existed in the RKKA. In order to create this written framework for the military input was solicited from many sources: chairs of military academies, military publications, and other civil-

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"TsGAKF (Central State Archives of the Soviet Army), folio 4, inv. 1, file 743, sheet 21. Footnoted in "Military Reform in the USSR," by Fancer (JPRS)."
military officials. In this area the undisputed leader was Frunze because of his inventing of the basic precepts of Russian military theory which up to this time had never existed in written form. The guidance of Frunze was evident by his input to the regulations and manuals being written. He personally edited the second portion of the RKKA Provisional Field Manual (Division, Corps), and wrote several articles concerning war and the army.¹¹⁸

The concept of one-man leadership was an indicative sign of reform because of the leadership's view of the unreliability of certain former "White Officers" in command positions. This particular reform had two steps. In the first step the unified command concept was split between the complete and the incomplete. A complete command organization was defined as an organization where there was only one commander who was in charge of all the normal military duties in addition to being responsible for the duties assigned to the commissar. An incomplete command organization was defined by the commissar being responsible for the party and political work while everything else was the responsibility of the commander.¹¹⁹ Because of the paranoia of the Communist party over their retention of power, this reform went quite slow since only party members who had both command experience and the proper ideological background were difficult to find.

"Runov, "Military Reform in the USSR," (JPRS, p. 60).

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4. The Cadre-Militia System

As mentioned above, one of the most consequential measures debated and ultimately adopted was the issue of establishing a qualitatively new system for manning the Armed Forces. The crux of this debate centered on a territorial militia system verses that of a purely professional force. Initially, the Communist civilian leadership was leaning toward the creation of a territorial militia system, and at the Ninth Communist Party Congress in 1920 the decision was made to transform the Red Army into such a system. This decision was greatly influenced by Trotsky, who supported the territorial militia system on both ideological and economic grounds.

Frunze, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the territorial militia system. Frunze and the majority of the military elite, were fearful that such a system would severely weaken what little military professionalism was left in the armed forces. The argument against a territorial militia system was made during 1920 and early 1921 and resulted in a compromise being reached at the Tenth Communist Party Congress in March 1921. The final result was a compromise between the Trotsky and Frunze proposals which became known as the cadre-militia system.

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When the system was originally organized, the cadre consisted of a 562,000 strong regular standing force including the entirety of naval and air force personnel.\textsuperscript{122} In the ground forces, the cadre accounted for two-fifths of the artillery and infantry, four-fifths of the cavalry, and all of the technical personnel (tank, armored-car units, engineers, signal service troops, air force personnel, etc...)\textsuperscript{123} The composition of the military clearly shows that the well-trained cadre dominated the more elite sectors of the armed forces while assigning most of the unskilled foot soldiers to the militia. This form of the cadre-militia system was in reality a victory for Frunze since it was based in large part on the strength of the cadre forces but it would not stand the test of time.

In the incipient stage of the cadre-militia system the territorial militia had far more personnel. This balance changed in the middle 1930's when by 1936 the cadre strength was 77\% of all divisions.\textsuperscript{124} This was the predominate trend and continued till the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 which eradicated the territorial system completely and reverted back to the full-time conscript force.

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...Michael Garder, \textit{A History of the Red Army}, (Washington: Praeger, 1966), p. 58. A cadre-militia system in this context is an army that has a smaller regular active-duty militia force and also has professional active-duty cadre personnel in key positions of skeleton military organizations that could quickly assimilate reserve personnel into the organization and use the structure to build effective military units.

\textsuperscript{122} ibid.

\textsuperscript{123} ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} ibid.
D. PARALLELS OF THE 1924-25 AND 1992 REFORMS

The most evident parallel of both the 1924-25 and the ongoing reform period is that they are taking place in a post-war environment. The end of World War I, and the Civil War in Russia precluded the earlier reform period, while the epilogue of the Cold War is just now being written.

Secondly, the end to hostilities and/or confrontation in history has always been related to economics, and in both of these reform periods the reform is inextricably linked with economics again. The economic situation is a major driving force in Russia today and no doubt will continue to be early into the next century.125 The economic situation is a factor in every decision that is being made whether it affects the political leadership or something as simple as the transition to an all volunteer military. The danger here is that the economic situation in Russia today could also be said to be quite similar to that of "Weimar Germany" after World War I, which brought Hitler and Fascism into power.

Thirdly, the political maneuvering that is taking place in Russia today is also very analogous to the earlier reform of 1924-25. Several months ago, President Yeltsin declared that he would not run for the presidency again in 1996.126 This was probably an attempt to prove to the Russian populace that he has no long term aspirations for power, and that he is holding the office solely for patriotic

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125 The attached budget appendix provides an in-depth look at the budget problems facing the Russian military today.

sentiment to the "Motherland" and to introduce and establish democratic reform to Russia. Unfortunately, this tactic has backfired in a sense that since his declaration prospective leaders seem more eager to criticize the Yeltsin government while putting forth their own agendas. As discussed earlier, the future political scene in Russia is murky at best but conservative nationalistic tendencies appear to be on the rise.

In more practical terms, a good example can be given in the military-technical sphere of doctrine. In working out the procedures for purchasing military material the Russian Defense Ministry is attempting to reduce the nomenclature of the military gear and is trying to adopt a policy of unification and standardization.\textsuperscript{127} The size and inventory of the Russian combat vehicle inventory was so vast that it was resulting in costly operation and crew training. This practical problem will be solved by "streamlining" the inventory to fewer basic combat vehicles.

E. DIFFERENCES IN REFORMS OF 1924-25 AND 1992

The vital dissimilarity between both the 1924-25 and ongoing reform period would unquestionably have to be the appearance of nuclear weapons. These weapons have drastically changed the strategic landscape of the world ever since

\textsuperscript{127} Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrei Kokoshin by Marina Cherunukha and Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the "Nation and Society" feature - transmitted via Kyodo, Moscow, Interfax in English, JPRS-TAC-92-025, 17 August 1992, p. 9-10.)
their appearance in 1945. Nuclear weapons permanently impacted the nature of geo-strategic thinking and their existence will most assuredly still play a key role in Russia's doctrine, strategy, and structure in the future.

Another striking difference in the reform periods was the way the Gulf war was viewed by many senior military members as a "revolution of military affairs." This was seen by some as providing proof positive to the predictions of General Nikolai V. Ogarkov who predicted, as early as the 1970's, an impending "Military - Scientific Revolution."

The problem of converting the populace to any specific ideological system, such as Communism, is also conspicuously absent in this reform period. This was a motivation for many of the actions taken by the government in the earlier reform period that does not have relevancy in the current reform. Some argue, however, that the move to democratic reform in Russia will be met with the same amount of resistance as the conversion to Communism was several decades ago.

Geography, as always, has been a major determinant in the military policy of Russia and the Soviet Union, and may be even more so during the 74 years of Communist rule. The most important point about Russia's borders of today is that they are completely unique. Never before in the history of Russia has the

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country had this geographical configuration. This aspect of geography and its impact on military doctrine will be discussed in the following chapter.

F. SUMMARY

In summary, the comparison of the military reform of 1924-25 with the current military reform is useful in terms of analyzing the similarity and differences of economics, politics, and geography present in both reform periods. Most importantly this comparison can also prove useful in forecasting the general direction that the current military reform is taking. Basically the similarities of both reforms can be summarized as a vast restructuring of the armed forces, a move to a cadre-militia system, and a new military strategy. The emphasis of this comparative analysis lies in the impact that economics will have on the emerging military doctrine. The economic constraints will force a more defensive strategy (variant three), that is probably going to be based on the Svechin strategy of trading ground for time while at the same time protecting valuable strategic assets. Secondly, economics will force the vast reduction and restructuring of the military and force it to accept a manpower concept of a mixed conscript-volunteer force that will be based on a combination of territorial and extra territorial principles. And lastly, the unpredictable mix of politics and economics will also play a vital role during the reform process.
IV. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE YEAR 2000

A. INTRODUCTION

Now that we have examined the policy, doctrine and strategy that the Russian military of the year 2000 will be drawn from, we turn to the individual services for a more in depth study of how each will fair under the new reforms. The strategic nuclear forces are all grouped together for ease of study and will be dealt with first. The ground forces will then be discussed and will include a section on the impact that the CFE treaty will have on Russia. The air defense forces, air forces and the navy will follow. It is not the intent of this section to postulate exact numerical order of battles (OOB) for the different services. It is the intent of this chapter to examine trends in reform of each service in order to present a reasonably accurate macro view of their status in the year 2000.

As noted earlier, according to the reform plan for the Russian military, by the year 2000 the total personnel of the Russian Armed forces will probably stand at close to 1.5 million.129 The ground forces then will most likely still occupy the largest percentage of the force though not to the extent of the past and probably

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129 This was also stated by President Yeltsin who envisages an Army which is professional, mobile, unburdened by administrative structures - small, but large enough to defend the country. In this same article the cut of the armed forces is said to be from 2.5 million to 1.5 million or 1.25 million. "Armed Forces Resurrection Linked to Statehood," Moscow, Teleradionovostiya Ostankino Television First Program Network, in Russian, 2000 GMT, 9 May 1992, (FBIS-SOV-92-092, 12 May 1992, p. 27).
stand at approximately 720,000. The existing general purpose forces will be professional, structured around a defensive doctrine that emphasizes high mobility and high operational readiness, and most importantly equipped with the some of the most modern conventional equipment.

B. THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

With the breakup of the Soviet Union the question of the fate of the nuclear weapons it possessed has been at the top of Washington's list of priorities. It has also been a high priority for the former republics, especially those that possessed the strategic nuclear weapons, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The process of all tactical nuclear weapons being delivered to Russia is well underway but the status of strategic systems is a little less certain. The view of the strategic nuclear forces as a tool of deterrence and as "a guarantor for Russia and all CIS countries against the initiation of any war, not just nuclear war" is still strongly held by many in Russia. The statement on military priorities issued by the Supreme Soviet Presidium also shows the high importance and reliance upon nuclear deterrence when it states that "adequate means of preventing world wars

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This figure is based on the assumption of 60 divisions with approximately 12,000 personnel per division.

directed against Russia and other CIS member states is provided by the strategic nuclear forces".\textsuperscript{132} The continued presence of strategic nuclear weapons is not in doubt for either the former Soviets or the West, the question is however, the number that will be in the Russian/CIS arsenal in the year 2000, who will control the weapons and what do they intend their policy for them to be? This is a question we need to answer to facilitate formulation of a projected force level for the year 2000.

1. **Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces**

The four nuclear holding states of the former Soviet Union have agreed that eventually the Russian Federation will be the only nuclear power.\textsuperscript{133} However the problems that have arisen from this agreement have not yet been solved. Kazakhstan and Belarus have agreed in total to the removal of strategic nuclear weapons from their soil, to Russia. Ukraine on the other hand has insisted that all nuclear weapons it now holds must be destroyed on Ukrainian territory, not transported to Russia. This in essence has left Ukraine holding strategic nuclear weapons which it has then exerted dual administrative control over with the CIS Joint Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{134} This has potential for trouble not only


\textsuperscript{134} ibid.
between the former republics but also with the West over the START treaty and
the Washington agreements. The four former republics have signed a protocol
to the START treaty but implementation may be difficult with the friction arising
from this dispute.

The operational control of the weapons stands today under the aegis
of the CIS Heads of State and the commander in chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces
Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. The Russian Federation President has
operational control over all strategic nuclear weapons in consultation with the
leaders of the states in which the weapons are located, all exercised through
Marshal Shaposhnikov. Presumably, when all weapons are on the territory of
Russia complete control will pass to Russia's General Staff and be delegated to the
CIS Joint Armed Forces commander in chief as deemed necessary. As it is now
the forces located in the former republics are administratively controlled by
Russia, jointly only in the case of Ukraine.

The distribution of the strategic nuclear forces is relevant at this point.
The numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads as of June 1, 1992 for all of
the former Soviet Union stood at 10,053 and are distributed as follows:3

Andreĭ Naryshkin "Ministers Discuss Nuclear Strategy,"
Moscow, Itar-Tass, in English, 1524 GMT, 3 Sep 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-173, 4 September 1992, p. 5).

The numbers for this table are drawn from the study of
nuclear issues by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
227.
In terms of these warheads; Russia possesses 80%, Ukraine 10%, Kazakhstan 6%, and Belarus 4% of the former Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear arsenal.  

Specifically: Ukraine has a reported 176 ICBM’s and 43 bombers; Kazakhstan has 104 ICBM’s and Belarus has mobile ICBM’s, none have nuclear submarines. These numbers are significant in light of the Washington agreements of this summer as we shall show shortly.

It is also important to note that the strategic nuclear forces are still divided between the Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Force and the Navy. The reform program expounded by Alexander Rutskoi and other officials calls for reorganization of the branches of the military in the third stage, from 1995-2000. The creation of a new force comprised of the strategic nuclear forces and PVO warning and ABM systems has been called for in recent years. The new service would be called the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF). This reorganization has

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"Dokuchayev, (FBIS) 2.


"Army General and at the time Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Vladimir N. Lobov dealt with this reorganization in his article "Military Force Generation (Stroitelstvo): On a New Foundation," Moscow, Voennaya Mysl, in
not been talked about much lately in the Russian press which may indicate resistance by particular services or the acknowledgement that the funds will not be available for the proposal in the near future.

2. Nuclear Strategy

The strategy for strategic nuclear weapons that Russia and the CIS are proceeding from is that the possibility of world nuclear war is not permissible. The conclusion is then drawn from this statement that the real role of these weapons is deterrence of attacks, conventional and nuclear upon the homeland.\(^{140}\) The prevention of war and the rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons appear to be hallmarks of the new military doctrine of Russia.\(^{141}\) Retaliation with massive strikes would also appear to be part of the doctrine.\(^{112}\) This is consistent with counter-value targeting vice counter-force. As Raymond Garthoff has said it would appear that the American idea of "deterrence by punishment" has taken some root in Russian strategic thinking.\(^{143}\) Transitioning from counter-value targeting to
counter-force targeting is not just a matter of doctrine but must take into account that the high levels of warheads still constitute a counter-force capable arsenal. Deep reductions called for by START and the 17 June 1992 Washington agreements are a good step in lowering the counter-force capabilities of the Russian strategic nuclear force. Unfortunately the status of these cuts is uncertain. Also, James J. Tritten points out, correctly, that the present levels of Russian strategic nuclear weapons along with ongoing research and development give credence to the belief that the Russians have not accepted mutual assured destruction completely. Tritten then goes on to say that this offensive capable arsenal does not necessarily mean an offensive nuclear doctrine. For the time being the declaratory policy of the Russian doctrine will have to be looked at closely until the numbers come more in line with the espoused targeting regime.

The policy of no first use of nuclear weapons has come under much scrutiny of late in Russian military circles. The direction that this scrutiny has led to calls for a renunciation of this policy and removal of any mention of nuclear weapon use from the doctrine. The arguments have been raised that no nation can predict what situation will arise in the course of a conflict which will call for

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the first use of nuclear weapons, and that the avowal to not use them first actually gives the aggressor the advantage.146 While it does not appear that the statement calling for no first use of nuclear weapons will actually be removed from the doctrine, it is probable that a looser interpretation of it will be adopted by the Russian military. Defense Minister Grachev has stated that Russia retains the right to use "those kinds, forms and methods of military action which are most effective in a given situation".147 This is not only in connection with nuclear weapons but all methods of repelling aggression.

The concept of parity has been much debated lately in the Russian press. The question has come up due to the perceived injustices of the Washington agreements of 17 June 1992. The military establishment has pulled out all the stops in calling for the maintenance of the "military-strategic parity between Russia and the United States".148 The Russian military establishment has even called for increases in funding of nuclear systems while asserting that the "nuclear parity unquestionably must be maintained"149 There have been statements to the contrary saying that the concept of parity has become obsolete and that Russia can even survive without it, as France and Great Britain have,

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144 Grachev, (JPRS) 59.

145 Ibid, (JPRS) 60.

146 Volkov, (JPRS) 31.
however these comments have come from non-military personnel. While it is true that parity can be achieved at lower levels of warheads the conservative faction in Russia today does not feel that the lower levels offered by the Washington agreements equal parity at all. The warhead levels that are being discussed are only one aspect of parity, it is in the other areas that the conservatives feel the balance is tilted in the US favor. The agreements of 17 June 1992 and the START treaty have had a tremendous impact upon the debate over strategic forces in Russia so it would benefit us to look a little closer at these two accords.

3. START and the Washington Agreements of 17 June 1992

The START treaty was originally signed by the US and the USSR on July 31, 1991. With the coup coming only days later and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union the US sought guarantees from the newly independent states that the terms of the treaty would be met by all. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the US signed a protocol to the treaty in Lisbon on 23 May 1992 addressing just this problem. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus pledged their desire to become nuclear-free countries and to abide by the treaty. Russia will receive the weapons that will be removed from the other three and conduct...
distructions in accordance with the treaty stipulations. However, the problem of destroying the weapons in place was addressed by Ukraine obliquely in its letter to President Bush, and more directly in later weeks. If Ukraine continues to insist that the covered weapons be destroyed on Ukrainian soil there may well develop serious problems with treaty compliance by the former Soviets.

