AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY UNITED STATES BASED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

THESIS

Kathleen E. Killen, Captain, USAF
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AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY UNITED STATES BASED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology Air University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Systems Management

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Captain, USAF Captain, USAF

September 1992

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Preface

The purpose of this study was to compile the experiences of the contracting professionals who supported Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from their continental United States based Department of Defense offices. The results of the study show that these professionals actively supported the conflict just as much as the contingency contracting officers who were deployed to the Middle East. The study also shows that certain regulations should be considered for changes or waivers and that there are specific training requirements that contracting professionals need to be able to support a military contingency properly.

We would like to take this chance to thank a number of people without whose help we could not have functioned. Both of our advisors, Dr. Rita Wells and Major Robert Pappas, were essential to the thesis writing process. Thanks certainly must go to the individuals who participated in the study. Their inputs form the very foundation of this thesis. The Killen family was especially understanding of all the telephone calls they received. The entire Wilson clan also provided most excellent support to us throughout this effort, although at a much closer distance.

Kathleen E. Killen

Gavin P. Wilson
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Thesis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Issue</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Problem</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Questions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Contracting</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS Contracting</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Review of Literature</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS History</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Constraints</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rapid Response Process</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Contracting</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Contracting Recommendations</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Recommendations</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Chain</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Officer Needs</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements Generation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Considerations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivers to Regulations</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Recommendations</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Training Recommendations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Officers</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Ordering Officers</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Attorneys</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### III. Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Focus Groups</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Personal Interviews</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the Delphi Method</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Investigative Questions</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 2</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative Question 10</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the Population</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of the Research Sample</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame of the Research Focus</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument Development</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretest</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Round Questionnaire</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Round Questionnaire</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Received Data</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of Round One</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items, Methods, Time Period</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODS Supplies and Services</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where Used</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When ODS Began</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After ODS Ended</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Methods</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Time</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing New Buys</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Development</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Commercial Items</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsolicited Proposals</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Contracts</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Delivery</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Priorities Allocation System</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry's Response</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with Industry</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Payment</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Restrictions</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waivers to the Regulations</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications and Approvals</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements Generation</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Follow-up</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for ODS</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations During ODS</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Structure</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated Teams</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workload Impact</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Urgency</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers Experiences</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges During ODS</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges After ODS</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Information</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of ODS Contracting Actions</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement Acquisition Lead Time</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparisons to Focus Groups and Interviews</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of Round Two</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Development</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Commercial Items</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsolicited Proposals</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated Delivery</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with Industry</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Follow-up</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Payment</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications and Approvals</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Methods</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated Teams</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Recommendations</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Recommendations</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggestions for Further Study</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Round One Questionnaire</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Round One Questionnaire Answers</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C: Round Two Questionnaire</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D: Round Two Questionnaire Answers</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E: Statistical Analysis of Round Two Answers</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix F: Cover Letters</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix G: Acronym Definitions</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitae</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Desert Shield RRP Requirements Process</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Key Dates of ODS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Prospective Respondent Matrix</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Round One Actual Respondent Matrix</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Types of Contracting Actions in Support of ODS</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Continuation of ODS Contracting Actions</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Round Two Actual Respondent Matrix</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Point Values for Agreement Categories</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ranges of Agreement</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Statistics of Round Two Answers</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This study assembled the experiences of the contracting professionals who supported Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from their continental United States based Department of Defense offices. The results of the study show that these professionals actively supported the conflict just as much as the contingency contracting officers who were deployed to the Middle East. No major differences in contracting methods appeared among the different agencies studied. However, the study does suggest that certain regulations should be considered for changes or waivers that go into effect during military contingencies. Also, there are specific training requirements that contracting professionals should receive in order to support a military contingency properly.
I. Introduction

Overview of the Thesis

This study was conducted in order to determine the methods used by the military services and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies to contractually procure equipment, supplies, and services during times in which procurement by normal contracting channels would endanger national strategies. The study centered on the expeditious transactions that those agencies located within the continental United States (CONUS) used in order to shorten overall procurement times for the equipment and supplies required by Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (ODS). This particular type of contracting, best represented by the phrase "CONUS contracting," differs from contingency contracting only in the fact that the needed supplies are purchased in CONUS rather than in the theater of operations.

This thesis has been organized to present the background and importance of CONUS contracting in Chapter I. The literature review in Chapter II discusses the pertinent literature that has been written about contracting during
contingency situations. Some contingency contracting lessons learned during ODS and suggestions for contingency contracting training are also discussed in Chapter II. The research methodology introduced in Chapter III presents the research design used to gather and analyze the data on CONUS contracting methods. The analysis of the findings of this study is presented in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the conclusions of this study and recommendations for further study are discussed.

General Issue

On 21 February 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney revealed a new military strategy in an address to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The following quotation, taken directly from that speech, best describes the new strategy:

The most important change reflected in this new strategy is that we no longer are focused on the threat of a Soviet-led, European wide conflict leading to global war...The new strategy shifts its focus to regional threats and the related requirements for forward presence and crisis response...The regional contingencies we might face are many and varied...One trait most of them share, however, is that they will arise on very short notice and therefore require a highly responsive military capability. (Cheney, 1991:9,11)

This new strategy requires the United States DOD to be capable of the rapid deployment and support of troops anywhere in the world (Cheney, 1991:6; Crist, 1990:17). General Alfred M. Gray, USMC, concurs with Mr. Cheney's suggested new strategy and recommended that "we retain a robust industrial base capable of producing the equipment
and sustainability necessary" (Gray, 1991:14). In order to implement this strategy the various contracting organizations of DOD must possess the ability to award contracts quickly to support operations in the theaters of conflict (Wells, 1991).

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are examples of the types of conflict the military should expect in the future (Cheney, 1991:6). All of the agencies within the DOD prepared for ODS in their own ways. The preparations for the conflict required that the contracting professionals research regulations and public laws, coordinate with other military organizations, and work closely with the defense industrial base in order to meet the logistical needs of the troops deployed in the theater of conflict as rapidly as possible. Consolidation of the various methods used within the DOD to contractually support ODS has the potential to aid in educating contracting professionals to effectively and efficiently support a future military contingency.

Another important aspect of this study is to reveal any particular regulations and laws that need to be changed in order to expedite the support of military contingencies (Wells, 1991).

**Specific Problem**

The purpose of this research is to perform an analysis of the contracting actions taken by DOD agencies within the CONUS during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
This study has the potential to be the impetus for changes in laws, policies, or regulations governing contracting so that supporting troops mobilized overseas will be simpler for contracting professionals in the future (Wells, 1991).

This analysis will also be the basis for training contracting personnel in responding to support military mobilization contingencies in the future. The courses developed from this analysis can be tailored by specific organizations as necessary (Wells, 1991).

Investigative Questions

In order to understand what happened during ODS the following investigative questions require consideration:

1. What items were procured and what methods were used by the CONUS based contracting professionals to support ODS?

2. How were new sources developed in CONUS based contracting organizations to support ODS?

3. What methods did the CONUS based contracting organizations use to expedite existing contracts to support ODS?

4. What were relations like with industry during ODS?

5. What regulations could have been relaxed or waived during ODS to make CONUS based contracting more simple?

6. How did CONUS based contracting organizations receive requirements from the field during ODS?

7. What type of training was held for CONUS based contracting professionals to help them support ODS?
8. What organizational structures were used by CONUS based contracting organizations during ODS?

9. What challenges were encountered by CONUS based contracting professionals during and after ODS?

10. What recommendations do CONUS based contracting professionals have for improving the CONUS contracting process in support of future military contingencies?

A detailed discussion of the information to be received from each of these investigative questions and the method used to acquire that information appears in the discussion of the methodology, Chapter III.

Scope

Two methods of contracting exist for procuring equipment and supplies for units which are deployed to a theater of conflict. These methods are CONUS contracting and contingency contracting. CONUS contracting is characterized by procuring equipment, supplies, or services in the continental United States that are then sent into the theater. Contingency contracting is characterized by having contracting officers deploy with units to procure the necessary equipment, supplies, or services within the theater of operations (Bell, 1990:74; Mason, 1988:4).

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) uses CONUS contracting. The Air Force, Army and Marine Corps use both methods (Bell, 1990:74; Byther, 1991:23; Wilson and Wilson, 1991:43). This study addresses the contracting actions that
were used during ODS by the DOD agencies located within the CONUS to support the troops deployed to the Middle East: CONUS contracting.

Definition of Terms

**Contingency.** A military operation that involves the deployment of forces away from their home bases, usually overseas (Bell, 1990:74; Mason, 1988:3).

**Contingency Contracting.** Contracting for equipment, supplies, and services performed in the theater of operations to support the military units deployed there for the contingency (Bell, 1990:74; Mason, 1988:4).

**CONUS Contracting.** Contracting for equipment, supplies, and services performed in the United States to support a military contingency regardless of its location.

Summary

In 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced a new overall military strategy that requires the DOD to be capable of deploying and supporting troops anywhere on the globe (Cheney, 1991:6,11). Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are examples of the types of conflicts to be expected in the future (Cheney, 1991:6). Studying the various methods used within the DOD to support ODS can assist in preparing contracting professionals to support a future military contingency. This study can also serve as the basis of any regulatory or legal changes that can assist
contracting professionals in rapidly providing for deployed troops in the future (Wells, 1991).

A review of the literature on both CONUS and contingency contracting during ODS is compiled in Chapter II. Additionally, some ODS contingency contracting lessons learned and recommendations for contingency contracting training are also discussed in Chapter II.
II. Review of Literature

Introduction

This chapter contains a brief history of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS) as well as a review of the literature related to contracting during military contingencies. The only literature found that applies to CONUS contracting as defined by this thesis was from unpublished sources on the Rapid Response Process (RRP) that the Air Force conducted during ODS. Although the RRP was limited to the Air Force, its description is of importance to this research. The fact that no published literature on CONUS contracting was found reinforces the need for this research.

Most of the literature found that concerned contracting during a military contingency contained only general information or contingency contracting information. While contingency contracting is not the subject of this research, the information is applicable for a basic understanding of the importance of CONUS contracting. Also, the fact that contingency contracting has been studied as much as it has places even more emphasis on the fact that studies of CONUS contracting have been neglected to date.

Some contracting organizations that had contingency teams in the theater during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (ODS) volunteered their Lessons Learned or
After Action Reports for inclusion in this study. The recommendations from those reports are included in this literature review so that comparison to recommendations of the respondents of this study can be made.

**ODS History**

On 2 August 1990 the United Nations (UN) condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that had occurred earlier that same day (Watson and others, 1991:13; Watson and Watson, 1991:15). Operation Desert Shield began for the United States on 7 August 1990 in response to the situation (Watson and others, 1991:13). Table 1 shows the key dates of the events surrounding ODS.

Watson and Watson stated five reasons that Sadaam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait. First, Iraq could not repay Kuwait the money that was borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq War. Second, taking over the Kuwaitis vast wealth could end Iraq's financial problems. Third, allegations had been made that Kuwaitis were drilling for oil in the Rumaila oil field which was in a border disputed area. Fourth, Kuwait was producing a large amount of oil which had caused prices to fall over the previous ten years. In July of 1990 Saddam threatened to use force to punish Kuwait for his claims of losses of income due to the overproduction of oil. The fifth reason for Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was provided by the Emir of Kuwait when he requested Arab League
mediation rather than face-to-face peace talks with Saddam

**TABLE 1**
KEY DATES OF ODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2 August</td>
<td>Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 August</td>
<td>UN Resolution 660 condemned invasion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 August</td>
<td>President Bush ordered U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>Iraq annexed Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>UN Resolution 662 declared annexation of Kuwait null and void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 August</td>
<td>Cairo Summit condemned Saddam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 August</td>
<td>First British air power arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 August</td>
<td>Western navies began blockade of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 August</td>
<td>UN authorized nations to enforce embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 November</td>
<td>UN Resolution 678 authorized force to expel Iraq after 15 January 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17 January - Coalition air campaign commenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 January</td>
<td>First Iraqi Scud attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 January</td>
<td>U.S. deploys Patriot missiles and crews to Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 January</td>
<td>Iraq began pouring oil into Persian Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 January</td>
<td>Iraqi aircraft relocated to Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 January</td>
<td>Iraq launched ground assault at Khafji</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 February</td>
<td>Coalition ground assault began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 February</td>
<td>Kuwait City liberated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 March</td>
<td>Cease fire talks held</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Watson and others, 1991:13)

The UN tried to avoid military operations to free Kuwait by enacting sanctions against Iraq. Only when it
became apparent that the sanctions were having no effect were military methods used to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait (George and others, 1991:18). Watson stated that "wars with limited military aims do not necessarily solve the root political problems that brought them about" (Watson, 1991: 214). This fact was in evidence during the Gulf War because Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq after the war ended. However, the major objective of the war, to liberate Kuwait, was achieved (Watson, 1991: 214).

Nadel stated that there were two major logistical reasons that the coalition forces were able to defeat Iraq. Technology was employed in the form of sea and air lift, and "computerized movement control" (Nadel, 1991:172). "Complete freedom of movement" in the air, sea, and on land was realized because there were no terrorist or conventional military actions taken against the coalition shipping (Nadel, 1991:172-173).

**Contracting Constraints**

Rapidly occurring military contingency situations present the Department of Defense with the problem of transforming from a peacetime force to one mobilizing for a conflict that has the potential to quickly drain both weapon and support stockpiles (Polsky, 1988:38). Contracting under a time restriction to replace those stockpiles and to support units in theater is complicated by the rules imposed by both Congress and the military. "At last count there
were more than 30,000 pages of procurement regulations scattered in the federal code" (Polsky, 1988:39). There is no single plan to waive all restrictions during an emergency, but most laws contain provisions that give the Secretary of Defense or the President the power to negate them in the case of an officially declared war or national emergency. Some of the requirements that can be waived in that event concern wages, small business set-asides, environmental, and safety policies (Polsky, 1988:40). Additionally, new laws can be enacted or old laws can be amended. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contains special provisions for contracting during emergencies (Wilson and Wilson, 1991:43).

Some of the products needed by the units in theater may be manufactured by businesses that may or may not be familiar with how the government does business. The increase in government contracts to small businesses during Desert Shield was well received by those businesses already familiar with the government contracting process (Nouvel, 1991:4). However, those businesses unfamiliar with government regulations presented a problem to contracting officers who had to teach new vendors the basics in a short period of time (Polsky, 1988: 40-41).

Mr Berteau, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics, gave in his speech to Congress some examples of the expansion of existing production and the creation of production in response to new requirements
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. At the beginning of Desert Shield there were only three producers of Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) supplying three million MREs per month, but by the end of Desert Storm there were 22 producers supplying 16 million MREs per month. Similarly, only three contractors producing 1.3 million tray pack meals per month existed at the beginning of Desert Storm. But five contractors were producing 4.7 million tray pack meals a month by the end of Desert Storm. Prior to Desert Shield the two manufacturers of injectors for atropine, a nerve agent antidote, were producing 60,000 units per month. By the end of the conflict they were producing 717,000 units per month. There were no producers of desert boots at the beginning of Desert Shield, but 60 days later there were four contractors producing 136,000 desert boots per month (Correll and Nash, 1991:54).

The Rapid Response Process

The Air Force enhanced CONUS contracting on 28 September 1990, when General Loh, the Air Force vice-commander, authorized the Rapid Response Process (RRP) for acquisitions needed for Operation Desert Shield. The purpose of this new process was to streamline the existing weapon acquisition process while still considering "cost, reliability, operability, supportability and training" issues (HQ USAF/CV, 1990:3). General Loh stressed the fact that the RRP was not a replacement for the existing
requirements validation and acquisition processes, but was initiated for "expediting the existing process to be more responsive in support of Desert Shield" (HQ USAF/CV, 1990:4). The RRP begins with the receipt of a Combat Mission Needs Statement (C-MNS) from a deployed unit. The C-MNS were to be written only in direct support of ODS and only for needs that could be fulfilled within six months. The guidance for consideration was equipment in the "final stages of development, early pilot production, or available off the shelf" (HQ USAF/CV, 1990:1-4). Figure 1 shows the cumulative timeline of the RRP in diagram form. A Special Action Team (SAT) prepared a feasibility assessment within four days of the receipt of the C-MNS. Within five days from the feasibility assessment the SAT briefed the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) who recommended that the program be considered an RRP program. If the GOSC approved, the Program Management Directive (PMD) was issued the next day (Dalrymple, 1991:2-3). Note that an approved project would receive its PMD no later than 16 days from the receipt of the C-MNS. This compares to the year or more for normal operations (Dalrymple, 1991:3).

This information on the RRP originated from unpublished sources. No other information was found on CONUS contracting as defined by this thesis. This fact reinforces the need for the research study done for this thesis.
Figure 1. Desert Shield RRP Requirements Process
(HQ USAF/CV, 1990: Attachment)
Contingency Contracting

Contracting officers deployed with the units they support may encounter other problems unique to their situations. Bell stated in his article "Contingency Contracting in the Low-Intensity Conflict Environment" that even in a contingency all procurement actions must adhere to the FAR. He also notes that most contracting officers are deployed alone with their units, with no administrative assistants. This lack of assistance is particularly difficult because the FAR demands full documentation for all contracting actions (Bell, 1990:74).

Because the contracting officer is responsible for seeking vendors who are able to supply the needed goods and services, the contracting officer often must spend a great deal of time away from the unit attempting to locate those vendors (Bell, 1990:74; Wilson and Wilson, 1991:43). Montero supported this fact when he noted that during the eight months they were deployed to the Gulf War, he and the other contracting officer in his unit logged over 30,000 kilometers on their vehicle (Montero, 1991:14). The Government Services Officer at the American Embassy of the host country can sometimes assist in the process of locating potential vendors (Bell, 1990:76).

