Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader

edited by Terry L. Heyns

based on the proceedings of the ninth national security affairs conference
Understanding
U.S. Strategy:
A Reader

Based on the
Ninth National Security Affairs Conference
October 8-9, 1982

Cosponsored by the
National Defense University

and the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

Edited by
Terry L. Heyns

1983

National Defense University Press
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319
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Foreword

The Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, cosponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the National Defense University, provided a forum in which officials from throughout Government discussed important aspects of US national security with prominent leaders from the private sector. The papers presented to stimulate discussions at the conference, as well as summaries of those discussions, make up this volume.

This year's conference, "Evolving Strategies for a Changing World," addressed the problems of devising a coherent US national security strategy to meet the challenges of international turbulence. Five topics were addressed: evolving a national strategy, strategies for Western Europe, strategies for the use of space, comparing US and Soviet strategies, and the US system for developing strategy.

Our distinguished authors and panelists raised fundamental strategic issues which will continue to confront US national security policymakers in the years ahead. Because the issues are of abiding concern to scholars and to an informed American public, we have departed somewhat from our "Proceedings" format of past years and have designed this 1982 NSAC report as a reader in national security. We feel it will serve the defense and academic communities even better in this format, while still furnishing an accurate account of the conference events.

The National Defense University has noted a growing use of its publications in college courses throughout the country. This unanticipated but most welcome benefit has emerged from the combined efforts of those many individuals who have participated in our University's educational and research activities over the years, to each of whom we express our deep appreciation. I am confident that in keeping with their legacy and with the tradition of past National Security Affairs Conferences, this report will generate valuable insights into the serious security challenges which face our Nation.

JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense University
Preface

As the United States approaches the 21st Century, American defense interests and requirements are being discussed more widely and seriously than ever before. National strategy to meet the challenges of the future is certainly a key consideration in any discussion about future security interests and needs. This volume, which is the result of the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, is meant to contribute to the dialogue on America's defense interests by focusing on the concept of "strategy." The distinguished authors and panelists who gathered to debate US strategy in its various manifestations all contributed valuable insights to many of the questions facing the United States in the 1980s, the 1990s, and the early part of the next century.

As editor of this volume, I attempted to organize the conference papers and summaries in a format that accurately reflects the major themes and in a way that is most useful for the general reader. This accounts for the somewhat different appearance of this book from previous NSAC Proceedings. Although this volume in every sense still represents the proceedings of the 1982 conference, the papers have been edited for publication and the order of the papers has been revised. The intent was to blend the NSAC material into a "reader" on US national security strategies. Because the conference organizers put such careful thought into selecting and defining the topics of discussion, this task was an enjoyable one.

In addition to use as a reader, this book can be seen as a companion volume to previous National Defense University publications, in particular, Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta; and Planning US Security, edited by Philip S. Kronenberg. Also, the proceedings of the Seventh National Security Affairs Conference, Rethinking US Security Policy for the 1980s, and the Eighth NSAC, The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation? are both highly relevant to many of the issues raised in this book. Taken together, these publications provide important perspectives which are deeply involved in any discussion of US strategy and national security.

The introductory chapter briefly summarizes the most impor-
tant points made by each of the authors. The reader must remember, however, that no summary can adequately portray the complex ideas carefully developed by an author, who has brought both serious scholarship and years of experience to his work. For this reason, it is best to read the paper itself and not rely on any substitute.

Preceding each set of papers is a summary of that particular panel's discussion. Each panel chairman, assisted by the rapporteur, has prepared a synopsis of the key points made by the authors to the panel and also the key points that emerged during panel discussions. These panel summaries are especially valuable in that they represent the reactions and informed views of the participants themselves—government policymakers, scholars, and members of the media and business communities. In some cases, the issues raised in the panel discussions were especially contentious and difficult to deal with in any decisive way. In editing this reader, there was certainly no attempt to favor one point of view over another; disagreements will clearly come through. Indeed, the stimulation of a number of different points of view was encouraged. In this way, the conference directly supported the kind of creative thinking that is fundamental to the mission of the National Defense University.

The Ninth National Security Affairs Conference was the result of cooperation among many agencies and individuals. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the National Security Affairs Institute of the National Defense University cosponsored the event. The Honorable Francis J. West, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, President, National Defense University, deserve special recognition for their efforts on behalf of the conference. We were especially fortunate to have had a man with the experience of Dr. Harold Brown to deliver the keynote address to the conference. Special thanks must also be given to Mr. John P. Merrill, the Director of Policy Research, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Colonel Frank Margiotta, Director of the National Security Affairs Institute, who jointly coordinated the conference.

In addition, many others worked on behalf of the conference and publication of this reader. The entire staff of the Research Directorate pitched in wherever needed to ensure the many details
were attended to in timely fashion; Mr. George Maerz and Ms. Rebecca Miller provided editorial support for the various conference publications. Finally, Ms. JoAnne Lewis, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Affairs Institute, deserves a strong "well done" for her careful planning and thorough work in administrative support of this major event.

The real credit for a successful conference, however, belongs to the participants and authors who gathered to raise, discuss, and consider important issues of US strategy. It is to them that we all offer a special thank you.

TERRY L. HEYNS
Burke, Virginia
March 1983
Chapter 1

Introduction to Key Issues in National Strategy
Chapter 1

Introduction to Key Issues in National Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Heyns, USAF
National Defense University

Strategy has varied and flexible definitions. A standard dictionary definition is as good as any to start with. The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, for example, defines strategy as:

the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in peace or war.

This definition includes the political, economic, and psychological forces of a nation with its military forces, but leaves out the nation's technological forces. In the future, the ability of a nation to use its technological capacity for adopted policies in peace or war will be extremely important. If these technological forces are added to the above definition, then, we have a good starting point for coming to grips with the idea of strategy, and that in part is the purpose of this volume. Assembled here is a selection of papers dealing with US national security strategy, written by highly qualified authors whose perspectives are based on years of research and practical experience in and out of government. None of them would claim to prescribe permanent solutions for US strategy, but together their papers provide a unique set of well-informed views regarding US strategy.

In addition to the authors who contributed to these proceedings, the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference was fortunate to have Dr. Harold Brown as a speaker. Dr. Brown, who has held high positions in education, business, and government, typifies the multidiscipline perspective which the conference attempted to foster. Not surprisingly, his address (chapter 2 of this volume) contains some key insights into this complex question of strategy. Indeed, Dr. Brown argues that social welfare programs, budgetary policy, productivity, and even the social policy of a nation such as the United States should receive some consideration as inputs into national strategy. Dr. Brown establishes a three-fold interaction.
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linking international security, domestic economic matters, and international economic questions. He further suggests that those who up to now have been mainly concerned with international security questions, must also be concerned with how domestic economic matters fit with the other two legs of the tripod to support a stable national strategy.

Dr. Brown goes on to provide some specific points which illustrate these key relationships. He concludes that the task of factoring these domestic and economic matters into a broad and comprehensive strategy will not be easy, but will still be a necessary task if a national security strategy is to have any chance of success.

The complexity of formulating a national strategy is also addressed in the papers of Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein and Dr. James N. Rosenau. Dr. Nuechterlein believes that the United States must clearly distinguish and identify truly vital national interests in formulating a strategy. He suggests that a starting point for appraising US objectives might be four basic “national interests”: defense of the homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and the promotion of American values. He then assembles a matrix for assessing the degree of national interest, ranging from survival through vital interest on downward in intensity to major and peripheral interest. Using this matrix, he investigates US interests in the various regions of the world. Neuchterlein concludes that the United States in the 1980s is overcommitted and must align national priorities with needs, costs, and capabilities. He further states that no nation, no matter how wealthy, can ignore the changing international conditions which will continually be involved in this process of prioritization.

Dr. James Rosenau’s paper specifically addresses this difficulty of formulating a viable strategy in the face of a complex and ever-changing domestic and international setting. For Rosenau, the problem is to identify the obstacles to an effective strategy and to seek ways to work around these obstacles and achieve defined goals. Rosenau sees four basic elements in a US national strategy: a clear conception of goals and priorities among these goals; a design for achieving these goals or countering threats to their attainment with available resources; a societal consensus which will support the strategy; and a worldwide reputation for adhering consistently to the strategy. But Rosenau then goes on to ask if such a strategy is
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even possible in today's international and domestic environment. In answering, he coins the word "fragmegration" to designate the forces of "fragmentation" and the forces of "integration" which are so prevalent in the modern world. Being both simultaneous and contradictory, these processes have become typical in today's world as a whole and also in distinct regions of the world. Rosenau argues that fragmegration, in fact, has become fundamental. Given this all-pervasive fragmegration, a consistent national strategy at the global level is impossible. This is especially true, he says, because fragmegration also is characteristic of the Nation's domestic sector. This results not only from the difficulties that the United States is facing in its economy, but also from its Constitutional form of government.

Rosenau sees no easy way out of the problem of fragmegration for a policymaker striving for a coherent, balanced, and consistent strategy. He believes that accepting a pragmatic incrementalism may be the best approach that a policymaker might take in dealing with the realities of the contemporary scene. Not only would this serve US interests better than the fruitless efforts of constructing a broad-based and general strategy, but viewing international events in pragmatic, incremental terms would help lessen the rivalries that are so common to the US policymaking system.

Both Dr. Nuechterlein and Dr. Rosenau discuss national strategy in terms of global politics and the complexities typical of the global political milieu. The next set of papers, however, deals with the technological aspects of a national strategy. Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.) calls for the United States to replace the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and to use superior space technology to escape the balance of terror. After reviewing the threat the Soviet Union poses for the United States, a threat which he considers substantial and growing, General Graham outlines a program which he believes could nullify the Soviet threat, replace MAD, and provide the United States with the necessary security. General Graham sees the new frontier of space as similar to the old frontier of the American West in that exploration, transportation, and security can be followed by economic advances. An advance into this new frontier would also restore the military ethic of defense of one's country, and would not require a technological breakthrough, because options are viable with today's technology.
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General Graham believes that the United States should set out to construct a layered protective defense system. One layer would be in near space with an orbital spaceborne ballistic missile defense system constructed with off-the-shelf hardware. Other layers would use ground-based intercept systems combined with an active civil defense program. General Graham declares that such layered defense would be workable even though it couldn't be designed to meet a standard of perfection. He further holds that this proposal, while not a panacea to solve all national security problems, would mean that a disarming nuclear first strike would be much less likely and that a more stable world would result.

Dr. Barry Smernoff would agree with General Graham that space technology is the US strong suit. In light of this advanced technology, Dr. Smernoff outlines several possible options for the United States: To keep space a sanctuary; to seek to negotiate to prevent an arms race in space; to prepare to deny the Soviets an advantage; to compete to achieve superiority; or, to seek to blend technology and politics in such a way as to exploit the US edge and nuclear deterrence through MAD. Smernoff favors this last option. He sees space as tailor-made for facilitating a transition from nuclear offense to non-nuclear defense. He admits that a "zero-leak" space defense system is not attainable, but also believes that a low leak rate is acceptable, especially when combined with reductions in the number of warheads on both the US and Soviet sides. If such a condition could be achieved, both sides would be in a sounder security position and not have to rely on the mutual hostage relation which exists at present. Thus space offers splendid opportunities for shifting from nuclear offense to a safer and more sustainable non-nuclear defense.

Dr. Smernoff believes that a blending of the political components of arms control and diplomacy with the US technological advances in space into a "two-track strategy" is a very achievable goal. Indeed, he points out several developments—the formation of a new Space Command, the attention being paid to laser weapon development, and the 20 percent real annual growth in DOD space funding—as evidence that the United States is moving to space superiority in the 1990s and beyond. The two-track strategy also has implications for US force structure. Space is seen as a military force multiplier which can augment the blue-ocean fleet and an atmospheric "stealth" fleet. But a move into space is more than a
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mere multiplier. Space also represents a gradual nuclear deemphasis and the expansion of the politico-military emphasis of the United States beyond Western Europe and NATO.

Alternative strategies for the defense of Western Europe, in fact, were the focus of another set of conference papers presented by Dr. Edward Kolodziej and jointly by Congressman Newt Gingrich and Dr. Albert Hanser. Dr. Kolodziej discusses the question of detente and deterrence in Europe from the viewpoint of the long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) discussions and the resultant issues raised by those discussions. At present, any satisfactory resolution of LRTNF is doubtful. Not only are funds to pay for such weapons scarce, but there are serious differences over LRTNF roles, to say nothing of the lack of any theory of nuclear or conventional deterrence accepted by the allies. Nonetheless, LRTNFs can be of some use in controlling hostilities once the nuclear threshold is crossed. LRTNFs are not hair-triggerable; they are accurate, calibrated to limit civilian destruction, and able to reduce risk of accidental war. If LRTNFs were invulnerable, they might be able to define a mutually acceptable level of capabilities needed to stabilize detente.

In addition to resolution of the LRTNF issues, however, NATO needs a stable alliance consensus. Dr. Kolodziej suggests that if a stable alliance consensus were achieved, a predictable outcome on military policy and arms control could result. This policy should survive the change of governments. Dr. Kolodziej seems to agree with Professors Rosenau and Nuechterlein, for he also concludes that internal politics in democratic countries can affect the credibility of a foreign policy. The proposals for deploying US Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe are designed to assure the NATO European allies of US nuclear commitment. But in fact, the deployment proposal seems to be adding to their fear. Dr. Kolodziej believes that a sea-based system tied to the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) could resolve some of the current difficulties involving LRTNF weapons systems. The sea-based system would neither complicate arms control nor decrease deterrence, and it would dampen incentives to launch on warning. In addition, he points out that the British and French also can supply LRTNFs to NATO. Alluding to Clausewitz, Dr. Kolodziej concludes by stating that the political message sent by a weapons system is more impor-
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tant than the military medium the weapon takes. This applies to allies and adversaries alike.

Congressman Newt Gingrich and Dr. Albert S. Hanser also address the important process of political communication. They begin by highlighting the differences in outlook between the United States and its NATO allies on the meaning of deterrence, the idea of massive retaliation, and the idea of flexible response. These differing views have existed in the alliance for some time, but never before has NATO been confronted with the condition of strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR and with superior nuclear and conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact on the continent. Congressman Gingrich and Professor Hanser believe that this state of affairs renders deterrence no longer viable and dims the prospect of victory should deterrence ever fail.

The conventional aspect of this state of affairs, however, is being addressed by measures such as the US Army’s “Airland Battle” doctrine and the “Army 86” force modernizations. If these developments are successful, for the first time, the NATO side will have the capability of stopping a Warsaw Pact conventional attack without resorting to nuclear weapons, a capability unprecedented in NATO history. As a result, the Pact forces might be tempted to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons to achieve a breakthrough. Therefore, NATO still faces the task of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent.

Gingrich and Hanser believe that NATO can maintain a credible nuclear deterrent by relying on Pershing II and cruise missiles. In addition, the authors propose that other tactical nuclear weapons in Europe be removed, such weapons being more of a disadvantage than an advantage on the battlefield. By relying on the Pershing II and cruise missiles and upon a strong conventional deterrence, supported by nine specific principles which they believe underlie such a conventional deterrent, NATO can still be a working alliance in the next century. The authors are under no illusions that such conventional and nuclear deterrence will be easy to achieve. They cite the need for supplies, problems involving reserve forces, and the fact that the European allies must demonstrate that they are willing to make the necessary sacrifices to defend themselves. The authors conclude that NATO is in an especially dangerous period, for the allies now face a Soviet state which has serious internal strains and an enormous military capability.
This question of the military capability of the Soviet Union is a disturbing one. The mere fact that the USSR has such an enormous military machine is in itself cause for concern. What do the Soviets intend to do with this enormous capability? Involved in these questions is also the relationship of the United States and the USSR. The nature of the relationship between US and Soviet strategy is the subject of the next set of papers by Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Dr. Dimitri Simes.

Dr. Simes begins by reminding us that the Soviet Union has a cultural, historical, and psychological perspective of the world that differs radically from the Western outlook. It is not possible to view events in the Soviet Union and draw conclusions by the criteria of Western countries whose historical heritage and democratic political tradition are far removed from those of the USSR. To those in the West who point to the enormous economic difficulties of the Soviets, Dr. Simes counters that the USSR is not on any disaster’s edge; the Soviet growth rate is equal to the US rate. In addition, the Kremlin has defused dissident elements in Soviet society, has lowered some of the friction with China, has avoided the worst so far in Poland, has Eastern Europe under control, and is building the new natural gas pipeline. The Soviet regime’s difficulties are real, to be sure, but do not threaten imminent collapse.

Dr. Simes also believes that the Soviets do dream of world domination, but do not operate in terms of a master plan. Rather, the Soviet leadership responds to targets of opportunity and takes advantage of US lapses. This is different from the adventurist streak and missionary zeal characteristic of regimes such as Nazi Germany. He, however, does believe that Moscow is clearly interested in changing the international status quo at the expense of the United States.

Dr. Simes is of the opinion that the Soviets do have an important set of objectives which they pursue in the worldwide competition with the United States, even if they have no grand strategy. Indeed, such lack of strategy allows greater operational flexibility. Soviet objectives include maintaining their own security and that of their empire; preventing a new encirclement and blockade; reshaping the world order; and attaining legitimacy in terms of detente, especially in US recognition of the USSR as a superpower. In addition, the Soviets are improving their own military capabilities for offensive
purposes aimed at stopping counterrevolution and supporting “national liberation movements.” The Kremlin wants to ensure that in any international crisis, the Soviet point of view will be taken into account. The Soviet leadership also desires military power sufficient to allow the USSR to act unilaterally in worst-case scenarios.

Moscow does not always have smooth going in pursuing these objectives, however. Dr. Simes points out that the Soviets do overintellectualize some of their loosely connected tactical steps. For example, the Soviets calculated that the present correlation of forces in the world favorable to the USSR made detente an irreversible phenomenon—a calculation which has been proven inaccurate. The Soviets had misread the US public mood. The Soviet situation in the Third World has also had mixed results. Some of the expected benefits have not materialized from Soviet interventions in certain areas. Thus, Dr. Simes concludes that there may be anti-interventionist elements in the Kremlin that might be encouraged if Americans can avoid the impression of trying to stop the Soviets everywhere.

Also from the US perspective, the paper of Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff investigates possible American strategy in the face of this Soviet challenge. He first reviews some general requirements of strategy. A successful strategy should be coherent and consistent and integrated into the diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of policy. A clearly defined set of objectives is necessary to show how to move from one place to another. US strategy thus far has been to deny the Soviets alignments or alliances with as many states as possible along the rimlands of Eurasia. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been trying to leapfrog, circumvent, and break out of the rimland.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff believes that US global strategy now calls for building a strategic consensus. The dilemma now is to maintain regional alliance cohesion in the face of US global strategic requirements. Two contrasting approaches are possible. One would pursue a peripheral strategy with power projection based upon strategic nuclear forces, air power, and maritime supremacy, with burden-sharing by allies (NATO and Japan). A second approach would maintain a continental strategy to balance force postures and maintain ground forces in Europe and Asia so that deterrence can be preserved.
The strategy for the 1980s, Pfaltzgraff reasons, must still be based upon denial of core areas and the periphery, but the United States must work with its allies where possible, while acting alone in circumstances where policies are irreconcilable or where burden-sharing is not feasible. The US aim should be to foster democratic infrastructures and take advantage of those areas where the Soviets are vulnerable, such as in the economic realm and in Eastern Europe. The United States could call for a concerted action of those states that share a common interest and common security objectives, as well as exploit the US lead in space and technology. In such a way, the United States could evolve a global strategy designed to exploit the “contradictions” evident within the Soviet orbit.

We have now investigated strategy from a variety of perspectives, but an important issue remains, and this is just how the US system for developing strategy can be organized. Colonel Archie Barrett, USAF (Ret.), provides an excellent review of some of the current issues involved in the discussions of limitations to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff system and of proposals to improve the Joint Staff procedures. Colonel Barrett first explains the present organizational structure, discusses some of the criticisms of the way the present structure operates, and then analyzes the obstacles which stand in the way of any reform. The present arrangements of the Defense Department reflect the US pluralist tradition. There are many constituent interests involved in any kind of reorganization. Before reform can occur, these varied interests must all be satisfied, if not totally, then at least to an acceptable level. If any of the constituent interests feels that there will be an erosion of its status and influence, that interest will oppose a reorganization. This is what makes genuine reorganization so difficult. In addition, many of the impediments to reorganization have been around for the last 25 years and are deeply entrenched—formidable obstacles to any proposals aimed at substantially changing the system.

Colonel Barrett reviews some of the current reorganization proposals and outlines their possible implications. The suggestions of Generals Meyer, Jones, Allen, and Taylor are discussed, as are some of the provisions in HR 6954, the bill which calls for changes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. Colonel Barrett provides an excellent analysis here and we profit from the insights he has gained by virtue of his membership on the House Armed Services Committee Staff. While opinions vary on the pending legislation, Barrett feels
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that it does promise at least to investigate the shortcomings of the present system.

Also included in this chapter are three articles which have been reprinted with the kind permission of the Armed Forces Journal International. The articles by General David C. Jones, USAF, (Ret.) and by General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) outline specific critiques of the present system from the perspective of leaders who have had to work within the present system. General Jones believes that the challenges faced by the United States today require a greater integration of military service efforts than at any other time in our history. He calls for all involved in the JCS process to find the middle ground of reform needed to strengthen the system and make it more responsive to challenges the United States now faces. General Meyer agrees that there must be a better way to provide the best military advice possible to our national leaders. He also believes that reform of the mechanism which provides such advice is overdue. The last article, written by Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin F. Schemmer, provides additional commentary from some of the important decisionmakers who have had long experience with the present system. This commentary is well worth receiving, for its provides a diversity of viewpoints on this important issue.

At the beginning of this chapter, we attempted to define the term “strategy.” After reviewing the thoughts and ideas contained in the papers in this reader, however, it is clear that no simple definition adequately addresses the complexity involved in piecing together the constituent elements of national strategy.

Certainly, several key elements have emerged from the issues raised in the papers and panel discussions, but I would like to mention only one. The United States is a truly pluralistic society which operates under a unique Constitutional arrangement. The United States also faces the challenge of furthering its own and its allies' interests in a world characterized by rapid change and almost anarchic turmoil. To evolve a national strategy that is coherent and consistent; to use the technological capabilities of the present and future to further such a strategy; to include the interests of NATO
and other allies; to counter the challenges implicit in a Soviet strategy; and to organize effectively the US system for developing strategy—are all tasks that await US strategists as the nation moves toward and into the 21st Century. The challenges facing makers of US strategy are complicated by the very factors that make our nation strong—our pluralism, our Constitution, our democratic traditions.

Perhaps the first step toward understanding US strategy should be the realization that it can never be a static set of objectives, but must involve a dynamic process of defining, evaluating, and integrating the diverse interests and values of the American people. As a result, there may never be a definitive resolution. Instead, issues will continue to assert themselves; problems will be dealt with, but rarely will they be solved with finality. Accordingly, US policymakers will have to reflect on possible courses of action given a certain set of events and circumstances. This continual review and willingness to be open to new challenges will be dominant characteristics of future strategy formulation, and will be necessary for the United States to chart a safe path through an ever-changing and perilous world of the future.
Chapter 2

Keynote Address: Evolving Strategies for a Changing World
Chapter 2

Keynote Address: Evolving Strategies for a Changing World

Dr. Harold L. Brown
School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

To build upon the theme of this conference—Evolving Strategies for a Changing World—some of the elements necessary for the evolution of a national strategy should be identified.

But first, how broadly can the term "national strategy" be defined and construed? Surely rather less broadly than it is construed by some, although certainly it should go beyond strategy in the purely military sense. Already and it seems correctly, many have expanded the boundaries of the term to take in military-political considerations including diplomacy, foreign aid, and even international economics.

Pertinently, this conference's program has gone into military-political aspects in the defense of Western Europe. It has extended technologically, reaching out into the dimension of space. And the session on US-Soviet national strategies has gone into economic and geopolitical as well as military matters.

Most would probably agree that the ingredients of a national strategy should include at least those elements. Some would call for much broader inputs, including domestic concerns almost without limit. But sounder judgment would exclude many domestic matters from the scope of national security, and would thus derive a far more useful definition.

For example, calls are heard to include in the formulation of national security strategy matters ranging from crime in the streets and school prayer to the creation of a national health insurance system. An informed majority would surely say that each of these goes beyond what should normally enter into the national security equation.
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Yet the formulation of a national strategy should admit into consideration some domestic factors beyond just the need for a strong economy. At least some weight should be given to social welfare programs, budgetary policy, productivity, and even social policy, to name a few such factors.

What leads to this conclusion?

To begin with a clear example, domestic as well as international economic conditions determine the resources upon which the nation, or an allied group of nations, must depend to support foreign and military policy. Parenthetically: into foreign and military policy must go elements such as military capability, alliance relations, arms control, foreign aid, and the like. Beyond the purely economic question of the production of the necessary resources lies the reality that a consensus is required to make those resources available in support of foreign and military policy, at least in democratic countries—or at the very least in the United States.

Indeed, consensus seems more important to a nation's security policy than to its domestic policy. Traditionally, this concept has been expressed in the saying that politics should end at the water's edge. It hasn't and doesn't. But it is evident that the nation can probably stand an imperfect consensus on domestic matters rather better than on national security matters. A failure in domestic consensus, or failure in domestic programs, can cause us a great deal of unhappiness, of malaise, and of pain—but a sufficiently bad failure in national security policy can kill us.

It is thus important to have such a security consensus. Moreover, the degree of consensus on domestic issues will determine to a substantial extent how difficult or easy it will be to achieve consensus on foreign and military policy.

In the future, it appears that the leaders of the industrialized democracies will have to demand of their people difficult sacrifices for the long-run improvement of their domestic condition—economic, social, and political. And for improvement of the world economic system, which is now extremely shaky. Leaders will have to demand of their populations the postponement of gratification. That will also be needful for the production of a satisfactory, effective national security policy for their countries.
Unless the fragmentation of the domestic political and social structure in the industrialized democracies can be reduced, it’s not going to be possible to get that kind of sacrifice from their respective publics. If the domestic, economic, and political-social scene is perceived as unfair—as it is seen to be by a broad spectrum of the US public in terms of age, race, economics, status or geography—those sacrifices will be very hard to extract. That is particularly so where such unfairness is felt by those on both sides of the divisions between these population groups: where older people feel that they are treated unfairly, for instance, while younger people see their own treatment as unfair.

That kind of division prevents a favorable response to appeals for sacrifice domestically. Still less is it receptive to sacrifice for some particular foreign and military policy, even though strategists may recognize that policy as vital to the survival of the United States. In fact, the public at large may tend to regard defense as most regard insurance when the events that it is to guard against don’t happen—as an unnecessary luxury.

Thus it may be said that a threefold interaction links international security, domestic economic matters, and international economic questions. And it is notable that 10 percent of the US gross national product is involved in foreign trade, with one out of every three acres of farmland and one out of every six of the remaining industrial jobs in this country producing for export.

Any national security has to be built on all three legs of that tripod. Inseparable from this domestic economic leg is the question of slicing up the pie—domestic social welfare programs, productivity, capital investment, and social cohesion. We who are or have been professionally concerned principally with one of the legs, international security, need to think more about how that fits together with the other two legs to produce a stable national strategy, and out of it a national policy.

This, my fundamental thesis, provides the basis for several illustrations. These follow, in sketchy, abbreviated outline.

The first involves the relation between economics and security policy. Allegations are often heard that defense expenditure is somehow responsible for economic damage to the country. Promi-
nent legislators, journalists, professors, and others have often said that military expenditures are wasteful because they don't produce anything that anyone can consume. That they produce tanks which you can't eat, fighter aircraft that you can't live in, and so forth. This assertion is uncritically accepted by a wide spectrum of the US public.

Defense expenditures do, however, like other government expenditures, spread out through the economy with a certain multiplier effect, and thus have a role in stimulating the economy. That is what Secretaries of Defense mean if they point out that cutting defense expenditures reduces the number of jobs in the US.

In fact, adding a million dollars to defense expenditures affects the economy in much the same way as adding a million dollars for income transfer to shore up Social Security. Military, civil service, and contractor personnel are paid out of the million that goes into the defense budget; they don't produce consumer goods. But then the Social Security recipients don't produce consumer goods in return for their checks either; nevertheless, they spend that money, and it gets spread through the economy.

In either case, a million dollars has little inflationary effect; it does add to the GNP, however, in both cases, through secondary expenditure.

In each case, something is bought with the expenditures: they provide for the common defense in one case, and promote the general welfare in the other.

At some point, if defense procurements go up very rapidly, bottlenecks are created in critical materials and in skills, which can produce a special inflation in costs of defense hardware. If that effect grows large when the rest of the economy is operating at nearly full capacity, it can spill over into the rest of the economy. But so of course can social welfare expenditures at a high-enough level.

Neither sort of expenditure produces bottlenecks at low values because they are spread very widely among the population. But at a high-enough level they contribute to general inflation. For example, at the moment, producing tanks at a higher rate would be unlikely to run prices up by overloading our steel industry, since it is operat-
ing now below 40 percent of capacity.

In short, in most defense production, we are not now nearing problems of inflationary spillover into the rest of the economy.

The more of us that take the trouble to recall this and explain it, the more likely it is in time to penetrate with some effect on public understanding. Clearly, it is imperative to lay to rest this mistaken view that defense expenditures per se are wasteful. Or that they are to blame for such things as the loss of US preeminence in automobile manufacture, under the misapprehension that all our brilliant auto-bumper engineers are now being used in the defense industry and so are not available to outdesign the Japanese.

A third category of public expenditure competes with both defense spending and Social Security-style income transfers, and probably can make a better claim to adding to the US gross national product ten years hence. That category is public spending on infrastructure—on dams, bridges, roads, water supply, sewers, and the like. The same applies to expenditures on schools, which are an investment in human capital. Many such expenditures are by local government, and therefore are not in immediate competition with Federal spending. They are also, by and large, considerably smaller than either military expenditures or income transfers. They do, however, contribute to productivity in the long run.

Future debate may turn to the question of how Federal expenditures shall be divided between such capital expenditures (which are for future productivity), expenditures for various kinds of international stability (and defense expenditures are for that), and expenditures for domestic stability (which is in essence the aim of at least some income transfers).

Beyond all of these considerations, we must remember that the productive sector in our economy is the private sector, not its public sector. And Federal policies—on encouraging investment, on antitrust as this may affect productivity, and so forth—can have a greater effect indirectly than some of these Federal expenditures can have directly on investment. Notably, a Federal policy change altering private-sector productivity by 10 percent has a much greater effect than direct Federal capital investment. But however powerfully government may affect productivity, because ours is a
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relatively free market rather than a centrally planned economy, it does so indirectly.

Another element related to the strategy-supporting tripod is energy policy. Clearly, energy policy influences our national security, influencing our ability to remain a productive and effective society. To be held hostage by having to import even 30 or 35 percent of our oil—it used to be 50 percent—with part of that coming from a particularly unstable geographical region like the Middle East is a source of great vulnerability. Thus a sensible energy policy is a vital part of the tripod’s national security element, as well as of its domestic economic leg.

A further issue, tax cuts, is currently prominent in the domestic economic picture. Clearly, the 1981 decrease of taxes by $750 billion below the previous five-year projections (since adjusted by tax increases in 1982 by about $99 billion for three years or about $140 over the four remaining years of the five), and a five-year projected increase of defense expenditures calculated at $150 billion, leaves some $750 billion less in the Federal coffers over the five years. This works out at about $150 billion less a year. This is the origin of most of those projected $200 billion yearly deficits that have proven so frightening to the financial community.

It is also clear that interest rates, now falling because capital-investment borrowing has practically disappeared, will rise again when the economy starts to recover. But recovery is likely to be aborted unless this $200 billion yearly projected deficit can be reduced believably to something under $100 billion as it was in the past.

How can this be done? Ideas usually combine the good luck of a windfall improvement in the economy to generate more revenue with sacrifice by somebody else. The somebody else nominated, depending on the nominator’s political views, is usually the “welfare wastrel” or the “military wastrel.”

None of these prescriptions is going to work. Another which I will describe may well be politically unfeasible. But it does serve as an example of the kind of compromise needed to produce interaction among the three elements—those considerations of national security, international economics, and domestic social, economic,
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and political considerations—underpinning a genuine national strategy.

Problem: Where can $120 billion a year be found? Focusing on the year 1985, a source that many outside this room would start with would be diversion from defense spending. How much less can we spend for defense in 1985 than is now projected? The amount that I come up with is $25 billion, which is a great deal of money. Defense critics who would focus first, last, and only on this item for reductions in the national budget might say not $25 billion but $50 or $75 or $100 billion.

There really are only two other viable sources, but they can provide considerably more money. One is tax increases, from which I would seek some $50 billion more for 1985. One obvious approach, not too painful but politically very difficult, would be by decontrolling natural gas and imposing a windfall profits tax, or "wellhead" tax. This would yield perhaps $15 billion a year.

I would also tax imported oil $10 a barrel, which would yield another $15 billion a year. Now is probably the best time for this step, as there is not now any great petroleum shortage. Such a tax now would prompt a significant but not runaway increase in retail petroleum product prices.

Then I would take a more politically controversial action by perhaps postponing the third-year tax cut and certainly by eliminating tax indexing. This would yield another $30 billion. Let us say that all those together produce not the $60 billion they add up to, but $50 billion.

The other major viable source is transfer payments. Not much is left to take out of genuine means-tested welfare programs. In fact, my own judgment is that over the next year or two some of that will be restored. The welfare programs that are really a source of potential savings are not those, but the ones that go to us, the middle class—specifically, Social Security and Medicare.

Taxing Social Security would not touch those with very low incomes but those of us who have higher incomes. An alternative would be to tax half of Social Security income, since no tax was paid on the portion, about half, contributed by the employer. The average payback time for Social Security recipients, if memory serves, is
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20 months. That is, 20 months after the employee retires, he or she has recovered what both the employee and employer paid in. Taxing Social Security should bring in perhaps $25 billion. Put another way, this step would reduce transfer payments by that much.

By reducing the indexation of Social Security to match the per-capita GNP increase, or the average wage increase, we would by 1985 extract probably another $20 billion yearly out of the system. Medicare could become the source of another $10 billion in savings. The sum of $25 billion from defense, $50 billion from taxes, and $50 billion from transfer payments could reduce deficits below $100 billion—especially as interest rates and federal interest payments also fall in consequence of a corresponding conviction in financial markets that inflation will not reignite.

This combination of steps would shrink our annual deficits to manageable proportions. These steps will probably not be taken, but they mark a direction in which we must proceed to arrive at anything that deserves the name of a national strategy. And in the kind of compromises required, defense, which in my judgment should be a modest element, is nevertheless a key element.

Everyone involved is going to point to someone else and say, Take it from him. Defense, because its importance is underrated and because of the misconception that it affects the rest of the economy adversely, is a principal whipping boy. Indeed, with the disappearance of a consensus for defense, next year may see an attempt to take as much as possible of the necessary $120 billion out of defense. Or we may see a bid to take all that can be taken out of defense and leave other activities untouched.

It therefore seems to me important as part of a national strategy to cast defense in the role of political key to the rest. Compromise must be negotiated as a package, for a unilateral concession will probably be pocketed and unreciprocated, with the rest of the political deal falling apart.

National leadership needs to think more than it has in the past 20 or more years about a national strategy that includes all of these interacting elements. It cannot concentrate solely on the domestic side as some administrations have done, hoping that interaction will take care of itself. Nor can it concentrate on the international scene.
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as others have done with the thought that if performance in that sphere is good enough the difficult domestic decisions will take care of themselves.

We need, and soon, a turnaround in productivity. We have the technology, but we need new industrial plant and a return to the work ethic. These won't be developed easily.

We need also very substantial improvement in cohesion across generational, geographical, and racial lines, cohesion across the spectrum of economic status, and cohesion across differences in education. I am not sure this can be achieved; certainly the record of the past two decades is not encouraging in this respect.

Unless the elements of this kind of broad strategy interact, no single element is likely to succeed. They are too closely interrelated, and in a world where communication is instantaneous and interdependence is strong and deep, isolated successes are much less frequent than they used to be.

I am sure any two of us would differ upon the details of a broad, comprehensive national strategy. But I do believe one combining these elements in a coherent way is needed. In my judgment, it is also feasible. But I do think we must try, and that if we try hard enough, we have a fair chance for success.

The important, indeed critical, national security elements of any national strategy must be seen in this broad context. On those considerations I have spent most of my own career, and intend to continue. For unless we see national security in this broader context, and accept that it must be a part of a national strategy, I doubt that we can devise a national security policy or a national security strategy that has any chance of success.
Chapter 3

Evolving a National Strategy

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

“This panel will address the design of a coherent national strategy to meet America's security needs. The papers and discussions might review the evolving role of the United States in a changing world and the major security interests, objectives, strengths, and constraints that will set priorities for a US national strategy. Alternative national strategies will be proposed and the panel might consider the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a worldwide counter-Soviet strategy, an essentially maritime strategy, a Euro-centered strategy, and a Persian Gulf-weighted strategy. The panel will address the strategic concepts of "horizontal" and vertical escalation, their applicability, and their potential contribution to US security. The group will examine the implications of their discussions for US alliance systems and defense budgeting and force structures.”
Panel Summary

Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Chairman
Smithsonian Institution

Colonel Thomas J. Kennedy, USA, Rapporteur
National Defense University

Panel deliberations began with consideration of two clear and incisive papers by Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein and Dr. James Rosenau which, in very different ways, sparked the panel to deal with the elements of the highly complex problem of evolving a national strategy.

Dr. Nuechterlein proposed a useful definition of the national interest, established levels of interest, and proposed priorities among them. He then focused on the necessity for tough-minded discrimination among US national interests by a broadly-based political process in order to identify those vitally necessary to the US. Among his more provocative points were the arguments that the foremost interests of the US lie in North America (in this case extending south through Colombia and Venezuela); that the United States is overextended in Western Europe, Korea, and the Indian Ocean, and should reevaluate its interests in those areas; and that the United States has no vital interests in the Persian Gulf and should not fight to protect the flow of oil there, unless the Soviet Union were to intervene with military force in order to deny that oil to the industrial nations. In view of these considerations the United States should evaluate its commitments in the harshly realistic fight of what the public would sacrifice to protect each one and then make appropriate commitment reductions. His own priorities, presented for the purposes of illustration and stimulation of panel discussion were:

1. North America (including Middle America and northern South America)
2. Western Europe (plus Israel and Egypt from the Mediterranean area)
3. The Soviet Union
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4. Eastern Asia and the Pacific (excluding Korea)
5. South America
6. Middle East-Persian Gulf
7. Africa

Dr. Rosenau took a very different approach to the topic. Based on the sharp divisions among our allies and within US leadership, he contended that policymakers will have a nearly impossible task in formulating and implementing a viable national strategy. He pointed out that recent research indicates American leadership groups are divided into three distinct and mutually exclusive belief systems which make consensus-building virtually impossible. These belief systems are those of: cold war internationalists, post-cold war internationalists, and neoisolationists. To describe the simultaneous and contradictory processes of integration and fragmentation of views occurring globally and within individual societies, Rosenau has coined the special term “fragmegration.”

He concluded that American policymakers had to approach their work with an appreciation of these severe constraints to developing consensus and that, short of the most dramatic and catalyzing external events, they should not attempt the impossible. While one apparent alternative might be to adopt an exclusively military strategy, Rosenau insisted that would be insufficient to meet the national needs and that any strategy adopted must include economic, social, and political elements. In the absence of meaningful national consensus, he suggested that only by “muddling through” pragmatically could US leadership provide direction in the near term.

These two provocative positions generated considerable debate among panel members for the remainder of the day. However, the breadth of discussion, the profound nature of the topic, and the relatively short time available precluded a firm polling on each issue and the results noted below reflect impressions and judgments about points of general synthesis and disagreement. They are not presented as clear consensus views, and any panel member might take exception to a particular position or concept presented.

The panel agreed that a national strategy must be inclusive, that it must include economic, political, and diplomatic aspects and not be limited (as is too often the case) to its military elements. All these
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aspects must be well integrated, yet all panel members acknowledged the difficulty in achieving a viable strategy that was both inclusive and fully integrated.

The panel also agreed that a national strategy must be balanced with available resources at all stages of development and must be persuasively presented to both the public and Congress. Members frequently referred to the need for public understanding and support of a national strategy to outlast successive national political administrations. The difficulty of achieving such wide support was generally acknowledged, but the necessity for that support was accepted. The group also examined the need to make the general international community, friends as well as adversaries, aware of our strategic concepts. The implicit theme of overcommitment of resources also ran through all discussion. The group agreed that the United States suffers too often from excessive resource commitments, exacerbated by the rapid rise and fall of budget levels. Consequently, there is a clear need for steady, long-term policies and programs to match the political and economic realities facing this Nation.

The panel agreed that high levels of rationality and clarity could even be a handicap in policy formulation and public presentation because they too often lead to oversimplification. Most members accepted the benefits of ambiguity in implementing policy, but insisted that we should seek much higher clarity in our language and analysis of strategy. Instead of using terms like policy and strategy in multiple meanings, we would do better to use more precise words such as goals, means, and resources. Yet the concept of ambiguity remains useful, panelists felt, as long as that ambiguity is employed tactically, allowing flexibility of response and reaction, but never as a policy in itself.

The panel disagreed over whether to begin development of a national strategy with a definition of national interests in geographic terms. Many believed that a geographic approach could lead to imprecise comparisons and artificial estimates of value.

Some tangible thoughts developed:

- One panelist insisted that strategists should separate items of intrinsic importance (e.g., integrity and independence of
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Western Europe) from valuable instruments (e.g., Dew Line or bases in Iceland).

- The panel's one geographic case study was a discussion of whether the United States has interests worth using military force to defend in the Gulf and Southwest Asia. One paper contended we do not have such interests. Panelists argued this with some vigor, generally concluding that the Gulf as an isolated economic interest is not vital. But when threatened by the Soviet Union (a threat raised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the chaos in Iran), the region's importance rapidly escalated and it became vital. Thus its value is scenario-dependent.

- In dealing with the issue of the level of preparation to make for defending US interests in the Gulf, the panel made no specific judgment. But it seemed to accept the chairman's statement of limits, i.e., that the United States should not prepare to resist a massive Soviet invasion, but should be ready to send naval and air power and up to perhaps 30,000 troops in a major show of determination.

- The panel discussed the importance of the Soviet threat in creating a consensus regarding action both within the government and among the public.

- While Afghanistan lacks basic strategic value for the United States, it did represent a significant departure in Soviet policy. This, on top of the chaos in Iran and the uncertainty about where the Soviet invasion would stop, justified a sharp change in US policy for the region.

In discussing the nature of a visible national strategy, the panel members agreed that specific prescriptions could not be laid out for all contingencies. That was the foundation of individual "if-then" contingency plans. Instead, we felt that a national strategy should be a clear, consistent, and comprehensive set of guidelines along the order of the framework outlined below (not all would agree with these specifics, but supported the structure):

- The Soviet Union poses the main threat to US interests.
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- Western Europe would remain our top priority outside of continental homeland defense.

- The United States must have the capability to protect the Persian Gulf against attacks from local powers such as Iran, or low-level probes by the Soviet Union.

- The United States will avoid being the first to use military force.

- The American public must be kept informed about the Nation's basic strategic goals, and their support is essential to an effective strategy.

The panel had no solutions to the problems of how to integrate all these elements or how to implement the strategy through the bureaucracy and the Congress. It did emphasize the necessity of the President's involvement and support in addition to the value of working in small groups under top conceptual direction. Yet in the face of a governmental structure with an adversary process, wide media access, frequent elections, a divided public, and declining American relative power to achieve our goals singlehandedly, several panelists expressed despair for the successful adoption of a comprehensive strategic approach in the near term.
National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority

Dr. Donald E. Nuechterlein
Federal Executive Institute

In the summer of 1982, a year and a half after taking office, the Reagan Administration had not yet publicly enunciated a clear set of priorities regarding US national interests for the 1980s, or a strategy to defend and enhance them. In the absence of a well-defined statement of what he believed US vital interests to be, President Reagan ran considerable risks that his foreign and national security policies would be misunderstood by the American public and that they could prove confusing, even dangerous, to our friends and adversaries abroad.

Two statements by the President's closest advisers on national security affairs illustrate the ambiguity that existed about US national interests. Speaking to the American Bar Association in New Orleans on 11 August 1981, the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, asserted: "A working relationship with the Soviet Union depends on a balance of alternatives and our ability to communicate to Moscow that such alternatives exist. We must indicate our willingness to reach fair agreements that speak to the legitimate interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But we must also be prepared to defend our interests in the absence of such agreements." [Emphasis added.]

The President's National Security Adviser, William Clark, told an audience at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies on 21 May 1982:

Our interests are global and they conflict with those of the Soviet Union, a state which pursues worldwide policies. most [of them] unfriendly to our own . . . It's a given that, of course, we have vital interests around the world, including maritime sea lanes of communication. The hard fact is that the military power of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests as never before.
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In neither case did these senior Administration officials spell out what they or the President believed these vital areas of interest to be. Judge Clark nevertheless went on to assert that the United States "cannot reject in advance any options we might need to protect these same vital interests. To do so is to invite aggression, undermine our credibility and place at risk all global objectives." In short, he claimed that although the Administration had established priorities for strategic planning purposes, it would not make them public because it wanted US intentions to remain ambiguous. The danger is that an absence of clarity hinders the American public's understanding of what the United States is committed to abroad and may result in its being unwilling to support the President when he decides that US forces must be used to defend vital interests.

Another problem with the Reagan approach to strategic planning is that it assumes regional conflicts can and should be subordinated to a "strategic consensus," that the overriding threat to international security is the Soviet Union. Thus, local conflicts such as El Salvador, Lebanon, and Namibia must be seen primarily as part of the East-West struggle for world power, not the result of local antagonisms and historical factors. This globalist approach to international relations is underscored by the Administration's decision to support a "horizontal" rather than "vertical" escalation concept in strategic planning, making clear that Soviet escalation of conflict in one part of the world would not limit the US response to that area and might result in US escalation elsewhere. Judge Clark's remarks on this aspect of strategic planning are instructive:

Thus, global planning is a necessity. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously on all fronts. We can't. simply can't. What it does mean is that we must procure balanced forces and establish priorities for sequential operations to insure that military power would be applied in the most effective way on a priority basis. It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of any conflict. The capability for counteroffensives on other fronts is an essential element of our strategy, but it is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend our vital interests in the area in which they are threatened. On the other hand, the decision to expand a conflict may well not be ours to make. Therefore, U.S. forces must be capable of responding to a major attack with unmistakable global implications early on in any conflict.
The strategy for defending US interests seems clear, but the definition of what US vital interests are remains ambiguous. Until the two concepts are tied together in a meaningful way, suspicion grows that the Administration will decide what US interests are whenever a crisis arises. Without a clear idea of what those vital interests are, this Administration may blunder into another Vietnam-type situation and find that the public and Congress simply will not support either its view of what is vital, or the means to deal with a threat somewhere in the world.

A third problem concerns the organization of the government’s national security decisionmaking machinery. Mr. Reagan entered office in January 1981 emphasizing the “team” approach to national security affairs. Within a month, the Secretary of State was quarreling with the White House staff over “turf,” specifically over who would run the crisis management committee of the National Security Council. Once that issue was resolved in favor of the Vice President, the Secretary of State became embroiled in controversy with the Secretary of Defense and the President’s National Security Adviser. By the end of the first year, the President decided to replace his Security Adviser in order to reduce the “guerrilla warfare” that existed between him and the Secretary of State. But the internecine conflicts continued, and by the summer of 1982 the President decided to replace his Secretary of State with a “team player.” Although the key players have changed, the question remains whether the new Reagan team is any closer than the old one to defining what it is that the United States will and will not defend in an increasingly complex international environment.

The purpose of this paper is to be provocative, to question assumptions on which US foreign policy has been based for 30 years, to stimulate discussion about where we should be going in the next 20. The views expressed here are those of one scholar who has spent the past 10 years trying to find a better method for defining US national interests. For me, formulating a national strategy must follow from a clear perception of what the United States should stand for in the world, what issues are truly vital national interests, and which ones are not. The following discussion of US interests in the 1980s represents subjective judgments on my part, yet ones that are based on a conceptual framework that provides a useful tool of analysis for strategic planning. Specifically, the points where US interests are placed in the matrices shown in this paper
represent my judgment of the level of interest the United States has in various parts of the world today. These are not stated as a fact, but as the considered views of one scholar. Obviously, policymakers and other scholars will have different perceptions of what US interests should be. The essential point here is that decisions about what is in the US national interest are the product of discussion among political leaders who ultimately must decide whether an issue is "vital"—whether it is so important that it must be defended by force if necessary. As scholars, our job is to insure that these political judgments are based on clear analysis and an appreciation of the cost/risk factors that are involved. Decisions about national strategy should flow from prior political decisions concerning the intensity of a specific national interest. It is therefore essential that our discussion of a national strategy for the 1980s should begin with a debate about what constitute US interests at this point in our history.

BASIC US NATIONAL INTERESTS

A starting point for reappraising US objectives in the world is a careful look at four basic national interests which undergird all US foreign and national security policies. These are: defense of homeland (North America), US economic well-being, favorable world order (international security), and promotion of American values (ideology).  

Defense of Homeland

This is a narrowly defined interest which many scholars (but not military planners) take for granted. It is primarily concerned with defense of North America and with the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The security of Canada's territory and airspace, as well as peace and stability in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America are integral parts of this interest. Talks with Moscow on a strategic arms limitation agreement is also a crucial part of the US defense interest because of the Soviet Union's capability to inflict massive destruction on the United States. International terrorism targeted against Americans living abroad, including attacks on American embassies, is part of this defense interest, as is externally supported terrorism within the United States. The flow of millions of illegal laborers across the US border with Mexico is a defense interest if it poses a security threat.
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within the United States.

Two key questions must be addressed here: How much additional attention and resources should the US government give to the political, economic, and security problems of countries close to US borders? To what extent will greater attention to these issues divert public attention and resources from crucial problems elsewhere in the world? Looking back, it is now clear that the United States neglected its own neighborhood during the past 20 years as it pursued a global role that sapped its human and material resources. The internal divisions within Canada, a potential revolution in Mexico, Cuba’s continuing drive to subvert Central American and Caribbean states, and the inability of the United States to protect its own borders against narcotics smuggling and illegal aliens point to the need for much greater attention by policymakers to the serious problems of North America.

US Economic Well-being

This basic interest includes a wide range of international economic issues, such as: the value of the dollar, the US standard of living, the ability of American firms to trade and invest overseas, the impact of international currency transfers, as well as the "dumping" of foreign products in the US market. The economic well-being interest requires that policymakers appreciate the trade-off between a liberal international economic policy, on the one hand, and the severe domestic dislocations that result from the flourishing of this policy. Clearly, the United States in 1982 is approaching the crossover point where massive unemployment caused by growing imports—automobiles and steel being the best examples—threatens to diminish congressional support for the free-trade policies. Being mindful of the domestic environment in which foreign policy is formulated, policy planners must be realistic in dealing with these danger signals and not simply hold up free trade as the overriding economic national interest.

Favorable World Order

This basic interest encompasses US alliances, US security assistance agreements with countries outside North America, conflicts between noncommunist countries, Soviet support of national liberation forces, world hunger and population problems, and
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international terrorism. Emphasis on this category of interests expanded greatly after World War II and has resulted in considerable controversy within the United States. US involvement in the Vietnam War is the best example of the ambiguity in defining these interests correctly, and of the penalties of poor judgment.

Few persons doubt that Western Europe and Japan remain vital world-order interests of the United States in the 1980s because they contribute to international stability and their political and economic power is essential in balancing the growth of Soviet world influence. A key issue, however, is why many NATO countries and Japan do not share the US perception of world-order interests and the need for tougher policies to protect themselves against Soviet encroachments. In short, to what extent are Europe's and Japan's national interests divergent from our own? Clearly, there is considerable difference in views between Western Europe and the United States about Soviet intentions in the Middle East, in Africa, and East Asia. The unwillingness of some West European countries, particularly West Germany, to abandon detente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will continue to trouble NATO relationships. This calls into question whether so much attention should be accorded European views in deciding US policies. Similarly, Japan's reluctance to devote a significant share of GNP to building up its naval and air defense causes serious questioning about whether the United States should maintain large armed forces in Northeast Asia to protect Japan's interests.

Promotion of American Values Abroad

This basic interest includes the American set of values and the desirability of exporting them to other countries. It includes the US constitutional system and its emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and a sense of social justice. The key issue is the extent to which American values should influence US relations with other countries. For example, President Carter's emphasis on human rights antagonized many traditionally friendly countries in Latin America and in Asia. The American people support an ideological component of foreign policy, and Congress has mandated that the State Department report regularly on how other countries are dealing with human-rights issues. This basic national interest also affects US relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, and it has been given far greater attention by
the Reagan Administration than was the case during the previous 20 years.

The policymaker’s job is to identify which of these basic national interests is heavily affected by an international event or trend and then assess the intensity of that interest; i.e., the US stake. To assess the US stake in a specific issue, four levels or intensities of interest are suggested: survival interests, when the very existence of a country is in jeopardy as the result of an overt military attack, or threat of attack if an enemy’s demands are rejected; vital interests, when serious harm likely will result unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter an antagonist’s provocative action; major interests, when a country’s political, economic, and social well-being may be adversely affected by external events or trends; peripheral interests, when a nation’s well-being is not adversely affected by events and trends abroad, but when harm may be sustained by private US companies with overseas operations. The task of the country’s political leadership is to distinguish between those issues which are vital interests, and those that are major. These judgments are the result of a political process in which decisionmakers must address this crucial question: “Is the issue at hand so important to the well-being of the United States that the President must be prepared to use force if all other efforts fail to resolve the problem?” If the policymaker believes the United States cannot tolerate a developing threat, the level of national interest for him is vital; if, however, he concludes that the issues involved can and should be compromised, even though the result may be painful, the interest is major.

The utility of these categories of national interest is apparent, when they are assembled in a matrix configuration, as shown in table 3-1.5

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<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
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<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
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<td>Economic Well-being</td>
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<td>Promotion of Values</td>
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Evolving a National Strategy

This matrix may be used to assess the national interests of the United States as well as other countries having a stake in a specific international crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Suez Crisis, the Falkland Islands Crisis, to name a few, should be analyzed in terms of the interests of all the principal players, and this is true also for potential crises. A rule of thumb is that if a country has one or more vital interests at stake, it will probably use force if necessary to protect them; if it has no vital interests at stake, it will probably compromise and seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Most wars occur when two or more countries each have at least one vital and/or survival interest at stake and are therefore willing to fight rather than compromise.

VITAL US INTERESTS IN THE 1980s

At the beginning of the 1980s, the United States again runs the risk—as it did in the 1960s—of defining its vital interests so broadly that it may be unable or unwilling to defend all of them if put to the test. It is therefore imperative that policymakers approach the job of defining US vital interests—those which are so important that they could involve the nation in war—with a healthy respect for both the costs and benefits of defending a specific country or area in the world. To assume that the United States is a global power and therefore has vital interests everywhere is dangerous thinking. What follows, therefore, is an attempt to put US national interests in priority order, in terms of geographic areas and specific countries, using the national-interest matrix as a guide.

North America

Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Islands constitute the American heartland, the Monroe Doctrine defense zone. A direct military threat to countries in this area will be viewed as a vital, perhaps even a survival, US defense interest. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 demonstrated that the United States would react with vigor to a Soviet military threat so close to American borders, and might even employ nuclear weapons if US territory is threatened. This area is to the United States what Eastern Europe is to the Soviet Union: a vital defense zone which it will not permit to be turned into a military base of operations by a hostile power. This level of interest also applies to a surrogate for the Soviet Union,
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specifically, Cuba: the introduction of Cuban troops, volunteers or otherwise, into a Caribbean or Central American country would be considered a threat to vital US interests because no one doubts that Cuba undertakes dangerous adventures abroad only with strong Soviet support.

Table 3-2: US National Interests in North America

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<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
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In economic terms, Canada is by far the most important trading partner of the United States and accounts for nearly $40 billion in US private investments. Northern and northeastern American states are heavily dependent on Canadian energy resources, particularly natural gas and hydroelectric power (in the east). No two other major countries have such close economic relationships, and Canada must therefore be considered a vital economic as well as strategic interest of this country. To the south, Mexico is the third most important trading partner of the United States, and its exports to the United States have risen rapidly in the past few years. Mexican oil and gas have assumed an increasing importance to the US economy in reducing US dependence on Persian Gulf oil. The large number of Mexican workers who cross the US border each year in search of jobs is both a threat and a boon to the US economy and contributes to making Mexico a vital economic interest of the United States. If trade barriers were raised on either the Canadian or the Mexican border, serious economic dislocations in the US economy would result. Venezuela (treated here as part of North America) is another important importer of US products and is a source not only of energy resources, but also iron ore and other minerals needed by US industry. Although not as economically vital as Canada and Mexico, Venezuela constitutes an important economic interest of the United States. Colombia is in a similar position because of its geography and influence in the Caribbean Basin.

In ideological terms, the United States has a vital interest in
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promoting moderate, representative government in the North American area. With Canada included, the region has two of the world’s leading democracies, totaling a quarter of a billion people. To the south Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Jamaica are truly democratic states; the remainder are one-party governments or highly authoritarian regimes backed by military forces. Because North America constitutes the United States’ “neighborhood,” it is not enough for Washington to show only economic and political leadership: it should also promote the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution. Although human rights has been reduced as a foreign-policy theme by the Reagan Administration, it is nevertheless important that Washington continue to press its neighbors to move in the right direction of democratic government and to show respect for human rights.

It is the world-order interest that entails the greatest ambiguity in defining US interests in North America. Although an outside attack would clearly be a vital interest, or higher, it is less clear how the United States should respond to revolutionary change in countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador and to the spread of Marxist political influence throughout Central America. Some contend that internal political change in this region should be viewed as a major, not a vital, US interest and that Washington should not use American military forces in what are essentially civil wars. This was the US response to the case of Nicaragua, where the middle class joined the Sandinists in 1979 to oust the hated dictator, Anastasio Somoza. El Salvador is a somewhat different situation because the Duarte government sought to steer a middle way between fascists on the right and Communists on the left. Others contend that the US stake in this area is so vital that political, economic, and military tools are required to support it. These considerations will apply if Marxist revolutions should spread to such countries as Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica: If the United States cannot tolerate Marxist regimes in Central America, the US world-order interest is then vital; if we can live with them, the world-order interest is major.

Cuba is the most difficult North American political problem facing US policymakers, and six Presidents have had differing views of the level of US interest it comprises. Deposing Fidel Castro became a vital interest of the Eisenhower Administration in 1960, after it naively paved the way for him to come to power in 1959 in the expectation that he would modify his radical ideas after he was in
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charge. Eisenhower then set in motion the Bay of Pigs operation which proved disastrous when implemented by John Kennedy in April 1961. Thereafter, Kennedy put Cuba into the major interest category, until October 1962 when Soviet missiles were discovered on the island. The US interest then quickly escalated to the survival level, and an invasion of Cuba would have been ordered had Moscow not decided to remove the missiles. In 1975, Cuba sent its troops to Angola to help the Marxist faction win the civil war. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger sought unsuccessfully to convince Congress that a vital US interest was at stake. Jimmy Carter viewed Cuba as a major interest and sought to renew diplomatic relations with Havana; but Castro was unwilling to cease his African adventures or tone down his drive to undermine US influence in the Third World.

The Reagan Administration seems to view the presence of Cuban troops outside Cuba as a serious threat to US interests in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Although some of his campaign oratory indicated that he viewed Fidel Castro’s foreign policy as intolerable, Mr. Reagan’s first 18 months in office suggested that so long as Cuban troops are not used to spread Communist ideology in North America, Washington will not use force against Fidel Castro’s regime.

In sum, North America is the most important area of US interests in terms of defense, economic, and ideological interests, and it borders on a vital world-order interest as well. President Reagan underlined this deep interest by meeting during 1981 with the Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and Mexican President Lopez Portillo on several occasions, and by attending summit conferences with other heads of government in Ottawa, Canada, and in Cancun, Mexico. The President’s sponsorship of a new economic plan for the Caribbean Basin, in cooperation with Canada, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, is further evidence of the high priority he accords North American relationships.

Western Europe

The political, economic, and social viability of Western Europe’s working in relative harmony with the United States has been a vital world-order interest of this country since France fell to German armies in June 1940. At that time the US government concluded that
US security was so deeply bound up with the independence of Great Britain and France that it would be intolerable if Hitler's Reich dominated the entire European continent. It was therefore only a matter of time until the United States went to war; and in the meantime, President Roosevelt started the program of lend-lease to Great Britain and carried on clandestine cooperation with Prime Minister Churchill in order to aid Britain's desperate effort to survive. After the war, President Truman reaffirmed that Europe was a vital interest by proposing the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact, both of which were approved by Congress after lengthy debate. Since 1950 powerful US military forces have been stationed in Western Europe, equipped with nuclear weapons, to warn the Soviet Union that the United States will fight to protect this vital area against attack or intimidation.

Table 3-3: US National Interests in Western Europe

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<tr>
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<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
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<td>Promotion of Values</td>
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Although it has been a historically vital interest, Western Europe is not equivalent to North America in terms of its strategic and economic importance to the United States. It remains a vital world-order interest because of balance of power considerations, and probably a vital ideological interest because of its shared values with the United States. But Western Europe is not a vital defense-of-homeland interest for the United States: neither West Germany nor France is as important to US strategic and economic interests as Canada or Mexico, even though the latter are far smaller countries in terms of military forces and GNP. To assert this truth is not to denigrate the vital role of the European NATO allies, but rather to put their importance in perspective in terms of other US interests.

Western Europe is crucial to the United States for balance-of-power reasons, and all Presidents and Congresses since Truman have reaffirmed that it must not fall under the political domination of Moscow. Even though the United States is not crucially dependent
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on West European territory or the European Common Market for defense of American territory and economic well-being, Western Europe constitutes a vital factor in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its absorption into the Soviet sphere of influence would be an intolerable blow to US world-order interests, and that is why the NATO commitment remains firm.

The question of defense burden-sharing within NATO is a continuing problem, however, particularly as the Reagan Administration launches the Nation's largest peacetime rearmament program. President Reagan's decision in August 1981 to produce neutron weapons for use against massive numbers of Soviet tanks in a European war offers a relatively inexpensive means of countering the Soviet advantage in conventional forces; the same is true of deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, scheduled for 1983. But European public opinion is deeply divided on the value of these weapons because it is feared they will increase the likelihood of a theater nuclear war in which European territory would be devastated. President Reagan has insisted that since the defense of Western Europe is a vital American interest, US forces should not be denied the weapons needed to deter the large Soviet superiority in conventional forces; but in November 1981 he offered to cancel deployment of US intermediate-range missiles if Moscow dismantled the Soviet SS-20s.

European reluctance to defend Middle East oil, on which most West European countries are far more dependent than is the United States, is a further example of US interests in conflict with European views of their interests. With the exception of the French, West Europeans generally believe that protecting Persian Gulf oil supplies is an American responsibility because only the United States has sufficient military power to deter the Soviet Union in that area and reassure the Saudis and other insecure Arab states that they need not fear intimidation. Nevertheless, Europeans would protest strongly if the United States decided to reduce its troop strength in Europe or redeploy large parts of the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean in order to increase the credibility of its commitment to defend the Persian Gulf.

The most serious current issue affecting relations between the United States and its European allies is their divergent views on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Following the declaration of
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martial law in Poland in December 1981, President Reagan imposed economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union and vowed not to relax them until Polish authorities eased internal security measures. West European governments, particularly West Germany, are reluctant to lose the fruits of detente policies that prevailed in the 1970s, and they have pressured the United States to lift economic sanctions against Eastern Europe even though Polish authorities have not modified martial law restrictions. The sanctions issue that has triggered the most emotion in Europe is Mr. Reagan’s decision in 1982 to cancel American participation in the Soviet gas pipeline construction project. For the United States, the issue was a vital world-order interest, preventing the NATO allies from becoming dependent on Soviet energy resources and depriving Moscow of about $10 billion per year in hard-currency revenues. To West Europeans the issue approached a vital economic interest because of their need for an alternative source of energy to offset Arab oil, and also their desire to provide jobs for workers producing materials for the pipeline. Many Europeans, particularly in West Germany, also see a major world-order interest at stake in keeping open trade ties and lines of communication to the East, in order to reduce tensions and the risk of war with the Soviet Union. The gas pipeline, along with the issue of placing the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Central Europe, have the potential of splitting the NATO alliance. The Reagan Administration believed that the risk was worth taking because it thought that relenting on the pipeline issue would fracture NATO in stages rather than abruptly. In December 1982, President Reagan decided to remove the pipeline sanction.

In sum, West Europeans—particularly Germany, Belgium and Holland—seem to want it both ways: to keep the United States involved militarily in Europe but to maintain trade ties and close political links to Eastern Europe. The US vital interest in defending Western Europe should therefore be balanced against the rising costs of doing so. If some European governments do not see a vital interest in strengthening their defense capabilities and reducing their economic ties with the East at the expense of social programs, the United States may be forced to ask whether their continued membership in NATO is warranted.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

US relations with the Soviet Union is one of the few national
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interests that currently approaches the survival level, as defined earlier, and must therefore be given a high priority by policymakers. The USSR is the only nation capable of inflicting massive damage on the US homeland, even though the United States has the retaliatory capability of destroying the Soviet homeland. Therefore the US President has the responsibility to prepare for nuclear war with the Soviet Union and at the same time negotiate arms agreements that reduce the possibility of mutual annihilation. The Reagan Administration decided early that it would not engage in new strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets until it had bolstered both the US conventional and nuclear arms capability. Convinced that the SALT II treaty negotiated by the Ford and Carter Administrations could be dangerous for US security, the Reagan foreign-policy team concluded that this danger would be reduced if the US were to expand its military power and then enter negotiations. President Reagan's offer on 9 May 1982 to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions (START) set in motion a concerted effort to engage the Kremlin leadership in discussions on how to reduce the awesome number of nuclear weapons, not just to put limits on future production of them.

Table 3-4: US National Interests in the Soviet Union

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<td>Favorable World Order</td>
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<td>Promotion of Values</td>
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Although the United States has a survival interest in preventing war with the Soviet Union because of the likelihood of its escalation into nuclear war, this country has only a peripheral economic interest in the Soviet Union because it has little to sell the United States and because it is a poor market for private foreign investment. Some analysts think that providing financial credits for the Soviet Union to buy goods in the United States is a major economic interest because they hope it would induce a moderating effect on Soviet political behavior. This “linkage” idea was tested during the period of detente in the 1980s and, in the view of Ronald Reagan, was an erroneous assumption.
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The United States has a major, bordering on vital, world-order interest in the Soviet Union. It is in the US national interest to persuade the Kremlin leadership to stop supporting revolutionary groups in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but not to the extent of drawing the United States into local wars, as occurred in Vietnam. The US also has a major ideological interest in keeping the Soviet Union on the defensive regarding human rights; for example, on its role in the suppression of freedom in Poland and Afghanistan, and its poor record in abiding by the terms of the Helsinki Agreements on the flow of information. However, placing US world-order and ideological interests with the Soviet Union at only the major-interest level runs counter to the views of hard-line American conservatives who believe that these matters are of vital concern and that the President should take much stronger action, including military risks, to confront Moscow on its support of revolutions around the world. That is a minority view, however.

By 1982, it was clear that the United States and its NATO allies were not willing to use strong measures to counter a Soviet-inspired suppression of freedom in Poland, or any other Eastern European country. This is because what happens within Eastern Europe is a major, not a vital, interest of NATO. Economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are consistent with a major interest, however, and were imposed on Poland by President Reagan after the suppression of civil liberties.

The degree of US national interest in arms control with the Soviet Union depends, as it has from the beginning of such negotiations in the late 1940s, on Washington’s assessments of Soviet military intentions and Moscow’s willingness to abide by agreements. Some policymakers assume that the Kremlin’s leaders are moving inexorably toward war with the United States and believe that arms-control negotiations are not in the US interest. This view holds that US capability to wage war against the Soviets in the Middle East or Europe, or both, is a vital interest of this country and must be given top priority. Other policymakers are not convinced that the Soviets are bent on war with the United States and argue that arms control must be pursued vigorously and a new Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement reached soon in order to stop the momentum toward war. In this view, the United States has a survival interest in preventing a nuclear war. Instead of choosing between these conflicting views of the national interest, President
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Reagan's decisions early in 1982 showed that he intends to pursue both policies for the time being.

In sum, the United States has a survival interest in seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons and avoid war; but this interest must be balanced against a major and perhaps vital interest in preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the world.

East Asia

The Far East, as it was known until the 1960s, was an important economic, but never a vital political or strategic interest of the United States until World War II. Japan's rise as a major power during the early part of this century was not seen by US policymakers as a serious threat to US interests as long as Japan confined its ambitions to mainland Asia. Consequently, the United States acquiesced in Japan's invasions of China in 1931 and 1937 and even its occupation of North Vietnam in 1940. Only after the Japanese invaded South Vietnam and Cambodia (then part of French Indo-China) in July 1941 did President Roosevelt heed Churchill's warning that the Japanese were bent on attacking southward into Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies. Thereupon Roosevelt decided to ban oil shipments to Japan and freeze its assets in the United States. These decisions represented an upward movement in the US interest from major to vital, and the two powers went to war in December 1941.

Table 3-5: US National Interests in East Asia

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<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
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In the early post-World War II period, the United States again concluded that it had no vital interests at stake on the mainland of Asia. Therefore, it acquiesced in the Communist takeover of China in 1949 and withdrew its occupation forces from Korea. Until 1950
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American vital interests in the Far East were based, as both General MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted, on the islands off the Asian mainland: Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950 changed that perception, and within a few hours President Truman decided that the United States could not tolerate North Korean plans to unify Korea by force. He therefore sent US forces into battle and the US commitment to defend South Korea remains intact thirty years later.

But is Korea a vital interest in the 1980s? When Harry Truman made his unexpected decision to intervene in Korea, China and the Soviet Union were allies, Japan was weak and only beginning to recover from World War II, and South Korea had no real defense capability. This situation has changed dramatically in thirty years: China is hostile to Russia, Japan is one of the world's leading economic powers and has a respectable self-defense force, and South Korea possesses a large and well-equipped army. Is it necessary, then, for the United States to continue basing 40,000 ground-force personnel in South Korea in the 1980s? Why should not Japan and China, Korea's two closest neighbors and the countries most affected by events in Korea, take over responsibility for defending respectively North and South Korea and eventually bringing about peaceful unification?

In Southeast Asia, President Kennedy determined late in 1961 that South Vietnam was a vital US interest and had to be protected against a Communist takeover through the use of American military power. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed by Congress in August 1964, declared all of Southeast Asia to be a vital defense interest of the United States and gave President Johnson the legal basis for military intervention to prevent South Vietnam's collapse. Today, however, few Americans believe that Vietnam or any other part of the Southeast Asian mainland was, or is, a vital US interest. US economic and military aid to Thailand may be warranted because the Manila Pact of 1954 remains in effect, but US military forces are not, and should not be, based in the region again. The Philippines is a different case: its strategic location, its long political association with the United States, and the availability of two key US naval and Air Force bases continues to make those islands a vital world-order interest. This is also true for Australia which is allied with the United States in the ANZUS Pact. In addition to its strategic location and
the military facilities Australia provides the United States, the two countries share a common language, culture, and political institutions. New Zealand, also allied with the United States in the ANZUS Pact, qualifies as a vital world-order interest because of the location in and influence upon the island countries of the South Pacific.