Russian leaders accepted START and the role as the nuclear successor to the Soviet Union. While this agreement was being signed in Lisbon the groundwork was being laid for the radical cuts put forth by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 17 June 1992. These proposed cuts went far beyond anything in START. The main provisions of the agreement were as follows:

Within the seven year period after START goes into effect
- overall number of warheads down to 3800-4250 as each nation will decide
- 1200 MIRVed ICBM warheads
- 650 heavy ICBM warheads
- 2160 SLBM warheads
By 2003 or earlier with U.S. financial assistance
- overall number of warheads down to 3000-3500 as each nation will decide
- elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs
- SLBMs down to 1700-1750 as each nation will decide

The oblique reference noted was "that the process of elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should be carried out under reliable international control which should guarantee the non-use of nuclear charge components for repeated production of weapons and should prevent their export to other countries". This clearly is in reference to Russia gaining material if destructions are conducted in Russia vies Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk's letter to President Bush, dated May 7, 1992, Official Text: The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, U.S. Arms Control And Disarmament Agency Washington D.C., Office of Public Affairs, 22 June 1992, p. 3.

The changes called for in this agreement created deep discontent in the conservative Russian military establishment. The themes most used by Russian conservatives in calling for the rejection of the agreement are: the loss of parity with the US, the unfairness of eliminating ICBMs such as the SS-18 where Russia has the advantage and preserving SLBMs where the US has a decided edge, the cost of destruction in so short a time period, the destabilizing factor of a proposed global ballistic missile defense system, the lack of controls on other strategic weapons such as cruise missiles, and the perceived vulnerability of a lower number of nuclear weapons to conventional attack.\textsuperscript{3} The strong criticism of this agreement comes at the same time that President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Gaydar and Foreign Minister Kozyrev are under heavy attack by conservative political forces. Even Russia's Defense Minister has stated that reductions in strategic


nuclear forces must be militarily and economically optimal for Russia and not alter the parity between the US and Russia. This does not bode well for implementation of the agreement. The agreement has not been met with universal condemnation, support has come primarily from the civilian institutions that have stated the need for a new approach to Russia's strategic nuclear policy. As James Tritten shows the possibility of levels of strategic nuclear weapons with the equivalent megatonnage value of as low as 400 had been discussed since 1987 by reform minded persons in Russia. However the discussion today contains little reference to these radical proposals and seems to be solely concerned with high numbers of warheads only. The positions of the conservative detractors of the agreement carry far more power and influence than these civilian 'think tanks', and consequently the chances of the conservative view becoming more influential in policy formulation is high. Again this does not bode well for the prospects of the agreement. Now from this point we can develop some sort of a projection for the shape of Russia's strategic nuclear forces for the future.

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Grachev, (JPRS) 60.


4. Towards the Year 2000

Undoubtedly Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. The deterrent factor of these weapons against world class aggression, will be especially useful in the period where Russia is chiefly concerned with its internal and regional problems. During this period the ability to ward off major extra-regional aggression will allow the Russian military to concentrate on issues such as protection of national minorities and conflicts with peripheral countries. This would seem to argue for maintenance of a strong nuclear potential that is not threatening to the other nuclear powers. Large reductions in strategic nuclear forces below START levels, publishing of a military doctrine that renounces first use of nuclear weapons, joint inspection and cooperation agreements on research and development would help lower the fears of other nations. The agreements of Washington were a large step in this direction. President Yeltsin's desire to decrease the nuclear inventory may even lead to attempts at even deeper reductions.7 This represents the best scenario the US can hope for in the strategic nuclear field. Unfortunately this is dependent upon the good standing of reform minded individuals in positions such as

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7 Grachev stated that reductions below this number of 3000-3500 are possible but only if negotiations include China, France and Great Britain. He also stated that the ABM treaty needed to be strictly observed, no doubt a reference to SDI. This statement was made shortly after the agreements were signed and before the conservative tilt was so pronounced in Russian political circles. This coupled with his previously conservative remarks at the May conference leaves his true inclinations open to question. "Grachev Says More Nuclear Cuts Possible," London, Financial Times, in English, 25 Jul 92, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-152-A, 6 August 1992, p. 1).
Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Defense Minister not to mention President. As we have seen this is increasingly doubtful with the rise of the conservatives. The chances for the codification of these agreements into a treaty is becoming more problematical by the day.

The worst scenario for the West would be total repudiation of both the Washington agreements and START due to the rise of an ultra-conservative government. This scenario would obviously be cause for great concern and a re-evaluation of US security priorities. Fortunately the chances of this happening appear slim. The strongest political alliance in Russia now is the centrist Civic Union. While this alliance and the conservative Russian military have called for revisions in the Washington agreements they have not called for scrapping START nor total repudiation of the proposed agreements. Downsizing in all areas of the military appears to be most likely as the economic situation is so poor. Thus some reductions are actually agreed to even by the conservative elements of society.

There is a middle ground between these best and worst case scenarios, one in which START is fully implemented and where negotiations will take place for the implementation of the new agreements. These agreements will have to be substantially modified in the Russian view but the principle of lowering strategic nuclear weapons has been accepted by most players on the scene. The pressure placed upon the government by the more conservative elements of the military
and the opposition parties will in our opinion prevent codification without major changes being included in the agreement.

The changes most needed in the conservative Russian view include extension of the ABM Treaty to preclude any Western fielding of an SDI type of system which is argued to be fundamentally destabilizing. This debate over ABM systems is still ongoing between conservative and reformers. The contentious question as to whether even a limited system, such as the proposed Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), is acceptable remains unanswered. The conservative opposition to even GPALS will be significant if the swing to the right by Yeltsin continues. The reduction of the Strategic Rocket Forces by such a considerable amount as seen by the huge drop in ICBMs is another serious problem in the conservative view. This may be institutional bias against the loss of prestige of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) but probably also reflects the traditional philosophy of the Russian military. The creation of the Strategic Deterrent Forces may be an attempt to ameliorate the ruffled feathers of the SRF. The weighting of strategic arms to a more sea-based component is not seen as in their interests either. With these and other arguments on the agreements the Russian conservatives fear losing "parity" and will most probably call for re-negotiating the agreements. President Yeltsin will be unable to

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1. Volkov, (JPRS) 32.
2. Volkov, (JPRS) 31-32, and Grachev (JPRS) 60.
withstand the political pressure to step back from the accelerated reductions he has already agreed to with President Bush.

The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will be adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to wait till beyond completion of START reductions, i.e. the year 2000. The numbers of strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems. Some illustrative numbers for a future Russian strategic nuclear force in terms of deployed warheads are as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICBM Warheads</th>
<th>SLBM Warheads</th>
<th>Bombers' Warheads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy 3,080</td>
<td>Total 1408-1648</td>
<td>Total 350-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile 700</td>
<td>Other 300-500</td>
<td>Other 300-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,280 Total</td>
<td>4,080-4,280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volkov, (JPRS) 31.

The numbers for this table are drawn from an analysis by the authors of which type of weapons the Russian are most likely to destroy as they reach obsolescence. It is assumed that only the most modern delivery vehicles will be retained and will be capable of carrying their full compliment of warheads. The vehicles include: six Typhoon and seven Delta IV submarines; all SS-18's; all mobile ICBM's; a small number of other ICBM's; and most ALCM capable bombers. These estimates are based upon the extreme economic difficulties posed by maintenance of existing older vehicles and developing newer ones. Original numbers are drawn from The Military Balance 1992-1993, p. 227.
It must be noted that these numbers are highly subjective at this point but could represent the approximate level of warheads by the year 2000. Reductions beyond the year 2000 are possible. The ICBMs will be the most modern including the SS-18 and mobile launchers. The SSBN fleet will continue to operate as a deterrent but at reduced levels in terms of actual hulls. The quality per hull will increase however as the older, less reliable vessels are decommissioned. The newer Typhoons and Delta IVs will probably be the only remaining SSBNs by the year 2000. This is in part due to budgetary restraints and to the START which calls for reductions of 47.9% in ICBMs and SLBMs\(^2\). As we have stated earlier the conservative swing of the government and military may make it difficult to ratify the Washington agreements of this summer. If this can not be accomplished the Russians may be more inclined to reduce SLBMs and retain heavy ICBMs where they have an advantage. Therefore we will assume that the order of battle will consist of: six Typhoons with twenty SS-N-20 MOD 1 or 2 missiles each, totalling 960 -1200 warheads\(^3\); and seven Delta IVs with sixteen SS-N-23 misses each, totalling 448 warheads\(^4\). As stated by Andrei Kokoshin and Rear-Admiral Pauk earlier the SSBNs will patrol the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea.

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"ibid."
Return of strategic nuclear systems from the other republics will be completed but only after much negotiation with Ukraine. Research and development of future generations of strategic nuclear systems will remain a priority and continue but will be hampered by the greatly decreased budget. President Yeltsin has declared that production of the Tu-160 Blackjack will stop at a level equivalent to the B1-B and that production of the Tu-142 Bear will stop altogether. Russian strategy will be deterrence by punishment through the threat of massive retaliatory strikes, but the interpretation of when aggression actually begins and the use of nuclear weapons is then permissible will remain ambiguous.

C. THE GROUND FORCES

1. Introduction

It cannot be disputed that the ground forces, more than any other branch, are being affected by the most drastic reform since the previously discussed 1924-25 reform. Part of this can be explained by the apparent loss of stature of the ground forces. As will be explained in the following paragraphs, it appears that the historic dominance by the ground forces over the General Staff has apparently come to an end based on several important events.

The first was the appointment of Air Marshall Yevgeniy I. Shaposhnikov as head of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS. The appointment of

Jane's Defense Weekly, (08 Feb 92), 186.
an Air Force officer to head the Armed Forces was a first in the history of Russia. This was a political-military decision that can be attributed to the dedication of Shaposhnikov to democratic reform, and also to the leadership’s view of the importance that air power had in the Gulf war. Related to this event is the fact that the newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has a background of light infantry and airborne operations. This will no doubt affect the future structure of the military since Grachev is a proponent of mobile forces that are equipped with "high-tech" weapons.

The many changes taking place in the ground forces will no doubt set the stage for the reform process that will reconfigure all parts of the armed forces. This is due to many factors, one of which is the previously mentioned fact of the historical seniority that has traditionally been held by the ground forces. Since the ground forces have traditionally been held in high esteem within the military community, the changes taking place within this branch will influence all the other branches.

Just one example of the many important vast changes taking place in the military that will have far reaching ramifications is the restructuring of the military district system, which will result in there being probably only eight

At the time of the appointment of Marshal Shaposhnikov, it was still believed that there was a possibility of a CIS armed forces based on former USSR armed forces. Since that time many republics have declared to form national armies and have done so, thus forcing Russia to do the same.
military districts spread out within the three new TVDs of Russia.\textsuperscript{167} This is a direct reaction to the new geographical borders of the Russian Federation.

As discussed earlier, the military reform is predicted to go through several phases with the transitional phase lasting two to three years and by the year 2000 all changes should be firmly established.\textsuperscript{168} There are many factors specifically affecting the ground forces during the reform process with the major ones being the impact of the Gulf war, the socio-economic situation in the military, the CFE treaty, the new geo-strategic environment, and most importantly day to day politics.

This section will first visit these topics that are having wide-sweeping effects on the ground forces of the Russian military, and then attempt to paint a picture of the future force structure and missions of this force. The first topic that will be addressed is the impression the Gulf war had on the military decision makers in Russia.

2. Impact of the Gulf War

Another historical event that will no doubt provide input to the Russian armed forces was the Gulf war. From an analysis of the 1992 draft

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{\footnotemark[1]}}}


\footnotetext[2]{This transitional period is prevalent in all of the public statements coming out of Russia.}
military doctrine and other literature sources it appears that the political-military leadership is holding air assets in higher esteem in view of the post Gulf war analysis. But the debate is far from over and the Russian military has been actively publishing articles on the "lessons learned" from the Gulf war showing varied reasons for the US decisive victory over Iraq. This has lead to the basic question of whether the ground forces will play a predominant role in future wars.

The Gulf war was viewed by many senior military members as a "revolution of military affairs" and gave credibility to the predictions of General Ogarkov concerning the "Military-Scientific Revolution." The leadership of the then Soviet Union watched in awe on CNN the devastating precision-guided munitions used by the US military in the Gulf war.\footnote{Instructors of the Frunze Academy told the authors in July of 1992, that the reason for the preponderance of publications in Russia dealing with the admiration for the use of "smart" weapons in the war should not be taken as a factor in the reliance on them in the future for Russia. They went on to say that the Russian military also possessed such "high-tech" weapons, but that they were kept secret from the public. Videos of U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles flying over downtown Baghdad shown on CNN in Moscow greatly impressed the population leading to many articles about these weapons.}

This is exemplified in the following description of the future of the army, which was described by the first Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin as being:

...a professional army above all. We can easily have a small army - up to approximately 1.5 million men, including all branches of the Armed forces. It must have a powerful strategic reserve and highly mobile
forces. As specialists believe, there must be several airmobile brigades with their own army aviation and highly equipped not only with firepower but also with systems of radio-electronic combat and intelligence systems for combating optical-electronic instruments. This is what we are concentrating on now and not the buildup of firepower per se.170

This prospective view of the armed forces easily meshes with the phases of reform laid out by Vice President Rutskoi. Once again one can see the impact that the Gulf war had on the military elite who are making the reform decisions in Russia. More importantly, the lessons learned from the Gulf war have fueled the debate between ground and air superiority that had been adjourned originally by Marshall Nikolai V.Ogarkov.

On one side of this debate are the "Ogarkovites", for a lack of a better term. These people believe that the Gulf war greatly emphasized the importance of "high-tech" weapons and air forces in future battles. The proponents of this position want to put the majority of military expenditures into this area and would take the assets away from the ground forces and the armor forces in particular. Massed armored formations, it is argued, are a thing of the past, and should be relegated to a secondary role in any future conflict.

The other side of this argument finds its support from the ground forces community, who claim that the Persian Gulf war was an aberration and nothing else. The argument's premise can be best described as saying that a

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desert war with a force structure like that Iraq on one side and the US led coalition on the other side was a unique historical occurrence - an anomaly. Because of its uniqueness, future military reform policies shouldn't be formulated on it. This is a clear reference to Svechin's thoughts on the ever-changing fluidity of confrontation.

Another point in favor of the tank proponents is the fact that production of tanks in the countries of Germany, Britain, and most importantly the US, has not decreased. In fact as the author of one article points out:

...at the end of 1990 the United States began drawing up a program to create an entire family of fighting vehicles and auxiliary armored vehicles (ASM) to meet requirements in the year 2000. It is proposed to spend $59 billion on this. If the program is implemented, approximately 6,000 new fighting vehicles will join the U.S. Army's arsenal, including the new Block III main battle tank.\textsuperscript{7}

The author of this article goes on to say that according to Colonel General A. Galkin, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Armor Directorate, Russia currently has a varied inventory of tanks but that 25% of it is comprised of the most modern T-72 and T-80 models. Colonel General Galkin also claims that not only is series production planned for next year, but also that it will be in sufficient quantities to carry out the necessary research and development. It appears that some of the momentum toward eliminating the "World War II dinosaurs" has been slowed or even halted. The question of what part these

"heavy forces" will play in the future force structure of Russia will be examined later.

The ongoing debate in the Russian military hierarchy will most likely be won in the long run by advocates of air superiority and the proponents of ground armored formations will hold on to a smaller piece of the future force structure. Nevertheless, there appears to be general consensus that the coalition air forces and advanced conventional munitions were at a minimum the critical force responsible for the quick and decisive victory. This, in addition to the appointment of General Grachev, an airborne/light infantry officer, to First Deputy Defense Minister will most likely translate, in the short run reform period, to a lower stature for the ground forces in general and more specifically to the advocates of massed armored forces.

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There is a plethora of literature that is leading in the direction of air power superiority in the greater context of the military technical revolution.

General Grachev was quoted as saying that "alongside the traditional branches of service (Rocket and Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy, which it is planned to preserve until 1995) there is a need for mobile forces - a new operational strategic formation of along the lines of the rapid deployment force. These will include airborne assault combined units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile support services for all arms of service, and will be capable of carrying out their mission in any sector of operations." Reported by Colonel O. Falichev, "Grachev Details Armed Forces Creation 'Concept'," Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian, 26 May 92, p. 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, p. 24-25).
3. The Unique Border Problem

As previously mentioned, the geographic situation that Russia is in currently is unique in the history of the country. Since the sudden demise of the USSR, the new borders of Russia (or even the CIS because of the Baltics and Georgia) have left hundreds if not thousands of miles of border uncontrolled and basically open. This has basically left the previous strategic reserve military districts now as the frontline forces that are on the borders opposing foreign armies.