Sometimes deployed contracting officers have little experience in government contracting. Bell stated that most of the Army's contracting officers deployed to Honduras had no previous contracting experience but were given a basic
contracting course immediately prior to their deployment. Byther noted that the Army Logistics Management Course given to contracting officers prepares the students for contracting in a "fixed and stable environment." Contingency contracting was not mentioned in the course. Byther also noted that little hands on experience was given, and not enough emphasis was placed on the subject of small purchases (Byther, 1991b:19). Montero had several recommendations for training contracting officers for contingencies that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter (Montero, 1991:11-13).

Bell also stated that there had been no foreign language training for those new contracting officers (Bell, 1990:74-75). The lack of foreign language training can create risks because, while the FAR states that the English language meaning of contract terms translated into another language is the correct meaning, a contracting officer without language training does not know positively that the foreign vendor understands the contract correctly. Wilson and Wilson also stated the need for contracting officers with language capabilities or interpreters for deployed contracting officers (Wilson and Wilson, 1991:43). While a language difference can be a barrier to effective communication, Montero stated that the language issue was not a problem during ODS because most of the local contractors in Saudi Arabia spoke English (Montero, 1991:13). When dealing with those Saudi Arabian businessmen
who did not speak English, the contracting officers were successful in receiving required supplies by drawing pictures or looking through the shop until they found what was needed (Montero, 1992). Almas and others expressed concern over language problems because the businessmen that they dealt with did not read the contracts, and signed them only because they had to. The issue of having competent parties in order for a contract to be legally binding could have arisen if the contracts were not performed properly (Almas and others, 1992:24).

Cultural differences concerning bidding and negotiation of contracts can also be problems for contracting officers. In some countries bribery to get U.S. government contracts is common (Bell, 1990:77). Byther states in his article, "Desert Shield Contingency Contracting," that the Saudi vendors were more concerned with the payment provisions than any other part of the contract (Byther, 1991a:25). It is common practice in Saudi Arabia to pay for the whole contract period whether it is completed or not. Therefore, those businessmen who had contracts terminated for the convenience of the government at the end of the war took offense and were difficult to negotiate with (Almas and others, 1992:26).

Contracting officers in ODS achieved the greatest success when using the cash-and-carry method of contracting, in which cash was paid on the spot and the equipment carried away immediately. Montero stated that when asked by higher
headquarters if he needed more checks for local purchases he replied that more cash would be preferred instead (Montero, 1992).

Contracting officers can have problems with the purchase requests they receive from the units they serve. Many purchase requests were "incomplete, nonspecific, poorly written," and some did not include delivery information (Byther, 1991a:25). During ODS, communication lines were not always available, a fact which required contracting officers who did not understand what was wanted to wait until someone from the requesting unit arrived in person to check on the order status before proceeding with the procurement (Byther, 1991b:15).

Byther noted that because the U.S. dollar is worth less overseas recently, the contracting officers' workload was higher than it should have been (Byther, 1991a:23). Unit ordering officers could purchase supplies other than personal comfort items and automatic data processing equipment (ADPE), up to $2,500 without involving a contracting officer (Byther, 1991b:10). The limit on those purchases made by the unit ordering officer meant that the contracting officer had to write contracts for any order that exceeded the authorized amount. Increasing the limit would lower the number of contracts contracting officers would have to write (Byther, 1991a:23, 25). The dollar threshold for use of the Standard Form (SF) 44 for small purchases was increased from $25,000 to $100,000 for
contracting officers overseas during ODS. Because of the volume of supplies and services needed, this measure was very helpful. Unfortunately, the higher dollar authorization was withdrawn shortly before the beginning of the ground war (Byther, 1991b:2; Johnson, 1991:13).

A problem specific to Operation Desert Shield occurred on November 1, 1990, when the Saudi Arabian government decided to pay for the food, water, facilities, fuel, and transportation of all of the troops stationed in that country. The contracting officers had to transfer all contracts for those goods and services mentioned to the Saudi Arabian government, a process that meant that all of the contracts had to be renegotiated (Griswold, 1991:79). This transfer also led to delays in paying the contractors, a fact which later made some of them hesitate to do business with contracting officers. Some contractors attempted to cancel their contracts because they were not being paid (Montero, 1991:9). Recent contact with some of the businessmen who had contracts transferred to the Saudi Arabian government showed that they have not been paid as of this writing (Montero, 1992).

**Contingency Contracting Recommendations**

The lessons learned and after action reports received from contracting officers who had been deployed to the Middle East during ODS contained many recommendations to facilitate contracting in a contingency environment in the
future. These recommendations exist in two major categories: contracting recommendations and training recommendations.

**Contracting Recommendations.** Several recommendations for improving contingency contracting operations in the future were made by contracting officers who were deployed to ODS. An Air Force Institute of Technology graduate student whose thesis was on contingency contracting also made recommendations. These recommendations concern the contracting chain, contracting officer needs, requirements generation, finance considerations, transportation, waivers to regulations, and other general topics.

Mason's 1988 thesis recommended that Air Force Regulation 70-7, Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program, be rewritten (Mason, 1988:34). The updated document was in draft form at the time of this writing. The draft included changes that incorporate many of the recommendations discussed below (Department of the Air Force, 1992:1-33). It was not known if any other DOD agencies reviewed their contingency contracting regulations as the result of ODS lessons learned.

**Contracting Chain.** An important area of concern was the fact that contracting officers and their staffs received "little guidance about whom they were to support" (Hagel, 1992:8). Byther suggests that deployed contracting officers should be assigned to work for contracting support organizations (Byther, 1991b:26). Separation from the
direct chain of command of the units they serve would alleviate pressures on contracting officers to perform activities that are not properly performed by a contracting officer, such as developing or seeking approval for requirements. Also, the pressures to expedite orders for particular units or to meet unrealistic deadlines would be diminished (Byther, 1991b:13-14).

Contracting officers should be deployed with the advanced party in order to begin work immediately on the major base service and supply contracts before the arrival of the rest of the unit (Hagel, 1992:8; Montero, 1991:5). Logistics and services personnel should also be part of the advance party (Montero, 1991:8). Acquisition corps offices require their own comptroller and staff, who should also be deployed with the advance party (Byther, 1991b:28).

Byther suggested that unit ordering officers should be limited to one per battalion during the deployment and operations phase of a contingency. During redeployment only one unit ordering officer would be needed per brigade (Byther, 1991b:23).

**Contracting Officer Needs.** Separate copies of all reference materials that would be needed for deployed contracting officers should be kept in a special storage container ready to be shipped with the deploying unit (Byther, 1991b:20). This duplication of material would mean that the contracting officers at both the home units and the
deployed units would have all references necessary to perform their jobs (Byther, 1991b:7).

Contracting officers should be equipped with a computer and have access to a photocopier and a facsimile machine (Johnson, 1991:6). Other office equipment such as desks and typewriters also need to be included in deployment packages (Montero, 1991:7). Because contingency contracting officers spend a lot of time away from the office, some sort of portable communication line is needed. Pagers, hand held radios, portable telephones, or citizens band radios were suggested (Montero, 1991:8). Because contracting officers often buy items that they take with them, they need to have access to a vehicle with substantial cargo space (Montero, 1991:10).

The planning and distribution of photocopy machines among deployed units should be firmly established. Machines should be purchased rather than leased, and the type of machine received should depend on the anticipated usage. Generally, simpler machines should be used whenever possible. Only units that have a specific need for large quantities of copying in climate controlled conditions need the more technologically advanced copiers (Byther, 1991b:27).

Requirements Generation. There appears to be a definite need for requirements to be consolidated among units before writing contracts for individual units (Byther, 1991b:24; Johnson, 1991:10). The consolidation step would
preclude duplication of orders sent by units through different channels in an effort to get materials as quickly as possible (Johnson, 1991:10-11), as well as duplication of orders sent by different units (Byther, 1991b:11). An additional benefit of the consolidation process would be that requirements could be more easily forecasted (Byther, 1991b:24).

Procedures should be developed to permit the deployed contracting officers to pass along requirements to contracting officers within the CONUS for supplies that are not available within the theater (Byther, 1991b:30; Johnson, 1991:17).

Requisition forms need to be modified to include the Contracting Officers Representative (COR) in the "point of contact for further information" section. This change would be beneficial in several ways. It would insure the equipment would be delivered to the proper unit and that the proper maintenance of the equipment be performed. It would also insure that payment would be made only for those services performed or equipment received. Also, this change would minimize abuse and neglect of equipment (Almas and others, 1992:28; Byther, 1991b:25-26).

Finance Considerations. Several recommendations were made regarding the financial aspects of contingency contracting. A separate fund cite should be assigned specifically to contingency operations (Byther, 1991b:28). Experienced finance personnel should be assigned to
acquisition sections for the duration of the deployment so that mission proficiency would be maintained (Byther, 1991b:28). Class A paying agents should be used in contingency operations so that contracting officers do not have to transfer funds (Byther, 1991b:28-29).

**Transportation.** Transportation motor pools of rental or leased vehicles with specified areas of responsibilities should be established during contingency operations overseas. This method would require a minimum of contracts to be written (Byther, 1991b:29). The motor pool would ensure the proper care of the vehicles by conducting inspections at check-out and turn-in. Unit commanders should be held accountable for leased vehicles just as if they were equipment on property books (Almas and others, 1992:28).

**Waivers to Regulations.** The Judge Advocate General office and contracting officers should prepare a list of FAR deviations that would be useful and/or required for contingency contracting operations (Byther, 1991b:21; Johnson, 1991:16). Some of these deviations include increasing the current limit of $2,500 for the unit ordering officer and allowing negotiated acquisitions without completing the Business Clearance Memorandum (BCM) (Byther, 1991b:21). The authority to ratify unauthorized commitments should be delegated from the Head of Contracting Activity to a senior officer in the deployment area (Byther, 1991b:21, Mason, 1988:33-34). The threshold for small purchases of
$25,000 should be permanently raised for contingency operations (Byther, 1991b:21; Johnson, 1991:13; Mason, 1988:34).


Determination of responsibility criteria should be modified during contingencies to include the following conditions. First, supplies must be in stock in the country of purchase. Second, if not available, positive proof of the contractor's ability to deliver must be made. Third, equipment to be leased must be available for inspection before responsibility is determined. Once the equipment is inspected, that same equipment must be provided (Byther, 1991b:22; Johnson, 1991:16).

Additional Recommendations. Other contingency contracting recommendations were made that do not fit easily into any of the previously discussed areas. Because
Automatic Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) acquisitions are complicated, they should be assigned to a contracting officer with previous experience (Byther, 1991b:26). The leasing of equipment to support the battlefield should be the responsibility of United States contracting officers, not the host nation (Byther, 1991b:33). Laundry service planning should be accomplished before units deploy overseas. The Contracting Officer Representative should be responsible for the smooth function of the laundry service contract so that the contracting officer would be free to deal with other issues (Byther, 1991b:27).

Training Recommendations. Johnson suggested that the unit exercises held during peacetime should include contracting support to facilitate knowledge of procedures and foster relationships among participants (Johnson, 1991:9). Other recommendations for training were made for contracting officers as well as other individuals in related positions, such as Unit Ordering Officers, Contracting Officer Representatives, contract attorneys, and the users in the field.

Contracting Officers. Montero gave several recommendations for training contracting officers who will be deployed with units. Exposure to combat base organization and operations is necessary for contracting officers to have an understanding of the variety of supplies that would be needed during a contingency. Some general topics that need to be covered are anti-terrorism
techniques, security practices, and driving in foreign countries. Special contracting subjects that should be covered during training for contingency contracting are overseas acquisition procedures, contracting during a conflict, local purchasing, alternative methods of contracting, and the economic variation provision for armed conflict. He suggested that attention be given to base level mess service contracts, especially the following topics: medical inspection clauses, menu planning, food quality, approved sources listings, contract employees, and payment methodology. Another important area for training would be that of base closure at the end of the contingency. Information regarding records collection, final reports, termination of contracts, and disposition of assets needs particular emphasis (Montero, 1991:11-13).

Unit Ordering Officers. Byther states that unit ordering officers deployed for a military contingency need more familiarity "with the limits of their appointment." He suggests that a training program be initiated at the home base (Byther, 1991b:23). Some topics that should be covered in such training should be limitations on types of items that can be ordered, funding authorization, requirements consolidation, and record keeping during both normal operations and emergencies (Byther, 1991b:10,11,24). Johnson suggests that battalion-level and above commanders receive this training as well as the actual unit ordering officers (Johnson, 1991:13).
Contracting Officer Representatives. Byther suggested that Contracting Officer Representatives need training in their responsibilities. They need the same experiences as those discussed above for the unit ordering officers (Byther, 1991b:29-30).

Contract Attorneys. Contract attorneys deployed to contingencies need to know the rules and procedures involved in negotiating contracts. They also need experience evaluating proposals and using award criteria. Byther stressed that the attorneys need these experiences at their home bases before departure to support a contingency (Byther, 1991b:24).

Users. All of the individuals in deployed units who complete requisition forms for supplies and services must be trained in the contracting process and their roles in the acquisition of the units' needs. These individuals must have training in fully and properly completing the required forms to insure that the requested item will be described exactly. Detailed descriptions are especially important for non-standard items (Byther, 1991b:26-27).

Summary

Contracting for the support of units deployed to a theater of conflict is prolonged due to the myriad of regulations on the subject. There are provisions to waive some of these laws and regulations, but only in the event of a declared war or national emergency. Expanding the
production of current vendors is simpler than teaching new vendors the way the government contracting business works so that they can effectively participate in production for a contingency. The examples Mr. Berteau gave Congress demonstrate the ability of the defense industrial complex to increase productivity to support a military contingency.

The Air Force used the RRP to enhance the CONUS based contracting in order to quickly deploy weapon systems to ODS. The RRP reduced the time for approval of a PMD to only 16 days for ODS programs.

Contracting officers who deploy with the units they support can face a variety of problems. Some of these problems are lack of administrative assistance, lack of contracting experience, language and/or cultural barriers, poorly written requests for materials from the units, and the low dollar limit on purchases by unit ordering officers.

The fact that no published literature on CONUS contracting during a contingency was found reinforces the need for the research study done for this thesis and any other studies that may follow.

Chapter III discusses the methodology used to acquire the data for the study of the CONUS contracting that occurred during ODS.
III. Methodology

Introduction

This chapter contains a review of the methods used by the researchers to study the Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (ODS) Continental United States (CONUS) based contracting. As discussed in Chapter II, a shortage of published work existed on the subject of the contracting efforts performed in the CONUS to support military contingencies. Therefore, this study begins a unique stream of research inquiry.

The two-stage research design is considered to be an efficient method of selecting the pertinent areas of study as well as evaluating those factors intensely (Emory and Cooper, 1991:148). A two-stage research design consists of an exploratory phase, where the focus of research is defined, and then a formal phase, where the research focus is investigated. In order to facilitate a two-stage design which considered the factors surrounding the ODS CONUS rapid response contracting effort, several research design perspectives were considered.

From a research perspective this was an ex post facto, after the fact, study (Emory and Cooper, 1991:141,158). Considering the two-stage process, the first stage was in the form of exploratory research while the second stage was formal and best represented by the term "descriptive
In descriptive research, the focus of the research is to discover the basic parameters of a problem best summarized by the who, what, when, where, and how of the problem (Emory and Cooper, 1991:148). The time dimension of this study was cross-sectional in nature. A laboratory environment was not available to depict the ODS contracting events, requiring the use of a field research setting (Emory and Cooper, 1991:139). The two-stage approach also allowed limited objectives to be set for the first stage; the exploratory stage (Emory and Cooper, 1991:145,147). The initial stage of research was conducted by the use of focus groups. The focus groups gave a general assessment of ODS CONUS contracting, and helped to refine the investigative questions.

The second stage of the two-stage approach was the formal phase, in which the Delphi technique was determined to be appropriate (Emory and Cooper, 1991:149). The data was gathered by using a structured mail questionnaire utilizing the Total Design Method (TDM) (Dillman, 1978: 21). The data received from the questionnaires was then compiled in order to ascertain whether a consensus of opinion occurred among the study participants with respect to the investigative questions (Jones, 1975:160).

Research Design

The unique nature of this research in relation to previously published work in the acquisition contracting
field necessitated exploratory research in order to formulate the investigative questions and develop the formal research instrument (Emory and Cooper, 1991:144). Several critical issues pertaining to the research design needed resolution. First, the research design needed to consider many pertinent research considerations such as clarifying the degree to which the research problem had been "crystallized", the methods of data collection, the purpose of the study, the time dimension, the topical scope, and the overall research environment (Emory and Cooper, 1991:139). The two-stage approach to research design assisted in resolving the above considerations by providing an approach to more clearly define the research problem and develop an appropriate research design. In the first phase, exploration about the research problem can be conducted as a preliminary study of limited scope. The formal stage of the two-stage approach begins at the point where the exploratory research ends and the investigative questions are crystallized (Emory and Cooper, 1991:147-148).

Because the Delphi technique uses a relatively small sample when compared to other forms of research, the total response rate is important (Sackman, 1974:25). The TDM approach to mail questionnaire surveys assisted in receiving a higher total response rate (Dillman, 1978:27). The decision to use a mail survey was logical when the relative distances between the formal study participants and the costs involved in attempting to bring them together were

The formal stage questionnaire was divided into two rounds. The first round solicited answers to the measurement questions and the second round collected the respondent's relative agreement after the examination of other participant responses. Also, the relative strength of respondent concurrence was considered during analysis (Brown, 1968:3-6; Dalkey, 1967:3).