Japan and China, the two most important East Asian countries, present real dilemmas for US interests. Japan has been a vital American interest since the end of World War II, and on economic and world-order grounds, it remains valid. Japan is the United States' second most important trading partner, it exercises great economic and political influence throughout East Asia, and it is one of the few functioning democracies in that part of the world. On the military side, however, Japan spends relatively little on defense, and it has refused to increase significantly its military contribution to defense of Northeast and Southeast Asia. This imbalance in priorities—booming exports to the United States and refusal to expand its defense role in East Asia—has caused many Americans to question whether Japan should continue to be a high priority in US national interests. If the alliance is based on a mutual assessment that each country is a vital interest of the other, why should Japan expect the United States to provide the overwhelming proportion of naval and air power in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia while Japan continues to provide only for "self-defense"? If Japan's reluctance to assume a larger military role is based on doubt about the United States' long-term commitment to support and defend it, there is little the Reagan Administration can do to reassure Japan except to be steadfast elsewhere in upholding US commitments. If, however, Japan's reluctance to increase its defense contribution in the Western Pacific is based on an assumption that the United States will always provide military protection regardless of what Japan does, then it is time for a serious reassessment of whether Japan should continue to be a vital interest of this country.

China is a different issue. Historically, it never was a vital national interest of this country, even though certain US political and missionary groups tried to make it so during the early 20th century. From 1949 to 1969, China was an implacable enemy of the United States in Korea, and in Vietnam. The thaw in Sino-US relations that occurred in the 1970s was based on a mutual perception that China and the United States needed each other to contain the
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growing power and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union in Asia. But does that make China a vital interest of the United States today? China has little economic or defense-of-homeland value to the United States, and it continues to be ruled by a totalitarian government that has relaxed internal controls only marginally during the past decade. China's value to the United States is its balance-of-power (world-order) role vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but one can argue that today China needs the United States for protection more than the United States needs China. Even though there is strategic value in having China tie down many Soviet divisions in Central Asia, this is hardly sufficient reason to put China into the vital category.

In sum, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are the only East Asian countries that constitute vital interests for the United States in the 1980s. After two major wars on the Asian continent during the last 30 years, the United States should now accept that its vital interests are what Secretary Acheson declared them to be in February 1950: they lie offshore in the Western Pacific.

South America

This continent historically has been considered a vital interest of the United States, dating from the Monroe Doctrine declaration in 1823. The commitment was reaffirmed in the Rio Pact of 1947, the first US alliance in the post-World War II period. Originally intended as a means of preventing Spanish and Portuguese recolonization in the Western Hemisphere after defeat of Napoleon's France, the Monroe Doctrine eventually became a cover for North American economic exploitation of these newly independent states. Although the doctrine's legacy hangs over the American perception of its interests, a case can be made that nothing in South America except Venezuela and possibly Colombia is a vital interest of the United States in the 1980s. This is not to say that Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru—to name the major states—are not important trading partners of the United States or that they have little world-order value; it is simply to recognize that this vast area, mostly south of the equator, is not so important to the United States that it should use US military forces in case one of the countries is attacked. Economic and military aid would be warranted, however. Strategically, economically, and ideologically South America constitutes a major US interest today.
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Table 3-6: US National Interests in South America

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</tbody>
</table>

Because South America shares a Western cultural heritage with the United States, the US Government should continue to press these countries to move toward democratic governments and to improve their record on human rights. Washington should also encourage good trading and cultural relations, as well as a continuation of close links between the US military services and those of major countries of the continent. This is consistent with a major interest and is particularly important in the case of US Navy ties with its Brazilian, Argentinian, and Chilean counterparts. It is important to the United States that the sealanes off Brazil's and Argentina's coasts be protected, that their ports be open to US ship visits and replenishing, and that they continue to be receptive to US investment and trade; but this in itself does not make Brazil or Argentina a vital interest of the United States.

The reality of South America's being a major but not vital interest of the United States was illustrated clearly in the Falkland Islands war in the spring of 1982. Argentina, with a historical claim to the Falklands (Malvinas), decided to use force to gain control of the British colony rather than continue to pursue fruitless negotiations with London. The Reagan Administration tried valiantly for several weeks to prevent open war between its two friends, one an ally in NATO and the other a less-staunch ally in the Rio Pact. When it was clear that Argentina would not evacuate the islands unless its sovereignty over them was guaranteed, President Reagan decided to support the British position. In so doing he implicitly concluded that Great Britain is a vital interest of the United States and that Argentina was not. Much of Latin America criticized Washington for choosing Britain's side in this conflict, but the Reagan decision was evidence that the US alliance with Great Britain has a higher priority for the United States than the Rio Pact commitment to Argentina when the two interests are in conflict. A Soviet threat to South
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America, however, would be a different matter and would no doubt precipitate US military action under the Rio Pact.

Middle East

The greatest foreign-policy dilemma for American policymakers and Congress today is deciding whether anything in the Middle East and Indian Ocean area is so crucial to the US well-being that it must be given the status of vital. Consider these past and potential US commitments in the area: President Jimmy Carter said in his State of the Union Message in January 1980 that the Persian Gulf region is a vital US interest and would be protected by American arms if necessary; all Presidents since Harry Truman have reaffirmed an American commitment to defend the state of Israel if it is attacked; Iran under the Pahlavi Dynasty had a special relationship with the United States, and in the 1970s President Nixon provided the Shah with the most advanced US military equipment in return for his playing the policeman’s role in the Persian Gulf; Saudi Arabia today remains the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States, and it has the decisive voice in OPEC pricing policy; Egypt under Anwar Sadat turned away from military dependence on the Soviet Union, and it now offers the United States facilities from which to deploy military power into the Persian Gulf area. Yet which of these cases constitutes a truly vital US interest in the 1980s?

Table 3-7: US National Interests in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-being</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Middle East has never been an area of military military involvement, even though the Eisenhower Administration supported the “northern tier” alliance system with countries south of the Soviet border. A major reason why the United States could avoid becoming involved in the Middle East with its own forces during the 1950s and 1960s was that Britain exercised an important security role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. But when London
announced in 1968 that it would withdraw from "east of Suez" by 1971, Washington had to choose whether it would fill the role itself or permit a power vacuum to develop. President Nixon decided against a US military buildup in the Indian Ocean but approved expanding US naval facilities on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia. Nixon also concluded an agreement with the Shah of Iran to take over Britain's role in the Persian Gulf—one he played with considerable success for eight years. With Britain and the Shah gone, and the Russians in Afghanistan, does the United States now have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?

There are two possible grounds on which the United States may have vital interests at stake in the Middle East: (1) to ensure the continued flow of Persian Gulf oil to world markets, unimpeded either by outside interference or by conflicts within the region; (2) to prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its influence in the Middle East and challenging the world balance of power.

The uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil is certainly an important interest of the United States, as well as of Western Europe and Japan; but for oil to be considered vital, one must prove that a disruption of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, or the cutoff of supplies from any state in the Gulf, would be an economic disaster for the Free World. When Saudi oil to the United States was embargoed in 1973, it proved painful but bearable. President Nixon did not resort to military force or to other means of retaliation against the Arab oil producers and the United States managed with less gasoline. Britain today is self-sufficient in oil, and Germany, France, and Japan are moving to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil by developing other sources of energy, particularly nuclear power. Even if a major Persian Gulf producer—Kuwait, for example—were prevented from exporting oil, the world could cope with that loss, just as it coped with the vast reduction in Iranian exports after the demise of the Shah's regime, and as it did after Iraq went to war with Iran in 1980. The world has learned to live with uncertain Persian Gulf oil supplies, and other sources of crude oil (Mexico, for example) are reducing the previous large Western dependence on Arab oil. For the United States, Persian Gulf oil is at present a major national interest, not a vital one.

Preventing Soviet expansion into the Middle East is a more serious matter. In terms of worldwide balance-of-power considera-
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tions, the United States may have a vital interest in putting sufficient military power into the Middle East to make the costs of a Kremlin military adventure there too high. If the Soviet leadership assumed that with the Shah gone and the Saudi leadership on shaky political ground, it could risk American displeasure over installing a pro-Moscow government in Iran, that action might trigger a US military response. But should it? A crucial question here is whether the US President could convince Congress and the public that American troops should be used to defend Iran against a Soviet-supported leftist takeover. In light of the imprisonment of American diplomats in Tehran for over a year and the unremitting hostility of the Khomeini regime, a US government decision to help Iran resist Sovietization seems unlikely.

Saudi Arabia is a different matter. Not only are Western Europe and Japan heavily dependent on its oil, the Saudi government has been a moderating influence within OPEC in keeping world oil prices lower than they might otherwise have been. The United States probably has a vital world-order interest in seeing the Saudi Arabia's oil exports to world markets are not subjected to either Soviet or Iranian intimidation. To protect Saudi Arabia against such outside pressures, the United States requires Egypt as a working partner, if not as an ally. For this reason, and because of its influence on other Arab states, Egypt must be included along with Israel as part of a new security zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the war in Lebanon in 1982 and President Reagan's dispatch of US Marines as peacekeeping forces there, Lebanon must also be included in this Near East security zone.

The US interest in promoting Arab-Israeli peace has undergone significant change in the past eight years. Since the October War of 1973, it is clear that Israel cannot have peace unless it it willing to give up territories occupied during the 1967 War, and to live next to some kind of autonomous Palestinian entity. The Camp David Accords were a first step in this direction, but the Israeli government's subsequent actions suggested that after peace with Egypt was secured, Jerusalem planned to annex the remaining occupied lands. Its annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981 seemed to confirm this intention. Whereas before 1973 US interests in the Middle East were based primarily on preserving the state of Israel, after 1973—particularly after Egypt's decision to oust Soviet military advisers and seek close ties with Washington—the US
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interest has been enlarged to include the defense of Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well.

Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 in pursuit of PLO forces, and its brutal bombardment of Beirut, caused its government to encounter serious difficulties with the Reagan Administration. Whereas President Reagan desires to build good relations with the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, Israel's military actions in Lebanon made achievement of this objective more difficult. The unwillingness of the Begin government to show restraint in the use of US-supplied military equipment caused many American political leaders to question whether the United States should maintain a close relationship with the Begin government. At issue is the determination of the Reagan Administration to foster closer ties with moderate Arab countries in order to reduce the risks of a wider war in the Persian Gulf area. The Begin government sees Israel's interests as being jeopardized by an evenhanded American policy and has made it increasingly difficult for Mr. Reagan to pursue his goal of a "strategic consensus." Whether a closer relationship between Israel and the United States can be restored following the Lebanon war will depend on how the Begin government deals with the Palestinian homeland issue. It may not be possible for the current Israeli government to meet President Reagan's requirements, outlined in his 1 September 1982 speech in Los Angeles, for a solution to the Palestinian question, and the relationship will therefore be strained so long as Mr. Begin remains in power.

The United States has only a peripheral ideological interest in the Middle East because it is not in the US interest to turn Moslem countries into Western-style democracies, or to impose Western values on a wholly alien culture. The risk of doing so was highlighted in Iran in 1979 when a violent reaction to Western institutions and culture was exploited by the new Islamic revolutionary government that succeeded the Shah's regime. Supporting democratic government in Israel, however, is a major US interest.

In sum, the overall US national interest in the Middle East is a major one, although US interests in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel approach the vital level. This means that Washington should be willing to sell or grant large quantities of military equipment to friendly countries in the area to help them resist Communist and
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other pressures. The United States should certainly continue its mediation efforts to work out a peace settlement between Israel and its neighbors, and it should keep a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. But it is questionable whether the United States should establish bases in or make binding defense commitments to any country in the region.

Africa

Strategically and politically, Africa should be divided into sub-Saharan Africa, populated almost totally by blacks, and North Africa, which is inhabited primarily by Arab-speaking peoples whose religion and cultural ties are Moslem. (Egypt, although located in the African continent, is usually considered part of the Middle East.) North Africa is more important strategically to the United States than southern Africa because it borders the Mediterranean and is therefore closely associated with US interests in Europe and Turkey, which constitute the NATO area. However, it is difficult to make a case that the North African states constitute more than a major economic or world-order interest of the United States.

Sub-Saharan Africa gained considerably in US interests after decolonization took place in the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted partly from Soviet penetration of Africa (Angola and Ethiopia) with arms aid, and partly from the new awareness of the American black community of its historical roots and the need to speed the demise of white racism in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Table 3-8: US National Interests in Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Interest at Stake</th>
<th>Intensity of Interest</th>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Homeland</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Well-being</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable World Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although no country in Africa should be considered a vital US national interest today, a number of them fit the "major" category: Nigeria because of its large population, oil production, and strategic location; South Africa and Zaire because of strategic locations
and large production of key minerals; Angola because of oil. Furthermore, Kenya and Somalia in East Africa have gained importance because of the US Navy's need for support facilities for its Indian Ocean fleet. All of these countries are important to the United States and Washington wishes to retain or build good relations; but none of them today should be considered in the vital category. Some Pentagon planners believe that the US interest in Somalia, Kenya, and South Africa is vital because the United States needs their naval facilities, but that is highly questionable; in fact, US military bases ought not to be established in any country which has little more than its land to contribute to an alliance relationship, because the political commitment to US objectives will usually be marginal and subject to sudden shifts whenever a government changes hands.

If the raw materials of certain African countries are a major economic interest of the United States and the existence of stable, friendly governments is a major world-order interest, it must be emphasized that these interests probably are not sustainable unless the United States also supports the African nations' sense of justice. The "human rights" component of American foreign policy is an essential ingredient in this regard, and US efforts to resolve the Rhodesia and Namibia issues constitute reassurance to African states that US policy is not based simply on exploiting their natural resources or obtaining access to military facilities. Except for this aspect, however, the US interest in the promotion of US values and its system of government in Africa is at the peripheral level.

CONCLUSIONS

This assessment of US national interests in the world today suggests the following priorities in terms of geographic location, and thus strategic importance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>Level of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>vital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>vital/major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>major/vital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>major/vital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>major/peripheral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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It also means that US vital interests—those for which the country should be willing to engage in warfare, if necessary—remain essentially what they were in the 1950s: areas contiguous to the United States in North America, Western Europe, and the island nations of the Western Pacific. It includes the Soviet Union as a potential survival interest because of that country’s unique capability for destroying large parts of the US homeland. Areas not included as vital interests—South America, the Middle East, and Africa—continue to be regions of major concern to the United States and some countries there should receive considerable amounts of economic and military assistance as well as diplomatic attention; but in the absence of a clear Soviet military threat, the United States should not contemplate using its own military power to influence the outcome of events or trends and should rely instead on economic, political, and covert actions. Nor should the United States establish permanent military bases in the Middle East, Africa, or South America because the presence of large military forces in a region increases the potential for US involvement in local conflicts and for escalating the level of national interest.

A conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of US interests and military commitments is that the United States in the 1980s is an overcommitted giant that needs to get its priorities in line with its capabilities, and with its willingness to uphold them. North America in the 1980s remains the clearest vital interest of the United States, and the Reagan Administration has accorded a high priority to improving US relations and security arrangements in this region. In East Asia, only Japan, the Philippines, and Australia are vital US interests. Western Europe remains a vital interest so long as these countries want to be protected against the Soviet Union and are willing to contribute a substantial portion of their GNP to the collective defense; but neutralism and pacifism are likely to increase in Western Europe, and the point may be reached during the 1980s when several countries will elect to leave NATO. The US commitment to defend Europe must always be commensurate with Europe’s willingness to defend itself, and Washington should not hesitate to make its conditions for future membership known to alliance members. The danger for the United States in the Middle East is that Washington is inexorably being committed to defend any states in that region without a formal alliance system or a clear understanding by the American people of the military implications of the commitment. Persian Gulf oil is not something for which the United
States should be willing to go to war, and yet US military forces are being positioned so that they can intervene in local wars in that region. The Reagan Administration attitude toward the Persian Gulf area in 1982 is not unlike the Kennedy Administration’s view twenty years ago regarding Southeast Asia; and the danger is that history will repeat itself in the 1980s if Congress and the public prove unwilling to use US forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean—where US interests appear ambiguous and where US military capabilities will remain limited.

No great power, regardless of its wealth, can afford to ignore changing international conditions, and it must adjust its evaluation of national interests to new realities. Whether the United States remains a superpower into the 21st century depends in large measure on how it decides its international priorities in this decade and how it marshals its resources to defend them. Reducing the range and cost of worldwide commitments is long overdue, and the Reagan Administration should not flinch from making the hard decisions to do so.
Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy

Dr. James N. Rosenau
University of Southern California

The recurring calls for an overall national strategy to guide the US in world affairs that have been voiced with increasing frequency in recent years, along with a seemingly pervasive frustration over the elusiveness of such a strategy, suggest there may be some virtue to stepping back from day-to-day developments and focusing on the decade-to-decade trends that may hinder the formation of a viable strategy. Such a perspective is not easily achieved. In this era of investigative journalism and extensive news leaks there is a tendency to assume that close proximity to the policymaking process, its hard data and its word-of-mouth information, offers the best route to comprehending the dynamics of global politics. At times though, the opportunities perceived in this assumption appear as limitations, as blinders that obscure the larger contours of the world scene, as if the very proximity to policymaking so exaggerates immediate and transitory problems as to confound the broader outlines of global structure. At such times, then, there are advantages to distance, to being long on global perspectives and short on up-to-date information and inside knowledge.

Perhaps this conclusion is merely an excuse for the fact that what follows lacks familiarity with the current Washington scene, its personality clashes and its bureaucratic rivalries. On the other hand, I like to think that a lack of information conduces to a readiness to be playful, to theorize anew, which may prove useful in the search for a comprehensive national strategy appropriate to an increasingly "fragmegrated" world. (The term "fragmegration" is explained later in this paper.)

Viewed from a decade-to-decade perspective, a growing gap between a number of emergent global and societal structures stands out as inhibiting, if not prohibiting, the design of a viable national strategy for the United States. Stated more directly, even if the problems of personnel turnover (Kirkpatrick's complaint), policy inconsistency (Haig's lament), fractious bureaucratic machinery (everybody's grievance), and the many other microfactors cited
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as explanations for the lack of a national strategy could somehow be resolved, the macrodynamics of global life in the waning years of this century would remain. And, as such, they are likely to undermine, even preclude, the formation of a viable and comprehensive strategy.

In short, the problem is not that of clearing away the underbrush so that an underlying, coherent, and compelling national strategy will reveal itself and serve to guide the nation effectively through the thickets of world politics. Rather the problem is to identify the obstacles to a viable strategy, acknowledge their durability, and then seek ways of working around them so that goals can be realized and challenges met. Such is the purpose of the ensuing analysis.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY

To assess whether and how a viable national strategy can bridge the growing gap between global and societal structures, we need first to outline both the requirements of such a strategy and the nature of the structures for which it is designed. I have pieced together the following conception of an effective strategy from many of the wistful pleas that one be developed. As I understand it, these yearnings derive from a sense that the capacity of the United States to manage its external affairs has not kept pace with changes unfolding abroad and that therefore, it is desirable, even vital, that the Nation's goals and capabilities be brought together into a coherent design for coping with (rather than simply reacting to) a fast-moving world. Equipped with such a comprehensive strategy, it is felt, the United States would act consistently and its friends and foes abroad would know what to expect in diverse situations and, at the same time, the policymaking process at home would be founded on the strategy and thus more immune to the vagaries of style and personality that have plagued it for so long. Consequently, with coherence of purpose and consistency of action, the nation will be able to protect its interests and maximize its influence over the course of events. That is what happened in the 1950s, the argument stresses, when the country did have an overall strategy, that of containment, which was widely supported at home and clearly recognized abroad as the basis for American foreign and military policies and which thus enabled the country to move effectively in world affairs. To be sure, Stalin miscalculated in Korea, but the
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viability of the strategy was reaffirmed and strengthened by the successful American response to the miscalculation. And that is what is needed today, an overall perspective that can be translated into specific responses to external challenges even though, admittedly, the world has become more complex and thus may require a more elaborate strategy than that of containment.

In sum, the yearned-for national strategy is conceived to consist of four basic elements: (1) a clear and coherent conception of the Nation’s external goals and the priorities among them; (2) a design for moving toward these goals or countering threats to them consistent with the resources available to sustain the movement and counter the threats; (3) a widespread societal consensus in support of the strategy so that it can be effectively implemented; and (4) a global reputation for consistently adhering to the strategy.

CHANGING EXTERNAL STRUCTURES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A FRAGMENTED WORLD

Assuming this is a reasonable assessment of what those who long for a comprehensive strategy are calling for, the test of its viability lies in whether or not it can serve as a bridge between the changing structures of global and national life. A diagrammatic summary of some of the more salient foreign and domestic structures is presented in Table 3-9, and here the enormous bridging tasks of an effective strategy can be seen in their juxtaposition. That is, the changing external structures listed on the left side of the table, each of which reinforces the others, have combined to render the global environment less stable for all states, while the changing internal structures listed on the right, each again reinforcing the others, have interacted to make the United States an increasingly vulnerable great power. And as can be seen in the center column of the table, the interface of these two conditions poses a number of troubling questions as to what may be required if the country is to adapt its internal structures to its external circumstances, including the question of whether a viable national strategy can at least do part of the job.

Stated differently, as indicated by the multiple entries in the center column, a national strategy is one of several mechanisms through which the adaptation of the United States to a fast-moving world can be accomplished. Given the magnitude of the other
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mechanisms, it seems clear that the obstacles to a viable strategy are considerable and that, in any event, the formulation of such a strategy would have to be accompanied by a number of other developments for it to be effective. Indeed, viewed in this way, Table 3-9 suggests that a viable strategy may not be achievable unless and until the American people evolve a broad and solidly based consensus that, in effect, is founded on a new social contract, redefined priorities, a new lifeboat ethic, a clearer conception of the national interest, and/or other economic value changes.

Before analyzing the prospects for developing a domestic consensus wide and deep enough to render a national strategy viable, let us assume that such a consensus exists and briefly consider the obstacles located abroad to the formation of a national strategy. One useful way to conceive of these obstacles is to posit global structures as having undergone a vast transformation in recent years, a transformation that makes them much more complex than was the case in the early postwar years when the strategy of containment proved so viable. The wellsprings of this transformation can be analyzed in terms of five underlying dynamics (the major headings listed on the left of Table 3-9). Elsewhere I have examined the sources and consequences of these dynamics at some length, but for present purposes it suffices to emphasize that all five contribute to and sustain two interactive, simultaneous, and contradictory global processes, those of integration and disintegration, of centripetal forces that are making groups and nations more and more interdependent even as centrifugal forces are increasingly fragmenting them into subgroups and subnations.

To highlight the importance of the simultaneity and contrariety of these two primary processes, one can think of their interaction as forming a fragmegrative process and to use the label of fragmegration for the global structures to which their interaction has given rise. In my view the concept of fragmegration, embracing as it does both fragmentation and integration, facilitates a more incisive understanding of the changing world scene than does the concept of interdependence. The latter concept is plagued with ambiguity over the hierarchical relations among groups and states, whereas fragmegration bypasses the problem by assuming that both hierarchy and autonomy are at work as groups and states concurrently fragment and integrate in response to declining resources, weakened governments, and new challenges and issues that span and violate their longstanding political and legal boundaries.
Table 3-9: The United States in a Fragmented World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE WORLD</th>
<th>HOW WILL THE US ADAPT?</th>
<th>THE UNITED STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLINING RESOURCES (centripetal forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td>INCORPORATING CONSUMPTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- water shortages</td>
<td></td>
<td>- nearly one-third of world's daily use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- human population growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>- success in conservation. temporary or permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- food: excessive global dependence on few suppliers</td>
<td></td>
<td>- increasingly antiquated economic plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUNTING INTERDEPENDENCE (centripetal forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- economies, groups, states, individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td>- trade deficits, competition from imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- global repercussions of events, crises</td>
<td></td>
<td>- high unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROWING SUBGROUPISM (centrifugal forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- reduced productivity in heavy industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ethnic, religious, linguistic, national</td>
<td></td>
<td>BREAKDOWN OF NATIONAL CONSENSUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- subgroup access to modern means of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>- hastened by inflation, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECREASING CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS (centrifugal forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- spirit of division and irrelevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- greater demands and expectations</td>
<td></td>
<td>- growing regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- resort to authoritarian methods</td>
<td></td>
<td>- decline in sense of political efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- repression instead of policy effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>- resistance to draft registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- vast poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td>MOUNTING EMPHASIS ON SELF-INTEREST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- growing gap between 1st and 3rd worlds</td>
<td></td>
<td>- contradictory attitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ISSUES FOSTERED BY DECLINING RESOURCES AND MOUNTING INTERDEPENDENCE (centrifugal forces)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- loss of confidence in system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- energy, pollution, food</td>
<td></td>
<td>- distrust of leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td>- age of narcissism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- currency crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>AN OBSOLETE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE (?!)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td>- designed for 18th Century, with ad hoc additions to meet change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- persistent executive-legislative conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- less cohesive political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- deleterious effects of institutional &quot;reform&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OLD ISSUES REVIVED, LIFE-STYLE ISSUES CREATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- church and state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- family and life-style as political issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Being both simultaneous and contradictory, fragmegrative processes are marked by tension and upheaval even as the resulting structures become regularized and institutionalized features of world affairs. Seven recent "international" crises, those in Iran, Poland, Central America, Mexico, Afghanistan, the Falkland Islands, and Lebanon, offer vivid insights into the global scope of fragmegration. The integrative forces of the Iranian revolution swept through the American Embassy in Tehran and upended the most elemental premises of international law even as the disintegrative energies it unleashed have rent Iran’s society, stalemated its economy, and spread fear and uncertainty throughout the Arab world. In Poland the centrifugal forces that created Solidarity clashed head-on with the centripetal structures of the Soviet empire and the financial links of Western and Eastern banking institutions. In Central America the simultaneity of integrative and disintegrative dynamics is poignantly evident in the large extent to which its guerrilla wars have become a regionwide conflict, spreading across and obfuscating traditional boundaries as both governments and rebel groups coordinate their actions with their counterparts in the region. Hardly less conspicuous an illustration of fragmegration was evident in Mexico’s near-collapse into insolvency and the integrative response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may at first seem a more conventional instance of hierarchical power politics, but on closer inspection the flight of insurgent groups into Pakistan and their subsequent difficulties in consolidating their efforts suggest the presence of multiple fragmegrative processes. Likewise, while the Falkland crisis may appear as a classic case of one state invading another and then being repulsed by a counterattack, its origins and dynamics lay in the simultaneity of disintegrative tendencies in the Argentine economy and the British polity and integrative processes inherent in both Argentine and British nationalism. And with four armed services having been at war in Lebanon and five negotiating teams having sought to end the conflict, what could be a better example of the vigor and ubiquity of fragmegration!

Viewed from this perspective, the worldwide flow of refugees seeking new homelands, the flow of currencies seeking higher interest rates, the flow of acid rain spread by the winds far beyond their origins, the diffusion of unemployment across national boundaries and the disruption of trade flows between them, the flow of terrorists, former CIA agents, and carriers of stolen computer tech-
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ology seeking to defy national structures on behalf of subnational or personal aspirations, and a host of other new patterns are also part of a larger, unfamiliar encompassing global structure that has emerged in the last couple of decades. Such diverse patterns can be viewed as cumulating into a more encompassing structure because they commonly derive from the dynamics noted in Table 3-9 and thus overlap, forming a circuitous and complex chain of causal connections whereby the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in the global system become functions of each other. It may not always be easy to trace the overlap and the causal links, but the patterned occurrence of the various fragmegrative processes suggests the presence of an underlying and all-encompassing global structure.

Indeed, the structure of fragmegration is so encompassing that its scope is not confined to the commingling of integrative and disintegrative processes within and between states. It is also operative on a regional scale, thereby further confounding the tasks of a viable national strategy. The crises in the South Atlantic and Lebanon are both illustrative in this regard. Just as the conflict over the Falkland Islands precipitated both centripetal forces within Latin America and Western Europe and centrifugal forces between the two regions, so did the Israeli attack on the PLO intensify (at least initially) a sense of common cause within the Arab world and deepen the rift between it and Israel's friends in the West. As a consequence, in both crises the United States was compelled to make choices that were regional in scale, between NATO and the Organization of American States in the one case and between the moderate Arab world and Israel in the other. And in both instances it was a no-win choice. To support the centripetal forces on one side of the conflict was to offend those on the other side, while the avoidance of choosing between the regions was to offend both sides and to allow for a further deepening of the centrifugal forces dividing the regions. Little wonder, then, that in both crises the United States postponed the choice as long as possible by undertaking a mediating role in the hope of promoting any nascent centripetal forces that may have been operative between the regions.

In short, the variety and scale of the world's fragmegrative processes are so great that it would be a grievous error to view their emergence as part of a transitional realignment or as a temporary phase in international history. For if fragmegration has become a fundamental global structure, founded on all the habituation and
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routinisation that undergirds any social structure, then it may well be a permanent feature of world affairs. It may well be, in other words, that what presently appear to be ungainly asymmetries in the state system have in fact become its symmetries. In any event, whether fragmegration is in the long run transitory or enduring, its pervasiveness on the current scene is too great not to be treated as a major obstacle to (and thus as a central focus of) any national strategy the United States may evolve for the foreseeable future.

And why do the processes of fragmegration pose serious, if not insurmountable, challenges to those who would draft a national strategy that coherently specifies external goals, the priorities among them, and the actions required to move toward them consistently? Answered most simply (and still assuming that a widely shared domestic consensus exists or could be fashioned around some basic propositions that accord the United States an active—as distinguished from an isolationist—role in world affairs), because some of the external goals inherent in the role of a superpower will best be served through supporting the centrifugal forces at work within and among states and other goals are likely to be best served by favoring the centripetal forces; and to be aligned simultaneously with these contradictory forces is to be, inevitably, committed to inconsistent courses of action.

That is, it will be difficult to frame a set of basic propositions that summarize the nation’s international role because global fragmegration does not lend itself to broad strategic principles that have universal relevance. To cope with fragmegrative processes is to have to direct action simultaneously at substantial, national, and supranational actors abroad, and the norms, aspirations, capabilities, and maneuverability underlying the responsiveness of the actors at each of these levels will normally be so different (and often so mutually exclusive) that no set of strategic principles could possibly be effective at all the levels. As indicated in the Polish crisis, for example, the principle of freedom of assembly may serve worthy goals and evoke desired responses at the subnational level, but it may also evoke undesirable responses at the national level because it conflicts with the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state. Similarly, fragmegrative processes can differ as greatly across situations as within them, thus confronting policymakers with the necessity of applying some principles in one situation and negating them in others. This is why, presumably,
the United States found the principle of opposing the first use of force as an instrument of foreign policy compelling in the recent case of Argentina but unwise in the even more recent case of Honduran incursions into Nicaragua.

In sum, it is reasonable to assert that each increment of global fragmegration reduces by a comparable degree the capacity of any state to develop and maintain an internally consistent global strategy. If this is so, it follows that those who call for a national strategy seem likely either to be ever more frustrated or to turn away from internationalist orientations that posit the US as having worldwide interests.

CHANGING INTERNAL STRUCTURES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A FRAGMEGRATED AMERICA

But the dynamics of global fragmegration are not only external to the United States. As indicated on the right side of Table 3-9, they are also at work within the country and they pose equally serious challenges to the prospects for evolving a viable national strategy. Most notably, these prospects become even more questionable when the assumption of a broad national consensus is relaxed. The findings of a long-term inquiry into the underlying attitudes of 4,783 American leaders conducted by Ole R. Holsti and myself has yielded clear-cut evidence of deep cleavages within the American leadership community over the goals and role of the United States in the world. That is, not only did we fail to turn up any signs of a global perspective widely shared by leaders in all walks of American life, but we also uncovered a series of patterns which greatly reduce the likelihood of such a consensus either evolving slowly or being mobilized by a charismatic leader, a political party, and/or a severe crisis: (1) the "containment" consensus of the 1950s has given way not to confusion or ambiguity with respect to the country's role in the world, but to at least three highly structured and mutually exclusive belief systems; (2) the replacement of the consensus with these belief systems was in good measure (though not entirely) a product of the trauma of Vietnam; (3) each of the belief systems is so internally consistent that those who hold them are likely to interpret the course of events reinforcing their beliefs, thereby perpetuating the cleavages that divide the society; (4) no foreseeable international crisis short of an attack comparable to Pearl Harbor and an ensuing global war is likely to serve as the basis for a new society-
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wide consensus, or at least our evidence plainly indicates that neither the Iranian hostage crisis nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave rise to any reduction in the gaps that separate the three belief systems; (5) while there are some connections between a leader's belief system and his or her occupation and political ideology, all three belief systems prevail in every subsection of the leadership community, including both major political parties and all the institutions and agencies of the Federal Government; and (6) the prevalence of three mutually exclusive, internally consistent belief systems in all walks of American life, combined with the decentralized character of the country's policymaking machinery, can thus be viewed as a prime source of the inconsistency and vacillation that has marked American foreign policy since the war in Vietnam.

Table 3-10 outlines the three foreign-policy belief systems, which we have labeled Cold War Internationalism, Post-Cold War Internationalism, and Neo-Isolationism, and here the internal consistency of each can be readily discerned through glancing down the columns, and their mutual exclusivity is no less evident through comparing across the rows. Since an elaborate discussion of the differences depicted in Table 3-10 has been presented elsewhere, here it suffices to address the question of whether any of the three belief systems is susceptible to transformation into a national strategy appropriate to coping with a fragmegrated world. The answer, of course, depends partly on one's belief system. Analysis committed to any one of them are likely to argue that it is sufficiently coherent and comprehensive to serve as the basis for ordering priorities and resolving hard choices among policy alternatives. And certainly it is clear from Table 3-10 that each system is founded on general principles as to the underlying structure of the global system and what should be done about it.

Viewed from the perspective of the dynamics inherent in the processes of fragmegration, however, each of the belief systems would appear to be wanting. This is readily apparent with respect to Cold War Internationalism and Neo-Isolationism: as indicated in Table 3-9, global fragmegration derives from a number of diverse and diffuse sources besides those originating in the Communist world, and many of these link the United States to a number of situations abroad that cannot be reasonably ignored. Thus a strategy founded on containing the Soviet Union would be seriously out of phase with many of the centripetal and centrifugal forces at work.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of the international system</th>
<th>Cold War Internationalists</th>
<th>Post-Cold War Internationalists</th>
<th>Neo-Isolationists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loci of primary problems</td>
<td>bipolar</td>
<td>multipolar</td>
<td>multipolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of the main threats to the United States</td>
<td>East-West issues</td>
<td>North-South as well as East-West issues</td>
<td>within the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of conflict</td>
<td>zero sum</td>
<td>non-zero sum</td>
<td>non-zero sum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the Soviet Union</td>
<td>powerful and aggressive</td>
<td>militarily powerful but not awesome as they otherwise resemble a developing country</td>
<td>powerful but beset with domestic problems and, thus, conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the US role in the world</td>
<td>leader of the non-Communist world, protector of its integrity and values</td>
<td>selective leadership on key issues</td>
<td>US capacity for leadership abroad highly limited and of doubtful desirability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases of US foreign policy</td>
<td>keep up with the Soviets militarily and respond to their efforts to extend their influence in the Third World</td>
<td>promote a multiplicity of economic and political institutions to facilitate movement toward world order and away from confrontation</td>
<td>keep foreign involvements and commitments to a minimum (i.e., primarily to Western Europe, Japan and Israel)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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in the world, and the same would be said of an isolationist strategy that fails to account for the myriad ways in which fragmentative structures at home respond to patterns unfolding abroad. Similarly, precisely because Post-Cold War Internationalism comes somewhat closer to recognizing the diversity and diffusion of fragmentative processes, it is conspicuously lacking in several kinds of overall principles (particularly those pertaining to the question of when to employ force and the problem of how to balance conflicting challenges from the Third World and the Soviet Union) that are essential to a viable strategy. The indecisiveness and incoherence that marked the conduct of American foreign affairs during the Carter-Vance years is a poignant reminder of the difficulties inherent in transforming Post-Cold War Internationalism into a national strategy.

In short, none of the three belief systems seem appropriate to a fragmentated world and thereby capable of bridging the changing structures of global and national life. And this would appear to be especially the case when the findings relevant to the distribution of the three systems throughout the national leadership community are recalled. Whatever potential each system may be assessed to have as national strategy, none is likely to emerge as the basis of a nationwide consensus. Indeed, the complexity and solidity of the cleavages which presently mark American society is probably much greater than Table 3-10 suggests. For there are strong indications (partially derived from systematic evidence) that the leadership is also divided by three domestic-policy belief systems, no less mutually exclusive or internally consistent than their foreign-policy counterparts. A comparison of the two sets of belief systems is likely to yield the conclusion, discussed at length elsewhere, that there are few if any philosophical links between the two sets, all of which suggests that efforts to mobilize a broad consensus behind a particular national strategy are likely to founder because of division over its domestic as well as its foreign-policy implications.

It follows that the problem of American inconsistency in world affairs goes far deeper than the absence of a national strategy or the personality and bureaucratic clashes among policymakers in the White House, the State Department, the Defense Establishment, the Congress, and the many other agencies with some responsibility for the society’s adaptation to its external environment. The problem is rooted in underlying value divisions that are independent of particular individuals or units of government. Neither the last-minute shift
of a US vote at the United Nations by the Reagan Administration during the Falklands war nor a virtually identical event in 1979 under the Carter Administration over the Middle East—to take two of innumerable examples of inconsistency that could be cited—occurred mainly because the Secretary of State, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, and/or the Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs were competing for jurisdiction or otherwise rubbing each other the wrong way. Such events occur, rather, largely because there is no one-to-one relationship between the recruitment process and the belief systems held by the occupants of high office, with the result that at any moment in time adherents of all three belief systems are scattered somewhat randomly throughout the decentralized machinery for adapting the society to its external environment. Hence at any moment in time one or another official, each performing his or her share of the policymaking responsibility as seems best in the light of his or her belief system, is asserting or adopting policy positions that may vary from, even contradict, the positions articulated by other top officials whose responsibilities and belief systems are of a different kind. It was not so much Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski who clashed across institutional lines—to cite one of the more conspicuous policymaking rivalries—as it was a conflict between Post-Cold War Internationalism and Cold War Internationalism. This multiplicity of voices that articulates and sustains the vacillation built into American foreign and defense policy seems destined to persist as long as the policymaking organization is widely decentralized and the core values of the society are widely discrepant.

ALTERNATE ROUTES TO A STRATEGIC DESIGN

Two lines of argument might be advanced to demonstrate that the foregoing grossly exaggerates the external and internal obstacles to a national strategy. One would be that such a strategy need only be capable of coping with military challenges and can thus leave to the makers of foreign policy the task of responding to the socioeconomic and political challenges inherent in fragmegration. A second would be a national-interest argument, in which a clear and pragmatic conception of the Nation's underlying interests in the diverse situations of global politics is conceived to be capable of identifying and clarifying a viable strategy for coping with both military and nonmilitary challenges.
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It is tempting to posit the problem of national strategy as simply one of framing an overall military posture toward the world. For surely it is much easier to calculate where and how force should be used in support of national goals than to devise principles that also govern when political, economic, and diplomatic instruments should be used on behalf of the goals. Framing an overall military posture, while not free of difficulties and controversy, involves assessing where unacceptable threats to the status quo may occur and then planning the force levels and tactics necessary to contest them. However, whatever might be the organizing premises of such a posture, whether they focus on seapower and mobile marine units or on troops and airbases located abroad, it would be bound to fall short of infusing coherence and consistency into the Nation’s efforts to adapt to a fast-moving world. For as the processes of fragmegration widen and deepen, more than ever do unacceptable changes abroad derive from nonmilitary sources, from dynamics that cannot be contained or channeled through the application of force. Any national strategy does, to be sure, require a military posture and planning for the circumstances when combat units should be employed, but such a posture can only provide physical security for American interests. It cannot promote the social, economic, and political institutions abroad that are no less necessary to the Nation’s welfare. Recent events vividly demonstrate this point:

For what is the lesson of the past few months if not the near-total irrelevance of American military power? Irrelevant in the Falklands dispute, irrelevant in Poland and Afghanistan, and now irrelevant in Lebanon. Of what practical use is all that military power, all those billion-dollar aircraft carriers and the tens of thousands of atomic weapons? In what way have they influenced the course of events in these critical areas of the world? Their only use, as should long ago have been obvious, is to deter the other muscle-bound nuclear Gulliver: the Soviet Union, whose paralysis is of the same order of magnitude.

Stated differently, the more fragmegrated the world becomes, the less meaningful become the distinctions between foreign, military, and domestic policy. A military posture can only be effective if a government is seen as ready to use force and its people ready to supply the human and nonhuman resources necessary to fight, all of which means that military, foreign, and domestic policy form a seamless web and any effort to design a national strategy for only one of these dimensions is destined to founder. In the case of the...
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United States, for example, there are ample reasons to presume that the American people will not support military actions abroad except under extreme circumstances, and any national strategy that ignores these constraints is bound to be short-lived.

The argument that a national strategy can be constructed out of a clear-cut conception of the Nation's interests in the various regions of the world also suffers from major insufficiencies. One is that a multiplicity of interests are operative in any situation, and even to categorize them, say, as survival, vital, major, and peripheral interests is not necessarily to fashion them into a coherent design and thereby achieve a workable set of priorities among them.14 No matter how pragmatic the calculation of national interests may be, the inconsistencies inherent in the simultaneity and ubiquity of fragmegrative processes will remain to confound the task of setting priorities. Secondly, for all the intellectuality and rationality involved in the assessment and categorization of national interests, the task is profoundly and ultimately a sorting out of values, a making of judgments about what is good and bad, and there is no way that a hardnosed, pragmatic approach to such judgments can render them into empirically objective truths.15 Thus what one observer or policymaker assesses as a survival interest may only be a vital interest to another, with the result that any strategy founded on an articulation of national interests is bound to be as viable as the degree of value consensus within the society will allow. As already noted, present circumstances in the United States do not offer much hope that viability can be achieved through this method of formulating a comprehensive strategy.16

CONCLUSION: COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES OR MUDDLED INCREMENTS?

If the dynamics of fragmegration have cut off all the easy routes to a national strategy, and if none of the three foreign-policy belief systems is likely to be up to the challenges of fragmegration or to serve as the basis of a nationwide consensus, what then? Are there no general principles to which top officials can resort when critical decisions have to be made? Or are they forever destined to proceed pragmatically from situation to situation and from crisis to crisis, treating each as a challenge to somehow muddling through, keeping losses to a minimum and, where possible, incrementally registering gains on behalf of whatever values and interests may be
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widely shared? In the absence of a consensual national strategy, is the United States fated only to react to external stimuli? Or can the obstacles to a national strategy be at least minimally circumvented?

I know of no magical answers to these questions. Beyond the widely held belief in the desirability of controlling the nuclear arms race, and aside from the very abstract proposition italicized below, it is difficult to conceive of any general principles that can serve as guides for American policymakers. Less because of the limits of imagination and more because of the nature of fragmegration, it does seem likely that pragmatic muddling through is the only way in which a bridge between the changing structures of global and national life can be effectively sustained. But does pragmatic muddling imply a future of confusion and inconsistency? Not necessarily. To muddle pragmatically is to acknowledge that regions, states, and subnational groups abroad are both cohering and breaking down, to recognize the constraints imposed by similar dynamics at home, and to respond to the simultaneity of these contradictory processes through policies and actions that are founded on multi-level calculations—that self-consciously and simultaneously seek to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs at every system level abroad by taking into account the consequences for each of the other levels.

And how to take account of multilevel consequences? The answer here is as close as I can come to a genuine guideline for framing a viable strategy. It can be called the fragmegration guideline: in order to muddle consistently from one situation to another, the United States should found its conduct abroad on the presumption that any and all disintegrative forces comprising subsystems within a system are legitimate (and thus not to be contested) as long as they allow for the perpetuation of the integrative forces comprising the system and that the system is legitimate (and not to be contested) as long as it allows for the perpetuation of any and all of its subsystems.

Such a guideline combines, on the one hand, a respect for the sovereignty of states and the integrity of of regions (system perpetuation) and, on the other, a readiness to align the US on the side of change and democratic values within states and regions (subsystem perpetuation). Indeed, this guideline is precisely the basis on which the US has supported Solidarity (which accepted the legiti-
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macy of Poland) and opposed the PLO (which has yet to accept the legitimacy of Israel). And at first glance it also seems suitable as a foundation for clear and consistent responses to the Iraq-Iran War, the issue of arms to Taiwan, the conflicts in Central America, the situations in Southern Africa, and a host of other current problems. Or, to make the case in negative terms, it is precisely the violation of the guideline on the issue of sanctions designed to inhibit construction of the natural-gas pipeline across Eurasia—the ignoring of the integrity of integrative forces within and between European countries in an attempt to promote disintegrative tendencies within the Soviet Union and Poland—that has fostered disarray in the Western alliance and intensified concern about consistency in American policy.

In sum, there are reasons to conclude that if top officials employed the fragmegration guideline and repeatedly and publicly affirmed that it lay at the core of American policy, the country's interests would be well served without conveying the appearance of indecision and vacillation. And conceivably, too, it would help make the world safer for diversity and enhance any other benefits that may be inherent in fragmegrative processes.

Again, of course, there is no magic here. The overlap and clash of integrative and disintegrative forces will still be chaotic and, as such, they will foment controversy and confusion among officials over whether particular systems and subsystems in particular situations allow for the perpetuation of each other. Yet, muddled as the making and summing of such multilevel calculations may be, presumably they will also be more in touch with the predominant structures of world affairs and thus will be more rather than less practical as mechanisms for adapting an increasingly vulnerable United States to its increasingly less stable external environment.

Disappointing as it may be to accept that in the present circumstances a viable national strategy cannot otherwise be developed, there is some virtue in such a conclusion. Or at least something important might be gained if the necessity of accepting pragmatic incrementalism and suppressing the need for general principles were to become widely shared. A consensus around this conclusion might go a long way toward rechanneling energy to the tasks at hand and away from the rivalries that are inherent in a decentralized policymaking system and a set of mutually exclusive belief systems.
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Surely, too, a recognition of the limits of general principles will lessen the fruitless, even counterproductive, arguments that have ensued over the merits of such vacuous concepts as detente, neo-conservatism, and ultraliberalism. And less rivalry and contention among top officials would, doubtless, contribute to a global reputation for consistency and reliability.
Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"The group will review the potential of space technologies to alter the security environment on the earth. This panel will examine the role that space might play in future US military efforts and will suggest potential strategies to ensure that US space efforts proceed toward desired security objectives. Recommendations might be made about the priorities for future US military space programs and about arms control in space."
Panel Summary

Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Chairman
Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace

Lieutenant Colonel Gunter H. Neubert, USA, Rapporteur
National Defense University

The role of space in affecting national security is a timely topic. Although the subject was considerably narrower than those addressed in the other panels, it proved to be no less challenging and contentious, surfacing some thorny problems and generating some lively debate. Most of the views discussed did not elicit unanimous support of the panelists, but all did enjoy some form of consensus.

It has been almost 25 years since Sputnik I was first placed in orbit, ushering in the space age. Space activities have exploded since that time: there are some 4,700 man-made objects being tracked in space; shuttle operations have devolved from the spectacular to the routine so that the flight announced for 11 November 1982, at 0719 hours, will very likely take place on 11 November at 0719 hours; the shuttle tank is large enough to contain the trajectory of the first and most famous flight of the Wright brothers; some dozen Americans have walked on the moon; and Russian cosmonauts, almost unnoticed by the American public, are continuing, even as we must, to circle the globe, adding an interesting challenge to US security concerns. With this proliferation in mind, trying to address future security issues provided a decided challenge to the imagination.

It was felt by the panel that the United States is at a crossroads in its space program. Past eras have been centered upon a major goal: In the fifties, the US goal was the placement of an artificial satellite in orbit around the earth; in the sixties, the Apollo program provided the major challenge; and the space shuttle program received major emphasis in the seventies. What about the eighties? There appears to be no single, center-stage, national space objective. Panel reaction to the present national space policy, as recently announced by the President, was mixed. There were those who felt the policy does indeed set the framework for maintaining leadership
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in space, as well as strengthening national security. Others felt that the pronouncement was too vague, offered no blueprint for the Nation's progress in space, and will result in a "Band-Aid" approach to the national strategy for the development of space. This seeming lack of a single direction may in fact be no more than a sign of the maturity of the space program, where the many missions that can be accomplished are much more routine than spectacular, and support economic and military objectives more than political objectives.

A definite change in the composition of the US space program from a NASA-oriented toward a Defense-oriented program was noted by some panelists. Today, for the first time, the Defense budget for space equals the civilian budget. This shift may well be designed to try to redress past US-Soviet asymmetric efforts in space. The Soviets traditionally have had a strong military space program. Since 1977 some 33 Soviet cosmonauts have accumulated four man-years of experience on orbit, performing surveillance, repairs, and positive command and control functions, as well as possibly developing techniques for targeting, and providing warning of attack. Today they have the only space weapon in the world, which they have tested some 20 times. In contrast, the United States has only accumulated some 39 man-days of orbital experience, and has no space weapons.

The ability of the Soviets to track the US fleet using radar satellites is of particular concern to the United States. Over the past decade the Soviets have launched four to five times as many satellites as the United States (with 70 percent of the launches being strictly military). Last year alone, they launched about 75 military-related satellites, as compared to eight US launches. But, as pointed out by some panelists, given the superior reliability and capability of the US efforts, the United States still has a stronger space program at this time. The US program was felt by the panelists to have a decided edge by virtue of the shuttle and the lead in miniaturization capability. However, it was noted that the United States has no new defense initiatives planned until 1983, the implication being that this makes us vulnerable to possible Soviet breakthroughs.

There is today a definite change in the character of the US space program. From the earlier missions of strategic warning and intelligence, there appears to be a shift toward enhancing the tactical warfighting capability of US forces. These forces are increas-
ingly dependent on the capabilities offered by space assets. Some commanders have voiced concern about the fact that space assets are not at present under their control (and thus are subject to being diverted at the most inopportune times in war), and that these assets are very vulnerable to Soviet intervention. The following initiatives were identified to address the latter concern:

1. Add sensors to satellites to confirm/report attack.

2. Harden satellites against EW (electronic warfare soft kill), nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and against conventional intercepts.

3. Build in redundancy (to enhance capability for restoration).

4. Add maneuver capability to evade killer satellites.

5. Develop a U.S. ASAT capability (as a deterrent and as a bona fide warfighting device).

The panel felt that, unless there is an improvement in the survivability of US space vehicles and hardware, the military space program could actually see a decline in the future. Since the Soviets presumably would attempt to eliminate/neutralize US space assets even in conventional warfare, it was the view of the group that the United States must develop an antisatellite program on a high-priority basis, with an immediate capability against spacecraft in near-earth orbit. It was felt that the development of a technology base to address requirements for an antisatellite capability in geosynchronous orbit should be sufficient for the near future. It was noted that space assets are actually only part of the overall space system, and that the associated ground stations, control links, and data processing equipment, as well as launch facilities, must also be hardened.

The panel concluded that over-the-horizon (real-time) targeting against surface ships, aircraft, and ground vehicles, using space as a link in the targeting, represents the premier opportunity for the United States to reap major benefits, and thus should be pursued on a priority basis. The United States already has the capability of targeting individual elements with high precision, but not with rapid time-lines. This latter aspect is the key to increasing the effective-
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ness of many weapons systems which are limited not by intrinsic capabilities but by means of target acquisition.

Historically, the United States has relied principally on an offensive doctrine in the strategic arena. In fact, since the late sixties, it has been argued that more emphasis on strategic defense would be destabilizing. The panel concluded, however, that the dramatic change in space technology (and other factors) has changed the environment, and that the United States would be well advised to adopt a policy that would be more balanced between strategic defense and strategic offense. Indeed, it was felt by some members of the panel that space offers the United States the opportunity to attain a strong strategic defense. This could potentially be achieved in terms of conventional kill mechanisms, explosives, and kinetic energy, although this point was much disputed.

The most publicized (and scrutinized) program, though, involves the high-energy laser. The United States and the Soviet Union both have active programs in this area. Although the panel generally agreed that the United States should conduct research on a high-energy laser potentially applicable to space missions, most of the panelists argued that the technology was not sufficiently developed to determine at this time whether the large investment of national assets would in fact yield a productive defense system. On the other hand, the panel believed that a vigorous program to investigate technology and operational feasibility was indeed in order. In the final analysis, it was concluded that the problem was one of insufficient data, and that it was important for the United States first to close this data gap, in order to make an intelligent decision on the future of this program.

Man in space! Should this program be the key to US space policy? The answer to this question also proved to be elusive. The present US manned space program is somewhat low-key—although many argued that the shuttle represents a man-in-space program which is by no means low-key. It was generally agreed that the Soviets certainly seem to think that the manned space program is important, and that the United States would be well-advised to understand why. Although the panel wasn't prepared to identify the manned space station as the key ingredient of US national strategy in space, several possible near-term missions for a permanently manned space station were identified, including surveillance, targeting, providing precise command and control, logistic support
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(e.g., repairing, as well as constructing, space assets), and providing unambiguous warning of strategic attack. The United States may indeed be passing up the chance for making major discoveries in technical and other arenas—discoveries that might well rank with historically important (and accidental) discoveries such as penicillin, x-rays—and America.

Sanctuary in space! This concept, more than any other, generated some heated debate. It was generally agreed that nuclear weapons should be barred from space (although the question of verification may be insoluble). However, after a thorough discussion, it was quite apparent to all that the issue of conventional weapons in space was indeed very complex and intractable. The following factors were identified as being relevant:

1. The present space treaty, (barring the deployment of weapons of mass destruction from space) was generally viewed as a positive measure, of benefit to the United States. However, curtailment of deployment of other weaponry, both offensive and defensive, received close attention, and elicited some vociferous discussion. On the issue of expanding the terms of the existing space treaty, two diametrically opposed positions emerged. On the one hand, some panelists maintained that, since the United States derives more benefit from its space program than does the Soviet Union from its own, it would be to our advantage to secure an agreement with the Soviets that would attempt to guarantee noninterference with our space assets.

On the other hand, the majority of the panel felt that, since we are ahead in space activities, any agreement on constraining these efforts would most likely work to our detriment, and asymmetrically favor the Soviets—basically freeze our efforts, while the Soviets caught up. (It should be noted that all panelists agreed that the United States did indeed enjoy a lead in space—the disagreement concerned the mechanism for assuring the future of that lead.)

2. The use of space for strategic defense was felt to be critical to future US national security. It was generally conceded that strategic and tactical aid to military operations on earth through the medium of space was indeed appropriate and important, and that the location of sensors in space was probably stabilizing in most applications. This is where agreement ceased. Some members felt
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that space inevitably should, and will, be the next arena for military combat, and that the United States should pursue a vigorous program to attain a comprehensive capability in this medium. The sanctuary advocates would bar all weapons from space. These advocates felt that competition should be shifted from the military to the technological and scientific areas, that military competition in space would ultimately lead to escalation, and prove unprofitable to all sides.

3. The provisions of any agreement on a space sanctuary would be extremely hard to verify and enforce, would apply primarily during peacetime, and could put the United States at a disadvantage in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets prepared for war surreptitiously (which could easily go undetected by the United States), and abrogated the treaty in de facto fashion by using its space weaponry at the onset of hostilities, the result could prove of major impact on the United States’ military capability.

4. Space is no longer the exclusive preserve of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is being accessed by an ever-increasing number of nations. Thus, attempts to establish space as a sanctuary would require multinational agreement by principals who are generally at cross purposes over national objectives/interests, as well as the means of achieving them.

A few words on organizing the US effort to exploit the perceived US lead in space are in order. The close coupling between NASA and DOD was greeted positively by the group; formation of the Air Force’s Space Command was also viewed as a good first step. The formation of a future Joint Space Command was felt to be an even more effective step. Formation of a US Space Force, at this time, was viewed by most panelists as being diversionary. A few others felt that the present space program is somewhat disjointed, precisely because there is no real advocacy. And that, until a US Space Force is activated, Service rivalries and competition for assets within DOD will hamper the efficient development and implementation of an effective US space program.

The panel voiced some concern that the Soviet Union was posturing for another space spectacular (a la Sputnik). The nature of this planned coup was not apparent, but there appears to be
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considerable evidence that the ingredients are coming together. This raised the question of the proper US response—or better, "anticipatory position." Although the panel did not arrive at an answer, it concluded that the United States could largely neutralize the impact of such an event by maintaining a positive, vigorous, publicly-supported program of its own.

In summary, space was indeed felt to be the high ground for the decades ahead, and it was felt to be crucial that the United States make space assets and their ground-supporting assets survivable in war. While the military must continue to ferret out new missions, particularly missions that will maximize use of present capabilities, the United States, as a whole, must continue its efforts to expand and strengthen its presence in space.
The High Frontier Study:  
A Summary

Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.)
High Frontier

The United States is faced with an historic, but fleeting, opportunity to take its destiny into its own hands. The ominous military and economic trends which today beset the peoples of the Free World can be reversed, and confidence in the future of free political and economic systems can be restored.

To accomplish this, we need only take maximum advantage of one priceless legacy handed down to us by those free institutions—superiority in space technology. We can escape the brooding menace of "balance of terror" doctrines by deploying defensive systems in space. We can confound the prophets of doom by opening the vast and rich High Frontier of space for industrialization.

If we are to seize this historic opportunity, we must first muster the political will to discard without qualm the failed doctrines of the past, to attack without quarter the bureaucratic impediments to action, and to meet without flinching the wave of indignation from outraged ideologues at home and abroad. The technology is available, the costs are reasonable, and the alternatives are not promising solutions to our security problems.

THE OBJECTIVE

The objective of the High Frontier Study is to formulate a national strategy option which would make maximum use of US space technology to accomplish the following goals:

- Nullify the present and growing threat to the United States and its allies which is posed by Soviet military power.
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- Replace the dangerous doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) with a strategy of Assured Survival.

- Provide both security and incentive for realizing the enormous industrial and commercial potential of space.

This objective must be met with recommendations that are:

- Militarily sound.
- Technologically feasible.
- Fiscally responsible.
- Politically practical.

THE THREAT IMPERATIVE

The High Frontier effort has focused primarily on countering the Soviet military threat, which is ominous and growing. This threat is the result of determined efforts by the Soviet Union to establish global military dominance—efforts that have been abetted by poorly conceived US security policies such as MAD. The Soviet military buildup coupled with US military neglect has created these alarming conditions:

- There is a serious and growing Soviet advantage in strategic nuclear power which cannot be countered by the undefended United States except by a threat of retaliation that involves national suicide.

- The preponderance of Soviet conventional power vis-a-vis the United States and its allies is also severe and growing. It can no longer be counterbalanced, as it has been in the past, by a credible threat to bring higher-technology US weaponry to bear.

- The Soviet Union is increasingly successful in the use of propaganda and the application of direct or indirect military power to disrupt our alliances and to force the conversion of underdeveloped nations to Marxism. This Soviet success
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now threatens the continuing availability of raw materials which are critical to the industrialized West.

- The West is dangerously dependent on diminishing crude-oil supplies located in areas threatened by Soviet military or manipulative political power.

- The US alliance system is in serious disarray. It suffers a lost sense of purpose and a perception of a decline in US power and leadership. The Soviet propaganda offensive against US nuclear weapons, designed to persuade Europeans to become neutrals, is increasingly effective.

The Soviets are engaged in a costly and all too successful effort to cap their current strategic advantages—in their terms “a favorable correlation of forces”—with Soviet domination of near Earth space. The Soviets have the only tested space weapon on either side, an antisatellite system. They have orbited nuclear reactors. They have a manned space station in orbit and are expanding it. Almost all Soviet space activity has a distinct military flavor. The essence of the Soviet military space threat was included in the 1981 Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power (pages 79-80):

The Soviets have a vigorous and constantly expanding military space program. In the past ten years they have been launching spacecraft at over 75 per year, at the rate of four-to-five times that of the United States. The annual payload weight placed into orbit by the Soviets is even more impressive—660,000 pounds—ten times that of the United States. Some, but by no means all, of this differential can be accounted for by long-life U.S. satellites using miniaturized high technology components. Such an activity rate is expensive to underwrite, yet the Soviets are willing to expend resources on space hardware at an approximate eight percent per year growth rate in constant dollars.

We estimate that 70 percent of Soviet space systems serve a purely military role, another 15 percent serve dual military/civil roles, and the remaining 15 percent are purely civil. The Soviet military satellites perform a wide variety of reconnaissance and collection missions. Military R&D experiments are performed onboard Soviet manned space stations, and the Soviets continue to develop and test an ASAT antisatellite co-orbital interceptor.
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The Soviets appear to be interested in and possibly developing an improved ASAT. A very large space booster similar in performance to the Apollo program’s Saturn V is under development and will have the capability to launch very heavy payloads into orbit, including even larger and more capable laser weapons. This booster is estimated to have six-to-seven times the launch weight capability of the Space Shuttle.

Soviet space research and development, test, production, and launch facilities are undergoing a continuing buildup. The new booster will be capable of putting very large permanently manned space stations into orbit. The Soviet goal of having continuously manned space stations may support both defensive and offensive weapons in space with man in the space station for target selection, repairs and adjustments and positive command and control. The Soviets’ predominantly military space program is expected to continue to produce steady gains in reliability, sophistication and operational capability.

The Soviets consider space a perfect environment in which to exercise their long-standing doctrinal and operational preferences in warfighting—unconventional “first moves,” preemptive attacks or “decapitation attacks” against vital targets such as strategic communications, “combined-arms” moves (as are possible with shiptracking satellites), and other elements of their well-stocked repertoire. The Soviets integrate military space operations into their strategic thinking. They see space in straightforward terms, as an operational or combatant theater, whereas we see it—given our own strategic culture—as a “sanctuary” where “support forces” for terrestrial military forces can operate permissively.

If Moscow achieves its aims, we will be faced with a new era of Pax Sovietica in which Soviet space power dictates Free World behavior. We believe that the High Frontier of space provides us with the opportunity, perhaps our only opportunity, to frustrate Soviet power ambitions and at the same time open up a new era of hope and prosperity for the United States and the Free World.

THE HISTORICAL IMPERATIVE

The immediate threat impels us to exploit our space technology, but there is also an unavoidable historical imperative to move vigorously into that arena. Throughout man’s history, those nations which moved most effectively from one arena of human activity to
the next have reaped enormous strategic advantages. For instance, when man's activities moved from the land to the coastal seas, the Vikings established an extraordinary dominance by excelling at sailing those seas.

After the epic voyages of Columbus and Magellan, Spain and Portugal dominated the world through military and commercial control of the new arena of human activity—the high seas. Later England with her powerful fleet of merchantmen and men-of-war established a century of Pax Britannica. When the coastal seas of space—the air—became a new sphere of human activity, the United States gained great strategic advantages by acquiring the most effective military and civilian capability in aviation. Today, after epic manned and unmanned exploration of space, we shall see which nation puts the equivalent of the British merchantmen and men-of-war into space. We dare not let it be our adversary.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION

We cannot reverse the ominous trends in the military balance if we adhere to current strategy and try to compete with the Soviets in piling up weapons of current technology. Even if Congress were willing to appropriate unlimited funds for procurement of these weapons (and it is not), our defense production base is in such a sorry state that it could not compete with the Soviet arms production base which is today operating at very high levels. Our best hope is to change our strategy and to move the key competition into a technological arena where we have the advantage.

A bold and rapid entry into space, if announced and initiated now, would end-run the Soviets in the eyes of the world and move the contest into a new arena where we could exploit the technological advantages we hold. This is far preferable to pursuing a numbers contest here on Earth, which will be difficult if not impossible for us to win.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE OPTION

When we look to space for the technological end-run of the Soviets, we find all factors call for an emphasis on strategic defense. First, defensive systems hold the only promise to break out of the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine. Second, defense is the only
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sound alternative to costly "racetrack"-type options to protect our deterrent systems. Third, our current and crucial heavy military investment in space is also vulnerable to attack. Fourth, available technology favors defensive space systems. Last, there are severe political constraints and some technical-military reasons inhibiting the deployment of offensive weapons in space.

For these reasons the military side of High Frontier emphasizes the resurrection of a long neglected aspect of our security—protective strategic defense. We visualize a layered strategic defense. The first layer would be a spaceborne defense which would effectively filter a Soviet missile attack in the early stages of flight. The second layer would be a broader space protection system, perhaps using advanced beam weaponry to further reduce the effectiveness of a missile attack and to defend other space assets from a variety of attacks. The third layer would be a ground-based point defense system capable of removing any Soviet assurance of success of a first strike against our missile silos—even before a space system is deployed—and of intercepting Soviet missiles which later might leak through the space defenses. A passive fourth layer would be civil defense, which becomes a valuable aspect of strategy in conjunction with these active defense layers.

We can get a point defense within two or three years which would be adequate to protect our ICBMs in silos and avoid the high-cost deployment modes for MX. An initial spaceborne global ballistic missile defense (GBMD) can be acquired in five or six years given adequate priority. A second generation general space defense using advanced technology can probably be achieved in the early 1990s.

In proposing such strategic defenses, one invariably encounters the shibboleths that have plagued consideration of strategic defensive options in the past. It has been an article of faith in the offense-only, Assured Destruction school of thought that strategic defenses in the nuclear era are useless unless they are impermeable or not subject to attack and/or that they are impossibly expensive. These are false premises.

With regard to impermeable or invulnerable defenses, there never has been nor ever will be a defensive system which could meet such criteria. Such perfectionist demands ignore the purposes of
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defenses and the effects of strategic defense on deterrence. Defenses throughout military history have been designed to make attack more difficult and more costly—not impossible. Defenses have often prevented attack by making its outcome uncertain. General Grant put a cavalry screen in front of his forces not because the cavalry was invulnerable to Confederate bullets or because he thought it could defeat General Lee, but because he did not want the battle to commence with an assault on his main forces or his headquarters.

It is this same military common sense that must prevail in our approach to strategic defenses today. Given the drastic consequences of a failed nuclear attack on an opponent, the critical military task is to keep a potential aggressor uncertain of success if not certain of failure. In the absence of defenses the Soviet military planner has a rather straightforward arithmetic problem to solve to be quite sure of the results of a disarming strike against all locatable US strategic weaponry—ICBM sites, airfields, and submarine bases. His problem is simply to ensure that he can deliver two warheads of current size and accuracy against each such target. If, on the other hand, the Soviet planner must consider the effects of a strategic defense, especially a spaceborne defense which destroys a portion of the attacking missiles in the early stages of their trajectories, he is faced with a problem full of uncertainties. He does not know how many warheads will arrive in the target area and—even more crucial—which ones will arrive over which targets. This changes the simple arithmetic problem into a complex calculus full of uncertainties. Such uncertainties are the essence of deterrence.

Strategic defenses are eminently practicable and by no means impossibly expensive if the programs involved are not required to meet unrealistic standards of perfection or incredible postulated threats. A cursory review of combinations of spaceborne defenses, land-based ABMs, and civil defense—while by no means definitive as to costs—indicates that a defense system of decisive strategic importance can be devised which is relatively inexpensive when compared with some previously proposed offensive systems.

SURVIVABILITY

One issue which must be carefully addressed is that of space system survivability. While space systems are nearly invulnerable to
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a large array of threats with which terrestrial systems must cope (e.g., bombs and bullets) they have some unique vulnerabilities to threats which can be posed by a technologically advanced adversary. An examination of this problem leads to several conclusions:

- As with all systems, no space-based system can be envisaged which is invulnerable to all postulated threats.

- Vulnerability of current US space assets (intelligence and communications satellites and the shuttle) sharply increases the imperative for an effective spaceborne defensive system which can defend itself, reduce the threat to other space systems, as well as defend ground targets against hostile objects transiting space, e.g., ICBMs.

- Defensive systems employing large numbers of less sophisticated satellites are far less vulnerable than those employing small numbers of more sophisticated satellites.

- An ability to provide mutual warning and protection among satellites in a ballistic missile defense is very important to survivability.

- The sooner a spaceborne ballistic missile defense system can be deployed, the better its survivability (long lead time systems are susceptible to long lead time Soviet countermeasures—real or postulated).

- Future US deployment of more sophisticated beam weaponry military satellites may be dependent for survivability on protection provided by a lower-technology defensive system already deployed.

Given the characteristics of currently operating US space systems, one can readily postulate ways for the Soviets to attack them, ranging all of the way from throwing sand in their paths to burning them out of space with futuristic beam weapons. Such attack modes fall into two basic categories, peacetime attack and wartime attack.

Most current Soviet capabilities to attack US space systems are applicable in the peacetime attack category. These include attack with non-nuclear direct ascent missiles, the current Soviet antisatel-
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Lite system, and current power-level Soviet lasers. However, these attack modes presuppose Soviet willingness to risk the grave consequences (including war) of attacking our space systems in time of peace or crisis. While such Soviet action cannot be totally ignored, most experts on Soviet behavior find this possibility extremely remote.

The second class of threat—wartime—is more serious. In this situation nuclear weapons could be used to destroy or disable our space systems using radiation effects. (Blast effects are of little effect outside the atmosphere.) There are technical means of reducing the vulnerability of space systems to these effects, but a capability of a defensive system to intercept hostile objects directed at it is the best counter to such threats.

The Soviets may develop laser-beam weaponry of such power that satellites passing over them could be destroyed with a single burst of energy. It is doubtful, however, that such systems could, in the foreseeable future, successfully attack satellites coming over the horizon toward the Soviet Union where they would be shielded by much more of the Earth’s atmosphere.

Probably the most important factors in the survivability program are military rather than technical. Survivability is sharply increased by the ability of space vehicles to destroy threatening objects launched at them, or at other US space vehicles. Even should the Soviets eventually create the means to attack a spaceborne defense system successfully in order subsequently to launch a strategic missile attack, all chances of destroying the US deterrent on the ground would be lost. In these circumstances, launch on warning or launch under attack become both credible and feasible options for the United States. The Soviets could not expect, after the attack in space, that the US President would hesitate to respond to sensor warnings that a missile attack had been launched from the USSR. This fact alone would make a spaceborne defense of great strategic value.

NONMILITARY DIMENSION

Space holds out the promise of a new era of economic expansion. The unique environment of space—zero gravity, near-perfect vacuum, unlimited heat absorption, and sterile conditions—opens
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up a broad range of industrial/commercial possibilities. Space also contains inexhaustible supplies of minerals and solar energy. The economic potential of space is already being tapped in the communications industry. As the cost of space transportation is lowered, the industrialization of space will burgeon. However, the capital investment in space industries will be quite large and unlikely to be undertaken if space installations are unprotectable from hostile attack. For this reason, military capabilities in space are critical to space-based economic growth.

We should harbor no illusions that space can be limited to “peaceful uses” any more than could previous arenas on land, sea, or in the air. Indeed, most current space assets, US and Soviet, are partially or entirely military—and the most destructive of all weapons, strategic ballistic missiles, must transit space en route to their targets.

The government’s role in opening up the High Frontier of space for economic exploitation is basically the same as it has been with the opening of frontiers of the past: exploration, transportation systems, and security. These functions translate to these specifics: scientific research, improving the space shuttle, and providing spaceborne defenses.

Both the military and nonmilitary uses of space depend on the continued efforts in certain core technologies: improvements in space transportation to reduce the cost-per-pound of materials in orbit, and the creation of permanent, manned space stations at the “terminals” of the space transport system.

While these efforts are primarily the responsibility of government, they should be undertaken in cooperation with private industry and with support from other nations which would benefit.

With a proper combination of space technologies we can sharply improve the security of the US and its Free World allies, and at the same time restore confidence in the ability of Free World economies to meet the challenges of the future.

The urgency here is far greater than many people in this country appear to recognize. Following the successful US moon landing the Soviets made it clear that, while intending first and foremost to
develop maximum possible military capabilities in space, they expect also to achieve dominance with respect to the economic exploitation of space opportunities. In 1964, Brezhnev spoke of these plans, and Soviet specialized literature has gone into great detail concerning concrete possibilities. Further, all phases of ongoing Soviet space activities that aim at strategic objectives also serve as stepping-stones to the USSR’s preeminence in the space environment for military as well as nonmilitary purposes.