Currently Ukraine and Belarus have sizeable armed forces that are considerably well equipped. The equipment that was located in both Ukraine and Belarus was the top of the line because of the geographic proximity to the west and NATO forces. This was admitted in an interview with Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin:

Admittedly, a lot of most updated combat material has remained on the territory of Ukraine and Byelarus. I would like to specially emphasize that in terms of proportion the ratio of outdated to up-to-date equipment in those countries is much better than in Russia. The same situation is with the tanks, artillery systems, fire support helicopters, etc.\textsuperscript{74}

Additionally, the former Red Army located in these locations have traditionally had better living conditions and therefore many of these first echelon

\textsuperscript{74} Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrei Kokoshin by Marina Cherunukha and Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the "Nation and Society" feature - transmitted via Kyodo, Moscow, Interfax, in English, (JPRS-TAC-92-025, 17 August 1992, p. 9-10).
well-trained soldiers have sworn loyalty to these countries. The question, though, of these so-called "traitors" is loyalty. For example could a Russian born soldier, who has sworn allegiance to Ukraine, be relied upon to fight against Russians or other "Slav" soldiers?

On the other hand, with the loss of the former Warsaw Pact "buffer zone", the Russian Federation can take some solace in the fact that a new "buffer zone" has been de-facto created against Germany by the presence of these former Republics. Just as the question of loyalty of soldiers between Russia and Ukraine was mentioned above, most assuredly the nuclear-weapon equipped countries of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus would collectively defend against any aggression from the West, whether it be from Germany or NATO.

This unforeseen border relationship that exists now in Russia which has resulted in many areas of the Russian border being unpatrolled on the ground and in the air has presented other problems of an internal nature. Obviously there are no problems in areas where the former Soviet Union's borders coincided with the present day borders of Russia. But in particular, the situation of borders with the Baltics and the central asian states has turned into a tactical and logistical nightmare. An example of an ongoing quagmire that has no end in sight is the current situation in Moldova concerning the 14th Army. This conflict is interesting in that Russia does not have a direct line of communication with its

forces in Moldova and has received the cooperation of Ukraine in getting supply and personnel in the area. Lastly, Moldova and the several other "hot-spots" are providing the world and the Russian government with a preview of the possible "Yugoslavization" that could appear all over the former USSR but most importantly within Russia or on its periphery.

Additionally, the PVO (Air Defense Troops) has lost key facilities to former republics, and large gaps now exist in the air defense network. These border security deficiencies are no doubt going to be solved in the future, but in the meantime, they represent a serious gap in the defense and security of a historically paranoid Russia.

4. Withdrawal of Forces

The withdrawal of general purpose forces (GPF) from the former Warsaw Pact, Mongolia, Cuba, Libya, and other areas around the globe is a number one priority for not only the Russians but for some of the host countries, such as is the case with the Baltic Republics. The problem here is the already strained logistical resources in Russia are not capable of removing these forces or providing them decent living conditions when they do return. Moreover, recalling the ground forces is more complicated that air and naval assets, since these forces will have to transit across what is quickly becoming unfriendly if not hostile areas. This recall of GPF troops has resulted in a paradox since the government of Russia desperately wants to gather all of the personnel and equipment of the GPF, yet they do not currently have the resources to support the
move. This inability to immediately recall all of the GPF, especially in the Groups of Forces Germany, is being driven by the socio-economic conditions in Russia. Keeping the military content in the near future is definitely a high priority of the Russian government.

5. The Socio-Economic Impact

A very prevalent theme in the Russian government is the necessity to provide for the social concerns of current and former military members. The Russian government consideration over these social concerns are based on the historic respect and stature of the military but most importantly the current leadership clearly understands that the military prevented the success of the coup and has been surprisingly passive in the momentous events that have taken place over the last three years. It is therefore valid to assume that reducing the military in the transitional stage is as dependent on the socio-economic forces as any perceived military threat. Lastly, the vast problems of the withdrawal and the socio-economic impact are also intertwined with the difficulties of implementing the CFE treaty and its many provisions.

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In this newscast the text read "RIA today carried a statement by Dmitriy Volkogonov, Russian Peoples deputy and President Yeltsin's military affairs counselor, in which he said Russia intends to take under its wing all military units that have not yet been taken under the jurisdiction of other republics. Not a single Russian soldier or officer must remain without political and social protection, Dimitry Volkogonov said." From the "Novosti" broadcast carried by the Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network, in Russian, 1700 GMT, 8 April 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 19).
6. Impact of the CFE Treaty

The CFE treaty will have an enormous impact on the future force structure of the Russian armed forces. While it was being negotiated it was considered a "watershed" in terms of arms control agreements, but since the signing of the treaty the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union disintegrated. This has led to many criticisms waged against it from both sides of the Atlantic. The most fundamental criticism waged by all signatories is that the CFE is an already worthless arms control agreement that has been overtaken by events and should be consigned to history books. Nevertheless, the CFE is an important arms control agreement that will have a significant impact on the force structure of Russia and therefore bears close examination. This section will give a short summary and explanation of the original CFE treaty and show the impact it will have on Russia. Additionally, there will be a short discussion on the impact that the follow on CFE-1A might have on Russia.

"The CFE Treaty that was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 was hailed by the participating heads of government as a historic landmark. The CFE Treaty was an important event if for no other reason than for the speed and the current European environment of the time in which it was negotiated and finalized. The CFE was negotiated and completed within 18 months concurrently with the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). The timely completion of the treaty was a political testament of the signatories that they desired stability in Europe.


"The United States, along with most of the Western nations, ratified the CFE on 26 December, 1992."
a. **Summary of the CFE**

Basically the CFE Treaty can be summarized into four main components: 1) numerical limits both on categories of military hardware most critical for conducting offensive operations and on their deployment in differing sub-zones of the treaty's area of application from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU); 2) reductions in the levels of military assets of the 22 signatories of the agreement and the destruction of equipment in excess of allowed national holdings; 3) a detailed verification regime that includes extensive information exchange; and most importantly 4) implementation provisions. Besides the treaty itself, there were several vital associated commitments. These commitments limit the number of land-based aircraft and also restrict the size of the German Bundeswehr.

The original CFE treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, and ratified by most concerned parties by the fall of 1992, yet there were still some ambiguities which were agreed by all signatories to be clarified with follow-on

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1^Jane M.O. Sharp "Conventional Arms Control in Europe," SIPRI Yearbook 1991, 1991 ed., p. 407-60. The CFE covers battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, deployed by the 22 NATO and former WTO countries on the land territory defined as the ATTU. According to data that was released at its signature, the Treaty requires 44,329 Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) items to be removed from the ATTU zone and 27,000 items to be destroyed for the former WTO and NATO, respectively.

negotiations.  Some of these 'loose ends' were manpower limits, stabilization measures, and Open Skies.  Furthermore, since the signing of the treaty and the fall of the Soviet Union, many questions arose concerning which republics will be responsible for either part or all of the obligations of the former USSR.

b. The Tashkent Agreement

The CFE could have turned into a major altercation between several of the former Republics of the USSR had not the May 15, 1992 Tashkent agreement been brokered. Prior to this agreement all of the affected former Republics had made public statements to the effect that they support ratification of the treaty in their legislative bodies. The problem though, was that the former republics have also made statements declaring the formation of their respective armies and with the stated size of these armies the combination of the numbers

"John W.R. Lepingwell and Alfred A. Reisch ed. "Military and Security Notes," RFE/RL Research Report, 29 October, 1992. The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the CFE Treaty at a closed session on 21 October, ITAR-TASS reported. The treaty came into force on 17 July 1992, and Armenia is now the only one of the twenty-nine signatories not to have ratified the treaty, though they are expected to do so in the near future.

Open Skies was signed as a separate agreement on 24 March 1992.

of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) would be in violation of the CFE.\textsuperscript{185} This altercation could have resulted in the first major conflict between the major players involved. In connection with this is the problem now that Russia is experiencing with small local conflicts, such as in South Ossetia, Chechen-Ingush, and Moldova, just to mention a few. These local wars are hampering Russia from fully implementing the terms of the CFE.\textsuperscript{186}

c. Unforeseen developments

The first unforeseen development that has arisen in the CFE is concerning the displacement of TLE which is defined by the term "cascading." Cascading can best be defined as transferring the best modern equipment from the superpower allies to the less wealthy allies which in turn destroy their inferior combat equipment to meet the TLE provisions. This transfer preserves the best equipment among allies. Cascading is a major logistical problem that is difficult to accomplish, yet nevertheless happening on both sides of the signing parties to

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\textsuperscript{185} This problem was supposedly solved at the May 1992 CIS Tashkent Summit, but might still become a problem as reported in the article "General Staff Officer on Division of Weaponry" by Major-General Vadim Grechaninov, chief of the Center for Operational-Strategic Research of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: "Divorce Moscow-Style," carried in Kiev, Golos Ukrainy, in Russian, 2 April 1992, p. 3, (JPRS-UMA-92-014, 11 April 1992, p. 4-5).

the CFE.\textsuperscript{157} The cascading can even be taken one step further. The poor allies upon receiving modern equipment are then able to sell or transfer their weapons to other parts of the world instead of destroying them.\textsuperscript{158} Additionally, this internal distribution between the Cold War allies is politically tenable. The CFE calls for the destruction of withdrawn equipment, and, although it can be argued that this applies to the net reduction and does not prohibit internal redistribution, such a move is likely to be seen by the West like another possible treaty 'loophole'\textsuperscript{159} much like the transfer of motorized rifle divisions to the coastal defense forces.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{157} Rene Luria, "CFE armor windfall for Spain," \textit{International Defense Review}, vol 25, 1992, p. 92-93. Although this article describes a NATO type "cascading" this is most likely taking place internally within Russia and between former republics of the USSR and some members of the former Warsaw Pact. In effect cascading is providing some countries a cut-price global modernization program.

\textsuperscript{159} There are provisions in the CFE for certain amounts of equipment that have to be destroyed, but there is still vast amounts of displaced equipment that is being exported worldwide.


The USSR attempted to use a 'loophole' during the CFE negotiations by transferring three motorized rifle divisions to their coastal defense forces and other TLE equipment to the Strategic Rocket Forces. Col. Mike Rafanelli of the J-5 on 2 June 1992 at a briefing at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Ca. stated that "The transfer of the TLE to the Soviet Naval Infantry gave it more tanks than all of the British Army." This transfer in effect made them part of the naval infantry and excluded their equipment from the TLE provisions. This problem was eventually rectified in negotiation and under the terms of the treaty all land based naval forces fall under the TLE.
Russia no doubt sees many short term benefits in the CFE and a CFE1-A follow on. The commitment of limiting the size of the German Bundeswehr was an important component of the CFE. This commitment did quell Russian worries about a united Germany. This provision alone with some modification in CFE-1A will allow a continuing nondiscriminatory vehicle for the discussion of the size and shape of an all-German military power and the nature of superpower involvement and the guarantee roles they can play during the transition at specific levels of deployment and preparedness.1

Also the legality of the CFE, in view of the heightened role being played today by the United Nations, is of concern to Russia. A legal document, such as the CFE will force any potential aggressor to blatantly violate a binding treaty considerably prior to a planned attack.2 Additionally, if implemented the verification procedures should provide enough warning time for the other members of the treaty to prepare for military operations. This can be interpreted in Russia as a security guarantee or as a possible means of the world community "ganging up" on Russia in the future under the auspices of the CFE provisions. Depending on the Russian leadership at the time of negotiating the CFE1-A, it could include the critical components of non-compliance punishment, similar to

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the once proposed Baruch plan of the United Nations for nuclear non-proliferation.103

Additionally, a democratic reform minded Russian leadership might look favorably upon other CFE related agreements such as confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The Russian Federation might perceive CSBMs as important instruments to be utilized in the short term for promoting regional security in the new multi-polar world.104

d. CFE Summary

The CFE has paved the way as the first ever major international agreement on the reduction of conventional arms.105 The question though is how the future Russian leadership will view the document. On the one hand the CFE can be viewed as a valid security document that can prevent Germany, or any other European aggressor, from staging an operational-strategic attack on the motherland. But the conservative forces most like see the CFE as a bad treaty for Russia and disagree with the Tashkent agreed limits. Furthermore the

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104 Also signed in November 1990 and endorsed at the Paris summit was the Vienna Document 1990 which represented the culmination of extensive negotiations on CSBMs among the 34 members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Two important components of this document were the Unusual Military Activities (UMA) measure and the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). Both of these measures will further strengthen the already solid foundation laid by the CFE.
conservatives most likely perceive the CFE as a possible excuse for Western intervention in their country. Most importantly in the new world environment where the U.N. and international law is becoming paramount it is important to keep in mind that the treaty does legally bind the signatories. Depending on the future Russian government, CFE1-A negotiations might address such things as limits on tactical nuclear weapons and military personnel, sharing of multinational, and national technical means of information.

The CSBMs and the openness that will be fostered during the treaty implementation is currently being warmly received. This was even stated post-coup by the Soviet Chief of Staff, and North Atlantic Assembly associate delegate General Vladimir Lobov, when he stated on 29 August 1991 that he remained a continued advocate of "widening contacts both with the armies of the East European countries and with NATO, at all levels, in any form".

In sum the CFE has both positive and negative affects on the future of Russia depending on the motivations of the Kremlin leadership. If a conservative force comes to power in Moscow the West could expect to see Russia violating the CFE or demanding a renegotiation of the TLE limits set by the treaty itself or the Tashkent agreement. If the current democratic trends continue with

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a reform minded leadership the treaty will most likely be observed and add much needed stability in a post cold-war europe.

7. Ground Forces Force Structure

The new military doctrine will be a painful pill to swallow for the ground forces, and more importantly, for the tank troops. The tank troops have been the historic muscle behind the ground forces and were considered a source of great strength for the Russian military. That is all changing. Besides the attacks from the "high-tech" proponents, the impact of the CFE, there is a growing sentiment in higher military circles that light forces are key now if for no other reason than peacekeeping. President Yeltsin's military aide General Dmitriy Volkogonov in an interview expounded on this:

I propose that our country sell around half the 40,000 tanks we have and give half the money raised by the sale directly to military personnel, so they can purchase apartments. [as to military doctrine] ...that of the former Soviet Union was quite offensive - otherwise why so many tanks? - and we are now seeking a defensive doctrine based on being ready to defend Russia's sovereignty and being able to take part in neutralizing conflicts. The chance of a world war is zero, while that of regional conflicts is increasing. For that reason, in agreement with our neighbors and allies, we are organizing peacekeeping forces, as in Ossetia or Moldova, and we will take part with our contingents where the United Nations decides, as in Yugoslavia."

The above passage basically expresses the gloomy future for the "iron dinosaurs" in a variant three defensive doctrine.

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Interview with General Dmitriy Volkogonov, military adviser to President Yeltsin, by Rafael Porch in Moscow, date not given, Barcelona, La Vanguardia, in Spanish, 2 Aug 92, p. 8, (JPRS-TAC-92-026, 20 August 1992, p. 17).
This is not to say that another tank will no longer be seen on the Russian plains, but indeed there priority within the military has fallen precipitously. Also, not to be dismissed in connection with the CFE treaty, is the strategic importance of the some 21,000 tanks of different models that are located on the eastern side of the Ural mountains. Many of these tanks were moved there quickly so that they would not have to be declared in the CFE negotiations and be subject to the TLE limits.

Another facet to this argument is that there does appear to be a need for "light" armor that is easily transportable. Since regional and local wars are a priority in Russian defense planning now, there will be a shift to produce this type of vehicle. When Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin was recently interviewed on the new military doctrine he said:

"Russia is going to place special emphasis on mobile forces with relatively light armor. I don't think we will ever again produce tanks in such enormous quantities. At the same time, we do not want to forfeit our preponderance in tanks."

The implication here is that Russia will attempt to develop and produce more light armor vehicles, but that they will also maintain the armor assets they have that will be left after the CFE and Tashkent agreement are completed.
Also for economic considerations, Russia will find it necessary to make maximum use of existing military potential and the existing infrastructure of the armed forces stationed on Russia's territory. This will be combined with the troops being withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and the Baltic States, troop units from the Transcaucasus, and combined units and units which do not form part of the CIS member states' national armies. Eventually, they could be transformed into highly mobile units and rapid reaction combined units.

a. The new TVDs

Within the context of the many limitations of Russia currently and in the near future it would be unfeasible for Russia to maintain major combined arms formations on all strategic axes which could pose also pose a threat for her neighbors and therefore force them to arm themselves. However, the military experts in Russia do agree that Russia needs to maintain a definite number of combat ready division-sized and smaller units on the most dangerous axes in any case so that one is tempted to provoke a "crisis situation" or military conflict. And lastly, Russia will need and provide for the capability to reinforce a formation using a mobile reserve.

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The mobile forces will be arrayed in three TVDs (Western, Siberian [Also labeled Southern or Central], and [Far] Eastern). Operating within these TVDs there will be four strategic commands: West, Southwest, East, and a reserve command. The military district commander (of the strategic axis) will carry out ground and air defense, and in essence conduct true integrated combined arms operations. This is something that is currently not being taught at the such military academies such as the Frunze Academy in Moscow. Instructors from the Frunze academy told the authors that they train for combined arms operations only in the sense of organic equipment that is in the inventory of the army. The Russian leadership will attempt to train for true combined arms integration combining the PVO, navy, air forces, and ground forces.