**Use of Focus Groups**

In the exploratory phase of the research effort, the exploration serves to more clearly define the study area, learn the basic parameters of the problem, and examine the practicality of conducting the research as a whole (Emory and Cooper, 1991:144-145). One means for conducting exploratory research is through the use of focus groups (Emory and Cooper, 1991:147).

Focus groups are a form of qualitative research where groups of people are assembled and questioned. The value of the technique relies upon the interaction within the group (Morgan, 1988:9). Focus groups in and of themselves, are useful either as a self-contained means of collecting data or as a supplement to both quantitative and qualitative methods (Morgan, 1988:9-10). The strength of the focus group is "the explicit use of group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the
interaction found in a group" (Morgan, 1988:12). The main advantage of focus groups is the "opportunity to observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in a limited period of time" (Morgan, 1988:14). A possible disadvantage of focus groups is that there is some measure of control induced by the presence of the interviewer (Morgan, 1988:16). In the use of focus groups, the interviewer allows the group discussion and interaction to continue as long as the group remains within fairly broad bounds of the focus of research (Emory and Cooper, 1991:352).

The focus group sample used during the exploratory stage of this research effort consisted of interviewing people from a variety of organizations. Organizational access was a key ingredient to the success of this research. The questionnaire used for collecting the data in the formal stage of the research was derived from the initial investigative questions and modified from the information received in the focus group meetings. These meetings were held with contracting officers from the following organizations: Tank-Automotive Command, Army Material Command, Detroit, MI; Aeronautical Systems Division/YHK, Air Force Systems Command, Eglin AFB, FL; Naval Air Systems Command, Washington DC; and the Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Philadelphia, PA.

The focus group meetings were conducted with the hosting organization and consisted of inviting individuals who were heavily involved in supporting ODS from several
functional or project areas to describe their actions during ODS. The meetings were unstructured in order to allow the persons being interviewed to enjoy the most open atmosphere possible. The persons being interviewed were given the fewest possible prompts to promote discussion. The persons to be interviewed were briefed in the area of the research topic and were given assurances of total anonymity and non-attribution of their responses. The meetings were specifically designed to allow the persons and organizations being interviewed to impart their ODS CONUS contracting experiences without being led to answers by the interviewers. The information presented at the meetings assisted the researchers to focus the research to significant ODS issues. This information also assisted in tailoring the questionnaire items to reflect the issues of interest to both the researchers and the contracting organizations. The meetings provided valuable insight into the work in support of ODS, as well as the basis for the questionnaire design. Investigative questions and measurement questions were refined as a result of the discussions that occurred during focus group meetings.

Use of Personal Interviews

Additional assistance in the development of the questionnaire was received by conducting individual interviews with contracting personnel who were attending Professional Continuing Education courses at the Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. These interviews were held in a manner similar to the focus groups with the individuals relaying their experiences during ODS in an informal, open-ended question format type setting. The interviewers explicitly avoided a quiz or cross-examination environment in order to elicit the free flow of the respondent's opinions, views, and experiences (Interviewer's Manual, 1976:11).

Use of the Delphi Method

The Delphi method of research study is a qualitative analysis technique which uses the strengths of personal experience and opinion of a group of recognized experts to formulate or synthesize a knowledge base about an item of interest. This knowledge base is validated to some degree by having these experts independently review all the ideas which were generated and mark their level of agreement or disagreement with those ideas in order to build a consensus of opinion about the particular item of interest (Brown, 1968:3; Dalkey, 1967:4; Dalkey, 1969:16; Emory and Cooper, 1991:76-77; Sackman, 1974:3-7; Scheibe and others, 1976:277). This information gathering is generally conducted through the use of a mail questionnaire. The information is collected in the first round where the answers to the measurement questions are compiled. The compilation of answers is submitted to the respondents in round two where they may review all of the answers and
modify their response. After round two, the answers are statistically evaluated in order to ascertain the existence of a consensus (Dalkey, 1969:16; Farquar, 1989:36; Sackman, 1974:7). The Delphi technique eliminates committee activity altogether, thus further reducing the influence of certain psychological factors, such as specious persuasion, the unwillingness to abandon publicly expressed opinions, and the bandwagon effect of majority opinion. This technique replaces direct debate by a carefully designed program of sequential individual interrogations (best conducted by questionnaires) interspersed with information and opinion feedback derived from computed consensus from earlier parts of the program... Both the inquiry into the reasons and subsequent feedback of the reasons adduced by others may serve to stimulate the experts into taking into due account considerations they might have neglected, and to give due weight to factors they were inclined to dismiss as unimportant on first thought. (Helmer and Rescher, 1960:3)

The strengths attributed to the Delphi technique, a qualitative research tool, can be purposefully applied to assist in the examination of a specific problem or area of interest where no historical empirical data exists (Dalkey, 1969:1-3; Emory and Cooper, 1991:76; Farquar, 1989:36; Sackman, 1974:3). Therefore, the Delphi seemed appropriate for this research. The strengths of the Delphi Technique include: defining ill-defined or ambiguous problems which are not readily susceptible to quantitative research methods; working toward problem evaluation and problem solving through the use of an empirical knowledge base; and encouraging free expression of opinion by the study participants through use of anonymity (Brown, 1968:2-3;
Reliance on a statistical quantitative approach to explain non-quantifiable concerns does not allow for explanatory or definitive answers to questions such as why certain actions and techniques were used instead of others (Brown, 1968:3; Dalkey, 1969:16; Emory and Cooper, 1991:76; Sackman, 1974:4). Consequently, this technique seems appropriate for this research due to the following reasons: the historical nature of this research, a lack of a capability to associate statistical relationships between ODS events and potential answers, and an inability of obtaining a single truly objective observer who could correctly relate ODS events to the contracting problems and solutions (Brown, 1968:2-4; Dalkey, 1967:2,9; Dalkey, 1969:1-6; Sackman, 1974:6-7). For the above reasons, the Delphi Technique was the method of choice for the formal phase of research (Dalkey, 1967:9; Farquar, 1989:36; Sackman, 1974:3).

Discussion of Investigative Questions

The information needed to understand what contracting actions took place during ODS was obtained by answering the investigative questions listed in Chapter I (Emory and Cooper, 1991:78). The investigative questions were derived by associating major contracting activities to observed ODS contracting concerns as elicited in the literature review,
Chapter II. These associations were then divided into major research categories as investigative questions. The investigative questions were the basis of the measurement questions, the actual questions asked of the respondents in the questionnaire. In order to fully answer each investigative question, a number of measurement questions were developed. Answers to the measurement questions provided the data to be evaluated. This data was then used to assess the investigative questions (Emory and Cooper, 1991:78,79).

Measurement questions that addressed specific investigative questions were structured to allow the respondents to make suggestions on improving the process of rapidly responding to a military contingency. This open-ended method of questioning allowed for a more informed understanding when a full expression of the respondent's opinion is desired (Interviewer's Manual, 1976:19). The use of open-ended measurement questions also assisted in defining potential solutions to existing problems.

Open-ended questions ... are most often employed when the researcher cannot anticipate the various ways in which people are likely to respond to a question. They are used to stimulate free thought, solicit suggestions, probe people's memories, and clarify positions. Further, they give respondents a chance to vent frustrations and state strong opinions. (Dillman, 1978:87)

During the exploratory stage of the research effort, focus groups were used to refine the investigative questions and direct the data collection effort. This served as an
internal review to assess the appropriateness or content validity of the specific investigative questions (Mitroff and Turoff, 1975:22). The investigative questions are repeated below for easier reference.

Investigative Questions. In order to understand what CONUS contracting actions occurred during ODS the investigative questions below required consideration.

Investigative Question 1. What items were procured and what methods were used by the CONUS based contracting professionals to support ODS?

The information gained in assessing this question was to be used to obtain an appreciation of the types and disposition of supplies and services that were procured for the ODS efforts, and ascertain when and how the contracting professionals began working on ODS specific actions. This information defined the parameters for this research study by identifying which items were procured, how they were procured, and for what period of time they were procured.

Investigative Question 2. How were new sources developed in CONUS based contracting organizations to support ODS?

This investigative question elicited information about any new sources of supplies and services that were developed during ODS. Information about the use of commercial items and unsolicited proposals was also requested.
Investigative Question 3. What methods did the CONUS based contracting organizations use to expedite existing contracts to support ODS?

This question specifically addressed the methods used to expedite the delivery of items procured on contracts that already existed when ODS began. Observations about the benefits of the Defense Priorities Allocation System (DPAS) were also requested.

Investigative Question 4. What were relations like with industry during ODS?

This investigative question assisted in determining how the defense industry reacted to ODS. The question also allowed respondents to discuss whether or not the relationships that were encountered during ODS were significantly different from the every day relationships previously experienced.

Investigative Question 5. What regulations could have been relaxed or waived during ODS to make CONUS based contracting more simple?

This information allowed insight into the complex set of rules which govern the DOD procurement process. The primary purpose of this investigative question was to determine which, if any, regulations and procedures had a negative effect on the contracting professional’s ability to rapidly procure services and supplies needed in a contingency. Answers to this question also provided
information on any inspection findings that were directly attributed to ODS procurements.

**Investigative Question 6.** How did CONUS based contracting organizations receive requirements from the field during ODS?

This investigative question inquired into the methods in which ODS requirements were developed and transmitted to the procuring agencies in the CONUS. This question aided in determining how communications were used during ODS and how the contracting agencies located in the CONUS communicated with their contractors and vendors.

**Investigative Question 7.** What type of training was held for CONUS based contracting professionals to help them support ODS?

This investigative question examined whether any training was found to be particularly useful by contracting professionals. This examination could lead to a reevaluation of the types and amounts of training that is received by contracting professionals.

**Investigative Question 8.** What organizational structures were used by CONUS based contracting organizations during ODS?

This question examined the organizational structures used by the contracting agencies. Specifically, the use of special teams for procurement problems, impacts on workload, and the differences in level of effort given by individuals
at differing levels of the same contracting organization were explored.

Investigative Question 9. What challenges were encountered by CONUS based contracting professionals during and after ODS?

This investigative question allowed the respondents to relate specific lessons learned and possible methods of remedy. The question was divided into two parts: challenges during ODS, and challenges after ODS.

Investigative Question 10. What recommendations do CONUS based contracting professionals have for improving the CONUS contracting process in support of future military contingencies?

This final investigative question elicited further recommendations from the respondents for each of the areas within each investigative question. The recommendations of each respondent were the foundation upon which the Delphi is based: the opinion of experts (Dalkey, 1967:4; Brown, 1968:3; Dalkey, 1969:16; Sackman, 1974:3-7; Emory and Cooper, 1991:76-77; Scheibe, and others, 1976:277). Recommendations from the contracting professionals surveyed served as the basis for determining the consensus of opinion with respect to the investigative questions.

Description of the Population

The population of interest for a research effort included all entities which meet the defined characteristics
of the focus of the study (Emory and Cooper:191, 246). The focus of this study was to define the actions and efforts of CONUS contracting personnel during the ODS military contingency. Within the DOD, a sizable number of organizations whose duties were to contract for equipment, supplies and services existed. In order to perform a complete study of CONUS contracting in support of ODS, the population was defined to be those organizations that contracted for equipment, supplies, and services which specifically supported the ODS military contingency. Consequently, the relevant population under study consisted of those organizations and people located within the U.S. that supported the units deployed for ODS.

Description of the Research Sample

The research sample is a group of subjects drawn from the research population that can be used to represent the research population (Emory and Cooper, 1991:242). The sample was selected from a discrete group of contracting individuals who were drawn from the research population. In this case, the research sample consisted of a judgement sample rather than a random sample. The sample selection was considered judgmental for several reasons. First, the relevant population from which to draw the sample was limited, consisting solely of contracting personnel who acquired products for ODS. Secondly, of the contracting professionals who participated in ODS CONUS contracting
efforts, several members from each service or DOD agency, and from several organizational levels of contracting were desired in order to provide a representative sample of the population (Brown, 1968:3,4; Dalkey, 1967:2; Dalkey, 1969:76-78; Emory and Cooper, 1991:82,275-277).

Because an overall picture of DOD CONUS contracting was desired, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DOD agencies were sampled. The desire to address the inter-departmental and intra-departmental aspects of the investigative questions also made such a broad based selection necessary. The questionnaire respondents included individuals in contracting positions in CONUS buying activities, individuals in staff positions at headquarters, and some individuals in program office positions. The matrix shown in Table 2 was used to properly stratify the coverage of the contracting professionals who participated in this study. Once the matrix was filled with the levels of the selected respondents, the representativeness of the research sample could be assessed. The table below indicates the number of individuals at each level in each organization who were expected to respond to the questionnaire.

**Time Frame of the Research Focus**

The time dimension for this study was cross-sectional in nature. In the cross-sectional study, the members of the sample group of experts were all contacted and their data
evaluated at only one period in time (Emory and Cooper, 1991:141).

### TABLE 2
**PROSPECTIVE RESPONDENT MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Functional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instrument Development**

**Questionnaire Development.** The measurement questions for the questionnaire were derived from the investigative questions. The information gained from the focus groups helped refine the investigative and measurement questions. The Total Design Method was used to develop the mail questionnaire (Dillman, 1978:12).

Each of the measurement questions was written to assist the respondent in formulating a clear and concise answer. The wording of the questions were specifically chosen to take concerns of uniform understanding, abbreviations and phrases, vagueness, too much precision, bias, and objectivity into account (Dillman, 1978:97-105; Emory and Cooper, 1991:361-368).

Once the measurement questions were developed, the basic structure of the questionnaire was considered. Again,
multiple considerations needed evaluation. The basic questionnaire constraints concerning size and complexity were evaluated as well as question ordering and hierarchy, choice of the first question, page formulation, directions for use of the questionnaire, and the use of transitions (Dillman, 1978:120-146; Emory and Cooper, 1991:370; Fowler, 1984:45-59).

After the questionnaire was finalized, cover letters were written to assist the respondents in gaining an appreciation of the research importance and to provide them with a sense of respect for their own expertise. Appendix F contains examples of the cover letters. Several possible concerns the respondents could have regarding non-attribution and the use of the responses were contemplated and discussed in the cover letters (Dillman, 1978:165-171).

**Pretest.** The questionnaire was pretested by sending the questionnaire to a number of individuals in a wide variety of contracting organizations that used CONUS contracting during ODS. These organizations were representative of the organizations that would be asked to participate in the formal phase of the study. The recommended changes to the questionnaire, uncovered by the pretest participants, were incorporated into the final round one questionnaire. Content validity issues pertaining to the research subject coverage and the propriety of the measurement questions were considered resolved (Emory and Cooper, 1991:180-181; Mitroff and Turoff, 1975:22).
First Round Questionnaire. The information was collected by sending a written questionnaire to individuals in the sample organizations who were selected according to the sample guidelines, mentioned earlier. These individuals were involved in actually preparing and executing the contracts for the equipment, supplies, and services that supported the units deployed to the Middle East. Both open and closed ended questions were used so that respondents could elaborate on their answers to give a more complete response (Dillman, 1978:87).

Second Round Questionnaire. Information taken from the first round was compiled so that all of the respondents could analyze the total range of answers to each question. The participants reviewed not only their own, but all of the other participant’s answers as well. A rank ordered scale was then placed on the second round questionnaire for the respondents to select their relative agreement or disagreement with each response. The round two questionnaire was mailed to the same individuals as the round one questionnaire, including those who did not answer round one.

Analysis of Received Data

Analysis of the data from round one was specifically limited to gathering the range of responses and compiling the data into measurement question answers. This compiled round one data was then developed into a round two
questionnaire. The round two questionnaire was organized into two parts. The first part consisted of the consolidated answers of all the responses to the round one questionnaire. Because the first part was provided solely as background information for the round two questionnaire, no action was required. The second part consisted of answer sheets which were to be completed and returned to the researchers. The answer sheets were designed so that each of the recommendations made throughout the round one questionnaire appeared with a scale for respondents to mark their degree of agreement or disagreement to the recommendation. Additional space was provided for any comments to each recommendation.

The five point Likert scale used was suggested by Kerlinger for "agreement-disagreement" answers (Kerlinger, 1986:459-460). The point values assigned to each level of agreement to the recommendations were as follows: five points for strongly agree, four points for agree, three points for neutral, two points for disagree, and one point for strongly disagree. The mean answer for each recommendation was then calculated to determine the overall degree of agreement that the respondents showed. Means ranging from 5.00 to 3.51 indicated agreement; means ranging from 3.50 to 2.50 indicated neutrality; means ranging from 2.49 to 1.00 indicated disagreement. Consensus of agreement or disagreement was determined by calculating a standard
deviation for each recommendation. Standard deviations of less than 1.00 were determined to indicate a consensus of opinion. Appendix E contains all the statistical analysis for the round two questionnaire answers.

An additional analysis was made by comparing the personal interview and focus groups' results to the Delphi group's results. This comparison assessed whether any significant differences existed in the information provided between the questionnaire respondents and the other groups.

Summary

This research effort examined the actions taken by contracting personnel who may have attempted to shorten the total procurement acquisition lead time required to acquire equipment, supplies, and services in a contingency situation for which the normal contracting procurement actions may have risked the United States' national strategic goals. A two-stage research design approach was adopted which split the study into two definitive stages: an exploratory phase using focus groups, and a formal phase using the Delphi technique. Completion of the study was enhanced by the use of a questionnaire which was derived from the investigative questions and focus group methodology. The focus groups used open ended questions so that the respondents could elaborate on the methods they used to accomplish the goals of the rapid response contracting situation. The
questionnaire developed for the formal Delphi technique used both open and closed ended questions.