THE URGENT REQUIREMENTS

In order to fulfill the objectives of the High Frontier concept, including the rapid closing of the “window of vulnerability,” creating the concrete basis for a new strategy of Assured Survival, and opening space for economic growth, the following list of urgent requirements is presented. It should be noted that these requirements, when met, will not solve all urgent military problems facing the United States, let along all economic problems.

The urgent requirements for military systems to implement the High Frontier concept are these:

1. A point defense for US ICBM silos which, within two or three years, at a cost less than that of superhardening, can destroy any confidence the Soviets might have in a first strike against our deterrent.

2. A first-generation spaceborne ballistic missile defense, deployable in five or six years at a cost not exceeding that of the original MX-MPS system, and capable of significant attrition of a Soviet strategic missile attack in the early part of trajectory.

3. A second-generation space defense system, deployable within 10 or 12 years and capable of attacking hostile objects anywhere in near Earth space with advanced-technology weaponry.

4. A utilitarian manned military space control vehicle, deployable within the next six to eight years, and capable of inspection, on-orbit maintenance, and space tug missions wherever satellites can go.
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5. A civil defense program of sufficient scope and funding to take advantage of the proposed active strategic defenses and thus add to US deterrent strength.

The primary urgent requirements in core space technology and nonmilitary applications are:

1. Improved space transportation, designed to lower the cost-per-pound in orbit to under $100.

2. A manned space station in low Earth orbit as soon as practicable. It would allow low cost, efficient development and testing of both civilian and military system elements, and constitute a first step toward a similar manned station at geosynchronous orbit.

3. Development work on reliable, high-capacity energy systems in space, initially to power other space activities, and eventually to provide electrical power to any spot on Earth.

4. Preparatory development of a selected number of promising commercial business opportunities. Government efforts should focus on encouraging the transformation of these “seed” efforts into independently viable commercial operations as soon as possible.

CAN WE DO IT?

All these requirements can be met, some of them with technology already in hand, with components already tested. None of these requirements demand technological “breakthroughs” or a commitment to mere scientific theories. There are in fact a variety of viable options available to meet each of the requirements of High Frontier. The following is a description of one set of programs which could do so. Each is described in some detail in the main body of this study. The costs estimated for these programs are in constant dollars. The costs and times indicated are based on a management system which minimizes bureaucratic delays.

Quickly Deployable Point Defense

A partially tested system exists that could meet the requirement
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to destroy Soviet confidence in a first strike against our silos. It is a
very simple system which fires a large number of small conventional
projectiles which form a barrier against a warhead approaching a
US missile silo at about one mile from the target. It could be des-
cribed as “dynamic hardening” instead of as an antimissile system.
If deployed to intercept only the first Soviet warhead approaching a
silo, it would cost $2-3 million per defended silo. If it is to intercept a
second warhead, the costs increase to about $5 million per silo.

First-Generation Spaceborne Defense

The requirement for an initial spaceborne ballistic missile
defense system can be met by using off-the-shelf hardware to
to create a multiple-vehicle orbiting system. This system would deploy
nonnuclear kill vehicles to destroy Soviet missiles in the early phase
of trajectory. Enough weapons carrying satellites would be orbited
to ensure continuous coverage of Soviet ballistic missile trajecto-
ries, including those of SS-20 Eurostrategic missiles and submarine-
launched missiles. This system could provide protection to the
allies as well as to the United States.

The multiple satellite deployment permits one satellite to
defend itself and several others from hostile attack. It also has the
potential for forming the basis of a highly effective and secure
command, control, and communications (C^3) system. Since the
system makes maximum use of off-the-shelf space hardware com-
ponents, it may be the cheapest and quickest available option. This
system could start deployment in perhaps as little as three years and
be fully deployed in five or six years at a cost of some $10-15 billion.

Second-Generation Spaceborne Defense

The most promising possibility for a second-generation space-
borne defense is product improvement of GBMD I. With the addition
of advanced infrared sensing devices the first generation can be
made capable of attacking individual warheads throughout their
trajectory up to reentry into the atmosphere. This system could be
ready for deployment in 1990 at a cost of about a $5 billion add-on to
GBMD I costs.

The requirement for higher-technology space defense systems
might also be met by a high-powered laser system on the ground
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with redirecting mirrors on satellites or by beam weapon systems deployed in space or in pop-up installations on the ground. These systems are currently being researched. Costs to continue research should probably be increased by about $100 million per year.

High-Performance Spaceplane

There is an urgent need to develop a multipurpose, military, manned space control vehicle to perform a wide variety of space missions such as inspection of friendly or suspect space objects, satellite and space-station protection, and adjustment or retrieval of satellites. One such vehicle is the high-performance spaceplane, or one-man "space cruiser," which utilizes available space hardware components and technology and which could be operating in several years for less than $500 million in cost. It is now under active consideration in the Department of Defense.

Civil Defense

Civil defense is a multifaceted endeavor, the utility and cost-effectiveness of which sharply increase when considered in conjunction with active defenses. This study concludes that increased funding for civil defense is required for the near term but that over the longer term the active defenses of High Frontier would reduce the requirement for resource expenditures on civil defense. The impact of these conclusions on priorities and costs of current civil defense programs has not been analyzed in this study.

Improved Space Transportation

The immediate answer to improved space transportation is an upgrade of the current shuttle program to improve turnaround time and to create an unmanned cargo-only version. At the same time, development work should begin on a much higher-load-capacity vehicle. These programs would cost an estimated $6 billion over a 10-year period.

A Manned Low Earth Orbit Space Station

The currently proposed military Space Operation Center should be given high priority and expanded in concept to include provision for "fly-along" industrial/commercial space installations.
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station should be equipped to receive power for operations from a prototype solar power satellite. A 10-year program to deploy this space station should cost about $12 billion.

A Space Power System

This requirement can be met by a proposal using known technology which would place in geosynchronous orbit a solar power satellite and place on Earth a microwave receiving antenna and conversion system providing 500 megawatts of continuous electrical power. This pilot system, modified to include a capability to provide power to a space station with laser transmission, would cost about $13 billion.

Space Industrial Systems Research and Development

The costs of R&D for industrial space applications would probably be borne almost entirely by interested private enterprise, with no more than $50 million per year in government support.

COSTS

The total costs of the High Frontier concept over the next five or six years in outlays of constant dollars might be on the order of $24 billion. Through 1990 the total costs in constant dollars would probably be about $40 billion—a figure that compares favorably with what would have been the total cost of MX-MPS in its original configuration. It also compares favorably with the Apollo moon-landing program, and strikingly so if the inflation rate of the past 12 years is considered.

If one considers possible tradeoffs in programs no longer needed or lowered in priority by the existence of an effective strategic defense, the real costs of the High Frontier programs are even lower. For instance, the billions now earmarked for superhardening of existing missile silos and for deploying more complex point defenses need not be expended. There are other possible tradeoffs such as repositioning of SAC airfields, reducing the urgency of theater nuclear force upgrade in Europe, C3 improvements, and so forth.

Finally, there is a reasonable chance for sizeable cost offsets
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from industry and allied participation in the most expensive aspects of the High Frontier effort—nonmilitary applications. This is especially true if a vigorous effort to tap solar energy is emphasized. Several nations have already stated their willingness to assist in such an effort. Such nongovernment support would further reduce the real costs of the concept.

In any case, costs to the US taxpayer of implementing High Frontier will certainly be lower than those involved in other approaches to solving urgent security issues, e.g., MX-MPS. The High Frontier approach, therefore, cannot be characterized as unrealistically expensive.

IMPACTS

The mere announcement of a bold new US initiative along the lines of the High Frontier concept would have beneficial impacts at home and abroad. The fulfillment of the urgent requirements noted above would have even more far-reaching impacts.

Military Impacts

On the purely military-strategic side, we would be moving away from the unstable world of terror balance to one of Assured Survival—a much more stable condition. We would provide answers to US and allied security problems not involving the amassing of ever larger stockpiles and ever more expensive deployments of nuclear weapons.

By creating a proper balance between strategic offense and strategic defense we broaden the options for strategic retaliatory systems. A great deal of the counterforce, damage-limiting function of our strategic forces can be shouldered by the defensive systems. Cruise missiles become a more attractive option in a new strategic setting that includes defenses against ballistic missile attack.

Perhaps most important to our military efforts as a whole, the High Frontier concept would restore the traditional US military ethic. The military man’s role as defender of the country has always been the tie that has bound him to the supporting citizenry. Strategies of the recent past, such as MAD, which deny that role have seriously weakened that bond. A commitment to a new strategy
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which is consistent with the military rationale of the average US citizen could greatly ease problems in all facets of US security efforts.

Political Impacts

The potential for public support of this concept is enormous. If the military and nonmilitary aspects of High Frontier are effectively harnessed together, broad segments of the US body politic are likely to rally in support. Recent elections have demonstrated the widespread desire for improved defenses. There is a remarkably large support base, primarily among younger people, in the form of space enthusiasts. And there is general public disillusionment with the doctrines and strategies of the past.

The High Frontier concept would even convert or confuse some of the conventional opponents of defense efforts and technological innovations. It is harder to oppose non-nuclear defensive systems than nuclear offensive systems. It is impossible to argue effectively for a perpetual balance of terror if it can be negated by new policies. It is hard to make environmentalist cases against space systems.

Even those naysayers whose basic concern is disarmament will be hard pressed to make a case against High Frontier, the ABM Treaty notwithstanding. It is not necessary to abrogate the ABM Treaty to commit to High Frontier programs.

The High Frontier spaceborne defensive systems fall into the category described in the treaty as "systems based on other principles" which are "subject to discussion" with the Soviets. Point defense systems can be selected which are so different from ABM systems as defined in the treaty that they too could be considered as outside the treaty. Indeed, some silo defense systems can be considered "dynamic hardening"—a substitute for reinforced concrete—rather than an ABM. Further, the current ABM Treaty is scheduled for review in 1982, and the United States could propose any amendments deemed necessary to accommodate strategic defensive decisions.

A US commitment to the High Frontier concept does not necessitate rejection of arms negotiations with the Soviets. It does, however, mean that future negotiations would proceed on a different
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philosophical basis. Rather than continue to pursue agreements which attempt to perpetuate a balance of terror and MAD, our negotiating efforts would be dedicated to achieving a stable world of Mutual Assured Survival.

Economic Impacts

There can be little doubt that a strong commitment by the United States would have highly beneficial economic impacts. Some of these impacts will affect the US economy in the near term, primarily through the stimulus to investment in high-technology sectors of industry and a probable upswing in confidence generally. An increase of 200,000 jobs in the near term as a result of a strong commitment to space has been estimated. Longer-term impacts will depend on the rate at which industrial applications are realized and on unpredictable technological spin-offs from the space effort.

One area of commercial space application is already paying its way very well. Space communications is a $500 million-per-year enterprise and is growing rapidly. By 1990 it should become a multibillion dollar-per-year industry.

As other industrial applications in space are realized, the total revenues from space industries might reach levels of several tens of billion dollars per year by the year 2000.

Some of the most beneficial economic impacts of a strong High Frontier effort are indirect and unquantifiable. The demand for highly skilled workers is certain to have an impact on the education system and on the labor market. New products, tools, and services will be required by an expanding space effort. Research efforts will intensify.

Overall, the economic benefits of a strong US commitment to the exploitation of space for both security and industry are potentially very great, but they are no more predictable today than were the future economic benefits of aviation in the 1920s.

Foreign Impacts

The positive political effects in the United States will probably be reflected overseas among our allies. The announcement of a
commitment to the High Frontier concepts could have a strong counter-effect on the current highly disruptive, "antinuclear," or "peace" movements in Europe. A bold US strategic initiative would certainly bolster the morale of pro-US elements. The High Frontier concept can become a new cement for Free World alliances, making them global rather than regional.

A shared US-allied commitment to the harnessing of solar power from space could have highly beneficial impacts on foreign relations. If the prospects were good for future supplies of energy independent of the geographical location of fossil fuels, the over-dependence of the industrialized West on oil- and gas-producing countries could be rectified. Further, the prospects for overcoming the intractable problems of the underdeveloped nations could have a beneficial impact on the attitudes of the Third World.

As for the Soviets, their reaction is easily predictable as hostile. They have already moved to counter the US potential to adopt available military space options. They have introduced in the United Nations (and garnered some support for it among our allies) a new treaty which would ban all (not just nuclear) weapons in space. Meanwhile, evidence mounts that they are already in violation of their own cynical proposition. We can expect an extraordinarily strong Soviet propaganda effort against a US commitment to the High Frontier concepts, including threats of counteraction. However, in both particulars Moscow will find, for substantive reasons, an attack on the High Frontier concepts much more difficult to conduct than past anti-US campaigns.

MANAGEMENT

Time is critical in any commitment to the High Frontier, especially with regard to the military systems. If we cannot change the adverse trends in the military balance quickly, we may not be able to change them at all. If we do not move quickly to secure space for promising industrial development, we may later be denied the opportunity.

There are no technical obstacles to meeting the military and nonmilitary objectives of High Frontier. We can close the window of vulnerability in two or three years and negate the brooding menace of Mutual Assured Destruction in five or six years. We can lower the
costs of men and materials in space, establish a permanent manned presence in space, and open the door to enormous economic advantages in 10 years. However, this can be done only by initially selecting systems using to the maximum off-the-shelf technology and by instituting special management and procedural arrangements for their rapid acquisition and deployment. By using known and tested technology we can avoid the long delays imposed by research and development. By special management arrangements we can avoid the bureaucratic hurdles which have been inserted into our weapons acquisition processes over the past 15 years. Time is money, and literally billions can be saved by cutting acquisition times.

In 1956, President Eisenhower gave the go-ahead on a concept for a ballistic-missile-firing submarine. That concept involved far more technological unknowns than do the High Frontier options. In 1960, 47 months later, the first Polaris put to sea. In 1962, President Kennedy announced the objective of landing a man on the moon. Seven years later this astonishing feat was accomplished.

Today, even a new fighter aircraft takes 13 years or more from concept to acquisition, and decades of delay are predicted for space developments. Such protracted processes cause costs to soar astronomically. This sad state of affairs exists not because Americans have become technologically inept but because we have, over the years, constructed a complex and multilayered bureaucratic system in the Executive Branch and in the Congress which simply cannot produce quick results. In order to take advantage of the opportunities available to us on the High Frontier, we must—at least for a few years—find a way to short-circuit the bureaucratic institutions and procedures.

The first step is to select—and select quickly—those systems which will meet the urgent requirements of the High Frontier concept. This should be done by a Presidential Systems Selection Task Force composed of prominent and properly qualified individuals.

To provide overall guidance to the High Frontier effort, a National Space Council should be appointed with representation from the involved departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Congress, and industry. Its function would be to ensure full cooperation and fast action by all branches of government and
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of private industry involved in the effort. Its chairman should be the Vice President.

The actual coordinating and expediting of the programs selected to meet the High Frontier requirements should be the responsibility of a chief operating officer heading up a Consolidated Program Office. This officer should be assisted by special project officers within the departments and agencies charged with acquiring the first generation of High Frontier systems. The management system should ensure individual rather than committee responsibility for decisions, a minimum of Executive and Congressional staff review, and specified or "fenced" funding for High Frontier programs.

This management system should be unequivocally temporary. It should go out of existence upon achievement of its objectives of first-generation system acquisition. As results are obtained, all responsibility for the operations, maintenance, and further growth of space systems should return to the cognizance of the appropriate agencies—Defense and NASA. There is no need to create a new permanent layer of bureaucracy.

These are the essentials of the High Frontier concept. They are discussed in much greater detail in the main body of the study. We believe that the change of strategy recommended in this study supports a US policy statement as follows:

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF US POLICY

The United States and its allies now have the combined technological, economic, and moral means to overcome many of the ills that beset our civilization. We need not pass on to our children the horrendous legacy of "Mutual Assured Destruction," a perpetual balance of terror that can but favor those most inclined to use terror to bring down our free societies. We need not succumb to ever gloomier predictions of diminishing energy, raw materials, and food supplies. We need not resign ourselves to a constant retreat of free economic and political systems in the face of totalitarian aggressions. The peoples of the Free World can once again take charge of their destinies, if they but muster the will to do so.

In April of 1981, the Space Shuttle Columbia made its dramatic
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maiden voyage into space and back safely to Earth. This event was not merely another admirable feat of American space technology. It marked the advent of a new era of human activity on the High Frontier of space. The space shuttle is a development even more momentous for the future of mankind than was the completion of the transcontinental railway, the Suez and Panama Canals, or the first flight of the Wright brothers. It can be viewed as a "railroad into space" over which will move the men and materials necessary to open broad new fields of human endeavor in space and to free us from the brooding menace of nuclear attack.

This is an historic opportunity—history is driving us to seize it.

A few thousand years ago, man's activities—his work, his commerce, his communications, all of his activities, including armed conflict—were confined to the land.

Eventually man's technology and daring thrust his activities off the land areas of the continents and into the coastal seas. His work, commerce, communications, and military capabilities moved strongly into this new arena of human activity. Those nations that had either the wit or the luck to establish the strongest military and commercial capabilities in the new arena reaped enormous strategic advantages. For example, the Vikings, although never a very numerous people, became such masters of the coastal seas that their power spread from their homes in Scandinavia over all the coasts of Europe and into the Mediterranean Sea, up to the very gates of Byzantium.

At the beginning of the 16th century, after the epic voyages of men like Magellan and Columbus, human activity surged onto the high seas. Once again, the nations that mastered this new arena of human activity reaped enormous strategic rewards. First Spain and Portugal utilized their sea power to found colonies and to solidify their strength in Europe. Later, Great Britain, with an unsurpassed fleet of merchantmen and fighting ships, established a century of relative peace which we remember as Pax Britannica.

In the lifetime of many of us, man's activity moved strongly into yet another arena, the coastal seas of space—the air. And once again the nations which quickly and effectively made use of this new arena for commerce and defense gained great advantages. As
Americans we can take pride that the greatest commercial and military successes in aviation have been achieved by our nation.

But today, following the epic voyages of our astronauts to the moon and our unmanned explorer satellites to the rings of Saturn and beyond, we find man's activities moving strongly into yet another new arena—the high seas of space. Already the United States and other major nations, including the Soviet Union, are making huge investments in space. Much of our communications, intelligence, weather forecasting, and navigation capabilities are now heavily dependent on space satellites. And, as history teaches us well, those nations or groups of nations that become preeminent in space will gain the decisive advantage of this strategic "high ground."

We must be determined that these advantages shall accrue to the peoples of the Free World: not to any totalitarian power. We can improve the shuttle, our railway into space, placing space stations at its terminals and sharply reducing the cost-per-pound of material put into space. We can thus open the doors of opportunity to develop entire new space based industries, promising new products and new jobs for our people on Earth. We can eventually create the means to bring back to Earth the minerals and the inexhaustible solar energy available in space. By doing so, we can confound the gloomy predictions of diminishing energy and material resources available here on Earth. This will not only enhance the prosperity of the advanced, industrialized nations of our Free World, but will also provide the means to solve many of the hitherto intractable problems of the developing countries.

Further, we can place into space the means to defend these peaceful endeavors from interference or attack by any hostile power. We can deploy in space a purely defensive system of satellites using non-nuclear weapons which will deny any hostile power a rational option for attacking our current and future space vehicles or for delivering a militarily effective first strike with its strategic ballistic missiles on our country or on the territory of our allies. Such a global ballistic missile defense system is well within our present technological capabilities and can be deployed in space in this decade, at less cost than other options that might be available to us to redress the strategic balance.
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We need not abrogate current treaties to pursue these defensive options. A United Nations treaty prohibits the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in space, but does not prohibit defensive space weapons. The ABM Treaty requires discussion among Soviet and US representatives of any decision to proceed with defensive systems "based on other principles" such as space systems. We should initiate such discussions and propose revisions, if necessary, in the ABM Treaty, which is scheduled for review this year.

Essentially, this is a decision to provide an effective defense against nuclear attack for our country and our allies. It represents a long, overdue concrete rejection by this country of the "Mutual Assured Destruction" theory which held that the only effective deterrent to nuclear war was a permanent threat by the United States and the Soviet Union to heap nuclear devastation on the cities and populations of each other. The inescapable corollary of this theory of MAD (perhaps the most apt acronym ever devised in Washington) was that civilian populations should not be defended, as they were to be considered hostages in this monstrous balance-of-terror doctrine. The MAD doctrine, which holds that attempting to defend ourselves would be "destabilizing" and "provocative," has resulted not only in the neglect of our active military and strategic defenses and our civil defense, it also has resulted in the near-total dismantlement of such strategic defenses as we once had.

For years, many of our top military men have decried the devastating effect the MAD theory has had on the Nation's security. In fact, our military leaders have, over the years, denied its validity and tried within the limits of their prerogatives to offset its ill effects. But those effects are readily evident. The only response permitted under MAD to increased nuclear threats to the United States or to its allies was to match these threats with increased nuclear threats against the Soviet Union. Further, a US strategy which relied at its core on the capability to annihilate civilians and denied the soldier his traditional role of defending his fellow citizens has had a deleterious effect on the traditional American military ethic, and on the relationship between the soldier and the normally highly supportive public.

This legacy of MAD lies at the heart of many current problems of US and allied security. We should abandon this immoral and militarily bankrupt theory of MAD and move from "Mutual Assured
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"Destruction" to "Assured Survival." Should the Soviet Union wish to join in this endeavor—to make Assured Survival a mutual endeavor—we would, of course, not object. We have an abiding and vital interest in assuring the survival of our Nation and our allies. We have no interest in the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union.

If both East and West can free themselves from the threat of disarming nuclear first strikes, both sides will have little compulsion to amass ever larger arsenals of nuclear weapons. This would most certainly produce a more peaceful and stable world than the one we now inhabit. And it would allow us to avoid leaving to future generations the horrendous legacy of a perpetual balance of terror.

What we propose is not a panacea which solves all the problems of our national security. Spaceborne defense does not mean that our nuclear retaliatory capabilities can be abandoned or neglected. The United States would still maintain strategic offensive forces capable of retaliation in case of attack. The Soviets, while losing their advantage in first-strike capabilities, would still be able to retaliate in case of attack. Nor does our approach to the strategic nuclear balance eliminate the need to build and maintain strong conventional capabilities.

We Americans have always been successful on the frontiers; we will be successful on the High Frontier of space. We need only be as bold and resourceful as our forefathers.
A Bold Two-Track Strategy for Space: Entering the Second Quarter-Century

Dr. Barry J. Smernoff
B.J. Smernoff Associates

The second 25 years of the space age began on 4 October 1982. When Sputnik I was launched by the USSR, few observers dared to guess the large number and broad variety of US space systems that would follow, with such telling impact on civilian and military activities and even on how we view our home planet Earth. Only dreamers talked about extensive constellations of communications satellites, bringing live television into homes around the world, or photoreconnaissance platforms overhead (revealed officially to the American public by President Carter in 1978) to verify arms-control agreements as well as to collect intelligence imagery with startling detail, or meteorological satellites capable of providing synoptic photographs to which weathermen could key their daily forecasts, or the thunderous elegance of a space shuttle as it was launched into the depths of space, only to glide back quietly to an aircraft-like landing for piggyback flight and re-use. By 1980, the biggest tourist attraction in Washington had become the National Air and Space Museum—not the White House or US Capitol.

There is no doubt that the second quarter-century of the American space program can produce dazzling technological advances comparable in quality and novelty to those noted above. Space technology, most definitely, is America’s strong suit. As President Reagan recently reaffirmed in his July 4th, 1982, speech after the fourth Columbia landing that ended preoperational testing of the space shuttle, the United States has made a firm national commitment to remain the world leader in space technology. In some surprising sense, then, the technical side of the American space program is easiest to deal with, notwithstanding the problems and cost overruns that beleaguered the shuttle (and every other serious development program), and the competing priorities and bureaucratic conflicts that laced media reports.

What has been missing from the US space program are compelling answers to the essential and central questions of where, what,
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and why. Where are we headed, what important national goals should we be pursuing in our space program, and why are they of such critical significance? Do we have a workable and coherent national strategy for “getting from here to there,” with strategic milestones and goals that must be achieved along the way?

One of the critical tasks of political leadership in the United States has been to mobilize the American people behind goals that lie clearly in the national interest. The second quarter-century of the American space program presents such important and intriguing opportunities for meeting key national needs that we would be extraordinarily remiss to ignore or reject them. On the other hand, national policy in certain areas either does not exist or is contrary to the kind of bold and clearly articulated policy guidance needed to take advantage of these opportunities for exploiting outer space. Consequently, it is not surprising that coherent and practical strategies are totally lacking for pursuing goals in space which virtually everyone, if given the chance, might agree are both important and feasible to achieve.

Meeting such strategic goals in space, however, will demand much more than development of the appropriate technology, and merely technical solutions to the problems associated with these goals are neither feasible nor desirable. Bold and forward-looking two-track strategies will be required to blend the relevant political components, such as arms-control diplomacy, with promising technological advances, such as space-based laser weapons.

Accordingly, one must explore the assumptions and hypotheses that are linked with this central theme. One can then develop the rudiments of a national security strategy for moving boldly into the second quarter-century of the space age that blends competition and cooperation, technical nerve and political imagination, physical strength and moral courage. This period takes us forward into the long-range future, through the year 2000 into the new millennium, with all of its chiliastic overtones.

NET ASSESSMENT OF US AND SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

A review of space history suggests strongly that the United States holds a clear and compelling edge in demonstrated space technology, scare stories about the 12-foot-tall Soviet spacemen
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notwithstanding. Specific cases in point are easy to find. Whereas American satellites carrying infrared sensors constitute the primary means of providing warning of ballistic missile attacks to the National Command Authority (and have been operational since the early 1970s), as of 1981 the USSR had deployed no effective early-warning system in space—and not for lack of trying. Russian cosmonauts may have spent more time in long-duration space missions than American astronauts, but the Soviet space program never completed its development of a large Saturn-class launch vehicle (reported to have failed catastrophically in several tests beginning in the late 1960s) and never landed men on the moon. While this large Soviet space booster reportedly “will have the capability to launch...even larger and more capable laser weapons” into orbit, it is generically more than a dozen years overdue—and counting. The 120,000 to 250,000 kilogram size of the large manned space platform under development by NASA for possible launch in the next seven to ten years suggests that the Soviet Union may be hard-pressed to keep pace with ambitious American plans in this area—supposedly that of uniquely Russian advantage over the US space program.

Admittedly, space spending in the Soviet Union does appear to be growing more rapidly than overall defense spending. Highly publicized Soviet statements regarding the desired demilitarization of space contradict the consistently heavy military emphasis of the Soviet space program, which currently expends about $17 to $18 billion per year compared to the annual US level of about $14 billion for fiscal 1983. Such comparisons can be deceptive, however, since the USSR launches annually four to five times as many spacecraft as the United States—dozens of which are short-lived photorece birds and analysts believe that fully one-third of the Soviet total is spent on spacecraft placed in orbit. Moreover, substantial US spending on classified programs may not be included in “total” US space outlays.

During the past several years, the pace of American spending on military activities in space has accelerated sharply, with real growth rates approaching 20 percent per year. In fiscal 1982, DOD spending on space programs exceeded NASA’s budget for the first time since 1960 as US military forces become increasingly dependent upon space capabilities to accomplish many basic support functions such as precise navigation, long-haul communications.
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meteorology, and surveillance. The sharp acceleration of US space spending led by DOD programs suggests that the USSR may be playing catch-up, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the near future and that the American space lead will widen, perhaps markedly, by the late 1980s. Recent establishment of the Air Force Space Command will reinforce the trend towards rapid growth of US military activities in space.

WHAT SHOULD THE US DO WITH ITS LEAD IN SPACE?

Given the clear US lead in space technology and emerging US edge in space spending over the Soviet Union, how can/should these definite advantages be exploited to serve US national interests and goals? Five generic options have been identified, three of which can be quickly rejected as non-starters. Brief characterizations of these basic options are:

1. Do Nothing, for fear of destroying the "sanctuary" of space
2. Negotiate, to prevent an arms race in space
3. Prepare, reactively, to deny the Soviet Union any major advantage
4. Compete, vigorously, to achieve US superiority in space
5. Blend technology and politics, to exploit the clear US edge in space during an "age of obligatory arms control" and thereby achieve strategic goals more in keeping with deeply rooted American values than mutual assured destruction (MAD) forms of nuclear deterrence.

This section will examine these policy alternatives; since the first three can be discussed and rejected quickly as nonviable options, the "compete" and "blend" options will receive more attention.

1. Do Nothing

Quite clearly, this option has been overtaken by events, decisions, and steeply rising budgetary trends. The US has moved into space for military purposes with increasing vigor, and for good reason: space systems can be potent force multipliers. There are
unique advantages to be gained from basing increasingly powerful communication, navigation, meteorological, warning, surveillance, and other functions (eventually including non-nuclear weapons) on space platforms that have global and synoptic coverage. As a high-level defense official stated recently:

Hopes for demilitarization are only realistic in areas with no military worth; space is emphatically not one of these. While there are undoubtedly well-intentioned people who decry what they regard as the “militarization” of a pristine frontier, history teaches us that each time a new medium is opened up to man it is exploited to gain a military advantage. The course of world affairs has repeatedly been altered by the nation which first grasped the advantages offered by developing the military potential of the newest medium.

In a more pragmatic tone, Colin Gray writes that:

In a global war it would be no more feasible to retain space as a privileged sanctuary than it would be to preclude military action in any other geographical dimension. . . .
Space cannot be isolated from the earth with reference to armed conflict.

Perhaps, in the absence of a large and growing Soviet threat to US vital interests, the option of “doing nothing” about military activities in space would appear more desirable. The rather Hobbesian nature of the existing international scene has made this option infeasible as well as undesirable. It is inconsistent with the American “can-do” style of technological development to think that doing nothing in military space could ever be a practical alternative, especially given our unambiguous edge in this key arena (and the obvious parallel of airpower development).

2. Negotiate

During the Carter Administration, three rounds of US-Soviet talks were held during 1978-1979 on the matter of developing arms-control constraints for antisatellite (ASAT) weapon systems. The guiding policy for these negotiations was summarized as follows:

The United States finds itself under increasing pressure to field an antisatellite capability of its own in response to Soviet
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activities in the area. By exercising mutual restraint, the United States and the Soviet Union have an opportunity at this early juncture to stop an unhealthy arms competition in space before the competition develops a momentum of its own. While the United States seeks verifiable, comprehensive limits on antisatellite capabilities and use, in the absence of such an agreement, the United States will vigorously pursue development of its own capabilities.

Although this expressed preference for arms control designed to preserve space as a sanctuary is widely acknowledged, the practical feasibility of negotiating an even-handed and verifiable agreement banning ASAT capabilities appears virtually nil. After all, superpower arms control has suffered generally from the severe erosion of political relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the subsequent demise of SALT II, not to speak of the "yellow rain" and Bulgarian connection problems. There will always be well-intentioned groups believing that the strategic arms race must not be extended into outer space and that "time is running out" for banning the testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons.

3. Prepare

Once doing nothing and unadulterated arms control have been dismissed as serious policy options for guiding US military activities in space, one is faced with the "reactive" option of hedging against Soviet technological surprises by increasing our own activities through an emphasis on moderately aggressive R&D programs. To a large degree, this alternative is most consistent with Air Force thinking up to a few years ago. Now there is a clear shift toward more vigorous exploitation of space as the new blue-suit Space Command—perhaps the organizational precursor to a future US Space Force—becomes fully operational and the steep upward ramp of DOD space spending produces increasing policy interest in this area.

Primarily reactive moves are out of keeping with the characteristic American pursuit of action-oriented solutions to pressing problems, once the essential nature of any new frontier situation has been clearly understood. The US space shuttle was not developed during the 1970s simply to deny major political and military advantages to the USSR or to preserve the US lead in applied space technology. It was developed because enough American leaders
understood that the exploration and exploitation of space is of sufficient strategic significance that more routine (and hopefully cost-effective) transportation systems for launches into near-earth orbit would be required before fuller use of space systems could be possible. Perhaps, in the absence of a Soviet threat perceived to be growing both in scope and intensity, a purely reactive space policy would be in the cards. Since there is an ever-stronger consensus that military space programs are much too important to be shaped solely as responses to Soviet actions and decisions, this policy option falls into the same category as the first two—nonviable. Furthermore, America traditionally has wanted to control its own destiny, especially in frontier settings.

4. Compete

The strategic vision of a technologically dynamic America, seizing the ultimate high frontier (and high ground) of space to acquire clear-cut space superiority and provide unambiguous politico-military advantages to the United States, has captured the minds of many in recent years. Post-Sputnik literature reflects the underlying feeling that the US must obtain control of space first, and the sooner the better. As we bask in the national afterglow of the first five space shuttle missions during 1981-82, it is hard to dispute the increasingly prevalent view that, as the world’s preeminent spacefaring nation, the US must exploit its inherent technical and political advantages to achieve a clear and durable position of space superiority—unilaterally, without attempting to use diplomatic or other kinds of cooperative “crutches.” In a very fundamental sense, space has become a critical new arena for the American people, now that scientific research has become the leading edge of America’s frontier tradition:

A major world power such as the United States has to pioneer in those areas of life which are historically relevant and crucial. To the extent that ours is a scientific age, the failure of the United States to push beyond existing frontiers—and space offers a very dramatic challenge—would mean the loss of a major psychological motivation for innovation.”

Indeed, national resolve to reach beyond the ordinary is perhaps the essence of our topic, and it has several extremely important implications. On one hand, many would agree with Lieutenant
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General Kelly Burke's recent statement that space weapons "have a transcendental flavor, a little like gunpowder. We ignore them at our peril." Hence the threat to use space as a warfighting medium, beyond its historical supporting role, comes naturally. On the other hand, there is little doubt that Americans are searching actively for what Fred Ikle (now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) termed "a new path into the twenty-first century" inssofar as strategic thinking is concerned.

There is little doubt that the US could achieve durable space superiority—assuming that the Soviet Union would not rock the boat by undertaking preemptive attacks on, say, laser-bearing spacecraft thought to have BMD capabilities which the US might deploy in the 1990s and beyond. Advanced space technology such as space-based laser weaponry is opening attractive opportunities for constructing effective layered defensive systems capable of destroying attacking strategic bombers and missiles. Accordingly, space-related systems eventually could provide for the "common defense" in quite a direct manner—beyond the beleaguered concept of nuclear deterrence—and this alone would constitute sufficient motivation for aggressive US competition in the fourth arena of space. Rather than focusing upon business-as-usual with only evolutionary improvements of existing functions, the United States must continue to develop qualitatively new functions, such as spaceborne ocean and air surveillance systems and lasers, to take full advantage of space for meeting critical national needs. This point is even more valid now that the surprisingly rapid spread of the antinuclear movement in the US has created a host of seemingly intractable problems for sustaining the so-called defense consensus. Many Americans feel increasingly uncomfortable about the mutual-hostage relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. Others, in massive ignorance of current strategic realities, tend to assume that the US is defensible and (partly) defended at the present point in time.

5. Blend Technology and Politics

It is precisely for these reasons, transcending the more obvious politico-military and technical imperatives for moving into space much more aggressively, that the fifth option has become so essential: in contemporary terms, we have moved into "the age of obligatory arms control." Whereas the a priori negotiability of practical
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agreements which could have substantial influence on reshaping the nuclear mutual-hostage relationship is certainly very difficult to estimate, arms control has become an important part of the political scene. Although the future of formal arms-control limitations is in severe doubt, increasingly powerful domestic and European groupings embrace the theoretical ideals as necessary concomitants of growing defense expenditures—the now-traditional two-track approach.

This fifth space policy option is a deliberate attempt to blend the physical power of advanced US military technology—led by the sharp thrust of the two key technologies of microelectronics and lasers, especially applied to emerging and new space systems—with the political/psychological power of bilateral arms-control diplomacy. The essential policy objective is to shift the balance of strategic military power from a clear emphasis on nuclear offense toward non-nuclear defense grounded in weapons of self-protection. To be sure, the technical prospects seem brightest for non-nuclear defensive weapons when concepts are synthesized using space-based laser systems aided by various C'I systems (many of which themselves would be based in space), and other defensive layers such as exo/endoatmospheric non-nuclear kill-vehicle systems and advanced sensors under active development in the large and growing Army BMD program.

In his San Francisco speech to the editors of UPI announcing the Johnson Administration’s Sentinel ABM deployment decision, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that

it is important to understand that none of the (ABM) systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States. Were such a shield possible, we would certainly want it—and we would certainly build it... If we could build and deploy a genuinely impenetrable shield over the United States, we would be willing to spend not $40 billion (in 1967 dollars!) but any reasonable multiple of that amount that was necessary. The money in itself is not the problem: the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem.

Thus, defensive emphasis would be preferable to the existing moral nuclear-hostage relationship between the superpowers. The problem does not seem to be money but leakage! If a perfect "astro-
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dome” could be developed and built to protect the United States from “all” nuclear weapons deliverable by traditional means (not counting covert/clandestine emplacement by proverbial oxcart), and if everyone agreed that this were the case, defensive emphasis could clearly carry the day. Unfortunately, perfectionist demands for zero leakage will remain always unfulfilled, and it goes without saying that the best is the enemy of the good enough.

Apprehensions about unacceptable leakage through a future nationwide defensive shield could be reduced greatly if the overall size of the Soviet nuclear threat were reduced greatly. Indeed, deep cuts could reduce the thousands of existing strategic nuclear-delivery vehicles to hundreds on each side of the balance. The BMD problem could thereby become much less demanding, and the chances for building affordable defenses to protect cities with acceptably low leakage rates would become correspondingly larger. The rub would be to sustain the political credibility of nuclear deterrence during any extended transition toward defensive emphasis, and even beyond, as last-resort deterrence of large-scale central war through the threat of using whatever nuclear weapons are left after deep arms-control cuts.

This, then, is the pragmatic reason for justifying the critical significance of arms control. In his Eureka speech of May 1982, on the occasion of his 50th college reunion, President Reagan affirmed his goal of achieving deep reductions in strategic offensive forces (SOF) through negotiated arms-control agreements. It is now widely believed that the importance of finding a home for the hapless MX ICBM (which has tried multiple protective shelters, fixed silos, and most recently closely-spaced/densepack basing modes to no avail) is to create negotiating leverage and provide Soviet leaders with clear incentives to make deep cuts in their SOF, and particularly in their heavy MIRVed ICBMs such as the SS-18s.

THE BOTTOM LINE: NEW GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS

Where are we going in space during the 1980s and beyond, in pursuit of what goals, and why? The answers to these basic questions are unclear, largely because Americans tend to explore and exploit new frontiers by doing rather than thinking. It is within a fluid and somewhat confusing strategic context that the core questions
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of where, what and why—in connection with the US military space programs—must be addressed. If Americans are to exploit space for sound reasons, then new and more appropriate goals must be set before authentic strategic approaches can be conceived and implemented to reach them. As implied by the previous section, space is tailor-made for facilitating a transition from nuclear offense toward non-nuclear defensive emphasis where advanced systems (such as mosaic sensors and space lasers) will play a critical role in defending against external threats without utter reliance upon nuclear deterrence, an aging strategy of declining political credibility and dubious ethical content, as the principal method for securing America from its enemies. While the United States cannot (and should not) pursue unilateral approaches to nuclear arms control, any strong American thrust toward serious arms control in an attempt to "cooperate" militarily with the USSR will complement the even stronger American thrust into space for competing with the Soviet Union. The combination could produce a new strategic context in which national security—for both the US and USSR could be placed on a much sounder, safer, and more sustainable basis over the long haul.

The launch of Sputnik I by a Soviet ICBM in 1957 heralded the twin emergence of the space age and long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets across the planet. Now, in the early 1980s, American entry into the second quarter-century of the space age is beginning with sharply accelerated spending, important organizational changes, and numerous references to the advent of beamed weapons in space. The latter will have very long lethal reach and "transcendental flavor": the most mature type is the high-energy laser that ironically is similar (in aerodynamic operation) to the powerful rocket engines that propel ICBMs and space shuttles. Given this history, it is important that Americans continue to explore and exploit the high frontier of space by doing and thinking.

Accordingly, new strategic goals must be developed to reflect the felt need for making a timely transit from nuclear offense toward defensive emphasis. In the spirit of exploiting the traditional US edge in military technology, it is fortunate that such a strategic transition can be based largely upon advanced space technology—with microelectronics, lasers, and other basic R&D areas leading the way toward increasingly powerful new mosaic sensors and
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beamed weapons overhead. However, realistic understanding of what such an ambitious transition will involve implies that arms control must also play a central role, with technology.

Too often, Americans have relied on blind faith in technology, under the mistaken assumption that technical solutions can resolve virtually all major issues facing the United States. The primacy of human factors in international politics means that there is no purely technical (competitive) solution to the problem of defending America against nuclear attack.

Conversely, there is no purely political (cooperative) solution for doing so. Workable approaches will contain a strong blend of both tracks—technical and political components, competitive and cooperative elements—working together. For this fundamental reason, "proper" American entry into the second quarter-century of the space age is of extraordinary importance.

The "compete" option for achieving unilateral space superiority could (and probably should) be employed by the United States as effective bargaining leverage for pursuing arms-control objectives such as deep SOF cuts, in order to reach the preferable "blend" path. If prospects for serious arms control become even bleaker than they currently are, the stage would be set for unilateral pursuit of space supremacy that would serve the United States well if an unremitting, all-out arms competition with the Soviet Union became inevitable.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Rather than provide a normative list of specific technological thrusts that might be planned and programmed, with highly uncertain estimates of costs and schedules, the concluding section will attempt to indicate important goals and directions for the American space program during the next 25 years. In this regard, it is extremely useful to recognize that developing technology for its own sake is not the proper policy for guiding this program, or any other with high national priority. While technology clearly is the organizational essence of the US Air Force, which will continue to play the leading institutional role in military space activities (unless a US Space Force is established soon after Space Command becomes a unified command), human and political factors are criti-
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cal to both defining and achieving important goals.

Indications are clear that the United States is moving toward space superiority in the 1990s and beyond; 20 percent real annual growth in DOD space spending, formation of the new Space Command, and widespread attention of the brightening prospects for MAD-busting space laser weapons support this conclusion. Our past track record suggests that the US can achieve a relatively durable form of space superiority, just as we have sought and sustained naval, air, and technological superiority in the past, each of which appears to be "getting ragged at the edges." The surprising implication is that achievement of US space superiority would help greatly to restore each of these traditional forms of military superiority to their old levels. It is this general potential that gives military activities in space their authentic meaning as a "force multiplier" in the strategic sense of that phrase.

Two examples are useful to illustrate this point. Infrared and radar ocean/air surveillance satellites which may become operational by the early 1990s could place Soviet surface ships and (high-altitude) aircraft at risk from missiles and other long-range weapons. First-generation space laser weapon systems that might become available somewhat later (but probably before the end of the century) could place many types of missiles and aircraft (not to say spacecraft) at risk. Together, these advanced sensors and weapons could produce the kind of space superiority which would restore naval and air superiority to the United States in a manner that exploits traditional American advantages, but without spending tens of billions of dollars on ever-smaller numbers of expensive, complex, and vulnerable ships and aircraft.

This kind of emphasis on space could produce a modern US advantage in spacepower that dovetails with and enhances the traditional American advantages in seapower and airpower, giving rise to three great fleets: one sailing on and especially under the blue-water oceans, another orbiting Earth in the black depths of space, and the third flying (as stealthily as possible) in the coastal seas of space—the atmosphere. Technological superiority would enable each of these fleets to maintain a qualitative edge over adversaries. The purpose of attaining clear-cut space superiority would be twofold.
First, there is no doubt that eventually the United States must move beyond NATO in its politico-military emphasis. Steps toward establishing the Central Command for dealing with Persian Gulf and other nonstandard crises, and increasing American unwillingness to spend many tens of billions of dollars each year to sustain our large and visible troop presence in Europe and Asia, constitute clear signs that we will eventually move beyond NATO, and perhaps sooner than we think. In this context, a relatively persuasive case can be made for turning (back) to our natural advantage in sea-power. A similar case can be made for complementing traditional forms of sea-power with modern spacepower as the keystone of a new US strategy for defending America as an island continent (but not a “Fortress America”) having vital interests around the globe.

Just as important - a strategic goal as moving beyond NATO is the gradual achievement of nuclear deemphasis in which the now-dominant role of nuclear weapons will be substantially diminished through a judicious combination of technology and politics. Hence the second critical task for emerging US space superiority: to exert effective bargaining leverage on the Soviet Union so that deep cuts in SOF levels can be made (and made to stick), and the strategic balance can be moved firmly toward defensive emphasis, away from its historical essence of nuclear MADness. In effect, the United States would be applying its strong technological leverage in space to encourage a superpower competition in non-nuclear defensive weapons, thereby forcing a concomitant reduction in spending and policy attention regarding the nuclear component of the competition, for which the entire international community would be much better off in the long run. By moving the strategic competition into space within a context of deep SOF reductions, the software of arms-control diplomacy could suppress the offense-defense arms race that defensive hardware would otherwise trigger.

Hence the answers to our original questions have brought us to the point of beginning to understand what the future holds for US military activities in space. Military space is much more than simply a “force multiplier”—it is a potential restorer of traditional forms of US military superiority. Military space will not be a quick fix for resolving the problem of nuclear war once and for all, but it could go a long way toward reducing the awesome role that nuclear weapons and the unprecedented threat of nuclear holocaust have played in postwar history. If spacefaring Americans develop and build large-
scape space structures for collecting and beaming solar energy down to Earth, such solar power satellites in the deep future would join the growing constellations of communication, navigation, surveillance, meteorological, and other spacecraft that ply Earth-centered orbits. But most of all, a forceful and thoughtful blend between space technology and arms-control politics could prove to be of lasting significance for the long-range security of the United States.
Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Western Europe

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

“This panel will examine alternative strategies for defense of Western Europe that might result from changing military, political, and social realities. The panelists will examine such issues as the future of flexible response in Central European defense, NATO policy and debate on first use of nuclear weapons and theater nuclear force modernization, suggestions to emphasize maneuver warfare, and adoption of an offensive strategy after attack. The panel will examine pressures and strategies that might make a lowered US military profile in Europe appropriate and feasible should the United States need to allocate its resources to other military contingencies.”
Panel Summary

The paper by Congressman Newt L. Gingrich of Georgia and Dr. A. Steven Hanser of West Georgia College provided an excellent discussion framework to the panel assembled to examine alternative strategies for the defense of Western Europe. The authors argued for an "honest" approach to defending Western Europe which entails taking war seriously.

The means required to "...achieve this goal was to provide the basis for a new and more powerful NATO alliance" by upgrading NATO conventional forces, adopting Airland Battle doctrine, withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons from European soil and establishing thereon a new theater deterrent force consisting of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

The panel members agreed that there are no fundamentally new and overwhelmingly attractive alternative strategies for NATO, but that there is nevertheless a wide range of options to pursue within the framework established by the Gingrich/Hanser paper.

The panel began its deliberations by examining the background of the current situation in Western Europe and reviewing where NATO stands with respect to doing battle on the Central Front. While there are alternate strategies which can be pursued in defending the Free World, the imperatives of the Central Front cannot be ignored, nor is there a peripheral strategy which can replace these imperatives. Furthermore, now that the use of tactical nuclear weapons has become a cause celebre, or more realistically, because we have increasingly noted the inherent changes in the escalation ladder, we must look to working with our allies along new lines. This means fundamentally that a Central Front focus must be maintained and that conventional forces have greatly increased in importance, that is, we are going to have to meet Soviet conventional
capability with our own conventional capability—that we make a believable attempt to put an enemy victory in strong doubt and be able to stop the Soviets from driving the United States from the European continent.

The question of enhanced conventional warfighting capability brought the whole matter of deterrence to the forefront. It was pointed out that the Europeans see deterrence as an end unto itself. The problem here is that once the first tank crosses the border, the policy immediately becomes bankrupt. We have always thought in terms of deterrence, yet it is absolutely necessary, as some recognize, that we be prepared to go beyond that. We can have no illusions that to do so will require more: more money, manpower, and resources, especially if nuclear weapons are not used.

The use of nuclear weapons came under scrutiny because it was asserted that they will not do much for NATO, the Soviets have a better nuclear capability, and that the US nuclear capability is vulnerable. Disagreement with this perception centered on the need to hit Western Russia from Western Europe effectively and that to withdraw the nukes requires giving up an option, one that shows we are serious about enforcing the peace. But it was held that any greater reliance on nuclear weapons would be unrealistic and that what is required is a doctrine that is believable which will, in fact, enhance our actual warfighting capability.

One proposed approach to developing a realistic warfighting capability was advanced in the Airland Battle concept, which was taken as a serious option for the future, though there was a number of questions about whether or not the burdens placed on the concept are too heavy or whether present force configurations will even permit it.

The Airland Battle doctrine has stirred excitement, although doctrine is not the complete answer. The doctrine does not consider mobilization nor take into account readiness and Reserve forces. In addition, the Europeans have not accepted the doctrine since they may not be able to accomplish it, and there is a fear that the very technology necessary for a NATO Airland Battle concept if available to both sides may provide the Warsaw Treaty Organization with enhanced preemptive options.
The Europeans also have concerns over American conventional emphasis and are concerned that the United States may become decoupled from the present strategy. It was also felt that “decoupling” panics our German allies and that any changes must be evolutionary. Such evolutionary changes are also necessary in dealing with the nuclear pillar upon which the present strategy rests. It was pointed out that there is a “knee-jerk” reaction against anything new in nuclear warfare. This means that not only can a large reaction to the introduction of new nuclear weapons be expected but to take them out of Europe may be also considered a radical destabilization of the current “comfortable” modus vivendi.

This panoply of concerns led the panel to focus on four themes: how can the status quo in Central Europe be defended? what is the significant threat? what is the nuclear situation, and what are the Soviet perceptions of the US alternate strategies?

The defense of the status quo in Central Europe was addressed initially from a Soviet perspective. An interesting picture of how the Soviets in the Kremlin could conceivably see the situation in Europe was portrayed. The view from the Kremlin was that invasion of Western Europe might be a necessary but not inherently attractive course of action. The Soviets see the cost of even a limited war as high. Many panelists felt that the United States may underrate West European defense efforts, and that NATO’s forward deployed forces look stronger to the Soviets than is perceived in the United States. And if the United States is concerned about its allies, how do the Soviets’ allies appear to them? Half of the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s divisions are not Soviet. The question, as stated previously, is just how reliable these formations are. They may be trustworthy on the offense, but what about on the defensive?

The belief that the Warsaw Pact has potential weaknesses was counterbalanced by the panel’s recognition of NATO’s vulnerability to short-warning attack—where the element of time for defensive preparation is critical. NATO loses the day the war begins if it has not mobilized. Reserves being available is crucial. If the defense density is not high, then the Soviets will be able to move quickly against NATO due to its overcommitted air defense, vulnerability of command and control elements, and poorly deployed ground formations. The intensity and high rate of advance to positions deep into NATO’s rear areas not only threaten the viability of a success-
ful conventional defense, but also the credibility of effective nuclear escalation options.

The panel's examination of nuclear options argued against viewing the role of nuclear weapons as limited to only one overly simplistic concept. A closer examination revealed several options, each balancing nuclear posture vis à vis declaratory policy.

The first nuclear weapons option is the status quo; that is, continuing to stand on present policies. The second option is to adopt a declaratory nuclear posture and deploy a much heavier nuclear component in Europe than currently envisioned. A third option is to declare a "no first use" policy, and not touch the present deployment of forces. A fourth option, and one not eliciting much support, is to declare "no first use" and remove the nuclear weapons from the continent. The fifth option is to raise the nuclear threshold, downplaying but not denying the first-use option, expanding conventional capabilities and then withdrawing some of the short-range weapons.

The panel evaluated the pro's and con's of unilateral withdrawal of short-range systems, the one point of the Gingrich-Hanser paper producing the strongest debate. There was clear appreciation of the military difficulties inherent in a tactical nuclear warfighting posture and of the political advantages in symbolic removal. However, detailed discussion also illuminated military disadvantages in precipitous withdrawal: massive Soviet expansion and modernization of chemical and/or nuclear artillery and tactical SSMs would catch NATO without counterthreat means of inhibiting their first use; while yielding escalation dominance to the Warsaw Pact would undermine the viability of enhanced NATO conventional-force capabilities and the deterrent link vis à vis long-range theater and strategic systems.

This examination led the panel to set forth a number of possible alternatives and come to some significant conclusions. Seven broad strategies were recognized. First was the option of increasing nuclear dependence, which elicited little support. Second was to increase conventional defenses, which was the most viable of those considered—but also the most expensive.

There were a variety of European unilateral options. These
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comprised (third) for the United States to pull out of NATO with NATO disappearing. (fourth) for the British and French to go it alone with a nuclear deterrent, and (fifth) the Europeans’ going it alone conventionally within NATO. A sixth option would be to play the China card, which raised questions as to whether the card was an “ace” or a “joker,” and who would play it. Finally, the option of horizontal escalation was discerned, but it was difficult to find a place in the world where it would be possible to put sufficient pressure on the Soviet Union. The sum of the options was that there are not really many easy alternatives and that the most productive effort for NATO should be toward improving capabilities under the existing strategy of “flexible response.”

From the panel discussion emerged several significant conclusions. First, the focus must be maintained on the Central Front. One can do a number of different things on the northern and southern flanks, but if the center is not strong, what happens on the flanks is irredeemable. It is questionable, however, just how strong the center is. The military balance was seen as at a margin. That is, the Soviets pose a considerable threat if they should attack with little warning and with Eastern European allies. On the other hand, the defense is closer on the margin if NATO gets sufficient lead time, troops can get into position, and the French can be brought into the battle. There was a desire to increase the survivability of the nuclear deterrent but it was also seen as necessary to decrease dependence on nuclear weapons and make conventional defense more viable. It was considered that what we need are more conventional forces to offset the declining credibility of first use. This points to a policy of flexible response with an increased conventional defense and a nuclear deterrent that is still viable. It was agreed that to sell this program, even to explore these options, would require strong US leadership. As has been seen in recent developments, the Soviets have been particularly adept at exploiting both American and European public longing for detente. The Soviet propaganda campaign has already started to have an impact on the options NATO can pursue. Thus in the final analysis the panel’s conclusions are irrelevant if the required US leadership is lacking and it cannot sell its program to its NATO allies—a successful program being one which would have strong resemblance to that put forth by Congressman Gingrich and Professor Hanser.
Developing Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Western Europe: The Neglected Triad and Its Implications for Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

Dr. Edward A. Kolodziej
University of Illinois

The success of any alternative to present European defense policy, like the NATO decision of December 1979 to deploy American-controlled long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Europe, depends on reconciling such proposals with differing and often conflicting criteria at three separate but interdependent levels of decision. The first has to do with the development and deployment of military forces and weapons systems and the articulation of strategic and tactical doctrine to guide their threat or use. The second, prompted by the costs and risks of modern warfare, particularly those involving nuclear weapons, focuses on arms control and limits on conventional and nuclear arms. Both of these levels aim at shaping an adversary’s behavior, or that of allies, in ways that meet the differing and sometimes contending security prospects, interests, and values of alliance members.

For an effective deterrent and defense posture, decisions about threat, use, control, and limitations of arms must also be legitimated and supported by the ruling coalitions of member states—in most states of the Western alliance majority coalitions—which are expressed through separate, authoritative political processes and institutions. Within open societies, deterrence and defense are not abstract issues, accessible only to experts and elites, but matters for public debate, group pressure, and electoral confirmation. The life chances of nations depend on the prescient and prudent threat and use of military force. The quality of the lives enjoyed by their citizens is also a function of the control that can be reasonably exercised in maintaining peacetime military establishment—now at costs unmatched in history—whose continuing demands, if fully met, would bankrupt the member states of the alliance and undermine the open social and political institutions that they are supposed to protect.

Over the past half decade, American, NATO, and European national security policies have often failed to keep these levels of security policy in proper balance. The LRTNF issue illustrates the
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point. Adjustments at one or the other level have, alternately, been sometimes too slow or too rapid for stable and effective policymaking: too slow, as suggested by the decision to deploy LRTNFs in a basing mode that has proceeded largely without heed to the debate over the vulnerability of stationary land-based nuclear forces; or too rapid, as implied by the volatility of popular support for alliance LRTNF policy in the United States and in Europe. United States inconstancy has also been confusing. Complacency during the 1970s about its ability to meet NATO requirements from its stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, and its interest in stabilizing the global strategic balance with the Soviet Union through a SALT accord, gave way during the early Reagan administration to official and public demands for more military spending and preparedness. But even this latter position appears now to be in doubt as the pendulum moves back toward cuts in defense spending. If the December 1982 rejection of the “dense pack” basing mode for the MX missile is any indication, Congress is reluctant to approve additional increases in defense spending beyond those which have been already authorized and the Pentagon, like other agencies, is expected to slow the rate of its previously authorized programmed expenditures.

European worries about the decoupling of the American and NATO deterrents were first voiced by then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany in the fall of 1977. These concerns have been supplanted by fears that the United States is preparing to fight a limited nuclear war, with Europe as the battleground, while preserving the United States as a sanctuary. This reversal or roles is also expressed in other ways. Europeans forget that they initially forced the LRTNF decision on Washington and now accuse the Reagan administration of highhandedness in forcing the issue while a previously reluctant Washington currently identifies its success or failure as a leader of the alliance with its ability either to deploy all of the 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles that have been proposed, or to impose a zero option on the Soviet Union.

Alliance policy has also reflected ill-timed and misinformed stances by alliance members. Ill-timed (as viewed in European capitals) were the statements of President Reagan when he observed at an October 1982 news conference that the use of nuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union might be confined to Europe. These remarks fueled the worst fears of alliance suppor-
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ters of NATO's LRTNF decision. Misinformed (as perceived in Washington) was the insistence of European decisionmakers that the political dimensions of deterrence be stressed to the exclusion or slight of the military and hardware requirements of a credible deterrent posture. Previous administrations bear some responsibility for the current impasse. The Carter administration's interest in a SALT accord deflected attention from European security concern for NATO nuclear modernization and for an effective alliance response to the Soviet nuclear buildup commenced in the later 1970s. In compensation for this lapse, Washington and its European allies tied themselves to a questionable deployment mode for 464 cruise and 108 Pershing II missiles before the full dimension of the Soviet armament effort was fully known or the vulnerability of ground-based systems was fully appreciated.

At the outset it should be conceded that, for reasons to be developed below, no Western government could have escaped these lines of criticism no matter what it did alone or in concert with its alliance partners on the LRTNF issue. However, one should expect that Western security analysis, governmental decisionmakers, and those members of the interested public who have taken the time to inform themselves about the complexity of the security problems facing NATO might have developed a clearer set of shared criteria. Such shared standards could guide decisions on military force levels, weapons systems, and strategy, on arms control and disarmament issues, and on what policymaking procedures might be most appropriate to ratify alliance security policies and to generate public support for them. One should also expect governmental experts to be alert to changes in the military, technological, and political environment affecting Western security policies and to be quick to adjust to them or to create and exploit opportunities as they arise to enhance Western security or, at least, to minimize the cost and risks of security efforts to core values and national interests.

While the two-track approach, linking American and European decisionmakers concerned with military strategy and arms control, remains one of the most innovative developments in European-American security policymaking since World War II, there is considerable room for improvement. The discussion below attempts to clarify the conceptual framework within which NATO LRTNF policy—or any weapons decision within NATO—must be resolved.
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and the political process by which it must be articulated and approved if it is to make a contribution to alliance deterrence and defense missions and win the support of alliance members. Part one sketches the political assumptions and the key operational criteria and political norms that are applicable to decisions about weapons and the strategies of use and control appropriate to them. For illustrative purposes, part two applies these criteria to NATO’s LRTNF decision and argues that a sea-based deterrent, complemented by improved central strategic nuclear systems of Western alliance powers (France, Great Britain, and the United States) is better calculated than the current NATO deployment proposal to meet the requirements of effective security policy and policymaking within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1980s.

ASSUMPTIONS GUIDING EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY

The unknowns surrounding issues like conventional forces and LRTNFs and the inevitable differences of perception and interest about them, between the United States and its European allies (and among the latter as well), imply that a fully satisfactory resolution of these problems is highly problematic. Doing nothing about them is no recipe for alliance cohesion or effectiveness since these issues refuse to go away. Even their management, if not resolution, demands action. These dilemmas arise from the constraints that proponents and opponents of alternative arms postures and strategies confront in deciding these issues. Constraints that are not likely to be overcome very easily in the near future. Among the most important are those associated with the limited resources that will be available to allied military establishments. During the 1970s, defense expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, experienced a gradual downward slide. Between 1972-1976, US spending averaged 5.9 percent of GNP. In the middle 1970s, US expenditures fell to a low of 5.1 percent of GNP but are expected to climb to 6.6 percent in 1982. The Reagan administration’s increase in defense spending will certainly augment NATO’s rate of spending, but it is difficult to see how it will much surpass current averages even if Congress appropriates all of the funds requested by the administration, hardly a certainty given competing defense and welfare claims and the need to spur the growth of the civilian sector of the economy through increased investments.

The European states have simply not responded to repeated American calls for more outlays and greater burden sharing.
Throughout the 1970s, NATO European defense expenditures remained annually at approximately 3.7 percent of GNP. The prospect that military spending will increase is slight whatever the United States does. The economic depression gripping the Western powers, with large-scale unemployment approaching 1930s levels, provides little hope that they will be able to increase defense spending even if they were inclined to do so.

Military personnel remain at about the 1976 level, consisting of 5.5 million for NATO, of which 3.3 million are personnel of NATO’s European members and 2.2 million are those of the United States. Spending on equipment as a percentage of overall military expenditures has increased somewhat since the 1970s, but not at a rate to meet the requirements set by military planners. The major states of the alliance are falling short of projected plans. Britain must recoup its losses of the Falkland Islands war; France has recently announced cutbacks in conventional arms spending. West Germany, with mounting economic problems including high unemployment, trade deficits and a lowered rate of production, plans no appreciable increase in defense spending and actually decreased spending slightly in 1981: to 3.4 percent of GNP, slightly below the average for the early 1970s.

What these figures signify is that the Western allies face hard choices at several levels of military spending and between defense and civilian expenditures. The high costs of nuclear systems force choices among weapons systems, including missiles and bombers, and their ground, sea, and air basing modes. Britain has already opted for the Trident submarine and the Tornado. France has largely abandoned construction of more land-based systems in favor of a seventh nuclear submarine. The composition of American strategic nuclear forces after the setback on MX will remain unclear for some time. Growing deficits, estimated at over $200 billion, increase pressures to cut governmental expenditures, including those for the military. LRTNF capabilities must therefore compete for scarce dollars with other strategic nuclear systems. Pressures rise to apply common measures to these competing systems. Their worth depends on what each contributes to the coverage of Warsaw Pact and Soviet targets, to global and regional defense and deterrence, to the prospects of arms control and disarmament, and to the strengthening of public support for Western security policies.
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Choosing between nuclear systems on the strength of uniform measures of strategic, economic, and political value lends additional urgency to the growing claims for more spending either for conventional arms or for civilian purposes and welfare. The inability or unwillingness of European states, especially West Germany, to spend more on defense means that the United States cannot count on its NATO allies to supply increased conventional forces for European missions. NATO's ability to hold its defensive line against a major Warsaw Pact conventional attack beyond two weeks, based on current estimates, is not likely to be improved in the near future. Funds are in short supply to buy more conventional arms to forestall early resort to nuclear weapons. British and French determination to give priority to nuclear weapons over conventional forces makes more urgent the need to husband scarce resources for conventional missions when faced with a large and growing menu of nuclear options in the hands of the Soviet Union.

In addition, the United States cannot depend on its European allies to support military preparation efforts beyond Europe—for example, in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf—in support of Western security interests. They are neither prepared to assume these burdens nor to run the risks of nuclear war arising from local conflicts elsewhere. Witness European reticence during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the reservations expressed over tough American policy over Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage issue. Temptations grew, too, among Western states to assume greater security risks in light of spreading economic dislocation and social unrest and to shift priorities from defense to internal economic development and welfare. The margins for error in choosing between nuclear and conventional systems are, consequently, narrowed.

A second assumption on which American-European security policy and, specifically, the LRTNF decision must be based concerns the structural differences separating the United States from its European allies over the role of nuclear weapons, the requirements of deterrence and defense, the terms and likelihood of genuine arms control and disarmament, and the prospects of detente policies to relax East-West tensions. Short of political union, the members of the Western alliance on both sides of the Atlantic and within their continental spheres, however much they may be similar or share a common interest in balancing Soviet
power, are still separated by geography, history, language, economic interest, political institutions and values. It is not surprising, therefore, that they would disagree in their perception of the Soviet threat and the appropriate military response to meet it.

Since the formation of NATO, and particularly since the adoption of the flexible response strategy by the Kennedy administration and subsequent American regimes, Europe has been concerned about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee either out of fear that Washington could not be relied upon to defend Europe if it risked its own destruction or, paradoxically, out of fear that the United States might precipitately use its military might and drag Europe into an unwanted war which would devastate the continent. The Sputnik scare and the missile gap controversy of the 1950s which led to the now-defunct proposal to create a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) to assuage European concerns parallels current fears that led to the proposal to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe to assure the Europeans that the American nuclear guarantee remains viable. The neutralist and pacifist movements that coursed through Europe in the 1950s are similar to the antinuclear and freeze campaigns today. These similarities, however, do not suggest that because these problems were managed before, they will again be successfully resolved or that the old solutions will apply to a new technological environment or political landscape. The magnitude and complexity of the issues leave little room for complacency. American-European differences over military policy and doctrine are endemic to the alliance. The best one can expect is that means will be found to relax, if not resolve, the tensions arising from the dilemma which permanently confronts the alliance members.

NATO Europeans consistently prefer deterrence to defense. Visible troop concentrations and nuclear deployments in Europe are given greater weight than the word of passing American Presidents. Europeans remain skeptical about the costs and effectiveness of conventional forces and their impact on Warsaw Pact behavior. Because of the lower risks run by Moscow in using conventional forces, principal reliance by NATO on nonnuclear capabilities to defend Europe is viewed as an invitation to the very attack that the organization of NATO seeks to avoid. The British and, more pointedly, the French nuclear deterrents are insurance policies against the possibility of a breakdown in the American guarantee. These
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differences, elsewhere developed at greater length than need to be rehearsed here, extend to European resistance to American tendencies to use trade and technology transfers, like the recent pipeline controversy with the Soviet Union, as a policy lever or to link Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and in other regions to American and NATO interest in advancing detente in Europe.

The German case deserves special attention since the tensions between American and European views over deterrence, defense, and detente are most acutely felt in Bonn. It is no accident that German political leaders should be at odds among themselves over the LRTNF issue, having first pressed the United States to confront growing Soviet capabilities in the two-track decision only to back away from this initiative as the domestic peace movement grew, catalyzed partly by the Reagan administration’s rearmament program. The LRTNF issue reflects the structural dilemmas inherent in postwar German foreign and security policy. German aspirations for unification cannot be realized without the consent of its allies and the Soviet Union; meanwhile, West German security depends on NATO and, specifically, on the United States.

Since the FRG has had to renounce the unilateral use of force in pursuing its national objectives as well as the development and possession of nuclear weapons, any Bonn government must simultaneously strive to shape NATO and American military policy to serve its foreign and security objectives while assuring the Soviet Union (and important segments of domestic and allied opinion) that it does not seek a military solution to its unrequited needs. Hence the elaborate set of rules imposed by Bonn on itself as conditions for its participation in the LRTNF program that it was principally responsible for initiating: (1) that NATO’s deployment decision would be made unanimously (principle of equal sharing of risk); (2) that at least one other continental nonnuclear state would accept American nuclear missiles (principles of nonsingularity); (3) that the Federal Republic remain a nonnuclear power (principle of renunciation); and (4) that nuclear systems on German soil, capable of hitting the Soviet Union, remain under American control (principle of NATO and American dependency).

Germany’s approach to deterrence and detente in relations with its European allies and the United States within NATO must inevitably be ambiguous: one of “get away closer.” NATO (and the
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Warsaw Pact) has helped resolve the German problem that plagued Europe for almost a century and provides a framework (like the Warsaw Pact) of moderating European quarrels which have been the bane of the European state system since the 17th century. On these scores the superpowers and their allies, including preponderant opinion in West Germany, share a common interest. In responding to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact, these important objectives should not be overlooked or denigrated just because they are achieved quietly and unobtrusively relative to the external imperative of meeting the Soviet challenge. The LRTNF issue and associated differences over conventional arms and strategy should be understood within this larger political framework. Pressures to reduce the alliance to any one military problem, even so important a one as LRTNF, should be resisted, if the alliance is to survive and the gains that have been made in European security are to be preserved.¹⁴

A third assumption on which the LRTNF decision must rest is, curiously enough, uncertainty. There exists no universally accepted theory of nuclear (much less conventional) deterrence. Deterrence theory is at the stage of pre-science, involving more art and guesswork than precise calculation to guide decisions despite impressive efforts to place deterrence policy on a more solid theoretical and empirical footing.¹⁵ We still know very little about the consequences of operational and announced nuclear policies on adversary or allied behavior. We are no less certain about the behavior of the deterrer when confronted by a challenge. Witness the improvisations characterizing the Cuban missile crisis and other postwar cases of deterrence failure and success.¹⁶ Theory remains partial since there is no agreement on what factors to apply to explain and predict behavior: whether personality and individual or group perceptions,¹⁷ rational decisionmaking,¹⁸ organizational or bureaucratic constraints,¹⁹ regime behavior,²⁰ or systemic determinants.²¹ Theorists are also partial to different schools of thought that often hide rather than clarify their value preferences.

The significance of the uncertainties surrounding deterrence, the discord among defense experts, and the often skewed and partial character of their evaluations mean that proposals for or against different conventional or nuclear weapon systems, including their size, composition, basing, and use, are bound to be controversial and inherently suspect to rival decisionmakers. To sort out
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these claims posits the need for criteria, however provisional, that will discipline the raw political process by which decisions on deterrence will be settled. It prompts a need for clear criteria for choice that can command as wide a consensus as possible among governmental leaders, experts, and the ruling majorities of alliance members.

CRITERIA TO GUIDE NATO: ACQUISITION, THREAT, AND USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Several criteria appear particularly pertinent as guides for NATO policy. First, to deter war and to control escalation if war erupts, military capabilities should be developed that maximize incentives for an opponent to keep hostilities at the lowest levels possible. Deterrence operates as a consequence of an opponent’s estimate of what his adversary will do if the latter or his allies or their vital interests are attacked. This implies the existence of real and credible military capabilities that can and will be used if deterrence breaks down. Ideally, capabilities should be sufficient to deny an opponent dominance at all levels of military conflict and to impose successively higher costs and risks on an adversary if he chooses to escalate hostilities in scope or intensity. Implied by these circumstances are three conceptually distinct, if operationally melded, forms of deterrence. These are deterrence by denial, deterrence by prospective punishment, and, beyond these two calibrated attempts to rationalize and control the threat and use of force, deterrence that leaves something to chance.

NATO’s flexible response strategy tends to obscure the distinction between the first two forms of deterrence. Some advocates of nuclear modernization in Europe have seized on Soviet deployment of SS-20 and Backfire bombers to justify LRTNFs as a response to the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities stationed in Europe rather than confront the modernization problem directly and the shortcomings of NATO’s current TNF deployments.22 Fearing domestic opposition, some LRTNF proponents have projected the view that a LRTNF for NATO would preserve the military balance in Europe although the LRTNFs that have been proposed are, by themselves, incapable of matching, much less of eliminating, the Soviet military threat. Their principal utility is not in being able to disarm the Soviet Union of its theater nuclear forces, though they might well play some role in targeting these systems. Their effectiveness as a deter-
rent and as a control on escalation stems primarily from their presumed capacity to hit military and civilian targets in Eastern Europe, and, especially, in the Soviet Union. That is, they can inflict costs and impose risks on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact out of proportion to the political gains that may be anticipated in attacking the West. LRTNFs raise the stakes for Moscow more through deterrence by the prospect of punishment than by denial.