The forces by their nature of being mobile and defined as "light" will have a limited ability to conduct aggressive combat operations, or for that matter to stage any type of strategic-operational offensive operation. The variant three defensive type doctrine is clearly evident here in what is being predicted for the future of ground forces. Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and possibly peacemaking will be the predominant missions for the Russian ground forces in the near future and most likely will stay that way to the year 2000.

Additionally, the Russian military recognizes that the defensive sufficiency concept, in regards to quality and quantity of the armed forces, varies

ibid.
by TVD. For example, in the Southern and Far East TVDs defensive sufficiency can be provided with a lesser number and lower quality of forces. This is predicated on the type of threat that is perceived by Russia in these TVDs. Russia does not consider China or some Central Asian countries as having an advantage in quality or quantity of armed forces.

As far as the defensive sufficiency in the Western TVD is concerned, the Russian military clearly recognizes that the impact of technology and therefore quality of the military is vastly different. In this TVD the military must be a force that has both quality and quantity. The impact of the Gulf war might be a driving force in these decisions, since there was prior discussion of only requiring a quantitative advantage in the Far East and Southern TVD, while in the Western TVD the emphasis has always been on quality. The correlation of forces computations combined with budgetary constraints, will be the driving force in equipping and manning the forces in each TVD.

Therefore, if we estimate a sixty division ground force based on the proclaimed reductions, we can assume that these forces will be roughly divided in the three TVDs equally. The difference of the quality of the weapons and the manning of the divisions in each TVD should reflect the nature of the threat on each axis. The "groups of forces" will cease to exist after the complete

withdrawal of forces from the former Warsaw Pact, and the consolidation of former USSR military forces on Russian territory. The military district system will probably survive the reform and there will probably be two to three in each TVD. Lastly, the CIS (and possibly also Russian Federation) will form and employ a rapid-response force that will consist of special military and militia subunits that will be primarily trained for conducting tactical level defensive operations.\textsuperscript{315} The primary mission, which for now is being tasked to the airborne forces, is that of peacekeeping/peacemaking.

\subsection*{b. Peacekeeping/Peacemaking}

As for peacekeeping, this is becoming a growth industry in Russia and the job has fallen to the Airborne troops of the ground forces.\textsuperscript{316} The proportion of airborne divisions within the estimated sixty divisions of the Russian military will grow significantly. In the Red Army there only existed eight divisions within the ground forces that numbered near 120. In the year 2000 these airborne divisions will probably grow to comprise at least one-sixth of the

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total amount of ground forces divisions. This is quite significant because the offensive combat potential of an airborne is considerably less than that of a T-80 equipped motorized rifle division.

More local peacekeepers are at work in the outer areas of the former Soviet Union than in any other part of the world. Most of them are Russians. Forces claiming to represent the CIS have gone to both Moldova and South Ossetia, a part of Georgia. In the near future Russian peacekeepers might be summoned to Tajikistan and the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. And lastly Russian forces are already struggling to keep the peace in another part of Georgia, Abkhazia, and in other parts of Tajikistan.

In September the same members of the CIS who agreed to a treaty on collective security agreed to had over command of the peacekeeping operations to the CIS armed forces. The bulk of these peacekeepers have been Russian, thus opening the door to the charge that Russia is using peacekeeping as a means of pursuing its own interests. It remains to be seen if the Russian military (or CIS) will attempt to offer the excuse of peacekeeping in order to justify regional intervention.

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8. Other Military/Para-Military Forces

a. The KGB and Border Troops

The KGB and Border Troops are also being reconfigured and they will no doubt have a larger part to play because of the previously described unique border situation in Russia. Primarily Russia does not feel the need to have full-scale, army-protected borders with all of the former republics. In the case of the Baltics there will be full-scale borders, guarded by troops and with customs posts and visa control. The transparency of the borders with the Baltics is costing the Russian Federation hundreds of millions of rubles because they are basically transparent. In areas of republics have created their own border forces (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), but yet do not control the traffic on the border, Russia will most likely close these borders. Conversely, the adjacent republics that have common border practices (Byelarus and Uzbekistan) will remain open with a single external border regime. And lastly, Russia will provide border security for states that have not formed their own border forces (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan).

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*ibid.*

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The missions of these troops will also include play a larger role in the peacekeeping role since they will be equipped with helicopters, light armor, and limited artillery assets. Since these troops will be full-time and also more professional, an extra burden might be placed on them for regional threat detection along the some 60,000 kilometers of the Russian border.

b. The Strategic Rocket Forces

The ground troops of the Strategic Rocket Forces are a very small force that will probably not be affected much in the reform period. These troops have only some 1,700 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 140 helicopters. Of these numbers that were declared under the CFE Russia will inherit only 700 APCs under the limits of the Tashkent agreement. This is the smallest contingent of ground forces and clearly plays no strategic or operational role, though they do reinforce the appearance of a variant three type defensive force, because they are so inconsequential.

c. The Russian Naval Infantry

In the early 1980's the naval infantry was reorganized when the Coastal Defense Force (CDF) was restored by the Soviet Navy and absorbed two former branches, the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) and the Coastal Missile Artillery Force (CMAF). This reorganization of the Navy's land-based coastal defense force

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ibid.

was probably initiated as a result of Soviet force reductions and their declared
defensive doctrine. One Soviet source has stated that the Coastal Force is a
revival of the old Coastal Defense Service that was a major branch of the Navy
from 1926 until its abolition in the early 1960's.212

In 1990 three Motorized Rifle Divisions were transferred to the
Soviet Navy in an attempt to exempt their equipment from the Conventional
Force in Europe treaty (CFE). Currently each fleet's land-based coastal defense
force now combines a former motorized rifle division, renamed a coastal defense
division (CDD), Naval Infantry, and a Coastal Missile Artillery Force. The same
structure had previously existed within the Pacific Ocean Fleet.

As stated above, although the RNI is under the control of the CDF
its primary mission and training emphasis has not been restricted to defense of
the coast but rather toward amphibious assaults/landings. This is a military
operation of the RNI that has both tactical and operational significance especially
since the transfer of the MRDs to the Fleet.

After the military reform, the future total strength of the Soviet
Naval Infantry with the recently transferred MRDs should not exceed 70,000 men
including the higher staffs and support troops as well as the training elements.
The presence of the MRDs in a coastal defense role would not exclude their

---Department of Defense, 1991 Military Force in Transition
availability for amphibious warfare operations since the majority of their equipment is compatible with amphibious warfare ships.

The merchant marine fleet of the former Soviet Union was key to the deployment of the naval infantry and other ground forces. As part of the military reform and privatization of many state assets, the capability of the military to use merchant ships for military operations has significantly been downgraded. Additionally RO/RO (Roll-on/Roll-off) ships, all of which can serve as military sealift or logistics ships, are on order. These ships will probably be completed since they also hold important civilian use, but again their availability in the future for combat operations is not as secure as in the past when the civilian industry of the USSR would immediately heed to orders from Moscow. Lastly, as noted in the appendix, future construction will be limited to small combatants and some submarines. Therefore there will be no growth in amphibious capability.

By the year 2000 the RNI will have completed the transition under the military reform program since it is a smaller force and is not undergoing as much restructuring as the rest of the military. During the transitional period, though, the RNI will be degraded considerably, probably only being able to provide regional security and defense missions. This decline in military capability will be short lived.

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9. Ground Forces Summary

In the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the general trends that can be expected are sizable force reductions, degradation of operational readiness, reduced mobilization potential, and most importantly an inability to conduct large scale offensive operations. The key concept to keep in mind for the future is that intentions are very difficult to recognize, while capabilities are not.

When the reform process is complete ground forces will definitely resemble the “meaner and leaner” concept and will attempt to become a genuine professional military. This will be accomplished by the downsizing of personnel and equipment in all parts of the ground forces to generate effective mobile type forces to operate in the proposed three TVDs (Far East, South and West). The internal transfer of newer combat equipment (cascading) and personnel will at a minimum replace older assets and at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat potential of the ground forces. The military will have a mostly professional force, that is highly trained, very mobile, highly motivated and equipped with modern conventional arms.\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{214}In an "Appended' Statement Issued" to the Resolution on Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and also for the fulfillment of Russia's international commitments...the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of delivery...For the prompt neutralization of possible local military conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
The concept of operations of the ground forces will in general remain the same, but will probably attempt to incorporate much more combined arms integration, and defense training aimed against enemies with advanced conventional munitions. Furthermore, the ground forces will with much difficulty strive to develop their own equipment in line with the "military-technical revolution."

Although research and development for ground forces will be cut drastically we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems already developed, such as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel carrier. The older equipment in the inventory will either be destroyed, sold, or stored east of the Urals in compliance with the CFE treaty.

The reconstitution capability of the ground forces will remain high since the vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not deteriorate due to the cold dry climate. The exact number and type of these armored vehicles in unknown though it will remain an important strategic asset since many of the armored vehicles can be easily brought up to working condition by some routine maintenance and battery replacement. Much of this TLE is modern equipment and will most likely be kept, while the obsolete TLE and excess equipment will be destroyed or sold in the arms export business for hard currency.

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In the long run the ground forces, after a painful reform, could transform into a force that would have the capability to execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO, though this is unlikely. This is predicated on the assumption of the predicted size of NATO and the U.S. forces (Base Force 1) in Europe in 1995. The bottom line is that although the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get smaller they will become more lethal, defensive oriented, and truly represent a variant three type doctrine.

Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews. Additionally, the ground forces might be inclined to volunteer their forces for external peace-keeping duties, if for no other reason than for minimal training value, deferment of training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the Russian flag and to provide for a more stable environment which is beneficial to Russian economic reform. There will probably be an emphasis on low intensity conflict intervention, in view of the problems arising in the new multi-polar environment.
D. THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES

1. Introduction

The old mission of the Soviet Air Defense Troops was the responsibility for the air defense of industrial areas, military installations, deployed troops and other vital interests in the USSR and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. They accomplished this mission by having control of non-ground force surface-to-air weapon systems, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile defenses, space, ground- and air-based early warning radar systems and fighter interception, the national warning and monitoring organization, and all civil and military air traffic control.

The USSR air defense system was based on "a series of separate, highly defended 'islands' (of valuable targets) in a vast, largely undefended wasteland." This system, which was the most practical because of the geographical vastness of the USSR, had its flaws. The system was developed and intended to detect and repel large scale air attacks on the country. Anything short of an all out attack from NATO or other forces was the inherent weakness in the system. The flaws in this system were demonstrated by two fairly recent key events.

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"Donnelly, 147.

"ibid., 147.

The first event was the 1983 incident in which the Korean Boeing 747 (KAL 007) was destroyed over Sakhalin. This incident demonstrated the problem of communications and control of an air defense system that spans eleven time zones. But as Christopher Donnelly explains:

Despite the fact that the KAL 007 disaster proved the Soviet system to be somewhat inappropriate for peacetime, theirs is an eminently sensible solution for major war, when there is likely to be less sensitivity to the destruction of a civilian airliner in error.21"

The second event that had a measurable impact on the Air Defense Forces was the Mathias Rust incident in 1987, when a nineteen-year-old West German computer operator, landed his Cessna 172 by the Kremlin Wall on a May evening in 1987. Rust had flown his single engine Cessna through over 650 kilometers of some of the most heavily guarded air defense districts of the country. The flight was a great embarrassment to the Soviet military and provided Gorbachev with an excuse for sacking the defense minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov, and the PVO chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Koldunov (a survivor of the 1983 KAL 007 incident).21" Both of these incidents seriously affected the PVO and the situation did not improve in the ranks with the announcement of a new defensive doctrine and the recall and reduction of forces

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"Donnelly, 20.

that Gorbachev was calling for. The situation did not change considerably till the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet empire.

2. The Current Status of the PVO

Obviously the paramount problem facing the PVO today is the new geographical border situation of Russia. Additionally, the loss of key facilities on the borders of the former Soviet Union, especially in the Baltics, has left large gaps in what was once considered an effective network. But the question remains as to how will a security conscious Russian state cope with a less than adequate air defense shield. The logical solution would be for the CIS to coordinate the former PVO system under the logic that it is tied in with nuclear security and ABM defenses. But as everyone now knows, logic is not part of the decision making process when historical animosities, ethnic problems, and raw nationalist sentiment are evident.

Logic and economics though, temporarily appear to be prevailing. It appears that at least for the short term the CIS will try to maintain its air defense system since each new Republic cannot afford to re-invent a new effective air defense system. The chief of staff of the PVO has accurately stated:

I want to particularly point out that it would be extremely difficult to establish an effective air defense system for individual republics. Furthermore, this would require large forces and funds. I am profoundly convinced that the air defense system - and in the future an aerospace
defense system - must be a unified system for our entire Commonwealth of Independent States.120

3. Future of the PVO

The future restructuring of the PVO will be one of the most difficult of all the other branches because of the nature of its mission and the loss of key facilities on the periphery of the former USSR. This branch, as explained above has had its share of difficulty in adapting to the new geo-strategic position of Russia. Plainly, the first needed change for the PVO is to revise the above stated mission statement to conform to the new doctrine and geo-strategic position of Russia. Secondly the PVO will be a key player in the new "high-tech" war of the future.

The impact of the technology utilized in the Gulf war was far more significant in the Air Defense Troops as in any other branch of the Russian armed forces. The Gulf war impact was felt in two different areas. The first area was that of the importance of air power and is best characterized by the following quote from a recent Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) journal.

Persian Gulf combat operations summed up wars of position involving armies of millions. The possibility was demonstrated there of creating a powerful air grouping in a relatively short time in any region of the world capable of independently performing strategic missions during an air

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campaign. Aerospace became a very important sphere of warfare (emphasis added).221

In addition to the loss of the critical permanent radars and installations the PVO troops are to be among the first to completely vacate the Baltic region.222 This has lead to the loss of the first echelon of air defenses in what was the Western theater of military operations, and greatly reduced the time available to make the decision to alert other forces. The PVO is also scheduled to be reduced by more than one-third of its present strength in the reform program.223 These developments will also have a great impact on the PVO and may make it one of the last branches to fully reform in the near future.

As stated earlier, the CIS temporarily appears to have come to some agreement on maintaining the PVO network, most likely because of economic considerations. There has been great investment in the systems of the PVO that were responsible for the air security of the former USSR. Many of these assets are permanent and cannot be removed or displaced easily. An example of this is the part of the PVO responsible for defense of attacks from satellite weapons platforms.

---ibid.


---ibid, 3.
The Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN) that is part of the Air Defense Forces monitors the orbital parameters of objects in near-earth orbits that could threaten what was the former USSR. The radar sites are currently deployed on what was the periphery of the former Soviet Union, and what is now the territory of six independent countries. This system would be prohibitively costly to move or to rebuild for Russia or any other republic. In this area the PVO troops could logically come under the auspices of the CIS command structure because it possesses missiles armed with nuclear warheads that are supposedly used to repel enemy air attacks and is clearly a strategic weapons system.

Within this context and the new draft military doctrine, the PVO's new mission statement and reform was defined recently at a special conference of military reform. The restructuring/reform of the PVO will be accomplished by:

- optimizing the authorized organizational structure in accordance with the nature of a possible war and the missions to be performed; the assets warning of aggression and aerospace attack, ensuring the reliable repulsing of enemy air-launched missile strikes, and delivering a retaliatory strike against him; as well as mobile forces capable of operating in any sector where a threat to Russia's security should arise.

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In accordance with these goals the PVO will include the following systems: unified reconnaissance and aerospace attack warning, command and control, missile-space defense, and air defense.22 The Air Defense Troops Reconnaissance and Aerospace Attack Warning System will:

perform missions of providing information to the President and Supreme High Command on the preparation and beginning of an aerospace attack, as well as providing intelligence and tactical information to command and control agencies and air defense weapons. It includes space, air, and ground (including above-the-horizon and over-the-horizon) reconnaissance personnel and equipment of the Air Defense Forces, General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, and assets of military districts.

The Missile-space Defense System will include the following:

Air Defense Troops large strategic formations for missile attack warning, for ABM and space defense, and for space surveillance; EW equipment for anti-satellite warfare of other branches of the Armed Forces deployed on and outside of Russian territory and in outer space. Command and control of mixed forces and equipment of missile-space defense must be exercised centrally from the Air Defense Troops' Central Command Post via corresponding system command posts. Political resolution of the question of the status of groupings of missile-space defense assets deployed on territories of sovereign states is a problem of today.

The third component, the Air Defense system itself will include:

large strategic formations of the Air Defense Troops, and the air defense troops of the military districts and fleets. We assume it is advisable to build Russian Federation air defense on a territorial principle, where all Russian territory is divided into air defense zones. The zones include corps (division) air defense areas, the boundaries of which correspond to boundaries of responsibility of formations.

The last and most critical component of the future PVO will be the command and control of all the air defense and missile-space defense forces which:

---ibid, 35.
must be exercised from the Central Command Post by the Air Defense Troops Commander. Chiefs of air defense zones and areas exercise command and control of all forces deployed or arriving in these zones and areas regardless of subordination, and they bear total responsibility for the performance of air defense missions, for operational preparation of the territory in support of air defense, and for organizing battle management of all forces within the established boundaries.