Upon collection of the round one Delphi data, the researchers consolidated the information and sent out a second round to allow the respondents to evaluate and rank the answers. When the round two information was received, the information was analyzed for consensus and similarities by agency affiliation and level in the organization. Lastly, the information derived from the focus groups and personal interviews was compared to the questionnaire information in order to assess the completeness of the study. In the next section, Chapter IV, the results of both the round one and round two questionnaires will be discussed.
IV. Results

Introduction

The discussion of the results of this study is divided into three main sections and a summary. The major sections are as follows: results of the round one questionnaire, comparisons to focus groups and interviews, and results of the round two questionnaire. Information on the response rates to the two questionnaires, and the demographics of the respondents will be discussed separately with the results of each round.

The results of the round one questionnaire are presented as they relate to the first nine investigative questions that were discussed previously in Chapters I and III. Answers to the last investigative question, which asks for recommendations, will be discussed with the results of the round two questionnaire. The respondents answers to the round one questionnaire are consolidated into similar groups, rather than discussed individually.

The comparison section includes only information revealed during the focus group meetings and personal interviews that differs from that revealed by the participants of the round one questionnaire. Five issues were discussed in the focus groups or interviews that were not disclosed by the round one questionnaire.
The results of the round two questionnaire consist of the respondents' agreement or disagreement with the recommendations made in the round one questionnaire. The results of the round two questionnaire are discussed by consolidating like recommendations, in the same way that the round one results were discussed. The statistical analysis of the respondents' agreement to each of the recommendations is included in Appendix E for further reference. The discussion of the results of the round two questionnaire also includes any additional comments that the respondents made to each of the recommendations.

Results of Round One

Of the 25 round one questionnaires that were mailed, 21 questionnaires were returned. One of these was returned without being completed, and one was returned later with the round two questionnaire. The questionnaire and the answers appear in Appendices A and B, respectively. The detailed demographic information has been excluded to assure the anonymity of the respondents as discussed in Chapter III. However, the matrix in Table 3 shows the round one respondents stratified by agency and organizational level. The counts in the table do not add up to the total of 21 respondents because some of the individuals did not provide the information on their organizational levels. Individuals from the following DOD agencies other than the military departments participated in the round one questionnaire:
Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Electronics Supply Center, Defense Commercial Communications Office, Defense Program Representative Office, and Defense Contract Management Command. The results of each of the questions in the round one questionnaire are grouped under the investigative question that they answer.

TABLE 3
ROUND ONE ACTUAL RESPONDENT MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>DOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Line Supervisor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Supervisory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Items, Methods, Time Period.* The first investigative question asked what items were procured and what methods were used by the CONUS based contracting professionals to support ODS. Questions 1 through 3, and 18 of the round one questionnaire asked specifically for that information. Questions 4 and 5 of the questionnaire asked for the beginning and end of the period in which ODS procurements were made. Question 26 asked about the lead time that was available between the beginning of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
ODS Supplies and Services. The following categories of supplies and services were obtained for ODS by the questionnaire respondents: spare parts (9 respondents), equipment (7), weapons or ammunition (5), communications (3), transport services (2), food (1), clothing (1), aircraft modifications and repair (1), and repair and/or diagnosis of equipment (1).

Where Used. Eighteen of the respondents indicated that the supplies or services obtained were used specifically in the area of operations. Four respondents reported purchases that were to remain in the U.S. as replacements for deployed items. One respondent replied that the items purchased were used for training in the US before deployment to the Gulf. Another respondent stated that the items were used as war reserve both in and out of the area of operations. One respondent reported that the supplies were used for the repair of engines at the depot. One of the respondents who purchased spare parts replied that they were used worldwide.

Disposition. While many of the items were consumables, (food, spare parts, weapons or ammunition, and communications), a number of the items (equipment, food, weapons or ammunition, spare parts, and communications) were to remain in the area of operations after the conflict ended. Many of these same items (clothing, equipment, spare parts, weapons or ammunition, and communications) were to be returned to the U.S. after the conflict ended.
When ODS Began. Operation Desert Shield began on 9 August 1990. Four respondents reported working on ODS related activities even before that date. Seven of the respondents began work to procure ODS supplies and services immediately. The other respondents reported working on ODS supplies beginning one to two months after the beginning of Operation Desert Shield.

After ODS Ended. Operation Desert Storm ended on 27 February 1991. Three of the respondents reported that they are still performing contracting work related to the operation. Other respondents reported that their work on Operation Desert Storm related purchases continued for several months after the end of the campaign. Several respondents stated that their work dropped back to normal levels within one month of the official end of the conflict.

Contracting Methods. Thirteen respondents reported that they accelerated delivery on existing contracts to meet ODS procurement needs. Fourteen respondents awarded new contracts; 12 respondents exercised options on existing contracts; 11 respondents awarded new orders under Basic Ordering Agreements (BOA's); ten respondents issued delivery orders on existing indefinite delivery contracts; nine respondents awarded new purchase orders. The "borrow - payback" system of taking delivery of spare parts from weapon system production lines was used by five respondents. Other individual respondents used the following contracting methods to support ODS procurements:
letter contracts, accelerating existing kit BOA orders, expanding existing orders, changing the location of retrofits, leases, deceleration on parts not required to allow assets/machinery to manufacture parts required, and UCA's.

The firm fixed price contract was used by 17 respondents for ODS procurements. Fixed price incentive firm and cost or cost sharing arrangements contracts were used by two respondents. Four respondents used cost plus fixed fee. Eight respondents used time and material contracts. Requirements and indefinite quantity contracts were used by three respondents. One respondent purchased parts and material under competitive bidding concepts.

Nine respondents used letter contracts, change orders, and other undefinitized contractual actions. BOA orders and sustaining engineering contracts were also used to procure materials for ODS.

Seventeen respondents reported that some of their contractors started work at their own risk (without a contract). Four of these respondents reported that verbal direction was given to start work and the paperwork followed.

Lead Time. Thirteen respondents reported that the four months between Desert Shield and Desert Storm were essential to procuring supplies for ODS. One respondent stated that because of budget cuts in the past the supply system "shelves were bare." The time period between Desert
Shield and Desert Storm allowed stocks to be accumulated. Another respondent reported writing contracts for aircraft modifications as early as June 1990 to support the increased demands for intelligence information. One respondent noted that "we were not adequately prepared, and next time we may not have the luxury of four to six months to get ready."

The fact that Desert Shield lasted four months before Desert Storm began allowed many of the respondents to procure items that they would not have had time to procure if hostilities had occurred suddenly. Only five of the respondents replied negatively to this question. Two of those respondents answered that four months was not enough time to do something substantial to the weapons that they procured unless the action was to accelerate an existing planned upgrade or correction.

**Sourcing New Buys.** The second investigative question asked how new sources were developed in CONUS based contracting organizations to support ODS. Questions 6 through 8 of the round one questionnaire asked about the use of source development, commercial items, and unsolicited proposals during ODS.

**Source Development.** Ten of the respondents reported that no source development was necessary for the supplies and services that they procured for ODS. Of those respondents who did have to develop sources, the items they needed were in the following categories: chemical defense ground and flight crew ensembles, food, battle damage repair
kits, air cleaner vacuums, commercial truck tractors and trailers, modifications of buses for medical transport, airlift, spare parts, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, and radios.

The respondents used various methods to develop the needed sources. Two respondents went sole source to the developers of required supplies. One respondent who acquired food sources went to the commissary and commercial supermarkets to read the labels of the products needed. The companies which had usable products received telephone calls inviting them to visit the contracting office for further information. One respondent reported that some of the parts for battle damage repair kits had not been previously procured as separate items. Samples of those items were obtained so that contracting personnel could question people in the local area to find manufacturing firms which could make the needed items.

In another instance a company contacted the contracting office to inform them that they had provided a particular unit to military bases in the past. Investigation uncovered another company willing to supply the same unit. A technical representative was sent to both companies to determine the best qualified producer, with price considered. The units were built, tested, and delivered to the Middle East in only six weeks.

Due to a shortage of heavy moving equipment one contracting office examined all the transportation companies
who had moved their equipment in the past to determine who would be able to provide transportation for that equipment during ODS. This method was also used to acquire air transportation. Similarly, the shortage of military trucks and spare parts led to searches for commercial equivalents. The various manufacturers were invited to brief their current commercial capabilities or how their current commercial capabilities could be modified to meet the military's need. Some respondents also checked for available stock from any DOD source. One respondent even checked with the Air Force's surplus and disposal site at Davis Monthan AFB, AZ, for the existence of some needed items. Other respondents advertised in the Commerce Business Daily, posted requirements in the procurement office used by vendors, requested potential sources from the directorate of technical operations, or used the competition advocate's office to acquire new sources of supply.

Use of Commercial Items. Four respondents did not procure any commercial items for use during ODS. Of those who did procure commercial items, the items were in the following categories: laser gun sights, food and hygiene items, tires, trucks, trailers, conversion packages, spare parts, CAP aircraft, GPS, communications services and equipment, and computers. One respondent reported that a contractor was paid to use spare laptop portable computers which he made to supplement the support equipment the Navy and USAF had already purchased.
Three of the respondents reported that during ODS was the first time they had procured these items at all. Five reported that it was the first time that they had procured the items commercially.

Many reasons were given for the purchase of commercial items. One respondent reported that the industrial mobilization base was not able to expand in time to meet requirements. Commercial tires were purchased because tire wear was extremely high due to the climate and loads carried in the Middle East. One respondent reported that although contracts had been signed recently for military vehicles, no vehicles were being produced. Therefore, the shortage of those particular types of vehicles had to be filled with commercial equivalents. Similarly, three other respondents replied that the military standard items were not readily available to support the mission, and there was no time to develop them.

Six respondents reported that no modifications were required to use the commercial items in ODS. Two respondents indicated that minor modifications were required. One respondent replied that not all the modifications needed were made due to the lack of time.

Seven of the respondents reported that the commercial items fully met the needs of the users during ODS. The commercial food items were preferred by the users due to brand name recognition. Two respondents reported that they were unable to use the commercial items. In one case, there
were quality problems that could not be resolved in time; however, other sources were available. In the other case, the items were simply unable to perform the job (bent axles on the trailers from extreme weights).

Only two respondents gave an unqualified "yes" to continuing to procure the commercial items in the future. Some of the qualifications to a positive answer were as follows: only when shortfalls occur, on a case-by-case basis, and when the quality problem is resolved. The negative responses to continuing the procurement of commercial items were based on the fact that the items used were acceptable because they "got by in the operating environment, but wouldn't work in all military environments." This description was aptly shortened by one respondent to "not ruggedized." One negative response was that there was "no known future requirement."

**Unsolicited Proposals.** Most of the respondents did not receive any unsolicited proposals from industry for ODS supplies and services. The items included in these proposals varied among the following: food, a vacuum system, recapping of tires, airlift, radios, GPS, and support services. Only one respondent replied that that organization received unsolicited proposals on a routine basis. The unsolicited proposals were reviewed and considered by most of the organizations receiving them and the items procured were used during ODS according to all
except one respondent. Modifications to the proposed items were required according to two respondents.

**Existing Contracts.** The third investigative question asked what methods the CONUS based contracting organizations used to expedite existing contracts to support ODS. Question 9 of the round one questionnaire asked about accelerating deliveries, and question 11 asked about the Defense Priorities Allocation System (DPAS).

**Accelerated Delivery.** Only three respondents replied that they did not take action to accelerate delivery on any existing contracts. Twelve other respondents accelerated delivery on such items as aircraft modifications, fuzes, spare parts, military trucks, refueling kits, and trailer hitches. Two respondents indicated accelerating delivery on all items that they normally procured. One respondent reported canceling the regularly planned maintenance in order to award 11 sole source contracts for accelerated delivery of maintenance. Another respondent’s organization activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to increase airlift capability.

Modifications were not required to accelerate delivery in only three cases. Nine respondents reported that modifications were required, and three of these said that the delivery schedule was modified. One respondent replied that inspections were accelerated and packaging specifications were waived in favor of "best commercial" practice. Another respondent stated that some contract
modifications were made to adjust the delivery schedules of items not accelerated as a trade-off. One respondent indicated that first article tests were waived in order to facilitate early delivery.

Nine respondents reported that there was an additional cost to accelerate delivery. Two respondents stated that the additional costs were for contractor overtime. One respondent replied that the contractor requested premium pay and the modification of delinquent contracts but that the government refused to pay for those increases in price. Three respondents said that no extra charges were required to accelerate delivery.

Defense Priorities Allocation System. Six respondents found the Defense Priorities Allocation System (DPAS) helpful during ODS; however, eleven did not. One of the reasons given for DPAS not being helpful was that "things moved too fast." Another respondent stated that DPAS was not necessary because the contractors knew what the priorities needed to be and acted appropriately without having to use DPAS officially. One respondent stated that "the powers of intense persuasion were more effective" than DPAS. One respondent indicated having problems because all the contracts he dealt with were rated equally, so it seemed that there was no priority among them.

Only two respondents successfully changed DPAS ratings during ODS. One respondent did not change the DPAS rating
on existing contracts, but did use the system successfully on a new contract.

**Industry’s Response.** The fourth investigative question asked what relations were like with industry during ODS. Question 10 of the round one questionnaire asked for this information specifically. Question 16, on contract payment, was closely related.

**Relationships with Industry.** Eighteen respondents had very good relationships with industry during ODS. One respondent reported that the manufacturer of the material for chemical defense ensembles, Hocht-Celanes, did not want to be the prime contractor for that program. However, when they realized that in order to meet the delivery schedule they would have to be, they agreed to accept the prime contract. One respondent indicated that some of the contractors reprioritized projects as needed. One respondent stated that some contractor technicians deployed with their systems and lived in tents along with the military members using the systems. One respondent reported that contractors began preparing and planning when requirements became known. Another respondent replied that contractor CEO’s were available for discussion of any issue. One respondent reported that Detroit Diesel put aside their commercial work and delivered engines in two weeks. One respondent stated that Donaldson Filters’ workers showed up early at the plant "not expecting overtime" to be sure there were enough filters for the war effort. A respondent
replied that a tire dealer in Texas rented a U-haul to get tires to the Army base that was transporting them. One respondent said that many contractors went through "what-if" drills over and over, and made excellent suggestions on speeding up actions. One respondent stated that GE's aircraft engine division worked directly with government personnel in assessing needs for parts by engine model, manufacturing capacities, and the abilities of vendors to provide raw materials and components. One respondent replied that contractor employees at all levels did not have to be asked to perform; they only needed explanations of what was required. One respondent reported that 11 contractors worked together to make one ship ready. One respondent reported that contracts were negotiated on the weekend and that contractors had people working around the clock. One respondent replied that some contractors paid for transportation upgrades at their own expense. One respondent stated that shipowners generally were very responsive to the government's transportation requirements, but because they were high in demand they could negotiate at the high end of the price scale. Only one respondent reported that some contractors tried to take advantage of the situation.

There was unanimous agreement among the nineteen respondents that there was a difference in industry support during ODS as compared to before or after ODS. Nine respondents stated that there was an air of cooperation that
did not exist before ODS. One respondent reported that some contractors were willing to work without formal contracts and frequently at no change in contract price. Two respondents reported that the contractors with whom they worked were less concerned with profit during ODS. One respondent reported that contractors were more willing to work longer hours with shorter material lead times. "Total team effort" was one respondent’s description of the difference in industry support during ODS.

Patriotism was repeatedly given as the reason for the change in industry support during ODS. Some other reasons were the desire for the company and equipment to "look good," and pride in wanting to support the systems. Only one respondent attributed the change in the relationship with industry to increased business opportunities.

**Contract Payment.** Thirteen respondents stated that none of their contractors encountered payment problems with ODS contracts. The respondents that reported having payment problems gave several different reasons for the problems. One respondent attributed the problems to the lack of familiarity of commercial contractors new to dealing with DOD. The UCA expenditure limit caused some payment problems because contracts were awarded and parts shipped before the action could be definitized. One respondent replied that part of the problems were due to the reorganization of the payment office at that organization. Other reasons that were given were that the payment office
was overwhelmed with work, and that some of the people in
the payment offices did not care.

**Regulatory Restrictions.** The fifth investigative
question asked what regulations could have been relaxed or
waived during ODS to make CONUS based contracting more
simple. Questions 12 and 17 of the round one questionnaire
asked about waivers to regulations and Justifications and
Approvals (J&As). Question 25 asked for information about
inspections that have occurred since ODS ended.

**Waivers to the Regulations.** Eight respondents
reported that their organization would not have been able to
work more effectively if a waiver or deviation to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) had been granted.

Many suggestions for waivers that would have been
helpful during ODS were given. Five respondents stated that
an increase to the Justification and Approval (J&A) review
threshold for contracts awarded through other than full and
open competition would have been helpful during ODS. Two
respondents suggested waiving the small business review
during ODS. Other waivers that would have been helpful to
the respondents were concerned with undefinitized
contractual actions (UCA’s). Two respondents replied that
the delegation of approval for UCA’s over $5 million to
lower levels would have helped speed up procurements during
ODS. One respondent indicated that deviations to the law
restricting amount of expenditures which can be made under a
UCA would also have been helpful. Some other suggestions for waivers that individual respondents reported would have been helpful during ODS were as follows: waiver to the Service Contract Act concerning wage determinations, waiver of the synopsis publication and response time, and waiver to the necessity for cost and pricing data.

One respondent made several suggestions concerning actions the individual military departments could have made during ODS to make awarding of contracts faster. These are as follows: the designation of urgent ODS requirements as Public Exigency requirements, the execution of a class unusual and compelling urgency J&A for certified ODS requirements, the waiver of all reviews except contracting officer and Judge Advocate General (JAG) for any contract document implementing urgent ODS requirements, the waiver of acquisition plan format, the approval to automatically continue performance of an ODS contract in the face of a protest at the Government Accounting Office (GAO) level, and the delegation of Head of Contracting Agency (HCA) individual FAR deviation authority to the product division for urgent ODS contracts.