The heightened costs and risks of escalation implied by nuclear weapons raise another problem for an adversary: the threat that leaves something to chance. Since we have no reliable experience with nuclear weapons, no one can predict the outcome of a nuclear strike and subsequent exchanges. Wars rarely assume expected form. There is little assurance that in the heat of battle, a nuclear war will remain limited or be amenable to control. Soviet military doctrine pointedly rejects this projected vision of how a nuclear exchange will develop even while it develops a wide range of conventional and nuclear capabilities that appear to seek dominance, not merely deny it to an opponent, at all levels of armed hostilities. If sufficient nuclear capabilities can be developed and deployed to survive a first strike at successive levels of military conflict in order to nullify or blunt an adversary’s attack, there exists some hope of deterring the outbreak of hostilities and of generating incentives to maintain it at low levels of intensity.

So long as an opponent cannot be disarmed or can be disarmed only at unacceptable costs to one’s own society, the probability is low that an attack will be launched. Not only does deterrence by denial and punishment conspire to affect the behavior of a calculating opponent but the inability of nuclear adversaries to be able to guarantee control of their own forces or their exchange during war reinforces deterrence. Uncertainty about the outcome of a nuclear exchange bolsters fears of the certainty of large, though unpredictable, damage and dislocation. A threat that leaves something to chance makes nuclear deterrence more robust than is contemplated by those who characterize the balance of terror as delicate. What is needed is the survival of a sufficient level of nuclear military capabilities, including their control systems, in the wake of an attack to punish an aggressor’s first strike. The requirements for such a level of survivable nuclear weapons, capable of being reliably delivered against a wide array of targets, while clearly larger than advocates of minimum deterrence would admit, are lower than
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advocates of a nuclear war-winning strategy would want.

If the object of preparing for war is first to deter it and, if hostilities should erupt, to deny an adversary the military and political fruits of his resort to force, while limiting the destructiveness of a military clash, what is needed is a clearly demonstrated escalatory ladder, constructed from the total stock of the alliance's conventional and nuclear capabilities. A strategy of flexible response has, in theory, sought to supply this spectrum of capabilities, but it has fallen short of this objective for some of the reasons discussed earlier. European and American analysts have also compounded the problem by emphasizing a distinction between global and regional forces available to alliance members, a distinction sure to break down rapidly in the event of war in Europe. The distinction between NATO and American missions or between military capabilities needed for both sets of objectives is to a substantial degree artificial. For there can be no theater balance in Europe at the conventional and, especially, at the nuclear level—given the long-range striking power of the latter—that excludes two essential elements: (1) the military weight of the superpowers that can be brought to bear in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict; and (2) the deterrent postures of both alliances and their major protector powers.

It follows from the first criterion noted above that conventional forces should be used initially in any alliance military confrontation. Also, it follows that, to the extent that resources permit, conventional arms should be substituted for missions now earmarked for nuclear weapons. It is by no means clear that the NATO alliance, even under current resource strictures, cannot continue to improve its conventional force posture and strengthen its ability to withstand a major nonnuclear Warsaw Pact attack. At a minimum, it should be capable, if mobilized in timely fashion, to afford the West approximately two weeks of respite before nuclear weapons have to be considered. Most Western observers agree with the estimate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that the conventional alliance, measured in static forces, has progressively tipped in favor of the Eastern bloc. In several categories, particularly in tanks, artillery, heavy armor, and surface-to-surface (SS) and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, the Warsaw Pact is approaching or exceeds the three-to-one advantage that is widely used as a rough measure of what is sufficient to overcome the defending force in a major conventional attack. Moreover, the West has steadily lost its technological edge as the quantity and quality of Soviet and Pact
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arms have risen. Despite these trends, there is agreement within IISS circles and in the NATO community that, as the latest IISS Military Balance concludes, "the overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking... There would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory. The consequences for an attacker would be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, incalculable." 

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces face formidable problems: Western leadership, training, and equipment are still better; the use of precision guided missiles (PGMs), while useful to aggressor or defender alike, potentially pose greater problems for an attacker than a defender. French and Spanish forces and territory are likely to be available in the case of extended hostilities. The economic resources of the West, including links to other industrial countries, are still vastly superior to those of the Soviet Union. Non-Soviet Pact forces are of doubtful reliability. Moreover, the Soviet Union faces threats all along its borders, not simply those on its Western front, including a Chinese force composed of an army of 3.9 million men grouped in 128 divisions and supported by over 5,000 combat aircraft. Over five divisions and almost 3,000 additional combat aircraft, based in the United States, are available for rapid reinforcement of the European Theater. Traditionally neutral states, like Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland, which have impressive military forces, might well side with the West in the face of a massive Soviet attack.

This guardedly optimistic assessment provides a sufficient basis on which to argue for an announced NATO policy of "no early first use" of nuclear weapons. Such an orientation, if linked to a LRTNF, can ease some of the concern of those who want no weakening of American and NATO announced policy to use nuclear weapons—first if need be. It should also relieve those who argue for a doctrine of "no first use." A "no early first use" policy increases Soviet and Pact incentives to keep war at a conventional level. It also helps to guard against rapid and precipitate escalation in case of an accidental or misguided attack. Conventional forces buy time to negotiate an end of hostilities. A gain of an additional day may make the difference between an admittedly costly war and a nuclear holocaust. Whether pressures to escalate to nuclear levels will actually surge or recede under these circumstances is impossible to predict.
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However decisionmakers in Western capitals react to a conventional war in Europe, it is still sensible to buy options that may limit damage, since the possibility of escalating to nuclear levels, given the invulnerability of central nuclear forces on each side, continues to act as a deterrent against an adversary's expansion of a military clash. What is critical is the development of military capabilities that afford mutual incentives for restraint. To minimize the risks of nuclear suicide, alliance members, especially those armed with nuclear weapons, are logically led to develop military capabilities that avoid as long as possible a choice between national extinction and military defeat.

With obvious stops and starts, the operational military policies of the superpowers have reflected a concern for avoiding this intolerable choice. This is true despite the pronouncements of the Soviet Union that it refuses to distinguish between the rungs of an escalation ladder leading from conventional engagements to nuclear demonstrations, limited strikes, and eventually to mutual assured destruction (MAD). How else can one fully explain the Warsaw Pact's sustained modernization of its conventional forces, the development of new and impressive middle- and short-range nuclear systems (Backfire, SS-20, SS-21, SS-23), and continued qualitative development of central strategic forces, if they are not related to some notion of escalatory control and counterforce balance?

Controlling hostilities in Europe once the nuclear threshold has been crossed poses the most serious challenge to American and European planners. There is a NATO and American requirement to develop a spectrum of nuclear capabilities that provide a wide number of targeting possibilities beyond population and industrial centers whose destruction is likely to prompt similar calamitous attacks against Western cities. A key determinant of the utility of LRTNFs is their contribution to an integrated targeting plan, not simply what they contribute to NATO capabilities. These latter cannot reasonably be evaluated for effectiveness in isolation from American strategic doctrine, central nuclear weapons, or conventional forces. A proper mix of LRTNF characteristics is critical if the alliance is to grope toward a nuclear posture that reduces, if not resolves, some of the problems associated with its force structure, particularly its current deployment of theater nuclear weapons.

To be consistent with American efforts to develop a calibrated
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denial and punishment strategy, NRTNFs should combine several characteristics. Most important, they should be as invulnerable to a first strike as possible. Otherwise, they invite hair-trigger use to prevent destruction or preemption. Moreover, in a postattack environment, they should be capable of being reliably fired and of penetrating alerted enemy defenses. Quick reaction to destroy enemy systems is a desirable quality but only if such a decision is informed by sound intelligence and strategic need, not forced by a concern to avoid a disarming preventive or preemptive strike. To these characteristics should be added accuracy, flexibility, quick reprogrammable target selection, calibrated destructive power to limit damage to defined military and civilian targets, and reload capability.

For the United States and its NATO allies to be able to conduct a limited war in Europe, to deter war through denial, and, failing that, to deter the expansion of hostilities and to compel their swift cessation through threatened punishment requires that nuclear systems be centrally controlled. The NATO LRTNF proposal, partly at German insistence, acknowledges the need for an American-controlled system and for American responsibility, with European consultation rights, over nuclear arms control reflects a complex compromise of American and European (and especially German) expectations; these should be recognized lest one be tempted to exaggerate or downgrade the utility of the LRTNF proposal: for the Americans in NATO’s LRTNF keeps new nuclear forces under Washington’s control to reduce possible European triggering of American nuclear forces; for Europeans it clearly links American NATO and central strategic forces to bolster the credibility of the American deterrent: for the Soviet Union the LRTNF is essentially an extension of American central strategic forces.

On the other hand, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear systems within the Western alliance precludes total American control. France remains adamant on retaining its nuclear independence, an affirmation that enjoys a wide spectrum of political support from the right to the left. Everyone, as Charles de Gaulle predicted, is now Gaullist. The British nuclear deterrent, dependent on American sale of Trident submarine and missile technology, is susceptible, as before, to American and allied overtures to joint planning within the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of the alliance, but remains, when needed, under British control.
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CRITERIA FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

A second general criterion to apply to any NATO arms proposal is its contribution to arms control and disarmament. Does it create, dampen, or nullify incentives in three critical areas: Does it control the risks and costs of the arms races? Does it reduce the probability that war will erupt as a result of accident, inadvertence, or miscalculation? And does it promote detente between the two blocs and the superpowers? Progress on these three fronts critically affects, as discussed below, the cohesion of the alliance and the domestic support that can be generated among the allies for alliance military strategy.

The invulnerability of LRTNFs is vital to arms control negotiations. A system vulnerable to a disarming attack, ipso facto, does not give an adversary pause. The controversy over land-based systems largely turns on the capacity to deploy weapons capable of disarming an opponent’s ground systems in a first strike at a faster rate than such fixed systems can be installed, even in decoy modes like the Carter administration’s race-track proposal. Achieving a viable arms-control accord in such an unstable environment is highly improbable.

Much of the incentive for the antiballistic missile (ABM) ban of SALT I lay in the inability of ABM technology in the early 1970s to protect superpower cities and strategy.56 If LRTNFs are invulnerable, negotiations are encouraged to define a mutually acceptable level of capabilities that can stabilize deterrence between the blocs and the superpowers, since increasing nuclear arms will not improve an opponent’s position. There is also reason to believe that if these weapons are also upgraded in their ability to reach enemy targets and deliver their ordnance in limited and controlled strikes, both sides will have incentives to keep the number of these systems low. This would avoid needless duplication, conserve resources for other military and civilian purposes, and set the stage for additional reductions.

Regarding invulnerable NATO LRTNFs and American central strategic systems as parts of one overall nuclear striking force should reduce the probability of war through accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. Responsibility can be more clearly fixed than might be the case with a separate NATO multilateral force, like
the MLF unsuccessfully launched by the Kennedy administration in the 1960s. There is, of course, always the possibility that French or British systems might be employed. However, these are currently designed as city-busting systems and are ill-suited for hard or semihard military or civilian targets. A LRTNF, capable of selectively hitting Warsaw Pact and Soviet military targets and support facilities (which do not involve major population or industrial centers), can leave a clear signature, because of its accuracy and calibrated firepower, to distinguish NATO and American use of conventional and nuclear weapons from those that might be employed by France or Britain. Building these distinctive features into a NATO LRTNF could strengthen superpower control of the escalatory process.

The unity of American command of all nuclear forces under Washington’s control as well as the integrated targeting plan implied by these weapons argue for parallel integration of American arms control and disarmament policy and negotiation strategy. The division between the START talks and the LRTNF deliberations has the ironic effect of emphasizing the difference between American nuclear weapons earmarked for central strategic missions and theater missions—precisely the kind of distinction that is of concern to European allies. There may have been some initial justification for having kept the LRTNF and START talks separate—including insulating both from nuclear and forward-based systems and NATO European nuclear forces—but these considerations are less persuasive than they were before. They make little sense from the perspectives of either superpower: the US is logically led to rationalize use of its nuclear forces in Europe with its Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) preparations, and the Soviet Union must defend against American and designated NATO nuclear forces as different aspects of a single strategic problem. European expectations that a Soviet attack on American-controlled nuclear forces stationed in Europe will engage the future panoply of American nuclear power are essentially rooted within the same conceptual framework although for political and psychological reasons it has been convenient to make distinctions that progressively evidence no difference.

The integration of the SALT and LRTNF talks would have several positive effects. First, NATO European allies would not only have rights of consultation for the latter but also for the former.
Second, negotiators would be given a greater degree of flexibility. They could swap and trade among all systems capable of hitting the territories of the superpowers. Dubious distinctions between the lethality of weapons as a function of their range would be finessed. The stage would be set to review the full spectrum of Soviet nuclear modernization in Europe that has been lost from view in the narrow focus on LRTNF. Soviet SS-21, -22 and -23 weapons, replacing older Scud and Scaleboard systems, could be brought within arms control talks. British and French capabilities could also be submitted to appropriate counting rules and their alliance and national roles more clearly defined. Forward-based systems as part of NATO's first line of defense might also eventually be included in the talks, but only after progress had been made in stabilizing the strategic nuclear environment, comprising central nuclear forces and LRTNFs.

The operational deterrence posture and arms control negotiating position outlined above are calculated to address a number of conflicting military, strategic, and political expectations on the part of the superpowers and the NATO European allies. Meeting all of these expectations, at least in part, is a precondition for an advance to détente, if the experience of the postwar period is any guide. First, there is no incentive to negotiate if any of the superpowers or the principal European allies perceive that they are at a military disadvantage in entering negotiations that promise to consolidate an opponent's position. Nor is there much weight in the argument that one can gain at the bargaining table what has not already been implicitly achieved in actual or threatened military preparations. Between competitors who share much in common, such an optimistic expectation may be reasonable. Where the differences between rivals are profound, the prospects of regaining a lost parity through bargaining is less promising. Reliance primarily on bargaining skill against an implacable and a militarily stronger opponent has not enjoyed much success in achieving a stable peace in this century. Nor have many governments been attracted to such risk-taking. Once ahead, an opponent is not inclined to concede military gains to a weaker adversary; the latter strives to buy time to rearm.

Much of the lack of movement on mutual and balanced force reductions may be attributed to Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. Perceived parity has also been the touchstone of the SALT process. Witness the Jackson amendment on parity accompanying
the signing of SALT I. Note, too, the circumstances surrounding the
rupture of the SALT process and its rebaptism as START as a
consequence of the Reagan administration's assumption of Ameri-
can strategic inferiority as its point of departure in justifying an arms
buildup prior to negotiations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, the
NATO allies agreed that LRTNFs should go forward while negotia-
tions for their limitation were pursued in order to give the Soviets an
incentive to come to the bargaining table.

It follows from these considerations that some rough concep-
tion of military balance or parity must be mutually perceived as the
basis for a viable arms control accord. Moreover, parity must be
achieved at several escalatory levels if progress in limiting arms is to
be made. Imbalances at one level are not easily compensated for at
another whether in the form of increased military spending (a self-
defeating arms race tends to be the result) or in mutually acceptable
arms limitation agreements. Progress in relaxing political tensions
(detente) is also hostage to an agreed-upon balance and on rules for
systematic and ordered modernization of military weapons as
scientific and technological advances prompt innovation and reno-
vation. Detente between bitter foes is not facilitated by military
imbalance and arms control agreements are no substitute for
detente beyond perhaps initial low-risk confidence-building mea-
sures or limited proposals for graduated reductions in tensions. 9
Once a military balance is achieved that is reasonably stable and
also consistent with arms limitation and disarmament accords,
detente can rest on a firm foundation, and through feedback, bolster
a mutually assuring system of military security.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF DEFENSE, DETERRENCE, AND
DETENTE

If complementary military strategic and arms control policies
are to be effective they must not only meet the criteria sketched
above but they must also rest on a stable alliance consensus that
has the support of the public opinion of the member states. Defense,
deterrence, and detente, including arms control accords, have been
democratized in two senses. First, opinion supportive of govern-
mental policy in a democracy must, as always, rest on some form of
majority rule. Democratic norms insist upon a political process that
assures open debate and free election of competing elites, largely
working through mass parties, who assume responsibility for
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governmental policies. Military policy is, however, only one issue area. It must be aggregated with others by a party in presenting itself for election. The ruling majority is inevitably a flawed coalition composed of different and even divergent interests, many of which may be far removed from immediate strategic considerations. This feature of democratic decisionmaking tends to destabilize a military consensus based on a shifting coalition of interests. The consensus-building process is obviously compounded in an alliance of members whose governments depend for survival on the patchwork of democratically based coalitions which support them. The requirement of constructing a stable, predictable consensus on military policy and arms control from a coalition of coalitions is an inherent weakness within the Western decisional process which improved consultation and information flow among allies can help to alleviate but which can never be fully overcome.

The problem of alliance consensus is further compounded by the divergent values and outcomes expected by domestic political opponents from different military, arms control, and detente policies to be followed by a government as a member of an alliance. All of the Western democracies are divided against themselves on security policy by rival groupings, sharpened further by extreme elements within them. If the British Labour Party overturns the Conservative government, its leader is on record favoring abandonment of Britain's nuclear forces and of its commitment to station NATO LRTNFs on British soil. The Green Party in the Federal Republic has expressed similar views as have important segments of the SDP support. As the past decade has shown, American security policy is also susceptible to rapid change and oscillation. Given these structural and continuing divisions within Western-style politics, alliance security policy is highly vulnerable to domestic influence. How else to explain the "zero sum" option adopted by the Reagan administration and the "no early first strike" proposal by NATO if not as attempts to assuage the demands of the peace movement, which enjoys wide support in several member states? Democratic-backed alliance policies are similarly subject to exterior influence, as is shown by the fact that recent Soviet overtures to "freeze" European theater nuclear forces, to redeploy them out of range of European cities, or to sign nonaggression pacts with the West have received a positive reception in some official Western quarters. Whatever their intrinsic merit, these initiatives inevitably prompt divided Western responses. These weaken a common
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Western front to Warsaw Pact or Soviet threats and blandishments and drive a wedge between the United States and its NATO allies.

There is another dimension to the democratization of defense, deterrence, and detente (D3) that strains the normal consensus process within an open society. Domestic conflict over D3 problems now assumes the character of a mass movement divided into broadly based popular groupings holding sharply clashing and increasingly inflexible policy views and preferences on these vital issues. Debate moves from legislative, bureaucratic, and media forums to mass assemblies and even to the street. Techniques appropriate to the mobilization of mass opinion and to public demonstrations gradually tend to overwhelm the decision process. Groups for and against new weapons proliferate and establish a network of ties that becomes institutionalized. Sustained pressures are brought to bear on alliance governments, whether on the right or left; to accede to these demands. Issue voting hardens political battle lines and diminishes opportunities for compromise. Political leaders have incentives to posture for domestic support and media attention in lieu of probing debate and study of complex security issues. Much less have they an incentive to assume unpopular positions on security and arms control issues. As these issues become increasingly entangled in the intricacies of democratic politics within the nations of the alliance and, subsequently, within the NATO policy process, their management becomes at once more tenuous and simple: tenuous since fixed negotiation positions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are made more difficult; simple in that the complexities of strategic and arms control problems are glossed over under the pressure of a perpetual political tug-of-war aimed more at the domestic struggle for power than at favorably influencing an adversary’s behavior.

Democratic governments face a dual problem in legitimizing their security policies. They must contend with the normal push-and-pull of democratic politics, difficult under any circumstances, as de Tocqueville recognized long ago, and they must now conduct their affairs under volatile conditions that destabilize the superpower bargaining process and discourage efforts to define viable arms control and limitation accords. Under these circumstances, the arms accords that are struck are robbed of much of their credibility and legitimacy; but accords that cannot be kept undermine the minimal conditions of mutual confidence needed between adver-
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saries in risking the signature of arms limitation agreements.

THE NEGLECTED TRIAD AND LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The decision to deploy 464 cruise and 108 Pershing II missiles was a right step in several wrong directions. It was a right step to assure European allies of the American nuclear commitment and to define a role, however circumscribed, for the European states to play in superpower strategic arms limitation talks. However, the circumstances surrounding the two-track decision and its subsequent management leave something to be desired. In the initial SALT negotiations European concerns were not given much weight. The draft treaty bartered European concerns over the development of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber for Soviet consent to a SALT accord.

European concern deepened further when the United States consented to temporary limits on the transfer of cruise missile technology and deployments (supposedly equal roughly to the time that would have been needed to develop the missiles to a deployment stage anyway). The obsolescence of NATO TNFs gave impetus to the search for new nuclear systems to offset growing Soviet superiority. Parity under SALT between the superpowers appeared to widen a deterrence gap between European-based conventional and nuclear forces and American central strategic forces. An unsettling view spread through policy circles that the United States might be self-deterred if the Soviet Union launched a major surprise attack against NATO forces. The SS-20, with three nuclear warheads of 150 kt. strength, could destroy all of NATO's nuclear forces in a first strike. These are estimated at 70 major nuclear theater targets in peacetime and no more than 200 to 300 in war. Under the pressures of these concerns, arrival at some decision—any decision—on deployment of American-controlled LRTNFs appeared to many Europeans as important as the decision on what specific systems would be deployed. This led to the first wrong step. It led to the proposal for the creation more of a target than of a deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Emphasis was placed on the need for a visible system under clear American control to link the European theater weapons to US central strategic forces. While this line of reasoning was consistent with over two decades of European thinking, it failed, ironically, to give sufficient attention to
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the possibilities afforded the Soviet Union as a consequence of new nuclear capabilities in Europe despite the ostensible purpose of responding to this threat. A sea-based deterrent was specifically rejected because it did not identify American nuclear weapons with the defense of European soil. It was plausible to argue that the Soviet Union might be deterred from launching an attack on Europe and NATO forces if the Soviet homeland could not be preserved as a sanctuary. But why an American President would be more inclined to risk American cities because a handful of nuclear weapons bases were destroyed than in response to an attack against American ground and air forces in Europe was never made clear.

Nor were the arms control problems posed by the ground-based system fully explored. As a vulnerable target, the ground LRTNFs invited preemptive or preventive attacks. To protect these exposed systems they also put pressures on Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) to use its weapons before they were destroyed. Instead of buying time to bargain with the Soviet Union and to terminate a conflict before escalation enlarged, the ground-based system encouraged more, not less, devastation. Meanwhile, preponderant Soviet nuclear capabilities were not really offset since the reaction time of the bulk of the weapons proposed by NATO, principally cruise missiles, did not seriously threaten Soviet nuclear capabilities. These latter, being mobile, with reload capability, remained invulnerable to a disarming attack by NATO forces. NATO's ground-based system, therefore, created the worst of all possible worlds. It offered no appreciable gain in deterrence that could not already be attributed to American troops (dependents, and American civilians) in Europe or to central strategic forces; the capabilities that were proposed were vulnerable to attack; crisis management was weakened as hair-trigger reactions were encouraged on both sides if hostilities erupted; and the decoupling of American and European security interests that the LRTNF posture was supposed to forestall was unwittingly accentuated.

The very visibility of the ground-based system was also an invitation to heightened domestic opposition in Europe. What may have been assuring to European NATO security planners had the opposite effect on domestic opponents of NATO's nuclear policy. The war-fighting rhetoric of the Reagan administration's nuclear strategic buildup, on one hand, and the vacillating behavior of the Carter administration on defense policy, its wavering response to
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Soviet expansion in the Third World and mismanagement of SALT, on the other, tended to bolster the commitment of groups, variously inclined toward unilateral initiatives in nuclear and conventional disarmament, toward neutrality in the superpower struggle, or toward political accommodation of the Soviet Union, to press their views forward. Partly in anticipation of such opposition and to forestall demonstrations against LRTNFs moving through the European countryside, largely existing or new fixed NATO installations are to receive cruise and Pershing missiles. The infrastructure of Pershing I is to be adapted to the Pershing II. However, the same concerns expressed by residents in Utah and Nevada in opposition to the race-track MX system, tentatively advanced by the Carter and Reagan administrations, have been raised by European groups in opposition to LRTNF deployments. This opposition, as suggested above, was likely to have crystallized no matter what deployment mode was adopted. However, the vulnerability of the ground-based system encourages a hawk-dove alliance that erodes elite and popular support for the current NATO LRTNF posture. This alliance reportedly emerged to defeat the Reagan administration’s “dense pack” proposal as military analysts interested in increased strategic military capabilities tacitly joined forces, like oligopolists, with their rivals, who were committed to decreased spending on nuclear weapons or to a freeze or even to cutbacks on all defense spending. The incentives bringing these otherwise opposing groups together arise partly from the inherent vulnerabilities and threatening character of land-based nuclear weapons.

A second misstep associated with ground-based cruise and Pershing missiles derives from the isolated and insulated character of the decision. The NATO proposal was isolated from the evolutionary development and modernization of American strategic forces, begun during the 1970s and signaled by NSDM-242 signed by President Nixon in 1974; it was also insulated, as already suggested, from the major thrust of United States strategic arms limitation talks in the form of two parallel negotiation forums dealing essentially with a single, albeit complex, problem of controlling nuclear arms.

A case can be made for the modernization of NATO long-range nuclear forces but only if they are fitted into an overall plan that is consistent with the development and modernization of central strike forces in the United States. These forces, and those that will
be coming on-line in the 1980s, are able to discharge most, if not all, of the missions that might be assigned a NATO force. First, there exists no way for the Soviet Union to prevent destruction of its population and industrial centers if it launches a disarming first-strike attack, even if all of America’s land-based systems were wiped out in a surprise assault. While approximately 50 percent of American strategic nuclear launchers are in ICBMs, only 24 percent of its warheads or throw-weight are assigned to these systems. Destruction of these systems would still leave 7,000 warheads at the disposal of American SLBMs with 2,000 equivalent megatons available for retaliatory action. A suicidal attack against Soviet cities of 400 equivalent megatons has been calculated to produce more than 70 million deaths and to destroy three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s industrial capacity. Additional strikes would not substantially add to these disastrous levels of destruction.\(^\text{42}\) Half as many equivalent megatons would promptly kill a fifth of the Soviet population (or more than 50 million) and destroy almost as much of its industrial capacity as a strike two times as powerful.\(^\text{43}\)

The modernization programs commenced during the 1970s, and stepped up since, increase the risk to the Soviet Union that a disarming strike would be possible, and would leave American nuclear planners with sufficient survivable capabilities to meet NATO needs. These measures are detailed elsewhere, but some highlights here underline the point that LRTNFs are useful as a supplement but cannot be justified apart from American nuclear strategy and capabilities. The modernization of C3I systems, including the Command Data Buffer System, the Airborne Command Program, and Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) links, \textit{inter alia}, have greatly improved the survivability and reliability of American nuclear strike forces and have forged closer links with systems deployed in Europe. These improvements reduce the need to hold back warheads from NATO support missions under attack conditions, since rapid retargeting is unlikely.\(^\text{44}\)

Planned increases in American capabilities also spell serious problems for Soviet decisionmakers even though the Soviet Union may possess, with its SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, the ability to destroy one of the three legs of the American triad. Surviving 

\textit{Minuteman III} missiles will possess improved CEPs of 200 to 400 meters; Mark 12 warheads will increase yields of 300 of 550 missiles from 170 to 335 \textit{kt.}; and single-shot kill probabilities are estimated to rise to 0.83.\(^\text{45}\)
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The range of Poseidon submarines will increase 10-fold with the introduction of the Trident I or C-4 missile. On these, circular error probably will be improved to 1,000 feet and kiloton yield for 8 reentry vehicles (RV) will more than double, from 40 to 100 kt. Also, flexibility in targeting against semihardened and industrial targets will be enhanced. Attack submarines are being armed with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). B-52G and H series bombers, with improved avionics, will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses with standoff air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and short-range air missiles (SRAM). Some F-111 bombers will also be upgraded with similar equipment.

Over the horizon, even if a new land-based system is not installed, Trident submarines, armed with the new D-5 missile, will enter the American inventory in the late 1980s. The D-5 will increase the throw-weight, range, accuracy, and retarget flexibility; and it will also increase RV carrying capacity for each sea-launched system launcher from 8 to 14. These missiles with hard target capability will reduce the need to rely on vulnerable ground systems, like fixed ICBMs, or base facilities for bombers or ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Either the B-1, the Stealth, or both new bombers can also be expected to expand the American inventory and the number of launchers and warheads that can be directed at Soviet and Warsaw Pact targets. Barring a major expansion of Soviet nuclear capabilities and a breakthrough in detecting or destroying these newer systems or the command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems that direct them, the Soviet Union cannot enhance its current strategic posture and very well may find itself at the end of the decade, measured in static terms of warheads, launchers, and equivalent megatons, in an inferior position in any nuclear exchange. This evolution bodes ill for the Soviet Union which has concentrated its strike forces in ICBMs. In 1980, while 56 percent of Soviet launchers were ground-based ICBMs, 75% of its warheads and 70% of its throw-weight were committed to these systems. Despite increased hardening, perhaps as high as 5,000 psi, Soviet strategic systems were more vulnerable than those of the United States. However much proponents for an expansion of American nuclear forces may have worried about growing Soviet capabilities, none was prepared to advocate swapping American systems for their Soviet counterparts.

There are grounds for agreeing with the conclusion of one
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well-informed observer, following analyses conducted late in the Carter administration, that “even after an all-out Soviet attack on US ICBM[s] and a US response in kind, we could carry out extended deterrence options involving several thousand weapons while preserving at least three times the number of warheads required for the civil-economic recovery targets in the SIOP assured destruction option.” Moreover, British and French nuclear forces would be available for strikes against the Warsaw Pact. These include on the British side Polaris A-3 submarines and Vulcan, Buccaneer, and Jaguar attack planes. On the French side the Soviet Union faces 18 S-3 IRBMS, Mirage III, IV, and Super Etendard aircraft, and five nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, the French plan to deploy the Hades tactical nuclear weapons system and work on enhanced radiation weapons in support of its ground troops.

If, indeed, NATO LRTNFs are needed, they cannot be easily defended in isolation of American strategic capabilities and a strategy of limited strike options nor insulated from American arms control policy. To do so, as has been the case so far, has two unintended and perverse effects. On the one hand, the European theater is implicitly decoupled from American strategic planning by stressing the deterrent (actually lightning-rod) qualities of ground-based systems. If installed, the United States would still have every incentive to keep a nuclear exchange limited to Europe and of signaling the Soviet Union that preference—precisely the kind of decoupling that the LRTNF deployment is supposed to prevent. On the other hand, a vulnerable system throws doves and hawks together in opposition to NATO policies and gives the Soviet Union new openings to divide NATO Europe from the United States.

The “zero option” negotiating position adopted by the Reagan administration also exposes it to the charge that it is at best unrealistic about what can reasonably be expected from the Soviets in the way of concessions or at worst willfully obstructive. It does not appear plausible to expect the Soviet Union to deal constructively with theater nuclear weapons unless it has some notion of their implications for strategic nuclear arms talks. This follows from what has already been said about the essential unity of planning and targeting between central and theater nuclear forces under American control. Meanwhile, Moscow is able to cast the United States as the principal obstacle to an arms accord on LRTNFs. Whatever the merit of this charge, it has been given wide currency in European
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public opinion and governmental circles." The inflexibility of the
American position is also held hostage to Soviet initiatives such as
the Andropov suggestion that Soviet SS-20 missiles on Russia’s
western front be reduced to levels equal to British and French
nuclear capabilities.

If by some chance the Soviet Union were to accept the “zero
option,” which it has consistently rejected, this would do little to
check the growth of Soviet military capabilities in other vital areas.
The missteps arising from the LRTNF negotiations have also led
NATO planners and political leaders away from giving full attention
to halting or slowing Soviet modernization of short-range nuclear
systems, and, most importantly, to upgrading NATO conventional
capabilities.

NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons, however well the moder-
nization of its forces is managed, raises serious doubts in the minds
of experts and laymen as to whether nuclear weapons would best
serve European interests if deterrence in Europe should break
down. This is especially true of short-range systems, many of which
are obsolete, vulnerable, and error-prone. LRTNFs partly compen-
sate for some of the shortcomings of these systems, but excessive
focus on the need for their deployment neglects the liabilities occa-
sioned by the vulnerability of NATO’s short-range TNFs. They invite
preemption and elicit little support in European circles as the basis
for a viable defense posture. European political leaders are hardly
inclined to authorize use of these weapons. The reduction of 1,000
of these weapons in Europe, accompanying NATO’s 1979 proposal
for LRTNF, was sensible since NATO was already overarmed with
such systems. There seems also little justification to stockpile so
many weapons which, if used, threaten Europe’s civilian popula-
tions. They offer little assurance, moreover, that, in light of Soviet
modernization, NATO forces will be at an advantage in an exchange
of tactical nuclear weapons limited to Western territory. Further
reductions of these weapons might well be contemplated as part of
an arms control package offered the Soviet Union to limit deploy-
ment of these weapons. Meanwhile, more attention might be given
to reducing threatening modernization of conventional forces while
pressures could be brought to bear on the Soviet Union to reduce its
conventional forces or lower the rate of their modernization. These
possibilities have lately been ignored as the alliance has concen-
trated its political and military eggs in the LRTNF basket.
A sea-based system, specifically dedicated to NATO missions but one that is an integral part of an American controlled SIOP, can relax, if not resolve, many of the problems associated with the current NATO proposal. Such a shift would not necessarily add new and formidable obstacles to striking a more nearly optimal balance among strategic, arms control, and domestic consensus factors that must be integrated into NATO planning if a viable solution to the LRTNF issue is to be found. Such a system, particularly if submarine based, would be less vulnerable, dampening incentives for the US to launch on warning of an attack or for the Soviet Union to preempt. Deterrence would not necessarily be decreased by going to sea since a mixed force of cruise and ballistic missiles would presumably be employed in accord with plans discussed and decided upon within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group or other NATO bodies created for this purpose. Here is a surer mechanism than exposed nuclear systems to link the United States and European security interests more closely together. A sea-based system also projects a more credible threat to the Soviet Union.

A sea-based deterrent, closely integrated with other American-controlled nuclear weapons, promises also to be a more reliable instrument to control escalation than other systems. That such systems have previously been associated with American strategic forces should make them more, not less, attractive to European planners if deterrence is uppermost in their minds. The problems of command and control posed by sea-based systems, while not negligible, are on the way to solution. The alleged greater C'I reliability of ground-based systems is far from convincing since they have not been battlefield tested. Progress has been made in solving the C'I problems of sea-based systems, and there is no reason to believe that these will not be further advanced. The development of the C-4 and D-5 missiles suggest that sea-based systems are fast approaching the targeting selectivity and flexibility of land-based counterparts.

There is nothing except political inertia preventing NATO planners from adopting a sea-based system in lieu of the previously announced cruise and Pershing II proposal. For those segments of European opinion worried about an American and NATO response to Soviet theater modernization, a sea-based system would constitute a bona fide response. It is also conceivable that European officers could be seconded to serve with these American-controlled
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systems in a liaison role in order to tighten even further NATO and American targeting and planning. Since these systems will be at sea, they are less likely than stationary systems or those roving through the countryside to attract attention and to upset local populations. The composition, size, and characteristics of such a force, whether surface or submarine, would depend on intraalliance discussion and the outcome of Soviet-American missile talks. What is important to recognize at this point is the superiority of a sea-based system in meeting the criteria for an effective and publicly supported LRTNF policy.

CONCLUSION

How to think about European defense is as important as what to think about it. The NATO two-track decision was a marked improvement over previous efforts in meeting NATO's nuclear needs. It reflected a notable advance in integrating strategic, arms control, and consensus-building requirements. However, NATO planners did not go far enough and the specific steps that were taken were not always calculated to move NATO policy in the right directions. The integration of American strategic and arms control policy with the LRTNF proposal has not gone very far. Planning for American central and the theater systems which have been proposed isolates one from the other and weakens the credibility of additional capabilities to NATO's deterrent forces on which Americans and Europeans can rely. Fully closing this alliance credibility gap does not seem realistic in the short run. Nevertheless, more progress can be realized than has been the case so far by hewing more closely to the criteria sketched above for shaping and sizing American nuclear capabilities assigned to NATO. The American arms control approach of dividing the START and LRTNF talks further insulates European-American policymaking and reinforces the decoupling tendencies evident in NATO policymaking.

The strategic and arms control elements of the policy triad have not always been skillfully related to domestic consensus building within the alliance. Credibility, like charity, begins at home. The vulnerability of fixed land-based ballistic missile systems and their dubious strategic and political future requires a reexamination of the December 1979 proposal and an equally serious reconsideration of a sea-based option. It would be unfortunate if a specific weapon system were confused with the standards of evaluation of
the system—or of any system to be deployed in Europe. This form of reductionism can only be harmful to long-run efforts to reduce the military confrontation in central Europe, to adapt military strategy and nuclear and conventional arms to new political and technological conditions, and to relax the political tensions and disputes dividing the continent without jeopardy to core values. Weapons proposals which are insensitive to these larger considerations will ultimately lack credibility vis-a-vis a determined foe or an anxious ally or a skeptical public.

If force or its threat still has some sense today, it is as a medium of communication and exchange between allies and adversaries whether governments, competing specialists, or interested publics. As Clausewitz suggested long ago, the political messages that they wish to send to each other are still more important than the military medium they use. Weapons have an inner logic appropriate to the narrow military functions for which they are designed but they convey no intrinsic political sense except what a nation and its leadership—civilian or military—imputes to them. These political messages will be louder and clearer and more likely to elicit the desired allied and adversary responses if the triad of strategic, arms control, and consensus-building criteria, outlined above, inform and fashion the military medium of communication and exchange. Otherwise, the medium becomes the message.
Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Western Europe

Representative Newt L. Gingrich
United States Congress

Dr. Albert S. Hanser
West Georgia College

In his penetrating study of the first 25 years of NATO, British Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton described the Military Committee as having enshrined in 1967 "the doctrine of deterrence, forward defense, flexible response with detente which is unchanged (and highly unlikely to be changed) to this day." When written in 1978, that analysis presented an accurate summary of NATO doctrine.

Today, only four years later, all of the elements of that doctrine as originally understood are subjects, at least on this side of the Atlantic, of considerable discussion and no little challenge. To understand the terms of that discussion it is useful to examine how each of these elements evolved and how it was and is understood both by the United States and by its European alliance partners.

During the first 15 years of the alliance, deterrence had a simple and easily understood meaning. The Soviet Union was to be discouraged from using its massive conventional military forces against Western Europe. Initially this was to be accomplished by the creation of a multinational conventional force equal or superior to that of the Soviet Union and its allies. Political and economic considerations on both sides of the Atlantic soon combined to cause abandonment of that idea. Instead, America's nuclear arsenal was to serve as the dissuader. Massive retaliation against the Soviet homeland would be the price of any military aggression against Western Europe. The North German plain and Fulda Gap would be defended from Omaha, Nebraska. The role therefore of NATO's conventional forces was not to fight and win in the event of war but simply to serve as a tripwire.

That original relegation of NATO conventional forces to the status of tripwire has had important long-term consequences for
the alliance and for the national military forces that make it up. Since conventional force was not to be the means of winning it was not necessary to match Soviet strength in Europe. NATO therefore accepted Warsaw Pact conventional military superiority as a given. Alliance ground and air forces were only there to assure that war with its terrible nuclear destruction did not begin by error. Any aggression which touched off a conflict so deadly and destructive must be clear and unambiguous. The Soviets were to be permitted to strike the first blow, giving them not only the advantage of greater strength but also that of the initiative. Equally, there must be no question of provocation. Therefore NATO forces were to be purely defensive in character, word, and action. Their sole purpose was to prevent a war, not to fight it.

While the United States with its worldwide commitments and the experiences of Korea and Vietnam never accepted totally this consequence of massive retaliation and the tripwire, some of our European allies did and still do. As late as April of this year, one of the authors of this paper was told by a colonel of the West German General Staff that our discussions of possible military options in the event of war were purely theoretical as the Bundeswehr was not permitted to discuss how they hoped to defeat the enemy. Their only permissible function was to deter war, not to win it. Of course this conversation may have reflected the caution of a professional soldier speaking to a foreigner at a moment when his Social Democratic government was dealing with a very active peace movement and a revolt of left-wing elements within the party. Nonetheless, it is indicative of a firmly established mindset within the political and military leadership of some of our allies. Much of the nervousness displayed by our European allies in reaction to the United States Army's new Airland doctrine can be traced to this mindset.

The doctrine of massive retaliation was one within which the European members of the alliance felt very comfortable. For them it represented the best of all possible worlds, since it allowed them to purchase security at a very modest political and economic price. For the allies the key feature of the doctrine, the automaticity of the US nuclear response to the Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe, was guaranteed by the presence of large numbers of American troops and their dependents in Germany. By the same token the Europeans were protected from possible US adventurism by those terms of the alliance which restricted it to Europe and which required
unanimous decision before action could be taken. They were therefore less than enthusiastic when in the early 1960s the United States, through its energetic Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, began urging—nay demanding—their agreement that massive retaliation be replaced by flexible response.

Flexible response as a concept contained many pitfalls for the NATO alliance in that each side of the Atlantic evolved a different understanding of it. The concept was driven by the growing strategic nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, which increasingly guaranteed that massive retaliation would be a two-way street. That growing Soviet nuclear strength was already causing American nuclear analysts to formulate their new strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Flexible response seemed to the United States a necessary step to raise the nuclear threshold. Reaching that threshold now for the first time presented a genuine threat to the continental United States as well as to the Soviet Union, thus placing the deterrent effect of massive retaliation in doubt. It seemed therefore clearly in the interest of the United States that there should be created some intermediate steps—a ladder of escalation—between the opening shots of a conventional war in Europe and the homeland nuclear exchange which was to be the final product of mutually assured destruction.

It was not nearly as clear to our allies that those intermediate steps on the ladder would be in the best interests of Europe. Those steps, while short of Armageddon, would be very destructive indeed and would be taken on European soil. It was entirely possible that even if the escalation ladder worked as designed and a massive strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers were prevented, it might well be at the cost of the total destruction of Europe. By creating doubts about the automaticity of an American nuclear response to Soviet aggression in Europe, the US had reopened painfully for Europe the whole question of deterrence.

Attempting to assuage those European fears, the US tried to interest its allies in some form of nuclear sharing. We first sought to create the MLF, or Multilateral Force, an attempt which failed dismally. Next came the NPG, or Nuclear Planning Group, which appeared to succeed with everyone but France. Despite the failure of the US to institute any form of nuclear sharing with our allies, flexible response was adopted as official NATO doctrine because
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of: (1) the stationing in Europe of massive numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, (2) the development of the French force de frappe and the British Polaris program as part of a credible theater nuclear capability, and (3) the tacit acceptance by the United States and Europe of differing concepts of what first deterrence and then detente were all about.

Within the framework of flexible response, deterrence has been for the United States a movable and progressive concept. Americans believe of course that it is highly desirable that war itself be deterred and that every effort should be directed to that end. However, should war break out in Europe, it is equally important to deter escalation to the next steps upwards on the ladder. The conventional phase should be prolonged as long as possible before resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. That phase should be extended as far as possible before resorting to theater weapons. Ultimately the last and most destructive phase, that of homeland strategic exchange, should only occur as an absolutely last resort. Every effort must be made to avoid any miscalculation by either side which might lead to a premature and unnecessary move to a higher and more dangerous level of conflict. To that end each element of defense escalation must be as strong as possible in order to deter enemy action without recourse to the next higher element. Above all the conventional element must be strengthened in order to prevent that first step on the ladder of escalation—the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Over time it was this logic which led to the recent American determination to improve our conventional forces, to develop a doctrine which would permit us to fight and win a conflict on the lower end of escalation ladder, and to pressure our NATO allies to spend the money necessary to upgrade their own conventional capabilities. However, for political and economic reasons, the alliance still has not devoted the resources required to make deterrence on the conventional level a credible policy.

To Europe deterrence was quite another matter. It has been first, foremost, and always designed to prevent the outbreak of war, since even a victorious war would result in the devastation of the continent. The thousands of tactical nuclear weapons now in place were, along with theater weapons, seen as a replacement for the threat of that massive retaliatory strike which had served so well to
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prevent war in the fifties and sixties. If these weapons were to be used at all in a conflict then they should be employed as early as possible so as to minimize damage of Western Europe and to reach the stage of threatened strategic exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union at the earliest possible moment. This would either end the conflict through a negotiated peace or at least minimize the nuclear damage suffered by Europe at the expense of the two superpowers.

When the authors of the this paper were in Western Germany in 1977 it was striking how similar were the views expressed by German soldiers, politicians, and journalists. All saw the certainty of the earliest possible use of strategic nuclear weapons by the United States as the best possible deterrent against a Soviet attack as well as the only way of terminating a conflict initiated by such an attack. All refused to consider the possibility and consequences of a more protracted war in which no such use of strategic weapons was made. That some at least in Germany are now considering that possibility helps in part to explain the power of the peace movement there.

For the Federal Republic of Germany, agreement by its allies to the concept of forward defense has been a vital and necessary factor in its acceptance of flexible response. By meeting a Warsaw Pact assault as far forward as possible the Germans intend to limit the loss of life and property during what they hope will be a short conventional phase of conflict. More importantly they view it as a guarantee that the use of tactical nuclear weapons which must clearly take place on German soil will occur before the large population centers are reached by advancing Warsaw Pact forces. Forward defense indeed only makes sense if it is assumed that both the conventional and tactical nuclear phases of a Central Front war are of the shortest possible duration. Nothing could better illustrate the tenacity with which West Germany clings to its original view of deterrence under the old massive retaliation doctrine. Nor could anything better illustrate how far from the American view of flexible response NATO has come. From a purely military standpoint forward defense as it is understood at present is a suicidally dangerous strategy if one wishes to fight an extensive conventional war, since it would have to be fought without meaningful operational reserves against an opponent whose known doctrine is one of deep thrust and rapid exploitation. It would well be a repeat of the Polish
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campaign of 1939—but this time with Germany on the receiving end.

If the combination of forward defense and flexible response was flawed from the beginning as NATO doctrine because of differing national interpretations and the failure of the Western alliance to create a conventional force strong enough to provide by itself a credible deterrent, it nonetheless could and did remain a useful policy as long as NATO maintained a convincing tactical and theater nuclear superiority over the Warsaw Pact. In the 1980s that has ceased to be the case. In addition to its overwhelming superiority in conventional ground forces the Soviet Union now possesses more tactical weapons than NATO. Moreover, these weapons have greater range and a more powerful throw weight than their Western equivalents. If the thousands of tactical nuclear artillery shells and short-range missiles the United States had stationed in Europe presented a credible deterrent in the past, they no longer can be viewed as doing so. Indeed deterrence may not be on the other side. Soviet tactical nuclear options are so much more powerful than our own that it may be too dangerous to use our own lest we invite a more dangerous retaliation on their part.

We therefore find ourselves as an alliance in a situation in which the Warsaw Pact has achieved strategic nuclear parity on a global level while with its tactical nuclear weapons and new SS-20 missiles it has acquired a clearly superior theater nuclear capability. When this is combined with that conventional superiority and military initiative which the Warsaw Pact maintained since the earliest period of NATO’s existence, it is clear that Western deterrence in either its American or European versions is no longer a viable long-term policy. It is equally clear that should the West be forced actually to fight a Central Front conflict under these conditions, prospects for victory are not good.

It was to address the conventional level of this dilemma that the United States Army developed its new Airland doctrine. Recognizing that neither our own government and people nor those of our allies were likely to approve the enormous economic and political costs of matching man for man, tank for tank, and missile for missile the huge conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, the Army set out to devise a method by which we could fight outnumbered and outgunned and still win. It is believed that when the transition to
Airland Battle doctrine and Army 86 force modernizations are complete the United States and its allies will have achieved that end. If the belief in Airland is correct, and we believe it is, then the West will have acquired a meaningful conventional deterrent capability for the first time in the history of NATO.

It is not our purpose to examine here the Airland Battle and Army 86 in any great detail. It will be sufficient to note that Airland Battle, by reorganizing the structure and thinking of our military, will permit it to exploit enemy vulnerabilities as never before. The new battlefield as envisioned will be nonlinear and expanded geographically far into enemy's rear areas. There in his vulnerable rear areas high-priority targets will be identified and destroyed. His timetables will be disrupted, his follow-on echelons threatened, his command and control disorganized even while his forward elements are locked in close combat with our own forces. By using the indirect approach, seizing and maintaining the initiative and making use of our greater speed and flexibility, it should be possible for our forces to thwart the enemy's intentions while savaging his forces.

If, as we believe, our conventional forces, using this new doctrine, can successfully halt an attack by the Warsaw Pact on the European Central Front, then it is the Soviets, not the Americans, who will be first tempted to use tactical nuclear weapons. It is indeed probable that they will have already resorted to chemical weapons. The West must therefore have an effective means of deterring such action on the part of the Pact so we can keep any conflict at the conventional level.

The need to create such a deterrence is based on four assumptions. The first of these is that the United States would gain nothing if it achieved a conventional war-winning ability at the cost of increased danger of escalation toward a homeland nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. The second is that our European allies would be less than enchanted at a conventional victory whose predictable price would be total destruction of much of their continent. The third assumption is that, given the greater number, range, and power of Soviet weapons, our own tactical nuclear force could hardly be expected to deter Soviet use of theirs. Finally, it is assumed that any effort to deter the use of tactical nuclear weapons by directly threatening the Soviet homeland would be counterproductive since it would only tempt the Soviets to escalate imme-
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diately to a homeland exchange phase of conflict. What is needed therefore is either the total elimination of superpower nuclear weapons from European soil as President Reagan suggested last year or a specific nuclear threat which is directed against targets in the territory of Russia’s Warsaw Pact allies but not against the Soviet Union itself.

The targets chosen should have an important and obvious bearing on the outcome of the war and should if at all possible not be located in heavily populated areas. For this purpose both the new Pershing II and our sea-, land-, and air-launched cruise missiles should be highly suitable. In view of these considerations, it is our view that all of those tactical nuclear weapons now on European soil should be removed. Once the conventional military forces have been upgraded and have adopted Airland doctrine, such weapons will no longer be needed to compensate for our conventional weakness. Since they no longer match their Soviet opposite numbers their utility as a deterrent is, as has already been demonstrated, highly questionable. More importantly, in the nonlinear battlefield of the future, forward-based, short-range nuclear weapons will be more of a liability than an advantage to either side. They would be difficult to move quickly and impossible to defend on a battlefield with no safe rear area. Since it is known that both Soviet doctrine and our own single out nuclear facilities as high-priority targets, it is clear that in future conflicts such weapons can only be an embarrassment to the side which deploys them.

In addition to these military considerations there are considerable political benefits which will accrue to the United States through a unilateral withdrawal of all American tactical nuclear weapons from European soil. One, it would enable the United States and its NATO partners to renounce first use of nuclear weapons. It is only our conventional inferiority — and the perceived need for tactical nuclear weapons to redress that inferiority which have in the past made it impossible for us to renounce first use. No one will have to be reminded how well the Soviets have used our refusal to do so for propaganda purposes. Second, it will allow us to begin reversing the widely held assumption in Europe that the United States can only help defend its allies by threatening the nuclear destruction of Central Europe. That assumption is one of the cornerstones of the present European peace movement and one of the principal reasons for its largely anti-American tone. Third, by voluntarily giving
up our artillery and Lance nuclear capability while at the same time specifically focusing world opinion on the fact that our Pershing II and cruise missile weapons were to serve a purely deterrent purpose, we would both reassure our allies and mark the Soviet Union as that sole true threat to world peace and instrument of nuclear destruction it has so long in fact been.

In summary, by upgrading our conventional forces, persuading our European allies to do the same, adopting Airland doctrine, voluntarily withdrawing all of our tactical nuclear weapons from European soil, and leaving in Europe only a new theater deterrent force consisting of Pershing II and cruise missiles, we can provide the basis for a new and more powerful NATO alliance—one better designed to deter war, but one capable of winning that war should it occur. At the same time we can demonstrate to a doubting world that the United States is the true champion of peace and the Soviet Union the true threat to that peace.

However, our new strategy of deterring war by increasing Soviet doubt of victory will only work if it is based on realistic preparations. The real target of deterrence is the mind of the Soviet military analyst. It is the professional military advisers in Moscow who must believe that the West could win a conventional war if that war is to be avoided. Having the New York Times or any number of US Senators believe in our military capabilities is not only irrelevant, it could in fact be dangerous if the Soviet military doesn't see hard evidence that we can carry out what we promise.

Changing our doctrines so that our force structure, training, and equipment secure deterrence through effective and credible capabilities will prove a hard challenge to the NATO nations. The real difficulties are more than budgets and politics. The reality is that the professional military bureaucracies have relied on deterrence for two generations. Hard questions of training, of ammunition supplies, of equipment have simply been brushed under the rug. It should alarm every citizen that there have been no war games involving a conflict lasting more than thirty days in which the Western allies win a Central Front war. It should concern all of us that no serious training exists for dealing with Red forces inside the Warsaw Pact borders even after war breaks out. It is as though the Israelis had planned to defend Tel Aviv inside its suburbs instead of on the Golan Heights.
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NATO will face serious problems in convincing its civilian sector to increase budgets adequately to support true war-winning capability. It will face equal difficulty in convincing its citizens to sustain an adequate Reserve trained well enough to fight a long war. However, even those achievements will matter little if the professional military in all NATO countries does not develop a more rigorous standard of intellectual honesty. One reason many civilian politicians regard much of the military bureaucracy’s arguments and requests with disdain is the poor quality of argumentation. Self-serv ing approaches to force structure, mission assignments, and the protection of existing service structures and habits are all too common in all Western nations. If the career military doesn’t take war seriously enough to alter the routines of its defense ministries, higher headquarters, and established services, why should they expect politicians to do more? Thus the prerequisite to a successful NATO deterrence through adequate and demonstrable conventional capacity is to develop an officer corps that believes war is possible and that is determined to be tough-minded enough to insist on the arguments and changes necessary to win that potential war. As politicians see the quality of professional arguments and professional plans improve it is likely that there will be a corresponding increase in the seriousness with which the political world examines the real cost of deterrence.

There are nine specific principles which have to underlie any United States program for an adequate conventional deterrence:

1. We must understand that war is possible.

2. We must understand that losing such a war is unacceptable.

3. We must understand that the interests and views of our allies are just as important to them as ours are to us.

4. We must understand that military goals must be realistic and precise.

5. We must understand that NATO conventional forces must be alert enough to win a short war that begins with a surprise Soviet attack and must have enough reserves to fight a long war.
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6. We must understand that no peripheral strategy works if NATO loses on the Central Front.

7. We must understand that other members of the alliance must take on greater global responsibilities if the United States is to remain a primary partner for them in Europe.

8. We must understand that NATO must dominate every rung of the escalation ladder beginning with the conventional. Every phase must be made unprofitable for the Soviets.

9. We must understand that ultimately a secure military alliance must rest on the base of a stable political-economic-cultural alliance.

These nine principles are the intellectual key to designing a NATO alliance which will still be working in the year 2015. Only by developing a stable nonmilitary alliance can we sustain the military effort. Only by involving Western Europe in the Third World as is further expounded below can we continue to justify an American focus on the Central Front. Only by establishing a conventional war capability while simultaneously making the escalation ladder unprofitable can we minimize the Soviet Union’s options while maximizing our own. Only by making these steps so real that Soviet intelligence and military analysts believe in them can we deter major war.

While each of these nine principles is interdependent and all must work if deterrence is to be assured, it is worth taking a moment to examine each principle in more detail, since they form a framework for measuring current plans against future dangers.

First, we must recognize that war is possible. As Harry Sommers notes in his book, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, our own Pentagon is dominated by thinking geared to war preparation rather than warfighting. War preparation for two generations has been dominated by bureaucratic and political rather than by battlefield and military considerations. The other Western democracies have made the same error. The result is a state of mind which has infected the career military, the professional civil service, the politicians, and the news media of all our countries.
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NATO is in grave danger of playing the role played by France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Our plans tend to be dominated by bureaucratic and budgetary considerations. German farmers' local interests block moving our forces out of obsolete casernes. The sociology of the American military blocks development of an adequate air-ground tactical support doctrine. The President's personal prejudices stop us from planning an adequate Reserve and National Guard force based on some form of conscription. In numerous ways we avoid confronting the reality that war may come and its fiery blast will annihilate the petty institutions and personalities that now avoid taking it seriously.

Second, wars are real. There is a decisiveness to major wars which changes history fundamentally. The Russian experience with the Mongol yoke is a revealing example of the way in which culturally advanced societies (in this case Kievan Russia) can be totally altered by a confrontation with a more primitive but militarily dominant society. There is a tendency in the West to regard war as an aberration which can be magically overcome if it does occur. Deterrence has been such a magic word. It has allowed both the civilian and military parts of Western society to avoid confronting the very real dangers of the Russian Empire. If we don't have enough artillery shells, don't worry about it because we will have gone nuclear by then anyway. If our armored personnel carriers are obsolete, prone to breaking down, and wholly ineffective on a modern battlefield, don't worry about it because that is the politicians' fault and anyway we are only a large tripwire. At every level of both military and civilian society there is a tendency to forget that maneuvers are make-believe but war is real.

NATO needs a much more rigorous commitment to professionalism on the part of its career military. Politicians may well decide to ignore professional advice and professional assessments but they should at least hear the unvarnished truth as measured against potential battlefields. All too often NATO politicians are hearing only from political generals and political staffs. They rely on reassuring data that simply has no relevance to wartime reality. The time to know how weak you are is when there is still a chance to remedy that weakness. We need descriptions of grim reality now rather than apologies for defeat after the fact. It may make some generals and admirals unpopular with their national press and national politicians but then that may well be the price for building a
true deterrence.

For 37 years the West has accepted grave risks and weaknesses in its conventional forces because it felt comfortable relying on its nuclear deterrent. When in doubt Western governments almost always have decided in favor of less preparedness. War games made assumptions favorable to the Blue teams and unfavorable to Red teams. When possible the odds were always bent. For the next generation we must learn to do just the opposite. A true war-preventing deterrent will require that we give Red forces the advantage in our war games and maneuvers. We will have to learn to take seriously slightly more alarmist analyses and tend to do a little too much rather than a little too little. This new state of mind can only make sense if we keep reminding ourselves that war is real.

Third, our allies must be taken as seriously as we take ourselves. For a generation after World War II, Americans had the advantage of being able to use their allies as living hostages to deterrence. Since we possessed an overwhelming preponderance of nuclear force our allies could get freedom on the cheap and we could lead with little dissent. Today all that has changed. As our allies contemplate the weakening nuclear deterrent they begin to assess the costs of its possible use. The implications of flexible response strategy for West German survival make Finlandization a real alternative for national citizens. Continuation of a nuclear battlefield approach to deterrence will increase the stress on all European governments as their citizens think realistically about the collateral damage and the annihilation of their towns and countryside.

If NATO is to survive in an era of relative Soviet-American military equality we are going to have to accept the equality of interest of our allies. West Germans will come to regard a heartland exchange as involving Fulda or Hamburg equally as much as Chicago or Atlanta. That will signal the end of any usable nuclear first-strike threat even at the tactical level.

NATO's deterrence problems are compounded by the desirable but difficult reality of a free and increasingly universal press in the NATO countries. There simply cannot be two strategies in the 1980s and 1990s as there were in the 1960s and 1970s. The news media and left-wing politicians will make sure that the citizens involved
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know about their alliance's schizophrenia. It will be necessary to have one strategy articulated in clear, forthright language so that citizens can debate it in all NATO countries simultaneously. That will require military bureaucracies and their civilian heads to think and speak much more precisely and carefully. A successful articulation of a strategy in politically defensible language is the basic requirement for all military systems in free societies. It is not only guerrillas who must be fish in the sea of people. It is also the professional military leaders of free societies.

NATO strategy for the next generation must begin with an understanding that the inter-German border has to be as sacred as the American. The use of nuclear weapons in Europe has to be as unacceptable to the United States as would be the use of them on American soil. Our goal is not to recover West German territory after the first month of the war but to avoid losing West German territory in the first place. We must learn to offer the prospect of future peace and security even if deterrence should fail. Otherwise we will continue to witness an erosion of support for NATO as more and more citizens contemplate the currently grim plans for their lives and country if war comes.

This new emphasis on the importance of our allies' lives and territories will require that Soviet military aggression in Europe be met by a forward defense capable of defeating Soviet forces on Warsaw Pact soil. There must be only minimum penetration of West Germany or other NATO countries.

Fourth, military goals must be realistic and precise. Far too much of our current military planning is just pie in the sky with no real relationship to budgetary force structure, or military realities. The very language of a great deal of NATO and US planning is so ambiguous and filled with bureaucratic verbiage that it is impossible to understand clearly what it means. As S.L.A. Marshall once said: "Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in unmistakable language. All administration is carried forward along the chain of command by the power of men to make their thoughts articulate and available to others." That standard must once again be applied to all military planning and implementation.

Our overall goals should be simple, understandable, and objectively measurable. We should plan to deter by having adequate
forces at such a level of training that Soviet analysts doubt their own ability to win a conventional war on the Central Front. We on the other hand should recognize that it is possible any time in the next 30 years that the Russian Empire and NATO will have a test of will in which no deterrents or negotiation offers will have any effect. In that setting we must be prepared to defeat Soviet forces decisively before they can penetrate significantly onto West German soil.

Focusing on the destruction of Soviet forces while they are still in Warsaw Pact territory will have three salutary effects on NATO. First, it will reassure our own allies and especially the Germans that they are being defended and can live in safety. Second, it will reassure the Soviets that any test of will can be resolved outside their national boundaries. They will therefore have no need to resort to weapons of mass destruction. This narrow focus on a decisive NATO victory in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia thus maximizes the reassurance to our own allies that they will suffer little collateral damage while minimizing threats to the Soviet's political stability at home. Third, the prospect of themselves being the battlefield will increase pressure from the Warsaw Pact members on Moscow to avoid war. If the Polish, Hungarian, East German, and Czechoslovakian governments believe the war will not be a romp in the West with little risk to them but instead will resemble a Lebanon in their own countries they may well bring maximum pressure to bear on the Soviets to avoid war.

The operational concept of achieving victory in the Warsaw Pact area can be turned into specific plans, realistic maneuvers, purposeful force structures, and real budget requirements. Such a budget, offering security and victory, should prove far more acceptable politically than do present budgets which offer neither security nor victory.

Fifth, conventional forces must be alert enough to win a short war that begins with a Soviet surprise attack yet have enough reserves to fight a long war. One of the amazing features of current NATO planning is that it can neither win the most likely short war or the more likely long war. The only war NATO is currently designed to fight is a brief war with adequate warning time which is either negotiated or escalated just before NATO runs out of ammunition.

Modern military history is filled with examples of successful
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surprises, Yom Kippur in 1973 being the most recent and involving
the surprise of an Israeli Army that has been legendary for its
alertness and its intelligence capabilities. It is at least plausible that
the Soviets might at some point conclude that a standing-start war
would be a reasonable risk. Given the current NATO force disposi-
tions, the locations of many units, and the number of dependents
and civilians likely to get in the way, it is hard to see how NATO
could do anything in its current posture except fall apart if hit with a
successful surprise assault. It is therefore clear that the next genera-
tion of deterrence will require turning NATO’s standing forces from
garrison into field armies so that the initial thrust of a surprise
assault would be blunted and turned without losing half or more of
Western Europe.

Assuming NATO does not get surprised in the short run it is
certain that in its current force posture it can simply be outlasted in
the long run. There are no provisions for a serious war in Central
Europe lasting much beyond 30 days. Therefore a relatively low-risk
Soviet strategy would be simply to keep slugging it out somewhere
along the inter-German border until the NATO forces began to run
out of men, equipment, and ammunition. In some ways the NATO
forces are prepared for a gigantic repetition of Isandhlwana, where
British forces in 1879 stood off the Zulu as long as they had ammuni-
tion but were massacred when the available supplies ran out. Sim-
ilarly, it is conceivable that NATO will be able to stand off the
Russians while the supplies last but will be annihilated when insuffi-
cient preparation presents its bill. A realistic long-war strategy will
require massive reserves on the Israeli or pre-1914 Imperial German
Army model. That will require either universal military training or a
very large draft. The reserves will have to be oriented to fighting.
They must be realistically exercised every year, with their weekend
sessions devoted to preparation for real fighting. In addition to
increasing manpower reserves the NATO countries will have to
expand their mobilization base dramatically with more factories
prepared to produce war materials and with more ammunition and
other supplies in reserve.

Sixth, no peripheral strategy works if NATO loses on the Cen-
tral Front. There has been a great deal of talk about a maritime
strategy which will somehow allow the United States to defeat the
Soviet Union without having to invest massively on the Central
Front. Unfortunately it just can’t be done. Clausewitz was right in
insisting that winning the central battle of annihilation makes the secondary skirmish irrelevant. The side which wins the main battle has the capacity to turn and mop up the victorious secondary forces of the opposition.

Western theorists who look at Pitt the Elder's maritime strategy or the Peninsular Campaigns of Wellington misunderstand the reality of power in the late 20th century. There is no Frederick the Great and Prussian Army capable of balancing off the Soviets while the United States wins the peripheral war. There is no Russian empire to drain the enemy's strength while an American Wellington wins a secondary campaign. It is inconceivable that any collection of Eurasian powers will balance off the Soviets in the next generation without a massive infusion of American ground fighting power. Therefore we are bound to maintain a massive military commitment to Europe as long as we think the freedom of Western Europe is a matter of significant importance to us.

Seventh, the reality of our need to remain deeply committed in Europe means that we will have to think through our own and our allies' global role. Those analysts who argue that the United States cannot afford to balance the Soviet Union in Europe while policing the entire Third World are correct but come to the wrong conclusion. We must recognize that if our allies are in fact morally our equals (principle three) then our allies are going to have to learn to help maintain our mutual interests around the planet. In fact the French have done a remarkably good job with very limited resources of playing a serious role in much of Africa and the Middle East. There is reason to believe that other of our allies could play much larger roles than they currently do in virtually all of the Third World. If we were to assess our relative contributions to the alliance by adding both our defense and foreign-aid commitments as a percent of gross national product we could set goals for even our most pacifist allies that would increase the relative influence of the alliance in the Third World at little cost to the United States and which would redistribute the burden of common survival so that the American economy would be bearing only its fair share.

There simply has to be a new equation in the American and Western European commitment to each other. If the Western Europeans want us to remain on their continent helping them defend themselves, something which is in our national interest but far more
in theirs, they are going to have to shoulder more of our foreign-aid burden and more of our Third World intervention burden. If they seek to beggar us by insisting that our economy bear a vastly disproportionate share of the common defense burden, as it has since 1945, then we will inevitably have to confront the fact that while we want to help Europe we must help America first. Such a decision is not in our interest and is still less in theirs.

This strategic approach to global problems as an alliance is not as drastic a departure as some might suggest. In fact the last several years have seen the development of de facto NATO naval efforts in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area. There have been a number of non-United States NATO warships in the area ensuring that various countries knew NATO intended to keep open the oil supply lines. Similarly, the use of American airlift to deliver French and Moroccan troops to Zaire was a model of multinational cooperation to achieve mutually desired goals. Once American planning is integrated into a NATO approach to the entire planet our unique requirements to build one force for Central Europe and an entirely different force for the Third World will diminish. That will bring some sense of proportion into military requirements which are currently absurd in terms of our real ability to develop a two- or three-war capacity in peacetime. At the present time we have used that slogan because we have deceived ourselves about the cost of a real conventional deterrent in Europe. We have also deceived ourselves about our real ability to project power in the Third World. The United States cannot possibly do both. NATO as an alliance can. That has to be our goal.

Eighth, we must regain control of the escalation ladder by making it unprofitable for the Soviets to climb the rungs. Possibly the most frightening single development of the last decade has been the methodical, calm, professional manner in which the Soviet military has addressed the problem of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets have concluded that it is possible that these weapons will be used and have decided to ensure that they will win any exchange at any level.

This response to weapons of mass destruction is appropriate to a country which in this century has witnessed the horrors of major war being fought on its own soil. Soviet leaders know that millions can die and yet a nation continue to fight because they have per-
sonally experienced that reality. They also know that the world is
dangerous since they themselves have lived through surprise
attacks and because of that surprise have seen their cities de-
stroyed. From their perspective being prepared to climb the escal-
ation ladder is prudent, not aggressive behavior.

The Western response to weapons of mass destruction has till
now been to recoil in horror and emphasize the destabilizing
aspects of their possible use. Such reactions are fine if the only
possible first-user is the West. Moral revulsion might block us from
ever using such weapons. However, moral revulsion seldom helps
the victim if the aggressor doesn’t share that feeling. Given Soviet
use of biological and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and their
present use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, there is every
reason to believe that the Soviets will use whatever weapons they
think will help them. The more serious the conflict the more likely
they are to be willing to risk escalation.

In this setting the West cannot simply plan to win convention-
ally and then rely on Soviet morality or common sense to avoid
escalating. Indeed, Soviet doctrine implies that a Western conven-
tional victory would lead to a Soviet escalation in an effort to regain
the initiative and open up the chance of victory. Therefore the West
must be prepared at each rung of the ladder to trump the Soviet
card. We must be capable of causing them so much damage at each
level that there is no profit to the Soviets in looking for a new level of
violence in order to avoid defeat at a lower level.

This capacity for overtrumping on the escalation ladder has to
be real because again it is the Soviet intelligence officer and military
analyst who has to be our target if deterrence is to work. Ultimately it
has to be the military committee in the Kremlin which advises the
political leadership to negotiate instead of escalating. Only by con-
vincing them that no increase in violence will work will we be able to
force them to a negotiating table once war has begun.

Ninth, a military alliance can be secure only if it is based on a
stable political-economic and cultural alliance. For over a genera-
tion NATO has existed largely as a negative, defensive alliance
against the Soviet Union. That initial impulse born of fear and
insecurity is gradually ebbing. The once-passive and insecure
Europeans now have their own strengths, their own agenda, their
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own interests. If the alliance continues to be narrowly anti-Soviet it will become increasingly unstable. The fact is that Western Europe and the United States have many interests beyond avoiding war with the Soviet Union. As George Ball explained in his parable of the society that built a dam to avoid flooding and then as flooding ceased grew less interested in maintaining the dam because there was no longer any proof of its value, the longer war is avoided the harder it will be to take it seriously at a political level.

NATO must develop a positive new agenda for its citizens and societies to work on. Peace, freedom, and prosperity are possible on this planet in the next century if the free peoples of the West decide to encourage market economies, spread the advantages of high technology and education, and develop global institutions capable of securing prosperity and freedom for most human beings. Revolutions in biology, space, and information technologies will make it possible for the West to offer the Third World advances in the quality of life, in information, and in new ways of feeding and healing people that will simply eliminate the Communist Bloc from competition. A concerted effort by NATO to develop industrial projects in space, information technology, and biology that transcend national boundaries and draw all the West together could create such a momentum of human energy that NATO's military alliance would survive as a by-product of the interaction of the rest of the NATO nations' civilian population.

In closing it should be noted that taking war seriously is more important for the United States and its NATO allies now than at any time in the past two generations. Not only is our nuclear deterrence fading, but the strains and stresses on the Soviet Union are increasing. At a time when our ability to deter war is decaying, the prospects of the Soviet Union becoming desperate are increasing. We have not faced as dangerous a period as the near future since Adolf Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia.

The West is winning the war for the human spirit across the planet. By any reasonable standard the West is also winning the geopolitical war as Egypt, India, China, and others turn away from the Soviet Union. The West is also clearly winning the economic competition despite our current unemployment and inflation problems. The only conflict we are in danger of losing with the Soviet Union is war itself. If we fail to take war seriously and fail to prepare
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for it professionally and rigorously, we may well see a thousand years of darkness fall across Europe and from there across America itself. If that happens it will not be a Soviet success, it will be a Western failure. If we are willing to face the danger forthrightly and respond honestly to the challenge, nothing can threaten us. If we are unwilling to do so, nothing can save us. That is what is at stake.
Comparing United States and Soviet National Strategies

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel and papers will seek to identify the key elements in both US and Soviet national long-term strategies. An attempt will be made to compare the geopolitical, economic, and military strategies of both nations and to analyze how much each government's strategies seem to be reactive or opportunistic versus calculated and long-term. The group will try to assess what weaknesses and vulnerabilities might be exploited in the other country's strategies and where contending strategies might lead to direct or indirect conflict."
Panel Summary

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Chairman
Harvard University

Mr. John A. Baker, Rapporteur
Department of State

The panel had a first-rate start with two first-rate papers. One, "Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy," was presented by Dimitri K. Simes. The other, "U.S. Strategy for National Security," was given by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.