The PVO leadership apparently clearly understand that to realign this branch within the economic constraints of the time, they will have to preserve the costly intelligence and battle management system created and already constantly functioning in peacetime, as well as attempting to provide the favorable conditions for future establishment of an ABM defense in theaters of military operations. Additionally, the command and control system of Air Defense, Air Force and Navy fighter aviation (including command posts and vectoring posts) established in the Air Defense Troops based on a unified radar field will be preserved.

In specifics, the concept of the PVO proposal, after the re-structuring, calls for an air defense district; several air defense armies and a missile attack warning army; and separate air defense, ABM defense and space surveillance corps, divisions and brigades. This order of battle was defined by maintaining minimum defensive sufficiency, but most importantly, "cost effectiveness" criteria.

Also, this structure is attempting to come to grips with the likely possibility of local/regional conflicts which will warrant a strategic flexibility of defense.

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Surnin, 36.
There has been a movement afoot to eliminate the PVO as a branch of the armed forces. The proposal is based on the fact that there is no such branch as the PVO in the majority of the foreign armies. Other arguments have been presented but currently it appears that a compromise is taking place. The PVO will still be a branch of the Russian military but some key assets will be shifted to the Strategic Defense Forces and other assets will be transferred to the commanders within the TVDs.

In summary, the near future will be determined by the economic constraints placed on the PVO and can best be described with the words of Major-General A.S. Sumin:

Maintaining a global military balance will require a significant additional buildup of air defense forces, and we assume that at the present time this is not dictated by the military-political situation and is unrealistic from an economic standpoint.

E. THE AIR FORCES

1. Introduction

The former Soviet air assets consisted of the Soviet Air Forces (SAF), the Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), and Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA). These three organizations also subject to the vast re-structuring that will result from the
withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe, the military reform, the impact of the Gulf war, and the nationalization of these assets by former republics. This section will concentrate on the Russian Air Forces, which will basically shadow the future of all the components that make up the air assets of Russia.

2. The Present and Future of the Russian Air Forces

The Russian Air Forces, just like every other branch, have been devastated by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The one fact that has aided this branch was that the main assets of the branch - aircraft, can and were displaced easily after the break-up. Many units did nationalize in former Soviet Republics, such as the prestigious Tu-160 Backfire Bomber (which has been compared to the US B1-B) regiment in the Ukraine that was unilaterally privatized by that government. These bombers were "secured" by the Ukrainian military not only because of their strategic offensive capability, but more importantly they can be sold for hard currency or fulfill the long range transportation mission. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the vast majority of the pilots did not swear allegiance to Ukraine and returned to Russia. This has been the case of most of the air forces that found themselves outside of the Russian Federation. These air forces by and large have pledged their loyalty to Russia and simply flew their planes back to their "motherland." And in the rare cases that the planes were unable to be


ibid.
removed, the pilots left themselves and returned to serve the Russian Armed Forces.

Secondly, the impact of the Gulf war and its connections with air power was duly noted by the leaders of the former Soviet Air Forces and new Russian Air Forces. This was exemplified in the force generation concept, purpose and missions under present and future conditions, that was logically presented in the July 1992 special edition of *Military Thought*. This method for determining the future structure of the air forces was presented in a diagram that made very strong references to the importance of technology in future air forces. The approach is a very methodological and scientific method of reforming the Air Forces, (which greatly resembles the Soviet scientific approach) and has clearly taken into consideration the impending Ogarkov "scientific revolution." From this method and diagram a few conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the Air Forces will have to perform two groups of missions in future wars and armed conflicts of varying intensity: air superiority and air interdiction.

Prevalent in this article was the concept of the fluidity of future wars and their lack of clearly defined borders. In Russian terms this mobile nature of modern war presumes rapid establishment of groupings of troops and aviation with a transfer of their assets to other theaters of military operations or axes. This problem will be solved with a mobile transportation structure using large-capacity military aviation as its basis. Once again this was a reaction to the coalition efforts during Gulf war.
Future air forces of Russia will also attempt to integrate reserves units. These units should be comprised of reserve aircraft and trained flight and technical personnel. A problem will arise here because of the training required for a fighter pilot. In the case of transport pilots, though, this makes good sense.

A good summary of the missions and basic structure of the air forces in a future war was accurately stated by the chief of the Yuri Gagarin Air Academy:

The performance of missions facing aviation in an air campaign as well as in joint and independent operations is possible only with the presence of large air units in the makeup of the Russian Air Forces, including formations and units of various air arms capable of independently performing the full set of missions in operations and, most importantly, ensuring attainment of their goals. In our view, air armies meet these requirements. They can be of two types: large strategic formations of Long Range Aviation, large strategic formations of Front Aviation, and Military-Transport Aviation.

What this will probably mean in terms of commands is four aviation commands in the authorized organizational structure: Long-range and Naval Missile-Armed Aviation, Front Aviation, Military-Transport Aviation, and Cadres and Reserve Training. The immense change here from the former Soviet Air Forces is the presence of a cadres and reserve command. As noted above, this will be difficult to accomplish in the fighter squadrons, yet is probable and inevitable in other areas mainly because of the economic problems in the military at large. Therefore an important intelligence indicator would be the evidence of the formation of a serious air force reserve component. As for the importance of
high-tech weapons, the chief of the Air Academy acknowledges the need for them when he says:

The shift of emphasis in warfare to airspace and aerospace, especially in the initial period of war, is becoming obvious. Operations and engagements are acquiring a clear-cut three dimensional character with broad use of EW equipment and precision weapons. A trend is clearly seen toward a disproportionate change in the relative importance of branches of the armed forces in achieving goals of operations and the war as a whole. The Air Forces will steadily grow. It must become the nucleus of Russia's mobile Armed Forces.231

Future production of the Tu-160 Blackjack will stop at a level equivalent to the B1-B and that production of the Tu-142 Bear will stop altogether.232 However, other aircraft programs are expected to have been preserved because of the need for hard currency sales and to keep the technological base alive. "These include two next-generation fighters, a major upgrade to the Su-27 Flanker, and a jet trainer to replace the L-39."233 The emphasis on going ahead with the new fighter programs is again that they will hopefully provide a source of hard currency, as advanced fighters have done in the past.

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The ability to reconstitute air assets will be virtually nonexistent without a planned reserve component to build upon. Front-line aircraft will be limited in numbers and those in storage will be in such a poor material condition of readiness as to make them useless. Additional hardware would have to be produced which would put a severe strain on an already weak economy, which is explained in detail in the appendix. A critical, but often overlooked, area will be the shortage of trained pilots and an inability to train additional pilots quickly.

Regarding the impact on US policy, one of the most serious implications will be that although Russian pilot skill and training will likely be low, third world nations will be able to obtain advanced aircraft, particularly fighters.

3. Air Forces Summary

The air forces in Russia, just like all the other branches, are rethinking their role in the new geo-strategic environment of Russia, one that is founded on local, small, regional conflicts that will be fought in a high technology environment. The aviation transport assets that Russia currently owns will be greatly utilized in the near future for purposes of moving equipment and men to local "hot-spots" within the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the leadership in the field of aviation technology will attempt to continue research and development within the limited economic constraints. Some of the funding needed for this may be provided for by hard currency sales of advanced aircraft.
A quote from a senior division aviation inspector sums up some of the problems in the Russian air forces today:

...the level of flight training for the personnel is the same today as before the [Second Great Patriotic] war. There was no fuel then, either, there was not enough spare parts. In order to feel like a fighter a pilot must fly on a regular basis, but we get into the air once a week at best. Even then, what are the flights like? We must not deviate either to the right or to the left, as though we are carrying not bombs and missiles but bowls filled to the brim with borsch. When the squadron flies, it is always in 'skilled file,' aircraft after aircraft at intervals of two-three minutes. We penetrate air defenses in the same way. In a real situation all of the aircraft would be shot down. It is like making a hole in the wall, putting a cat on one side and a bunch of mice on the other [side] and letting the mice go through one at a time....Why repeat those errors?2

F. THE NAVAL FORCES

1. Introduction

The former Soviet Navy has been of special concern to US planners as one of the services capable of projecting power, by nuclear or conventional means, on a worldwide scale. The ability of the navy to still fulfill its conventional and nuclear strategic missions is of great importance to the US. While it is true that President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the US and UK are no longer the
enemy, it is still prudent for US programming and war-planning purposes to study the evolution of the Russian Navy.

As the year 2000 approaches the Russian Navy will have evolved beyond the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form, that may or may not come into competition with the US navy. To examine the Russian Navy in the year 2000 it is necessary to construct the force structure that it is likely to have at that point. The decisions as to that force structure depend upon the reduction/procurement cycles, military policy, doctrine and strategy established by the Russian government. Determination of the military policy, doctrine and strategy is also imperative in projecting the types of employment that the Russian Navy may see at the turn of the century. This, of course, is the crux of the matter for the US Navy, i.e., who will it face, what will they have for forces and how will they employ them.

The Soviet Navy has in the most part been taken over by Russia. The Caspian Flotilla is being divided between several former republics and the Black Sea fleet will be divided between Russia and Ukraine. The Baltic fleet, while Russian, will become a training fleet with little to no strategic value. The rest of

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The issue of the Black Sea Fleet division between Russia and Ukraine was nominally settled with an agreement signed in Yalta on 3 August 1992. It remains to be seen whether this agreement is the final word on the issue. "Full Text' of Black Sea Fleet Agreement," Moscow, Itar-Tass World Service, in Russian, 1152 GMT, 5 Aug 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-151, 7 August 1992, p. 14).
the navy will belong to Russia. Therefore it is Russia's policy, doctrine and strategy that will most directly affect the navy. We have already examined the policy and doctrine of Russia, and the navy has never had a separate strategy in Soviet experience. This will continue in the Russian era. Therefore through the doctrinal and operational-strategic contexts we will examine the naval policy for the future.

James Tritten has examined the topic of the future of the Russian Navy in the wake of the lessons learned from the Gulf War and come to some conclusions as to best and worst case scenarios from the Russian and West's points of view. Tritten states that an article by Admiral Chernavin that postulates a Russian Navy that is defensive but still sees the US as a threat should be considered the worst case for the US and the best case for the Russian Navy. Tritten then goes on to call an article by Konstantin Sorokin the worst case for the Russian Navy and the best for the US. This article stressed coastal defense and elimination of strategic ASW against US SSBN's. Tritten's conclusion that the worst case scenario for the US as stated by Chernavin is unlikely due to resource

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ibid.

ibid, 599.
constraints is in our opinion correct. His worst case scenario is also deemed unlikely as seen by the increasingly conservative swing the government is taking in Russia. There is a middle ground between these two cases that seems more likely to be adopted.

The middle ground is seen in a recent presentation by Rear-Admiral A.A. Pauk, chief of the Main Naval Staff for Operational-Tactical Studies, is important to examine. Pauk begins his presentation to the General Staff Military Academy science conference of May 1992, by explaining Russia's need for a strong navy. These reasons are fairly classic in nature in his claim that Russia is a great sea-power, the nature of the world requires a strong Russian Navy, the lack of naval arms control agreements and that US maritime power has not changed.

What is new is the wrapping of the defense of lines of communication (LOC), in terms of Russia's integration into the world market economy. Pauk then goes on to state that the navy must be capable of presenting a deterrent to aggression and possess the ability to repulse that aggression if it is not deterred. To do this he presents wartime and peacetime sets of operational-strategic missions that the navy must be able to perform. These missions tie in with the strategic missions

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"ibid., 598.


"ibid."
for the armed forces that were contained in the May 1992 draft military doctrine.

They include:

In Wartime
- Repulse aggression together with other branches of the Armed Forces and deter a possible enemy from initiating a nuclear war. In case he employs nuclear weapons deliver strikes against the most important military installations as part of the CIS nuclear triad;
- Ensure high combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces in a non-nuclear period of combat operations;
- Win superiority on contiguous seas and in operationally important areas, and deprive the enemy of an opportunity to conduct offensive operations from the sea;
- Defeat the enemy's principal naval attack groupings;
- Operate on enemy LOC and defend friendly coastal LOC;
- Blockade strait zones and the most important enemy ports and bases;
- Provide security and defense for fleet basing areas and facilities;
- Assist ground forces operating on maritime flanks of fronts, including by means of landing amphibious assault forces.

In Peacetime
- Strengthen international security and global stability in the world, above all by keeping naval strategic nuclear forces in constant readiness;
- Support joint foreign policy acts by states of the world community (naval presence in particular regions, showing the flag, activity of forces and so on). Participate in the activity of multilateral naval force elements under UN aegis to keep or establish the peace in various regions;
- Maintain a favorable operational regime in contiguous and internal sea theaters;
- Assist naval units of Border Guard Troops in performing missions of securing state borders and Russia's maritime economic zone;
- Participate in the fight against terrorism, smuggling and other violations of international law and other laws, as well as in forming a global system of measures for confidence-building and naval activity verification.\textsuperscript{44}

If we take these wartime missions as the sentiments of the navy's higher echelon then we notice some problems in regards to the strictly defensive doctrine called for by the Russian Defense Minister. The peacetime missions seem

\textsuperscript{44}ibid, (JPRS) 40.
to fall in line with the defensive and internationally interactive military that will be most acceptable to the West. While the thrust of the new doctrine will undoubtedly retain this defensive character the interpretation may leave more leeway as we have stated before, for the navy. Will this leeway allow the interdiction of enemy LOC and blockading of straits and ports? It would appear from the conservative swing that is currently underway in doctrinal discussions that it might. These actions will probably not be initiated until a severe threat has been enunciated by the Russian Security Council, the problem will be how they view possible threats.

Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin has stated that in the context of forming a new Russian military the navy should be aim for: high technology coupled with heavy downsizing; the importance of coastal defense; own-SLOC defense; and defense of strategic missile carriers in bastions of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea. These goals for the future navy look very similar to Pauk's but do not go as far as Pauk in his call for blockading and SLOC interdiction. The leeway spoken of earlier may well come into play for these questions if circumstances warrant.

If these are then the missions of the navy we must now look at the ability of the navy to fulfill them. The most obvious question to be dealt with is the economy’s impact on the navy’s mission capabilities. Historically the Soviet

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military policy justified the military budget, now that has changed and it must be justified in the context of the broadening definition of national security and economic policy. The most noticeable areas for the effect this is having on the navy is in training, readiness and future construction. The Soviet Union usually kept about 15 percent of its fleet at sea at any time, while 30 percent were capable of deploying at a moment's notice, another 30 percent within about 20 days and the final 25 percent in overhaul. The number of days a unit spent at sea relative to the days it was available to go to sea is defined as operating tempo or OPTEMPO. This has declined steadily since the late 1980's. It is important to realize that spending and training were designed for a relatively high level of out of area deployments which supported a naval operational-strategic policy of "offensive defense" that included anti-SLOC operations and a presence in the rest of the world. Recently the lack of presence of any Russian surface vessels anywhere outside of Russia itself attests to the deep affect the budget cutbacks are having on the navy's ability to conduct training, and thus maintain a high state of readiness. The Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered fuel

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shortages since late 1991, with the result that the ships are lying at anchor and not carrying out any maneuvers. Rear Admiral Sheafer has also stated that the:

Poor economic conditions have led the (Russian) Navy to reduce further the scale of major exercises since 1989. Last year was the first year the navy did not participate in any large scale fleet wide exercises.

These and other instances of lack of fuel, spare parts and operating funds show how deep the effects are on the Russian fleets of the economic woes of the country. The prospects for the future of the Russian Navy are rooted in these budget problems.

The rising percentage of the budget addressed to servicemen and their social protection will mean a consequent reduction in the allocation for future acquisitions and research. Construction rates for all types of ships are drastically reduced if not completely halted. Admiral Chernavin noted that shipbuilding in classes other the Kuznetsov is towards small ships with displacements of 2-4,000 tons and surface craft that are used for coastal operations, the production of large ships is not planned. Similarly no ballistic missile submarines will be constructed.

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"Osckin, (FBIS) 14.
Shearer, 23.

Admiral Chernavin has stated that since the beginning of the year not one warship has put to sea and that repairs on over 130 ships has ceased. Vladimir Zelentsov "Admiral Chernavin Gives Briefing on Navy Issues," Moscow, Rossiskaya Gazeta, in Russian, 10 Jul 92, First Edition, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-134, p. 22).
for at least the next ten years. With many vessels on the slips still in various stages of construction it is difficult to ascertain which will be completed and which will not. The aircraft carrier Ulyanovsk was cut up for scrap and the carrier Varyag still awaits a decision as to her fate, possibly a sale to China. What construction does occur will most probably be for export and for modernizing the submarine force. Scrappings will probably increase dramatically, although the disposal of nuclear reactors now poses a problem.

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"In July Rear Admiral Leonid Belyshev, acting chief of navy shipbuilding and armaments stated that there were "for sale only two small antisubmarine ships, two fast-attack crafts, two patrol crafts, one minesweeper, and one diesel submarine" and that ships of similar classes would be constructed for export. Vyacheslav Kocherov "Navy Aide on Selling Warships to Third World." Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, 16 Jul 92, Morning Edition, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-143, 24 July 1992, p. 23).