One respondent relayed an incident concerning waivers that occurred in the early 1980’s that was pertinent to ODS. A buyer in the respondent’s organization sent a suggestion to higher headquarters requesting waivers and changing the delegation of authority to lower levels for military contingency operations. The headquarters’ response at that
time was that the suggestion did not need to be processed because waivers would be granted when necessary. However, that organization's request for a class J&A during the early stages of ODS was not processed. The headquarters insisted that each contractual action have its own J&A. This respondent also reported that later during ODS the headquarters issued a request for information on suggested waivers, changes, or regulatory relief, to include documented support for each suggestion, that had a very short suspense. The respondent reported being incensed at that request because of the headquarters' lack of response to the class J&A request they had made months earlier.

Seven of the respondents reported requesting a waiver or deviation. Of those only two reported that their requests were granted. The reasons given for not requesting a waiver or deviation generally dealt with the necessity for speedy award of the applicable contracts. One respondent reported that the organization did not request a waiver because they were told that the request would not be approved. Several respondents reported that because of the urgency of the situation there was not enough time to process a waiver request. Another respondent reported that because the expenditure limit for UCA's is a legal limit, a change would require a change in the law, which would also have taken too long.

Justifications and Approvals. The dollar threshold for local approval of Justifications and Approvals
(J&A’s) during ODS varied among the organizations surveyed. Eight respondents reported that their threshold for local approval was $10 million. Some other thresholds reported were $25 million, $1 million, and $50 million.

Eight respondents reported that the majority of their procurements which required J&A’s fell under this dollar threshold. Six respondents did not request authority to use a blanket J&A for ODS procurements. One respondent reported that blanket J&A authority was authorized before ODS began, and another reported that the organization received an annual J&A and so did not need special approval for ODS.

Six respondents requested blanket J&A’s for ODS. One of these used three separate J&A’s for the different phases of the war: Phase I for Desert Shield, Phase II for Desert Storm, and Phase III for Desert Sortie.

Only three respondents received approval to use a blanket J&A for ODS. One of these reported that the approval was only for certain classes of items.

Those respondents not receiving approval for a blanket J&A reported various reasons. Two respondents replied that a blanket J&A was not needed. Another respondent reported that the headquarters refused to forward the request to the military department and sent it back. Another respondent stated that the organization was advised by their approval authority to satisfy the requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).
Inspections. Ten respondents' organizations have been inspected after ODS. None of the respondents reported any adverse findings related to ODS procurement actions. One respondent replied that one inspection finding was that because the contracting staff was not augmented to contend with the increased work load during ODS the documentation processing was delayed or incomplete.

Requirements Generation. The sixth investigative question asked how CONUS based contracting organizations received requirements from the field during ODS. Question 13 asked for that information specifically, and questions 14 and 15 asked for related information on communications and delivery follow-up.

Requirements. The respondents reported that the requirements for ODS were originated much the same as they are in peacetime: from using commands through the program office to the contracting division. The requirements for food were generated within the contracting organization, based upon the classified troop strength.

Four respondents stated that they received requirements on a daily basis. Respondents reported requirements arriving even before Desert Shield began and continuing throughout the conflict as requisitions came in, as stock levels were inventoried, as studies were completed and demands anticipated.

In ten cases the requirements were clearly described. One respondent replied that the request was for something to
be done to make certain weapons better, not for a specific
weapon. Another respondent stated that the requested
delivery dates changed frequently causing changes to
requests for proposals (RFP's). These changes caused
problems because during ODS the normal award time from
issuance of RFP to award was three days for that
organization. One respondent reported that the user
requests the organization received were not for specific
items, but were of the "what if" variety. These requests
were pointed at specific contractors as to how many
particular items could be delivered per month, or if a
certain number of items could be delivered each month.
Another respondent stated that the initial requirements were
clear, but that they kept changing throughout the conflict.

Ten respondents replied that funding was available when
the requirements were first identified. Four respondents
reported no funding was available with the requirements.
Three others reported that funding was sometimes immediately
available, and sometimes not. One of these reported using
the contracting organization's funding in some cases.

If requirements were not clearly identified or if
funding was not available in a timely fashion, the
respondents performed a variety of different actions to
assist in the contract award process. Two respondents
reported that they acted as if funds were available and
found that in most cases the funds arrived before they were
ready to award the contracts. One respondent replied that
the "contracting [organization] was not going to be the reason a contract award was late." One respondent stated that some efforts were delayed due to the wait for funding. Two respondents reported working with the program managers, engineers, and contractors to obtain the best option for the user.

Eight respondents reported that their relations with the ultimate user did not change as a result of the experiences with ODS. One respondent indicated that a better relationship and greater understanding of the user's needs now exists. Another respondent stated that better communications links were established with the users during ODS and have been maintained to date. One respondent replied that the user still wants requirements met as quickly as they were during ODS.

Communications. During ODS eight organizations did not have direct communications link-ups with individuals in the area of operations. The respondents who did communicate with individuals in the area of operations during ODS used various methods: telephones, facsimilies, official messages, electronic mail, ship-to-shore communication, and letters.

Nine respondents reported having a dedicated point of contact in the area of operation. One of these was a person assigned there specifically for the purpose of communicating with the office in CONUS. The dedicated points of contact were of the following specialties: four contracting
specialists, four end item users, one contract person, one distribution type, two logistics specialists, and one engineer.

The frequency of communication with the contacts varied from once a week to more than once a day. Seven respondents reported communicating with their contacts more than once a day.

The communication with the contacts in the area of operations consisted of many different subjects. Eight respondents stated that they discussed what was needed. Eight respondents reported discussion of when items were needed. Seven respondents replied that they discussed when items would be delivered. One of these also discussed the redelivery of some items. Four respondents discussed the marking, containerization, or transport of the needed items with their contacts. Some other subjects that were discussed were leased vehicles return dates and conditions, problems encountered with repairing vessels, contract administrative items, requirements definition, backorders, and if contractors were working on other ODS orders.

Only three respondents reported discussing whether items would be bought in the CONUS or in the gulf area with their points of contact. The primary factors influencing the decision to make purchases in the area of operation or CONUS were quality, timeliness, cost effectiveness, and the conformance of the supplies.
Only one respondent stated that if the direct communication methods had not been available there would have been no impact on the ability to be responsive to the needs of the user in the area of operations.

Delivery Follow-Up. The ten respondents who tracked the delivery of the procured items to the area of operations reported a variety of experiences. One respondent reported a high success rate because much of the material was hand carried by a contractor or met at both ends by a contractor or military person. One of the respondents reported that everything was tracked from the vendor to the port of departure but that trace was lost at the tranship points in Spain. This respondent also noted that because there was no stock control system in theater some receivers did not know whether or not they received some items. Another respondent reported that transportation was a big problem because of the difficulty in getting material into the port at New Cumberland. Contractors had difficulty finding truckers to pick up their material because the truckers did not want their rigs tied up while they waited to get into the port. Workers in the contractor's plant who had worked extremely hard to quickly manufacture parts became frustrated when they saw the material sitting on the dock awaiting transportation. One respondent hired a field service representative from a contractor, Mack Truck, and another who was familiar with commercial vehicles. The representative were at the port
when the ships docked in the theater of operation so that the equipment could be successfully mated for use. One respondent reported that vessels were tracked using all types of communication from the time of delivery to the load port, ocean transit arrival in discharge port, until redelivery of vessel to the ship owner. One respondent reported that most of the problems occurred because the buying activity failed to modify the contract to change the mode of transportation for expedited shipments.

Training for ODS. The seventh investigative question asked what type of training was held for CONUS based contracting professionals to help them support ODS. Question 29 of the round one questionnaire asked specifically for this information.

Training. Thirteen respondents reported that they did not receive any special training for responding rapidly to contracting needs for a military contingency. Five respondents answered that their training was the years of experience they gained on the job. One respondent replied that all mandatory training requirements were received, but that none of the training was designed specifically to prepare for military contingencies. Another respondent received inter-office training on international airlift purchases.

The on the job training (OJT) was given during the period between the mid 1970's and ODS. The training on
international airlift purchases began in November 1990 and continued for the next several months.

The OJT was given by contracting officers. The mandatory training was given by AFIT, TACOM, and Fort Lee instructors. The international airlift purchase training was given by experienced expansion airlift buyers.

Three respondents reported that the training adequately prepared them for supporting ODS. One respondent stated that the training should have been more structured and given at the beginning of ODS.

Organizations During ODS. The eighth investigative question asked what organizational structures were used by CONUS based contracting organizations during ODS. Questions 19 through 23 asked for this information specifically, as well as other related information on teaming, workloads, the sense of urgency observed, and co-workers experiences.

Organization Structure. Sixteen of the respondents worked in functionally structured organizations before ODS. Only three respondents worked in matrixed organizations prior to ODS.

Eighteen respondents reported that the structure of their organizations did not have to change in response to ODS. One respondent stated that matrixed teams were set up during ODS.

Thirteen respondents reported no change in the decentralization of authority during ODS. One respondent replied that decentralization of authority did occur at the
local level. Another respondent reported that the organization evolved into one that was more decentralized because certain people took on the responsibilities with the command leadership's encouragement.

**Dedicated Teams.** Seven respondents replied that their organizations did not form any teams dedicated specifically to supporting ODS. Two of those respondents reported that no new teams were formed because teams were already in use in their organizations. Seven respondents' organizations formed special teams to support ODS. One respondent reported that the entire contracting office was used to support ODS.

The teams that were formed were composed of individuals from many different organizations. The respondents reported that the makeup of the teams consisted of representatives from the following functional areas: comptroller, logistics, engineering, test wing, laboratories, quality, technical, supply, procurement, military service, production, contracting, transportation, maintenance, product assurance, readiness, administrative contracting officer (ACO), price analyst, supervising surveyor, and "trade people."

The operation of the teams differed from organization to organization. One respondent described the operation of the Air Force's Rapid Response Process (RRP) team that was described previously in Chapter II. The RRP team was set up as a focal point for incoming combat mission needs statements (CMNS) from ODS users. The team was to analyze
the need, direct the work to a specific program office, and to present an alternate fix if necessary. The team worked toward a 48 hour turn around from identified need to a suggested fix and the strategy to accomplish the fix. The team also acted as consultants to the program offices if needed. Four respondents described team operations that attempted to solve problems dealing with transportation, delivery, forecasting amounts, acceptability of deviations from the specifications, modification of inspection criteria, and acceptability of substitutes.

Four respondents reported that the team members were selected for their high level of expertise. Two respondents answered that the team members were chosen by a higher authority. These respondents did not give information on the basis of the choices. Two respondents replied that team members were chosen who were compatible with others.

The respondents who replied to the question of what the teams accomplished reported that the teams solved the problems that they faced.

Only four respondents reported that the teams were continued after ODS. One of these answered that the team was continued as the result of the drawdown decisions. One negative response included the explanation that organizations "cannot keep all the best on one team."

Workload Impact. Only one respondent answered that the workloads of the individuals in that organization did not differ from the normal, non-ODS workload. More
overtime was required during ODS than for the normal workload for all except two respondents. Eight respondents reported that overtime was used extensively; eight indicated some use of overtime; and one replied that very little overtime was used during ODS.

Seven respondents reported using overtime constantly; four used overtime frequently; and five answered that overtime was used only occasionally.

While ten respondents reported no use of extra employees, they were used to assist during ODS in many other cases. Four respondents reported using reservists, temporary employees, and borrowed employees from other organizations. Retired civil service annuitants were used during ODS in the organizations of three of the respondents.

Employees in fifteen of the respondents’ organizations worked week-ends during ODS. Eight respondents reported people working on holidays to support ODS procurement activities.

During ODS employees in only five respondents’ organizations were not on-call via beeper or restriction of travel area during off-duty hours during ODS. Four respondents were on-call constantly, and three respondents replied that they were on-call either frequently or occasionally.

Several additional comments were made concerning the workload during ODS. One respondent answered that routine buys were postponed and individuals were not able to do as
much planning and follow-up as usual. ODS forced people to move into more of a reactive instead of a proactive mode. A respondent replied that payment for overtime was never discussed. One respondent reported that productivity increased 50% per hour per person and that almost no sick leave was taken during ODS. Another respondent suggested that even though the DOD is downsizing we should attempt to retain trained, knowledgeable individuals who would be available for use in an emergency by using part-time, or job sharing programs in government offices. This respondent explained that because it takes three to five years to train buyers, hiring new employees in an emergency would not be as effective as converting a trained, part-time employee to full-time would be.

**Sense of Urgency.** Individuals in the contracting offices of most of the respondents demonstrated a distinct sense of urgency in accomplishing the ODS support mission. Eighteen respondents reported that buyers and contracting officers showed a sense of urgency during ODS. Twelve respondents answered that the local review committee members and legal staff demonstrated a sense of urgency during the period of ODS. Ten respondents reported that price analysts showed a sense of urgency in supporting ODS procurements.

Higher headquarters personnel were reported to demonstrate a sense of urgency less often than the contracting office personnel. Seven respondents reported that the policy staff, and six respondents reported that the
contract review staff, showed a sense of urgency in dealing with ODS matters.

Seven respondents reported that contract administration office personnel (Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)) were responsive to the urgency of the ODS situation. Two respondents replied that Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) personnel showed a sense of urgency during ODS.

Program management, engineering, and program control personnel demonstrated a sense of urgency during ODS according to 11 respondents. Six respondents stated that accounting and finance personnel showed a sense of urgency during this period. The clerical staff was reported to demonstrate a sense of urgency by 12 respondents. Five respondents reported that production specialists were responsive to the urgency of ODS. Six respondents replied that supply and transportation personnel demonstrated a sense of urgency during ODS. Fourteen respondents reported that the contractors they worked with during ODS demonstrated a sense of urgency.

Several examples regarding both a demonstrated sense of urgency and a lack of urgency were given by the questionnaire respondents. The most common complaint (by three respondents) was that both local and headquarters staff offices treated the ODS requirements as normal business. One respondent answered that "those [people] that were not responsive to my needs could be easily forced to be so by emphasizing their contribution or lack of same to the
war." A respondent reported that a DCMAO transportation representative ordered a contractor not to ship needed items which consequently missed the boats that the Program Executive Officer (PEO) had scheduled specifically. The transportation contract had to be terminated and the contracting office personnel had to work all weekend to find other trucks that could still meet the boats' departure date. No reason was given for the representative's actions.

On the positive side, a respondent reported that there was not "one example of someone who refused to help. Some only gave 10% over their usual amount, some gave much more." One respondent answered that "everyone bent over backwards to do their jobs" and then asked what else could be done. Four other respondents commented that everyone involved in ODS procurements worked as a team and went "above and beyond the call."

**Co-workers Experiences.** Eighteen respondents reported variations on the theme of the pride their co-workers felt for their support of ODS. Only one respondent reported negatively to this question, and that response dealt with the lack of urgency shown by individuals in the staff offices.

**Challenges.** The ninth investigative question asked what challenges were encountered by CONUS based contracting professionals during and after ODS. Question 24 of the round one questionnaire asked for this information specifically.

85
Challenges During ODS. Many challenges were faced during ODS by all of the respondents to this questionnaire. The most frequent challenge given by the respondents (14) was performing all the aspects of the procurement process as rapidly, and accurately as possible. Seven respondents reported that one of their greatest challenges was getting individuals in staff and other offices not directly supporting ODS to expedite ODS related work. Another challenge that four of the respondents listed was the lack of a pre-planned streamlined acquisition process designed specifically for supporting military contingencies. Three respondents replied that the recent personnel cutbacks caused challenges in supporting ODS procurements. One respondent answered that the role of intermediary among the different agencies trying to exert their own priorities over the DPAS that the contractors used was a challenge. One respondent that dealt with the repair of ships answered that determining the difference between necessary repairs and desired repairs was a challenge during ODS. One respondent reported that getting funds in a timely manner was a challenge during ODS. One respondent replied that getting contractors to understand that the war did not mean that "anything goes" was a great challenge during ODS. Another respondent indicated a similar problem with program offices who attempted to use ODS priority for non-ODS requirements. One respondent reported the challenge of balancing ODS priorities with the every day program priorities in order to
insure that both were accomplished. One of the respondents was challenged with "getting the latest and best to the field without getting ahead of spares" and training requirements. Two respondents replied that overseas transportation was a significant challenge faced during ODS. One respondent reported that the selection of the best contractor was a challenge during ODS due to the necessity for the decision makers to consider the best value in terms of delivery schedules, quality, as well as price. Two respondents answered that finding new procurement sources was a challenge during ODS. One respondent replied that anticipating requirements was a challenge during ODS. Individuals in that organization were forced to move from their normal reactive mode to a more proactive mode in order to best serve the needs of the troops in the field. Two respondents stated that dealing with organizations or subject areas that were rarely ever dealt with before (state level and DOD transportation authorities, bankers, and payment offices) while still abiding by contract terms created a significant challenge during ODS. Three respondents reported that completing all the required contract file documentation under the time constraint posed by ODS was a major challenge. Another respondent replied that obtaining the users' accurate need dates before deployment was a challenge in supporting ODS procurements. The development of "streamlined internal office procedures for managing fast-paced procurements with large numbers of
offerors on each solicitation" was reported by one respondent as a major challenge during ODS. One respondent indicated that managing changes to the requirements was a challenge because the lead time was so short for ODS procurements. One respondent stated that rearranging personal schedules in support of ODS was a challenge. One respondent reported that getting contract technicians to the theater and obtaining clearances to deploy were significant challenges faced during ODS. Another respondent replied that assisting customers in writing Statements of Work (SOW) was challenging during ODS. One respondent's processing of a change to the DPAS to support ODS requirements created a major challenge. One respondent stated that prioritizing multiple orders from different sources for one contractor's product created a significant challenge during ODS. Another respondent replied that challenges were encountered when contractors did not pass priorities on to their subcontractors. Protecting the independence of the contracting officer's decisions from the people generating the requirements proved to be a challenge for one respondent.