With the stimulation of these two excellent papers, the panel began its discussion with some of the basic elements of strategy. For a definition, we drew on what Bob Pfaltzgraff raised in his paper. This is that the essence of strategy is goals and the coordinated and consistent utilization of the elements of statecraft to achieve those goals. Having a strategy means having a hierarchy of objectives and making choices to achieve them.

The panel members agreed that there is a relationship between the relative power of a nation and its need for a national strategy. The elimination of post-World War II power disparity means that having a national strategy is even more important for the United States. As for the question of whether or not the United States currently has a national strategy, since January 1981, there does seem to be one. Although the panel members would not necessarily agree with either the goals that have been established or the choices that have been made to achieve those goals, the United States has the basic elements of a strategy. As for the Soviet Union, the panel was led by Dimitri Simes's paper and his conclusion that it finds itself without a long-term strategy and without even clear and firm assumptions about the international situation.

As one would expect, with the diversity of backgrounds represented on the panel, there was not total agreement on any one of the issues discussed. There were, however, many interesting points
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

raised by the panel members, points which underlined both the
need for and the difficulty of achieving a national strategy. The best
way of summarizing these points would be to put them into four
categories: (1) Soviet and United States goals, (2) the threats to
each country, (3) the capabilities of each, and (4) the dilemmas.

GOALS

Although the Soviet Union may lack a clear national strategy,
there seems to be a consensus on its objectives. The priority of
these objectives is also fairly clear.

1. Security of the regime. This is first and foremost. And, as
Dimitri Simes pointed out, this means that the Soviet Union will not
favor detente at the risk of internal order.

2. Security of the Soviet Empire. This is second but not totally
separate from the first.

3. Avoid encirclement. This is a strong and historical goal and is
reflected in historic Soviet policies toward the Federal Republic of
Germany and China.

4. Displace and replace the United States as the major world
power.

During the discussion of United States goals, a panel member
pointed out that there has been confusion between goals and
means. He used the example of containment. It most often is viewed
as a goal, an end in itself, when it should be viewed as a means.
There were three United States goals discussed. The difficulty the
panel had in defining these goals suggests the difficulty of setting a
national strategy.

1. Favorable distribution of power. This means favorable to the
United States.

2. An international system favorable to United States values.

3. An international environment in which United States inter-
ests may be safeguarded.
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

THREATS

The Soviet Union sees itself as being highly vulnerable. It is threatened by the sheer existence of the outside world. Whatever real threat the United States may pose to the Soviet Union is compounded by this view of the international environment. In addition, saying that the Soviets have this view does not suggest that it would not be possible to assuage the fear by certain actions.

The panel discussed the reasons for the deep insecurity of the Soviet leaders. It was suggested that they may be found in the lack of legitimacy of succession. Detente is not working. The economy is not working. And their adversary is rebuilding its strength.

The Soviet Union is not alone in its distortion of reality. The United States has had a historical fear of the Soviet Union. The record suggests that this fear often has been unreal, divorced from reality. There was the scare of 1919; there was the McCarthy period; and there was NSC-68. NSC-68 was described by one panel member as a fantasy document.

While the Soviet Union represents the major threat to the United States, the panel member pointed out that it is not the only threat. The United States must be concerned about threats from other areas and the national strategy needs to reflect these.

CAPABILITIES

The relative capabilities of both superpowers is declining. Neither can control the chessboard as before—or as they thought they could before. There was some discussion, for example, that it was just as difficult for the United States to control its allies in the 1950s as it is today. Different views were presented on exactly how successful the Soviet Union has been over time in controlling its allies.

On the question of economic capabilities, the discussion highlighted the relative weakness of both countries. As for the specific condition of the Soviet economy it was described in various terms from "not as bad as the Administration would have us believe" to "absolutely awful."
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

Dilemmas

Neither country is without its strategic dilemmas. For the Soviet Union there is the serious problem of balancing resources between needs. There is the question of economic reforms; there is the question of how to handle detente, as defined from the Soviet point of view. Beyond these, there is Afghanistan. It was argued that the Soviets probably cannot win that war continuing as they are and that victory would require taking over the war completely and going after sanctuaries in Pakistan. On the other hand, it was suggested that the Soviet Union might find it desirable to use some form of settlement in Afghanistan as a means of improving relations with China.

As for the United States, high on the list of dilemmas is strategic arms. The problem is one of continuing competition with the Soviet Union while at the same time working toward an arms-control accord. There was almost complete agreement on this second element. It is viewed as a must for a new administration. There must be an arms-control position early and it must show progress. The current administration suffers from not having done that.

The United States has the problem of setting realistic goals. It also has the problem of deciding how those goals are going to be achieved. Will it be done with a unilateral strategy or a multilateral strategy? Will it be reactive or activist? There seemed to be general agreement that the United States cannot adopt a unilateral strategy and most seemed to favor being activist rather than just reactive. These two positions, however, further underscore the dilemmas because, as was pointed out, the greater the number of actors in the process, the more difficult it will be to be activist.
Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy

Dr. Dimitri K. Simes
The Johns Hopkins University

Americans have traditionally had difficulty analyzing the Soviet Union's long-term strategy. Wide zigzags in US perceptions of the Russians' international behavior can be only partially explained by shifts in the Kremlin's approach to the world. Factors for which the Soviets can be only remotely responsible and which sometimes lay completely outside their control have on many occasions greatly influenced America's images of its principal rival. Robert Kaiser has wisely cautioned observers "...to keep in mind that the Soviet Union does not exist in American, or British, or German terms. It exists in Russian terms, in a unique setting and cultural environment unlike anything we know. Comparisons are inevitable, but usually irrelevant. Russians could not live like Englishmen or Americans even if they wanted to, which they don't. They must live like Russians which means they cannot turn their society into a copy of ours."

AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Neither can the USSR, even if it was interested, conduct a foreign policy which would be a mirror image of the way the United States conducts itself in the international arena. Moscow looks at the world through a different cultural, historical and psychological prism. It responds to different challenges and perceives different opportunities. Its policy is formulated through different channels and according to totally different procedures than in the American case. Finally the Soviet Union goes through its own states of development, experiences its own periods of fear and hope—periods which more often than not are not synchronized with the historical cycles evolving in the United States.

Because of these numerous and serious disparities, American thinking regarding what the Russians are up to in international
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affairs, how well they are doing for themselves and in what way their successes and failures affect US interests, has, at best, suffered from a tendency to draw premature conclusions and, at worst, has been ethnocentrically divorced from reality and occasionally completely off the mark.

A newly fashionable school of thought, particularly strong among influential sectors of the Reagan Administration, assumes that the Soviet empire is declining. It still represents a considerable threat and is responsible for a lot of global mischief, but to paraphrase Soviet propagandists talking about imperialism, while its nature has not changed, its opportunities are now severely limited. In short, the USSR is perceived as decaying, but deadly.

Certainly, during the last ten years, the aging Brezhnev leadership has encountered a number of serious difficulties both at home and abroad. Still, is there credible evidence that we are dealing not with a temporary Time of Troubles, but with a fundamental systemic crisis? The answer is far from obvious. First, economically the Soviets, despite their growing shortcomings, are not at the edge of disaster. They are still the leading oil, coal, steel and concrete producer and their output of electricity and especially of natural gas is growing quickly. Their declining growth rates have not been any lower during the last two years than those in the United States. In fact, Soviet rates have kept pace with American ones throughout the whole of the 1970s.

Second, the Soviets have managed to deal successfully with the troubling wave of dissent which swept the USSR during the high days of detente. In 1977, the regime began systematically arresting, imprisoning and/or deporting anyone involved in dissenting activities considered by the authorities to represent a challenge to the system. The crackdown was so thorough and so effective that Andrei Sakharov’s wife, Elena Bonner, was recently forced to disband the last of the Helsinki monitoring groups, the organizations which had provided a rallying point for much of the dissent appearing during the 1970s. Thus, the Soviet leadership has demonstrated the clear ability, and determination, to contain political dissatisfaction within the narrow limits it finds acceptable.

Finally, there is a consensus among Western students of Soviet affairs that the Brezhnev regime is increasingly inept. out of steam
Comparing US and Soviet Strategies

and indecisive. It has difficulty defining priorities, making tough choices and introducing innovations. It would be a fair guess that if this kind of leadership style were to continue indefinitely, the Soviet Union would indeed find itself in a major crisis. But the Brezhnev regime will not last forever, the General Secretary's periodic recoveries from ailment notwithstanding. One is obliged at least to entertain the possibility that Brezhnev's heirs will act with greater boldness and imagination. We simply do not know whether domestic constraints on their freedom of maneuver would outweigh an apparent desire among the elite, particularly among its younger generation, to see things moving again. Neither do we know to what extent carefully calibrated reforms can allow the system to modify itself without a radical overhaul.

In the international arena, the last several years have clearly provided Moscow with ample grounds for concern and frustration. But Soviet foreign-policy setbacks should not be overstated. Basic Russian military capabilities have improved during the 1970s and provided the Kremlin with both rough strategic parity with the United States and a new conventional global reach. These capabilities, at the disposal of a leadership more inclined to take risks and more sensitive and sophisticated in local situations, may allow a number of major new openings for Russian geopolitical advances.

In the Third World, the Soviets overextended themselves and their positions in a number of important areas, such as the Middle East, and appeared to be considerably weaker than conventional wisdom had previously suggested. But here the problem may have been more with American conventional wisdom than with the Soviets' relative strength. What, after all, were the USSR's realistic options for helping its allies and clients during what the Israelis have called the Peace for Galilee operation? Vadim Zagladin, a CPSU Central Committee member and First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department, addressed this question in a recent television interview. Asked why the USSR permitted an Israeli victory allegedly backed by the US, Zagladin responded:

What do you have in mind with this "permitted or not permitted"? Well, what has happened? There is a war between Israel and one of the Arab countries, aggression against an Arab country. Under these circumstances what can the Soviet Union do? Should it attack Israel? This is a rather impossible situation.
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By the way, no one here has raised this question, or could anyone have raised it. When it comes to support due our friends, the Syrians and the Palestinian patriots, we have done everything, in the political and diplomatic spheres, in the United Nations, in the course of our negotiations with the United States and the Arab countries. We made up all the losses they suffered in the first few days of the fighting. Our Syrian comrades say they are now much better equipped than before.

Zagladin also raised the question of "what did the other Arab countries do?": His clear message was that Moscow could not and moreover was not supposed to, do more for the Arabs than they were willing to do for themselves. Such a frank admission may be interpreted as a sign of impotence, but it is not the first time either the US or the Soviet Union has encountered situations beyond their power to affect. Not to engage in bluffs and pitiful grandstanding may sometimes be not an admission of weakness, but an indication of prudence and common sense.

In relations with China, the Soviets failed to achieve a real reconciliation, but are surely happy to witness new Sino-American friction and particularly the tentative indications of Peking's (Beijing's) interest in reactivating contacts with Moscow. That is much less than the Kremlin wants and there is a real possibility that the Chinese are just playing the Russian card to pressure Washington. Nevertheless, Brezhnev's successors may seriously consider making some concessions to Chinese demands (such as thinning troops on the border, withdrawing from Mongolia and Afghanistan and abandoning support of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea) in order to restore a more favorable relationship with Peking (Beijing). None of the possible concessions really affects fundamental Soviet interests and while a resumption of genuine Sino-Soviet friendship is probably out of the question, the Soviets may have some real opportunities further to neutralize America's ability to play the China card in its geopolitical competition with the USSR.

In Poland, the Soviet Union has, perhaps just temporarily, avoided the worst. There are no new difficulties with the Kremlin's relations with other East European allies. And some former difficulties, most notably with Romania, are more or less under control. As far as Western Europe is concerned, the USSR is still on the offensive hoping to preserve and enhance a separate detente with the Europeans and to undermine their willingness to follow US leader-
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ship. At this point, as the pipeline dispute and continuing pressures from Western Europe's antinuclear movement suggest. Soviet hopes are not entirely without foundation.

In short, while the Soviet Union is going through a difficult time, both domestically and internationally, it may be dangerous to assume that the West is dealing with a paper tiger, or even with a desperate giant, bound—if only the NATO allies persevere in squeezing a little harder—to surrender or to collapse. The Russians went through an assertive phase in the middle 1970s and it is traditional for them to take a pause and regroup before proceeding with a new offensive. Moreover, their long-term future remains uncertain. And Brezhnev's successors are not out of options to put their act together both at home and abroad.

Thus, the Soviet situation looks so desperate primarily because of our earlier fears that the Russians were on the march. They were about to exploit an alleged window of vulnerability. They were planning to cut off Western oil supplies by moving to the Persian Gulf through a landlocked, rebellious Afghanistan. They were plotting to use their new Marxist friends in Angola and Mozambique to deny the West access to South Africa's strategic minerals. They were manipulating an arc of instability running from Mogadisho through Tehran to Islamabad and Kabul. And finally, they had developed nothing but contempt for the United States' will and power and were prepared to disregard America's growing warnings even when US vital interests were at stake.

Those who write science fiction in the field of international relations are always entitled to say that it was their vigilance and alarms that avoided the worst. Still, the easiest strategy to defeat is a strategy which never existed in the first place. And Soviet successes and failures today must be evaluated not on the basis of yesterday's exaggerated fears, but rather on the basis of actual Soviet capabilities, actions and intentions. Inevitably, the exposure of the United States to international traumas, such as Vietnam or the Iran hostage crisis, and changes in American domestic currents, cannot fail to have an impact on US perceptions of the other superpower. But as long as Washington persists in the habit of thinking about the Soviet Union primarily in American, rather than Soviet terms, there are bound to be serious miscalculations concerning Soviet foreign-policy behavior and, equally inevitably, periodic reappraisals of US
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policy as American politics enter new phases or old dogmas are proven false.

WHITHER SOVIET LONG-TERM STRATEGY?

Does the Soviet Union seek world domination or does it simply want to become America’s equal in global affairs? This highly unprecisely formulated and politically irrelevant question somehow managed to surface as the principal issue in debates about policy in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. Let us assume for argument's sake that Moscow is interested in dominating the world. What does this really tell the West about the Kremlin’s motives and policies? Actually, very little. The Soviets may dream of world domination, but what are they willing to risk? What sacrifices are they prepared to make in pursuit of it? Where does world domination stand on their priority list in relation to other more defense-oriented objectives? Does the USSR have any approximate timetable and a coherent strategy to accomplish it? On the other hand, is the statement that the Soviet leadership will be satisfied with military parity and equal status in world affairs any more sound? How do the Soviets define parity and global equality? Do they believe that they already have them or are they convinced that obtaining them would require a further “shift in the correlation of forces” in the Russians’ favor? Does equality with the United States mean that the superpowers would act in condominium, or conversely, would the Soviet Union be entitled to seek new global positions at the expense of the United States and in a fashion reminiscent of American behavior in the days of US preponderance?

As Vernon Aspaturian correctly observes:

Actually, Soviet policy amounts to something less than a master plan (grand design) or a five- or ten-year plan (global strategy), yet it is something much more than a sequence of responses to targets of opportunity... The Soviet Union responds to targets of opportunity, it often creates its own opportunities, and it behaves in the absence of opportunities.¹

Indeed, during the Brezhnev era, the Soviet Union has failed to develop a truly coherent and realistic foreign-policy strategy. The very nature of the mandate of the post-Khrushchev regime with its emphasis on continuity, stability, prudence, conservatism and bureaucratic consensus has discouraged daring schemes and
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long-term planning. As Harry Gelman points out: "...despite the obligatory obeisance all Soviet institutions must make to paper plans, the practical decisionmaking horizon of the Soviet leadership, particularly in foreign affairs, is remarkably short."

Tired of Stalin's purges and Khrushchev's harebrained experimentation, the Brezhnev elite has above all yearned for reliability, pragmatism and steadiness as central elements of the post-Khrushchev leadership style. Leonid Brezhnev has been extremely careful to appear the champion of these yearnings. In the early seventies, the General Secretary began to act with greater confidence and even occasional flamboyance. But just at the time when Brezhnev was probably secure enough to initiate policies sure to be considered controversial among some segments of the establishment, his ailments started to interfere with his ability to offer decisive leadership. The General Secretary's failing physical health could not but affect his political health as well. His personal position did not appear to be challenged. As a matter of fact, a number of aging Politburo members had reason to feel more comfortable with a less assertive, somewhat handicapped leader. Still, even with his staying power intact, Brezhnev lost an important opportunity to make critical foreign-policy choices without which no strategy worth the name could be shaped. There is a possibility that the Politburo could have scored reasonably well if the international environment would have favored the policies the Soviets already had in place. But the progressive decline of detente with the United States, the erosion of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the emergence of tempting new opportunities in Africa and Asia called for a serious reassessment of earlier assumptions.

Such a reassessment was apparently beyond the Politburo's conceptual and organizational reach. The Brezhnev leadership's course became increasingly reactive and eclectic. On the surface, the General Secretary and his associates may have seemed to be on a worldwide offensive. In reality, they were probably politically and intellectually confused as they attempted simultaneously to pursue a variety of mutually contradictory policies: they refused, for example, to recognize that in the long run tough choices could not be avoided between expansion and detente, between preventing Sino-American rapprochement and engaging in activities which both Peking and Washington viewed as threatening, and between encouraging a split between America and her European allies and deploy-
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Of course, the absence of a true grand design has its positive side. Too well defined a master plan may undermine one's ability to deal with international complexities. A lack of strategy allows greater operational flexibility and prevents the commission of costly errors in the pursuit of a vision. And the USSR's principal rival, the United States, was hardly capable of sustaining a steady and calibrated line in world affairs following the collapse of Nixon's imperial presidency. Thus, the Politburo's opportunistic behavior did not prevent Soviet foreign policy from retaining its effectiveness, at least as long as there was no urgent necessity for the leadership to determine priorities. And the Politburo was spared this necessity because for the time being the Soviet superpower was the new boy on the block and benefited from the perception of many postcolonial nations that the Kremlin merely sought to restrict the "imperialists'" freedom of maneuver. In addition, the United States, recovering from its Vietnam-Watergate trauma, was unwilling to go beyond empty rhetoric in challenging Soviet geopolitical advances.

There is no reason to pity the poor Russians. Nor should one underestimate the threat opportunistic Soviet assertiveness poses to the credibility of the United States' global role. The point is that the USSR under Brezhnev hardly represents Hitler's Germany, Norman Podhoretz notwithstanding. Moscow has been clearly interested in changing the international status quo and doing so at the United States' expense. But the Politburo lacks the Nazis' adventurist streak, their sense of urgency, their missionary zeal, and, finally, their readiness to risk the very survival of the regime in the name of the cause.

Instead of a grand design, the Politburo has a pattern of international behavior which seeks to accomplish a number of remarkably constant objectives and which is based on several evolving assumptions about the opportunities and dangers provided by the outside environment. At the top of this list of objectives is the security of the regime.

It is important for those dealing with the Soviet Union to understand this. The Politburo is most reluctant to engage in activities which can invoke a real threat to the Communist system. The Soviet
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leadership is not about to threaten its domestic hold by pushing so hard internationally that Russia itself becomes the target of powerful counteraction. Nor is the Kremlin inclined—almost no matter what the potential foreign-policy benefits—to display any but a marginal flexibility on the issue of internal controls. Giving the domestic situation unquestionable priority means in practical terms that the Kremlin does not want to test whether it can fight and win a nuclear war. It also means that Soviet rulers were bound to react harshly to Western, especially American, efforts to use detente as leverage to achieve internal liberalization in Russia.

Another priority is maintenance of the Soviet empire. The empire is much more central to Soviet thinking than it was in the case of the United States, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and even the Ottomans. Since the overthrow of the Mongol yoke, Russia has never existed as a true nation state. It has always been a multinational entity. And the prospect of the empire’s unraveling has always invoked great fears that disintegration would become uncontrollable and lead to a collapse of Russian statehood. Moreover, whatever the Soviet leadership declare publicly regarding the “unbreakable unity of the socialist community,” deep in their bones they probably know that without Russia’s armed forces and coercion their hold not only over Eastern Europe, but also over some areas of the Soviet Union (most notably the Baltic states) would be short-lived.

Events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland probably persuaded the Kremlin that it is its military power, not the alleged irreversibility of Communist totalitarian controls, that keeps the Soviet empire intact. Moscow is too unsure of its clients’ loyalty to risk war in Europe, even if it could be restricted to conventional weapons (something not taken for granted by the Soviet high command). But for the same reason the Russians become highly nervous when East-West accommodation provides the context for their allies to forge independent political and economic ties with the capitalist world, especially the United States. In short, concern for the safety of the empire makes the Politburo simultaneously less prone to dangerous adventures and less likely to undertake genuine and comprehensive accommodation with the West.

Of almost equal concern with maintenance of the empire is the Soviet desire to prevent a new encirclement by hostile powers. The fears of encirclement—or, as the Soviets sometimes call it,
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blockade—has traditionally been an important consideration in the USSR. And the fear has stayed alive despite the Soviets' accretion of global power. At the same time Sino-Soviet skirmishes took place on the Ussuri River in March 1969, the West German Bundestag was called into session in West Berlin to elect a new president. The Soviet media were quick to charge that "it was no accident" that the two events took place almost simultaneously. If there was no actual coordination between Bonn and Peking, then they were at least implicitly reinforcing each other. West German revanchists were allegedly violating the status of West Berlin and the Chinese were attempting to use force to revise the "sacred" borders of the Soviet Union.

Prevention of a new encirclement was to a considerable extent behind the unsuccessful trip Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Aleksei Kosygin paid to Peking in September 1969. It also added urgency to concluding the 1970 agreements between the two Germanies and the Quadrupartite Agreement regulating the status of West Berlin. The fear of encirclement clearly contributed to the emergence of a near consensus in Moscow—despite the United States' continued involvement in Vietnam—in favor of normalizing relations with the US. In the early eighties, when Washington adopted a more antagonistic attitude to the Soviet Union, the Politburo predictably responded by reactivating efforts, on one hand, to promote a separate detente with the West Europeans, and on the other hand, to proceed with an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.

Further down in the hierarchy of objectives held by the Brezhnev leadership was the temptation to reshape the world order. While not as crucial as the three defensive objectives mentioned above, the commitment to change the international status quo is, for a variety of reasons, important to the Politburo. First, Soviet ideology, which predicts the eventual victory of Soviet style Communism, requires constant reaffirmation by deeds. As the Soviet economy deteriorates, corruption flourishes and the regime fails to display anything even remotely resembling charismatic and confident leadership, there will be a growing need to use foreign-policy successes for domestic legitimation purposes.

The search for legitimacy through international advances does not limit the Soviets only to Third World geopolitical exploits.
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Detente with the United States, which the Soviets have interpreted as recognition by the US of the USSR’s new superpower status, could also be used by them to demonstrate that the “correlation of forces” was shifting in Moscow’s favor. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that detente with the West—and any benefits which could be derived from it—could, in Soviet eyes, completely eliminate the need to demonstrate from time to time that, in accordance with Lenin’s prophecies, imperialism was gradually losing its international positions.

Second, even today the Soviet Union perceives itself as an underdog in the global competition with the United States. Extending the Soviet geopolitical presence into new regions not only appeals to Kremlin machismo, it is also seen as a good security investment. It allows the USSR to threaten adversaries; it dissuades opponents from interfering in the Soviet sphere of influence; and it positions the Kremlin to pressure competitors to defer more and more to the upcoming Soviet superpower. Finally, there are economic interests involved. In terms of its foreign-trade structure, the Soviet Union is still a developing country. Thus, it is not illogical for Moscow to support Third World raw-material producers to demand a redistribution of international wealth. With a chronically ailing agricultural sector and stagnating oil production, the USSR has a vital interest in steadily growing oil and mineral prices. Without such increases, Russia would have tremendous difficulty buying grain and machinery in the West.

A further Soviet foreign-policy objective requiring attention is the Politburo’s interest in obtaining the fruits of international economic cooperation. The Soviets are especially hungry for Western credits and technology. Their failure to undertake meaningful economic reforms coupled with their reluctance either to cut defense spending or to squeeze the Soviet consumer harder encouraged the Politburo to look for politically acceptable shortcuts. Economic cooperation with the West looked promising and the initial enthusiasm of the Western business community over the prospects of large new Eastern markets reaffirmed Soviet inclinations in this direction.

Last, but definitely not least, the Soviet regime is absolutely determined to improve its military capabilities. Possessing military power which is not just second to none, but which is capable of dealing with a potential coalition of enemies, is viewed as an abso-
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lute security requirement. The Soviets probably do not believe that they already have military superiority over the United States. But in any case they are likely to perceive their legitimate defense needs quite differently than the West. As long as diplomatic arrangements—whether with allies or opponents—do not fundamentally alter Soviet convictions that they require sufficient military power to act unilaterally in the face of a variety of real and imaginary worst-case scenarios, the Soviet arms buildup will remain unacceptable to the West.

Furthermore, Soviet military might has been increasingly used by the Soviets for offensive purposes. The expansion of Soviet influence through ideological appeal and economic assistance, as projected by Khrushchev, has turned out to be a big disappointment. And the Brezhnev leadership has resorted increasingly to the one instrument at its disposal which has seemed to work best—namely, military muscle, and more specifically, arms sales, security assistance, the use of surrogates, and ultimately, in the case of Afghanistan, direct reliance on Soviet ground forces. As the last Soviet Minister of Defense Andrei A. Grechko explained:

> At the present stage, the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely to their function of defending the Motherland and other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity, Soviet state policy actively, purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of the planet it may appear."

Grechko’s statements, combined as they are with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko’s regular assertions that no international crisis can henceforth be settled without Soviet involvement and approval, have an ominous ring.

These principal objectives of Soviet foreign policy have remained fairly constant through the Brezhnev era. What has undergone change has been the relative priority the Kremlin has assigned to them and also the assumptions regarding how most effectively to pursue them in the international environment.
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CHANGING SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS

The greatest shifts in Soviet thinking probably took place in Soviet assumptions regarding relations with the United States. In the late sixties, the Brezhnev regime was simultaneously furious with the United States for American involvement in Vietnam (involvement which included bombing a Soviet ally) and delighted to witness the way in which the war gradually eroded US domestic cohesion, American willingness to maintain other global commitments and US international prestige. Later, however, the logic of detente with Western Europe, the split with China, US disengagement from Vietnam and the Nixon Administration's formidable image persuaded Moscow to accept normalization with the United States. Not unlike the Americans, the Soviets have a tendency to make a virtue out of a necessity and to practice ex post facto overintellectualizations of what are essentially a series of loosely connected tactical steps.

The Brezhnev leadership, encouraged by the excessive optimism of Moscow's America watchers, managed to persuade itself that detente was irreversible. US willingness to accommodate the USSR was, it was believed, based on a new correlation of forces. This correlation of forces was supposed to continue shifting in the Soviets' direction and the "realistic elements" more and more dominant in American ruling circles would increasingly recognize that their own best interest lay in not challenging what the Soviets called the "new international reality."

As subsequent events demonstrated, this was both an extremely comforting and an extremely misleading assumption on Moscow's part. It was comforting because it presented the opportunity to boast about having been accepted as a legitimate equal by the other superpower. Similarly, there was the expectation of sizable economic and political dividends. And since detente was not a temporary development, but a response to long-term objective conditions, there was no need to make hard choices to placate the Americans. Their narrowly defined vital interests in Europe, the East and to a lesser degree the Middle East, had to be respected or at least not assaulted too boldly. But everywhere else it was open season. And the US was not expected either to resist or even to get particularly upset if the Kremlin on occasion picked up an additional piece of real estate here and there.
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This, of course, was a profound misreading of the American public mood. Nobody knows what the Soviets would have done in Angola if they had not miscalculated the US reaction. But the miscalculation contributed to the apparent ease with which the momentous decision to intervene by proxy was made.

The outcry the Soviet-Cuban role in Angola caused in the United States perplexed and annoyed the Soviets. But they failed to see the writing on the wall. The Politburo refused to accept that the moment of truth had come and that a choice had to be made between detente with the United States and meddling in the Third World in pursuit of questionable and marginal advantages. Confronted with the message that sacrifices had to be made, the Kremlin preferred to do nothing. The Brezhnev leadership reacted to Kissinger's warnings by on one hand issuing appeals for continued improvements in relations and on the other hand exploiting new hotbeds of international instability, as in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict.

In trying to justify this apparent inconsistency, Soviet officials and analysts suggest in private conversations that Moscow's policymakers were not completely blindfolded. Rather, they hoped that a combination of cautiously avoiding challenges to really vital American interests, indications of good will, and demonstrations that greater Soviet involvement in the Third World was a fact of life and had to be accepted, would sooner or later cool off the indignation in the United States. If such an interpretation represents more than a belated rationalization it indicates that having persuaded themselves regarding the irreversibility of detente, Brezhnev and his colleagues had great difficulty changing gears and responding promptly and in an informed fashion to a growing body of evidence that Washington was unprepared to accept the Soviets' right to use military instruments in Third World areas.

By the early eighties, the Soviet Union reached the tentative conclusion that the American ruling classes, not just Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, were unprepared to treat the Soviet Union as a second superpower, or to use the Soviet formulation, they were unprepared to deal with the USSR according to the "principle of equality and equal security." Without completely giving up hope that there may be some improvement in the relationship and reluctant to substantiate US charges by behaving and sounding
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like warmongers, Soviet policymakers have come more or less full circle and have returned to their assumptions of fifteen years ago—that the United States is the principal threat to Soviet security and a main obstacle to Soviet global ambitions. The name of the game has become to neutralize the United States, to prove that the Americans lack the ability to succeed in their anti-Soviet crusade. From detente with the United States, Soviet foreign policy has shifted its objective to detente despite and against the United States—detente with the West Europeans and, if possible, the Chinese to isolate the US adversary.

Soviet treatment of opportunities in the Third World represents another example of changing assumptions in Moscow. Nikita Khrushchev argued that so-called national liberation movements would develop into a powerful ally of the Soviet bloc and the working class of capitalist countries in a historic struggle against imperialism. The expectation was that these movements would perceive the USSR as a natural ally against their former (and in some cases still current) colonial masters. It was understood that despite Khrushchev’s occasional bluffing Russia did not have the capacity to assist its friends militarily in regions far from Soviet borders.

But Soviet assumptions gradually changed on both counts. Moscow lost confidence that developing nations would, according to the logic of history, choose a noncapitalist path of development and appeal for Soviet friendship. The Politburo discovered, as Academician Evgeny Primakov, director of the prestigious Institute of Oriental Studies, commented, that there was not just one but rather “two diametrically opposed trends” in developing countries: radicalization in some and conservative, pro-Western shifts in others.8 In sum, history on its own could no longer be assumed to take care of Soviet interests. Concurrently with this reassessment, the USSR developed force projection capabilities which enabled it to give history a shove in the right direction. Opportunities and intentions represent a two-way street. In 1961, the Kremlin could do next to nothing to help Patrice Lumumba in Zaire (then Congo Kinshasa). In 1975, the Soviets were in a position to mount a major airlift and sealift to assist the MPLA in Angola. And the Kremlin also got a convenient and presumably willing surrogate in Cuba.

By the end of the late decade, however, the Soviet Union began to realize that reliance on military muscle also had considerable
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costs and was not altogether effective. In addition to damaging the
East-West relationship, Soviet Third World exploits failed to deliver
some anticipated tangible geopolitical and economic benefits.
Soviet clients such as Angola, Ethiopia and Vietnam were unwilling
to pay for Soviet assistance with a major increase in the USSR's
military presence. Some landing rights for reconnaissance aircraft
and some port privileges for naval vessels were essentially the limit
of the advantages the Soviets were able to derive from their commit-
ments. This is in addition, of course, to the satisfaction of receiving
support for Soviet positions at the UN on issues which did not
involve client nations' own interests. Politically, states like Angola,
Ethiopia, and Vietnam tend to guard their independence and are not
beyond probing for possible ways to improve relations with the
West, including the United States.

On balance, the Soviet Union still appears proud of its new
global status. But as recent Soviet passivity during the Lebanon
crisis indicates, the aging Soviet leadership is becoming more dis-
criminating in its willingness to take a stand on behalf of friendly
Third World forces. And there is evidence of a growing sentiment
among the Soviet elite that the USSR has few genuine friends in the
Third World, that most of them are demanding and unreliable allies
of convenience, who ask for too much and are prepared to pay too
little.

CONCLUSIONS

As the Brezhnev era comes to an end, the Soviet Union finds
itself not only without a long-term strategy but without even clear
and firm assumptions about the international situation and how to
cope with it. It is going to be up to Brezhnev's heirs to make another
effort to shape a coherent and effective foreign policy. Obviously, a
succession period is not the easiest time for radical policy depar-
tures impossible without alienating some bureaucratic constitu-
encies. And yet in 1953-1956, before Khrushchev had managed to
consolidate his personal power, a consensus among the Presidium
(as the Politburo was called at the time) allowed several important
changes in the direction of the USSR's foreign policy. They ranged
from reconciliation with Yugoslavia to a peace treaty with Austria
and from a declaration that war could be avoided to the new policy
of forming an anti-Western assertive alliance with Third World radi-
cal forces.
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Those who are interested in trying to influence Soviet succession choices would be wise to assess realistically how much the West can affect Soviet international behavior. Chances are that no feasible Soviet government would be willing to make significant concessions when the security of the regime and of its empire are involved. If there are voices of moderation among the Soviet elite arguing for turning inward and taking at least a pause in global expansionism, the surest way to silence them is to create the impression that the United States is seriously committed to putting Communist Russia on the ash heap of history. Few regimes are prepared to cooperate in their own annihilation and the Soviet regime is not one of them.

As far as Soviet exploits in the Third World are concerned, there may be much greater flexibility in Moscow. A feeling of being overextended, according to private information from a number of well-informed Soviet sources, is increasingly shared by the Soviet elite. If the United States on one hand demonstrates the power and will to challenge Soviet expansionism on the ground and on the other hand avoids treating containment as a strait jacket designed to stop the Russians everywhere, there may be a real opportunity to reinforce existing antiexpansionist sentiments in Moscow. This would not make the Soviet superpower a comfortable partner in world affairs. Russian military might, the USSR's fundamentally antagonistic attitude to the West and what it stands for, as well as Moscow's notorious insensitivity and self-righteousness are not going to disappear. The Soviet Union is going to remain an adversary, but the specific mix of policies it opts for makes a difference to the United States and will, one way or another, be influenced by its actions, regardless of whether American policymakers expressly seek to exercise such influence.
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US Strategy for National Security

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY

To an extent without historic parallel, the security of the United States, together with that of allied and friendly states, depends upon the fashioning of an effective American global strategy. The essence of such a strategy lies in the achievement of coordination, coherence, and consistency in planning for the utilization in integrated fashion of all of the elements of statecraft—diplomacy, military force, economic strength, science and technology, psychological-moral elements, political will and leadership—for the attainment of vitally important objectives. A global strategy is necessarily dependent upon the ability of strategic planners, with adequate levels of public support in a pluralistic society, to view each specific issue in a broad context—one that takes account of relationships between, and among, seemingly discrete, but nevertheless closely linked, functional categories such as technological-industrial strength and military power. Seemingly isolated events in geographically remote parts of the world become part of a patterned sequence in which the policies of an adversary can be analyzed in a strategic framework and one's own global strategy can be developed. A strategic world view, necessarily multidimensional, is deeply rooted in an understanding of the relationship between geography and technological-political-economic-psychological factors in national security. A global strategy relates means to ends based upon an assessment of the capabilities and objectives of an opponent compared to one's own.

To think strategically is to link the present to the future, for any strategy has as an essential characteristic a set of clearly defined objectives that lie beyond the immediate issues of the day. In fact, a strategy posits goals, sets forth concepts for their attainment with due consideration for timing and phasing, develops necessary capabilities, and relates the shorter to the longer term. The greater
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the timespan between the present and the future within the strategy, the more general and simple are likely to be its basic elements. Conversely, the shorter the time between the present and the envisaged goals, the more concrete and detailed the planning must become. All grand strategies, however elegant in their simplicity, depend for their realization upon the development of specific plans, priorities, and tactics. On a day-to-day basis the tactics in support of strategy call for planning related to the posited long-term strategic objectives adapted to take advantage of opportunities that become available and to overcome the obstacles of the moment. In the United States, the postulated requirements of a global strategy confront the realities not only of a pluralistic society with the contending pressures and interests of major constituencies, but also the complexities of decisionmaking in a large bureaucratic structure, which in itself may place a heavy burden upon the formulation of a coherent, consistent global strategy.

To recognize the importance of strategy is to take cognizance of the inevitable constraints upon available resources, which must be used as efficiently as possible in support of national security policy. Like the roadmap, strategy indicates the most effective way to move from one place to another. If you do not know where you are going, according to the old adage, any road will take you there. Similarly, without a strategy, no amount of capabilities would be sufficient to provide for the common defense, to safeguard the security of the United States and allied and friendly nations. If all states neglect strategy to their peril, for weaker members of the international community a strategy for maximizing the effectiveness of limited capabilities becomes necessary to survival. If the margin for error narrows as it has for the United States in the 20th century, the need for a strategy is more imperative than ever, even though the sheer abundance of national resources never provided an alternative to a strategic approach to national security. To face as the United States does, an adversary that has measurably superior military capabilities in many categories is to place a greater premium than in the past upon a strategy which relates all relevant capabilities to a clearly stated set of objectives sustained by a national consensus.

A US STRATEGIC WORLD VIEW

In the 20th century the strategic interests of the United States.
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and hence the conceptual basis for an American global strategy, have been clearly defined in spite of the historic isolationist-internationalist debate and the periodic clashes between proponents of world-order politics and advocates of balance of power. American foreign policy has been based upon a quest for a favorable distribution of power, together with the evolution of domestic political structures as compatible as possible with US values and a global system within which American interests can be adequately safeguarded. The strategic interests of the United States formed the basis for American military intervention in two World Wars, and subsequently for the formation under US leadership of the alliances and other associations that emerged in the almost two generations that have passed since World War II. In the absence of such strategic interests, a policy of American isolationism would have sufficed, for under circumstances in which we were not dependent upon international trade or in which we were immune to the foreign policies and values of totalitarian states which might have been placed in permanent control of Europe and Asia, the United States could have survived in a world without allies in those continents.

Thus the interventionist-isolationist debate of the earlier years of this century represented essentially a clash between two contending views of the strategic importance of Eurasia to the United States in which the concepts of historic American isolationism were shown to be fallacious. In the final analysis the United States fashioned, in the containment policy of the late 1940s and in NCS-68 between 1950 and 1953, a global strategy which recognized the enduring interests and goals that had led to our entry into two World Wars. In "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which established the conceptual basis for our postwar relationship with the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan posited that

the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies...The Soviet pressure against the institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be talked or charmed out of existence."

According to NSC-68, it was necessary to prevent the hostile domi-
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tion of Europe and Asia in order "to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper." NSC-68 postulated the achievement of a balance of power that would halt the growth of Soviet hegemony, for "any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled." For this purpose NSC-68 emphasized the need for the defense of all points on the perimeter of the Free World. This called for a strategy encompassing the political-diplomatic, military, and economic means of statecraft to combat the Soviet Union "by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system so that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to the generally accepted international standards." Therefore, it was posited in the decade after World War II that the United States needed to maintain, with other friendly states and allies, overall superiority in power, especially military capabilities.

Although the United States might have remained physically intact in a hostile world dominated by one or more Eurasian states aligned with each other, the minimum price would have been the creation of a garrison state with attendant consequences for personal liberties, levels of prosperity, and amounts of armaments. The idea of such a Fortress America could not provide an acceptable alternative to a world in which as many other states as possible shared with the United States as many compatible values, objectives, and social-political-economic structures as possible. For this purpose, it was held to be necessary for the United States to help build a balance of power, first by means of US military power projection in a coalition or Grand Alliance in the two World Wars and subsequently by the formation of multilateral alliances of which NATO became the most important, and by means of a series of bilateral security treaties, especially in the Asian-Pacific area. By the 1960s the United States, it will be recalled, was the leader of a group of nations termed the Free World. Although not a few were less free in their domestic political structures than the United States and their motives for association with the United States were not always the same, the Free World represented a manifestation of American global strategy.
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Thus the continuity of US strategic interests is evident, for the problems confronting the United States in the 1980s, although more complex, require the fashioning of a strategy which, in many of its basic elements, resembles that of nearly two generations ago, but which encompasses security issues and regions that were not of principal concern to the United States in the decade after World War II.

THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC MAP

In the broadest sense, the global strategic map from an American perspective has encompassed in this century a struggle between land powers—first Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union—and maritime powers—first Britain and subsequently the United States—with West European allies and the United States linked in a transatlantic security framework, just as Britain had once formed coalitions in order to prevent the hostile domination of continental Europe. In Asia, Britain’s empire in the Indian subcontinent formed a counterpoise to Russian expansion from the north. The rise of Japan as a maritime state helped to check Tsarist expansion in East Asia. As recognized in the Containment Doctrine enunciated in 1974, the immediate problem for the United States, as for Britain in the preceding era, was to counter the efforts of the Soviet Union to press its outer zone of influence into states and regions on the rimlands of Eurasia and into adjacent territories and oceans.

In global geostrategic terms, the struggle of our age between an historically land-locked state, the Soviet Union, and a maritime power, the United States, remains for control, or denial of control, over territories extending from Northwestern and Central Europe to the Middle East-Persian Gulf-Africa area to Northeast Asia. Because the sealanes and the airspace above them constitute the internal lines of communication between the United States and the peripheral states of Eurasia, their control is indispensable to American global strategy, just as their denial to the United States has become a crucially important component of the Soviet global strategic perspective. In contrast to those of the United States, the internal lines of communication of the Soviet Union extend across the land spaces of Eurasia, impenetrable by the United States except perhaps under wartime conditions. Control of the peripheral, rimland regions of Eurasia by the United States would not be synonymous with control of the world, although it has been argued
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correctly, in geostrategic analysis, that such domination would be indispensable to, and a prelude to, Soviet global hegemony. Hence the enduring importance for the United States of the development of a global strategy whose major component is the denial of Soviet dominance in such territories. In the final analysis, an American global strategy includes alliances or alignments with as many states as possible on the rimlands of Eurasia, just as Soviet strategy is designed to undermine, divide, leapfrog, and circumvent such groupings of states and to break out of the inner reaches of the Eurasian landmass.

THE GLOBAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND US STRATEGIC INTERESTS

It has proven far easier to set forth the strategic interests of the United States than to develop in all of its dimensions a strategy to ensure their security. In fact, the strategic problems confronting the United States have grown in magnitude and complexity with the passage of time. In the first generation after World War II, the formation of alliances under American leadership provided a security framework in which economic growth and political pluralism flourished at a time of US strategic and commercial-technological supremacy. The diminution in American power militarily with respect to the Soviet Union and economically in comparison to allies in Europe and Japan has taken its toll on alliance cohesion and upon the global stability fashioned by American coalition leadership in the generation after World War II. The pursuit of various forms of detente with the Soviet Union in the last decade by alliance members has produced in NATO a crisis that at worst threatens its survival and at least diminishes its utility to the security of states on both sides of the Atlantic. A reconciliation between the exigencies of alliance cohesion and relations with the Soviet Union has eluded successive American administrations. A decade ago, the United States attempted to call into existence a multipolar world, with partnerships between itself and a unifying Western Europe and a strengthened Japan, together with an emergent de facto alignment with China, as the foundation for an American global strategy. Such an approach, based upon various forms of surrogates, represented an effort to find a means for more equitable burden-sharing with other states. Well before the end of the last decade, the inherent limits of such a strategy were apparent. The coincidence of interests among allies did not translate easily into necessary capabilities or even into similar approaches to important issues. West European

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allies and the United States were sharply divided on policies toward the Soviet Union, and on issues in the Third World, from Afghanistan to the Middle East to Central America. A global strategy providing for partnerships with allies and with other states assuming greater security burdens in itself was not compatible with an America-centered alliance decisionmaking structure. Nor was the greater independence and flexibility of diplomatic action that characterized American foreign policy then and now necessarily in keeping with alliance cohesion.

Fundamentally important to American global strategy, for more than a decade, has been the perceived need to form a de facto alignment with China. The Sino-American relationship was founded a decade ago upon a strategic consensus that stopped far short of an alliance and, on many issues, such as the US relationship with the Republic of Korea, Beijing (Peking) and Washington continue to hold substantially different positions. In fact, the PRC periodically links the United States and the Soviet Union together as superpowers whose “hegemonism” must be countered by a coalition of states encompassing China and the Third World. At other times, and especially between the late 1970s and the beginning of this decade, China called for a United Front including the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, in addition to the PRC itself, to oppose the Soviet Union.

In a quite different way than with allies in Western Europe and with Japan, the United States, in its relationship with China, confronted a dilemma that has yet to be fully resolved between whatever parallel strategic interests exist with the PRC and a residual American commitment to an erstwhile ally, Taiwan, which both the United States and the PRC, since the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972, as well as the government in Taipei, have recognized as forming a part of China. The global strategy of the United States calls necessarily for the building of what has been termed a strategic consensus with as many states as possible in opposition to the Soviet Union. A generation ago, the formation of a strategic relationship and the establishment of alliances were coincidental. Taiwan was clearly part of a strategic consensus in which the alliances for the containment of communism extended from Europe to East Asia. By the 1970s, not only had allies in Western Europe, in some cases, manifested greater independence in their own relations with the Soviet Union, but the United States itself had embarked upon a
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diplomacy, especially in the Nixon Doctrine, characterized by flexibility, maneuver, and surprise. In the 1980s the United States faces the difficult task of reconciling its interests as a superpower in a global strategy with the regional and more local preoccupations of allies and friends. This proposition is abundantly evident in the Sino-American relationship in which the United States has sought with only limited success to subordinate the Taiwan question to a broader strategic interest with the PRC against the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East and Latin America, respectively, recent American diplomacy has faced equally difficult problems with states whose interests are, first and foremost, grounded in their respective regions, rather than in forging the strategic consensus sought by Washington to contain Soviet expansionism. Nowhere has this problem been more apparent in recent years than in the US relationship with Western Europe, where the requirements for alliance cohesion have clashed with the creation by the United States of policies based upon strength to challenge Moscow's global strategy and the demands of West European allies for various forms of detente with Moscow.

The result has been to create in the United States a formidable problem in forging a global strategy based upon cooperation with allies and other friendly states. If the price of alliance cohesion were to become the adoption of policies of appeasement toward the Soviet Union, the security organizations of the last two generations, and especially NATO, would have outlasted their usefulness as the framework for a global strategy of the United States. An Atlanticist approach to American foreign policy would have become incompatible with the necessary means to achieve the global strategic goals of the United States. Under such circumstances, the United States would seem to have as its principal alternative the adoption of a unilateralist approach to foreign policy, in which American national interest would be asserted even over the objection of allies, as in the present American opposition to West European participation in the building of the natural-gas pipeline. Thus, the dilemma between alliance cohesion and a global US strategy against the Soviet Union has grown in magnitude in the last decade. In the absence of allies willing to assume the burdens envisaged in the strategy of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States faces the need to rely upon its own means and, when necessary, even to oppose the initiatives of allies whose policies are incompatible with its own. In
the early 1980s, the transatlantic relationship has come close to such a situation.

Thus American global strategy in the early 1980s retains elements of the Atlanticism forged in the mid-20th century, together with an emergent nationalist, or unilateralist, approach to strategy and foreign policy providing where necessary for principal emphasis upon American capabilities that will be strengthened in the years ahead. Paradoxically, if the first generation after World War II furnishes a guide, the rebuilding of American strength in the context of a global strategy, even though the relative power position enjoyed at that time by the United States cannot be restored, is indispensable to enabling Washington to regain a measure of lost coalition leadership. The greater the decline in American capabilities in support of its national strategy—relative both to allies and to the Soviet Union—the more difficult it becomes to assert American global leadership. If allies were not prepared to strengthen their own capabilities as surrogates for the weakened America of the 1970s, the key to US global strategy in the 1980s would seem clearly to lie in the building of greater American capabilities in support of commitments. Such a strategy must provide for the more equitable sharing among allies of the burdens of collective defense. This is the approach that American policy correctly has assumed in the early 1980s, although the gap between a global strategy and what is needed in its support remains wide. Taken together and viewed in the context of the continuity of US strategic interests in the 20th century, the official statements of the Reagan Administration yield the basic concepts of American global strategy for the 1980s. Such a strategy has not only military components but also political-ideological-economic content. The United States seeks to confront the Soviet Union by emphasizing the dynamic values of the open societies of the West contrasted with the monolithic, closed systems of the Soviet Union and its allies. In an address on 21 May 1982, William P. Clark sounded such a note when he called for an American strategy that would force the Soviet Union "to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings," and set forth the view that "our strategy must be forward-looking and active. . . . To secure the America we all want and the global stability and prosperity we all seek, we cannot sit back and hope that somehow it will happen. We must believe in what we are doing. That requires initiative, patience, and persistence. We must be prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they arise and to create opportunities where none have existed before."
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Thus the contemporary debate about American strategy for the late 20th century relates more to means than to objectives: how to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its strategic objectives in a world in which Soviet military capabilities, relative to those of the United States and allied and friendly states, have grown on a vast scale during the last decade, with abundant evidence of the failure of American approaches to detente and arms control as a substitute for adequate defense capabilities set within a multifaceted global strategy. At the time of the formation of the Atlantic alliance the strategic debate in the United States revolved around the question of the type of US commitment that would be necessary to deter any possible Soviet attack against Western Europe. Initially, the United States extended to its European allies an American nuclear guarantee with the expectation that the principal ground forces would be raised in Western Europe. To be sure, the land defense capabilities on the NATO Central Front have been largely West European although, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Atlantic alliance evolved a forward defense posture with substantial increases both in European and American forces. In the Atlantic Treaty ratification debate in the United States Senate the question of the type and level of American commitment arose: was it to be based upon nuclear forces and maritime capabilities or, in addition, the stationing of ground forces in Western Europe? In this sense the American debate of the early 1980s about alliance burden-sharing has an antecedent that is nearly two generations old, although the United States must forge in the 1980s a global strategy based upon greater commitments in support of vital interests but with increased constraints upon resources.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO US GLOBAL STRATEGY

In the quest for a US global strategy, essentially two contrasting approaches have asserted themselves: the first calls for power projection capabilities based principally upon strategic-nuclear forces, air power, and maritime supremacy as its principal military components, with a heavy emphasis upon the assumption of greater burdens by allies. Although its proponents do not ignore the need for the maintenance of a balance of power, they posit that in an equitable sharing of defense, the United States should focus its resources outside Western Europe. In this perspective, NATO allies and Japan, within their respective regions, should take on substantially greater responsibility. Hence, this approach may be termed a
Peripheral Strategy. The second approach, called here the Continental Strategy, posits the continuing need for the United States, with a balanced-force posture, to maintain ground forces in place both in Western Europe and Northeast Asia as a means of countering superior numbers of mobilized Soviet capabilities and preserving deterrence based upon an escalatory link with the US nuclear deterrent.6

The Peripheral Strategy is derived from certain of the premises which informed the Nixon Doctrine a decade ago in which allied burden-sharing was a central element. Because the United States is constrained in its capacity to project military power simultaneously to all theaters of vital interest, it must obtain from other states sharing compatible interests, values, and goals a greater commitment to defense. The Continental Strategy holds that, however desirable the objective of such burden-sharing may be, the growth of Soviet capabilities makes necessary a commensurate increase in the military forces of the United States and the continuation of a forward defense-in-place. The withdrawal of American ground forces from Western Europe, in this perspective, would not necessarily be offset by a growth in Western European capabilities. In fact, it is suggested, an irreversible erosion of political will and defense commitments might take place. Western Europe would then become the object of increasing Soviet political pressure and influence as the military balance, both in conventional and nuclear forces, shifted toward Moscow. The Peripheral Strategy, moreover, calls for the United States to furnish increased capabilities to counter security threats emanating from outside the North Atlantic area and the Western Pacific. In this perspective, both Western Europe and Japan should assume a greater portion of the burden of defense within their immediate geographic regions in order to enable the United States to focus its defense energies on other regions such as the Persian Gulf, in which West European and Japanese interests are deemed to be at least as great as those of the United States. If the Soviet Union is principally a Eurasian land power, all of whose capabilities the United States cannot match because we are not also such a power, we must maximize the advantages that allegedly accrue from our status as a maritime nation separated from Europe and Asia by two oceans. According to this approach, a rational division of labor would provide for modernized European ground forces and a substantial increase in Japan’s self-defense forces. The capabilities of the Atlantic alliance would continue to be based
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on nuclear deterrence. There would be a shift in US military priorities toward a larger navy and strengthened nuclear capability, together with greater mobility and firepower for remaining land forces.

The Continental Strategy calls for the more efficient utilization of existing land armies. This approach has, as one variant, the idea that nuclear forces, at all levels, must be strengthened as a means of enhancing deterrence through assured escalation and that the presence of large numbers of American ground forces at the point of potential conflict represents an indispensable ingredient for this purpose. In a second variant, the modernization of US and West European conventional forces committed to NATO is deemed to be essential to alliance security. Represented principally by a recent study published by Senator Nunn, this approach, in rejecting the withdrawal of US forces, asks rhetorically the following question based upon a critique of the Peripheral Strategy: "Those who suggest that Europe alone has the resources to muster a viable conventional defense—while this has considerable theoretical long-term appeal—should first answer a parallel question: Can an Alliance without American conventional forces be expected to provide a credible conventional defense when the Alliance with American forces thus far has failed?" Instead, this variant embraces the "Air-land Battle" concept providing for a military doctrine based upon the utilization of existing forces with new technologies and tactics designed to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, and calling for the destruction of Soviet-Warsaw Pact echelons before they would reach the inter-German border to reinforce front line units. A European-NATO defense-in-depth would be based upon expanded and modernized reserves and territorial forces. NATO would eschew any no-first-nuclear-use declaration until adequate conventional forces were available. At that time, according to this approach, it would be possible for the alliance to withdraw, as part of negotiated arms reductions, several thousand of the battlefield nuclear weapons now stationed in Europe. It lies beyond the scope of the present analysis of US global strategy and its requirements to enter into a detailed examination of NATO flexible response, or of the no-first-use of nuclear weapons proposal. Suffice it to say here that nuclear weapons have formed, and must continue to form, an essential component of any deterrent relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although neither the United States nor its allies plan to launch an attack upon the Soviet Union, we have
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properly reserved the right and sought to maintain the necessary means to retaliate against a Soviet attack at whatever level, including nuclear, that we might deem to be appropriate. In short, we have already embraced no-first-use, for NATO nuclear and conventional forces, and the flexible response doctrine as the term itself connotes, are based upon the notion of defense after a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack.

The Continental Strategy rejects the notion that, without forces in Europe, the United States would be able more easily and at lower cost to maintain its security commitments elsewhere, unless we could be certain that allies would fill the gap left by the withdrawal of US ground forces and the potential psychological effect of a decoupling of US strategic forces. The inability, or unwillingness, of allies to redress the imbalance resulting from withdrawal of ground forces, called for in a phased 15-to-20-year period in this approach, would strengthen greatly the Soviet power projection capability elsewhere. The result would be a neutralized Western Europe, which would be subject to greater pressure not only to help subsidize the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries by means of low-interest loans and high-technology transfers, but also to acquiesce in other Soviet initiatives. With its Western front more secure, the Soviet Union could reposition military capabilities to other theaters of direct importance. These would include not only the Sino-Soviet frontier, where approximately 25 percent of Moscow’s forces are already deployed, but also those points of strategic interest to the United States for which the advocates of the Peripheral Strategy argue that the United States should design its future force posture. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union, already enjoying the advantage in many cases of greater geographic proximity, would confront the United States with an even greater disparity in power projection capability than now exists. At the same time the United States would have greatly diminished its residual influence in Western Europe, which remains, in global strategic terms, the principal prize for the Soviet Union. In this view, a Peripheral Strategy, in place of a Continental Strategy, would have created for the United States a series of formidable, and perhaps insurmountable, problems on the Eurasian periphery, while the core area of American strategic interest outside the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, would have been lost.

It follows that a global strategy for the United States in the
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1980s must be based upon the denial to Soviet and other hostile influences, of both the core area, especially Europe, and the maritime periphery. Although the United States is a maritime state, the possession of forces for control of the seas and the adjacent airspace and for power projection is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the conduct of a global strategy. An American global strategy must contain as its principal elements the means for denying Soviet or other hostile forces control of the rimlands and for exerting countervailing political pressure upon the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the global strategy of the United States must be based upon elements of both the Peripheral and Continental Strategies. For example, American global strategy continues necessarily to rest formally upon the alliance infrastructure forged in an earlier day. In William P. Clark's words: "Ours must be a coalition strategy. We, together with our friends and allies, must pull together. There is no other way. We must achieve an even closer linkage with regional allies and friends." With the present deeply rooted divisions between the United States and certain of its NATO allies, however, alliance cohesion on some security issues must remain more a goal than a reality. In the absence of adequate levels of consensus among allies, the United States will have no real alternative to pursuit of a unilateralist approach, unless it is prepared—as it should not be—to alter substantially its global strategy to conform with the divergent interests of allies. Given its worldwide interests, capabilities and commitments, contrasted with the regional perspectives of the allies on many issues, the United States will continue to confront the need to balance alliance cohesion with, where necessary, the pursuit of unilateralist policies. Thus, an effective American global strategy will contain elements of both approaches: to work with allies where possible while acting alone in circumstances where policies are irreconcilable or when burden-sharing with other alliance members is not feasible.

TRENDS IN US NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Since 1945, the United States has relied heavily upon nuclear capabilities as a central element of global strategy. Although we cannot be certain that the United States and the Soviet Union would have gone to war with each other in the absence of nuclear weapons, the fact remains that for almost two generations (1945-1983)—nearly twice as long as the interval between the two World Wars (1918-1939)—there have been no military hostilities despite
the deeply rooted tensions and periodic crises with the Soviet Union and the numerous wars using conventional weapons within, and among, Third World states. None of these military conflicts have escalated to the superpower level. There is a valid presumption that nuclear weapons have played an important, and perhaps indispensable, role in US global strategy.

American nuclear strategy in the 1980s differs from that of a decade ago. Such changes take account of the altered circumstances of the strategic-military environment as a result of a greater American understanding of Soviet military doctrine and requirements imposed for deterrence by the growth of the capabilities of the Soviet Union. By the middle of the last decade, evidence had mounted that Soviet and American concepts for nuclear warfare, and for deterrence of such conflict, were different in fundamental respects. In the 1980s, American nuclear strategy has embraced more explicitly than previously the idea that the deterrence of nuclear conflict may depend upon a capability to fight a protracted war beyond a single exchange of nuclear weapons. The nuclear strategy of the present Administration goes substantially beyond Presidential Directive 59 issued by President Carter in 1980, which focused upon attack against specific military and political targets in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, present US nuclear strategy displays continuity extending over successive Administrations and reflecting the view that the United States must possess more than simply the means to deter a nuclear attack by threatening to inflict unacceptable levels of damage upon enemy cities and populations.

The nuclear strategy of the Reagan Administration is said to call for the deployment of American forces able to destroy the Soviet military and political power structure, as well as nuclear and conventional military forces and vitally important industry. An emphasis is placed upon strikes against Soviet political and military leadership and its ability to communicate with other elements of the forces of the Soviet Union. Although by no means new in many of its elements, current American nuclear strategy has been represented by certain of its critics as constituting evidence of a willingness by the United States to fight a nuclear war as an alternative to deterring such a conflict. Instead, the nuclear strategy of the early 1980s should be viewed as reflecting an altered American official conception of what is needed to enhance deterrence. Why should the United States not seek to be prepared to “win” a nuclear war as the
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basis for deterring its outbreak? There is a logical inconsistency in the notion that deterrence is undermined by a strategy based upon the “winnability” of nuclear war. Strategic deterrence depends upon the ability of the United States to ensure that the Soviet escalation of a political crisis with the United States to the level of nuclear warfare would result in defeat, not victory, for Moscow. If the Soviet Union posits that its postattack survival and recovery capabilities exceed those of the United States to such an extent that, in the event of nuclear war, a US defeat could be assured, the consequences for strategic stability would be highly disadvantageous to American interests. Despite the apparent and understandable reluctance of the American official policy community to confront critics on the nuclear war winnability issue, US nuclear strategy has moved steadily toward a concept of deterrence whose basis lies properly in assuring that the means available to the United States will be adequate for sustaining a protracted exchange of nuclear strikes and conducting other kinds of military operations against the Soviet Union.

PREREQUISITES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE GLOBAL STRATEGY

Because the United States might face the threat of simultaneous war in several parts of the world, the American response would be not to strike everywhere at once but instead “in sequence from one target to another.” In this respect, the Reagan Administration’s approach appears to emphasize, on the one hand, that a conflict with the Soviet Union could expand to the global level while, on the other hand, that the United States will not necessarily ever be able to engage such forces on all fronts at once. Instead, the United States should have available balanced forces, together with established priorities for military operations. Similarly, because the United States has an interest in limiting the scope of any conflict, it must have both a capability for counteroffensives on other fronts and the means to defend vital interests where they are attacked. Because the decision to enlarge a conflict may be made not by the United States, but instead by its adversary, forces must be available for immediate response.

It must be presumed that the makers of American global strategy regard its other elements in similar perspective. Undoubtedly in recognition of the need for such an approach to strategy, President Reagan has called for the strengthening of the “infrastructure
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of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.' This would encompass competition in ideas in a "plan and a hope for the long-term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people..."9 It is to be expected that such a comprehensive approach to strategy would make use of available political-diplomatic and commercial-economic instruments of statecraft which would be utilized at the points of an adversary's weakness. If the strength of the Soviet Union lies almost exclusively in military capabilities, it follows that Soviet vulnerabilities are to be found in the nondefense sectors. Within the Soviet Union, and within the territories under Moscow's hegemony, Marxist-Leninist ideology, together with political institutions and economic systems, face formidable, and perhaps insurmountable, structural problems. The points of vulnerability lie within the geographic zone under direct Soviet domination, and especially in Eastern Europe. Here the contrast between the global strategy of the Soviet Union and that of the United States and its allies becomes sharply delineated. One of the great paradoxes of our age is that the political-ideological-military battleground of the second half of the 20th century has been located largely outside Moscow's direct sphere of influence. Instead, the great conflicts of our era have been waged in the contested Eurasian rimlands and in countries and regions in the third World, many of which are fraught with potential instability and a legacy of Western colonialism and beset with a host of socio-economic problems ripe for exploitation by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Not only has the United States proven unable to develop, as part of a global strategy, the means to thwart major Soviet-sponsored and other hostile interventions, as in the Caribbean-Central America region, but the very growth of such forces has provided the basis for further disagreement between the United States and certain of its allies concerning an appropriate response, which seems only to be exceeded by differences related to the means to be used by the West to lessen Moscow-supported political suppression in Poland.

Ideally, a coherent and consistent US global strategy, in cooperation with allies, would call for common actions not only to thwart Moscow's extension of influence into the disputed Eurasian rim-
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lands and beyond, but also for concerted Western action to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities within its zone of direct influence and, specifically, in Eastern Europe. It would summon states sharing common interests and security objectives to join together, formally or informally, for concerted action to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union. A global strategy for the United States, conceived in such terms, may lie beyond the capacity of pluralistic political systems or coalitions based upon such states. Under such circumstances, the United States must evolve, without full support from allies, a global strategy which provides for the exploitation of the perceived "contradictions" within the orbit of the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

In the next-to-last decade of this century, the focus of US global strategy remains the development of the means within the appropriate framework to combat an adversary who seeks control of the Eurasian landmass and beyond. This geostrategic focus of American national interest, and of foreign policy, is likely to remain vitally important, even though the future holds the prospect that space will become another crucial arena for civilian and military competition with the Soviet Union. There has always been an inextricable relationship between technology and the utilization, both for military and civilian purposes, of the maritime and land surfaces of the earth, as well as the surrounding atmosphere. Therefore, it seems obvious that the existence of technologies for the transport of formerly earthbound objects—human and manmade—into outerspace holds important implications for civilian and military activities at least as great as those changes which accompanied the major technological innovations of the past. Under such circumstances, the concept of global strategy, especially for the United States, but also for the Soviet Union, will be broadened to include additional objectives, interests and exoatmospheric dimensions. 10 Inevitably, a global strategy for the United States will give to extraterrestrial space a place of prominence that extends far beyond existing national security activities such as command, control, communications, surveillance and verification.

As in the past, the development of strategy will be closely linked both to the exploitation of opportunities afforded by technology for the projection of power, broadly defined, into strategically important environments, and the integration of all of the elements of
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policy and statecraft into a framework for the attainment of national security objectives.
Chapter 7

Reorganizing the United States System for Developing Strategy

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will discuss recent suggestions about improving national security policymaking and organization. The papers might examine the constraints imposed by current and proposed organizations and examine the impact such constraints might have on future US strategy planning. The panel will evaluate the adequacy of the current legislated organization for developing strategy and recommend possible alternatives that might be more effective."
The panel considered recent proposals for organizational reform to improve national security policymaking. Our work was aided greatly by papers prepared by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, USAF; General Edwin C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, US Army; and Colonel Archie D. Barrett, USAF (Ret.), House Armed Services Committee Staff. The papers by Generals Jones and Meyer previously appeared as journal articles and were largely responsible for stimulating the current interest in JCS reform. Both General Jones and General Meyer describe problems in the current JCS system and offer remedies for improving the quality and timeliness of JCS advice. The Barrett paper similarly criticizes the existing JCS system, and additionally and usefully describes impediments to change and the means for overcoming this resistance.

A word about the panel composition is in order. Unfortunately, we were unsuccessful in getting many opponents of JCS reform to attend the conference. Thus, our discussions and our conclusions were somewhat skewed. But, it should be noted, a majority of the panel members were aware of the arguments against change and had taken them into account in their own thinking.

The panel established three questions intended to bound the discussion. We asked: (1) What is it that we expect of our civilian and military leaders?; (2) What is it about the current system that doesn’t work? and (3) What can be done—particularly in view of the obstacles to the proposals for reform?

The panel members were in general agreement regarding the proper roles of civilian and military defense leaders. Civilian control
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is essential, and civilian leaders should develop and articulate overall policy guidance and direction. Drawing upon their professional experience and judgment, senior military officers should provide integrated advice on matters of strategy, as well as on how to maintain, deploy, and employ military forces. One panelist, a senior retired military officer, argued that military advice to civilian leaders generally has not been as good as it should have been and that civilian leaders generally have not listened as well as they might have. Another retired general officer put forward the case for greater civilian control, noting that (except for the last two Presidents) civilians have tended to exercise too much control in operational matters and not enough in aggregating and rationalizing Service programs. There was a strong consensus within the panel that, on the broadest level, policy guidance has been relatively clear and consistent over the years.

The panel then turned to an analysis of what is wrong with the current system. The Barrett paper identified major weaknesses and elaborated the various impediments to reform and reorganization, noting in particular the tendency of the Services and other bureaucratic entities to become discrete organizations unto themselves, pursuing their own objectives relatively independently of, and at times in opposition to, the overall goals of the Department of Defense or national policy. As the Services pay most attention to their own priorities, certain key areas—the so-called “orphan missions”—receive scant attention: they include airlift, sealift, readiness, unconventional warfare, and communications, command, and control.

Because the Services pick and choose their own priorities, the sum of their programs is not synchronized and rationalized into a coherent whole. There is a serious disconnect between the providers (the Services) who are developing long-term strategies for procurement and the users (the unified commanders) who must use today’s forces to meet today’s threats under the framework of today’s political leadership. The result has been a sizeable mismatch between strategy as declared in national policy and the forces on hand to implement that strategy.

To the extent that it is done at all, strategy is developed quite independently of force development. There is simply no mechanism to rationalize combined military objectives and to use them to
inform and guide the programmatic process. What is missing is an
effective link between broad goals and objectives, on the one hand,
and resources and forces, on the other. That missing link is strategy,
which, within resource constraints, calculates how to reach goals
and objectives to the greatest degree possible. Effective strategy
would inevitably involve a significantly greater emphasis on joint
planning and operations.

On the question of what is to be done, a majority of the panel
agreed on several propositions and conclusions.

First, there was widespread pessimism about the prospects for
significant congressional action. Attendance at and interest in hear-
ings on the subject were both notably low. The Senate seems less
likely to act than the House. The (by some) anticipated connection
between DOD organizational issues and congressional review of
the DOD budget never materialized. Further, congressional action
is considerably less likely in the absence of executive branch
leadership.

Second, some changes are occurring in the system, largely
because the issue has been raised at such high levels, i.e., Jones
and Meyer. Many improvements can be made from within the sys-
tem without legislation, and some are already underway.

Third, senior civilian defense officials should establish objec-
tives and priorities in the field of national security, informed by and
in consultation with the considered judgments of senior military
officers, who should speak with a more unified voice. This is an
iterative and simultaneous, indeed continuous, process.

Fourth, there should be a single source of unified military
advice to the National Command Authorities, although there should
always be a right of reclama for Service Chiefs.

Fifth, serious doubts remain as to whether senior civilian lead-
ers are ready, willing, and able to accept good military advice and
seriously incorporate it into their decisionmaking.

Sixth, the operators—the heads of the Unified and Specified
Commands—must be linked more systematically to the guidance,
strategy, and procurement processes. The CINCs are the ultimate
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consumers of what DOD produces, and they must execute the strategies that are handed down. They must become more integrally tied to the system.

Seventh, the Chairman should be strengthened with a deputy and greater staff resources. Only then can he play a more effective and much-needed role in cross-Service and functional issues. A strengthened Chairman could bridge the gaps that now separate the Services, CINCs, and the NCA, and he could maintain more effective linkage between joint planning and Service planning, particularly in regard to the "orphan issues."

Eighth, the attentive public will continue to ask questions of accountability—how is our tax money being spent, and is it being spent wisely? Confidence in the soundness of the decisionmaking system is the key ingredient in sustained public support for the defense budget.
I. INTRODUCTION

In a 16 August speech to the House of Representatives supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982, House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Richard C. White summarized the concerns which prompted his bill:

Serious organizational flaws mar the performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, our highest military body might fail to function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case during World War II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War, we would be faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to our military organization in the midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize that there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict. Equally important in a continually threatening peacetime environment, timely, clear-cut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian counsels has diminished over time and, because decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by civilian analysts.

Chairman White explained that his disquiet stemmed from a recently completed series of hearings on Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reorganization conducted by his subcommittee. Those hearings were prompted by incumbent JCS Chairman David C. Jones' unprecedented announcement in February 1982 that he was concerned about basic defects in the JCS organization. General Jones further stated his intention to recommend proposals to correct those shortcomings and to work for their acceptance during the remaining months of his term as Chairman and thereafter when he retired.
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JCS Reorganization Proposals

The Jones Reorganization Initiative. General Jones found four major problems with the present organization: (1) diffused responsibility and authority; (2) inadequate JCS corporate advice—not "crisp, timely, very useful or very influential; (3) dominance of the JCS by individual service interests; and (4) basic contradictions between the two roles of each service chief, as a JCS member and as head of a service: a built-in conflict between service and broader defense interests; and incompatible demands on each Chief because he is called on to perform two full-time jobs.

To overcome these problems General Jones recommended that the JCS Chairman be strengthened. The Chairman would replace the JCS in the chain of command and as the principal military adviser to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman would also assume full authority over the Joint Staff which would be made directly responsible to him. Also, a newly authorized four-star deputy would assist the Chairman. The JCS, diminished in stature, would advise the Chairman and render corporate advice to the President on subjects referred to it by the White House. Additionally, each service chief would have the right to submit recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense, and to the President as appropriate.