"V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy," Moscow, Morskovy Sbornik, in Russian, Nov 91, p. 3-12, (JPRS-UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 54).

Admiral Chernavin alluded to the problems that Russia will have to face as it retires nuclear vessels, when he emphasized the extraordinary lengths that the navy is going to ensure the safety of nuclear reactors on scrapped vessels. Zelentsov, (FBIS) 22.
The conversion of some shipyards to civilian functions or their loss to other republics will limit the ability of Russia to reconstitute the navy quickly. This budgetary crisis will be the determining factor for the Russian Navy as it heads towards 2000. Now let us examine the submarine, surface and aviation forces a little closer for our projection. The Naval Infantry was dealt with previously and the KGB fleet will not be addressed as it is deemed of a non-strategic nature.\textsuperscript{257}

2. **Submarine Forces**

The submarine force is the most important branch of the navy in Russian strategic thinking. This of course has to do with the ballistic missile submarines. Preservation and protection of this nuclear deterrent is the top priority of the Russian navy. The SSBNs will patrol bastions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea. This will provide the major mission for the attack and guided missile submarines - defense of these bastions.

The three main missions for the attack and guided missile submarine forces are: protection of those strategic missile systems, defense of Russian interests and territory, and protection of SLOC.\textsuperscript{258} If the conservative swing

\textsuperscript{257} Chernavin, "Time and the Fleet: The Navy, Problems of Reduction and Development", (JPRS) 55.

\textsuperscript{258} The KGB fleet has an enormous amount of coastline to cover for law enforcement and other duties, all of this is to be done with a small number of assets. The KGB does have about 111 coastal and patrol combatants with the 7 KrivaK III's being the largest vessels but they are armed with only 100mm guns and carry a Ka-27 helicopter. With the missions it has and the limited assets available the fleet already has its hands full without trying to enter the strategic arena. \textit{The Military Balance 1992-1993}, p. 191.
underway in the Russian government continues, the anti-SLOC and blockading missions advocated by Rear-Admiral Pauk may be authorized in wartime. To fulfill all of these missions the Soviet Navy built up the largest attack submarine force in the world. Now with the given budget constraints the numbers will most surely fall but the quality per hull will increase as in the SSBN case. The attack force today includes 163 submarines, 88 of which are nuclear powered.\(^{299}\) The funding for future construction of nuclear submarines is doubtful, but the construction of diesel submarines will probably continue with the export of some of these vessels.\(^{300}\) Our projected numbers for the Russian attack submarines are: 7 Akulas; 3 Sierra I and IIs; 18-22 Kilos, depending on the number of exports and constructions; 26 Victor IIs; and 18 Tangos. The guided missile submarine will fare little better with the total deceasing from 57 to 16.\(^{301}\) It is assumed that only Oscar I/IIIs and some Charlie IIs will be still operational. The possibility is still open for bringing decommissioned but not scrapped vessels back into the force.

As we have already seen Iran has purchased 2 Kilos and has an option to buy a third.

but this could well be prohibitively expensive. This is by no means a definitive list but represents a best guess for the year 2000.

3. Surface Forces

The surface forces of the Russian Navy will be significantly reduced by the year 2000. The quality per hull will increase as it will in the submarine case. The division of the navy will continue between four fleets and the Caspian Flotilla, but the overwhelming majority of the vessels will be Russian and located in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The reduction in force that will occur will come from scrapping obsolete ships and selling others if possible. As seen earlier construction will only be of vessels in the 2-4000 ton classes. The missions will be in line with those expressed by Rear-Admiral Pauk; coastal and SLOC defense, defense of strategic nuclear forces, superiority of contiguous seas, assisting ground forces, etc. The numerical strength of the surface navy at present is: "483 surface combatants (of which 72 are for the ocean zone), ...310 various small combatants" of these surface combatants Pauk states that by the turn of the century 300 will be up for decommissioning. This coupled with no new ship construction in the near future and the further budget constraints will result in a loss of 67-70 percent of the present ship totals. These numbers are from the Russians of course but we have very little data to contradict them. The only way

Pauk, (JPRS) 40.

ibid., (JPRS) 41.

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for the Russians to ameliorate this trend is to appropriate more money, possible if a more conservative government comes to power, or extend the life of the vessels through some type of refit/overhaul. Neither of these two scenarios will be enough to significantly enlarge the Russian surface forces by 2000. Therefore we project a greatly smaller but more modern surface forces for the end of the decade.

4. Soviet Naval Aviation

This section will attempt to accurately evaluate the posture of former Soviet Naval Aviation as it will exist in the year 2000. A number of topics will be discussed in the body of this section: mission/threat as viewed by Russia; disposition of forces; estimation of the aviation OOB; status of the CTOL carrier program; status of aircraft production; evaluation of reconstitution ability; defense agreements; and impacts on U.S. policy.

It is probably true that naval (aviation) missions will change very little from those stated by Admiral Chernavin:

The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to start and wage military operations.  

Of particular interest for naval aviation, it appears that Russian:

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"V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy", (JPRS) 56."
general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective performance of defensive operations in the continental theaters of military operations in conjunction with other branches of the armed forces.²⁴²

Thus, land-based naval aviation will retain as primary missions the traditional ones of reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-ship strike, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and aviation support,²⁴⁶ with anti-ship strike constituting the core capability as a result of the above statement. In addition, as a result of naval aviation maintaining a fighter escort capability, it will have coastal defense and intercept as a secondary mission.

With respect to disposition, Russia will retain almost all naval aviation and will continue to maintain forces in all four fleet areas, albeit the presence in the Baltic and Black Sea areas will be considerably diminished. The number of aircraft across the board will have decreased with those remaining being of the highest capability and quality available.

The continued support for the CTOL (conventional take-off and landing) carrier program is not surprising. In a thesis written at the US Naval Postgraduate School by Stanley G. Stefansky in 1985, he concluded that:

The Politburo has come to accept the role of attack aircraft carriers in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in the developing world. The

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aircraft carrier complements well their apparent acceptance of a greater military role in Third World crises. The Soviets realize that the attack aircraft carrier provides certain military advantages not apparent in other forms of weaponry. They perceive in aircraft carriers a means of projecting Soviet airpower to distant areas of the world where access to land-based airfields is not guaranteed. It is also a means of protecting naval assets at sea and of competing for 'air supremacy,' a critical prerequisite for gaining sea control in theaters of operations areas far removed from friendly fighter bases.

The local war mission will not be the aircraft carrier's only role in the overall Soviet military doctrine. The Soviets appreciate the mission flexibility of this type of ship and it will surely be tasked to perform many missions of which defense of the homeland is primary. However, the local war mission appears to be extremely important and probably provided one of the major rationales for the decision to build it.²⁶⁷

Although his thesis was written with communist regime in mind, the rationale that justified its building then continues to exist and will continue to exist. The argument for justification of a carrier program, from the Russian naval point of view, can be made much stronger today in view of the fact that the threat of nuclear war has greatly diminished and as a result the threat of losing a carrier during time of crisis has greatly diminished. This in essence would make the now less vulnerable, multipurpose aircraft carrier a much more cost effective platform because the chance of losing one would be much less.

Russia will retain all significant naval aviation. With respect to the existing bomber and fighter/FGA (fighter/ground attack) aircraft of naval aviation, only the most modern aircraft will be retained and marketed world wide.

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for hard currency while the older aircraft will be scrapped, or sold if buyers can be located. The older aircraft if retained, will be excess and reduced to such a poor material condition of readiness as to be useless.

Based on the above assumption: the Northern and Baltic Fleet will retain the majority of the naval air assets while the Pacific Fleet will retain slightly less naval air assets and the Black Sea fleet will have to split its assets with Ukraine in 1995 as per their agreement. The total number of bomber/strike and fighter aircraft for the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets would be approximately 300 aircraft. This is roughly 25% less than the number envisioned by Chernavin:

As for aviation, we are realizing the decision to restrict the strike and fighter aviation of shore-based naval units in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets to an overall level of 400 combat aircraft, which signifies a reduction of 60 percent.

As Chernavin has stated, the long run missions of the Russian Navy and thus naval aviation will not change. Naval aviation will maintain forces in all four fleet areas; actual numbers of aircraft will be reduced with the highest quality aircraft being retained. Two aircraft carriers will be operational but the airwings will still be developing. Their primary missions will include fleet air defense, power projection, and defense of the homeland. Although defense

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Chernavin, "Chernavin on Missions", (JPRS) 58.
spending will be considerably reduced, emphasis will be placed on the quality of advanced technology aircraft and air-delivered weapons, not the quantity.

5. Final Issues

Several issues are of crucial importance to the state the Russian Navy will find itself in at the end of the decade. First and foremost is the economy and the consequent budget crisis for the navy. The navy is a capital intensive service that needs long lead times for development of new systems and copious amounts of money for its maintenance and upkeep. With the present state of affairs in Russia it does not appear that the resources will be available for the navy to remain at a highly efficient level. The effect upon training and readiness is most dangerous for the future of the navy. The loss of some obsolete ships and the scaling back of acquisitions will hurt but, a leaner fairly modern navy will be the end result. However the loss of training and maintenance funds may well leave this force hollow. It is also important to note that this leaner force will be operating in smaller areas along the coastline, this does not pose a threat to the US. This bears close scrutiny for Western naval analysts over the next 8-10 years.

The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends in Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued swing of the present government in the conservative direction is a double edged sword for the navy. The more conservative the government then the greater the

\footnote{ibid, (JPRS) 40.}
possibility of funds being increased and of the missions of the navy taking on the more conservative tones expressed by Pauk. The other edge to this conservatism is that the economic reform of the country will be drastically slowed, thus the funds needed will be unavailable for any length of time. It remains to be seen which way the government will go but the short term outlook to the year 2000 is for a much smaller, more modern, less ready and poorly trained fleet.

G. SUMMARY

The reform process the Russian military is undergoing will lead to a vastly different force structure by the year 2000. Deep reductions in all branches will occur forcing re-evaluation of force requirements and missions. This re-evaluation is already underway as are the drawdowns in force levels. The exact makeup of the Russian military in the year 2000 cannot of course be predicted but the trends visible today can yield a reasonably accurate picture for our purposes. It is from these trends that we have drawn our conclusions on force structure for the year 2000.

Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future mainly for the deterrent factor against world class aggression. This will be essential for Russia in a period in which she is primarily concerned with internal and regional problems. During this period, the ability to ward off major extra-regional aggression will allow the Russian military to concentrate on issues such as protection of national minorities and conflicts with peripheral countries. This
would seem to argue for maintenance of a strong nuclear potential that is not threatening to the other nuclear powers. Large reductions in strategic nuclear forces below START levels, publishing of a military doctrine that renounces first use of nuclear weapons, joint inspection and cooperation agreements on research and development would help lower the fears of other nations. The agreements of Washington were a large step in this direction and furthermore, President Yeltsin's desire to decrease the nuclear inventory may even lead to attempts at even deeper reductions.\textsuperscript{271}

The most likely scenario is one in which START is fully implemented and where negotiations will take place for the implementation of the new agreements. These agreements will have to be substantially modified in the Russian view but the principle of lowering strategic nuclear weapons has been accepted by most players on the scene. Most likely, the pressure placed upon the government by the more conservative elements of the military and the opposition parties will in opinion prevent codification without major changes being included in the agreement. President Yeltsin will be unable to withstand the political pressure

\textsuperscript{271} Grachev stated that reductions below this number of 3000-3500 are possible but only if negotiations include China, France and Great Britain. He also stated that the ABM treaty needed to be strictly observed, no doubt a reference to SDI. This statement was made shortly after the agreements were signed and before the conservative tilt was so pronounced in Russian political circles. This coupled with his previously conservative remarks at the May conference leaves his true inclinations open to question. "Grachev Says More Nuclear Cuts Possible," London, \textit{Financial Times}, in English, 25 Jul 92, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-152-A, 6 August 1992, p. 1).
to step back from the accelerated reductions he has already agreed to with President Bush.

The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will be adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to wait till beyond completion of START reductions, ie. the year 2000. The numbers of strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems.\textsuperscript{272}

When the reform process is complete ground forces will definitely resemble the "meaner and leaner" concept and will attempt to become a genuine professional military. This will be accomplished by the downsizing of personnel and equipment in all parts of the ground forces to generate effective mobile type forces to operate in the proposed three TVDs (Far East, South and West). The internal transfer of newer combat equipment (cascading) and personnel will at a minimum replace older assets and at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat potential of the ground forces. The military will have a mostly professional force, that is highly trained, very mobile, highly motivated and equipped with modern conventional arms.\textsuperscript{273}

\textsuperscript{272} Volkov, (JPRS) 31.

In an "'Appended' Statement Issued" to the Resolution on Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and also for the fulfillment of Russia's international
The concept of operations of the ground forces will attempt to incorporate much more combined arms integration and defense training aimed against enemies with advanced conventional munitions, especially in the Western TVD. Furthermore, the ground forces, as well as the other forces, will strive to develop their own equipment in line with the "military-technical revolution."

Although research and development for ground forces will be cut drastically we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems already developed, such as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel carrier. The older equipment in the inventory will either be destroyed, sold, or stored east of the Urals in compliance with the CFE treaty.

The reconstitution capability of the ground forces will remain high since the vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not deteriorate due to the cold dry climate. The exact number and type of these armored vehicles in unknown though it will remain an important strategic asset. Much of this TLE is modern equipment and will most likely be kept, while the obsolete TLE and excess commitments...the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of delivery...For the prompt neutralization of possible local military conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities," appended to 1 April 1992 resolution, carried by the Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, 8 April 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 37-38).
equipment will be destroyed or sold in the arms export business for hard currency.

Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews. Additionally, the airborne forces will undertake the peacekeeping/peacemaking forces until other CIS forces are formed. This will translate into an emphasis on low intensity conflict intervention in view of the problems arising in the new multi-polar environment.

In the long run the ground forces, after a painful reform, could transform into a force that would have the capability to execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO, though this is unlikely. Although the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get smaller they will become more lethal for their size, defensive oriented, and truly represent a variant three type doctrine. Again it is important to note that this "leaner and meaner" look is only in the context of the local and regional orientation of the new doctrine, not global in any sense.

The PVO reform proposal after the re-structuring, calls for an air defense district; several air defense armies and a missile attack warning army; and separate air defense, ABM defense and space surveillance corps, divisions and
brigades. This order of battle was defined by maintaining minimum defensive sufficiency, but most importantly, "cost effectiveness" criteria. Also, this structure is attempting to come to grips with the likely possibility of local/regional conflicts which will warrant a strategic flexibility of defense. The PVO will still be a branch of the Russian military but some key assets will be shifted to the Strategic Defense Forces and other assets will be transferred to the commanders within the TVDs.

The Air Force assets in Russia, just like all the other branches, are rethinking their role in the new geo-strategic environment of Russia, one founded on local, small, regional conflicts that will be fought in a high technology environment. The aviation transport assets that Russia currently owns will be greatly utilized in the near future for purposes of moving equipment and men to local "hot-spots" within the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the leadership in the field of aviation technology will attempt to continue research and development within the limited economic constraints, some funding may be provided for by hard currency sales of advanced aircraft.

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The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends in Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued swing of the present government in the conservative direction is a double edged sword for the navy. The more conservative the government then the greater the possibility of funds being increased and of the missions of the navy taking on the more conservative tones expressed by Pauk. The other edge to this conservatism is that the economic reform of the country will be drastically slowed, thus the funds needed will be unavailable for any length of time. It remains to be seen which way the government will go but the short term outlook to the year 2000 is for a much smaller, more modern, less ready and poorly trained fleet.

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*ibid, JPRS* 40.
As we have seen the Russian military is in for a very difficult transition period, one of reductions in all branches. These reductions will leave a smaller, more professional military by the year 2000, albeit a poorly trained one. It must be stated again that this force will operate only in a local and regional context, not a global one. Now we will look at the impact this reform of the Russian military will have on the new regionally-focused national security strategy of the US.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

A. AMERICA'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1. Introduction

President Bush's Aspen speech of August 1990 was the public acknowledgement that the national security needs of the United States had changed. For forty-five years the USSR had dominated US strategic and security thinking, the Aspen speech admitted that that had changed. With that speech President Bush launched the public enunciation of a "new national security strategy", one that would take into account the changes that have occurred in the world and in particular the USSR. However the question arises as to whether the "new regionally-focused national security strategy" actually goes far enough in addressing those changes. Are the changes in the former Soviet Union deep seated and radical enough to justify the new strategy? The strategy was formulated prior to the August 1991 coup and the subsequent dissolution of the USSR, but the force structure advocated by the administration before these events is still the force structure advocated today. The outcome of the 1992 election will no doubt produce changes to the strategy. President-elect Bill Clinton has called for a reduction of troops in Europe and deeper defense cuts but the specifics of his proposals have not been entirely clear. Thus we are left with examining the strategy as presented by the Bush administration and coming to some conclusions.
as to the viability of the strategy as it relates to Russia. In other words; has the threat from the former Soviet Union disappeared or is Russia capable of a renewed threat by the year 2000, can the new Russian military be used as any justification for large defense expenditures by the US, and finally what should the US reaction be to a renewed threat from Russia if one develops? Questions such as these will tie our study the future of the Russian military to the future security needs of the US.