Challenges After ODS. The aftermath of ODS also created challenges for the respondents of this study. Ten respondents reported challenges dealing with modifying or terminating contracts after ODS ended. One of these respondents replied that modifying or canceling contracts without seeming to destroy the industrial base or punish the
contractors proved to be especially challenging. Five respondents reported challenges encountered when making monetary adjustments to ODS contract modifications or terminations. The adjustments mentioned were the war risk bonus, fuel adjustments, and cost estimates for work completed at the point of "stop work." Five respondents reported that a major challenge they have encountered since ODS ended was preparing for the downsizing of DOD and being able to support future efforts with less people. Three respondents indicated the challenge of returning to the normal pre-ODS work routine. Two respondents replied that definitizing letter contracts was their greatest challenge after ODS. One of those respondents also stated that explaining to the program office why we could not use UCA's and letter contracts on a day-to-day basis after ODS proved to be challenging. One respondent reported that understanding that the organization's support of ODS did not end with the official end of the hostilities was a challenge. One respondent stated that identifying excess levels of supplies in theater created a challenge after ODS ended. One respondent reported that returning stock levels to that used before ODS was a challenge. One respondent said that getting equipment returned to the CONUS proved to be challenging after ODS ended. One respondent noted the challenge of recognizing both contractors and employees "whose outstanding support was obvious" during ODS. One respondent replied that "capturing the streamlining ideas
and permanently improving the procurement process" has been a great challenge since ODS ended.

Additional Information. The information in the following sections is not directly related to any of the investigative questions, but is of interest.

Summary of ODS Contracting Actions. Tables 4 and 5 below summarize the information the respondents provided on contracting actions taken during ODS. Note that this information is not comprehensive for the organizations surveyed because many of the respondents did not have access to the information requested.

Procurement Acquisition Lead Time. The respondents reported Procurement Acquisition Lead Times (PALT's) that varied from 2 to 119 days. Five respondents had PALT's of five days or less. Two respondents indicated PALT's between 10 and 14 days. Five respondents answered with PALT's of more than 30 days.

Only two respondents had additional comments regarding performance during ODS. One respondent stated that the organization used letter contracts for the larger dollar efforts. The other respondent reported that a number of trips were made that did not show up in the documentation.

Comparisons to Focus Groups and Interviews

Only five notable pieces of information were revealed during the focus group meetings and personal interviews that were not mentioned by any of the questionnaire participants.
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* Statistics from January 1991 through March 1992

** Includes options that were awarded
TABLE 5
CONTINUATION OF ODS CONTRACTING ACTIONS

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<tr>
<td>194*</td>
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<td>983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Disadvantaged</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1.2 M</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Statistics from January 1991 through March 1992

Congress required one person interviewed to testify about the large surplus of items that person’s organization procured that existed after ODS ended. This person was appalled that any explanation was needed and felt that too much was better than too little for the troops in the field.

Another person interviewed reported procuring 6300 units of a commercial hand-held navigation device for ODS from a company that had never done business with the government. The units were not proven at that time and required slight modifications for use with the military grid coordinate system. However, they were used successfully during ODS.

Three people interviewed stated that contracting officers who were deployed to the Gulf War often spent more
money on purchases than they should have because of the $25,000 threshold that existed for small purchases in CONUS based contracting organizations. The contracting officers were supposed to purchase equipment and supplies through their home bases in CONUS. The low limit on small purchases in CONUS hindered the swift procurement of needed items by requiring new contracts to be awarded. The result was that contracting officers used their $100,000 small purchase limit in the theater to buy the equipment, sometimes paying twice the price that would have been paid in CONUS. All three of these individuals recommended that the small purchase threshold be raised to $100,000 in CONUS to preclude paying exorbitant prices just to get equipment quickly.

One person in one of the focus groups stated that "wars begin with spare parts." This individual discussed the fact that the philosophy of Just In Time (JIT) works well in the commercial world, but that it does not apply to the military. Changes in the procurement philosophy prior to ODS resulted in the various military depots having low quantities of spare parts on hand. These organizations had to scramble to be able to support the major mobilization effort that ODS became. This individual suggested that the military not use the JIT policies to purchase spare parts.

An interview with a liaison from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Services revealed the fact that during ODS the committee expected to receive
requests from DOD for waivers of CICA and other contracting regulations and laws, but did not. This individual said that approval would have been granted if only DOD had provided enough information to justify the waivers. The individual also reported that many of the contracting problems that DOD had during ODS were due to "self-imposed impediments," because certain waivers could have been approved within the DOD agencies without having to appeal to Congress for approval.

Results of Round Two

Of the 25 round two questionnaires that were mailed, 14 were returned. Eight respondents who completed the round one questionnaire did not return the round two questionnaire. Two respondents who did not respond to the round one questionnaire did return the round two questionnaire. Table 6 below shows the actual respondent matrix for the round two questionnaire. Individuals from the following DOD agencies besides the military department participated in the round two questionnaire: Defense Contract Management Command, Defense Commercial Communications Office, and Defense Mapping Agency.

The round two questionnaire asked for the respondents' degree of agreement or disagreement to the recommendations made in the various sections of the round one questionnaire. Those responses answer the final investigative question, which specifically asks for recommendations on improving the
CONUS contracting process. Appendix D contains the results of the round two questionnaire. The respondents' recommendations are discussed by consolidating those that are alike, in the same way that the round one results were discussed. The statistical analysis of the respondents' agreement to each of the recommendations is included in Appendix E for further reference. While a space for additional comments was provided for each recommendation, few respondents gave reasons for their agreement or disagreement with the recommendations. The additional comments that did appear are discussed as part of the questionnaire responses.

### TABLE 6

ROUND TWO ACTUAL RESPONDENT MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>DOD</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Line Supervisor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Supervisory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source Development. The recommendations that were made on source development during military contingencies were somewhat similar in nature. Two respondents suggested that lists of commercial equivalents of equipment be compiled. Two respondents proposed that the original
Manufacturers of the needed equipment should be reached for information. One respondent recommended that other buying activities be contacted. One respondent advised that pre-arranged agreements be made with sources in preparation for unexpected contingencies.

**Use of Commercial Items.** Several recommendations were made concerning the use of commercial items during military contingencies. One respondent recommended that the DOD should expand the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. Another stated that commercial equipment should be used as long as it met the users’ requirements. One respondent stated that "all mobilization plans should be based upon commercially available items." This recommendation met with significant disagreement from the other respondents. One respondent noted that while commercial items can provide "instant capability," they are not as rugged as items that are built to military specifications. This respondent also expressed concern for the necessity for awarding sole source contracts for the replacement or support of commercial items. One respondent recommended that the designers of new systems should consider using some commercially available components rather than specifying uniquely military ones.

**Unsolicited Proposals.** Several recommendations were made about the use of unsolicited proposals during military contingencies. Two respondents replied that unsolicited proposals provide a valuable source of information about new
technologies. One respondent suggested that all unsolicited proposals be forwarded to a central DOD point for analysis and screening. This recommendation was not received well by the other respondents. One of the dissenters stated that the use of a central screening point would increase the processing time too much for proposals to be useful during contingencies. One respondent stated that unsolicited proposals are only useful if all other sources have been exhausted.

**Accelerated Delivery.** The respondents provided a number of recommendations on accelerating the delivery of equipment already on contract. One respondent recommended that the users' needs should be fully justified before accelerating delivery for items already on contract. Another respondent suggested that future production lots would need to be accelerated to prevent production gaps. This suggestion elicited the full range of strongly agree to strongly disagree responses on the round two questionnaire. The mean response was neutral because there were an equal number of agreements and disagreements. Those respondents disagreeing with the recommendation suggested that future lots could be adjusted as necessary without the need for acceleration.

One respondent stated that "contractors have excess capacity so deliveries can be accelerated." This statement met with disagreement by many other respondents for several reasons. One respondent noted that the shrinking defense
base may not allow for accelerating delivery on contracts in the future. Others stated that each situation is unique and while the statement may be true now, it may not be in the future. One respondent stated that additional factors such as the cost of overtime and the availability of materials need to be considered in determining the surge capacity of contractors.

One respondent recommended that new contracts be awarded that provided for additional deliveries of items already on contract, while keeping the original contracts in place. The response to this suggestion was neutral overall. However, three negative comments were notable. One respondent stated that long lead items could not be obtained quickly enough to be helpful during ODS. Another respondent commented that this method would eventually "put more in [the] logistics pipeline" but that it would not be effective immediately. One respondent replied that this method would create "a lot of extra work for no gain."

One respondent recommended that the United States should "always have as popular a war as ODS...Also have a short war." While this suggestion met with considerable agreement, one person stated that the optimal war scenario can not always be expected.

Relationships with Industry. The recommendations the respondents made on relationships with industry generally regarded improving cooperation and communications. Thirteen suggestions were made for both industry and government to
work together more closely, honestly, and frequently. All of these suggestions met with significant agreement. See Appendix E for the actual figures for each recommendation. One respondent recommended that contingency contracting procedures be explained fully to both the government and industry. Another respondent suggested that "Congress needs to trust acquisition and industry folks and focus on the few bad ones and jail them." This suggestion was very well received by the other respondents.

Defense Priorities Allocation System. Several recommendations for changes to the Defense Priorities Allocation System (DPAS) were made by the respondents. One of the respondents suggested that the Department of Commerce streamline their process for reprioritizing contracts that have similar ratings. This individual also suggested that a new rating should be created that would lie between DX and DO which would be used during military contingencies. Most respondents agreed with these ideas; however, three stated that these suggestions would only serve to complicate a system that is not understood well enough as it is.

One respondent recommended that contractors review the films and booklets available through Defense Contract Management Administration Offices (DCMAO). This suggestion was agreeable to ten of the fourteen other respondents. Another respondent suggested that government people do not understand DPAS and that training was needed. This recommendation was agreeable to nine of the respondents.
One respondent suggested that the relationship with the contractor was more important than DPAS during contingencies. Ten of the fourteen respondents agreed. Another respondent recommended that a Presidential declaration of "partial mobilization" would support changes in DPAS ratings. While most other respondents agreed with this suggestion, three disagreed.

Requirements. Only one of the recommendations made about requirements and funding was not favorably received by the other respondents. That particular comment was "in a crisis, it is difficult to determine these things in advance." The overall response to this suggestion was neutral; however, there were an equal number of agreements and disagreements.

One of the more favorably viewed recommendations was for the military to identify the critical weapons systems needed for war. Three similar recommendations were made to plan now for various types of operations. One respondent recommended that food requirements be determined in peacetime to prevent delays when a contingency occurs. One respondent suggested that fewer reviewers and approvers are needed during emergency situations. One respondent recommended that contracting personnel should work more closely with program managers to solve requirements and funding problems.

Delivery Follow-up. Four respondents recommended that the DOD develop a system that identifies shipments
accurately with dates, places, and contents. One respondent suggested that individuals at buying activities duplicated the efforts of DCMAO personnel and need training on the DCMAO responsibilities in delivery matters.

**Contract Payment.** Several recommendations were made to prevent contract payment problems. One respondent suggested that the government needs to reduce the amount of paperwork involved in paying contractors. Another respondent suggested that the limit of 75% of the Not To Exceed (NTE) price on UCA expenditures before contract definitization should be increased during military contingencies. The other respondents generally agreed with this suggestion; however, one person who disagreed stated the opinion that the limit should be determined on an individual case basis.

One respondent recommended that payment be based upon the vendor's shipping documents instead of the DD Form 250. This suggestion was disagreed with by eight of the other respondents. One of these commented that in some cases during ODS parts were paid for but not received by the users.

**Justifications and Approvals.** Seven respondents recommended that class Justifications and Approvals (J&A's) be allowed during military contingencies. One respondent suggested that the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) be given the authority to approve J&A's during war time. One respondent recommended that a special plan be developed "which contains a class Public Exigency J&A which can be
activated by message" during a contingency. All of these recommendations were agreed with by the other respondents.

**Contracting Methods.** Two respondents recommended that approval levels be delegated to lower level during military contingencies. One respondent suggested that the government should award indefinite delivery or indefinite quantity contracts in order for contractors to be responsive during contingencies. This suggestion was disagreed with by two respondents. One respondent questioned the ability of awarding contracts that might never be used. Another respondent disagreed because manufacturers would have to be offered incentives to keep long lead items in stock until the next contingency occurred.

**Dedicated Teams.** Several recommendations for fostering teamwork were made by the respondents. One person suggested that everyone work in a team all the time. Another person recommended that teams have solid objectives and motivated members. One person proposed teams consist of the best people from each discipline. This individual also advised that the teams should be given the authority to make their projects work. All of these recommendations received agreement from the other respondents.

One respondent suggested setting up teams in advance of their need. This recommendation was disagreed with as often as it was agreed with. One respondent commented that a team set up too far in advance could prove to be ineffective. Another stated that the productivity of teams depends on the
particular activity and the personalities of the individuals involved.

Policy Recommendations. The respondents made many similar recommendations for changing contracting policies to improve the process of supporting a future military contingency. Four respondents suggested that lowering the approval levels for such items as J&A's, UCA's, business clearance waivers, and committee review waivers. Three respondents suggested a consolidated listing of contingency related regulations and laws be developed for contracting professionals to refer to in situations like ODS. One respondent reiterated the need for using blanket J&A's during contingencies. All of these recommendations were agreed with by the other respondents.

Organization Recommendations. Two of the recommendations made for organizational changes during contingencies were repetitive of the policy recommendations made above. For example, one respondent suggested that authority should be delegated to local levels during contingencies. Another respondent advised waiving regulations. Although these recommendations were repeats of previous suggestions, they were agreed with by most of the other respondents.

One respondent proposed that organizations write lessons learned so that future contracting professionals faced with a military contingency situation would have information on what methods were used successfully. Only
two negative comments were made to this suggestion. One of the respondents stated that lessons learned were only valuable if "someone with authority to make the changes is agreeable to processing changes to laws and regs." The other negative statement was that lessons learned packages are not useful because they do not get read and do not match new situations.

Two respondents recommended that the government needs to plan now what will be done in the future when another military contingency arises. One of these respondents suggested that a variety of scenarios should be considered. Examples given were the tropics, mountains, or arctic.

Two respondents proposed that teams be used to solve problems encountered in contingency situations. One comment was made to this recommendation that the contracting officer needs to remain independent from the team.

One person suggested that the government suspend the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) during conflicts, along with the elimination of approvals for UCA's, and the suspension of the uniform contract format. Three respondents disagreed with these recommendations. One disagreed with the suspension of CICA; one disagreed with the elimination of approvals for UCA's; and one disagreed with the suspension of the uniform contract format.

Training. The respondents gave a variety of recommendations for topics to be included in a training package for CONUS contracting. These topics were as
follows: the difference between laws and regulations, the requirements certification process, the use of UCA's, how to obtain Department of Commerce direction to reprioritize DPAS ratings, alternate sources for delivery, how to procure commercial items, how to find sources for items no longer produced, communication with the users, relationships with contractors and other government personnel, and DCMAO responsibilities.

Other recommendations regarding training were also made. One respondent proposed forming the teams that would be used in a military contingency and performing exercises. Another respondent suggested using case studies in training scenarios that included all of the contractual documents, especially any justifications and work arounds that were necessary.

Summary

This study found that during ODS the contracting professionals who were based in CONUS procured supplies and services varying from spare parts and food to aircraft modifications and ship repairs. A few procurements began even before Desert Shield began, while others did not occur until just before Desert Storm began. Some of those procurements ended immediately after the end of ODS, and others have continued to the present time. Many different contracting methods were used including new contract awards, exercising new options on existing contracts, and issuing
orders on indefinite delivery contracts. Commercial equivalents to military items were purchased in many cases. Industry's response to ODS was extremely supportive of the needs of the military. Waivers to certain contracting regulations would have been helpful in quickly procuring equipment for ODS. Few contracting professionals received specific training to prepare them for military contingencies. Varying degrees of both overtime and additional personnel were used throughout DOD contracting organizations to support procurements for ODS.

Only four different issues arose from the personal interviews and focus groups that were not disclosed in the questionnaire. These subjects included a testimony to Congress, commercial navigation devices, small purchase thresholds, JIT philosophy, and the House Armed Services Committee's expectations.

Most of the recommendations made in the various areas of the questionnaire met with agreement by the other respondents in the second round questionnaire. The study respondents made recommendations on the following subjects: source development, use of commercial items, unsolicited proposals, accelerated delivery, relationships with industry, DPAS, requirements, delivery follow-up, contract payment, J&A's, contract methods, policy, organizations, and training.

Chapter V contains the researchers' conclusions drawn from this study. The following chapter also contains
recommendations based on the study, as well as suggestions for further study.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

During military contingencies the contracting efforts that receive the majority of the attention are those that take place in the theater of operations. This study shows that the contracting professionals who stayed within the CONUS supported the conflict just as diligently as did those who were deployed with their units.

The discussion below consists of the major conclusions drawn from this study, recommendations for improving the process of CONUS contracting during contingencies, and suggestions for further study in this area.

Conclusions

The information provided by the respondents to this study was generally uniform across the services and DOD agencies. No major differences were perceived in any of the answers due to agency affiliation.