Subsequent Proposals. Events following General Jones' initiative added momentum to the reform movement. Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, in an action as extraordinary as that of General Jones, announced that he believed the Chairman's reorganization proposals had not gone far enough. General Meyer proposed ending the "dual-hatting" of Service chiefs by creating a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) to replace the JCS. The NMAC would consist of four-star officers headed by a chairman. The members would have no service responsibilities and would not return to their services. The NMAC would assume advisory functions comparable to those of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the Chairman would be the principal military adviser, as in General Jones' proposal. The Service chiefs would devote themselves to their service responsibilities.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, the former Presidential adviser, JCS Chairman, and Army Chief of Staff, weighed in with an even
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more scathing indictment and a correspondingly more far-reaching reorganization proposal. He stated during his appearance before the Investigations Subcommittee that the "weaknesses of the present system... are so fundamental as to negate any hope that a little organizational tinkering will be enough to set things aright." He recommended dissolving the JCS organization and creating a "Military Staff, National Command Authorities" headed by a Chief of Staff who would be "the principal military adviser on matters related to current military policy, strategy and major DOD programs." To provide advice on "future national and military policy and strategy," General Taylor recommended creating a National Military Council somewhat analogous to General Meyer's concept.²

During the Investigations Subcommittee hearings a distinguished group of more than forty witnesses elaborated positions along a spectrum defined by the status quo at one extremity and General Taylor's proposal at the other. With few exceptions witnesses agreed that the JCS organization has significant weaknesses.

The JCS Reorganization Act of 1982. In early August the Investigations Subcommittee reported a bill, H.R. 6954, which subsequently received House Armed Service Committee endorsement and passed the House of Representatives. The House bill, though not as far-reaching as any of the major proposals, nevertheless addresses most of the major weaknesses identified in the testimony. It would strengthen the JCS Chairman by making him an adviser in his own right, giving him greater control over the Joint Staff, creating a Deputy Chairman, and allowing the Chairman to use the Joint Staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. The bill also contains several provisions designed to make the Joint Staff more independent—the author of its own work rather than a secretariat for the service staffs.

On the other hand, the JCS remains the principal military adviser and the Joint Staff remains responsible for assisting it as well as the Chairman. Also, the House bill includes provisions obviously intended to accommodate the concerns voiced by opponents of reorganization: a provision establishing the right of any chief who disagrees with the advice of the JCS or the Chairman to submit his views to the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, to the President; and a guarantee, subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, that service chiefs and unified and speci-
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The Unlikelihood of Reform

Despite the outpouring of criticism, if the past is any guide, it is doubtful much will come of the current movement for reform. The National Security Act which created the Department of Defense was adopted in 1947. Subsequently, it was revised three times—in 1949, 1953, and 1958. Since 1958 no significant restructuring of the Department has taken place.

The slackening of structural change has not occurred because the organizational defects of the Department of Defense went unnoticed for 24 years until they were discovered and publicized by General Jones. Government studies and academic treatments in the years since 1958 have consistently criticized the structure and recommended changes, many similar to those advanced by Generals Jones, Meyer, and Taylor, to the basic framework of defense organization.

The history of the issue, then, suggests the existence of powerful and persistent obstacles to Department of Defense reorganization which have more than matched the efforts of proponents of reform over the years. The most obvious obstacle with respect to JCS reorganization at the moment is the legislative process. Though more progress has been made this year than at any time since 1958, it has probably not been made soon enough. It is unlikely that the Senate will act in the three remaining months of the 97th Congress. Consequently, the proponents of reform will have to start over in the 98th Congress. And, because of their near success this year, they will undoubtedly encounter even stronger efforts to block their path in the future.

This would appear to be an unusually appropriate time to consider the impediments to Department of Defense reorganization. Though the press of legislative business and the timing of the political calendar have become major obstacles this year, the legis-
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ative process per se is neither the only nor the most formidable barrier to reform. In fact, considering the events of 1982, the legislative branch might be considered a catalyst for reform. In an\textellipsis case, many other obstacles have inhibited DOD reorganization over the years. If they are not successful in 1982, those who would reform the JCS will probably face them again next year. And those who agree with past studies that many other parts of the Department should be restructured will continue to face them. Consequently, attention to the impediments to Department of Defense reorganization is of more than academic interest at this time.

Because I recently completed an analysis of Department of Defense organization based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80), the Director of the National Security Affairs Institute requested that I apply the results of my research to the subject of impediments to reorganization. Upon examination, my work, though concerned with appraising alternative ways to organize the Department, did include material relevant to the subject.

This paper presents these insights on impediments to Department of Defense reform. The next section examines institutional impediments to DOD reorganization, both internal and external. The third section dramatizes the obstacle created by the gulf between the DOD organization intended by the framers of the National Security Act and the actual organization in operation, as

\textsuperscript{1}The Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (DOS 77-80) was initiated by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in response to a memorandum of 20 September 1977 from President Carter which called for a searching organizational review of the Department of Defense. The study eventually included five separate, independently prepared and published study reports which are cited fully in the endnotes. They address: departmental headquarters, the national military command structure, resource management (the planning, programming, and budgeting system, acquisition, logistics, personnel career mix; and medical care), defense agencies, and training. The DOS 77-80 effort consisted of more than the production of these five reports, however. All five final study reports were circulated among senior decisionmakers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the defense agencies, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council. Extensive comments were exchanged as a result of these reviews.
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pictured by the DOS 77-80. Though their "ideal" organization of the Department may vary, the legislative model used in this section is meant to serve as a more or less accurate surrogate for reformers' composite objective. The fourth section discusses the implications of the interplay of conflict and cooperation in DOD for reorganization. Disagreement or misunderstanding of this aspect of the nature of DOD organization serves as a major impediment to meaningful reorganization. Finally, the last section provides some observations on the relevance of the foregoing to the current organizational proposals.

II. INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO DOD REFORM

The Internal Structure: Basic Organization Model

Considered in its most abstract form, the Department of Defense (DOD) consists of four basic elements that are responsible

![Diagram of Basic Organization Model of the Department of Defense]

Figure 7-1: Basic Organization Model of the Department of Defense
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for the two principal functions of the Department, as depicted in figure 7-1. Each element contains one or more large subelements of the Department; for example, the four services are a part of the military department element. Also, the two functions, maintaining and employing, subsume a large number of subsidiary functions. The maintaining functions include recruiting, training, research and development, procurement, administration, logistical support, maintenance, and medical care. The employing functions are performed consequent to providing military advice to civilian authorities and directing the operations of combat forces in peacetime and wartime. These functions include assessments of enemy threat and friendly warfighting capability, strategic, operational, and logistical planning, and command and control arrangements.

Several aspects of the basic DOD structure are relevant to questions concerning reorganization. First, the Pentagon houses the central management of three of the four elements. Their close proximity contrasts markedly with the worldwide dispersal of the unified and specified commands. This undoubtedly weakens the organizational clout of the unified and specified commanders (the CINCs) vis a vis the other elements.

Second, though housed together, the three Pentagon-based elements are by no means limited in size. They are all large. Table 7-1 indicates the smallest, the Air Force secretariat, numbered approximately 320 individuals at the beginning of FY 80; the largest, the Army headquarters staff, approximately 3,381. Organizational realignment issues in DOD are unparalleled with respect to the absolute numbers of people who may be affected and who are therefore interested in influencing the outcome.

Third, although all of the Pentagon-based headquarters are large, great disparities in size are evident. The service headquarters staffs range from approximately three to nine times the size of the secretariats. The JCS/Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense/OSD complexes are in the middle—far larger than the service secretariats but only about one-half the size of any one of the service military headquarters staffs.
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Table 7-1: Staff Strengths Projected for the End of Fiscal Year 1979

| Office of the Secretary of Defense | 1,568 |
| Joint Staff                        | 1,273 |

Military Department Secretariats

| Army   | 378  |
| Navy   | 852  |
| Air Force | 320  |

Service Headquarters Staffs

| Army   | 3,381 |
| Navy   | 2,228 |
| Air Force | 2,930 |

Source: Budget data submitted to the Executive Secretary, Defense Organization Study, Spring 1979

Fourth, the potential influence of the organizations varies significantly, even though each possesses sufficient resources to make its presence felt on issues of particular concern. In part, these differences reflect the uneven sizes and, in the case of the CINCs, the location of the organizations; but not entirely. More fundamental are the allocations of responsibilities. For example, the comprehensive charter of the Secretary of Defense—direction, authority, and control—makes OSD a principal determinant on any issue it chooses to address. But the missions, resources, and capabilities of the services make them principal determinants also. On the other hand, the advisory function of the JCS, as well as its placement in the chain of command at the sufferance of the Secretary of Defense, are factors which would tend to undermine its relative position.

The final aspect worthy of comment at this point is that the collocation of the leadership and principal staffs of three of the elements in the Pentagon adds a dynamic dimension which makes the phenomenon being examined unique. Issues of DOD reorganization involve the possible internal and external realignment of a number of staff organizations, all large and several among the largest in the world, located in such close proximity that face-to-face contact between and among members of the organizations at any level requires no more than a five-minute walk. An important implication of the proximity of these organizations is that they must be perceived as a closely knit system as well as a collection of
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separate entities. The dynamic interplay among the organizations fosters several systemic tendencies: a dilution of hierarchy in favor of bargaining; an advantage for those who oppose change and favor the status quo over proponents of new initiatives; and increased potential for the more aggressive, independent organizations to gain predominance over others.

Fleshing Out the Basic Organization Model

Organizational Complexities. Viewing DOD solely in terms of the basic organization model (figure 7-1) which depicts only the essential elements and relationships incurs the risk of oversimplification. The model may convey the impression DOD is a rigidly structured pyramid which extends inexorably through succeeding levels of subordination from the Secretary of Defense at the apex to operating forces in the field. In fact, of course, that is by no means the case. The structure is riven with formal and informal reporting and advisory links, communications channels, and other internal and external avenues of access to influence in addition to the maintaining and employing arms shown in the model.

Several examples illustrate the variety of interactions among elements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of the chiefs of each service and the Joint Staff is composed of officers from each service. Thus the service-JCS linkage, though not depicted in the basic organization model, is possibly stronger than the relationships which do appear. Moreover, by law, the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President as well as the Secretary of Defense, thus providing that body tremendous leverage outside the formal hierarchical structure. Each chief, qua chief-of-service, also enjoys comparable privileged access to Congress. The same is true of Service Secretaries. Finally, the Secretary of Defense's own staff, OSD, has been regularly subjected to detailed legislative engineering. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, ASD(HA), for example, was established by Congress over the objections of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

These examples demonstrate that the organization of the Department of Defense is only partially, and very inexact, hierarchical. It might, in fact, be characterized as "permissive" in its tolerance of deviations from the pyramidal structure. The abstract basic organizational model symbolizes, although it cannot possibly
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portray, the scope of the responsibilities and activities of the constituent elements as well as the complicated interrelationships among them. But a sound analysis, while manipulating the abstract model in search of valid "macro" insights, must remain cognizant of the underlying realities governing the permissive structure.

**Reorganization as a Political Process.** The permissiveness of the DOD structure is congruent with the proclivities of its constituent organizations. Although the division of responsibilities, reflecting legislation and departmental directives appears clear-cut in the model, each of the organizations below the Secretary of Defense in fact exhibits a strong interest in both the maintaining and employing functions. Consequently, the organizations of each element may attempt to play a part in decisions respecting both of the principal functions. This phenomenon is particularly evident when an organization perceives the issues being decided as either potentially advantageous or threatening to its strength, vitality, and ability to perform its accustomed part of one or both functions.

Reorganization issues fall into this category, as an examination of the model indicates. Proposals which would expand or contract the authority, power, or structure of one element almost invariably impact upon other elements. For example, some critics maintain the "top" of the structure, the Secretary/OSD element, exercises excessive control, sometimes labeled "micromanagement," over the maintaining function. They would reduce the central management role and, as a corollary, expand the role of the military departments. Others hold, in effect, the maintaining side of the model has immoderate influence on the employing arm as a result of service headquarters staff preponderance in the joint staffing process and service control over the component commands. Some of the DOS 77-80 proposals would strengthen the JCS and combatant command elements, thereby redressing this purported imbalance. Setting aside the merits of the arguments for the present, it is apparent that each of the elements will have an interest in decisions concerning these reorganization proposals.

Equally apparent is that the organizations in each element have the ability to translate their interest into influence on reorganization decisions. Several factors contribute to their effectiveness in advancing claims. Within very broad, and ill-defined, limits, the constituent organizations enjoy abundant freedom of action as a
consequence of the structural configuration of the Department of Defense. The framework, as discussed above, is characterized by large organizations, differentiated in size and power, collocated, except for the combatant commands, in the Pentagon (facilitating interaction at all levels), and joined in a very permissive hierarchy. Moreover, the organizations are situated at the seat of government. Their freedom of action provides ample opportunities to seek and find powerful external proponents whose interests parallel their own.

Finally, the constituent organizations can advance strong arguments they are entitled to participate in the reorganization decision process. After all, DOD is a going concern. It is performing its mission, albeit perhaps imperfectly, through the concerted efforts of the organizations which compose the constituent elements of the model. Each organization possesses position, stature, expertise, and experience. In sum, in the absence of an unlikely event which discredits part or all of the current structure and thereby presents the opportunity for some external entity to begin, like Moses, with a tabula rasa, the positions of the organizations of each element will play an important part in shaping reorganization decisions.

The foregoing discussion suggests reorganization in DOD is a very political process involving the constituent elements of the organization, Congress, outside governmental agencies, and even private groups. It supports the contention, which will be discussed later, that reorganization proposals insensitive to ambient political conditions—that is, the perspectives of the constituent organizations which will figure in reorganization decisions—are unlikely to find acceptance.

The discussion also explains why the more extreme organizational proposals advanced by reformers over the years did not receive serious consideration. If reorganization issues are political, involving the clash and adjustment of interests among bureaucratic organizations, reorganization decisions must accommodate a coalition sufficiently powerful to hold sway over opponents. Constructing such a coalition, in other than extraordinary circumstances, rules out extreme proposals."

"The political nature of reorganization is a phenomenon repeatedly encountered and remarked in this paper. In its reference to the "clash and
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The Nature of the Constituent DOD Organizations—A Bureaucratic Perspective

What latitude for change in the Department of Defense exists if a number of organizations must reach consensus as a precondi-
tion? Answering that question requires an examination of the nature of the organizations—the relevant characteristics and inter-
est of DOD constituent organizations which help to explain why they might support or oppose particular reorganization proposals.

Recent organizational literature, particularly the work of Morton Halperin, has focused on DOD constituent organizations. The remainder of this section employs the organizational literature to examine the nature of the bureaucratic organizational which figure in DOD reorganization decisions.

Characteristics of DOD Constituent Organizations. In the most general terms, an organization may be defined as a combination of people with a common set of values who work together by fulfilling different but complementary functions to achieve some purpose or objective; the participants also share a set of beliefs (an ideology) which relates their values and purposes to larger organizations within which they operate. This definition, based on Carl Fried-
rich's concept of organization, suggests the major characteristics and interests relevant to this inquiry which students of defense organization have identified in one or more of the elements of the DOD model.

Each of the DOD elements contains organizations with separately identifiable purposes or objectives which may be general or specific. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has a general charter to “perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.” On the other hand, each service is assigned a specific mission. For example, the Navy “is

adjustment of interests” this paragraph conveys the intended meaning of “political” in what follows. Thus “politics” is not limited to the activities of elected officials, the processes which adjust and accommodate the inher-
ent contradictions among the myriad interests present in a modern society are found throughout the governmental apparatus, and elsewhere as well.
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responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war...."

Several of the organizations with a specific mission also have large, expensive capabilities which are necessary to accomplish the mission. The capabilities, of course, are the combat forces and their supporting elements. Questions concerning capabilities—their size, composition, readiness, supportability, and modernization—reach the very essence, or raison d'être, of the Defense Establishment and, as a corollary, largely define the dimensions of its internal conflicts. They involve the allocation of the limited resources available to the DOD to the constituent elements which are in turn responsible for maintaining and employing the military instrument. Decisions must be made under the conditions of uncertainty which prevail in the national security arena because such variables as the intent and capabilities of potential adversaries (the "threat") are (at least, in part) unknown and unknowable. In these circumstances, the constituent elements of the DOD with specific missions inevitably and understandably attempt to decrease the uncertainty by pressing for greater capabilities to ensure they can accomplish their missions. Under the conditions of limited resources, all claims cannot be met. Thus, the tendency for intraorganizational conflict within the DOD is built-in.

The inherent difficulty of operationalizing national security objectives reinforces this tendency. These objectives of the "larger organization" in Friedrich's concept are often so general any number of alternative specific objectives or actions can be proffered by various proponents as the optimum way to pursue them. In discussing this point, Halperin explains the dilemma faced by the United States after the Soviet launching of Sputnik I.

Despite the general consensus that the United States needed to preserve its strategic deterrent and maintain its technological advantage over the Soviet Union after the Sputnik launching, President Eisenhower, Congressional leaders, and the heads of the military services all had very different notions of what course of action would achieve these objectives.

The Cuban missile crisis included a similar experience. The United States finally realized its objective when the Soviet Union agreed to remove missiles from Cuba. That outcome was achieved
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through the imposition of a successful policy of blockading Cuba, a policy implemented only after days of exhaustive consideration of other options (eventually discarded) involving the Air Force, Army, and other agencies.

The absence of a clear linkage "downward" between the general objectives of the large organization and those of the constituent organizations results in the reverse phenomenon. A characteristic of the elements of DOD organizations, particularly those with specific missions and large capabilities, is the tendency to view their purposes and objectives as identical with national purposes and objectives. Friedrich points out in the definition that organizational ideology relates the values and purposes of the lesser to the larger organization. Halperin and Kanter find that, as a result of the absence of clear-cut, exclusive operational courses of action to achieve national objectives, each participant is "relatively free to give operational meaning" to the objectives. The ambiguous linkage of objectives and means sometimes results in the participants of the lesser organization considering the relationship between their values and purposes and those of the larger organization as an identity. To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, "what's good for the Air Force is good for the country"—because the Air Force provides capabilities to accomplish the objectives of national security.

It is only a short step from this reasoning to another characteristic, the often-noted phenomenon whereby its members adopt, as one of its principal purposes, the well-being and survival of the organization itself. The organization, after all, is the institution which provides and promotes the values and purposes shared by the participants and is crucial as well to the larger organization. Thus the lesser organization becomes an instrumental value which must be preserved.

Organizational Interests of DOD Constituent Elements. Based on several of the characteristics discussed above, Halperin identified the principal interests of organizations which participate in the national security policy process, among which the constituent elements of the Department of Defense are an important part. These interests are influence, domain, essential role, independence, budget, and morale.
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Influence. The most pervasive interest is to exert independent influence. An organization must have influence to further organizational purposes, ensure organizational well-being, and, in some cases, secure capabilities—all of which, in the opinion of organization participants, are worthy goals, by definition (or identity) in the national interest.

Domain. All governmental organizations, from the most comprehensive to the most specialized, are concerned about their organizational turf, or domain. A complex society requires that functions be differentiated and assigned to separate organizations. But it is impossible to differentiate functions so precisely that disagreements over functional responsibilities do not arise between and among organizations. At the highest levels of government, these concerns with domain involve the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches; in Congress, jurisdictional disputes among the committees; in OSD, disagreements over functional responsibilities; among the military services, disputes over roles and missions; and between the JCS and OSD, conflict concerning where policy ends and operations begin.

Essence. The essential role or "essence" of an organization derives from the common set of values and purposes participants share. It is a normative conception held by the members—what the organization ought to be, how it ought to proceed, and what it ought to seek to achieve. The services, with their environmental orientations toward land, sea, and air warfare, are prime examples of organizations in which this interest is particularly powerful.

The US Navy has perceived its essential role as maintaining warships which guarantee freedom and control of the seas. The question of what kind of warships—aircraft carriers to project naval air power, other types of surface combatant ships, or submarines—has divided the Navy since World War II. Nevertheless, the unifying element, sea control, has been sufficiently strong to define the "Navy" for its members and exclude other conceptions of essence.

The Army defines itself in terms of providing the capability for ground combat by organized, regular units. This concept accommodates such traditional combat arms specialities as infantry,
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artillery, and armor as well as the more recent air mobility capabilities. It discourages elite missions. Also very much on the periphery are such capabilities as air defense and long-range missiles—and, in the 1940s, strategic bombardment. In fact, lack of enthusiasm for the latter capability because of its challenge to the ground combat role accounts in some part for Army willingness to allow creation of a separate Air Force after World War II.

The Air Force achieved its status as a separate service largely as a result of the efforts of pilots who agreed with the Army on this point. They were convinced their essential role, flying combat aircraft capable of defeating an enemy through strategic bombardment, was fundamentally different from, and incompatible with, the values of the remainder of the Army. This conception of the Air Force essence, though altered to accommodate a broader range of aerospace vehicles, remains strong.

Independence. Organizations are interested in maintaining or enhancing their independence or autonomy in order to safeguard their essence and domain. This interest is most apparent in organizations like the services which have resources and attempt to exert as much independent control over them as possible. Interest in autonomy at times overshadows other interests. In The Common Defense, Samuel Huntington cited cases in which a service opts for a smaller budget with greater control of its disposition rather than a larger budget with the possible loss of some degree of control.

Other manifestations of the interest in independence or autonomy include: attempts to gain total operational control over personnel assigned to accomplish a mission; avoidance of operations involving the combined forces or resources of several organizations; reluctance to participate in operations controlled by foreign governments; and resistance to participation by outsiders in agency operations.

Budget. Despite occasional instances in which concern with independence may prevail, all DOD organizations are interested in the size and composition of the defense budget. For staff organizations with general purposes, the budget serves as an indicator of the significance of their influence in providing advice on their particular area of responsibility. For organizations requiring large capabilities to accomplish their missions, the size of their portion of the budget,
and its relation to the budgets of other mission-oriented organizations, reflect in a concrete manner national priorities at a given moment.

Morale. if the well-being and survival of an organization can be rationalized as a legitimate purpose of the organization, as discussed above, it follows that maintaining the morale of the participants, qua members, is an important interest of the organization. The values and purposes they share must continue to be regarded by members in a favorable light; the purpose or objective they seek must continue to appear worthwhile—not only personally but in the context of beneficence to the larger organization. These considerations reinforce attempts by organizations to maintain the essence perceived by members, protect their domain, and enhance their capabilities. Furthermore, they explain, in the case of the military services, why compensation and promotion are important not only as personal rewards, but also as confirmation of the continuing validity of the organizational ideology which relates military service to national purpose. Any form of actual or perceived loss of status on the part of the larger organization (for example, "erosion" of benefits) is interpreted as weakening the ideological linkage and is resisted.

The External Environment

Thus far the discussion of institutions has treated the Department of Defense as a separate entity. The external environment the Department faces has been discussed only as an avenue for the constituent elements to gain influence by attracting extrinsic support for their positions. But DOD organizational issues are not solely an intradepartmental concern. Organizations external to the Department possess characteristics and interests similar to those of the constituent elements as well as the requisite access and power to translate their interests into influence. Consequently, DOD reorganization depends on the demands and constraints which derive from its relations with other executive departments, the White House, Congress, and, at times, many other groups and interests.

Congress and President

Legislative and Executive Civilian Control. The constitutional commitment to civilian control of the military and the American
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pluralistic political tradition of dividing powers and creating overlapping responsibilities among the branches of government profoundly influence all aspects of defense organization. Civilian control is a responsibility shared by the President and Congress; each branch is assigned constitutional powers to effect civilian supremacy. The result is a multifaceted approach which sometimes leads to differences on defense organization.

The executive branch tends to favor a concept of civilian control which emphasizes the President as Commander in Chief served by a strong Secretary of Defense with a legislative mandate granting him authority over and responsibility for the Department of Defense.18

The Congress, on the other hand, exercises its responsibilities for civilian control through its governance of the disposition of resources and its access to officials, many with legislative charters, who are interspersed at several levels below the Secretary of Defense.19 In addition to service Secretaries, these positions include Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense and service Assistant Secretaries as well as high-ranking military officers. Congress has jealously guarded its right to receive the advice of these officials directly. As a corollary, Congress has consistently objected to any plan which might tend to concentrate power in the hands of one staff headed by a single preeminent military officer—the perceived German general staff model. The legislative concept of civilian control, then, ensures that the Congress, in determining the allocation of resources for national defense, can consult with politically responsible officials at levels which range from broad policy formulation and implementation to detailed scrutiny of specific activities. Congress has consistently defended its prerogatives to assure civilian control in this manner in pursuance of its mandate to provide for the armed forces.

As a result of the shared power with respect to national security, the organization of the Department of Defense must accommodate both the executive and legislative branches. This imperative inevitably bounds the universe of feasible organizational changes because of the differing perspectives of the two branches. Realistic organizational initiatives must take cognizance of the constraints imposed by the differing perspectives of both branches.
Other Factors. Even if the differing approaches to civilian control were set aside, other factors inhibit reorganization initiatives by the Congress and the White House. Foremost among these is the legislative process. New legislation requires agreement by both Houses of Congress, including their various subcommittees and full committees as well as the President. Thus the legislative process offers opponents of reform multiple redoubts from which to defeat prospective legislation. Legislative pitfalls are so well known that the process requires no further elaboration here. It suffices to note that as this piece is being written in September 1982, even though the JCS Reorganization Bill has passed the House of Representatives after six months of deliberations, prospects of Senate action this year are not bright. A half-passed law is, of course, no law at all. But the bill will lose even that status with the advent of the new Congress.

Possibly as daunting to the politically accountable officials as the legislative process are the esoteric nature of the reorganization issue and the absence of time to devote to it. Presidents and Congressmen are elected, they tend to believe, to initiate and carry out policies and programs, not to invest the inordinate time required to master the intricacies of arcane organizational arrangements in the Department of Defense. One of the most telling obstacles to JCS reorganization in 1982 has been the Defense officials' belief that they should devote their full time and energies to the Reagan Administration program to rearm America. Even President Carter, who promised during his campaign to reorganize the government, had no specific idea what direction his "mandate" in that regard should take with respect to the Department of Defense. And, soon inundated with myriad policy decisions, he was afforded no opportunity to study the issue and decide.

Nor is it likely that the priorities of very many Congressmen will ever be such that they believe themselves able to devote the hours necessary to understand DOD organization sufficiently to make an independent judgment in the absence of a legislative proposal by the executive branch. During the 1982 JCS reorganization hearings, the Congressmen on the House Armed Services Committee were engaged in considering and acting on the annual defense authorization, military construction, and military pay bills as well as a large supplemental authorization bill. Each piece of legislation requires subcommittee hearings, markup sessions, full committee consider-
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In sum, it is difficult for Congress to concentrate sufficiently on DOD reorganization to master the subject. That this happened in 1982 with respect to JCS reorganization is a tribute to the perseverance of dedicated legislators, particularly Chairman White. But the Congressmen themselves would be the first to acknowledge that the multiple demands on their time present a formidable barrier to DOD reorganization efforts.

The National Security Apparatus

Other executive-branch agencies as well as the White House evidence keen interest in the manner in which DOD participates in the formulation and implementation of national policies which orchestrate all facets of national security affairs. This interest extends to the organizational arrangements within DOD which link the military to national policy, institutionalize its responsibility to civilian authority, and ensure national objectives are accurately reflected in military plans and budgets. Proposed DOD organizational changes, because they may affect the development of national security policy and its implementation, will be carefully scrutinized by other members of the national security community.

It should be noted that rather than serving as an impediment to reorganization, the bias of external agencies may well be in the opposite direction. A National Security Council enquiry concerning the issues surrounding JCS reorganization during the summer of 1982 apparently spurred the Secretary of Defense to initiate a review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Prior to the expression of NSC concern the Department had shown little interest.
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The Public

Department of Defense organization decisions are of concern to many other persons and organizations. For many intensity of their interest depends upon the subject of the decision. Portions of the general public, for example, are vitally concerned with base realignments and closings; educational institutions with research and development policies and procedures; business with acquisition processes; allied governments and international security organizations with the unified and specified command structure, mobilization responsibilities, and foreign military sales.

An informal "defense community" also exists. It consists principally of former defense officials, retired military personnel, academicians, and a variety of organizations ranging from the Air Force Association to the Council on Foreign Relations. The debate on JCS reorganization in 1982 revealed that the defense community is split on the issue. Most of the private sector witnesses testified in favor of reform and, in fact, provided some of the most compelling testimony favoring change. Nevertheless, opponents were also effective witnesses and, in addition, appear to have been much more active and successful behind the scenes exploiting the advantages the legislative process affords those who favor the status quo.

Conclusions Concerning Institutional Impediments

Examining the Department of Defense from an institutional perspective yields the following observations and conclusions concerning reorganization.

The Department is composed of many constituent organizations which vary in size, location, importance to the overall defense mission, and influence.

The structure which links these constituent organizations together into the Department of Defense is more accurately characterized as "confederal" than hierarchical, particularly with respect to the most powerful constituent organizations. Thus the subordinate DOD organizations enjoy much greater freedom of action than a strict hierarchical interpretation of the Department structure would indicate.
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The bonds which unify several of the most powerful DOD constituent organizations, the services, are much stronger than the links which frame the Department structure. The services, with missions critical to national survival, evidence the typical characteristics of close-knit bureaucratic organizations. Therefore, it is not difficult for them to identify their purposes as national objectives, their well-being and organizational survival as an instrumental national good in itself. Thus justified in their actions, the services pursue their interests: influence, independence or autonomy, domain (roles and missions), budget, and morale.

In these circumstances organizational measures, which almost invariably seek to bring greater unity to the Department of Defense as an organization, are likely to be viewed by one or more DOD constituent organizations as threatening their national mission and their interests. Thus opposition to reorganizations is almost automatic. The more far-reaching a proposal, and the more DOD constituent elements it affects, the more intense the opposition within DOD is likely to be.

Because of their independent influence and the permissiveness of the DOD structure, constituent organization opposition translates into a powerful institutional bias within the Department of Defense against change.

Department of Defense reorganization, then, must be viewed as a political process involving the clash and reconciliation of interests. Bargaining and negotiation are more characteristic of the process than is decisive authoritative action, though the latter may also figure at times.

The organizational milieu in which the Department of Defense is situated often reinforces the political aspect of reorganization actions. It also favors those who support the status quo. Congress and the executive branch must agree on any significant reorganization. Yet they have differing concepts of how best to effect civilian control. Congress tends to be wary of proposals which would strengthen central control at the expense of the constituent organizations. Also both branches tend to be confronted by, and saturated with, substantive defense issues which drive out DOD organizational concerns. In that regard, the complexity of defense organization and the intricacies of the legislative process create a bias
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against congressional action. The private sector "defense community," though its majority probably favors DOD reform, nevertheless includes a significant group of knowledgeable opponents who effectively employ the checks and balances available in our governmental system to thwart reorganization.

III. THE GULF BETWEEN WHAT "OUGHT TO BE" AND WHAT IS

The apparent gulf between the de jure and de facto DOD organization reinforces the institutional bias against restructuring. This section advances two variations of the basic organization model to demonstrate the stark difference between the DOD organizational concept embodied in law and the actual organization as depicted in recent studies of the organization.

Legislative or Objective Model—DOD Organization De Jure

If the basic "neutral" model is rearranged to reflect changes in the legal morphology of the Department of Defense from its inception in 1947 to the last major legislative reorganization in 1958 the model depicted in figure 7-2 emerges.

As compared to the "neutral" basic organization model of figure 7-1, the employing arm in the legislative model is stronger and more independent. The JCS and combatant command elements are much closer together, concerned primarily with unified employment of forces, or US military "output." As a consequence, the component commands are further removed from, and more tenuously linked to, their parent services through the support channel. The more pronounced differentiation between the organizational arms focuses the military departments on maintaining or "input" functions—recruiting, training, and supporting forces. The service chiefs in the legislative model have the capacity to accomplish the intellectual hurdle required by their "dual-hat" responsibilities. When meeting as the corporate body of the JCS, they assume the appropriate employment arm perspective, adopting a joint, or unified, "national" outlook. Reconciliation between output demands and input constraints occurs at three levels—in the integration of maintaining and employment functions required to conduct unified and specified command military operations, in the duality of the service chief-JCS role, and in the relationships of the subordinate
elements to the Secretary of Defense/OSD. However, the politically responsible Secretary makes the ultimate decisions relating input to output.

The designation of this model as the "legislative or objective" model is not meant to imply a narrow congressional idealization of DOD organization. In fact, the model rather accurately portrays the goal of those who support organizational reform of the Department of Defense, as is apparent from the brief description of the Jones, Meyer, and Taylor proposals at the outset. Also, in addition to Congress, several Secretaries of Defense, the military departments, the JCS, and two Presidents participated in the development of the National Security Act and its revisions during a period which spanned the 1940s and 1950s. Nevertheless, the following review of the successive legislative reorganizations between 1947 and 1958 reveals that the model portrays the structural configuration which
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emerges from the legal provisions on which the Department of Defense is now established. In that sense, the model reflects the legislature's fixed "objective" of Congress.

The Secretary of Defense. The most widely recognized development in post-World War II defense organization has been the centralization of authority in the Secretary of Defense. From a position in 1947 in which the services retained all powers not specifically delegated elsewhere, the Secretary of Defense has acquired complete responsibility for the management of the Department of Defense. His initially small, immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has expanded in size, legal authority, and expertise to provide the capability to discharge his responsibilities. As a result, the Secretary is in fact as well as title the predominant Defense official.

Commentary on centralization has at times tended to overshadow the more fundamental process which in large part explains this phenomenon, the trend toward integration of defense functions. Succeeding reorganizations in 1949, 1953, and 1958 contained measures intended to secure the integration of service claims into unified, fiscally constrained acquisition and budget proposals; eliminate overlap in research and development; consolidate the performance of similar functions; and provide a stronger framework for the internal resolution of differences which would in turn facilitate an integrated DOD approach to national security issues. Integration has inevitably resulted in greater centralization of power in the Secretary of Defense and his staff.

The National Military Command Structure. Organizational changes with respect to the national military command structure (NMCS) since the National Security Act was first adopted in 1947 have had three major purposes. First, reforms have repeatedly attempted to transform the Joint Chiefs of Staffs into a more "national" advisory body as opposed to the perceived orientation of each Chief to his particular Service. Creation in 1949 of a nonvoting but prestigious Chairman divorced from any service was followed in 1953 with several modifications designed to strengthen his role. Second, the chain of command has been changed several times to streamline the linkage between the President as Commander in Chief and the operational forces he commands. Service Secretaries were explicitly included in the chain of command and the JCS was
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excluded in 1953; in 1958, Service Secretaries were excluded and the chain was redefined to extend from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. (However, a subsequently issued DOD directive provided that the Secretary will transmit orders through the JCS.) Third, employing arm responsibilities for combat forces have been increased. In addition to removing Service Secretaries from the chain of command, the 1958 reorganization assigned planning responsibilities to the unified and specified commanders.

The Military Departments. The effect of the successive revisions of the National Security Act has been to diminish legally assigned responsibilities of the military departments, channeling their activities into the maintaining areas—providing manpower, weapon systems, and support for the combat forces assigned to the unified and specified commands. Many of the increased powers granted to the Secretary of Defense and National Military Command Structure elements as the National Security Act was revised correspondingly diminished the responsibilities of the services. The military departments lost “executive department” status in 1949; in addition, Service Secretaries were eliminated from National Security Council membership and lost their right of direct appeal to the President and his budget authorities in what is now the Office of Management and Budget. In 1958, the service Secretaries were removed from the chain of operational command; their planning and operational responsibilities were reassigned to the JCS and unified and specified commanders, respectively. In addition, the Secretary of Defense was given the authority to reassign supply and service functions, assign combat forces, and designate which service would develop new weapon systems. Subsequently, in the 1960s, the initiation of the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) resulted in a significant diminution of military department control over budgetary matters. Also, the movement toward creating defense agencies to perform common functions began. Over the years the defense agencies have assumed responsibilities formerly assigned to the military departments in a number of areas including logistics, communications, intelligence, and mapping.

These changes should not be viewed as manifestations of a plan, either implicit or explicit, gradually to weaken the military departments and eventually to eliminate them. Rather, they evi-
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dence the congressional intention to concentrate the military
departments on the maintaining function. The departments retain
major management responsibilities the Congress has carefully
elaborated in law. Those responsibilities include training, opera-
tions, administration, support and maintenance, welfare, prepared-
ness, and accountability for the effectiveness of their services. The
military departments, by law, are also responsible for the adminis-
tration of forces assigned to the combatant commands. In practice,
this means the military departments have continuing support
responsibility for all US forces. Finally, Congress regularly calls
upon Service Secretaries and other military department officials to
explain matters under their purview. The tenor of the dialogue in
these hearings indicates Congress holds the military departments
responsible for the resources with which they are entrusted.

As will become apparent below, the criticisms of DOD organi-

cation, taken as a whole, suggest the legislative model does not
accurately depict the structural relationships which actually obtain.

Critique Model—DOD Organization De Facto

If the basic organization model is again rearranged to reflect
the findings and criticisms of the Defense Organizaton Study, 1977-
1980 (DOS 77-80) concerning the existing relationships among the
elements, the concept of current DOD organization depicted in
figure 7-3 emerges. This critique model is based on all five studies
and cannot be attributed to any one of them; it is an interpretation
that results from integrating their findings and conclusions, and
then manipulating the basic organization model to depict the com-
posite result.

The critique model indicates that the dominating organizations
in the Department of Defense are the central management (the
Secretary and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)) and the
services. The latter exercise preponderant influence over the joint
structure. As a result, the relationship between central management
and the services is the anvil on which the major decisions concern-
ing both maintaining and employing functions are hammered out in
the Department of Defense.

The service Secretaries have little influence, relatively. They are
not participants in top management and are not in a position to act
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as the actual leaders of their departments. They represent an intervening layer of management between the Secretary of Defense and the services which is subject to challenge in the absence of more meaningful contributions.

The joint organizations are far too weak. The two primary functions of the joint system, military advice and employment of forces in the field, are compromised. Military advice, the principal function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is flawed by the inability of the
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Chiefs, also imbued with service responsibilities, to address a broad range of contentious issues as a corporate entity. The JCS acts as a forum for arriving at conjoint service positions through negotiations in which each service seeks to maximize its position through bargaining at multiple levels.

By this reading, however, the JCS fails to approximate fulfilling its raison d’etre for two reasons. First, the JCS bargaining approach produces military advice that is fundamentally different from what was intended by the authors of the National Security Act—and, more important, of less value to the President and Secretary of Defense. The framers of the act sought an organization to produce military advice derived from the deliberations of a corporate body of the highest military leaders considering issues from a national perspective detached from, but cognizant of, service interests. Second, because bargaining is unable to produce compromises acceptable to the services in contentious areas, the JCS finesses a broad range of issues that shape the very core of the US defense posture. These issues include the allocation of resources, basic strategy, roles and missions of the services, joint doctrine, and the functions, responsibilities, and geographic assignments of unified and specified commands.

The Joint Staff is fashioned to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the bargaining process. Its procedures establish rules of the game for consultation that maximize service influence and preclude an independent Joint Staff voice. Its analytical capability has been systematically weakened. Furthermore, the services control its personnel structure and have no interest in developing a Joint Staff whose talent rivals that of service staffs.

The commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) have neither the influence nor the clear-cut, durable links with higher authority commensurate with their responsibilities as theater commanders of US forces in the field. In crucial decisions determining the composition and warfighting capability of theater forces, subordinate component commanders and, by extension, the services overshadow the CINCs. No overarching joint readiness assessment system exists to analyze the preparedness of each unified theater force and subsequently relate
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this assessment through joint channels to resource allocation decisions intended to correct deficiencies. Instead, readiness evaluations are conducted by the component commands, controlled by the services, and linked to service budget proposals. In contrast, the CINCs have no spokesman in Washington to represent their collective views. Consequently, the joint influence on resource allocation decisions that ultimately determine the structure and readiness of forces is almost nil or irrelevant, despite the obvious fundamental importance of these decisions to the accomplishment of the basic joint function, employing US forces. Finally, the CINCs' chain of command from and to the Secretary of Defense is rendered potentially indecisive by its routing through the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, a committee, as opposed to a single military official acting as the agent of the Secretary of Defense in supervising the CINCs.

By inference, the component commands are too independent of the unified commanders. These commands have dual designations as major service commands. This latter identity is far more influential than the joint, or unified, nature of their assignment. The Services train and equip as well as control "the flow of men, money, and material to the CINCs' components. The services (and the components) thus have the major influence on both the structure and the readiness of the forces for which the CINC is responsible."20 The configuration of each component in a theater as a self-sufficient fighting force with a full range of support possibly results in costly redundancies in areas such as supply, maintenance, administration, and discipline. Consolidating some functions deserves serious consideration, particularly in the logistics areas where control by the theater commander could possibly increase warfighting capability as well as save dollars.

The preeminence of the four services in the DOD organizational structure is completely disproportionate to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities for the maintaining function—in essence, organizing, training, and equipping forces. The interests of the services in maintaining organizational independence and ensuring their capability to accomplish service missions provide continuing incentives to influence as many decisions affecting them as possible. In effect, the services have co-opted the joint structure through the dual roles of the service chiefs, overarching influence on the Joint Staff, participation in CINC selection, and predominant control over the component commands. As a
result, the underlying framework for making and implementing decisions in the Department of Defense, whether on maintaining or employing issues, is dialogue between the Secretary of Defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services.

This finding does not mean that the military is unresponsive. On the contrary, the adherence of the services to civilian control is beyond question. It does mean that the military input into decision-making, whether through service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, CINCs, or components, is predominantly service-oriented. On a broad range of contentious issues, military advice from a national perspective is unavailable to civilian decisionmakers who are forced to provide this perspective themselves, whether or not they are qualified to do so.

Given that the basic DOD relationship is between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services, with the unfortunate absence of a truly joint military voice, are other aspects of the relationship in balance? Definitely not. In each of the several functional resource management areas examined by the component studies of the DOS 77-80, the services were found to exercise too much latitude.

In the acquisition process the tendency of each service to favor alternatives that will enhance its organization and to rush into production with inadequate test and evaluation is not sufficiently offset by a broader OSD perspective. In the area of health care, excessive service autonomy results in inconsistent planning that makes it impossible to ascertain medical readiness needs despite convincing evidence of serious shortfalls. Although some evidence suggests service logistics concepts may be outdated and should be challenged, progress in this direction is unlikely in the absence of OSD action. The services are unable to address many training problems effectively. More vigorous OSD involvement is needed, even though this would diminish traditional service autonomy in training. A similar situation exists in personnel management with respect to developing a uniform methodology and DOD-wide data bank as prerequisites to optimizing the mix of experienced and inexperienced personnel in various career fields.

Despite these management shortcomings in specific functional areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is endowed with suffi-
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cient authority, responsibilities, control mechanisms, and talent to make it a formidable counterpoise to the services. The Secretary of Defense ultimately controls defense policy, strategy, resource allocation, and manpower decisions within the Department. Although the studies that compose the DOS 77-80 fault the Office of the Secretary for failing to provide stronger leadership in several areas, they do not call for expanding OSD power. In fact, offsetting the foregoing criticisms to some extent are charges of OSD overmanagement in the acquisition review process, overly detailed program guidance, and imprudent step-by-step direction of complex military operations during crises.

The underlying theme of the studies relative to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is that a change in management approach is needed. The Office of the Secretary slights the broad policy function; it fails to define the linkages between national objectives and military planning, to evaluate alternative approaches to military requirements, and to ensure that decisions, once made, are implemented and the results assessed for needed adjustments. Effecting the needed change to a management approach in which broad policy is the central focus will require correction of a number of weaknesses: ineffectual military participation in OSD policy formulation; insufficient delegation to operating levels of the Department; imprecise delineation of authority between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments; weak OSD evaluation capability; inattention to output measures such as joint warfighting or readiness capabilities in resource allocation decisions; and absence of cohesion and teamwork among constituent elements of the Department.

Attempts to Bridge the Gulf

The implication of the DOS 77-80 critique and the recent initiatives by Generals Jones and Meyer and others is that the time has come to consider modifying the present Department of Defense structure. The earlier discussion of institutional barriers suggests that a spontaneous, sustained internal DOD effort to improve defense organization is very unlikely.

But if that means the impetus for reform must come from outside the Department, history suggests prospects are equally bleak. Students and practitioners who have addressed the current organi-
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zation in scholarly treatises and official government studies have consistently agreed on the major outlines of what is wrong with defense organization. This point was graphically demonstrated by General Jones before the Investigations Subcommittee when he displayed a thick stack of studies of JCS organization which span over three decades, all of which found that major flaws exist in the structure.

Why, then, have structural weaknesses been unattended since 1958? Why has this facet of defense affairs been so unresponsive to the findings and recommendation of critics while relative flexibility has been evident in responding to other deficiencies?

Resort to Alternative Organizational Approaches. One reason is the relative ease and apparent effectiveness of alternative organizational approaches. Since 1958, if not before, the authority of the Secretary of Defense to establish processes for deciding resource allocation, acquisition, and similar issues has been unchallenged. Organizational processes, after all, in one respect are merely rules defining who figures and to what degree, in a decision. The power to establish a process is the power to slice through the structure of an organization, bypassing certain elements regardless of their position in the hierarchy, and including others, even though they may be formally subordinate. Thus processes can be used to avoid direct conflict and facilitate action by defining, and redefining when necessary, the rules of the game for making decisions.

And process changes are less dolorous for Secretaries of Defense than reorganizations. Although the formal authority of the Secretary of Defense to reorganize his department is comparable to his authority to create and modify processes, the de facto circumstances differ markedly. A Secretary who proposes significant reorganization of the military departments or Joint Chiefs of Staff can be certain he will be strongly challenged both from within the Department of Defense and from powerful segments of the Congress and the general public. Faced with inevitable, unremitting opposition to significant restructuring, Secretaries focus on modifying processes.

Absence of Political Sensitivity. A second reason for the absence of significant structural changes is that many reform proposals have been too far-reaching to attract committed and power-
ful proponents. They run the gamut from recommending complete centralization to championing a return to decentralized service preeminence. Acceptance of any one of those proposals could result in changes as wrenching as any of the sweeping reorganizations of the 1940s and 1950s. The 1961 Symington Report suggested eliminating the present military departments and placing the Services, as separate organizational units, under the Secretary of Defense within a single Department of Defense. In addition, the report recommended replacing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a single officer who would act as the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense, preside over a military advisory council unaffiliated with the services, and direct the combatant commands. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed completely regrouping the functions of DOD under three Deputy Secretaries of Defense to which service Secretaries and a revamped military operations structure would be subordinate. Paul Y. Hammond recommended conferring authority and responsibility for the military program of all of the services upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would head a formally established general staff. Finally, John C. Reis’ treatise favoring a return to decentralized organization suggested the possibility of consolidating the unified and specified commands into four mission-oriented services which would absorb the existing military departments.

After the strident conflicts of the early post-World War II years, the erstwhile combatants had little energy and no enthusiasm for further battles along these lines. Furthermore, less provocation existed. The Secretary of Defense emerged with such sweeping authority he could hardly continue to claim to be too weak to run the Department. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps found they had successfully defended the separate identities and relative autonomy they sought. Finally, the external factors which had fanned the reorganization fires subsided with the election of President Kennedy. Parsimonious Truman and Eisenhower defense budgets, which gave rise to intense service competition and corresponding public reaction in support of greater unification, gave way to an expanding defense posture and subsequently to the plentiful Vietnam budgets. Nor did succeeding Presidents share Eisenhower’s penchant for personal involvement in Department of Defense reorganization. In these circumstances, despite the periodic proposals for major realignments, none of the powerful potential proponents demonstrated sufficient interest to make structural change a viable issue.
Thus the later years have confirmed what the early years demonstrated: structural reorganization of the Department of Defense is, first and foremost, a political process, involving the clash and adjustment of bureaucratic, legislative, and private interests. Re-structuring is not, as many studies implicitly assume, an academic exercise in organizational optimization. Those who would reorganize the Department of Defense are simply too prone to advance far-reaching proposals while remaining insensitive to possible sources of support and opposition in the bureaucracy, White House, Congress, and public. If they are to influence the shape of public institutions such as the Department of Defense, reformers must advance reorganization proposals developed with an informed appreciation of the likely boundaries of the politically possible.

IV. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

A phenomenon often remarked, and once again demonstrated during the JCS reorganization hearings, is that the prescriptions of proponents of reorganization are as diverse as the diagnoses of DOD organizational maladies are similar. Identifying problems is primarily an empirical exercise; deriving solutions, primarily deductive. Until those who advocate organizational reform move closer to agreement on the premises from which their recommendations are derived, the very diversity of their views will continue to serve as an impediment to meaningful reorganization. To arrive at similar deductions concerning organizational realignments requires starting with similar premises concerning the nature of organizations.

In particular, in the case of the Department of Defense, those who would reshape the structure need to consider more carefully the sources and implications of conflict and cooperation in organizations. Any reorganization which fails to consider and provide for the interplay of those phenomena is unlikely to achieve the reformers' goal of a more integrated national defense effort.

Coexistence of Conflict and Cooperation in Organizations

Assumptions about conflict and cooperation constitute one of the major fault lines which divide organizational literature. The rational, hierarchic model elaborated by Max Weber concentrates on the division of labor and the rules which govern each division in a
bureaucracy; i.e., jurisdiction, function, authority, duties and rights. et cetera. This model implicitly assumes the members of the organization voluntarily cooperate to achieve goals established by the leadership situated at the pinnacle of the hierarchic pyramid. More recent scholarship by Halperin and others, discussed earlier, emphasize what Weber's model overlooks: the conflict among the elements of an organization which inevitably attends delegation of authority and decentralized operations. These authors explain bureaucratic behavior on the basis of interaction among conflicting and competing interests. Neither model is sufficient in itself. The hierarchic model cannot deal with the complexities which conflict imposes and thus fails to explain nonrational (bargaining) decision processes and outcomes. The conflict model, emphasizing disagreement, does not adequately explain how cooperation is achieved and actions are finally taken.

Nevertheless, the tenor of the findings of the many studies of Department of Defense organization suggests each model approximates significant portions of reality. An eclectic approach which subsumes discordant premises must be accepted. Despite the apparent contradiction, empirical evidence leaves no room to doubt both tendencies are inherent in bureaucratic organizations. They coexist. In some circumstances explanations of bureaucratic behavior which assume cooperation are more accurate; in others, those which emphasize conflict. The purpose of any reorganization must be to foster circumstances in which both conflict and cooperation contribute to achievement of organizational objectives.

Conflict—Sources, Legitimacy, and Requirements for Control

The treatment of conflict in organized bodies, although overlooked by Weber, nevertheless has a distinguished lineage. James Madison, in essay 10 of The Federalist, suggests the structure of the United States Constitution derives from an appreciation of the pervasiveness, and potentially disastrous effects, of unregulated conflict among “factions.” The Federalist attributes the origin of factions, and thus conflict, to (1) man’s nature, in which reasoning ability and emotional make-up provide the basis for arriving at differing opinions (concerning, for example, religion, government, and political leadership which are pursued with “zeal”); and (2) the claims of different interests based on the distribution of property. Two centuries have done nothing to tarnish those insights.
although the earlier discussion of institutional impediments to reorganization suggests the source of conflict might be broadened beyond "property" in explaining bureaucratic organizations to include interests such as influence, domain, independence, essence, budget, and morale.

As a result of genuinely incompatible judgments and interests, then, conflict within and among organizations is inherent, pervasive, and (regrettably, in Madison's view) legitimate. Because resources are too scarce to accommodate all valid requirements, because the opinions of sincere men may diverge on the most appropriate course of action, and because decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty in which no definitive proof exists that the alternative selected is in fact "best," differences are inevitable and the pursuit of competing claims justified. Charles Ries has given eloquent expression to the legitimacy of conflict in the Department of Defense:

There is no reason to believe those sharing power will view all policy questions identically. Differences will occur. And these differences do not appear because some individuals have the "right" or the "truly national" view while others have the "wrong" or "parochial" view. On the contrary, differences occur because of the different duties of those who share power. Duties to office, duties to constituency, duties to organization, duties to knowledge and duties to self are different.

Despite mutual agreement on its legitimacy, Ries and The Federalist disagree on the value of conflict. Ries appears to justify all conflict; The Federalist, to condemn it. Neither position is tenable. Certain forms of conflict are detrimental. On the other hand, the success of an organization like the Department of Defense in defining and achieving its objectives depends in large part on how it structures conflict to achieve constructive results. Conflict is counterproductive, for example, when based on personal jealousies and animosities, or on narrow organizational considerations of a constituent element manifestly at variance with the objectives and well-being of the parent organization. It is equally harmful when it results from unrelenting pursuit by a subordinate element of a course of action rejected by the Secretary of Defense in favor of another.

But conflict which derives from the pursuit of their interests by the constituent elements of an organization provides the issue
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agenda, complete with alternatives, which constitutes the basic data and framework for organizational decisions. That statement is true whether the competing elements are the sales and production departments of a business or the military departments of the Department of Defense. The conflicts may be over objectives, the operational goals the Department of Defense should pursue to maintain national security; for example, an assured destruction versus a counterforce targeting strategy, or a Navy preeminent in all aspects of sea power (air, surface, and subsurface) and capable of prosecuting all types of warfare (conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic) at the expense, if necessary, of the Air Force and Army. Or the conflicts may involve selection of the means to achieve given ends; for example, the choice between an Air Force and a Navy cruise missile design. Any assumption that the Secretary of Defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense—or any single military or civilian staff—has the capability within its own resources to plumb the depths of issues such as these (which involve ultimate national defense goals and ends-means compatibility) and arrive independently at solutions at once feasible and acceptable to elements of the Department charged with carrying them out would be completely spirited advocacy on pending decisions as well as valuable source which fails to provide avenues for differing positions to reach the top denies its central management the most innovative thinking and spirited advocacy on pending decisions as well as a valuable source of intelligence on the most significant issues facing the organization.

The problem, then, in coming to grips with conflict is not to eliminate it, as many reorganization proposals implicitly assume. That is impossible. The problem in structuring an organization is to manipulate conflict to secure its benefits and minimize its harmful effects. This pluralistic approach requires that (1) all relevant interests are represented in decisions which will have an impact on them and (2) interests are checked through organizational devices—structure, procedures, and processes—which secure their benefits while harnessing their excesses.

The first requirement is self-evident: a decision uninstructed by all significant viewpoints and urged by strongly interested advocates could very easily fall short of approximating overall organizational goals.

The second, more complex, requirement assumes, with The
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*Federalist,* that organized interests, if left unchecked, will pursue their goals to the point of disregarding "the public good" or "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." This being the case, "the principal task" is "the regulation of those various and interfering interests." 12

Organizations, whether private or public, in advancing their interests tend to continue to escalate their claims until checked. The reason is not difficult to find. Whether they merely fail to consider the question of the more general interest, or are able to rationalize their objectives and actions as conforming with it, is irrelevant. The point is that an abstract concept such as the general, public, or national interest, which political philosophers are patently unable to define, poses absolutely no limitation to the activities of organizations in pursuing their interests. That is true whether the interests involved are businesses, labor unions, environmentalists, developers, government departments (DOD versus State), free traders, protectionists, nuclear power advocates, their opponents, minority activists, or Army, Navy and Air Force proponents. Consequently, in attempting to control the strong-willed organizations which comprise the confederation that is the Department of Defense, reorganization actions should focus on configuring the inevitably conflicting constituent elements to check and balance each other.

**Cooperation—Source and Potential for Controlling Conflict**

David Truman has suggested another, more subtle, check to the potential excesses of organizational interests which bridges the gap between conflict and cooperation. Truman points out that members of any organization are also members of many other groups, both organized and unorganized. Each of these groups has interests which may or may not be compatible. The overlapping memberships of the participants in any one organization impose inherent limits on its demands. Moreover, additional limits result from participants' loyalties to latent interests which, when mobilized (or disturbed), are very powerful. The latent interests include a sense of fair play (or the absence thereof), pride in the overall organization, and a sense of propriety or impropriety in the manner in which decisions are made. 31

Several examples illustrate the limitations which overlapping organizational membership and unorganized interests may impose in the context of the Department of Defense. A member of the Air Force may have supported acquisition of the B-1 bomber but
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opposed any further Air Force effort to acquire it during the Carter Administration after the President rejected the program. A naval aviator may support the air against the surface and subsurface components within the Navy but later support a Navy budget which stints naval air against Air Force and Army budget proposals. Despite personal reservations concerning its wisdom, a serviceman may willingly participate in a controversial war, such as Vietnam, because of his commitment to the constitutional and democratic process from which the war policy, however misguided in his view, emerged. A service Secretary or chief may advocate that his department assume jurisdiction over military space activities but, after thorough consideration of the issue by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with all concerned, fully support a multiple-service approach to space activities. Thus the variety of loyalties and interests of the members of an organization may serve to limit the objectives and activities of the organization.

Overlapping interests and loyalties can be exploited to foster cooperation in a number of ways: by restructuring to ensure that all significant interests are represented in decisions (as in the case of the service Secretary above); by establishing “rules of the game” for decisionmaking, through organizational changes or by other means which are generally acknowledged as legitimate and thus become “interests” in themselves (as in the cases of the doubting Vietnam War veteran and the B-1 advocate); by ensuring that the broad overall implications of alternatives under consideration are assessed and made known as well as the effects on subordinate organizations (as in the case of the naval aviator). Through techniques such as those, the multiple loyalties and interests which characterize each member of the organization make claims on him. He will pursue immediate and intense interests, such as a service position, through bargaining and negotiations with other interests. But beyond a certain point he will give way to other claims which he also perceives as justified. Consequently, in an organization as interlaced with overlapping layers and loyalties as DOD, reorganization actions should attempt to manipulate the framework of cooperation to ensure competing claims are at the cutting edge of decision for all participants.

Conclusions Concerning Conflict and Cooperation.

Herbert Simon has written that “administrative organizations are systems of cooperative behavior.” With respect to the organi-
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Organizational circumstances of the Department of Defense, that statement is no more than half true, in and of itself—and completely inadequate as an operative assumption. Simon would have been just as wide of the mark, however, had he written that organizations are essentially arenas of conflict. Large bureaucracies like the Department of Defense which are composed of powerful constituent elements are characterized by strong patterns of both conflict and cooperation. Purposeful, integrated, and coordinated action can only be achieved by deliberately arranging these patterns to achieve constructive results. The foregoing discussion suggests the following guidelines for reorganization proposals which would exploit conflict and cooperation. That many DOD reorganization proposals would violate one or more of these guidelines is a major impediment to successful reform.

Mobilize all significant interests whose perspectives are germane to decisions on Departmental activities. The DOS 77-80 studies, for example, recommended that relatively unorganized interests such as the genuine joint perspective be organized, and that weak institutions with a useful perspective, such as service Secretaries, be strengthened. Most of the recent proposals for JCS reorganization have recommended strengthening the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commanders as well as the JCS Chairman. Such recommendations would tend to strengthen the joint interest vis-a-vis service interests.

Structure conflict to ensure all relevant interests figure in decisions. Ensure that conflict is channeled into adversary relationships which delineate the differing positions, alternative solutions, and their implications. This guideline would favor retaining the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it is potentially a superb conflict arena. It would, however, require that other relevant interests—that is, those with a joint perspective—be fully represented as well as the present service interests.

Structure conflict resolution to encourage cooperation and legitimate, as a last resort, the exercise of authority. First, improve the quality, consistency, and flow of communications thereby reducing conflict based on inadequate or erroneous information. Second, increase the certainty opposing positions will be revealed and challenged in fora with authority to make decisions, thus encouraging cooperation by participants reluctant to face such exposure. Third, intensify the latent claims on participants for
accommodation by unorganized or weak interests. Finally, in addition to voluntary cooperation, encourage negotiated cooperation through bargaining and compromise by reinforcing participants' anticipation that other decision points in the structure are prepared to exercise their prerogative to decide in the absence of agreement.

This guideline would also favor retaining the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the JCS would require modification to become a vehicle for conflict resolution. The flow of communications would necessarily be broadened to include independent assessments from the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commanders, as well as the services, so that conflicts among all relevant interests are laid bare. The various interests would then serve to check each other. Most important, this guideline would require strengthening the JCS Chairman who would serve to encourage conflict resolution through consensus-building among all interests if possible, but through the interposition of his own independent advice to civilian authorities in the absence of agreement.

V. HOW IMPEDIMENTS TO REORGANIZATION AFFECT CURRENT JCS REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

By this point the impediments to reorganization of the Department of Defense must seem overwhelming. And, in fact, they have been for almost a quarter of a century.

If they are so strong, how can they be overcome? Answering that question would require an analysis comparable to this one. But analyzing some of the current proposals to reorganize the JCS in terms of the obstacles to reorganization identified herein yields some insights on their prospects.

The spectrum of JCS reorganization proposals extends from the status quo to General Taylor's proposal to revamp the entire joint structure. Thanks to the events of this year, those who support reorganization may find that the status quo end of the spectrum is becoming recognized as an extreme. Scathing critiques of the organization by two serving members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff followed by three months of exhaustive hearings in which the weaknesses of the organization were painstakingly revealed make it difficult for those who oppose any changes at all to remain credible. What were earlier identified as "latent interests" may have been
mobile in support of correcting glaring deficiencies in the national defense structure.

Rejecting the status quo, however, does not make proposals at the other end of the spectrum, characterized by General Taylor's scheme, any more likely to be accepted. In the absence of a wartime catastrophe or some other event that completely discredits the present JCS organization, thereby allowing architects of reorganization to sketch their proposals on a tabula rasa, no recommendation which involves obliterating the present structure is likely to be taken seriously.

Proposals of this nature display too little political sensitivity. They immediately arouse more opposition than could possibly be overcome by a few well-intentioned supporters. For example, General Taylor's proposal for a Military Staff, National Command Authorities headed by a chief of staff is open to the timeworn but effective alarums about the dangers of an emergent "man on horseback" at the head of a powerful Prussian-type general staff. Just as important, because these schemes threaten the interests (domain, influence, autonomy, budget) of many of the most powerful organizations within the Department of Defense, they excite intense internal opposition. In short, the Taylor proposal and its ilk, insofar as they entail discarding the present organization and starting over, must be rejected because of their lack of political sensitivity.*

That conclusion is admittedly harsh. It does not even reach the merits of the more far-reaching recommendations before rejecting them. But an examination of General Meyer's proposal, which is somewhat similar to General Taylor's and must also be discarded on political grounds, reveals it apparently disregards the implications of the interplay of conflict and cooperation in organizations. Because the dual roles of each service chief involve a conflict of interest, General Meyer would eliminate the JCS, thus severing the strongest service tie with the joint structure. Recalling the discussion in Part IV of this paper, this realignment would do nothing to eliminate the inherent conflicts in the Department of Defense. But it would eliminate the JCS as an arena for conflict resolution. And General Meyer's proposed National Military Advisory Council.

*Recall that "political" herein refers to the clash and adjustment of interests in the bureaucracy as well as the elective offices.
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devised to exclude parochial service interests, would not take the place of the JCS as a potential arena to resolve conflicts.

In his testimony, General Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff, strongly emphasized the need to retain the service-JCS link to achieve the adjustment and integration which he feared the Meyer proposal would destroy. With the caveat that the service-joint linkage should remain intact, General Allen supported General Jones' initiative.

Thus the Jones proposal, more than the others, appreciates the potential of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a conflict arena which can address and resolve the inherent conflicts, thereby achieving the necessary integration between the maintaining, or input, side of the defense structure and the warfighting employment, or output, side. But General Jones' approach also garners support because it is incremental. It is intended to retain as much of the present system as he thinks prudent. Many of his recommendations are directed at resolving specific problems which he deliberately and persuasively identifies.

But Jones would accomplish his principal objectives by making the JCS Chairman the principal military adviser and giving him complete control over the Joint Staff. Those recommendations exceed the bounds of political acceptability. They excite intense opposition from the services whose chiefs, as members of the JCS, would be reduced to rendering their advice to the Chairman, not the Secretary of Defense and the President (unless specifically asked), as at present. Also, giving the Chairman complete control of the Joint Staff conflicts with General Allen's caveat that the service-joint linkage must not be threatened. Finally, of course, these two Jones recommendations arouse concern among those on Congress, and elsewhere, who are not comfortable with a single preeminent source of military advice and a very powerful central military staff. Although General Jones' skillfully crafted proposal deservedly received more support than any reorganization proposal in many years, it nevertheless required modification in order to overcome the obstacles to DOD reorganization.

The necessary changes, in the view of the Congressmen who framed it, appear in the House Armed Services Committee bill, H.R. 6954 (see appendix to this paper). It is politically sensitive; it is tailored to garner the support (or blunt the opposition) of a broad
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range of governmental and private defense-oriented organizations and individuals; e.g., the Congress, Secretary of Defense, the unified and specified commanders, some of the services, the National Security Council staff, the private sector defense community. The bill would make the Chairman an adviser in his own right, not the principal military adviser. The JCS would retain its traditional charter. Though the bill would strengthen the Chairman's control over the Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs would be able to challenge the Chairman's stewardship. Finally, the bill would accommodate some of the concerns expressed by opponents of reorganization: It provides a dissent channel for each member of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense and the President. It ensures the linkage between the services and Joint Staff. Though it relaxes them, it retains the legislative limitations on Joint Staff assignments thought to be important by those who fear the emergence of a general staff. (A more complete explanation of the rationale for these and other provisions is contained in Chairman White's speech explaining the legislative intent of H.R. 6954. See appendix following this paper.

At the outset of the Investigations Subcommittee hearings General Jones expressed concern that his effort might result in a few inconsequential changes which would allow opponents of JCS reform to bury the issue for another quarter-century. It is one thing to demonstrate that a proposal has merit in terms of its political acceptability: it is another to demonstrate that it has merit.

If the Part IV discussion of the implications for reorganization of conflict and cooperation is valid, then H.R. 6954, though the least far-reaching, may be the most promising of all proposals advanced this year. Its provisions address specific shortcomings identified and substantiated during the hearings; e.g., the need for a Deputy Chairman and the necessity to improve Joint Staff personnel selection, promotions, tenure, management, and independence. It concludes the essence of proposals by Generals Meyer and Taylor and others for a council devoted to long-range strategic thinking (although the structure, composition, and charter of the council, as currently contained in the bill, have been challenged and may require modification).

Most important, however, is the overall organizational framework for the joint structure which the specific provisions of H.R. 6954 are intended to establish. The bill represents an attempt to
revitalize the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a mechanism for conflict resolution. The joint perspectives of the unified and specified commanders and a more independent Joint Staff would receive fuller consideration by the Joint Chiefs. And the Chairman’s independent advisory role would serve as a powerful incentive for less service-oriented accommodation of issues. Thus many of the conflicts on military issues which now engage civilian authorities on one side and military service leaders on the other—the Office of the Secretary of Defense versus the services—would be recast as issues involving differing military perspectives—the maintaining side of the basic model versus the employment side. The potential for resolution of these issues in favor of increased integration of the nation’s defense effort would be increased. With ample avenues for dissent, unresolved issues would be presented to politically accountable authorities in a more clear-cut fashion. And the military advice they receive would inevitably be more sharply focused.
Appendix: Floor Statement of Honorable Richard C. White on H.R. 6954

Mr. Speaker, the bill, H.R. 6954, would provide for more efficient and effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and establish a Senior Strategy Advisory Board.

Earlier this year Gen. David C. Jones, in an unprecedented action for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced a personal commitment to correct what he perceived as basic shortcomings in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Almost as extraordinary was the subsequent action of Gen. Edward C. Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, who joined General Jones in criticizing the present structure and suggested that the Chairman had not gone far enough in his recommendations for change.

Prompted by the alarms sounded by Generals Jones and Meyer the Investigations Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee began hearings on JCS reorganization in April. The subcommittee received testimony from an impressive body of more than 40 witnesses, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretaries of Defense, former Chairmen and members of the JCS, commanders of unified commands, and other civilian and military witnesses.

Mr. Speaker, the hearings revealed near-unanimous agreement that serious organizational problems hamper the performance of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, our highest military body might fail to function adequately in case of war. And, as was the case during World War II, World War I, and as far back as the Spanish-American War, we would be faced with the necessity of making fundamental changes to our military organization in the midst of a crisis. The most casual observer must realize that there may not be time for such a realignment in a future conflict. Equally important (is that) in a continually threatening peacetime environment, timely, clear-cut, realistic, feasible, and prudent professional military advice is often not available to civilian leaders. Consequently, the influence of the military in civilian counsels has diminished over time and, because decisions must nevertheless be made, has often been overshadowed by civilian analysts.

Witnesses emphasized that the advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body is often inadequate. Thus the JCS does not fulfill its legislative charter as "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." JCS advice often is not available when needed. When formal advice is finally rendered, its form and substance has been so diluted that it is of little use to civilian leaders.
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The advice rendered by the JCS is also faulted for a lack of realism. The structure of the Joint Chiefs is such that the group often cannot deal realistically with issues which affect service interests.

I want to emphasize that all parties to the hearings uniformly distinguished between the performance of individual Service chiefs, whose personal advice was given high marks, and the performance of the JCS as a group of advisers acting collegially. Thus the hearings clearly indicated that JCS problems are organizational in nature and by no means reflect on the competence of the members.

H.R. 6954 is intended to eliminate the most harmful effects of two of the most serious of these organizational problems which dilute the quality of military advice: (1) the contradiction between the responsibility of an individual as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a chief of his Service, and (2) present limitations on the Joint Staff.

Let me now turn to an explanation of the provisions in the bill. First, provisions designed to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice. Although the Armed Services Committee agrees that the dual responsibilities of Service chiefs may undermine the advisory capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate group with respect to certain issues, it is not prepared to admit that the JCS is fatally flawed. The committee proposes to expand and strengthen the sources of military advice, retaining the JCS as the principal military advisers. H.R. 6954 will accomplish that purpose by establishing a Senior Strategy Advisory Board, strengthening the JCS Chairman's role as a military adviser, and creating a deputy chairman to assist the Chairman in his added responsibilities.

The Senior Strategy Advisory Board will fill the void in reflective thinking on military matters emphasized by several witnesses, particularly with respect to long-range strategy. The Board, consisting of ten retired former members of the JCS or unified or specified commanders, will provide such advice and recommendations on military strategy and tactics as it considers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS Chairman is uniquely qualified to assume additional responsibilities as an adviser who reflects the unified military viewpoint because he is the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who has no Service responsibilities.

H.R. 6954 makes the Chairman responsible for providing military advice in his own right and gives him access to the Joint Staff for assistance in developing his formal positions. Though his advisory responsibility is not confined by the bill to any one area, the committee intends that the Chairman give special attention to those issues which the collegial JCS has been
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unable to address effectively—for example, resource allocation, roles and
missions, the Unified Command Plan, and joint doctrine and training. The
commitee also intends for the Chairman to forge stronger links with the
unified commanders in developing his positions. He should serve as their
spokesman in Washington, establishing priorities and integrating their
recommendations into a coherent set of combatant command proposals.

Increasing the Chairman’s advisory role is not meant to stifle legitimate
dissent, however. To ensure open channels for expressing opposing views,
H.R. 6954 provides that a Chief may submit any opinion in disagreement
with the military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense and, subsequently, to the President.

The deputy chairman would act as Chairman in the absence or disabil-
ity of the Chairman and exercise such duties as may be delegated by the
Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Although the
argument for creating a deputy chairman is strengthened by the provisions
which increase the Chairman’s responsibilities, establishing the position
makes sense in any case. The JCS Chairman is the senior military officer in
the United States. His responsibilities are in proportion to his rank. Yet,
unlike the Secretary of Defense, secretaries of the military departments, or
chiefs of each service, the Chairman has no deputy.

I now turn to the provisions for improving staff support. First, Joint Staff
personnel.