2. The New Regionally-Focused National Security Strategy

The new regionally focused national security strategy is based upon three basic assumptions as to the changed security environment of today's world; the Soviet, now Russian threat is reduced to the point of originally providing at least two years warning time prior to any possible invasion of Western Europe, the new realities in the world coupled with the economic difficulties in the US would necessitate a budget reduction for the military of 25-30%, and that NATO would continue to operate as it always has. Today these assumptions are for the most part still valid, the recession in the US was deep enough to lead to the defeat of President Bush, the economic tailspin of Russia and the avowedly defensive bend of her doctrine appear to guarantee at least eight years warning for a thorough definition of the new strategy see James J. Tritten's article "The New National Security Strategy and Base Force" in Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy, James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton (New York: Praeger 1992), p. 11-29.
time, and NATO still operates successfully. The questions about these assumptions are ones of degree and depth. The assumptions were formulated prior to the events of 1991 in Russia and may in fact not go far enough in their interpretation of the condition of Russia. We will examine these assumptions in more depth a little later. First we must examine the basic underlying principles upon which the new strategy is built.

The new strategy has four basic principles for US security; deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. The principles lay the groundwork for future decisions on the whole range of security issues so we will explain them all briefly. The principle of deterrence is seen as remaining the "cornerstone of American defense strategy." Interestingly the shift may be away from a predominantly nuclear focus to one of conventional and even economic deterrence. This was dramatically emphasized by the 27 September 1992 actions of President Bush in removing the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and other forces from alert status. The corresponding actions by the Soviet Union underscored the diminished threat of immediate nuclear war. The signing of START by the four nuclear states and the US along with the Washington

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"Admiral Jeremiah has stated that warning time has actually increased to at least eight years.

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"Tritten 11-29.


Ibid.

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agreements of this summer hopefully reduce the threat even further. This remains to be seen with the rising tide of conservatism in Russia today. If this hope is realized the expenditures for US nuclear weapons and SDI will decrease accordingly, unfortunately the reverse is probably also true.

The subject of conventional deterrence is one where significant changes will occur on the Russian side as well. The division of the military between the former republics will certainly lower the order-of-battle (OOB) for Russia although she will receive the major strategic assets. As we have seen the economic troubles of the nation will force major reductions in all branches by the year 2000. The other problems of training and repairs all point to a smaller, less well trained although more modern military for Russia by the year 2000. This could well lower the perceived need for US conventional deterrent forces as well, especially if Russia is used as any justification for these expenditures.

Forward presence is another of the four basic principles upon which the new strategy rests. Forward presence has been given a very broad definition\(^ {26}\) which distills down to participation in almost all facets of military cooperation with nations around the world. Under this definition the issue of large forces in Europe is called into question. While many reasons have been given for the presence of US troops in Europe, forward presence has been one of

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If as the new strategy states that forward presence can be achieved by as little as access and storage agreements, then why are the large troop formations needed? The traditional explanation has been to deter Soviet aggression into Europe by a show of US commitment to European security. If the threat has indeed receded to at least eight years warning time then why cannot troops be moved to meet up with equipment within that time frame? Obviously they can so another explanation is needed for the forward presence of troops in Europe. The Bush administration has used "uncertainty" as an explanation of a new threat but this does not justify two army divisions and three air wings. Jan Breemer's analysis of possible new justifications comes to the conclusion that the best reason would be for out of area operations, especially in the Middle East. Thus the issue of forward presence in Europe cannot use the Russians as any type of justification of this policy.

Forward presence does have uses in relation to Russia other than troop level justification. The presence of US personnel in the form of exchange programs, humanitarian efforts, nuclear weapon destruction and verification, peacekeeping operations and military to military relations will offer big dividends in fostering understanding and trust. The argument can also be made that the


ibid.

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forward presence described will enhance deterrence by lowering antagonism on both sides and by putting US personnel on the ground in Russia to sense any policy shifts the US needs to be aware of. These arguments can be used for forward presence in Russia and Eastern Europe but not for continued high troop levels in Western Europe, in fact they argue against such.

The next principle of the new strategy is crisis response. The new strategy speaks of the possible escalation of a security crisis in Europe as the most complex type of crisis response that the US will have to face. The crisis is no longer the feared Soviet invasion of Europe but a lesser contingency. The crisis response forces of the US and its allies will be able to handle this crisis even without the large US troop presence in Europe. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of national armies in the former republics put buffer zones between Russia and the West, an ironic twist to the Cold War's legacy. This coupled with the fall in size and readiness of the Russian military will provide more than enough warning time and security for the rest of Europe and the US to reinforce its crisis response forces if the conflicts escalates. Pre-positioning equipment will aid in this reinforcement. The US, France and Great Britain will still be able to exercise nuclear deterrence for major short notice scenarios until reinforcement, even with reduced forces in the field. The final argument that the instability that could occur in Eastern Europe calls for US troops in Europe neglects the fact that

"Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy, p. 22."
the US and NATO have no legal right or commitment to intervene in the area and
are not likely to get or even seek it soon. It is also increasingly unlikely that the
US would commit troops in Eastern Europe for any reason, the case of Yugoslavia
is a good example. This lowers even more the rational for excessive troop levels
in Europe.

The final principle to examine is that of reconstitution. This principle
is directed specifically against a "resurgent/emergent global threat" (REGT). The
Washington Post article, which was leaked from the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG), describes REGT developing:

Into an 'authoritarian and strongly anti-democratic' government over about three
years, beginning in 1994. After four or five years of military expansion, the
REGT is ready to begin 'a second Cold War' by the year 2001, or launch a major
global war that could last for years...

While this is ostensibly a generic threat it clearly deals with Russia. The principle
assumes at least eight years warning time, a functioning NATO and the continued
inward focus of Russia. These assumptions go back to the basic assumptions of
the entire strategy as shown at the beginning of this section. The problems with
the principle itself involve the economic and political decisions that will have to
be made in the US to support this reconstitution. The political will to decide that
the threat is reemerging from Russia and to then re-channel US resources to an

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arms buildup to counter it will most likely be too much for the principle and doom it to failure.\textsuperscript{267}

As stated earlier the three basic assumptions of the strategy need to be examined further. The functioning of NATO will be taken as a given and thus will support the new strategy as elaborated. The economic difficulties of the US will probably result in deeper cuts than 25\% thus putting Base Force I in the trash bin and calling for Base Force II or some other new force structure. Regardless of the structure the US will face a much tougher task to meet aggression from a resurgent Russian threat if it should occur. Thus the question that most concerns the new strategy's chances of success is that of the possible resurgence of the Russian military and whether there will indeed be eight years warning time.

As we have seen, the state of the Russian military is inherently intertwined with that of the Russian economy and the experiment with democracy. The threat to Western Europe and thus the impact upon US security policy is dependent upon the state of the Russian military. Thus we can extrapolate that the threat to the US will come from the success or failure of the economic and democratic reforms now underway in Russia. The swing towards conservatism occurring in Russia with the possible result of slowed reform, authoritarian rule, and increased emphasis upon military solutions to ethnic and

nationalistic problems does not bode well for the future of relations with the West.

As we have stated in previous sections the Russian government will strive to keep the international arena appeased as much as possible to facilitate concentration on regional and domestic issues. The problem for the West comes when a conservative government comes to power in Russia. With this conservative government the scenarios one could paint are grim: the ethnic and nationalistic conflicts either spill into Eastern Europe bringing the turmoil right to Europe's doorstep, the problems are resolved in the former Soviet Union and the Russians can concentrate on international confrontations, or if the conflicts actually bring down any sort of coherent government in Russia leaving the nuclear weapons open to dangerous elements of the world. This conservative government would rely on the military for resolution of these conflicts and would thus become beholden to a strong military machine. This indebtedness to the military would result in attempts to restore military capabilities for Russia.

If this all happens will the warning time for the West still be eight years. In our view the answer is affirmative. The Russian economy is in a shambles and it will take massive influxes of money from the West to rebuild it. The continued support of the West will only happen if democratic reforms continue. If these reforms stop so will most of the money. If the Western money ceases to flow the ability of the Russian military to reconstitute itself will be severely hampered. This is the basis for the United States' economic deterrence
vis-a-vis Russia. It will take many years for a credible threat to emerge for the West from the Russians except in the area of nuclear weapons. While the Russians feel the possibility of nuclear war should forever be guarded against, the threat to use them is something else. The possibility of the conservative government not agreeing to the strategic nuclear cuts of Washington will leave the Russians with a very credible force by the year 2000. The economic difficulties of the country will leave this force still very formidable as opposed to the other forces. If Russia is in a life or death situation she could very well turn to these weapons. It is only in this area that the warning time for the West will not exceed eight years. To counter this perceived need to repudiate the Washington agreements the US and its allies will have to resort to the economic deterrence mentioned above. The use of our military and a threatened buildup as a deterrent could well send the wrong message to the Russians who are already fearful of the West's military superiority.

3. Summary

As we have seen the new strategy was formulated prior to the August 1991 coup and the fall of the Soviet Union. The basis of the new strategy is dependent as James Titten states upon the responsible, good behavior of the Soviet Union. In this study we attempt to provide a glimpse of the Russian military in the year 2000. Through this study we have come to the realization that the US and its allies will have to resort to the economic deterrence mentioned above. The use of our military and a threatened buildup as a deterrent could send the wrong message to the Russians who are already fearful of the West's military superiority.
that the cuts in the military budget of Russia that Tritten states are essential to success of the new strategy, will occur. Unfortunately the rise of a conservative government in Russia may well doom the cuts in strategic nuclear weapons that he also sees as essential to success. This alone is cause for concern for US security planners. The principle of economic deterrence may well be the one US option that will help control or even solve this problem.

The question of what else represents "good behavior" is as Tritten suggests open to interpretation, and therein lies the problem. The interpretation of this behavior and thus the threat from a resurgent Russia will for a large part be left in the hands of the US President and Congress. The political will to turn away from domestic economic programs, so central in this last election, and concentrate resources on facing Russia may very well be hard to find. Defense cuts will be a reality in the US as well as in Russia, will Congress be able to turn about within the eight year warning time? Even with the extra warning time seen by Admiral Jeremiah will the time be wasted? These questions are unsettling ones to say the least. However it seems safe to say that cuts of at least 25% in the US and even ones of up to 50% will not significantly affect the security of the US as far as Russia is concerned. This may change after the year 2000 and thus must be constantly re-evaluated to ensure proper use of that eight years warning time.

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ibid.

ibid.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

The future of the Russian military will be determined by the national security policy, military policy, doctrine and strategy adopted by the state. With all the turmoil in Russia for the last year it is small wonder that the formulation of these tenets of national security are under deep and controversy ridden review. As we have seen the driving force for change is the economy. From the economic perestroika of Gorbachev to the radical reforms of Gaydar the impact upon the military of economic change has been enormous. This will continue for the foreseeable future. The estimated budget from the appendix may be a rough guess but if the figures are anywhere near correct the Russian military faces continued inability to train, perform maintenance, construct new weapons and even difficulty in research and development.

The political changes in Russia will also have an enormous effect upon the policy and doctrine the military will operate under. The swing toward conservatism by the Yeltsin government carries with it the seeds of even worse economic and ethnic troubles. The question of defense of the expatriate Russians in the former republics is especially dangerous, all the more so if Yeltsin shows signs of shifting more towards the right. These factors will no doubt be reflected in the drastic reductions called for in the latest doctrine and the emphasis upon local and regional threats. The concern for the social welfare of the servicemen...
will also remain an important factor in Russian military policy and doctrine, as the military is an important political constituency.

National security and military policy in Russia appears to be expanding its definition and decreasing the importance or dominance of the military in security planning. This is in part due to the greater role that the economy has assumed in security thinking as well as the obvious decrease in tensions with the West. The decreasing role of the military in security policy as well as the dire economic situation of the country will lead to massive cuts in the military as well as strong attempts at military-industrial complex conversion to civilian uses. Arms sales will be used to bring hard currency into the country as much as possible but the decreased demand for Russian equipment will limit sales to a few select items, such as aircraft, ships and submarines. Much of this can also be drawn from inventory as the Russian military draws down.

The defense of the homeland will be the primary mission of the military establishment. The primary threat to this being seen as local and regional conflicts. Worldwide military commitments will not arise outside of the United Nations or other coalitions. Relations with the West will remain on at least a neutral, if not positive level as it is definitely in Russia's interests to have no security concerns outside of its immediate region, and the influx of Western money is crucial to success of economic recovery whatever the pace of reform.

Collective security like the CIS will be expedient for Russia in Central Asia but will not work in the West, most notably because of the differences with
Ukraine. Even though the smaller republics will remain very cautious and wary with respect to Russian power and their perceived threat of Russian imperialism, defense agreements of various flavors will exist between them and Russia. It is assumed that Russia will sign military support agreements with those republics which do not form their own armed forces, particularly the weaker Asian republics. Agreements, treaties, and alliances of a more intricate and complicated nature will evolve between Russia and the republics which form their own armed forces and possibly between Russia and some of the former Warsaw Pact nations. Of primary importance will be agreements concerning the sharing and cooperation of airborne early warning information. Other will likely concern basing agreements, logistics support, spare parts, mutual support, and pilot training. Also, involvement in peacekeeping forces will probably increase as the number of regional conflicts arise. The peacekeeping operations will be both internal, under the auspices of the CIS (as long as there is a CIS), and external as part of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The major concern of the military will be with these peripheral conflicts which will not necessarily assume the character of war between nations but more that of civil and guerilla wars.

The comparison of the military reform of 1924-25 and the current military reform reveals some similarities that foreshadow the direction and destination of the current reform period. The most notable conclusion that can be drawn from this use of a previous historical surrogate is the impact of economics on military doctrine. This will force a more defensive strategy that is probably going
to be based on trading ground for time while at the same time protecting valuable strategic assets. Shrinking budgets will force the vast reduction and restructuring of the military and force it to accept a manpower concept of a mixed conscript-volunteer force that will be based on a combination of territorial and extra territorial principles. The eventual outcome of the reform debate will most likely lead to a defensive doctrine on the order of variant three. The armed forces also will attempt to make the conversion from quantitative parameters to qualitative ones, using the 1924-25 reform as a model.

Additionally, the military leadership seems to have decided on a smaller more professional force and possibly even a cadre-militia system such as the one that was implemented in the 1924-25 reform period. The establishment of a cadre-militia system would also give the impression that Russia has abandoned all offensive tendencies especially in terms of fighting a conventional war. The military leadership will also strive to equip its forces with advanced weapons, taking into account the impact of the Gulf War.

There is little doubt that the next decade of reform will be extremely painful for the once strong and proud Red Army. From all available literature it appears that the views of Svechin have indeed been rejuvenated and are permeating the majority of the Russian military elite. If the trends that have been established since the attempted putsch continue, the armed forces of Russia in the year 2000 will have the appearance of being "leaner and meaner" although they may in fact be hollow due to training and readiness problems. The Russian military doctrine
in the short run will have no other choice than to adhere to variant three, because of the appalling economic situation in the country.

Undoubtedly Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. The deterrent factor of these weapons against world class aggression, will be especially useful in the period where Russia is chiefly concerned with its internal and regional problems. During this period the ability to ward off major extra-regional aggression will allow the Russian military to concentrate on issues such as protection of national minorities and conflicts with peripheral countries.

The most likely future for strategic nuclear weapons is one in which START is fully implemented and where negotiations will take place for the implementation of the new Washington agreements of 17 June 1992. These agreements will have to be substantially modified in the Russian view but the principle of lowering strategic nuclear weapons has been accepted by most players on the scene. The pressure placed upon the government by the more conservative elements of the military and the opposition parties will in our opinion prevent codification without major changes being included in the agreement.

The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will be adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to wait till beyond completion of START reductions, i.e. the year 2000. The numbers of strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for
Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems. Return of strategic nuclear systems from the other republics will be completed but only after much negotiation with Ukraine. Research and development of future generations of strategic nuclear systems will remain a priority and continue but will be hampered by the greatly decreased budget. Russian strategy will be deterrence by punishment through the threat of massive retaliatory strikes, but the interpretation of when aggression actually begins and the use of nuclear weapons is then permissible will remain ambiguous.

For the Ground Forces in the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the general trends that can be expected are sizable force reductions, degradation of operational readiness, reduced mobilization potential, and most importantly an inability to conduct large scale offensive operations. In the short run, the U.S. military will not be perceived as a threat to Russia, even though the U.S. is still considered to have an extensive military capability.

In the long run the ground forces, and the RNI specifically will transform into a force that could easily have the capability to execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO. This is predicated on the assumption of the predicted size of NATO and the U.S. forces in Europe in 1995. The bottom line is that although the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get smaller they will become potentially
more lethal. Again this new lethality is within the local and regional context, not a global one.

Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews. Additionally, the GPF, to include the RNI, might be inclined to volunteer their forces for peace-keeping duties, if for no other reason than for minimal training value, deferment of training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the Russian flag. This training and readiness problem will limit the potential lethality of the forces. There will also be a greater emphasis on low intensity conflict intervention, in view of the problems arising from the dissolution of the USSR, again lowering the potential threat to the US.

The future restructuring of the PVO will be one of the most difficult of all the other branches because of the nature of its mission and the loss of key facilities on the periphery of the former USSR. This branch, as explained above has had its share of difficulty in adapting to the new geo-strategic position of Russia. Plainly, the first needed change for the PVO is to revise the stated mission statement to conform to the new doctrine and geo-strategic position of Russia. Secondly the PVO will be a key player in the new "high-tech" war of the future. The lessons of the Gulf war were far more significant for the Air Defense Troops than any other branch of the Russian armed forces.
As stated earlier, the CIS appears to have temporarily come to some agreement on maintaining the PVO network, most likely because of economic considerations. There has been great investment in the systems of the PVO that were responsible for the air security of the former USSR. Many of these assets are permanent and cannot be removed or displaced easily. The PVO leadership understands that to realign this branch within the economic constraints of the time, they will have to preserve the costly intelligence and battle management system created and already functioning in peacetime, as well as attempting to provide the favorable conditions for future establishment of an ABM defense in theaters of military operations.

Several issues are of crucial importance to the state the Russian Navy will find itself in at the end of the decade. First and foremost is the economy and the consequent budget crisis for the navy. With the present state of affairs in Russia it does not appear that the resources will be available for the navy to remain at a highly efficient level. The effect upon training and readiness is most dangerous for the future of the navy. The loss of some obsolete ships and the scaling back of acquisitions will hurt but, a leaner fairly modern navy will be the end result. However the loss of training and maintenance funds may well leave this force hollow. This bears close scrutiny for Western naval analysts over the next 8-10 years. The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends in Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued swing of the present government in the conservative direction may call for greater
investment in the navy but the funds for this will not be available for the foreseeable future. It remains to be seen which way the government will go but the short term outlook to the year 2000 is for a much smaller, more modern, less ready and poorly trained fleet.

As we have seen the new regionally focused security strategy was formulated prior to the August 1991 coup and the fall of the Soviet Union. The basis of the new strategy is dependent as James Tritten states "upon the responsible, good behavior of the Soviet Union". In this study we attempt to provide a glimpse of the Russian military in the year 2000. Through this study we have come to the realization that the cuts in the military budget of Russia that Tritten states are essential to success of the new strategy, will occur. Unfortunately the rise of a conservative government in Russia may well doom the cuts in strategic nuclear weapons that he also sees as essential to success. This alone is cause for concern for US security planners. The principle of economic deterrence may well be the one US option that will help control or even solve this problem.

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"ibid.
"ibid.
in the hands of the US President and Congress. The political will to turn away from domestic economic programs, so central in this last election, and concentrate resources on facing Russia may very well be hard to find. Defense cuts will be a reality in the US as well as in Russia, will Congress be able to turn about within the two year warning time? Even with the extra warning time seen by Admiral Jeremiah will the time be wasted? These questions are unsettling to say the least. United States national security appears to be safe from a Russian offensive in the near term. In the long term if the Russian military continues on it's current trend, it will have a reformed military that could again give Russia world-power status but not at a level that could significantly threaten the US. This reformed "leaner and meaner" military could be used in the future as an instrument for minimal global projection of Russian interests but even this will most likely not occur prior to 2000. The US would seem to be safe in taking at least the 25% military budget cut envisioned by the new national security strategy. Cuts of up to 50% will probably not lower the security of the US at least as far as Russia is concerned. However constant re-evaluation of Russia's armed forces will be needed in order to provide the US sufficient reaction time to counteract any possible future military threat.
APPENDIX - BUDGET

If a fundamental thesis of military readiness is that a force "plays like it practices," then examining the levels of activity within the Russian military may provide insight into its ability to accomplish assigned missions by the turn of the century.264 Traditionally, high levels of military training and readiness were not particularly controversial within the Soviet Union and its war economy; now, training and readiness appear to be constrained almost solely by the budget and economic realities of a nation in transition. In the chaos of the current political and economic situation in the former Soviet Union, it is of course difficult to predict the future. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that budgetary constraints will adversely affect the future training and readiness of the Russian military.

Historically, trying to assess accurately the percentage of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) spent on defense has been notoriously difficult. "The most respected and reliable sources estimate that Soviet defence spending accounts for 15-17 percent of GNP."265 On the high side, a number of Soviet dissidents, who included many of the hidden costs to the nation, argued that over

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"The authors are grateful for the extensive work done on this appendix by fellow classmates LT. P. Poor and LT. J. Lewis during a group exercise conducted in the Spring of 1992 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.

"Donnelly, 119."
40 percent of Soviet GNP was spent on the military. In any case, it is important to remember that spending and training were designed for a relatively high profile, high expense operational-strategic policy of "offensive defense" that included strategic defense, anti-SLOC operations, and a major presence in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Even during the era of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, when Soviet training levels dropped off slightly, these reductions were still a function of doctrinal and operational-strategic needs, rather than economic realities.

Whereas, historically, Soviet political/military policy justified the military budget, now the military budget must justify itself within the context of the changing national security and military policies, with all of their political and economic realities. As economic growth stagnated during the 1980's, former Soviet President Gorbachev attempted to exploit the "national investment in defence, and treat the defence sector as a reservoir of managerial talent and advanced technology which [could] be drawn on to revitalize the weak sector of the civilian economy." Although this reform-within-the-system failed because more drastic measures were needed, interestingly it appears that a "brain drain" from the military to the civilian sector has begun to occur anyway. In response to the current economic crisis, the Russian Parliament recently approved

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"Donnelly, 119."
draconian budget cuts for the military. At the end of January 1992, officials said that the first quarter budget would total 420.5 Billion (B) rubles, of which about 50B would go to the military. That gives the military a 4.5 percent share of GNP, far below the aforementioned estimates of previous levels. Two months later, speaking on Russian television, Russian Parliamentary Deputy Valerii Shinko said that the draft budget under consideration called for defense expenditures of 50.7B rubles for the first quarter of 1992, 118.8B in the second quarter, and an average of 132.6B for each of the last two quarters of 1992. We presume these vastly higher amounts for future military spending in the draft will not survive the budgetary review process. Rather, the huge jump in defense spending after the first quarter suggests the military still has not fully come aboard with the fiscal austerity program.

Even so, the effects of the current budget crisis on the military are astonishing. For example, Russian television quoted a Washington Post article that said "no Soviet surface warships are currently to be found anywhere in the world--not any, absolutely none!" Additionally, the Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered from major fuel shortages since late 1991. "The military--like everyone else--is

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desperately short of fuel. In order to maintain combat readiness while using as little fuel as possible ships are lying at anchor and have to all intents and purposes stopped carrying out maneuvers."

Another example comes from an officer on board a Northern Fleet Typhoon-class ballistic-missile submarine:

Take a trivial example, for instance--the device for throwing waste containers overboard has broken. How do you get it fixed? You cannot afford to wait for civilian experts, and as for spare parts and tools--no, they do not get delivered to the boat. You manage as best you can. But you cannot go to sea with a fault like that.

The percentage of spending on logistics and training within the already drastically reduced military budget has been significantly cut. In essence, this slashing of the budget allotted for military hardware is being used to fund increased spending on personnel and services. According to ITAR-TASS, expenditures on military equipment are to be cut by 3.5 times in real terms (1991 expenditures were reported at 39.65B rubles and the 1992 budget assigns only 11.2B). This figure matches the DIA assessment stated by its director, LTGEN James R. Clapper, Jr., in testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 22, 1992:

(Russia's military procurement) appears to have been cut by about 80% from the former republic's allotment for procurement in the same period last year.

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ibid, 14.


Concurrently, drastic measures are planned to offset the adverse effects of the country's economic woes on military personnel; a survey in the conservative paper, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, said that more than 300,000 servicemen's families were without permanent housing. And President Yeltsin, in a recent speech to 5,000 military officers, promised that 60 percent of the new military budget would be used for housing and other social services. In fact, reportedly "all capital investment in the military account will go to housing for officers, many of whom now live in abysmal conditions." Although this is perhaps an overstatement, nonetheless it points out the changing priorities within the defense establishment.

Ultimately, as CIA Director Robert Gates recently testified, "Modernization programs are likely to be delayed or abandoned, and training will be cut back," causing the readiness of conventional forces in the former Soviet republics to be "at the lowest level in many years," with naval deployments continuing to decline from already reduced numbers and the combat capability of general purpose forces deteriorating because of inadequate training.

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The future of the Russian military apparently will be a function of an increasing percentage of funds for personnel and decreasing percentage for hardware and training. At the same time, the overall naval budget will likely remain low to ease the financial burden on the government and ease the changeover from a command economy to a free-market economy. As A.G. Arbatov, (then) head of the Department of Disarmament Problems of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, pointed out in April 1990 (to paraphrase), if you are going to make military cuts, it makes more sense to cut future acquisitions rather than current obligations. The current civilian/legislative position is characterized by the chairman of the Russian parliamentary budget commission, Alexander Pochinok, who, according to ITAR-TASS, on 6 May 1992 criticized President Yeltsin's (and the military's) defense spending plans. He suggested that President Yeltsin has been persuaded to continue funding for a number of high-cost military products, including the construction of more nuclear-powered submarines. But:

in the context of impending military manpower reductions and the difficulties faced by the Russian government in even meeting the payroll for troops currently in services, Pochinok asked where the government expected to find money to finance such weapons procurement.

While it is unlikely that this debate will be resolved soon, some overall presumptions about the future direction of military forces, specifically training and readiness, may be

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made with a useful degree of accuracy. The degree to which the Russian economy can support future military expenditures while at the same time move toward a free-market system will have, as stated earlier, a major impact on doctrine (offensive defense has already been replaced by defensive defense). As General V. Lobov wrote, the military must "unequivocally demonstrate its purely defensive character, and, at the same time, be as economical as possible and be no burden for the country, which is in a difficult economic position."

Additionally, the "difficult economic position" has had a drastic effect on military personnel. Even in an era of personnel cuts, the General Staff of the Commonwealth foresees manpower shortages when the Spring 1992 selection of conscripts begins. According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda of 28 April 1992, "Only 28% of the total draft-age contingent is even available for service this year, and expected high rates of evasion will cut into the manpower pool even further." While this will likely have a greater impact on ground forces, it will surely reduce the navy's capability to man ships with competent sailors. Political realities have also impacted on the officer corps of the navy. As one Northern Fleet officer commented:

Unprecedented changes are taking place in the Army and Navy today ... particularly in the officer's mentality. ... People are sick of everything. No one wants to have

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to wait and hope for politicians to agree. So it is resign and get the hell out of this service...313

Initiatives such as large pay raises for the military only partially offset the debilitating effects of the country’s economic woes on military morale. Lack of housing, rapid inflation, and other problems in the civilian sector also reach the military. Paraphrasing Trotsky, the military feels all of society’s ills, only at a hotter temperature. It is difficult to quantify morale and its role in training and readiness. Nonetheless, poor morale undoubtedly decreases readiness as much as esprit de corps serves as a force multiplier.

Similarly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union directly affects the institutions of training in the military. The question of who should control the Black Sea Fleet, where: the overwhelming majority of officers—nuclear scientists and rocketeers—are trained...[has disrupted] the integrated organism of the Navy [and] will inevitably lead to an appreciable reduction in the level of combat readiness, will affect the reliability of guarding the sea lines of Russia, and will have a negative effect on the morale of the sailors.314

SUMMARY

Estimating the cohesion of the Russian military and the status of the Russian economy by the year 2000 is virtually impossible. "Comparisons with past budgets are extremely difficult because of rapid inflation, because this represents Russia’s first post-Soviet

Litovkin, 3-4.

budget and because Soviet officials never released reliable budget figures, especially about the military."\(^{315}\)

Out-of-area deployments have decreased nearly to nothing, as doctrinal needs have changed. As a result, the size and frequency of large-scale exercises have been significantly reduced. Now, whether current levels of training are appropriate has become a function of budget rather than mission. "The restructuring of this economic system to provide financial-economic administrative controls and its reorientation toward the urgent needs in improving the well-being of the people will hardly be effective without a radical reduction and restructuring of the military-industrial complex."\(^{316}\)

Therefore, due to the political and economic woes of the country, both training and readiness are, as LTGEN Clapper testified, "in profound decline."\(^{317}\)

Assuming past calls by then President Gorbachev for a fifteen-year "grace period" for the transition from a planned economy to a free market were based on more than whim, then economic growth during the 1990s will at best be slight. While admittedly dated, a 1988 model of Soviet economic modernization may remain relevant. It projected a best-case/worst-case scenario for average annual growth rates; ultimately, in either case


\(^{316}\) Arbatsky, 45.

the average annual growth between 1986 and 2000 was estimated to be 2.6 percent.\textsuperscript{318}

This, it must be remembered, was written in the context of an "orderly" transition to a
decentralized economy, and did not foresee the complete demise of the USSR.
Therefore, it seems realistic to opine that even an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent is
extremely optimistic, and will more likely be closer to stagnancy, if not an actual decline.
Additionally, as indicated in a 1987 Rand study, any growth in (then-Soviet) GNP most
likely would have been dwarfed by a much higher growth rate in the West.\textsuperscript{319}

The likelihood of the Russian economy's growing in real terms seems doubtful.
Similarly, the military's percentage of the budget will "best case," from the Russian
military's point of view, remain at 4.5 percent. This money will more likely be used to
placate military personnel than to ready units to fulfill their missions. Those missions
themselves remain under discussion, further lowering morale and readiness.

Thus, the overall outlook for training and readiness of the Russian military in 2000
is cloudy. The return of a more conservative government could raise the priority of
military spending. Additionally, improvement in economic growth could lead to more
funds being available, even if funding remains at only 4.5 percent of GNP; rapid
inflation and the transformation of the military-industrial complex, however, suggest the
military's capability to fund programs will not increase. In any case, Russia's economic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{318} Robert L. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization: An
\item \textsuperscript{319} Charles Wolf Jr. and others, \textit{Major Economic and Military
Trends, 1950-2010}, [draft], (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation), p. 4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
quandary points to a continued doctrine of defensive defense. Even this new doctrine, in the context of the current chaotic economy, where simple training and readiness are not being fulfilled, seems a difficult goal to achieve.

A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION

Trying to draw an accurate conclusion from the aforementioned figures is like trying to complete the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel using a paint-by-numbers kit. However, as a means of estimating the effects of budget reductions we have broken military spending into five main categories:

- Research and Development of future systems
- Procurement of new systems
- Maintenance of existing systems
- OPTAR
- Personnel support: salaries, housing, etc...

These categories roughly correspond to the "four pillars of defense" used for budgetary planning purposes in the U.S. Department of Defense:

- Readiness
- Sustainability
- Modernization
- Force structure
For our example, we intentionally separated personnel from hardware in order to estimate the budget remaining for the four categories specifically related to hardware (categories 1 through 4). We have presumed that previous military spending was indeed approximately 16 percent of the GNP, and future spending will be about 4.5 percent. Additionally, we will presume that the GNP at the turn of the century will remain at approximately current levels. As previously mentioned, President Yeltsin stated that 60 percent of military spending will be for personnel (category 5), which is apparently a large increase. If we assume previous levels of spending on personnel were about 10 percent of the military budget, and the other 90 percent was dispersed between categories 1, 2, 3, and 4, then the following is true:

[Let $M = \text{total military budget}$ and let $G = \text{total GNP}$]

**Previous**

$.10M \times .16G = .016G$ for personnel (i.e., 1.6 percent of GNP previously was spent on personnel)

$.90M \times .16G = .144G$ for hardware (i.e., 14.4 percent of GNP previously was spent on research and development of future systems, procurement of new systems, maintenance of existing systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR)).

**Current and Future**

$.60M \times .045G = .027G$ for personnel (nearly 3 percent of GNP will be spent on personnel, or nearly 1.7 times previous levels)
Therefore, the remaining forty percent of the (smaller) military budget must be split between research and development of future systems, procurement of new systems, maintenance of existing systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR):

\[ .40 \times .045G = .018G \] for hardware (less than 2 percent of GNP spent on hardware, about one-seventh of previous levels, which were 14.4% of GNP)

This level of one-seventhInterestingly coincides with levels published in a recent _Washington Post_ article, which reported that the Russian parliament approved a budget that contained one-seventh the level of spending for procurement.\(^2\) If procurement levels are at one-seventh (14 percent) of previous levels, then spending on maintenance, research and development, and OPTAR probably will also be significantly reduced. While it may be foolish to suggest that readiness of the entire military is at 14 percent of the level estimated during the Soviet military's heyday, it is safe to point out that current out-of-area deployments are at less than 14 percent of previous levels. Of course, a more efficient use of existing resources as well as a reduction in unnecessary systems, which are expensive to maintain and equip, could skew upwards the readiness levels of the rest of the military. However, the previously stated anecdotal evidence suggests that "efficiency" and "management" of Russian military assets are words that do not belong in the same sentence.

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