The only difference encountered that was attributable to differences in organization levels was in perceptions of the sense of urgency shown by individuals at higher headquarters. The respondents who were in senior leadership positions perceived their headquarters personnel as demonstrating a distinct sense of urgency during ODS. Respondents at the lower levels held the opposite perception. This difference suggests that the people at
lower organizational levels tended to focus on the product of their efforts, the equipment or services for the users in the Middle East, while the individuals at higher organizational levels tended to focus on the process of getting the product to the user. Both of these concentrations are important; however, their priorities may need to be adjusted during contingencies like ODS.

This study also suggests the organizations that used teams to procure equipment and services for ODS accomplished their purposes efficiently and effectively. Communication, feedback, a sense of urgency, clear goals, and autonomy appear to be key ingredients to enhance the likelihood of successful teamwork. Results of this study indicate that team focus on fulfilling users' needs should be paramount. Feedback systems between the buying activities and the users are an effective way to facilitate this process.

The Just In Time (JIT) philosophy is a practical innovation that the commercial business world has developed. However, it should be realized that chances are small that the next military contingency will build up over a period of months like ODS did. Surge manufacturing capacity may not be available when the next military contingency occurs because of the recent trend to decrease military spending. In the mean time, military organizations still have the requirement to be prepared for mobilization at any time. Consequently, the JIT philosophy may not be advisable or practical to support military systems.
Recommendations

The respondents to this study made many excellent recommendations that would greatly improve the CONUS contracting process. Below are the recommendations that the researchers feel should be strongly considered for implementation by contracting organizations throughout the DOD.

Policies. The leadership of the DOD departments and commands hold the power to make changes or waivers to regulations within their organizations in times of crisis. The decisions that they make can directly affect the troops in the field. Consequently, any relief that can be given to contracting officers so that they can rapidly provide needed supplies, equipment, and services for the troops in the theater of operations during a military contingency can save not only time, but lives as well.

A package of waivers to regulations and laws that can be enacted at the command, department, or DOD level by message during a military contingency appears to be a straightforward way to provide contracting professionals with the speed they need during such times. Increased management attention with respect to a waiver package seems warranted as a result of this study. A waiver package has the potential to reduce confusion and ambiguity should another contingency occur.

Proposed suggestions for the package are as follows:
1. Increase the small purchase threshold above the current $25,000 level. The $100,000 limit that now exists for contracting officers in the theater would be acceptable.

2. Allow blanket Justifications and Approvals for other than full and open competition for classes of items, for specific durations of time, or for specific dollar limits.

3. Waive reviews at the local level that add no value to the contracting process.

4. Lower the approval level for Undefinitized Contractual Actions to the Head of the Contracting Agency.

This package could be devised at the DOD, department, or command level and should be widely disseminated throughout the appropriate agencies to ensure that everyone who needs the information does indeed receive it. Specific training should be conducted on the contents of this package.

Training. It appears there is a clear need for contingency training exercises (war games) to be conducted that include the contracting function. The training should involve both contingency contracting professionals who will be deployed, as well as those who will stay behind in the CONUS.

Additional training courses should be developed to provide contracting professionals with the information they need to perform their jobs well during military
contingencies. The topics listed below are the minimum that should be covered in these courses:

1. The difference between laws and regulations,
2. The requirements certification process,
3. The use of Undefinitized Contractual Actions,
4. How to obtain Department of Commerce direction to reprioritize Defense Priority Allocation System ratings,
5. Alternate sources for delivery,
6. How to procure commercial items,
7. How to find sources for items no longer currently produced,
8. Communication with the users,
9. Relationships with contractors and other government personnel,
10. Defense Contract Management Administration Office responsibilities,
11. Waiver package for military contingencies.

Contracting officers who will be deployed with their units need training in the same areas as those mentioned above. They also need training in the following subjects, that were previously discussed in Chapter II:

1. Overseas acquisition procedures,
2. Local purchasing,
3. Alternative methods of contracting,
4. The economic variation provision for armed conflict,
5. Base closure at the end of a conflict.
The section on base closure should include information on records collection, final reports, termination of contracts, and the disposition of assets.

Suggestions for Further Study

This research was broad in nature due to the fact that it began a new stream of research inquiry. Many of the issues associated with CONUS based contracting for ODS that received only brief coverage in this study lend themselves to further inquiry in future research projects. Some of these areas include regulatory changes, transportation, delivery follow-up, container marking, teaming, training, product sourcing, leadership, and work force augmentation methods. Additionally, the contingency contracting aspects of ODS is an acknowledged fertile area for additional study.
Appendix A: Round One Questionnaire

DIRECTIONS

FOCUS: This research is focused on the experiences of contracting offices within the Continental United States (CONUS) which were involved in supporting contingency operations during Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

YOUR EXPERIENCES: Please answer the following questions based upon the experiences of yourself and your colleagues during Desert Shield/Storm. Feel free to show this questionnaire to others in your organization, but please do not expand beyond your own organization.

EXAMPLES: Where possible, use examples and anecdotes to illustrate your answers.

LENGTH OF ANSWERS: Your responses may be as short or long as you wish. Attach additional pages if needed. If a particular question does not apply to you, skip it.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Your answers will not be attributed to you. However, all answers (without names) will be compiled into one document which will be sent to all respondents.

ACRONYMS: The following acronyms will be used:

ODS: Operation Desert Shield/Storm
UCA: Undefinitized Contractual Actions
BOA: Basic Ordering Agreement
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation
DFARS: Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
J&A: Justification and Approval for procurement by other than full and open competition

AREA OF OPERATIONS: For the purposes of this questionnaire, the term "area of operations" means the countries and waters in the vicinity of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
QUESTIONNAIRE

(If more than one selection is correct, mark all that apply)

1. ODS SUPPLIES AND SERVICES: What supplies or services did you contract for in support of ODS?
   a. Food
   b. Clothing
   c. Spare parts
   d. Equipment
   e. Weapons/ammunition
   f. Transport services
   g. Communications
   h. Medical
   i. Other (please describe)__________________________________________

2. WHERE USED: Where were those supplies and services to be used?
   a. For use specifically in the area of operations
   b. To remain in U.S. as replacements for deployed items
   c. Other__________________________________________________________

3. DISPOSITION: Were the items
   a. Consumables
   b. To remain in the area of operations after the conflict ended
   c. To be returned to the U.S. after the conflict ended
   d. To be otherwise disposed of
      (If so, how?)____________________________________________________
   e. Not applicable (services, maintenance, etc.)

4. WHEN ODS BEGAN: ODS began on 9 Aug 90. How soon after the start of ODS was your organization called upon to procure ODS supplies and services?

5. AFTER ODS ENDED: ODS ended on 27 February 90. How soon after the end of ODS did your new procurement requirements drop back to pre-ODS levels? (Not counting terminations)
6. SOURCE DEVELOPMENT: Did you have to develop sources for any ODS supplies or services?

   a. If so, what supplies or services?

   b. How did you accomplish this?

   c. What recommendations do you have concerning source development?
7. USE OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS: Did you procure any commercial items for ODS?
   a. What items?

   b. Was it the first time you had procured these items at all?

   c. Was it the first time you had procured these items commercially?

   d. Why did you procure these commercial items for ODS?

   e. Were modifications required to use the commercial items in ODS?

   f. Did the commercial items fully meet the needs of the users during ODS?

   g. Will you continue to procure these commercial items in the future?

   h. What recommendations do you have concerning the use of commercial items?
8. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS: Did you receive any unsolicited proposals from industry for ODS supplies and services?
   a. For what?
   
   b. Were the unsolicited proposals reviewed and considered?
   
   c. Were they used during ODS?
   
   d. If they were used, were modifications required?
   
   e. What recommendations do you have concerning unsolicited proposals?

9. ACCELERATED DELIVERY: Did you accelerate delivery on any existing contracts?
   a. If so, for what items?
   
   b. Were modifications (specifications, packaging, etc.) necessary to accelerate delivery?
   
   c. Was there additional cost to accelerate delivery?
   
   d. What recommendations do you have concerning accelerating delivery?
10. RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY: Describe the support you received from industry during ODS? (Use examples as necessary)

a. Was there a difference in industry support during ODS as compared to before or after ODS? If so, explain.

b. If there was a difference, what do you attribute it to?

c. What recommendations would you make regarding relationships with industry?
11. DEFENSE PRIORITIES ALLOCATION SYSTEM (DPAS): Under DPAS, contracts can be assigned a "DO" or "DX" rating so industry will give them higher priority than commercial work, particularly in situations like ODS. This can also help prime contractors expedite deliveries from vendors and subcontractors.

   a. During ODS, was the DPAS system helpful?

   b. If no, why not?

   c. Did you try to change the DPAS rating on existing contracts? If so, were you successful?

   d. What recommendations would you make concerning the DPAS system?

12. WAIVERS TO THE REGULATIONS: At any time during ODS would your organization have been able to work more effectively if a waiver or deviation to the FAR or DFARS had been granted?

   a. If yes, a waiver or deviation for what?

   b. Was a waiver or deviation requested?

   c. If requested, was the waiver or deviation granted?

   d. If needed but not requested, why wasn't it requested?
13. REQUIREMENTS: How did you learn of your ODS procurement requirements or potential requirements?

a. Who originated the requirements?

b. When?

c. Were the requirements clearly described? (e.g., Did you receive enough information about the requirements to proceed with the procurement actions in a timely fashion?)

d. Was funding available when the requirements were first identified?

e. If requirements were not clearly identified or if funding was not available in a timely fashion, how did you react?

f. Did relations with the ultimate user change as a result of the experiences with ODS?

g. What recommendations would you make in regard to identification of requirements and availability of funding?
14. COMMUNICATIONS: During ODS did your organization have direct communications link-ups with individuals in the area of operations?

a. What kinds of communications link-ups did you have (phones, fax)?

b. Did you have a dedicated point of contact in the area of operation?

If so, was the dedicated point of contact a
(i) Contracting specialist
(ii) End item user
(iii) Other ______________________

On the average, how often did you communicate with your point of contact in the area of operations?

(i) Once a week
(ii) Once a day
(iii) More than once a day
(iv) Other _______________________

d. What topics did you discuss with your point of contact?

(i) What was needed
(ii) When items were needed
(iii) When items would be delivered
(iv) Marking, containerization, transport of items
(v) Other _______________________

e. Did you and your dedicated point of contact ever discuss whether items would be bought in the CONUS or in the gulf area?

If so, what were the primary factors influencing the decision?

f. If these methods of direct communication had not been available, what impact would there have been on your ability to be responsive to the needs of the user in the area of operations?
15. DELIVERY FOLLOW-UP: Did you track the delivery of the procured items to the area of operations?

a. If yes, describe your experiences regarding any of the following:

(i) containerization and marking
(ii) transportation
(iii) supply and issue
(iv) receiving dock
(v) other logistical support

b. What recommendations would you make in the above areas?
16. CONTRACT PAYMENT: Did your contractors encounter any payment problems with ODS contracts?

a. If so, please explain the causes?

b. What recommendations would you make to prevent payment problems?

17. JUSTIFICATIONS AND APPROVALS (J&A's): During ODS,

a. What was the dollar threshold for local approval of J&A’s?

b. Did the majority of your procurements which required J&A’s fall under this dollar threshold?

c. Did you request authority to use a blanket J&A?

d. If so, was the use of a blanket J&A approved for ODS?

e. If not requested or not approved, please explain.

f. What recommendations would you make regarding the use of J&A’s?
18. CONTRACTING METHODS:

a. What contracting methods were used to meet ODS procurement needs:

(i) Accelerating delivery on existing contracts
(ii) Exercising options on existing contracts
(iii) Issuing delivery orders on existing indefinite delivery contracts
(iv) Awarding new contracts
(v) Awarding new purchase orders
(vi) Awarding new orders under BOA's
(vii) "Borrow - Payback" (i.e., Taking delivery of spare parts from weapon system production lines.)
(viii) Other __________________________

b. What contract types were used for ODS procurements

(i) Firm Fixed Price
(ii) Fixed Price Incentive Fee
(iii) Fixed Price Award Fee
(iv) Cost or Cost Sharing
(v) Cost Plus Fixed Fee
(vi) Cost Plus Incentive Fee
(vii) Cost Plus Award Fee
(viii) Time and Material
(ix) Indefinite Delivery
   (a) Definite Quantity
   (b) Requirements
   (c) Indefinite Quantity

c. Were any of the following used:

(i) Letter contracts
(ii) Change orders
(iii) Other undefinitized contractual actions

d. Did any of your contractors start work "at their own risk" (without a contract)?

e. What recommendations would you make regarding methods of contracting and types of contracts?
19. WORKLOAD IMPACT: What was the impact of ODS on the workload of the individuals in your organization?

a. No real difference from normal, non-ODS workload.

b. More overtime required than for normal workload

(i) Extensive
(ii) Some
(iii) Very Little

c. If overtime was required, was it

(i) Constant
(ii) Frequent
(iii) Occasional

d. Were extra employees used for the ODS workload?

(i) Reservists
(ii) Temporary employees
(iii) Retired civil service annuitants
(iv) Borrowed from other organizations
(v) No extra employees used

e. Did employees in your organization have to work

(i) week-ends
(ii) holidays

f. During ODS were employees in your organization on-call (i.e., issued beepers or restricted to the geographic area during off-duty hours)?

(i) Constantly
(ii) Frequently
(iii) Occasionally

g. Other comments about workload

_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________

126
20. SENSE OF URGENCY:

a. Which of the following groups demonstrated a sense of urgency in accomplishing the ODS support mission?

i. Contracting office personnel
   (a) Buyers and contracting officers
   (b) Local review committee members
   (c) Legal
   (d) Price analysts

ii. Higher Headquarters
    (a) Policy staff
    (b) Contract review staff

iii. Contract Administration Office personnel
     (Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC))

iv. Program management, engineering, & program control

v. Accounting and finance

vi. Auditors (Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA))

vii. Clerical

viii. Production Specialists

ix. Supply

x. Transportation

xi. Contractors

xii. Other groups

b. Comments or examples regarding demonstrated sense of urgency (or lack of a sense of urgency) by any of the above groups?
21. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:

a. How was your organization structured before ODS?
   
   (i) Product centered (e.g., F-16 office)
   (ii) Functionally (e.g., Contracting, Engineering, Logistics, Finance)
   (iii) Matrix (e.g., Contracting people working for a program manager)
   (iv) Other ____________________________

b. Did the structure of your organization have to change in response to ODS? If so, how and why?
   
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________

   c. Was there a change in the decentralization of authority during ODS? If so, explain.

   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________
   ____________________________

22. CO-WORKERS EXPERIENCES: How do you think most of your co-workers feel about their experience in support of ODS?
23. DEDICATED TEAMS: Did your organization form any teams dedicated specifically to supporting ODS?

   a. If yes, what functional areas (e.g., production, contracting, engineering, etc.) and other organizations were involved?

   b. Briefly describe the operation of the teams?

   c. How were team members selected?

   d. What did the team accomplish?

   e. Were the teams continued after ODS?

   f. What recommendations would you make for fostering good teamwork?
24. CHALLENGES:

   a. What were the 5 greatest challenges you and your organization faced during ODS (in order of priority). Please explain and give illustrations if possible.

   b. What were the 5 greatest challenges you and your organization faced in the aftermath of ODS (in order of priority). Please explain and give illustrations, if possible.
25. **INSPECTIONS:** Has your organization been audited or inspected since ODS? If so, what was the outcome in regard to ODS procurements?

26. **LEAD TIME:** Did the fact that Desert Shield lasted four months before Desert Storm began allow you to procure items that you would not have had time to procure if hostilities had broken out suddenly? If so, explain.
27. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: What changes do you feel need to be made to the legal aspects of contracting or to contracting policies in order to assist contracting professional in a future military contingency? Please be specific.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

28. ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on your experiences what would you recommend an organization do to make contracting for a contingency situation in the future faster, more cost effective, or more responsive to the customer.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
29. TRAINING:

a. Did you have any special training for responding rapidly to contracting needs for a military contingency?

(i) If so, briefly describe the training.

(ii) When was the training given?

(iii) Who gave the training

(iv) Did the training adequately prepare you for supporting ODS?

b. If you were developing a training package on this subject, what topics would you consider to be essential? Give illustrations, if possible.
30. SUMMARY OF ODS CONTRACTING ACTIONS:

(Approximate values for percentages and dollar values are acceptable. Leave blank if you do not have access to this information.)

IN SUPPORT OF ODS ONLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Actions</th>
<th>Total Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Small Purchases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>Contracts - New Awards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Options Exercised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>Orders - Existing Contracts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>Calls Against BOA's</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>vi.</td>
<td>UCA's</td>
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<tr>
<td>vii.</td>
<td>Competition</td>
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<tr>
<td>viii.</td>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
.ix. | Small Disadvantaged |           |

b. Procurement Acquisition Lead Time (PALT) _____ days

c. Other significant data regarding performance during ODS?
31. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA: During ODS
   a. To which military service or agency were you assigned:
      (i) Navy
      (ii) Marines
      (iii) Army
      (iv) Air Force
      (v) DOD Agency ______________________
   b. Rank or grade ______________________
   c. Level
      (i) Non-supervisory
      (ii) First line supervisor
      (iii) Middle Management
      (iv) Senior Leadership
   d. Job title ______________________

32. ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?