Testimony revealed a number of disincentives which at times have had
the effect of discouraging officers from seeking Joint Staff assignments:
promotions have lagged; Services disagree on the caliber of the officers
who should be assigned; Joint Staff influence is perceived as limited.

H.R. 6954 affirms that the Joint Staff is the preeminent US military staff:
and it provides that the Joint Staff be manned by the most outstanding
Service officers. The bill also includes two provisions concerning promo-
tions. First, it requires the JCS Chairman to evaluate the performance of
any officer who has worked on the Joint Staff and who is recommended for
promotion above major general or rear admiral. Second, the bill makes the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman, responsible for
ensuring that Joint Staff officers receive equitable career rewards for their
performance. Performance at the Joint Staff level should be considered a
mark of distinction deserving special attention by promotion boards.

Next, provisions which would improve Joint Staff continuity and
experience.

Existing legislative provisions limiting Joint Staff assignments to three
years and prohibiting reassignment in less than three years (except for 30
officers) erect insuperable obstacles to staff continuity. At present the entire staff turns over every two and one-half years. General Jones remarked to Congressmen: "It is just as though every time you went through an election and came to Washington, you had a whole new staff..."

H.R. 6954 provides that the Secretary of Defense may extend the three-year assignment for as much as an additional three years. Also, as many as 100 Joint Staff members, as opposed to 30 at present, could return to Joint Staff duty in less than three years.

Finally, I will review provisions to improve Joint Staff management and procedures, and establish a Joint Staff charter.

At present the Joint Staff is smothered by complex, voluminous operating procedures which ensure that the Services control the form and content of Joint Staff work. Those procedures should be revised to ensure Joint Staff independence and focus its efforts toward achieving joint military objectives.

To that end, H.R. 6954 provides that the JCS Chairman shall manage the Joint Staff in the performance of its duties. Moreover, it directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated. Finally, it provides a charter for the Joint Staff which prescribes the objective of its duties: to support the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. These provisions provide authority for the Chairman to revise the current joint staffing procedures and a corresponding responsibility to do so in shaping the Joint Staff to fulfill its charter. In addition, the provisions vest ultimate responsibility in the Secretary of Defense, who is charted with ensuring Joint Staff independence and that the charter be followed.

H.R. 6954 also modifies the terms of reference for managing the Joint Staff. It removes the condition that the Chairman's management shall be "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Thus the Chairman's authority is independent of the JCS. But his management most conform to the Joint Staff charter and would be subject to challenge by the JCS if that body deems Joint Staff support inadequate to its needs. Finally, the provisions would also give the Chairman latitude to elicit Joint Staff support in the performance of his duties as a military adviser in his own right.

A final provision ensures that the Joint Staff will continue to receive information from the services and the combatant commands and that the channels for dissent remain open. The committee intends H.R. 6954 to establish conditions in which the Joint Staff is the independent author of its
own work. But the committee does not intend to diminish the vital channels of communication between the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands which are necessary to provide the basic information necessary for competent staff work. H.R. 6954 provides that, subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, each officer serving as a chief of Service or as the commander of a unified or specified command may have an opportunity to provide formal comments on any report or recommendation of the Joint Staff prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the report or recommendation is submitted.

In conclusion, I strongly recommend adoption of H.R. 6954 for two reasons. First, though this is a modest proposal, each of the provisions of this bill are steps in the right direction—and, collectively, they may possibly prove to be sufficient in themselves with respect to necessary changes in the law. I would much rather err on the side of caution than to strike out into the uncharted waters of fundamental organizational change. If joint military performance does not improve sufficiently, the Congress can always build on the measures contained in this bill.

The second reason for adopting H.R. 6954 follows from the first. Modest, prudent legislation by Congress this year should encourage action by the Department of Defense to correct the many problems identified in the hearings which should not require legislation. The Pentagon is the real arena for reform. This bill, and subsequent formal oversight into its implementation by the Congress, should serve as a catalyst for change in the Defense Department.

Finally, in closing, I want to pay tribute to Gen. David C. Jones. His courage, conviction, and devotion to duty caused him to raise the issue of Joint Chiefs of Staff reform even though he realized that many of his colleagues would not appreciate his stand. He deserves credit for placing a significant defense problem on the national agenda for resolution. And Gen. Edward C. Meyer is equally deserving for the part he has played.

I hope the Congress will seize the opportunity presented by the initiatives of these officers to effect needed changes in the joint military structure.
H.R. 6954

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for more efficient and effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to establish a Senior Strategy Advisory Board in the Department of Defense.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 10, 1982

Mr. White (for himself, Mr. Stratton, Mr. Mollohan, Mr. Dan Daniel, Mr. Aspin, Mr. MacGuen, Mr. Robert W. Daniel, Jr., and Mr. Nelligan) introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for more efficient and effective operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to establish a Senior Strategy Advisory Board in the Department of Defense.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982".
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Sec. 2. Section 141(d) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(d)"; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the Secretary of Defense any opinion in disagreement with military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the President any opinion in disagreement with military advice of the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Sec. 3. Section 142(b)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "have not agreed" and inserting in lieu thereof "have agreed and have not agreed and provide military advice in his own right".

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Sec. 4. (a)(1) Chapter 5 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 142 the following new section:

"§ 142a. Deputy Chairman

"(a)(1) There is a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Chairman shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman may not be members of the same armed force.

“(2) The Deputy Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of up to two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for one additional term, except that in time of war declared by Congress there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

“(b) The Deputy Chairman acts as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman and exercises such duties as may be delegated by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, shall perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed.

“(c) The Deputy Chairman may attend all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but may not vote on a matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff except when acting as Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman or when there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman.

“(d) The Deputy Chairman, while so serving, holds the rank of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral. The Deputy Chairman may not exercise military
command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.".

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 142 the following new item:

"142a. Deputy Chairman."

(b) Section 525(b)(3) of such title is amended by inserting "or Deputy Chairman" after "Chairman".

JOINT STAFF

SEC. 5. (a) Subsection (a) of section 143 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"(a)(1) There is under the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Staff consisting of not more than four hundred officers. The members of the Joint Staff shall be selected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approximately equal numbers from—

"(A) the Army;

"(B) the Navy and the Marine Corps; and

"(C) the Air Force.

"(2) Selection of officers of an armed force to serve on the Joint Staff shall be made by the Chairman from a list of officers submitted by that armed force. Each officer whose name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that armed force. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on any such list."
(3) Officers assigned to the Joint Staff shall be assigned for a period of three years, except that in time of war there is no limit on the tenure of members of the Joint Staff. Members of the Joint Staff serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, and the tenure of a member of the Joint Staff may at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense be extended for a period of up to three additional years.

“(4) Except in time of war, officers completing a tour of duty with the Joint Staff may not be reassigned to the Joint Staff for a period of not less than three years following their previous tour of duty on the Joint Staff, except that selected officers may be recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than three years with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. The number of such officers recalled to Joint Staff duty in less than three years shall not exceed one hundred serving on the Joint Staff at any one time.”.

(b) Subsection (c) of such section is amended by striking out “, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and inserting in lieu thereof “in the performance of those duties”.

(c) Subsection (d) of such section is amended by inserting “and the Chairman” after “Joint Chiefs of Staff”.

(d) Such section is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

“(e)(1) Subject to guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, each officer serving as a chief of service or
as the commander of a unified or specified command may
have an opportunity to provide formal comments on any
report or recommendation of the Joint Staff prepared for sub-
mittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before such report or rec-
ommendation is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A
copy of any such comment shall, at the discretion of the offi-
cer submitting the comment, be included as an appendix in
the submittal of such report or recommendation to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. For purposes of this paragraph, the chiefs of
service are the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps.

"(2) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the
Joint Staff is independently organized and operated so that
the Joint Staff, and the members of the Joint Staff, support
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in meeting the congressional purpose set forth
in the last clause of section 2 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) to provide for the unified strategic
direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under
unified command, and for their integration into an efficient
team of land, naval, and air forces.

"(0)(1) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Chairman, shall ensure that officer personnel policies of
the armed forces concerning promotion, retention, and as-
(2) In the case of an officer who has served on the Joint Staff and who is selected for recommendation to the President for appointment to a grade above major general or rear admiral, the Chairman shall submit to the President, at the same time as the recommendation for such appointment is submitted, the evaluation of the Chairman of the performance of that officer as a member of the Joint Staff.”.

SENIOR STRATEGY ADVISORY BOARD

SEC. 6. (a)(1) Chapter 7 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

“§ 178. Senior Strategy Advisory Board

“(a) There is established in the Department of Defense a Senior Strategy Advisory Board. The Board shall, from time to time, provide such advice and recommendations on matters of military strategy and tactics as it considers appropriate to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“(b)(1) The Board shall consist of ten members appointed by the President from among retired officers in the grade of general or admiral who, while on active duty, served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as the commander of a unified or specified command.
"(2) Each member of the Board shall be appointed for a term of five years, except that—

"(A) a member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of that term;

"(B) a member whose term of office has expired shall continue to serve until his successor is appointed; and

"(C) of the members first appointed, three shall be appointed for a term of one year, three shall be appointed for a term of three years, and four shall be appointed for a term of five years, as designated by the President at the time of appointment.

Members whose term has expired may be reappointed for one additional term.

"(3) The Chairman of the Board shall be designated by the President from among the members of the Board.

"(c) The Board shall meet regularly at the call of the Chairman or a majority of the members of the Board, but not less often than once each month.

"(d) Members of the Board are not entitled to compensation for service on the Board but may be paid per diem and travel and transportation allowances authorized under section 5703 of title 5.
9
"(e) The Board shall continue in existence until terminated by law."

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"178. Senior Strategy Advisory Board."

(b) Section 178 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 1982.
Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change

General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, if viewed as the military board of a government corporation, would provide some striking contrasts to organization and management principles followed in the private sector. The board consists of five directors, all insiders, four of whom simultaneously head line divisions. It reports to the chief executive and a cabinet member, and is supported by a corporate staff which draws all its officers from line divisions and turns over every two years. Line divisions control officer assignments and advancement; there is no transfer of officers among line divisions. The board meets three times a week to address operational as well as policy matters, which normally are first reviewed by a four-layered committee system involving full participation of division staffs from the start. At 75 percent of the board meetings, one or more of the directors are represented by substitutes. If the board can't reach unanimous agreement on an issue, it must—by law—inform its superiors. At least the four top leadership and management levels within the corporation receive the same basic compensation, set by two committees consisting of a total 535 members, and any personnel changes in the top three levels (about 150 positions) must be approved in advance by one of the committees.

I HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THIS "BOARD" for nearly eight years and its Chairman for most of the past four years, and have thus served as a member of the Joint Chiefs under four Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense. During this time, and before, many good men have struggled very hard to make the best of the joint system, and most, if not all, have experienced a great sense of frustration in dealing with both large and small problems.
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Much of this frustration comes from having to cope with legislative and organizational constraints which reflect concerns of the past, inhibit attempts to meet the rapidly changing demands of today's world, and violate basic leadership and management principles. Yet, despite many studies that have periodically documented problems with this military committee system and made cogent recommendations for improvements, the system has been remarkably resistant to change. Committees can serve a useful purpose in providing a wide range of advice to a chief executive or even in making some key policy decisions, but they are notoriously poor agents for running anything—let alone everything.

Although I recognize the very strong and persistent headwinds, I could not leave office in good conscience this summer without making a major effort to illuminate the real issues once more and hopefully wrest some substantial changes. Most of the problems and some of the approaches I will address have been discovered—then reburied—many times in the past 35 years. The difference this time is that the proposals for improvement are coming from someone inside the system who for many years has been in the best position to understand the causes and consequences of shortcomings. In formulating my approach, I have been helped by a group of senior retired officers who are in a better position than those now serving to step aside from long-standing Service positions and objectively assess the joint system.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

The roots of enforced diffusion of military authority can be traced to a period which precedes the founding of the republic. The continental Congress distrusted standing armies and military heroes, and even with George Washington in command, established multiple checks on his authority. The principles of the separation of powers and civilian control over the military have appropriately become deeply imbedded in our culture, both in law and in custom as well as in the attitudes of our military professionals.

In many cases, however, the mechanisms erected to exercise such controls have had the unintended effect of permitting—and often promoting—serious organizational deficiencies. As our military institutions evolved, the various military subbureaucracies
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attempted to establish as much independence as possible. As a result, by the end of the 19th century, both military departments—War and Navy—were riddled with semiautonomous, often intractable fiefdoms: branches, corps, departments, bureaus, and so forth.

By the time we went to war with Spain in 1898, conditions were ripe for reform, but as is so often the case it took near military disaster in the conduct of the war to provide the impetus within the Army and Navy to move toward better integration within the Services. The Army, despite much opposition, created a Chief of Staff position in 1903; after several intermediate steps, the Navy created the position of Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. Institutional resistance was still great, however, and it would take decades before centralized authority had shifted to the Chiefs of the Services.

Both the Army and the Navy began World War II with authority and responsibility diffused. The Army still had a large number of semiautonomous agencies with little effective coordination below the Chief of Staff level. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, General Marshall streamlined the Army by reducing the number of officers reporting directly to him from 61 to six. In December of 1941, the Navy had split responsibility in Washington with Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral King as Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet. A few months later much of that problem was solved when Admiral King assumed both jobs.

Inter-Service cooperation developed even more slowly. Before technological developments began to blur the boundaries between sea and land warfare, the Services had evolved independently into distinctly different organizations with separate policies and traditions. Competition rather than cooperation was the standard. This evolution resulted in four organizations which even today gravitate quite naturally to two groups of shared traditions and experiences: a maritime grouping (Navy and Marine Corps), and primarily a land warfare grouping (Army and later the Air Force).

However, circumstances surrounding defense in the 20th century created needs and motives for unified action. The first United States experience in deploying and supplying large expeditionary forces occurred in 1898, and it was not until World War I that the airplane emerged to blur historical distinctions between ground
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and sea warfare. These sorts of changes spurred the military into developing embryonic arrangements in the early part of the century for coordinating strategic and logistic plans and for conducting joint maneuvers. Until World War II, however, such arrangements remained rather exceptional and clearly did not work well.

The watershed for development of a permanent inter-Service system was the crisis atmosphere surrounding our entry into World War II. The British had established a committee of the heads of their military services in 1923. When intensive military consultation with the British commenced after Pearl Harbor, it soon became apparent that we too needed some such system, not only to assure smoother dealings with the British but also to coordinate our own national war effort.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established informally by President Roosevelt in February 1942. The White House appointments calendar suggests that the President met with the Chiefs as a body frequently during 1942, but primarily with the Chief of Staff to the President in the remaining three years of the war. For the most part, the Chiefs, along with their British counterparts, directed largely separate wars through three geographic commands which were essentially divided by Service. General Eisenhower commanded Europe while Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur commanded separate theaters in the Pacific. Strategic planning was conducted on the basis of direct guidance: put first priority on Europe; use the Nation's full resources to support coalition efforts to defeat the enemy forces; and compel the Axis governments to surrender unconditionally. In many ways, it was a simpler world. But as the biographies of many World War II leaders reveal, the joint system established then did not work very well: Service partisanship and inadequate coordination resulted in innumerable delays on many critical issues.

As the war drew to a close, an exhaustive debate ensued on how to organize the postwar military: the Army favored, but the Navy opposed, a highly integrated system. Many at that time believed that the Army would dominate any integrated system. The Air Force, then still part of the Army, supported integration, but was primarily interested in becoming a separate Service.

After nearly two years of studies, committee reports, and Presi-
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dential interventions, the National Security Act of 1947 emerged as a compromise between those who favored full Service integration and those who feared centralization of military authority. The act created a loose confederation among the military Services and a Secretary of Defense, who initially had little authority. Amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 served to strengthen the Secretary's authority and to expand the size and purview of his staff, but as far as the joint system was concerned, the changes were much more marginal. The role of the Chairman was formalized, the Joint Staff was expanded, and the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands was clarified.

Even modest changes, however, created great controversy. During part of the period (when) the amendments were being addressed, I was aide to General Curtis LeMay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Command, and I had many opportunities to observe the intense debates which took place not only in Washington but throughout much of the military. Only from such a vantage point was it clear how strong the pressures for preserving Service autonomy remained.

President Eisenhower, writing in 1965, said he had reminded his associates on signing the Defense Reorganization Bill of 1958 that it was just another step toward what was necessary. I believe he would be disappointed that further steps have not been taken.

Since 1958, there have been many recommendations for fundamental revisions of the system—but few changes in its statutory framework. In 1978 the Commandant of the Marine Corps was made a full member of the Joint Chiefs by law, but this primarily codified what had already become practice. Essentially, despite major changes in the world (on which I will comment later), we have had 24 years—and in many ways 35 years—without fundamental revisions of the joint system, a system which in effect represents arrangements developed in a patchwork way during World War II.

HOW WE OPERATE

At the top of that system are the Joint Chiefs, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. By law, we are the principal military advisers to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.
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As a body, we are responsible for reviewing and developing ways to improve the state of military readiness, assessing threats to our security interests, and identifying the forces required to meet those threats. We supervise but do not command the senior Combatant Commanders, and maintain an elaborate command, control, and communications system which provides the links to and within our combat forces worldwide. We also consult with foreign military leaders and provide military representation to arms-control negotiations teams. The Combatant Commanders are Commanders of European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, Southern Command, Readiness Command, Strategic Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command, Military Airlift Command, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Some of these have multiple services involved (Unified Commands) and some a single service (Specified Commands).

Four of the members of the Joint Chiefs are the military heads of their individual Services who, except in time of war, are restricted to a single four-year term. Since 1947, nearly 50 officers have held the office of Chief of one of the four Services. A Service Chief is not only a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also is the leader of his uniformed Service. As its principal military spokesman, the Service considers him the guardian of its professional interests, standards, and traditions.

The fifth member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman, is the only one to devote all of his time to joint affairs. Although outranking all other military offices, the Chairman does not exercise command over the Joint Chiefs or the armed forces but acts as an adviser, a moderator, an implementor, and an integrating influence whenever possible. A Chairman is appointed for a two-year term and may be reappointed once, except during time of war when unlimited two-year reappointments are allowed.

After four years as a Service Chief and now on my fourth year as the Chairman, I have found that a Chairman generally has more influence but less control than a Service Chief. Whereas a Service Chief can draw on significant institutional sources of formal authority, the Chairman's influence must be derived primarily from his effectiveness in personal relationships. His position provides the opportunity to meet with the leadership of the Nation, but it is his professional competence, his ability to present well thought-out
and broad-based arguments, and his performance as a team player grappling with difficult questions of national priorities that determine his degree of influence. The Chairman's only institutional advantage is his status as the one senior military official whose sole responsibility encompasses the entire spectrum of defense.

The Joint Chiefs are supported by a Joint Staff which is significantly limited by law in terms of size—it is dwarfed by the Service and Secretary of Defense staffs—and the tenure of officer assignments. Except for urgent matters, a joint action is traditionally handled by assigning the issue to a Joint Staff action officer who meets with comparable-level representatives from the four Service staffs. The pressures at this point create a greater drive for agreement than for quality: the process usually results in extensive discussion and careful draftsmanship of a paper designed to accommodate the views of each Service—at least to the extent of not goring anyone's ox.

The paper then works its way up through a series of such committees to a group composed of the Service Operations Deputies (three-star position on each Service staff) and the three-star Director of the Joint Staff. These individuals—who normally attend the meetings of the Joint Chiefs—can approve a routine paper, but refer any substantive issues or unagreed matter to the Chiefs. As would be expected, papers produced by such a multiple committee process are often watered down or well waffled, although not as badly as Dean Acheson judged when in his 1969 memoirs he wrote of the Joint Chiefs organization: "Since it is a committee and its views are the result of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could not say what she thought until she heard what she said."

When there is not time for this elaborate staff process or even to convene the Joint Chiefs, I must take action and consult with my colleagues later. The most extreme example would be that of direct attack on the United States. The Soviets have a number of submarines on alert off our Atlantic and Pacific coasts which could deliver nuclear warheads on Washington and other targets in a very few minutes. If an attack were made, our warning sensors would pick up the launches within seconds, and reports would reach Washington and other key points almost immediately. The general or admiral on 24-hour duty in the National Military Command Center would at
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once notify me as well as others. I then would recommend a course of action to the President and Secretary of Defense, and would implement the Presidential decision without delay.

At the other end of the spectrum are incidents such as the one last year when a Libyan pilot fired a missile at our Navy fighters over the Gulf of Sidra and our pilots responded by downing two of the Libyan planes. I was notified immediately and in turn informed the Secretary of Defense. I then proceeded to the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon to determine what further action, if any, was required. The need to respond to crises and incidents such as this one requires that I be immediately available, a requirement to which I have long been accustomed.

The more routine actions are considered each week in three regularly scheduled Joint Chiefs meetings, in which operational as well as policy issues are addressed. When in Washington, the first responsibility of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to attend all of these meetings, but because of our worldwide responsibilities we must be gone a considerable amount of the time. The Vice Chief of Staff substitutes when a Service Chief is absent, but since the Chairman is not allowed a deputy (a major weakness which I will address later), the senior Service Chief in attendance chairs the meeting when I am away. My experience has been that one or more substitutes attend about three-quarters of the meetings, a situation that results in a lack of continuity.

By law, if we cannot reach unanimous agreement on an issue, we must inform the Secretary of Defense. Such splits are referred to the Secretary a few times a year, but we are understandably reluctant to forward disagreements, so we invest much time and effort to accommodate differing views of the Chiefs.

The Joint Chiefs must maintain many constructive external relationships, the most important of which derives from their role as the senior military advisers to the civilian leadership, particularly the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Chiefs meet with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense each Tuesday to discuss joint matters as well as attend other meetings with them during the week. As Chairman I meet privately with the Secretary and his Deputy each day and participate with them in interagency discussions.
Traditionally, Presidents have met with the Chiefs as a body only on a few occasions. More often we send memoranda to the Secretary of Defense and request that they be forwarded to the President. Any Chief has the right to ask for an individual appointment or correspond directly with the President, but this right has also been exercised very rarely. To the best of my knowledge, it was last used in 1974 by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, who wrote directly to President Nixon to urge a stronger negotiating stance during the SALT II negotiations.

The main contact with the President comes when I participate as the Joint Chiefs' representative in National Security Council meetings. Such meetings are scheduled frequently by President Reagan, who has used the National Security Council forum more than any President since Eisenhower. I have the full opportunity at these meetings to express to the President the corporate views of the Chiefs as well as my personal views on any matters, regardless of whether the Chiefs have addressed them. I also have the opportunity to express such views below the Presidential level as a member of various interagency and Defense working groups, such as the Military Manpower Task Force, the Defense Resources Board, and the Armed Forces Policy Council.

Next to advising the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs' most important responsibility is the requirement to oversee the Combatant Commands. In meeting this responsibility, it is essential to nurture a close relationship with the commanders through longstanding personal contacts and frequent communications as well as visits to the field. The Service Chiefs are also responsible to their Secretaries for organizing, equipping, and training the forces assigned to the Combatant Commands.

Responsiveness to Congress is another important responsibility of the Joint Chiefs. The Secretary of Defense and I normally appear together before eight Congressional committees—many times each year before some. Service Chiefs also have hearings before several committees, particularly those concerned with Service budget matters. And the Joint Chiefs occasionally will appear as a body, as we did during various arms-control hearings. Extensive questioning of every action of the Defense Department is the norm during hearings as well as in detailed written questions addressed to us throughout the year.
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Whenever military officers appear at a congressional hearing, we are expected to respond fully to questioning, even when asked for personal views about matters on which we may disagree with the position of the Administration. I have responded to unsolicited questions with personal views at variance with the decisions of the civilian leadership on a number of occasions, the most recent of which concerned my reservations on the basing decision for the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile. I believe our system is unique among the nations of the world in airing such disagreement. A number of years ago, when I explained this aspect of US military-congressional relations to a head of government of one of our allies, he responded that one of his military officers would be fired if he gave a view other than the official position to his Parliament. The US civilian leadership throughout the years has understood and even supported the military's responsiveness to congressional questions so long as our comments have been made in good faith and neither solicited nor intended to circumvent a decision. I have found that senior officers have generally been sensitive to this responsibility.

Since it is essential to maintain the American people's confidence and support for our defense programs, the Joint Chiefs consider public relations, including speeches and other public appearances, another important function.

Finally, it is important for the Joint Chiefs to work very closely with our friends and allies, since we simply cannot go it alone in today's world. I meet with my NATO counterparts on at least four occasions each year, and with officials from many other countries somewhat less frequently. Since almost every aspect of our job has international implications, foreign travel is an indispensable aid to understanding key issues and establishing good relations with foreign leaders.

Those important external relationships take a great deal of time, but it is the cumbersomeness of the committee processes that constrains our ability to produce the best joint military advice. One of the Presidentially directed studies of the joint system, the 1978 Steadman Report, concluded that the advice provided personally (usually orally) by the Chairman and the Service Chiefs was of high quality, but that the institutional products (the formal position papers)—were not found very useful.
SOME PROGRESS...

Despite the institutional constraints, however, we have managed to make some joint program improvements over the last few years. Much of the credit for whatever progress has been made must go to my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs. The Nation has been, and continues to be, well served by these competent, hard-working officers. Some of the improvements are:

- development of a broader joint exercise program, to include mobilization practice;
- establishment of a Joint Deployment Agency to integrate deployment plans and activities;
- integration of our land and sea transportation systems;
- redirection of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to achieve better understanding of mobilization;
- revamping of our joint education system, to include establishment, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, of research centers at the National Defense University to help us take fresh looks at defense problems;
- organizational adjustments for better integration of the joint command, control, and communications system;
- establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to improve our capability to deploy and operate forces in Southwest Asia and as a mechanism to develop and exercise integrated operations by elements of all four Services;
- increasing the Combatant Commanders' opportunity to influence resource decisions, to include appearing before the Defense Resources board; and
- involving the Service Chiefs in specific joint issues when visiting the field in order to report findings and recommendations at a Joint Chiefs meeting.

...BUT PERSISTENT SHORTCOMINGS

While the above represents some important and helpful changes in inter-Service programs, such progress has been limited primarily to issues which only marginally affect important Service interests. However, unless the basic long-term shortcomings of the system are corrected, the severity of their consequences will continue to increase as the national security environment becomes ever more complex. We need to spend more time on our warfighting capabilities and less on an intramural scramble for resources.
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In my view, the basic causes of our most serious deficiencies can be divided into two categories: personnel and organization.

**Personnel**

There is inadequate cross-Service and joint experience in our military, from the top down. The incentives and rewards for seeking such experience are virtually nonexistent. And the problem is compounded by the high degree of turbulence in key positions.

We do not prepare officers to assume the responsibilities of membership on the Joint Chiefs as well as we should. I include myself in this judgment even though I was fortunate in having an unusually diversified background before becoming a member of the Joint Chiefs. In my many years in the Air Force, I had been assigned to bombers and fighters, command and staff, Washington and field tours. I had attended the National War College, an institution designed to prepare military officers and foreign policy civilians for joint and interagency duty. I had been an aide to an unusually competent commander, General LeMay, and he taught me much—his initial guidance to me was, "You are in this job to learn first and serve second, and do not mix those priorities." I had 10 years' duty overseas in Japan, Vietnam, and Europe, including direct involvement in two wars. And in my last overseas assignment I had two jobs—as US air commander with geographic responsibility stretching from Norway to Iran, and concurrently, as a NATO air commander with coalition responsibility for the air forces of a number of nations.

However, I still lacked two major ingredients of a fully rounded experience when I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I had begun service in the Army and had maintained close contact with that Service even after the Air Force became independent. But my contact with the maritime forces—the Navy and Marines—was limited. I had visited and had participated in joint exercises with maritime forces, but still did not have as deep an understanding of their strengths and weaknesses, their doctrines and traditions, as I would have liked. Unfortunately, my experience in this regard is far from unique: few Navy or Marine officers have substantial experience with the Army or Air Force, and vice versa.

The second gap in my experience is also too common among
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officers who assume key positions in the joint system (both on the Joint Chiefs and as Combatant Commanders): I had never served on the Joint Staff or in the headquarters of a Unified Command. And, frankly, I have found from my own experience that serving on the Joint Chiefs as head of a Service does not necessarily make an individual a truly joint officer. My perspective changed when I became Chairman and was immersed every hour in joint problems. But I must confess that as Air Force Chief, while I prided myself on my joint attitude and believed that some fundamental changes were needed, I was reluctant—as were the other Service Chiefs—to accept any infringement on Service autonomy on individual issues.

Most newly assigned officers arrive on the Joint Staff or a Unified Command staff from a Service-oriented career with little inter-Service experience and inadequate preparation for joint duty. In the case of the Joint Staff, the problem is compounded by statutory limits—restrictions which do not apply to the Service and Secretary of Defense staffs. For example, Public Law 10 (USC 143) states that:

- The tenure of members of the Joint Staff...except in time of war...may (not) be more than three years.
- Except in time of war...officers may not be reassigned to the Joint Staff (in) less than three years...except...with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, who may waive this restriction for no more than 30 officers.

Furthermore, officers come from and return to their Services, which control their assignments and promotions. The strong Service string thus attached to a Joint officer (and to those assigned to the Unified Commands as well) provides little incentive—and often considerable disincentive—for officers to seek joint duty or to differ with their Service position in joint deliberations. Indeed, it is hard to argue that Joint Staff duty is a path to the top. With the exception of Army General Earle Wheeler, not a single Director of the Joint Staff or one of its major components has ever become Chief of his Service or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We have many outstanding officers on the Joint Staff who work very hard under very difficult conditions with few rewards. It is no wonder that many retire while on—or soon after leaving—the Joint Staff, or seek early release for a more rewarding job. The three-year limit on assignments—when coupled with our reluctance to stand in
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the way of good people attempting to move to Service jobs that may further their careers—results in a turnover of the Joint Staff in a little more than two years. Better continuity is required.

Organization.

In the joint system we not only have the advantages and all the disadvantages typical of committees, but our problems are further compounded by the “spokesman-statesman” dilemma that a Service Chief encounters. This is especially true when the issue of distribution—of sources or of missions—is raised. Time after time during my years as a member of the Joint Chiefs, the extraordinary difficulty of addressing—let alone gaining the Chiefs’ agreement on—the distribution of constrained resources has been driven home to me. A Service Chief finds himself in a very tough position when asked to give up or forgo significant resources or important roles and missions, both because his priorities have been shaped by his Service experience and because he must be the loyal and trusted leader of a Service whose members sincerely believe their Service deserves a greater share of constrained resources and of military missions—and the control thereof.

Service Chiefs do differ with the position of their Service staffs on occasion, but to do so too often and particularly on fundamental issues is to risk losing the support essential for carrying out Service responsibilities. One former Chief relates that during a joint meeting, a Service action officer (a major) handed him a note which said, “General, under no condition can you agree to the third paragraph.” This incident is representative of a phenomenon which has often been called “the tyranny of the action officer.” However, that phrase tends to obscure a significant point: the major was expressing the viewpoint of a large and often unforgiving bureaucracy.

We in the defense business share the problem which afflicts most of corporate America—the difficulties inherent in long-range planning. Today’s business leaders are of course well aware of the problems of accurately predicting the future and developing successful strategies to improve long-range profitability—and creating incentives within constituencies to address the long term. Those of us responsible for defense planning must contend with the same problems as well as further complications stemming from the lack
of a readily calculable "bottom line," the buffeting of political and social disturbances anywhere on the globe, and a high degree of resistance to change.

Any institution that imbues its members with traditions, doctrines, and discipline is likely to find it quite difficult to assess changes in its environment with a high degree of objectivity. Deep-seated Service traditions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, Service pride, and heroism, but they may also engender a tendency to look inward and to perpetuate doctrines and thought patterns that do not keep pace with changing requirements. Since fresh approaches to strategy tend to threaten an institution's interests and self-image, it is often more comfortable to look to the past than to seek new ways to meet the challenges of the future. When coupled with a system that keeps Service leadership bound up in a continuous struggle for resources, such inclinations can lead to a preoccupation with weapon systems, techniques, and tactics at the expense of sound planning.

Despite valiant efforts to improve strategic planning in the Pentagon, we are often faced with intense pressures to spend most of our time addressing immediate issues. Those pressures are particularly great with regard to budget actions: sometimes we are addressing three budget documents at a time. For example, in the fall of 1981 we were working with Congress on the Fiscal Year 1982 budget (well after the fiscal year had started), preparing the 1983 budget for submission to Congress in January 1982, and doing long-range planning for the following five-year budget period (1984-1988). The work with the Congress obviously took budgetary precedence, and at the same time, big and small crises (Poland, El Salvador, Libya, Middle East, etc) were rippling through Washington with increased frequency. Under such conditions, it takes strong discipline to avoid being a total captive of the urgent.

NEEDED CHANGES

The shortcomings outlined about have been with the joint system for too long and the need for correction is more urgent now than at any time. Since we live in an era when conflicts could erupt regionally or globally much more quickly than in the past, we must build our military strength without delay—and we must be able to integrate our military forces with great efficiency.
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It is clear to me that the fundamental problem is not with individuals but is an organizational one. I have been a close observer or a direct participant in joint activities for more than 20 years. During that time there have been six Chairmen and dozens of Service Chiefs and the basic problems have continued regardless of who has been in a specific chair.

As a minimum, we need changes in three specific areas:

(1) Strengthen the Role of the Chairman

Many areas cannot be addressed effectively by committee action, particularly when four out of five committee members have institutional stakes in the issues and the pressure is on to achieve unanimity in order to act. It is unreasonable to expect the Service Chiefs to take one position as Service advocates when dealing in Service channels, and a totally different position in the joint arena. Such matters should therefore be removed from addresal by the Joint Chiefs as a body.

To the extent that an inter-Service perspective is needed on distribution issues, that perspective could be better provided by the Chairman in consultation with the Combatant Commanders. This in turn would require strengthening of the Unified Commander's role with respect to his Service Component Commanders, who command the forces and report both to the Unified Commander and the Service Chief. Under the current system the Service Component Commander's attention is often drawn more to Service issues than to inter-Service coordination problems. In other areas—such as joint operational and long-range planning, crisis management, and a number of routine matters—neither the Service Chiefs nor the Service staffs need participate at the level of detail in which they are involved today.

Furthermore, the Chairman should be authorized a deputy. It is an anomaly that the military officer with the most complex job is virtually the only senior—and in many cases not so senior—officer who does not have a deputy. This causes substantial problems of continuity when individual Service Chiefs, who spend only a fraction of their time on joint activities, stand in for the Chairman in his absence. Secondly, the Chairman needs assistance, particularly in ensuring the readiness, improving the war planning, and managing
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the joint exercising of the combatant forces. I would also recommend that, at least until there is far more cross-experience and education among all four Services, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman should come from the two different groupings (one to be a Navy or Marine officer and the other an Army or Air Force officer).

I am convinced that without some such revised role for the Chairman and less reliance on the cumbersome committee processes, the very great demands on the time of a Service Chief will continue and perhaps even worsen. President Eisenhower recognized this problem and when he transmitted his final reorganization plan to Congress in 1958, he stated: “This situation is produced by their having the dual responsibilities of chief of the military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The problem is not new but has not yielded to past efforts to solve it.” Unfortunately, the approach Eisenhower then advocated—having a Chairman delegate major portions of his Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief (with the hope that this would overcome many of the joint problems)—has not worked either, as the subsequent 24 years of experience have shown. I, for one, would also like to see the Service Chiefs be able to spend more time as the leaders of their Service in improving the capabilities of their units and in managing the spending of the billions of dollars in the Service budgets.

There is great wisdom in having the Joint Chiefs of Staff act as senior military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense on certain key issues. But without a stronger role and better support for the Chairman, the work of the Joint Chiefs is likely to remain too dispersed, diluted, and diffused to provide the best possible military advice or to ensure the full capability of our combatant forces.

(2) Limit Service Staff Involvement in the Joint Process

As mentioned before, the Service staff dwarf the Joint Staff with many of the Service officers duplicating the work of the Joint Staff. There are two basic problems. First, the Service staff involvement is a cumbersome staffing process and, second, the Service Chiefs receive their advice on joint matters from their Service staffs.

There are some advantages of having Service staffs involved in the joint process, but we should abolish the current system in which each Service has almost a de facto veto on every issue at every stage
of the routine staffing process. President Eisenhower noted 23 years ago that "these laborious processes exist because each military department feels obliged to judge independently each work product of the Joint Staff." The situation has not changed. The role of Service staffs can and should be reduced to providing informational inputs—the result would be a better product and fewer officers needed on the Service staffs.

When a Service Chief acts on a Service matter he should receive advice from his Service staff and when he acts on a joint matter he should receive his advice from the Joint Staff; however, since the beginning of the joint process, Service Chiefs have relied almost exclusively on their Service staffs in preparing for joint meetings. It is unrealistic to expect truly inter-Service advice from a staff comprised of officers from only one Service. The Joint Staff can and should provide such advice.

(3) Broaden the Training, Experience, and Rewards for Joint Duty

Finally, more officers should have more truly joint experiences at more points in their careers—and should be rewarded for doing so. There should be more interchange among Services at the junior ranks, as Eisenhower strongly advocated, and preparation for joint assignments should be significantly upgraded. The joint educational system should also be expanded and improved. (Along these lines, one innovative idea that is being addressed is to have all newly appointed generals and admirals attend a common course of joint education.) An assignment to the Joint Staff or to a Unified Command headquarters should be part of an upward mobility pattern, rather than a diversion or end of a career, as has been the case so often in the past. It is difficult to see how present patterns can be changed, however, without some influence by the Chairman on the selection and promotion of officers. Also, the statutory restrictions on service on the Joint Staff should be removed.

Despite the magnitude of the task, I am encouraged by the willingness of my colleagues to address the issues and by the support of the Secretary of Defense and others in the Administration on the need for change. Furthermore, I sense a different mood in Congress than that shown in the 1940s and 1950s, when large and powerful elements strongly protected Service autonomy. I am working hard in my final months as Chairman to bring about the
necessary changes. More specifically, I have underway a course of
action which addresses, first, recommendations to my colleagues
on changes which are within the authority of the Chiefs, and,
second, recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the
President on other changes, to include specific proposals for legis-
lative action.

Such change never comes easily. As the Navy approached its
major reorganizations at the start of the century, US naval historian
Alfred Mahan concluded that no Service could agree to give up
sovereignty, but would have to have reorganization forced upon it
from outside the organization. Six months before Pearl Harbor, a
farsighted Chairman of the General Board of the Navy proposed a
truly integrated joint system to the Secretary of the Navy. Like many
innovative proposals before and since, the idea was referred to a
committee for study and overtaken by events. It is interesting to
note, however, that then-Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower
supported this proposal with the judgment that “coordination by
cooperation is ineffective.”

The Services have an understandable desire to protect organi-
zational interests, to preserve their sovereignty, and to conserve
hard-won prerogatives. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact
that our national security today requires the integration of Service
efforts more than at any time in our history. To attempt to achieve
meaningful integration only through the existing committee system
is to leave it at the mercy of well-proven institutional counterpres-

sures. I believe that we can find a middle ground which draws on the
strengths of the separate Services and of having Service Chiefs as
members of the Joint Chiefs, while at the same time making the
changes necessary to strengthen our joint system. If not, major
surgery will be required.
The JCS—How Much Reform is Needed?

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, United States Army

AN EXCELLENT CASE for strengthening the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been made by General David C. Jones. His recommendations echo a well-established pattern. . . . His is but the latest expression of a frustration long felt by senior military officers—for all the reasons cited by General Jones—that there must be a better way to shape alternatives and to provide the best possible military advice. Virtually every serious student and practitioner has recommended that the JCS be strengthened. The near unanimity of their views can no longer be ignored, particularly in the light of grave new dimensions to the problem of national security.

- The Soviets understand full well that the United States no longer enjoys clear nuclear superiority. Their new nuclear prowess, combined with other radically improved Soviet military capabilities, lends then new confidence in their ability to mount and sustain a rapid offensive, nuclear or conventional. Indeed, after two decades of sustained build-up, the Soviets may now believe they can conduct simultaneous and sustained offensive military operations in several theaters.

- The West has not responded firmly and in a united fashion to this challenge. A carefully nurtured and sophisticated Soviet political offensive and growing Western revulsion to a defense buildup, particularly among the youth, have considerably weakened the old consensus based on traditional notions of how to defend against Soviet aggression.

- Overshadowing these factors is the sharp change that has occurred in the pace of warfare: "...A revolution...(changing) the
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whole scale and tempo... Warning times are vanishing... making timely reaction difficult." These words of President Eisenhower, true in 1958 when the sequencing of conventional operational phrases was measured in weeks and months, are even more compelling today when some scenarios allow only days, perhaps hours, for decision and reaction.

- Domestically, the explosion of lawmaking and regulation-writing in the 1970s has greatly complicated the development of a coherent defense posture. Additionally, the increasing demands of the appointed and elected leadership and the growth in congressional staffs have had an impact on the time available for the individual Chief to direct his Service. The Chiefs have even less time for strategic reflection or attention to the responsiveness of the JCS system.

Fortunately, we now appear to be beginning a serious reexamination of the role, organization, and functioning of the JCS. In the process, we should examine the even broader issue of whether the Nation’s civilian leaders receive the best possible advice from their military experts. The challenges our Nation faces today and the prospects for more demanding challenges in the critical years ahead require that the reforms we finally adopt cure the ills of the system. Strong medicine is needed. Various inadequacies in the National Security Act of 1947 have been addressed but were not fully corrected by a series of amendments over subsequent years. We now have a 35-year patchwork of law, custom, and shibboleth.

My own professional judgment is that the changes urged by General Jones, while headed in the right direction, do not go far enough to correct what ails the JCS. I believe that we must consider the feasibility of changes beyond the ones proposed by General Jones creating a stronger Chairman and Joint Staff. We must find a way to provide better balanced, sounder, and more timely advice from senior Service professionals in addition to strengthening the Chairman and the Joint Staff.

THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR

The historical context of the problem goes back much further than 1947, to the Civil War, when President Lincoln brought into being the "unified command" which eventually won the war. Since then reformers have tried every 20 or 30 years to institutionalize a
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better mechanism for planning and directing the military establishment, but none fully succeeded. What is notable is that each wave of reform followed the trauma of war and each sought to prevent in the future the troubles—sometimes disasters—encountered in devising and executing national strategy. Thus, the turn of the century reforms were the product of the planning debacle of the Spanish-American War; the 1920 reforms reflected our World War I experience.

Today, war is too devastating, the cost of warmaking machinery too expensive, the likely warning time too short for us to await another lesson. We must not delay until after World War III to create the command structure needed to fight it, nor can we defer any longer those reforms which if in existence today are likely to help prevent war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff dates back to the committee of heads of Services we adopted in 1942, emulating the British. The bureaucratic latticework of the 1920s and 1930s erected a façade of cooperation over well-protected Service prerogatives, which quickly gave way under pressures of wartime reality. With all-out war facing the President, he began to pay close attention to the committee of Chiefs. The continuous dialogue between the White House and the Chiefs resulted in sound military directives from on high so indispensable to victory. The key to this system was frequent access by the military to the decision-making bodies of government, both executive and legislative. That access was a matter of necessity, for the experience of war demonstrated anew the need for combined cross-Service planning. There is little doubt that the Chiefs established their credibility as trusted military advisers in World War II.

It is important to remember, however, that the times and the circumstances of the 1940s are not those of the 1980s. The geographical separability and remoteness of the combat theaters, coupled with limited overlap in the technologies employed by each Service, allowed the national leadership to parcel out theater responsibilities using traditional Service roles. Resource constraints such as we face today were of minimal consideration at the national level: American industry concentrated on war production; conscription provided manpower for 90 Army and six Marine divisions, an 8,200-ship Navy (including 98 carriers), and 79,000 aircraft (roughly equivalent to 1,097 tactical wings today). Defense was allotted more than
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one-third of the gross national product. Such abundance obviated the kind of inter-Service competition for scarce resources we know today, with the draft on stand-by, with defense allocations one-twentieth of the GNP and with many disincentives for industry's participation in defense.

POSTWAR CHALLENGES AND LEGISLATION

After World War II, the urgencies which had supported wholehearted joint prosecution of the war at the top disappeared. What remained were underlying sources of wartime inter-theater, intra-theater, and inter-Service disputes: Nimitz vs. MacArthur, Navy vs. Army, Pacific vs. Europe. Additionally, our postwar alliances generated new requirements for starkly different environments of threat and geography. New technological developments offered weapons systems whose capabilities blurred the accepted boundaries among Service roles and missions. Renewed interest in domestic programs greatly reduced defense resources. It was hardly an environment supportive of inter-Service harmony. President Eisenhower's message to Congress in 1958 pointed out the path to pursue:

... Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

AN IMPERFECT LAW

The first effort toward a more integrated defense establishment was the creation of the Department of Defense in the National Security Act of 1947.

That act also formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a council of advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense on military policy, organization, strategy, and plans.

At the same time, members of that council, the Service Chiefs, were told to retain their departmental responsibilities to organize, equip, and train their forces. Foremost of these, for the Chief of Staff of the Army, is his direct responsibility "...to the Secretary of the..."
Army for the efficiency of the Army, its preparedness for military operations, and plans..."

It should not therefore be surprising that the four Service Chiefs found it somewhat difficult to sit down three times a week and act as a corporate body against some of the very remedies they individually were seeking to apply within their respective Services. Nor were the oft-made criticisms of their deliberations without a strong element of unfairness. Given budgets which provide for less than minimum defense needs, the Chiefs often found themselves unable to act responsibly in their joint role except to the detriment of legitimate Service requirements. This "dual-hatting," dictated by law, confers real power with the Service Chief hat and little ability to influence policy, programming, and budget issues with the joint hat. This is the root cause of the ills which so many distinguished officers have addressed these past 35 years.

The Act of 1947 has been successively amended to grant increased authority to the Secretary of Defense and to build up the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the JCS. But while centralized civilian control over the process of determining defense resources materialized, structural changes for the JCS were minor, largely cosmetic. The JCS, while charged with the responsibility to conceive, plan, and organize a defense founded on a unified command structure, has never been provided the means to realize these plans. In particular, they continue to lack real linkages with the resource allocation process.

The 1947 legislation as amended in 1958 might have worked if the only threat to our national values was a Soviet invasion of Europe. The planning world, however, is far more complex: in conjunction with our allies we must be able to respond to legitimate national interests in many regions of the world. The central problem for a coherent defense program is funding the right balance of mutually supporting Service forces to meet the full array of likely contingencies. As currently worked in the resource allocation process today, we do not make a true horizontal examination. Rather, we focus on single Services or on functions—vertical slices—which in aggregate yield less than what might otherwise be attainable. Solid linkages must be forged between likely contingencies and resources if we are to minimize risk in the future.
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All of this accounts for a long thread of continuity in the critiques of Generals Bradley, Gavin, Taylor, and Jones. They are not alone. Almost from its inception the JCS has been a magnet for critical studies. There have been at least nine such efforts during the past 12 years alone. As General Jones notes, each new Administration customarily revisits the national security apparatus and its decisionmaking process. Unfortunately, only evolutionary adjustments occurred in the wake of these efforts, and change targeted at fundamental shortcomings of the JCS has been absent.

On the other hand, the resource management process within DOD has been a favorite area for structural change: as in the case of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), Zero Base Budgeting; and the current Defense Resources Board. Evidently the motivation has been stronger toward efficient management rather than the development of effective military planning. The latter could only result from much greater interplay between the joint military and civilian leadership. Simply put, the basic issue of aligning Service programming and expenditures to the requirements of unified command planning had been inadequately treated.

CRITERIA FOR CHANGE

The key to the effectiveness of the current JCS structure, or any other we might examine, lies in how well it serves the President, the Defense Establishment, and the Congress with timely and thoughtful advice on issues regarding:

• Policy: objectives, goals, restraints, and insights
• Strategy: concepts, global interrelationships, direction, and warnings
• Planning: force development, options, and range of realistic alternatives together with risks
• Assessments: key national security issues, arms control, security assistance, regional defense policies, and the like
• Priorities: based on operational needs; discipline, the PPBS
• Resources: money, men, and material of war in a joint or unified context.

Against these criteria, how is the current system judged? Criticism from civilians within Defense comes from many directions:

We badly need, and have not had, a coherent overall mi-
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...The individual military Services have clear stands on many of these issues, but an overall coherent military view has been conspicuous by its absence.

...For years the only central voice in defense has been provided by the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense. Lack ing military expertise it has, largely, failed.

—James Woolsey, 1982

There is certainly a lot of commentary available from people who have been involved...who say that the plans are not what they want them to be... The Chiefs and the Joint Staff can rightfully respond that frequently they get no guidance at all in the preparation of plans, that the key decisions in formulating plans for various contingencies are often political decisions....

—John Kester, April 1980

Criticism comes from civilians outside Defense as well. It takes this tone:

In fact, during the last decade the Chiefs have gradually lost influence both in the Pentagon and in wider interagency debates. In part, their declining clout reflects the rise of the civilian defense intellectuals...who entered the Pentagon as experts in the arcane world of nuclear weapons and arms control and challenged the traditional notion that "wars should be left to the generals."

—Richard Burt, June 1979

If the Congress perceives shortcomings in the work of the Chiefs, it is perhaps because their present organizational structure forces them to wear two hats simultaneously.

What we in congress desperately need from the Joint Chiefs are military judgments and recommendations...free from Service bias. Then we can make informed judgments about cutting or adding to a budget.

—Senator John Culver, 1978

The thrust of these statements is clear: when advice on joint military issues is required, sources other than JCS are increasingly sought. What verdict is rendered about the credibility of the system when it becomes desirable to create a new cell embedded within the National Defense University to provide alternative military strategies?
WHAT KIND OF FIX IS NEEDED?

It is surprising that the system works at all in light of its serious organizational, conceptual, and functional flaws. When it does work, it is principally due to the exceptional officers assigned to the Joint Staff who labor mightily to make the creaking machinery turn. It is their diligence and dedication which get us through operational crises and find paths through planning and staffing obstacles.

It is possible, of course, to jury-rig an unofficial arrangement to answer at least some criticisms of the current organization. But we are in a time when that solution is increasingly unattractive. Today, the Services are working to implant at their operational and tactical levels—a military command structure capable of reacting faster than any opponent. The pace of global change and the need for competent advice on short notice argue instead for a comparable capability at the strategic level. Though the pace of decision-making in peacetime may not routinely demand this, most contingencies we face in the future will require us to go to war with whatever peacetime military structure is in place. Ad hocracy is not the answer.

What, then, are the options?

THE JONES PROPOSAL

General Jone’s proposal is intended to make the joint system more responsive and effective than it is now. As a first priority he urges development of a stronger Chairman, an essential ingredient of any reform. The JCS would still be composed of the Chiefs of Service, but the joint role of the latter in operational planning and risk assessment of the individual Service programs and budgets would decrease appreciably and would remain to be defined. As a consequence, their role in the policy aspects of joint military planning would be changed. The Chairman’s role would be stronger in the development of contingency plans, in directing the unified and specified commanders in conducting military operations, and in providing an independent assessment of the operational risks associated with consolidated Service programs.

Additionally, the Jones proposal would establish a new position of Vice Chairman to provide continuity in directing the joint...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Today's System</th>
<th>Gen. Jones's Proposal</th>
<th>A Major Institutional Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Focuses on Services for answers.</td>
<td>Will have a stronger Chairman, but uncertain impact on Service Chiefs' roles and views.</td>
<td>Can investigate policies (through the Council) separately from programs (via the Services).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Receives advice on military matters from many sources. Relies on OSD staff for policy and program initiatives.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD Staff</td>
<td>Recommends cross-Service trade-offs. Drives policy formulation.</td>
<td>Will conform to minor shift of the policy formulation role to a strengthened Joint Staff. Remains the preeminent staff for policy and program initiatives.</td>
<td>Relinquishes the leading role in policy and program development, but adjusts to major role in policy and program implementation, which is more consistent with wartime role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Secretaries</td>
<td>Influence policy/strategy.</td>
<td>No apparent change.</td>
<td>Lose some voice in policy formulation, but have a firmer position in developing current and future force capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Advisory Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gives credible, uninhibited cross-Service advice to CJCS and civilian decisionmakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Is the first among equals. Influence rests on role as JCS spokesman.</td>
<td>Enjoys an enhanced role, staffed to present independent views more capably.</td>
<td>Is supported fully to fill role as trusted adviser to SecDef, President, and Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Chiefs</td>
<td>Have major responsibilities in both Joint and Service arenas.</td>
<td>Will no longer have override authority on Joint issues. Remain dual-hatted.</td>
<td>Are able to focus more clearly on near- and long-term Service improvements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinCs</td>
<td>Possess little influence on programs.</td>
<td>Gain a strengthened voice in matching resources to operational plans.</td>
<td>Present needs in a continuous dialogue to the Council, which is now much more capable of initiating change. Exercise considerable influence on near-term programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 7-3: Major Studies on Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Inevitably, there will be some impetus to turn the proposals by General Jones and General Meyer over to a group for study. If done, the exercise should be a very brief one, for as the following list of 20 studies over 38 years reveals, the need to restructure the JCS has been studied to death. We don’t need any more studies, we need action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1944</td>
<td>McNarney Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1945</td>
<td>Richardson Committee Majority Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1945</td>
<td>Eberstadt Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1945</td>
<td>Collins Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1947</td>
<td>Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1948</td>
<td>Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1949</td>
<td>Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1953</td>
<td>Rockefeller Committee Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1953</td>
<td>President Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1958</td>
<td>Wheeler Committee Report (prepared at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1958</td>
<td>President Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1960</td>
<td>Symington Study on Reorganization of the Department of Defense (prepared for President-elect Kennedy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1970</td>
<td>Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh) Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1978</td>
<td>Ignatius Report on Defense Reorganization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1979</td>
<td>Defense Resource Management (Rice) Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
process in the absence of the Chairman. The creation of this position could result in more effective coordination between the JCS and the National Security Council, the President, and the Unified and Specified Commands on a routine basis because one of the same two men would be at all the key meetings. However, the addition of this Vice Chairman would degrade the position of the Service Chiefs and change their role in still undetermined ways.

Accompanying these policy and structural changes would be an important procedural change. The Joint Staff would work for the Chairman, not the JCS corporately. The extent of Service staff participation in the development of joint positions and papers would be limited to providing factual inputs and advice on fewer issues selected by the Chairman. The Joint Chiefs would meet to consider proposals from an improved Joint Staff.

Unchanged, or as yet unclarified in the Jones proposal, are the relationships between the various agencies within the Defense Department most affected by changes in military structure. Will some functions of OSD be subsumed by an invigorated Joint Staff? Will an enhanced voice for the Chairman affect the ability of the Services to make Service views known to the Secretary of Defense and Congress? These and other relationships need to be laid out clearly before the full impact of the Chairman’s proposal can be understood.

**IS THERE A BETTER WAY TO GO?**

General Jones’s proposal clearly moves us beyond the current system and well along the path of reform. Yet, even with adoption—a process which will require some legislative action—an opportunity for further building exists. Three major problems still need to be solved.
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*First* is the divided loyalty we currently demand of the Service Chiefs. Dual-hatting, however refined, will continue to impair the ability of these top military authorities to provide sound, usable, and timely military advice to our civilian leadership.

*Second,* while the Chairman's proposal clearly promises to improve the Joint Staff's performance in peacetime, there may be a better way to provide a structure which can transition rapidly to war.

It is likely the process of joint strategic direction in wartime will totally consume the Chiefs' time. Simultaneously, immense issues of internal Service prioritization and direction will erupt, making equally large demands. Some will say that two relatively major wars have been fought satisfactorily with the current system. But today we face the most formidable force ever assembled in the history of the world, an opponent with the means to seize the initiative globally, in unanticipated ways, using an arsenal of great variety. Additionally, we must be prepared to respond to lesser yet equally critical contingencies which if not quickly contained could provide the flashpoint for World War III. The pace of future war is key, and having the right structure in place to keep up with that pace is vital.

The other aspect of transitioning to war involves the creation of solid relationships in peace which do not have to be abruptly (perhaps chaotically) rewickered in crisis. I believe that the driving factor in war is the ability to sustain effective theater operations which are fully responsive to the grand design of national political objectives. Similarly, the driving element in wartime resource distribution is the operationally derived requirements of the theater commanders. However, we operate in a peacetime mode which accords highest priority to cost effectiveness: the best defense at or under cost. This is a worthy objective. But we should arrive at it by a process which at the outset subordinates cost with acceptable risk to intended capability of the Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs). Resource allocation must be tied to operational planning directly, not *ex post facto.* This requires not only a strengthening of the Joint Staff, but redirection as well.

*Third,* we need to increase the role of the CinCs even more than General Jones has proposed in order to involve them more fully in the defense decisionmaking process.
These fundamental problems of the joint system lead me to believe that we have a situation in which major surgery may be necessary.

A COUNCIL

One clear option is the creation of a body of full-time military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense, thus ending the dual-hatting which has proved so troublesome.

The new body would logically consist of distinguished four-star rank officers, not charged with any Service responsibilities, who would never return to their respective Services. Each member would possess a varied background with extensive joint Service experience. Additionally, individual members would be sought who had particular expertise in areas of special importance to the joint arena: e.g., strategic nuclear policy, unconventional warfare, and command, control, and communications. One of the Council members could be appointed Vice Chairman for continuity purposes.

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, this body of military advisers would examine military alternatives and recommend strategic scenarios to govern how the military departments are to organize, equip, and prepare their forces for war. The group might be called the National Military Advisory Council (NMAC), as Senator Symington suggested in 1960.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Chairman's position would remain in the new Council but with a greatly enhanced role and increased influence. He would no longer be the first among equals, dependent upon consensus to shape his advice. Instead he would direct planning and operations and be able to speak his own mind as well as disagree with the opinion of the Council. Thus, more than one view and well-conceived strategic alternatives would emerge. The real or perceived obsession with unanimity, with an accompanying tendency for a lowest common denominator solution would end.

The Chairman alone would direct the Joint Staff. He would determine the issues for study and initiate staff actions through the
director of the Joint Staff. Throughout, he would remain sensitive to the concerns of the Council. To fulfill the enhanced responsibilities of the Chairman of the Council, the staff would be strengthened. One particular area of emphasis would be the development of an effective programming and budgeting capability. Other technical and administrative support would be increased to permit the Joint Staff to support the proposed role of the Chairman and the Council.

The Council's method of operation would be somewhat akin to that of a judicial body, its members sitting as an experienced body of military professionals to decide matters of joint military importance. The authenticity and credibility of their judgments would be based not only on decades of firsthand experience, but also by the continuous opportunity to review requirements of the unified commands and their reported readiness. The Councilors would be able to arrive at recommendations in a reflective atmosphere, focused on how best to flesh out the means to achieve the national objectives. Opinions would be freely given by all members and presented as majority and minority views. The recommendations would be timely and objective, and as the developers of the prime military input to the President and the Secretary of Defense, their views would be hard to dismiss.

Experience clearly shows that the more trusted and professional the advice, the more willing civilian authorities are to seek it. Simply eliminating the dual hats raises the expectation of heightened objectivity in the proffered advice of this body. Over time, its credibility verified, the Council could assume an increasingly influential voice in formulating defense policy. Additionally, and of equal importance, the direct formal link between the Secretary of Defense and the Council would serve to encourage a greater degree of civil-military interaction and dialogue which in turn could strengthen the bond between the Secretary and his military advisors. The dangers of today's world and the new dimensions to the national security problem clearly require full-time joint military advisers. Greater interaction and dialogue would provide the civilian leadership with a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in military planning and operations. Clearly, a better civilian perspective would be invaluable in unexpected crises which demand sound and rapid policy decisions.
ADVANTAGES OF FULL-SCALE REFORM

The Council would remove the conflicting dual-hat roles of the Service Chiefs. In peacetime the clear division between military authorities responsible for providing advice on Service and joint matters should result in a major improvement in the timeliness and value of military advice. In wartime, the division of responsibilities between the Council and the Chiefs should permit both bodies to better engage the greatly increased decisionmaking demanded during a crisis.

Removal of direct Service involvement in the relationship of the Chairman and the Council to the CinCs would free the latter to become more visible participants in the development of defense policy and joint programs. The CinCs would give the Council their views on the development of feasible and affordable military courses of action for the near term, as well as the near-term fixes which would improve their force capabilities. Coupled with an improved Joint Staff, the CinC input would influence the “front-end” formulation of military strategy instead of the CinCs remaining in a reactive mode to establish policy in the Defense Guidance.

RELATIONSHIPS

The manner in which these improvements would operate is summarized by viewing how relationships and lines of authority would shift in the several proposals. In the Defense decisionmaking hierarchy, the Council, led by the Chairman, would be directly responsible for translating top-down policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the President into strategic and cross-Service programming direction to the Services. The Council might best fulfill its responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense by analyzing strategic alternatives for cost and risk implications. As part of its role, the Council would suggest allocations among the Services as well as a distribution of major combat forces designed to meet strategic objectives.

Unlike some similar proposals of past years, the Services would be closely involved with the Council in the development of strategic alternatives, and would help a strengthened Joint Staff provide the individual land, sea, and air perspectives necessary for effective joint planning and analysis. Periodically throughout the analytic
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process, the Services, represented by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, would meet as a collective "board of directors" to comment on, or to disagree with, the Council's position on key issues.

Armed with the Council's recommended strategies and programs, together with any dissenting views from the Services, the Secretary of Defense and the President would be equipped to make fundamental decisions on the specific course of defense planning and programming.

The close Service affiliation with the Council might at first glance appear to focus the Council too narrowly on tactical and administrative detail and not enough on what the President needs. However, past experience has shown that continuous Service involvement is essential in the development of grand strategy to ensure that the product reflects the latest, most imaginative, and dynamic aspects of individual Service doctrine and technological development, as well as clear appreciation of what is feasible.

For this process to be successful, the Service Chiefs would undertake to sponsor visits by the Council to the commands, and to update the members on doctrinal developments, new weapons systems, and readiness of the forces. Indeed, it ought to be easier for a four-star to learn about the joint system and study in depth developments taking place in other Services once he is freed from the daily pressures of a high-level Service assignment.

Once approved by the Secretary of Defense, the strategic recommendations of the Council would become directive in nature and would shape the general outline of each Service program. Consequently, the Services would have less of a voice than at present in resolving cross-cutting resource issues and determining the composition of their major forces. However, by narrowing the focus to internal Service concerns, the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries would be given more freedom to concentrate on long-range Service planning and the discrete Service aspects of doctrinal, tactical, and technological innovation.

The streamlined relationship between the CinCs, the Council, and the Secretary of Defense would have a beneficial effect on how we plan for war. The new relationship between the Secretary and his military advisers would lead to more clearly defined "top-down"
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guidance from civilian leaders. The Council, now fully committed to
joint matters and familiar with requirements from the CinCs would
then translate that policy into strategic guidance for the field
commanders.

Last the CinCs, in turn, would send more useful feedback from
the field to civilian policymakers, thus completing the repetitive
dialogue so essential for solid contingency planning. The Council
would also decentralize the planning process by focusing primarily
on the larger issues of global integration of strategies and regional
planning guidance. As a result, the CinCs would be freed to deter-
mine details of force composition, force employment, deployment,
and support.

The Council would also better assist Congress in discharging
its important role. At present, congressional committees debate at
length the specifics of Service programs without full insight into
how these programs fit into an overall strategic context. Because of
its cross-Service perspective, the Council would be able to provide
Congress with a much-needed horizontal appraisal of individual
Service programs divorced from Service advocacy of weapons sys-
tems. The Council view would present the Administration's pro-
gram to Congress.

The format would be cast in terms of the capabilities provided
by the combined budgets of the Services to the operating forces in
relation to the near and long-term threat. Congress would thus have
an opportunity to probe for the genuine goals of military policy and
would be better able to isolate less essential and redundant pro-
grams. The position of the Council in relation to the Services would
given them a central role in the congressional budget review.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST

No solution which seeks fundamental reform is without poten-
tial drawbacks. At first glance it might appear that the influence of
the Service Chiefs might be severely diminished by the loss of their
JCS responsibilities. It is true that the role of the Chiefs would
change. My belief is that the additional time available to the heads of
Services by being relieved of time-consuming JCS duties would
permit them to concentrate on the more meaningful aspects of
Service roles in joint and combined operations. Relinquishing of
routine JCS duties would be a small price to pay to achieve this end. The Council would also relieve the Chiefs of the need continually to justify and defend to Congress the size of Service budgets and the composition of major Service forces to meet the national strategy. These issues would be developed and explained to Congress and the President by the Council.

A particularly emotional issue might be the creation of four new general officers. Why add another layer of military bureaucracy when other government agencies are being pared to the bone? It is important to observe that the Council would not be another staff layer but would, in fact, consist of four-stars who, because of their backgrounds and seniority, would otherwise continue to be influential in national security affairs regardless of their official positions.

Since they would in effect be merely extended on active duty before final retirement, the members would not disturb internal Service command arrangements. Moreover, the efficiency with which the advisers could provide advice and make decisions would greatly diminish the need for the redundant joint and Service staff work now necessary with the Service Chief wearing two hats. While the Joint Staff would grow moderately, the total number of officers now engaged directly or indirectly in joint work either on the Joint Staff or in the Service would decrease.

Another criticism might be that such senior officers would be unable to rise above their Service biases. I believe this to be unwarranted since the officers would have had past joint experience, and therefore access to the experience of other Services. Moreover, the officers would be representing joint interests and would not be returning to their Services upon completion of their appointment to the Council.

Reform as sweeping as this would require legislative change to the National Security Act of 1947. New relationships as outlined above would have to be fully defined, understood, and accepted by Congress—a process complicated by a historical reluctance to accept any change which might suggest creation of a "General Staff" from which a military elite might emerge. This has been a recurring theme in opposition to reform of our highest military body since first suggested during World War II. It is important to emphasize that all reforms suggested since the war have clearly accepted
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military subordination to civilian authority. Contrary to popular belief, the German General Staff was an army staff, not a joint staff. In fact, it was Germany’s lack of an effective joint staff apparatus and a corresponding failure in both World Wars to establish a unified control over three separate Services that contributed significantly to final defeat. One of the most telling indictments of this lack of coordination was made by General Zimmerman of the German army:

It is a matter of irony that Eisenhower, the servant of the great democracies, was given full powers of command over an armed force consisting of all three Services. With us, living under a dictatorship where unity of command might have been taken for granted, each of the services fought its own battle. Neither Rundstedt nor Rommell, try though they might, succeeded in changing this state of affairs in creating a unified command. The result was that the German army fought singlehanded against all the armed forces of the Allies.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of World War II the correlation of forces has shifted dramatically. The shift demands that our national security policy be buttressed by better and faster planning mechanisms. It also demands that the roles of the civilian and military leaders charged with this vital responsibility be clearly defined so that we provide our citizens the defense posture necessary to ensure their freedoms.

The prerequisites for organizational changes include:

- First and foremost: to ensure for civilian leaders the best and most usable military advice possible. Above all, this advice must be relevant and timely.
- Second: to ensure that the organization will work in wartime; and, where possible, that it focuses in peacetime on the same issues with which it will be seized in wartime.
- Third: to ensure that the CinCs are given sufficient guidance and resources to do meaningful planning, are permitted to do such planning, and remain intimately involved in near-term issues relating to the capabilities and readiness of their forces.

If these three prerequisites are used as the basis for evaluating
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organizational changes we should be able to come up with an organization which—
• provides clear, concise, and timely military advice;
• permits the Chairman to shape internal discussions;
• gives CinCs the ability to influence in peacetime what they are expected to implement in wartime;
• focuses the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the current readiness and the future of their Services;
• directs the OSD staff toward implementation of the Defense Department’s critical functions in peace and war;
• provides to the President, the Congress, and the American people a clear indication of how much more secure they are as a result of the dollars spent on defense.

Reform of the mechanism which provides military advice and counsel to our civilian leadership is long overdue. Tinkering with the mechanisms will not suffice. Only by addressing the issues which have been considered to be too tough to cope with in the past do we have a chance of instituting the reforms necessary to develop the smooth-running machinery required to see our nation through to the 21st century with our freedoms and national values intact.
Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms Most Others Tell Congress Are Long Overdue

Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin F. Schemmer
Armed Forces Journal International

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF have split right down the middle on the need to overhaul the US top military planning body, as recently proposed by outgoing JCS Chairman General David C. Jones and Army Chief of Staff General E.C. Meyer. But incoming JCS Chairman General John W. Vessey has given their initiatives new impetus by testifying at his Senate confirmation hearing on 11 May 1982 that he favors Congressional action along the lines Jones and Meyer have suggested. Vessey will replace Jones on 1 July.

The Navy and Marine Corps are outspokenly opposed to any organizational or legislative overhaul of the JCS and the Joint Staff system, and the Air Force seems to have weighed in on both sides of the issue during in-depth hearings which began on 21 April before the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee and which will continue well into July.

Navy/Marine Corps opposition to the reform proposals has been united among both present and retired Chiefs from those Services—and at times almost brutal. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward (who retires in June), told the subcommittee in a forcefully delivered, intense, prepared statement, for instance, that he was "deeply offended by the slanderous criticisms which one frequently hears about the Joint Chiefs being an ineffective group of parochial Service Chiefs who spend most of their time bickering among themselves, horse trading to preserve turf and what is best for their Service." That criticism, as Hayward summarized it, as a somewhat overstated but not unreasonable
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paraphrase of the very flaws which both Jones and Meyer have said
mar the present Joint Chiefs of Staff set-up and often render its
supporting Joint Staff ineffective.

The hearings, chaired by Congressman Richard White, a 10-
term Democrat from El Paso, Texas are going into more depth
than...on any defense issue since the TFX hearings of the early
1960s. (As of 6 May, when the hearings broke off for two weeks,
some 30 witnesses had testified on the reform initiatives launched
by Jones and Meyer; the Investigating Subcommittee has firm plans
to call at least 13, and more likely will hear from 18, additional
witnesses before Congress adjourns for its August, election-year
recess.)

White opened the hearings with a succinct summary of the
Jones and Meyer proposals adding, "We don't intend to just hold
hearings and do nothing about it. It's too important to the national
security of this country," he said. "We plan to put forward some type
of proposal," and later noted specifically that the subcommittee did
plan to draft legislation on the issue. But whether or not any Con-
gressional action—beyond hearings—can take place this year is
uncertain at best: the Fiscal Year 1983 budget process is now
behind schedule, and tough, time-consuming election campaigns
loom ahead for both Houses of Congress.

SENATE PLANS JULY HEARINGS

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower (R.
Tex.) has said both publicly and privately that his committee also
plans substantive hearings. Soon after his Committee reported out
its fiscal 1983 Defense Authorization Bill in late March, Tower said
he hoped such hearings might begin after Congress' Easter recess
and right after the Senate floor debate on the authorization bill,
which had been scheduled for late April. But that schedule has been
set awry by the Administration's and Congress's prolonged search
for a compromise on the overall fiscal 1983 Federal budget, and
Senator hearings on JCS reforms will probably not be held until July.
At this juncture, the Senate does not plan to call anywhere near the
number of witnesses the House has, and will probably focus instead
on just present and former JCS members and Defense Secretaries.
One informed source...
time to debate and pass reform legislation this year, if members of the Armed Services Committee decide that new or revised legislation is needed. Similar action on the House side seems less possible, and the issue may be held open until a new session of Congress convenes next January.

**NAVY/MARINE OPPOSITION**

Admiral Hayward’s blunt testimony opposing any JCS reform initiatives left the House subcommittee members almost speechless when he finished his prepared statement, saying, “Reorganization is simply not necessary” and “no reorganization is needed” in about 10 different ways. Finally, Chairman White asked him, “Admiral, is there any recommendation by either General Jones or General Meyer that you do endorse?” Hayward said, in effect, “Not one—except that I do agree we need to strengthen the role of the JCS.” But he said that would happen if civilian leaders demanded more active participation by the JCS in the early, formative stages of deliberating national policy and global strategy; if the JCs were more assertive in making their views known; and if Congress demanded greater participation by the JCS in its deliberations. As the hearing broke up, Hayward... (said) in front of Chairman White and his staff, “You know that I did not want these hearings to happen. It will not come to any good.” Someone quipped that if his intent had been to pour cold water on the issue, the heat of his opposition may have ignited Congress’s interest instead.

Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow gave the subcommittee a crisp and articulate statement in line with Hayward’s view, but even more strongly worded on some points. Barrow said that Jones’s proposals would “do serious harm to the system.” Making the Chairman—instead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body (as is now the case)—the principal military adviser with control of the Joint Staff “is essentially a supreme chief of staff/general staff system,” Barrow argued, that “would prevent the development of legitimate alternatives that should be presented to appropriate civilian authority for decision.”

He added that “the JCS corporate system, with JCS corporate members being also Chiefs of Services, thus combining authority with responsibility, would be virtually destroyed.”
Barrow added a quote from Churchill: "Any clever person can make plans for winning a war if he doesn't have to carry them out." (He did not mention, but others noted, that the same quote could be used to argue General Jones' case for making the Chairman instead of the corporate Chiefs the Nation's principal military adviser, since under the present system no one military person has any such responsibility. The Chairman isn't in the operational chain of command nor are any of the Service Chiefs: decisions go from the Secretary of Defense to the Unified or Specified commanders through the JCS as a corporate body. One senior Senator on the Armed Services Committee, apprised of Hayward and Barrow's strong testimony before the House, . . . (said) What did you expect? They've always been that way: they get two votes out of five going into every meeting in the tank."

Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen, Jr., though not in total accord with either the Jones or Meyer proposals, noted that "an improved joint system with Service Chief and Service staff participation is needed (to) improve both the formulation and the execution of war plans and military strategy and the Service responsibilities for creating the proper force." Allen warned that the "existing process in the joint area is cumbersome. The planning takes too long and is phased imperfectly with the budget cycle; the products are not as crisp and relevant as they could be. We must seek improvements to our systems."

**VESSEY SUPPORTS REFORMS**

During a confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 11 May on General John W. Vessey's nomination to become JCS Chairman, Sen. Goldwater (R, Ariz.) said he agreed with the changes proposed by General Jones, and asked Vessey if they would be acceptable to him.

Vessey said in an introductory aside that he had known that General Jones would propose some changes in the JCS system and had looked forward with "delight" to the debate that would ensue; but, Vessey quipped, he had thought he would be observing that debate from retirement in his new home in Minnesota. Instead, he said, he now finds himself "up to my armpits in the middle of the discussions."
Vessey said that "any organization can be improved" and hence put "the JCS in that category." He noted that the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee had heard a wide range of witnesses and experts on the subject, and that "the range of views expressed is as wide as the scope of the hearings." But, Vessey said, if the Senate and House both held hearings, he felt confident the two committees "can find the thread that may lead to sensible changes in the organization." Without committing himself at this stage to specifics of either proposal, Vessey said, "I agree with many of the things General Jones and General Meyer have proposed." But, he added, three fundamental questions first "have to be answered by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress about which direction we want to go in to change the (JCS) organization:"

- Does the Nation want to go to a Defense General Staff system that has been specifically prohibited since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1947?
- Should the Chiefs of the Services continue to be a part of that body—or separated from it to run their own organizations? (Vessey noted there are "arguments on both sides of that question.")
- How do you deal with differing views among advisers? (Vessey said he had not seen much "inter-Service bickering" among the Chiefs, but had seen some "honest differences of opinion," and that it would be "unusual to always find unanimity.")

24 HASC WITNESSES TO DATE

The House subcommittee has heard testimony from all five present JCS members and nine previous ones; from three members of Congress; one former Secretary of Defense, two former Deputy Secretaries and one former Under Secretary; one former Specified commander (not counting some former JCS members who also held such posts); and various other witnesses—in all, 24 to date. It has heard from two retired Air Force and three retired Army JCS members, and two retired Navy and two retired Marine Corps JCS members. Of those testifying so far, 11 have come out in favor of General Jones's proposal or some variation thereof, six support General Meyer's plan, and seven were adamantly opposed to any reorganization efforts. The subcommittee hopes to have current SecDef Caspar Weinberger testify in July, along with former Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, and before its hearings conclude, will have heard from all living JCS Chairmen past or present.
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Highlights of the testimony to date are provided below.

“Room for Improvement”

“I am increasingly convinced that all too often, we do not get the military advice we so sorely need.

“...My experience as a member of the Appropriations’ Defense Subcommittee has led me to feel that there is considerable room for improvement in the way we develop national strategy and allocate resources.”

—Rep. Norman Dicks

“We Desperately Need Reform”

“We have had almost 25 years now of review... We have had over a dozen major studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. No one who has studied it has been very happy with it. Many people have been extremely unhappy with it. General Jones and General Meyer have served a very important role in opening up this debate and dialogue.

“We need a Chief of the Joint Staff rather than a Chairman, and that Chief may be a five-star position.”

—Rep. Newt Gingrich

“Drastic Changes”

“I believe that General Jones’s recommendations are both well founded and a significant step in the right direction... I, like General Meyer, would be inclined to make changes substantially larger than those suggested by General Jones...though I would differ on some of the details.

“It should be clear that the Service Chiefs who now, together with the Chairman of the JCS, constitute the JCS, have a built-in and insuperable conflict of interest.

“I would urge the Committee to support at least as much organizational change as is contained in General Jones’s proposals.”

—Dr. Harold Brown
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“Changes... Imperative”

“The existing committee-type structure of the JCS produces too much fragmentation of views as well as inter-Service compromise and logrolling to fulfill the President’s need for clear, timely and objective advice on military matters.

“I find myself generally in agreement with the recommendations made by General Jones.

“The burdens and responsibilities of the JCS, in their dual role as Service Chiefs and JCS members, have long been too great for the JCS to carry out its important functions effectively.”

—Hon. Rosewell L. Gilpatrick

“Bad Organizations Hinder”

“My personal preference would be for something along the lines of General Meyer’s proposal.

“Until the Chiefs are organized in a way that allows them to respond quickly and with meaningful advice rather than platitudes, they are not going to be sought out, because they will not have much that is helpful to say.

“It probably is the most important defense issue (Congress) will consider all year, and the one with the most enduring effect on our military posture.”

—Hon. John G. Kester

An Open “Scandal”

“While General Jones’s proposals are a big step in the right direction, I would prefer General Meyer’s as facing up to both the need for decoupling and for conversion of the Joint Staff to one which is truly joint.

“A second major institutional failing is that no one man, however competent, can possibly perform adequately two full-time jobs as both Service Chief and JCS member, even if the inherent conflict of interest between them did not exist.”
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"In my judgment the real problem is institutional. There is a built-in conflict of interest between the roles of JCS member and Service Chief."

—Amb. Robert W. Komer

Backing Meyer

"I'd be inclined to go along with General Meyer's recommendation.

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should depend on (the JCS) staff, not the Service staffs."

—Hon. David Packard

An "Important Issue"

"I'm more inclined to General Jones's halfway reform. But (either type) of reform or a blend would be better than what we have today.

"I believe that reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to get a joint view, is important.

"I'm inclined not to go as far as the Meyer (uncoupling plan) at this time, because Services would be shunted aside in offering advice. But the question of reform is overriding. I'd support reform first even if that means the Meyer proposal."

—Hon. R. James Woolsey

Needs "Tweaking and Tuning"

"I think that both General Jones and General Meyer recognize the potential for constructive change.... I am not sanguine about the reception that these will receive in some quarters—hardened positions in opposition will surface almost immediately; their motives will be made suspect and the specters of the German general staff or the military dictators and martinet. with unwarranted influence and suppressed subordinates. will be invoked on all sides.

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) should be described in the statutes. Executive orders. and Departmental
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directives as the senior military officer on active duty and as the principal military spokesman of the United States; he should be nominated by the President, approved by the Senate for a four-year term; he should be given five stars and a Cabinet-level pay scale.

"I think there are changes that easily can be—and should be—recommended by this Committee and approved by Congress and the Administration."
—General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.)

"Go a Little Further"

JCS members are "just physically not capable of handling both tasks—sitting on the JCS and as head of their (Service). I think we need two separate jobs.

"I support a 'deputy or vice commander' of the armed forces of the US reporting directly to the President.

"I'm in general agreement with the basic changes General Jones proposed... but I'd go a little further."
—General Curtis LeMay, USAF (Ret.)

Reorganization A Must

"There is a need for administrative reorganization but this does not require legislative action.

"I support the need for a Deputy Chairman but his duties must be fairly well circumscribed to that he does not become a member of the JCS.

"I would not endorse Service Chiefs assuming Deputy Chairman responsibilities in the Chairman's absence because if you're running a Service, you've got a good handful there."
—General John D. Ryan, USAF (Ret.)

"Systemic" Weaknesses

"The contributions to increased military efficiency and effectiveness that could be made through improved top-level military planning and advice are not being realized.
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"The truth is that the weaknesses are systemic, and that it is systemic improvement that is needed.

"I believe (it is) unmistakably clear that a strengthening of the role of the Chairman of the JCS will be critical to systemic improvement."
—General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Ret.)

"Effective" Under Pressure

"I think (the JCS) could function effectively under time constraints.

"...As a member of the JCS, my value to the body was in direct proportion to my knowledge of my individual Service. (Service allegiance) is a problem, but you have to rise above it.

"I believe the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has all the power he needs."
—General Harold K. Johnson, USA (Ret.)

"Current System...Collective Wisdom"

"I feel that our present organization provides the checks and balances which moderate extreme views.

"I feel strongly that the best way of providing balanced military advice to our civilian leaders is by the use of talents and varied by the broad experience of the military Chiefs of all Services—each knows his own Service and each is an expert in his field.

"I believe that our present system places the final authority and responsibility where they belong—that is, on the elected and duly appointed civilian leadership of our country—and yet gives due consideration to the experienced judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of these decisions."
—General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.)

"Disadvantages Outweigh Advantages"

"I do have a very strong conviction that we must be extraordinarily cautious in approaching any decision to make significant
changes. The present system works.

"Elimination of the Service Chiefs in favor of a two-man Chairman and Deputy entity has two dangerous if not fatal flaws. The availability of the most knowledgable and experienced military advice on the readiness and capability of our military forces is turned off; there will exist a separation of responsibility and authority for the readiness of our military forces.

"Chiefs and their military staffs represent the most up-to-date repository of total knowledge concerning the long-term capabilities and the immediate readiness of their forces... To eliminate the direct participation of these four officers... is, in my view, to discard a source of professional wisdom and operating experience that would fundamentally impair the quality of our national security policies and our military operational planning."

—Admiral James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.)

"Leave the Organization Alone"

"The system does work due primarily to the things that General Jones wants to change.... The present system provides the best arrangement for providing strategic direction to the armed forces as dictated by law.

"In my view, the Chairman has all of the authority within the uniformed organizations he is willing to take.

"I, for one, would far prefer to have the Service Chiefs meet with me as Chairman to discuss crises than I would some super-council that could only get their information secondhand from those who really know, that is, the Service Chiefs. In short, it is my opinion that if an officer cannot find time to handle both his Service duties as well as his joint duties, then he is not qualified for either job."

—Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)

"Essentially Sound" As Is

"There is no need to reorganize the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization in any major way.

"The Chairman should be authorized a Deputy...(who) would
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improve continuity of action and be of great assistance to the Chairman in increasing readiness, improving war planning, and managing the joint exercising of the combatant forces.

"I have the following recommendations to make for improving the functioning of the JCS: More frequent and regular meetings between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and the JCS and the President. The Chiefs of Services to turn over more of their Service duties to their Vice Chiefs and to concentrate and spend more time on their JCS duties. . . . Through a series of Command Post Exercises and war games, test the two opposing concepts and compare results."

"The Joint Chiefs should continue their dual responsibilities . . . with priority to JCS duties."
—General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC (Ret.)

"Sound and Effective" As Designed

"The Chairman has the authority he is willing to exercise. . . . It would appear that there is little—if any—greater authority which could be provided him unless it were to be specifically or implicitly surrendered by the Secretary of Defense, the President, or the Congress.

"The present organization is undeniably subject to improvement, but there is ample authority and opportunity to effect improvement under present law and within the existing framework of the organization.

"The creation of such a billet (a Deputy Chairman) is objectionable, even under the current system.

"As I understand General Jones's proposals, he would have the Chairman of the JCS, instead of the JCS, (be) the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and have the Joint Staff work for the Chairman. This similarity to an armed forces general staff in form, if not in authority is clear and unequivocal despite the protestation to the contrary."
—General Louis H. Wilson, USMC (Ret.)
"Rivalries Multiply Difficulties"

"Quality of JCS advice is documentably poor enough to make Presidents skeptical of that advice.

"No Chief could rationally advocate additional divisions, ships, or planes as a Service spokesman, then recommend reductions during JCS review.

"Pressures to appear harmonious, however, impede defense planning.

"When the Chairman of the JCS comes to the SecDef with the lowest common denominator answer, they can't compete with OSD civilian analysts.

"Right now, the Joint Staff is dependent on the Service Staff because (the Joint Staff) lack the expertise of the Service Staff."

CHAPTER 3

Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy"

3. Ibid. p. 7.
4. For a more detailed discussion of these categories of national interest, see Donald E. Neuchterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time for New Approaches," Orbis, Spring 1979, pp. 76-80.
5. The national-interest matrix and its use as an analytical tool is described in greater detail in ibid., pp. 80-82.

Rosenau, "Fragmegrative Challenges to National Strategy"

1. For an example of a recent, frustrated expression along these lines, see Robert E. Hunter, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A Matter of Luck," Los Angeles Times 29 June 1982, Part II, p. 5, who stresses that "the tradition of U.S. reliance on pragmatism in dealing with other nations is dead and argues that therefore "there must be a central vision of foreign policy in order to bring the apples and oranges of individual events into some sort of balance, if not harmony... In effect, in our new state of relatively diminished power in the world, we need a world view that can make sense of the bits and pieces—a way of looking at our problems and devising answers that derives its legitimacy from the facts of life. It is basically different from having an ideology, of either the right or the left, that tries instead to impose an American vision on global events that can distort reality."
4. The question of whether interdependence involves mutual dependen-
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cies or is a form of hierarchical dependence of one unit on another has proven particularly troublesome. For debates over this question and other problems of the concept of interdependence, see Ibid., and the various essays in R. Maghoori and B. Ramberg (eds.), International Relations Third Debate: Globalism vs. Realism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1982).


10. This approach has been most recently developed by Donald E. Nuechterlein. See, for example, his "America Overcommitted," Foreign Service Journal (March 1982), pp. 14-30.


14. For a contrary line of reasoning, in which considerable hope is offered that a specification of priorities among interests can become the basis of a nationwide consensus, see Theodore C. Sorensen, "The Absent Opposition," Foreign Policy, No. 47 (Summer 1982), pp. 66-81.
CHAPTER 4

Smernoff, “Two-Track Strategy for Space”

15. Fred Charles Ikle, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?”
Endnotes

Foreign Affairs, January 1973, p. 285. His complete line is: “While luck has been with us so far, strategic thinking must and can find a new path into the twenty-first century.”

16. This scenario was posed by Richard L. Garwin (loc. cit., p. 73): “nuclear-armed interceptors would be used to attack the imagined laser-bearing satellites as they were being readied to orbit over a period of months.” Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is usually construed as equivalent to antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, which are now severely constrained by the US-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972.


19. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1983, p. 64. In its discussion of technological leadership, this document states that “lasers are perhaps second only to micro-electronics in their promise of impact on military systems.” Indeed, the laser is the only major weapon-system component based on a new scientific phenomenon that has been introduced since the development of nuclear weapons during World War II; see Alexander H. Flax, “Military Aerospace to 2000.” Aeronautics and Astronautics, May 1980, p. 33.


21. For a current statement of the proposition that “we are fated to live in a MAD world,” see Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, “MAD Versus NUTS: Can Doctrine or Weaponry Remedy the Mutual Hostage Relationship of the Superpowers?” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1981/82.


23. For a preliminary discussion of contemporary issues of nuclear morality, see Barry J. Smernoff, “An Exploratory Moral Analysis of Strategic Nuclear Options and Arms-Control Regimes,” Military Chaplain’s Review, Fall 1982.


25. Jeffrey Record, “Beyond NATO: New Military Directions for the United States,” in U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. Also see Michael Vlahos, America: Images of Empire. SAIS Occasional Papers in International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS, August 1982) for the case that America and Europe are in the initial stages of slow disengagement, and the
former must develop new modes of power projection to protect its interests and allies.
CHAPTER 5

Kolodziej, "Alternative Strategies for Western Europe"

1. See, for example, President Reagan's proposals to upgrade strategic nuclear programs. *New York Times*, 2 October 1982.


4. See *New York Times*, 18 October 1982. In a response to a question from foreign visitors, President Reagan said that he did not "honestly know what nuclear war in Europe would have the exchange of tactical (nuclear) weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button."


For earlier articles of interest that assisted in development of the LRTNF issue, see Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Army Control Enters the
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6. Bertram makes this point and also discusses the difficulties raised by this new procedure.

7. NATO, Press Service. Press Release M-DPC-1 (82) 24 "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense," December, 1982. The French are actually proposing to keep defense expenditures at roughly 3.9 percent of GNP, but spending priorities continue to favor nuclear forces with the result that further conventional cutbacks are in the offing.


13. Committee on Foreign Relations, Modernization, pp. 26-27

14. Morton Halperin reminds us of these concerns although his analysis of LRTNF tends to wish away the problem far more than is warranted by the Soviet build up. Morton Halperin, "NATO and the TNF Controversy
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18. The classical study remains Thomas Schelling’s *Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University, 1965).


27. Ibid., p. 131. The foreword to a recent NATO assessment of its capabilities essentially concurs: "The numerical balance of forces has moved slowly but steadily in favor of the Warsaw Pact over the past two decades. During this period the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have lost much of the technological advantage which permitted NATO to rely on the view that quality could compensate for quantity. It is clear that the trend is dangerous. Nevertheless the overall deterrent continues to safeguard peace." NATO, NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Brussels, 1982). It is useful to note that neither French nor Spanish forces are counted in NATO's estimates. The Soviet Union's assessment of the balance in Europe sharply conflicts with the pessimistic assessment of IISS and NATO. See Threat to Europe (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981).


29. French strategic doctrine since the mid 1970s has shifted from a deterrent posture narrowly based on the protection of national frontiers to one of extended deterrence that at a conventional level envisions increased cooperation with allied forces, either bilaterally, as with Germany, or multilaterally, with NATO. See the author's "French Security Policy: Decisions and Dilemmas," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1982, pp. 185-222. French planning for the 1980s foresees cutbacks of up to 30,000 in conventional forces. While these reductions are serious, the political conditions favoring increased French-European or French-NATO cooperation have not been greater since the inception of the Fifth Republic although the French commitment to an independent nuclear force remain strong. See note 8.

30. A recent controversial study conducted by Brigadier General Christian Krause for the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, reported to be closely associated with the Social Democratic Party, is even doubtful about the need for a NATO conventional or nuclear buildup. Washington Times, 16 August 1982, p. 6. See note 23 above.


Endnotes

33. The reopening of the debate over “no first use” was launched by the lead article in the Summer 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs* by the so-called “gang of four.” See McGeorge Bundy “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance.” Ibid., pp. Spring 1982, pp. 753-768.
44. Cordesman, p. 44.
45. See Cordesman for analyses and calculations.
46. Ibid., p. 48.
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47. Ibid., p. 29.
48. *New York Times*, 19 January 1983. The dismissal of Eugene Rostow as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the principal negotiator for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe was not reassuring to European advocacy of a compromise on LRTNF with the Soviet Union.
Endnotes

CHAPTER 6


1. See, for example, Nicolas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanich, 1942.
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CHAPTER 7

Barrett, "Impediments to Defense Reorganization"

2. Hearings before the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee on Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., in publication.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 8-12.
18. See, for example, President Truman's message to Congress, 19 December 1945, reproduced in US Department of Defense Historical Office, Documents, pp. 7-17. See especially p. 13.
Biographical Notes

CONFERENCE COSPONSORS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN S. PUSTAY. US Air Force, President. National Defense University, He formerly was Assistant to the Chairman, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Pustay commanded the Keesler, MS, Technical Training Center after high level assignments in Headquarters, US Air Force, and a tour as executive assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. General Pustay also served in Belgium with the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. He was an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy and as a White House fellow assisted Secretary of State Rusk. A graduate of the US Naval Academy, he holds a master's degree from San Francisco State College and a Ph.D. degree from the University of Denver. General Pustay has frequently published in professional journals and his book on Counterinsurgency Warfare was one of the first works on this subject in English. He is a 1970 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

HONORABLE FRANCIS J. WEST, JR. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. From 1976 until assuming his current position, Secretary West was Dean of Advanced Research and Director, Strategic Research Center for Advanced Research, at the Naval War College. Secretary West has also been a Professor of Management at the Naval War College and an analyst with the Rand Corporation. He has served as Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. Secretary West is a former Marine Corps officer with service in Vietnam. He is the author of Sea Plan 2000, a naval force planning study, among numerous other publications. Secretary West earned his B.A. degree in history from Georgetown University and his M.A. degree in public affairs from Princeton University.

DISTINGUISHED GUEST

HONORABLE HAROLD L. BROWN. Distinguished Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. Before he joined Johns Hopkins, Dr. Brown was Secretary of Defense from January 1977 to January 1981. He previously was President, California Institute of Technology, Secretary of the Air Force, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and member of the US Delegation, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A former research scientist at Columbia University and the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Brown was the director of the E.O. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.
Biographical Notes

California. A phi beta kappa graduate of Columbia University, Dr. Brown also received his doctorate in physics there in 1949.

CONFERENCE ORGANIZER

COLONEL FRANKLIN D. MARGIOTTA, US Air Force, Director of Research, National Defense University (NDU), Director of the National Security Affairs Institute, and Publisher, NDU Press. He formerly served as Dean of Curriculum and Research Professor at the Air University, and has extensive operational experience as a B-52 aircraft commander, Strategic Air Command. Colonel Margiotta received a doctoral degree in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has edited and contributed to two books, *The Changing World of the American Military* and *Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for US Policymakers*. He also has authored several chapters and journal articles in other publications.

CONFERENCE COORDINATION

MR. JOHN PHILIP MERRILL, Director, Policy Research and Special Assistant for Long-Range Planning, Department of Defense (DOD). Mr. Merrill was graduated from the University of California, with a B.A. (honors) and M.A. (high honors) in marxist economic history. He was a graduate in materiel management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and took postgraduate foreign language study at Wright State University. Prior to his current assignment Mr. Merrill coordinated analytical support for various DOD components including the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning. He previously served as a delegate to US-Soviet conventional arms control negotiations and as the first civilian appointee to the professional staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans and Policy Group. A recipient of numerous commendations from the Departments of State and Defense, Mr. Merrill is a frequent guest lecturer at US and foreign universities.

EDITOR

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY L. HEYNS, US Air Force, the editor of *Understanding U.S. Strategy*, is the Associate Professor of Research at the Research Directorate of the National Defense University. He received an A.B. from Saint Louis University and an M.A. from the University of Kansas, with postgraduate study at the University of Kansas and the University of Texas at Austin. He is also a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. LTC Heyns’ active duty assignments include service in Southeast Asia and Europe.
Biographical Notes

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

COLONEL DON L. ANDERSON, US Air Force, Deputy Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk. Colonel Anderson has received an M.A.S. in political science from George Washington University and a D.P.A. in public administration from Nova University in Florida. He has served in the US Air Force as Vice Commander (5th AF); Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Allied Forces NATO North Region; Deputy Chief of Staff, Aerospace Vehicles Branch, Military Assistant and Assistant for Military Applications, USAF Headquarters; and Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Thailand. Colonel Anderson attended the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College.

MR. NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, President, Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace. He is also Chairman of the Defense Science Board. Mr. Augustine graduated from Princeton University receiving B.S.E. and M.S.E. degrees in aeronautical engineering. He has served as Under Secretary of the Army; Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development); is President-elect of American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; and Chairman of Aeronautics Panel, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. He is the author of “Augustine’s Laws” and a book on defense management.

MR. JOHN A. BAKER, Department of State, Faculty, National War College. National Defense University. A graduate of Yale University, Mr. Baker attended the University of Geneva Institut des Hautes Etudes, the US Army Russian Language Area course in Oberammergau, and American University. He was in the Fellow’s program at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. Mr. Baker was a State Department Special Advisor to the US Delegation, U.N. General Assembly. Other assignments in the State Department include Deputy Assistant Secretary for Current Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and Director, Bureau of Refugee Affairs. He was US Representative to the U.N. Organization for Food and Agriculture and Minister-Consular, American Embassy in Rome. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs and as Director, Office of U.N. Political Affairs, for the Bureau of International Organization, Department of State. Among his publications is “Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” Harvard Paper (1968).

DR. ARCHIE D. BARRETT, Professional Staff Member, US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services. He has a B.S. degree from the US Military Academy, West Point, and M.P.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University specializing in political economy and government. A retired Air Force officer, he was formerly a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Before joining the University, Dr. Barrett was the military staff assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Organization Study (the
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MR. JAMES A. BARRY, Division Chief, Office of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Georgetown University. Mr. Barry served as an officer in the US Navy. He later received his M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University, and has since served at the Central Intelligence Agency in a number of analytical, staff, and management positions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL N. BEER, USAF. Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans for Space Command and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans for North American Aerospace Defense Command. General Beer was graduated magna cum laude from the University of Oklahoma and later completed his Ph.D. there in operations research. He is a distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. His service in the US Air Force includes assignments flying fighter-interceptor aircraft for Air Defense Command, developing base support capability for F-4/RF-4 aircraft in Southeast Asia, instructing F-4 combat crews at Davis-Monthan AFB, and flying combat missions from Thailand. He served as Deputy Department Head at USAF Academy and then as Chief, Fighter Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analyses, Headquarters US Air Force. His next assignment was as Executive Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

DR. RAYMOND E. BELL, JR., Deputy Director, War Gaming and Simulation Center, National Defense University. Dr. Bell was graduated from the United States Military Academy with a bachelor of science degree and received a master of arts in German culture from Middlebury College and a Ph.D. in Austrian military labor history from New York University.

JAMES R. BLAKER, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy Analysis), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Dr. Blaker was the Senior Analyst, US Army Threat Analysis Group and Senior Analyst and Director of the Southeast Asian Division, OSD (Systems Analysis). Previousiy Dr. Blaker was Deputy Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Congressional Budget Office and Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (1981-1982). A graduate of the University of Michigan he holds a Ph.D. degree from Ohio State University. In addition, Dr. Blaker was also a visiting lecturer in Western Philosophy at the
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University of the Philippines and taught US national politics and government at Ohio State University.

DR. JAMES BROWN, Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University. Dr. Brown earned his Ph.D. in civil-military politics from the State University of New York at Buffalo. Previously he was Professor of National Security Affairs, Air University, and a member of the US Delegation attending the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, Germany, 1982. His articles and books include “Turkey: A Policy in Flux,” in Current History (January 1982); “The Armed Forces of Greece,” in Brassey’s Defense Yearbook (1982); Military Ethics and Professionalism (coauthor Michael Collins, 1981); and “Challenges and Uncertainty: NATO’s Southern Flank,” in Air University Review (1980).

COLONEL MATTHEW P. CAULFIELD, USMC, Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations. Colonel Caulfield, in addition to serving in numerous command and staff positions as a Marine Corps Infantry Officer, has been the Head, Strategic Initiatives Branch, Headquarters US Marine Corps and is a graduate, Royal College of Defense Studies, London. He has a B.S. degree from Fordham University, an M.S. in government from George Washington University, and an M.B.A. from Harvard University.

DR. CHARLES W. COOK, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Space Plans and Policy, US Air Force. Dr. Cook received his B.A. degree in mathematics from the University of South Dakota and his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in nuclear physics from the California Institute of Technology. He was previously appointed Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Systems and Assistant Director, Defensive Systems, Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His other assignments were with the Central Intelligence Agency, North American Aviation, ARPA and Institute for Defense Analyses and General Dynamics Corporation. He has been honored with the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service and Distinguished Service awards and the Air Force Exceptional Civilian Service award. His publications include book chapters and journal articles on nuclear physics.

DR. ROBERT S. COOPER, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Dr. Cooper graduated with Distinction from the University of Iowa and received his master’s in electrical engineering from Ohio State University and his doctorate of science in electrical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). His previous positions include: Vice President of Engineering, Satellite Business Systems; Director, NASA-Goddard Space Flight Center; Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; and Staff Member, Group Leader, and Division Director at M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory. He was an Ohio State University Westinghouse Fellow and an M.I.T. Ford Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellow.
Biographical Notes

**COLONEL HAROLD S. COYLE, JR., USAF.** Deputy Director for Doctrine, Strategy, and Plans Integration, Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&O, Headquarters US Air Force. A graduate of the US Naval Academy specializing in engineering, Colonel Coyle went on to Purdue University where he completed an M.S. in industrial management and a Ph.D. in industrial relations. His assignments include Chief, Strategic Arms Limitation Office, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF: Senior Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense/Policy; Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Deputy Director, Office of Space Systems, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; and Associate Professor, USAF Academy.

**MR. ROGER E. CUBBY,** Chief, European Issues Division, Office of European Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Harvard University, Mr. Cubby earned his M.A. in political science at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He has served in US Army Intelligence, at the City University of New York; and in various analytical, management, and staff positions at the Central Intelligence Agency.


**DR. VINCENT DAVIS,** Director and Patterson Chair Professor, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky. He received his B.A. from Vanderbilt University, his M.P.A. in International Politics and Economics, M.A. in Foreign Policy, and Ph.D. in Defense Policy from Princeton University. Since being on the faculties of Princeton University, Dartmouth College, and the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver, Dr. Davis has been Visiting Research Professor at Princeton and Nimitz Chair Professor of the International Studies Association, member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, as well as various other professional societies. His publications include *The Post-Imperial Presidency* (1970); *Kissinger and Bureaucratic Politics* (1979).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. DIXON, US Army, Faculty, National War College, National Defense University. He received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Auburn University. He also earned an M.A. in political science and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of North Carolina. Colonel Dixon is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and has served on the faculty at the US Military Academy at West Point. He was a flight instructor at the US Primary Helicopter School and was assigned to the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, Washington. Among his publications are American National Security: Policy and Process (coauthor, 1981), and “A Structural-Functional Mathematical Model for Analyzing Protracted Social Conflict,” in International Interactions (1981).

DR. THOMAS H. ETZOLD, Assistant Director, Strategic Studies. Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Dr. Etzold received his A.B. and M.A. degrees from Indiana University and an M.Phil. and a Ph.D. in history from Yale University. He was Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College. His publications include Defense or Delusion? America’s Military in the 1980s (1982) and Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (1978).

DR. WILLIAM H. EVERS, JR., Vice President for Government Programs. W. J. Schafer Associates, Inc. Dr. Evers earned his bachelor and master degrees in aeronautics and astronautics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in aerospace engineering (plasma physics) from Cornell University. A nationally recognized expert in high energy laser technology and applications, Dr. Evers has served as Chairman of the Laser Device Panel of the Defense Department’s High Energy Laser Review Group. He earlier was the Technical Advisor and Chief of the Applied Technology Division for the Army High Energy Laser Systems Project Office of the Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Dr. Evers has authored several papers and reports on high energy lasers, plasma physics, and rocket engine combustion stability.

DR. NORMAN FRIEDMAN, Deputy Director for National Security Studies, Hudson Institute. He received his A.B. and Ph.D. degrees in physics from Columbia College and Columbia University, respectively. His areas of specialty at the Hudson Institute include military, naval, and tactical-technological studies; US-Soviet nuclear strategy; industrial mobilization; and Soviet tactical style for naval and land force. His recent publications include Naval Radar, Carrier Air Power, Modern Warship Design and Development, and US Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History (forthcoming). Among his journal articles are “The Soviet Mobilization Base,” in Air Force
Biographical Notes

Magazine (1979); "C3 War at Sea," in Naval Review 1977; and "The Soviet Bomber Force: Two 'Revolutions' in Warfare."

COLONEL SAMUEL B. GARDINER, USAF, Faculty, Department of Military Strategy. National War College. He received a B.B.A. in management from the University of Wisconsin, an M.B.A. from California State University, and a M.S. in international affairs from George Washington University. Prior to his present assignment, Colonel Gardiner was the Deputy Director for Resources, Directorate of Programs, Headquarters US Air Force: previously he was Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, SHAPE, Belgium.

CONGRESSMAN NEWT L. GINGRICH, Member of Congress, Republican. Georgia, Sixth District. A history graduate of Emory University, Congressman Gingrich went on to earn his M.A. and Ph.D. in modern European history from Tulane University. He was a Professor of History at West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia. Among his publications are "The Other Side of the Hill," in Defense Science (Vol. I, No. 2, 1982); "Think Now. Buy Later," in Washington Post (April 12, 1982); and "Advances Through Simulation," in Military Electronics (November 1981).

ALEX GLIKSMAN, Professional Staff Member, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, is a specialist in arms control and international security issues. He has worked as a defense policy consultant and was a frequent contributor to the press, defense and foreign policy journals and other media in the areas of strategic and regional arms control, US-European relations, and NATO and European nuclear issues. He has taught on the graduate faculty of the University of Southern California, School of International Relations, and at the University of Maryland. Alex Gliksman earned a B.A. in politics at New York University, held a study grant at the University of Vienna, and pursued doctoral studies in international relations at the University College London.

GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, US Army (Ret.) General Goodpaster was Superintendent of the US Military Academy at West Point and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He also served in Vietnam as Deputy Commander. In his early years, General Goodpaster served as Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower and, during World War II, commanded an engineering battalion in Italy. He earned his master's degree and doctorate in international relations from Princeton University and has published For the Common Defense (1976).

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL O. GRAHAM, USA (Ret.), Director, High Frontier, Inc. A graduate of the US Military Academy, West Point. Lieuten-
Biographical Notes

General Graham has served a distinguished military career in Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Washington including Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Other appointments since retirement from the US Army include staff of American Security Council and Co-Chairman, Coalition for Peace through Strength; advisor to Ronald Reagan in 1976 and 1980 campaigns; and Research Professor, University of Miami. His publications include *High Frontier: A New National Strategy* (1982), *Shall America Be Defended: SALT II and Beyond* (1980), and *New Strategy for the West* (1976).

DR. COLIN S. GRAY, President, National Institute for Public Policy. He has a B.A. degree with honors in government (economics) from Manchester University and a D.Phil. in international politics from Oxford University. He is a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was formerly Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute, and Assistant Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies. In 1982 he has published *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience and Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment*.

MR. WILLIAM H. GREGORY, Editor-in-Chief, *Aviation Week & Space Technology* magazine. Following a tour as a Naval Aviator Mr. Gregory was graduated from Creighton University with a bachelor of science in journalism. Mr. Gregory joined the staff of *Aviation Week & Space Technology* where he became Managing and then Executive Editor. He has published numerous articles and editorials in *Aviation Week & Space Technology* on military and commercial aerospace subjects.

MR. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, Partner, Shea & Gardner (attorneys). A gradu- tae of Cornell University with a B.A. in government, Mr. Hadley earned a J.D. degree from Yale Law School. Before joining Shea & Gardner he served as Consultant to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as a member of the National Security Council Staff, and as Program Analyst for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

MR. STEPHEN R. HANMER, JR., Acting Director, Theater Nuclear Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). He was graduated from the Virginia Military Institute with a B.S. in physics, and received M.S. degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from the University of Southern California. A retired US Army Colonel, Mr. Hanmer has also been US Representative to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group Staff, and Associate Professor for Fluid Mechanics, US Military Academy.

DR. ALBERT S. HANSER, Professor of History, West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia. Dr. Hanser received his A.B. in history from Wayne State University and his M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago. Prior to joining West Georgia's faculty he was on the faculties of
Biographical Notes

Illinois State and Vanderbilt universities. He has been a Senior Research Associate at the National Defense University. Dr. Hanser served as Congressman Gingrich's primary adviser in defense matters and was a consultant to Training and Doctrine Command, US Army.

MR. ANTHONY HARRIGAN, President, United States Industrial Council. Mr. Harrigan has authored eight books on foreign policy and national issues in addition to coauthoring "The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West." He has been a contributor to defense journals in the United States, Canada, England, France, and Germany. He has been twice a recipient of the "Military Review" award for military writing. He also is an occasional lecturer at leading universities and has taken overseas assignments as a correspondent in Vietnam, Cuba, Israel, South Africa, and other countries.

MR. JOHN HAWES, Director, Office of European Political and Security Affairs, Department of State. Mr. Hawes is a graduate of Princeton University in government and international affairs. He has served as Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO in Brussels, on the US Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations in Vienna; and as Director, Office of International Security Policy, Department of State.

DR. WILLIS M. HAWKINS, Senior Advisor, Lockheed Corporation. He received his bachelor of science degree in aeronautical engineering specializing in aerospace design and development, from the University of Michigan and subsequently an honorary doctor of engineering from there and an honorary doctor of science from Illinois College. Dr. Hawkins' previous position was President of the Lockheed California Company. He has held numerous other positions in the Lockheed Corporation including Director and Senior Vice President, Science and Engineering, and Vice President and General Manager, Space Division, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company. He was also appointed Assistant Secretary, US Army, Research and Development. His publications include the Wright Brothers Memorial Lecture (1982) and American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics lecture (Littlewood, 1978 and Vonkarmen, 1981).

MR. HANS HEYMANN, JR., National Intelligence Officer at Large, Central Intelligence Agency. A graduate of Rutgers University, Mr. Heymann earned a master's in international economic relations and a Russian Area and Language Study Certificate from Columbia University. He has served as Acting National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe and, most recently, as Acting National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His other assignments include consultant to the Office of Special Assistant to the President; Professorial Lecturer in Economics, George Washington University; and Senior Economist, The RAND Corporation. Mr. Heymann is the author of numerous studies on Soviet economi...
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ics. US foreign aid, arms transfer, research and development policies, and China’s approach to acquisition of advanced technology.

MR. CHARLES HORNER, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science and Technology. He was granted a B.A. from University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. from University of Chicago. He also attended the Stanford University Language Center at National Taiwan University and Tokyo University. His previous positions include Deputy Representative to the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea and Adjunct Professor and Research Associate in the Landegger Program in International Business Diplomacy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He also served in the Senate as Senior Legislative Assistant, Office of Senator Daniel Moynihan and Professional Staff Member, US Senate Subcommittee on Investigations and on National Security and International Operations. Previously he was on the Research Staff of the RAND Corporation. He is a member of the Committee on Fellows and Programs, Lehrman Institute, New York. He has been a contributor to the Wall Street Journal, American Spectator, Commentary, and Washington Quarterly.

MS. KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE, Diplomatic Correspondent, Wall Street Journal, Washington Bureau and Fellow, Institute of Politics, Harvard University. Ms. House earned a bachelor of journalism from the University of Texas at Austin. She has been Washington Correspondent for the Dallas Morning News and was the 1979 recipient of the Edward Weintal Award for distinguished foreign policy reporting. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.

MR. WILLIAM N. HULETT, President, Stouffer Hotels. Mr. Hutlett holds a bachelor’s degree in business administration from the University of Washington in Seattle. He was formerly Vice President, Westin Hotels, with operating and development responsibilities in Hawaii and midwestern United States.

DR. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Dr. Huntington also served at Harvard as Chairman of the Department of Government. At the White House, he was Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council. Dr. Huntington founded and coedited the quarterly journal Foreign Policy. He has served on the Council of the American Political Science Association and as Chairman of the Defense and Arms Control Study Group of the Democratic Advisory Council. Among his numerous publications are American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony: No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries: The Crisis of Democracy, and Political Power: USA USSR, coauthored with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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COLONEL C. POWELL HUTTON, USA, Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army. A graduate of the US Military Academy, Colonel Hutton earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University. He was Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College of Oxford University and later a Senior Army Fellow at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. Colonel Hutton has served as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (Europe); and in the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army. He was a student at the US Army War College and served in Armor and Cavalry units in the United States, Korea, Vietnam, and Germany.

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES, US Air Force (Ret.), Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before being appointed Chairman of the JCS in 1978, General Jones served four years as Chief of Staff, US Air Force, following his command of US Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Among General Jones's numerous command and staff assignments are combat tours in Korea and Vietnam. In his many awards and decorations, General Jones counts the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Flying Cross. A native of South Dakota, General Jones was graduated from the National War College and was awarded an honorary doctorate of humane letters from the University of Nebraska, an honorary doctorate of laws from Louisiana Tech University, and an honorary doctorate of humane letters from Minot State College.

MR. PHILIP S. KAPLAN, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Mr. Kaplan received his B.A. from the University of Connecticut and his J.D. from the University of California, School of Law, Berkeley. A Foreign Service Officer, he was Director for Multilateral Policy and Coordination, Bureau of International Organization Affairs. He served as a member of the US Delegation to the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, with the American Embassy in Bonn, and with the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels.

MR. PHILLIP A. KARBER, Director, Strategic Concepts Development Center. Also he is currently an adjunct professor at the Georgetown Graduate School. A former US Marine, Mr. Karber did his graduate work at Georgetown University where he was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He previously has served as Vice President for National Security Programs, BDM Corporation, McLean, Virginia, and a National Security Congressional Aide to several ranking members of the House and Senate, and as a television news reporter and news director of a CBS affiliate in California. He also was on loan to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for four years as Director of National Security Study Memorandum 186. He is a member of the US Army Science Board and the European-
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America Arms Control Workshop. Mr. Karber has authored numerous articles and contributed to seven books dealing with defense issues.

DR. CATHERINE McARDLE KELLEHER, Professor and Director of the Defense Studies Program, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. Dr. Kelleher is also Adjunct Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College. She earned her Ph.D at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to her government assignments she has served on the faculties of Columbia University, the University of Illinois, the University of Michigan, and the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. She has written numerous scholarly articles and books, including *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (1975), *American Arms and a Changing Europe* (coauthor, 1975); and *Political-Military System* (1974).

COLONEL THOMAS J. KENNEDY, JR., US Army. Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. A graduate of the University of Kansas, Colonel Kennedy received a B.A. in international relations and an M.A. in Slavic studies there. A Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Specialist for Eastern Europe, his other assignments have included operations, policy and planning, and positions on both the Army General Staff and the Joint Staff supporting the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MR. NOEL C. KOCH, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Mr. Koch received the bachelor of arts degree in English at Widener University and master of arts degree in international relations from Bryn Mawr College. He served in the Reagan campaign as an advisor on international policy and public affairs and in the Nixon and Ford administrations as special assistant to the President on assignments such as the Apollo space program, drug enforcement, defense and international affairs, and energy policy development. His other appointments include Assistant to the Postmaster General, Special Counsel to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, and member of Washington Regional Selection Panel for White House Fellows.

MR. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, Partner, Shea & Gardner. Mr. Kramer earned his B.A. degree from Yale University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He has served the US Government previously as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

DR. JOSEPH J. KRUZEL, Professor of Political Science, Duke University. In addition Dr. Kruzel is Director, Duke-University of North Carolina International Security Seminar. Having graduated from the US Air Force
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Academy as Outstanding Cadet in International Affairs, Dr. Kruzel went on to receive M.A., M.P.A., and Ph.D. degrees in government from Harvard University. He was a member of the US delegation to SALT I and consultant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT II. He served the US Government also as Current Intelligence Briefing Officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Deputy Desk Officer for Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Kruzel’s other assignments include Research Associate, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London); Member of Board, Arms Control Association; and Visiting Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution. Among his numerous publications in defense strategy and arms control are Parchment and Swords: Arms Control in Historical Perspective (forthcoming); “The International Arms Trade,” in National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues (1982); and “Verification and SALT II,” in Verification and SALT (1980).

REAR ADMIRAL RONALD J. KURTH, US Navy, Director, Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Rear Admiral Kurth was trained as a Naval Aviator. He was graduated from Harvard University with a Ph.D. in political science specializing in the Soviet Union. His past assignments include Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; US Naval Attache in Moscow; and Teaching Fellow at Harvard University. Among his publications are “Soviet Naval Capabilities in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas,” and “The Military and Power in the United States.”

MS. DEBORAH M. KYLE, Congressional Editor and Vice President of the Armed Forces Journal International. A graduate of Glassboro State College, Ms. Kyle is an M.B.A. candidate at George Washington University. She has been with the Armed Forces Journal International for six years, the last three years as Congressional Editor. She worked with the foreign policy coordinator in the 1976 Carter campaign.

HONORABLE L. BRUCE LAINGEN, Department of State, Vice President. National Defense University. Ambassador Laingen has been Vice President of the National Defense University since July 1981. He served as Charge d'affaires of the US Embassy in Tehran from June 1979 until the student takeover that November. He was among those held hostage in Tehran from then until the hostage release January 20, 1981. A former Ambassador to Malta, he entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after World War II duty with the Navy. Overseas diplomatic tours have included Germany, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. He was serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs when he was nominated as Ambassador to Malta. A graduate of St. Olaf College, he received his master’s degree from the University of Minnesota. He received the Department of State Meritorious Honor Award in 1967 and its Award for Valor in 1981.
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DR. ROY D. LAIRD, Professor of Political Science and Soviet and East European Area Studies, University of Kansas. Dr. Laird received his B.A. degree in biology from Hastings College, his M.A. in political science from the University of Nebraska, and his Ph.D. in political science and USSR studies from the University of Washington. He has previously served the US Government as Research Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency. He was a founder of the International Conference on Soviet and East European Agriculture. Among his numerous publications on Soviet affairs are "Soviet Meat and Grain, 1981-85: Output Projections." in Soviet Geography: Review and Translation (1982); Agriculture Policies in the USSR and Eastern Europe (with Ronald Francisco and Betty Laird) (1980); Soviet Communism and Agrarian Revolution (with Betty Laird) (1970); and The Soviet Paradigm (1970).

DR. JAMES R. LEUTZE, Bowman and Gordon Gray Professor, Department of History, and Chairman, Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He was graduated from the University of Maryland, received an M.A. from the University of Miami and a Ph.D. in 20th century American diplomatic history from Duke University. While in the Air Force he served in the Administrative Office and later the Commander Headquarters Squadron, Technical Training School at Lowry Air Force Base. Subsequently he joined the faculty at the University of North Carolina, where he received the Tanner Award for distinguished undergraduate teaching, the Bernath Prize for distinguished publication in American foreign policy, as well as the Bowman and Gordon Gray professorship for teaching. Among Dr. Leutze's publications are A Different Kind of Victory: The Biography of Admiral Thomas C. Hart (1981); Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941 (1977); The Role of the Military in a Democracy (ed.) (1974); and The London Journal of General Raymond E. Lee (1971).

COLONEL DINO A. LORENZINI, USAF, Program Manager, TALON GOLD, Directed-Energy Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He previously served as the Defense Economic Course Director at the Naval War College, Deputy Director at the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, and chief of the Inertial Guidance Research Laboratory at the USAF Academy. He is a distinguished graduate of the Air Command and Staff and the Naval War Colleges. He holds master's degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in astronautics and from Auburn University in business and management, along with a doctoral degree from MIT in astronautical engineering. Colonel Lorenzini has authored several articles on space, including "2001: A U.S. Space Force." NWC Review. March 1981.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM MALONEY, US Marine Corps. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, US Marine Corps Gen-
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General Maloney is also Operations Deputy for the US Marine Corps for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was trained as an aviator and is a graduate of Brown University. He received a master's from Stanford University, and a master's in international affairs from George Washington University. His previous assignments include Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; and Director of Information, Headquarters, US Marine Corps. He also directed Operations, J3, Pacific Command, and has served in Korea, Okinawa, Vietnam, the Mediterranean, the western Pacific, and various commands in the United States. Among his medals are the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, the Gold Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Bronze Star.

**DR. ERNEST R. MAY,** Charles Warren Professor of History. Dr. May has served as the Director of the Institute of Politics and as the Dean of Harvard College. In addition, Dr. May has been a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and various Congressional committees. He received a Ph.D. in history from University of California, Los Angeles. Dr. May has published books on the Monroe Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, US Entry into World War I, and Presidents as Commanders-in-Chief. Also Dr. May has written “Lessons” of the Past and is editing a forthcoming book on the history of intelligence analysis.

**COLONEL ROBERT E. McCLEAVE, JR.,** US Army, Associate Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, he holds master's degrees from the University of Tennessee and Brown University. He is also a graduate of the National War College and the Foreign Service Institute (South East Asia). Among his previous assignments are Chief, International Logistics Branch, Directorate for Logistics, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Transportation Plans Officer, Directorate for Transportation and Services, Department of Army, Deputy chief of Staff, Logistics, Battalion Commander, 69th Transportation Battalion, Korea; and Logistics Plans Officer, Directorate for Logistics, Pacific Command. Among his publications are “Determining Industrial Mobilization,” in DLA Dimensions (February 1981); and “National Defense Requirement for the US Merchant Marine,” in Naval War College Review (June 1969).

**MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE,** Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Educated at the US Naval Academy, Mr. McFarlane went on to serve as a US Marine officer, completed two tours in Vietnam, and was selected for early promotion. He also studied at L'Institut des Hautes Etudes, Geneva, where he completed a license in international relations. He was a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. His previous assignments include Counselor, US Department of State; Professional Staff, Senate Committee on Armed Services; and Executive Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He
is the recipient of the Distinguished Service Medal. His publications include “The Political Potential of Parity,” in Naval Institute Proceedings (1979); Crisis Resolution (coauthor) (1978); and “At Sea Where We Belong,” in Naval Institute Proceedings (1971).

DR. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Chicago. Dr. Mearsheimer received a bachelor of science degree from the US Military Academy at West Point and doctor of philosophy degree in international relations from Cornell University. Previously a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, he was also a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution. His book Conventional Deterrence is forthcoming from Cornell University Press.

MR. JOHN PHILIP MERRILL, Director, Policy Research and Special Assistant for Long-Range Planning, Department of Defense (DOD). Mr. Merrill was graduated from the University of California, with a B.A. (honors) and M.A. (high honors) in marxist economic history. He was a graduate in materiel management from the Air Force Institute of Technology and took postgraduate foreign language study at Wright State University. Prior to his current assignment Mr. Merrill coordinated analytical support for various DOD components including the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning. He previously served as a delegate to US-Soviet conventional arms control negotiations and as the first civilian appointee to the professional staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Plans and Policy Group. A recipient of numerous commendations from the Departments of State and Defense, Mr. Merrill is a frequent guest lecturer at US and foreign universities.

GENERAL EDWARD CHARLES MEYER, US Army, Chief of Staff. Previous to becoming Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Meyer served as Assistant Deputy, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army. His other recent major assignments include Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), US Army Europe; Deputy Commandant, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and Commander, 2d Brigade and then Chief of Staff for the 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam. He also was a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Among his many decorations are the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the Purple Heart.

MR. FRANKLIN C. MILLER, Director, Strategic Forces Policy, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). A former naval officer, Mr. Miller served as Politico-Military Affairs Officer, Department of State and as Assistant for Theater Nuclear Policy, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). A graduate of
Biographical Notes

Williams College, Mr. Miller also holds an M.P.A. from Princeton University in international relations specializing in national security policy.

DR. ROBERT H. MOORE, Corporate Vice President, Alexander & Alexander Services Inc. He has served as a consultant to the Conference Board as well as to the Senate Armed Services Committee and members of Congress. Dr. Moore has taught at Wisconsin, West Point and Maryland, where he was a tenured Associate Professor on the Graduate Faculty. He is a graduate of Davidson College with an M.A. from the University of North Carolina and a Ph.D. from Wisconsin. Dr. Moore is coauthor of School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms, selected by The New York Times as a Book of the Year and featured in PBS’s “No Excuse Sir” (1981).

MR. JAMES W. MORRISON, Director, European Policy, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (European and NATO Policy), Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). He holds an A.B. from Indiana University in government and an M.I.A. from Columbia University in international affairs. He is a graduate of the National War College, National Defense University. Mr. Morrison has served as Deputy Director, DOD Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Task Force and as a Staff Assistant to the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOUIS J. MOSES, US Air Force, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University and student, National War College. National Defense University. Colonel Moses earned his A.B. degree in chemistry and psychology from Coe College and his M.B.A. in economics from the University of Tennessee. He has served as Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the US Air Force; and on other staff jobs at Headquarters, US Air Force.

MR. ALLAN A. MYER, Staff Member, National Security Council. Mr. Myer was granted an M.A. in Soviet studies from Georgetown University. He has served as Staff Officer, Strategy and Policy Directorate, Operations and Plans, Headquarters US Army; as faculty member, National War College, National Defense University; and as faculty member, Strategy Department, US Army Command and General Staff College. He has published in Naval War College Review, Military Review, Swiss Military Review, and Norwegian Military Review.

MR. LARRY C. NAPPER, Officer in Charge of the Multilateral Affairs Division of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State. A graduate of Texas A&M University, Mr. Napper earned his M.A in foreign affairs at the University of Virginia. He has previously served in US Embassies in Moscow and in Botswana. Mr. Napper has written two chapters on US-Soviet conflict in Africa during the 1970s which will appear in the forthcoming Manag-
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REAR ADMIRAL RONALD E. NARMI, US Navy. Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. A graduate of Iowa State College with a B.S. in aeronautical engineering, he has earned an M.S. in physics from the US Naval Postgraduate School, an M.S. in systems management from the University of Southern California, and an M.S. in administration from George Washington University. He is also a distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Rear Admiral Narmi has served as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; as Deputy Manager Anti-Submarine Weapons System Project Office; as a Wing Commander, Command Patrol Wing 11; and as Deputy Director, Chief Naval Operations Executive Panel. Among his publications is Military Leadership: The Indispensable Ingredient (ed. forthcoming, 1982).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUNTER H. NEUBERT, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Colonel Neubert was graduated from the University of Michigan with a B.S. in chemistry and from the University of Texas, El Paso with an M.S. in chemistry. He is a graduate of the US Army War College. His previous assignments include Battalion Commander and Special Assistant to the Commandant, US Army Chemical School; Instructor, Chemistry, US Military Academy at West Point; Division Chemical Officer, Headquarters, 101st Airborne; Instructor, Radiological Safety Project Officer, Special Studies, US Army Ordnance Center and School; and Instructor, Radiological Safety, US Army Chemical School; Instructor, Chemistry, US Military Academy at West Point; Division Chemical Officer, Headquarters, 101st Airborne; Instructor, Radiological Safety Project Officer, Special Studies, US Army Ordnance Center and School; and Instructor, Radiological Safety, US Army Chemical Center and School.

DR. DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN, Professor of International Affairs, Federal Executive Institute. Dr. Nuechterlein is preparing a book expanding on the paper included in chapter 3 of this volume. In the fall of 1982 he will be a senior associate member at St. Antony’s College of Oxford University. He was a Fulbright professor at the University of Wales from 1975 to 1976. From 1965 to 1968 he was on the senior staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Previous to that appointment he was a Rockefeller scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Cultural Attaché at the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand. He was graduated from the University of Michigan with a Ph.D. in international relations. His publications include National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (1978); US National Interests in a Changing World (1973); Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (1965); and Iceland: Reluctant Ally (1961).
Biographical Notes

DR. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Professor of Government, Harvard University. Dr. Nye has served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and chaired the National Security Council Group on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For his service he was presented the highest Department of State commendation, the Distinguished Honor Award. He is the author of the books, *Power and Interdependence* and *Energy and Security*, as well as many professional articles. He is a member of the Trilateral Commission, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Commission on International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences. A former Governor of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, he served as Chairman of the Research Advisory Board of the Committee for Economic Development and was a member of the Ford Foundation’s Nuclear Energy Policy Study. A graduate of Princeton University, he earned his master’s degree at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and received a Ph D. degree in political science from Harvard University.

MR. JAMES E. OBERG, Flight Controller, Mission Control, Space Shuttle Program McDonnell-Douglas. Mr. Oberg’s specialization as a flight controller is in orbital rendezvous and he is a close observer of the Soviet space program. A former US Air Force Officer, Mr. Oberg has advanced graduate degrees in computer science and mathematics. Previously assigned to an Air Force weapons lab, he worked on systems definition for the airborne laser weapon testbed. He has written numerous magazine articles on the Soviet space program and the book *Red Star in Orbit* (1981).

DR. VLADIMIR PETROV, Professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University. Dr. Petrov has been a Lecturer, Russian Area Studies, Yale University; Editor, *Voice of America* in Europe, Munich; and Consultant, Strategic Studies Center, SRI. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Yale University and has published *US-Soviet Detente, Past and Future*; *Soviet-Chinese Relations 1945-70* (Borisov and Koloskov, ed.) and *Escape from the Future*.

Biographical Notes

The Study of International Relations (1977); New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict: The Other Arms Race (1975); and Contending Theories of International Relations (1971, 1981 2nd ed.).

DR. JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ, Professor of Political Science and Soviet and East European Area Studies, University of Kansas, and Lecturer for the University of Kansas at the US Army Command and Staff College. Dr. Piekalkiewicz is a World War II veteran of the anti-Nazi resistance in Poland and was decorated for bravery. He received his B.A. with honors in economics and politics from Trinity College, University of Dublin, Ireland and his Ph.D. in government and certificate with distinction, Russian and East European Institute, from the University of Indiana. He is the holder of many awards for study in East-Central Europe including Senior Researcher in the Czechoslovak Academy of Science. Previously Assistant Director of the Soviet and Slavic Area Program. Dr. Piekalkiewicz is now Director of the University of Kansas-University of Warsaw Exchange Program. He teaches in and lectures on comparative politics, politics of ideocracy, and logic of political inquiry for non-Western students. He has authored many articles on the Communist political systems of east-central Europe and Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, Communist Local Government, and The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (coauthor).

DR. ALBERT C. PIERCE, Deputy Director, Strategic Concepts Development Center, National Defense University. A cum laude graduate of Catholic University, he holds an M.A. and a Ph.D in political science from Tufts University. Dr. Pierce was a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Prior to that position he was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He also served with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as Assistant to the President of the University of Massachusetts. Most recently he published an essay on current defense issues in Foreign Policy and Defense Review.

MR. ROBERT B. PIRIE, JR., Director, Naval Strategy Program Center for Naval Analyses. Since his position as Commanding Officer, USS SKIPJACK, for the US Navy, Mr. Pirie has held staff positions with the National Security Council and Office of the Secretary of Defense. has been the Deputy Assistant Director for National Security of the Congressional Budget Office, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics), and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics). After his graduation from the US naval Academy, Mr. Pirie obtained a B.A. and an M.A. from Oxford University specializing in philosophy, politics, and economics.
Biographical Notes

DR. ROBERT J. PRANGER, Director of International Programs, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. DR. Pranger received his B.A. (Phi Beta Kappa), M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Currently he is also Adjunct Professor in International Politics, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Professorial Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. He has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Plans, and NSC Affairs; and as Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Washington. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and twice the recipient of the DOD Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. Among his publications are Nuclear Strategy and National Security (1977); Detente and Defense (1976); Eclipse of Citizenship (1968); and Action, Symbolism, and Order (1968).

DR. GEORGE H. QUESTER, Professor and Chairman, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. Dr. Quester was graduated from Columbia University with an A.B. in history. He earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He has served on the faculties of the National War College, Cornell University, and Harvard University. Among his publications are American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus (1982); Offense and Defense in the International System (1977); and The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (1973).

DR. URI RA’ANAN, Professor of International Politics and Chairman of the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Dr. Ra’anan is also a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. He had previously taught political science and government at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University, and City University of New York. He was educated at Oxford University and is the author of works on the US-Soviet strategic balance, the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet foreign policy, Soviet military aid to the Third World, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, the diplomatic history of the Middle East, Chinese factional struggles, and the politics of the coup d’etat.

MR. HERBERT A. REYNOLDS, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Space Policy, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, Mr. Reynolds was a pilot during World War II and the Korean War and spent most of his Air Force career in reconnaissance and intelligence-related activities. More recently he served on the
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Reagan Transition Team (for Defense) and previously was Vice President of Corporate Development at HRB-Singer. He also held the position of senior Engineering Manager at Boeing Aerospace Company.


COLONEL GILBERT D. RYE, US Air Force, Staff Member, National Security Council. Colonel Rye has held a variety of positions in budgeting, research and development, and planning in the Air Force. He served as Deputy Director of Budget for the Air Force in Vietnam, as Assistant to the Commander, Space and Missile Systems Organization, on the staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, as Chief of Program Control for Project 85, and later as Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe for Communications, Command, and Control. Previous to assignment on the NSC staff, Colonel Rye was assigned to Air Force Headquarters as a long-range planner, Deputy Chief of the Strategy Division, and Chief of the Air Force Space Plans Division.

REAR ADMIRAL JAMES A. SAGERHOLM, US Navy, Director, Long-Range Planning Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of Admiral Sagerholm’s previous assignments were Commanding Officer, USS KAMEHAMEHA; Deputy Director of naval Intelligence; Commander of the South Atlantic Force, US Atlantic Fleet; Director of the Office of Program Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy; and Director of Contingency Plans and Requirements, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

DR. RALPH SANDERS, Faculty, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. A graduate of Georgetown University, Dr. Sanders earned his B.S. and M.S. in foreign service and his Ph.D in international relations there. Dr. Sanders has also taught on the faculties of the National War College and Southern California University, Washington Public Affairs Center. Among his publications are "Bureaucratic Plays and Strategems: The Case of the US Department of Defense," in *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* (1980); *Science and Technology: Vital National Resources* (1975), *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (1974); and *Project Plowshare: The Development of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosion* (1962).
Biographical Notes

DR. SAM C. SARKESIAN, Professor, Department of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago, and Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is also President, Study Group on Armed Forces and Society, International Political Science Association. Dr. Sarkesian was granted his Ph.D. from Columbia University. A retired Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, he served in Airborne, Special Forces, and Infantry units in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, earning the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star, among other citations. Dr. Sarkesian was Executive Secretary and Associate Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He formerly was Chairman, Department of Political Science, Loyola University. He has published books and articles on national security and military professionalism among which are US Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s (1981); Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (1981); Non-nuclear Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (1980); Combat Effectiveness: Stress and Cohesion in the Volunteer Military (1980); and Defense Policy and the Presidency (1979).


CAPTAIN J. R. SEEHOULTZ, US Navy, Technology Planner, Long-Range Planning Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. A graduate of the US Naval Academy, Captain Seesholtz received a Ph.D. in oceanography from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has served as Project Officer, for the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for ASW Programs and as Program Manager for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He was the Commanding Officer of the USS AJAX and the USS DOLPH. He was a participant in the October 1981 Space Panel of the Naval Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

COLONEL ROBERT SIGETHY, US Air Force, Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. A graduate of Lehigh University, he has an M.S. in industrial management from Purdue University and a Ph.D in public administration from American University. He completed Squadron Officer School as well

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as the Air Command and Staff College and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Colonel Sigethy previously was Director of Plans and Operations then Commander, Air Force Office of Scientific Research at Bolling AFB, and at Andrews AFB, Chief, Laboratory Plans Division, then Chief, Laboratory Programs Division, Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command.

DR. DIMITRI K. SIMES, Executive Director, Soviet and East European Research Program, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. Formerly with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. Simes previously was Director of Soviet Studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. He attended Moscow State University's School of History and a graduate school of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where he was also a Research Associate from 1967 to 1972. Dr. Simes has served as a consultant to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and, currently, to both Houses of Congress. He has written numerous studies and articles dealing with various aspects of Soviet foreign and domestic policies, including Soviet Succession: Leadership in Transition and Detente and Conflict: Soviet Foreign Policy. 1972-1977.

DR. BARRY J. SMERNOFF, President, B. J. Smernoff Associates, Ltd. A graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he received his Ph.D. in physics from Brandeis University. He served as a staff member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory and at the Hudson Institute, as a consultant to the US General Accounting Office, and has testified before various Congressional committees. He currently consults for both Federal and State agencies. His publications include "The Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser Weapons," in Air University Review (March-April 1982) and The Future of Conflict (coauthor, 1979).

MR. JED SNYDER, Senior Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State. A graduate of Colby College he earned his M.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Chicago and is currently a doctoral candidate there specializing in strategic studies and the NATO Alliance. Before joining the US Government, Mr. Snyder was associate researcher at the Pan Heuristics Division of R&D Associates. His principal areas of research were US and Soviet comparative power projection capabilities and European security issues. Mr. Snyder also has been a consultant for the Rand Corporation and is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. His publications include "Strengthening the NATO Alliance: Toward a Strategy for the 1980s," in Naval War College Review (1981).
Biographical Notes

DR. WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN, Senior Consultant, National Security Council, and Director, Russian Area Studies Program, Georgetown University. He holds a B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley, an M.A. and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. He served in the US Foreign Service for 28 years and also was Senior Staff Member, National Security Council (NSC) and previously Chief, Indonesia Staff, NSC. He has also been Acting Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau for ACDA. He has written The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria (1962).

DR. JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution. A specialist in US strategic policy and decision theory. Dr. Steinbruner previously was a professor in the School of Organization and Management and the Department of Political Science at Yale University. Long a US Government consultant on national security matters, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The author of the Cybernetic Theory of Decision, he is on the editorial board of International Security and the American Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Dr. Steinbruner holds a Ph.D. degree in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

MAJOR GENERAL LEE E. SURUT, US Army, Commandant, National War College, National Defense University. A graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, Major General Surut received an M.A. in English from Columbia University, and an M.S. in international affairs from George Washington University. He is also a graduate of the National War College. He has served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs), US Army; as Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army; as Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna; as Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff; as well as in posts in Germany, Belgium, and Vietnam.

DR. WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., Director of Political-Military Studies, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Taylor is a graduate of American University's School of International Service with a Ph.D. in international relations. A retired US Army Colonel, he has been Director of National Security Studies, US Military Academy at West Point, and Visiting Academy Professor to the National War College. A frequent lecturer and author or coauthor of more than 50 publications, Dr. Taylor's most recent publications include The Future of Conflict and U.S. Interest (1982), The Future of Conflict in the 1980s (with Marenin; 1982), and American National Security: Policy and Process (with Jordan; 1981).
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DR. W. SCOTT THOMPSON, Associate Director for Programs, US Information Agency. A graduate of Stanford University, he earned his D.Phil. from Oxford University. Dr. Thompson was Senior Fellow at both Georgetown University for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage Foundation. He also has been Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Research Fellow at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Among his publications are The Third World: Premises for US Policy, from Weaknesses to Strength: National Strategies in the 1980s, The Thai Insurgency, and Fulcrum of Power: The Third World Between Moscow and Washington.

ADMIRAL HARRY D. TRAIN II, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, and Commander-in-Chief US Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Train is a graduate of the US Naval Academy and the US Naval Postgraduate School where he studied operations (systems) analysis. He has previously served as Commander Sixth Fleet: Director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Systems Analysis Division, Naval Operations and Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla EIGHT. Among his personal decorations are the Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars, the Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars, the Meritorious Service Medal, and the Navy Commendation Medal.

MAJOR GENERAL BERNARD E. TRAINOR, US Marine Corps. Director, Plans Division, Plans, Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters, US Marine Corps. A former exchange officer to the British Royal Marines, he commanded a company in 45 Commando, 3d Commando Brigade. Previous assignments include Director, 1st Marine Corps District, New York City; Assistant Depot Commander, Parris Island, South Carolina; and Deputy for Education, Education Center, Quantico, Virginia. He earned his master’s degree in history at the University of Colorado and is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College. He has published a book, A History of the Marine Corps.

MR TONY VELOCCI, JR., Senior Editor, Nation’s Business magazine, US Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Velocci is a graduate of Syracuse University with a B.S. in journalism. He specializes in defense and energy-related subjects, having spoken and written in-depth on US strategic and conventional defense readiness. He is frequently a contributing author to the National Defense magazine and to college and university textbooks on the future of nuclear energy. Mr. Velocci lectured as Editor-in-Residence at Syracuse University on energy and defense-related topics.

MR LAWRENCE MICHAEL WEEKS, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Headquarters. Mr. Weeks is a graduate of Iowa State
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University with a B.S. in applied mechanics. He has also received an M.S. in applied mechanics from Washington University at St. Louis. Before joining NASA, Mr. Weeks was Manager of Advanced Systems Development, Reentry and Environmental Systems, General Electric. He previously worked on the NASA Large Space Telescope Program at Perkin-Elmer Corporation, and as Vice President and General Manager of the Missile and Space Division, LTV Corporation. He has also been with IBM-Electronic Systems, Owego, New York; Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo.

DR. SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR., Secretary, International Security Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Wells previously taught at the University of North Carolina, where he was an Associate Professor of History, and at Wellesley College. Specializing in the fields of American foreign relations, economic diplomacy, arms control, and national security policy, Dr. Wells has had numerous articles published on those topics. He has had several fellowships, including a Ford Foundation grant for research in international security. A graduate of the University of North Carolina, he received his master's and doctoral degrees in history and international relations from Harvard University.

MR. ROY A. WERNER, Corporate Director, Policy Research. A magna cum laude graduate of the University of Central Florida, Mr. Werner received his M.Phil. in international politics from Oxford University. His previous positions for the US Government include Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Professional Staff Member for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and various career civil service positions. He has written "The Asian Military Balance and the Benign Chinese Military Threat," in *The Implications of US-China Military Cooperation* (1982); and "Resources and Requirements," in *Strengthening Deterrence: NATO and the Western Defense in the 1980s* (1981).

CONGRESSMAN RICHARD C. WHITE, Member of Congress, 16th District, Democrat, Texas. Congressman White is a member of the House Armed Services Committee, Chairman of its Investigations Subcommittee, and member of the Science and Technology Committee. This is his eighteenth year in Congress. He is past chairman of the Democratic Research Organization and currently serves on its Executive Committee. Congressman White served during World War II as a Japanese interpreter for the US Marines and was awarded the Purple Heart. He received his L.L.B. law degree from the University of Texas at Austin.

DR. DARNELL M. WHITT, Intelligence Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Having served on the Policy Planning Staff in OSD(ISA) and at the US diplomatic mission to NATO in Paris and Brussels, he has taught at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Dur
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ing the mid-1970s, he was Executive Director of the Committee of Nine—a group of prominent officials who reassessed political, security, and economic relations between Western Europe and North America. Dr. Whitt is coauthor of Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970s and coauthor of Quarrel on the Rhine: Intra-Alliance Diplomacy in an Interdependent World. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and the Editorial Advisory Board of The Atlantic Community Quarterly, as well as a Captain in the Naval Reserve.

DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A summa cum laude graduate in government from Columbia University, Dr. Zakheim received his D. Phil. in politics and economics from St. Antony's College, University of Oxford. Presently he also serves on the Maritime Policy Study Group of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. He is a member of the US Naval Institute, the American Political Science Association, and the Society of Government Economists; and in the United Kingdom, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Institute of Bankers. Dr. Zakheim has served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and as Principal Analyst with the National Security and International Affairs Division, Congressional Budget Office. He is author or coauthor of nine Congressional Budget Office studies and has contributed to professional and academic journals on security and academic affairs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>antiballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSATCOM</td>
<td>Air Force Satellite Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>air-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAT</td>
<td>antisatellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>circular error probable (nuclear missile/warhead prediction accuracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C'I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'</td>
<td>defense, deterrence, and detente</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>electromagnetic pulse (of a nuclear explosion in space)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBMD</td>
<td>global ballistic missile defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>ground-launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRTNF</td>
<td>long-range theater nuclear force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multilateral Force (NATO-related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX</td>
<td>(literally, &quot;missile, experimental.&quot;) US land-based ICBM follow-on to Minuteman</td>
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<tr>
<td>MX-MPS</td>
<td>MX multiple protective shelter (basing mode)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMAC</td>
<td>National Military Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPG</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning Group (NATO-related)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC-68</td>
<td>National Security Council Report 68 of 14 April 1950 (policy of containment of the USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>planning, programming, and budgeting system</td>
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<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>reentry vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Command, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>School of Advanced International Studies (Washington-based Johns Hopkins University adjunct)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>surface-to-air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan (nuclear doctrine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>sea-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>strategic offensive force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRAM</td>
<td>short-range air missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>surface-to-surface (missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>Theater Nuclear Force</td>
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