Thank you for participating in this study.
Appendix B: Round One Questionnaire Answers

1. ODS SUPPLIES AND SERVICES: What supplies or services did you contract for in support of ODS?

   a. Food: 1
   b. Clothing: 1
   c. Spare parts: 9
   d. Equipment: 7
   e. Weapons/ammunition: 5
   f. Transport services: 2
   g. Communications: 3
   h. Medical: 0
   i. Other: Aircraft mods and repair
       Contractor support for repair/diagnosis of equipment
       repair of equipment

1-left blank

2. WHERE USED: Where were those supplies and services to be used?

   a. For use specifically in the area of operations: 18
   b. To remain in U.S. as replacements for deployed items: 4
   c. Other: To train in the US before deployment to the Gulf war reserve in and out of AO for repair of engines at depot
       Also in CONUS on aircraft and vehicles destined for shipment to the Middle East worldwide

1-left blank

3. DISPOSITION: Were the items

   a. Consumables: 10
   b. To remain in the area of operations after the conflict ended: 8
   c. To be returned to the U.S. after the conflict ended: 11
   d. To be otherwise disposed of (If so, how?): 6
   e. Not applicable (services, maintenance, etc.): 6

1-left blank

4. WHEN ODS BEGAN: ODS began on 9 Aug 90. How soon after the start of ODS was your organization called upon to procure ODS supplies and services?

   2 months
   We had actually begun some efforts in June.
   2-Almost immediately
   3-immediately

   137
9 Aug 1990
Approximately one month later activity started
1st day
Immediately, 10-12 Aug 90
By Oct 90
2-10 Aug 90
Virtually concurrently
Immediately 8/9. Actually started a few weeks prior to 8/9.
Our support started about 30 days prior to Desert Storm.
30 days
Same day

5. AFTER ODS ENDED: ODS ended on 27 February 91. How soon
after the end of ODS did your new procurement requirements
drop back to pre-ODS levels? (Not counting terminations)

To date, no follow-on buy has been made
They have not been totally eliminated even now. We continue
to supply several systems that are supporting
activities in the Gulf.
Did not drop back--we continued with what we started.
Approximately end of February 1991
FY92
2-30 days
May 91
Within two months
31 Jul 91
Within a few weeks
Dropped back to normal conditions some time in late
December, early January
6 months
About 30 days after the war ended
We are still engaged in post-Desert Storm operations
repairing equipment/aircraft returned from the Middle
East.
We were still expediting or trying to get NOR's items 90
days after war.
90 days after
Immediately reacted acted by reducing some supply levels.
Demand tapered off to normal within two months.
1-left blank

6. SOURCE DEVELOPMENT: Did you have to develop sources for
any ODS supplies or services?

6-No
Normally no
No, existing
No--used existing
No. We are a contract administration office. Our
contractors purchased some one million dollars in
Contractor Acquired Property (CAP) to support
maintenance efforts.
a. If so, what supplies or services?

CWU-66P chemical defense ground and flight crew ensemble
Yes, commercially produced stable food items to augment operational rations

I can think of 2 instances. 1. Battle damage repair kit (BDRK), and AGT1500 (M1 engine) air cleaner (V-pack) vacuum

Commercial truck tractors and trailers to fill a void in the heavy equipment transport functions. We modified buses for medical transport functions.

Airlift
For the most part, these were sole source buys. In some cases for spare parts, we had to develop sources and located available suppliers.

Yes, alternate sources--switches, diodes

Global Positioning System, PRC-1077 radios

Yes, we are always in the process of developing sources for the electronic spare parts we procure.

b. How did you accomplish this?

We went sole source to the developer of the material who was in the textile business only and he subcontracted the various functions required to complete the ensembles

Went to commissary and commercial food stores-read labels of products. Ones which appeared usable called company. After screening, invited several firms to visit.

Bought $72 million worth first week.

BDRK--(parts for) Some parts for this kit had not been previously procured as separate items. We obtained samples, queried the people in our area to know local mfg firms which could make, took the samples to a small local ship, asked him to quote on price and awarded an order for expedited delivery. We found we received high quality parts in a short time at a reasonable price. V-pack vacuum--A company contacted us to inform us they had provided those units to Army bases. Upon investigation we found another company willing to supply the same unit. I sent a technical representative to both companies and on his recommendation we awarded a contract to the best qualified (also price considered). These units (inside a Mil-van) were built, tested at an Army post and on their way to Saudi in 6 weeks.

1. Truck trailer buys: In Sept-Oct 1990 we examined all available (close) commercial equivalents to military trucks. The various truck manufacturers were invited in to brief their current commercial vehicles and/or how their current commercial vehicles could be modified to meet various mission profiles in the area of
operations. We gathered all the information and sent it to headquarters AMC, who apparently never bothered sending it to the Dept of Army. Instead of having a short period of time to execute the buy for heavy equipment transportation equivalents (truck trailers to transport M1's) we had a desperately short period of time. 2. Truck trailer leasing: To identify available source we obtained a list of every transportation firm that had moved M1's in CONUS and began hours and hours of calling across the country to line up transportation firms who would lease us truck tractor and trailer combinations capable of moving M1's.

Contacted all DOD approved domestic and foreign air carriers Sole source--already determined. Spare parts--We checked with electronic manufacturers on sources of supply, distributors, etc., and we checked for available stock throughout the DOD supply system.

Thomas Register, Telecom info from buying activity or similar sources. Prime contractors on sources for end items, reviewing records for prior suppliers and AMARC-surplus and disposal (Davis Monthan AFB, AZ)

Went to commercial market place to find non-MIL-STD items that could meet certain operational parameters.

1. Advertising in the Commerce Business Daily. 2. Posting requirements in the procurement office used by vendors. 3. Soliciting vendors on the bidders' mailing list maintained by our director. 4. Requesting potential sources from the directorate of technical operations. 5. Utilizing the directorate's competition advocate office.

N/A

8-left blank

c. What recommendations do you have concerning source development?

Try to make dual awards during development in order to build in more than one source.

All classes of supply need to give listings of commercially available substitutes to use if required.

On a fast start war basis--none. Parts wear out faster due to climate and usage. Only recommendation is--be responsive. Red tape and archaic procedures that slow up contract/vendor support are not acceptable.

Have pre-arranged agreements with sources which can be used in contingencies like ODS.

We have in the Production Mgt Div a variety of sources both human and reference type to call upon when needed. Sources developed when there is no need may not be there when you need them. For fairly simple items we had little difficulty. Luckily our OEM's
Equipment Manufacturers] were still in production on vehicles so complex items could be borrowed from the line or constructed from them or their sources. The survey of commercial equivalent should be conducted annually with major truck trailer manufacturers. Various operational environments should be considered and the recommended modifications to each identified. We, contracting, production, and technical personnel, need to maintain contact with the commercial firms and understand what the industry is producing that might meet our needs in an emergency.

Start out finding out the end item manufacturer. If item is part of subassembly contact that s:b for sources. Contact buying activity find out if other sources bid and if any other sources ever supplied similar or identical items. Check with QAR [Quality Assurance Representative] at subcontractor to see if they sold to another source and check with them if they ever bought from other sources. Check with buying activities to see if anyone else bid or supplied in past.

If the development of new sources is an integral function of normal operations, the same procedure serves during emergencies such as ODS.

Continue to use the CBD [Commerce Business Daily], public forums, etc.

No recommendations.

9-left blank

7. USE OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS: Did you procure any commercial items for ODS?

4-No

a. What items?

Laser gun sights
We did not purchase anything. We paid the contractor to use spare laptop portable computers which he made to supplement the support equipment the Navy and USAF had already purchased.

Puddings, fruits, entrees, bread, candy, hygiene items
The one that comes immediately to mind is tires. Several commercial tires were adapted to military use. I know there were other items but I'm not sure what they were.

Yes, commercial trucks, trailers, bus conversion packages, and the spare and replacement parts for same.

Replacement parts for machinery
CAP [Civil Air Patrol] aircraft, electrical, electronic and vehicle parts and material.

Wide variety of communications services and equipment
GPS, PRC-1077, Zenith 248 computers
Yes, hospital ground connector (3 prong plug). However, we had problems with quality after inventorying 212,000 ea. Returned from inventory to supplier to manufacturer.

GPS, PRC-1077, Zenith 248 computers

Yes, unable to identify specific items. The directorate of technical operations has a continuing program to use commercial items to the extent they conform to requirements.

None
N/A
6-left blank

b. Was it the first time you had procured these items at all?

2-Yes
Used, yes
5-No
We buy the military versions of the basic vehicles. Technical assist only--corrosion and burrs on prongs. Not for computers.
8-left blank

c. Was it the first time you had procured these items commercially?

5-Yes
5-No
N/A
9-left blank

d. Why did you procure these commercial items for ODS?

The commercial item met the user's requirement.
See above
Industrial mobilization base not able to expand in time to meet requirements
Tire usage was extremely high because of climate and loads. For ODS the M1 was carried on heavy equipment transports to the battle area.
Acquisitions for the military vehicles had been delayed. Although contracts had been signed recently, there were no vehicles being produced yet. Therefore, the shortage of these particular types of vehicles had to be filled with as close as possible commercial equivalents.
Mil standard items not readily available for support
Backorders
To meet mission requirements when government support was unavailable.
My direct mission
N/A

142
There was an operational need that was not met by current assets and no time to develop MIL-STD equipment to meet the need.

8-left blank

e. Were modifications required to use the commercial items in ODS?

2-None
Minor
3-No

They added tubes to some tires. Also, adjustment of valve stems.

Yes, we did the ones we had time for, not necessarily all desired. Had we had more time we could have gotten automatic transmissions (for instance). In a hostile environment the driver shouldn’t have to worry about which gear he or she is in.

Waiver
No, we procured conforming items.
N/A
8-left blank

f. Did the commercial items fully meet the needs of the users during ODS?

5-Yes

Yes, faster than government issue.
Yes, in fact were preferred due to name recognition.

No, we had some problems—bent axles on the trailer from extreme weights in some cases.

Machinery was operational

Couldn’t get quality problems resolved in time. However, was able to expedite other sources.

N/A
8-left blank

g. Will you continue to procure these commercial items in the future?

No known future requirement
?, not ruggedized

Only when shortfalls occur

No, got by in the operating environment, but wouldn’t work in all military environments.

On a case-by-case basis
2-Yes

When quality problem is resolved. Source is replacing inventory.

To some extent
?
N/A
8-left blank
h. What recommendations do you have concerning the use of commercial items?

They are fine to use as long as they meet requirements. Should be a mix—if the laptops failed—they are cheap—but should not be the only reprogramming source.

All mobilization plans should be based upon commercially available items.

DOD should expand the use of COTS.

I believe we should be doing this up front in our design of new systems. Too often we use a part that is unique to the military when a commercial item would serve the same purpose and be easier to buy. Not just during ODS but always.

For specific limited application they can fill the void and the more versatile military vehicles can then be freed up to fill the more demanding assignments. But they are a logistics nightmare!

Make sure they are as good as or better than required items by letting the buying activity make final decision requirements.

Good way to go, especially when required on short notice. Provides instant capability. However, not ruggedized and can lock you into sole source for replacement or logistics support.

None

10-left blank

8. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS: Did you receive any unsolicited proposals from industry for ODS supplies and services?

7-No

N/A

Yes, we routinely receive unsolicited proposals

a. For what?

Classified

All types of food items

I’m sure there were many. The one I’m aware of was the V-pack vacuum system. Also had a contractor offer to recap tires.

I believe there were some, but I’m not familiar enough with the specifics.

Airlift

Yes

Yes, radios, GPS, support services

Unable to identify.

3-N/A

8-left blank
b. Were the unsolicited proposals reviewed and considered?

5 - Yes
Not all, only those close to normally stocked items
I believe so.
Yes, but not considered
2 - N/A
9 - left blank

5 - Yes
Not all, only those close to normally stocked items
I believe so.
Yes, but not considered
2 - N/A
9 - left blank

5 - No
9 - left blank

C. Were they used during ODS?

4 - Yes
All as donations and free issues @ $30 million worth
Don’t know
Some
No
2 - N/A
9 - left blank

4 - Yes
All as donations and free issues @ $30 million worth
Don’t know
Some
No
2 - N/A
9 - left blank

4 - No
2 - N/A
9 - left blank

D. If they were used, were modifications required?

Classified
Not applicable
I don't know.
Don’t know.
2 - Yes
No
3 - N/A
9 - left blank

Classified
Not applicable
I don't know.
Don’t know.
2 - Yes
No
3 - N/A
9 - left blank

2 - None
N/A
10 - left blank

E. What recommendations do you have concerning unsolicited proposals?

Be certain the using organization has a bonafide need for the items.
Need DOD central screening point so as not to waste valuable time at ICP [Inventory Control Point] level to screen.
They are a valuable source of info. Sometimes we don't know what's out there.
Only valuable if we have, as we did in ODS, exhausted all sources
Good way to find out about technologies and products that are available and may not have been considered.
We always accept unsolicited proposals for spare parts and submit them to the directorate of technical operations for review.
2 - None
N/A
10 - left blank
9. ACCELERATED DELIVERY: Did you accelerate delivery on any existing contracts?

3-No

a. If so, for what items?

Yes, A/C modifications
GBU-15-I kits, FMU-143 B/B fuzes
A-6 aircraft cockpit night vision modification, AU-8 aircraft FLIR system
Yes, field reprogramming of missiles to latest configurations, and "quick latch covers"
All items
All open contracts. There were priorities based on need but expedite was a way of life.
Spare parts and certain military truck models on an existing multi-year.
Yes, aircraft engine parts
Canceled planned maintenance, awarded 11 sole source contracts to accelerate delivery
We activated the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to get increased airlift
Trailer hitches, diodes, switches, refueling kit (airplane), dies (electronics)
Yes, all items involved in sustainment of existing communications/electronics equipment.
Yes, cannot identify specific items
Yes, wide variety of equipment
None
N/A
3-left blank

b. Were modifications (specifications, packaging, etc.) necessary to accelerate delivery?

3-No

a. Delivery schedule modification
b. To contract were necessary

Yes, delivery schedules, inspection accelerated, packaging waived in favor of "best commercial"
Yes-commercial equivalent in lieu of spec.
Yes, in some instances.
2-Yes

Yes, but were done after-the-fact in most cases. Mods were to adjust delivery schedules of items not accelerated, as trade-off.
In some cases, mostly alternate handling or shipping instructions.
Yes, especially in packaging area. Also waived first article tests in many instances to get early delivery.
Sometimes
N/A
5-left blank

c. Was there additional cost to accelerate delivery?

Yes, paid overtime
2-Yes
a. Yes b. No
Some overtime and some accelerated vendor material, not much.
Occasional, but not frequently.
Not usually
In certain cases we paid a premium.
Not proposed by contractor
Approximately 10% more
Yes, for CRAF activation
No, contractor requested premium pay and/or modification of delq. contracts but government refused.
Yes, for some items.
Sometimes
N/A
4-left blank

d. What recommendations do you have concerning accelerating delivery?

Insure that increased costs are justified by genuine need.
Once a production lot has been accelerated, future production lots must be accelerated also or there will be a gap in production.
Contractors have excess capacity so deliveries can be accelerated
Get a rough order of magnitude (ROM) MIPR money to ACO, give verbal turn on and audit actuals, only works if you have developed working relationship and trust with contractor and ACO--not friendship-trust and fairness basis.

Keep normal contracts in effect with no acceleration. Issue new contracts on an affordability basis to augment normal requirements.
Always have as popular a war as ODS. Contractors were almost 100% cooperative. Also have a short war. Over an extended period people get tired/burned out.
Hopefully we would have caught up with the cycle eventually and not been required to expedite as much or as often.
Almost all these cases had a unique set of circumstances. Each was worked case-by-case. I can’t think of any universal recommendations.
If demands for airlift are greater than that which can be satisfied on a voluntary basis, CRAF will have to be activated.
None, our system works well

147
Give major contractors description of needs, request their expert input; get out of the way.
Pay premium funds or trade off delq. contracts. Most government employees who do this type work are in need of training.
Most contractors were supportive and accelerated at minimal costs when they could.
Our standard policy regarding acceleration of deliveries was followed and worked well

None

5-left blank

10. RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY: Describe the support you received from industry during ODS?

Support was extremely good. Hocht-Celanes the manufacturer of the material for the chemical defense ensembles described in para 6, did not want to be the prime contractor. However, they realized that in order to meet the required deliveries they would have to be, so they agreed to accept the prime contract.

Industry support was outstanding. Contractors did work-arounds and prioritized DS/DO projects. Some of the contractor technicians deployed with the systems and lived in tents, etc., along with our military members. Generally very responsive and more cooperative than normal.

Industry realized the importance of ODS support and generally cooperated.

Outstanding

Very supportive. Began preparing and planning when requirement became known.

Excellent—a relationship had been established with the prime and two GFE suppliers of rocket motors that basically consisted of the idea that (1) No verbal came from the PCO unless it was sure, (2) the company would get a "fair warning" of any gripe, (3) PCO's word was final and speak up if didn't agree—this relationship with companies and DPRO's was established long before Desert Storm and all the companies performed admirably and without question or hesitation. To the best of my knowledge all were treated fairly in the end—no gripes were registered.

Patriotic, oftentimes unselfish! All wanted to be involved. Had access to CEO's on any issue.

Lots of examples. Everyone has heard how Detroit Diesel put aside their commercial work and delivered engines in 2 weeks. Donaldson Filters (v-packs) had workers show up early at the plant (not expecting overtime) to be sure we had enough filters. A tire dealer in Texas rented a U-haul to get tires to the Army base that was transporting them via Desert Express.

Most vendors understood the urgency and acted accordingly. 24 hour staffing, verbal orders
About 90% of the contractors we dealt with bent over backwards. Individual contractor employees were cooperative, concerned and enthusiastic. Many tirelessly went through "what-if" drills over and over. Many made excellent suggestions on speeding up actions. They were extremely responsive. A few tried to take advantage of the situation. Frequently we were able to undermine their efforts to rip us off--but not always.

Shipowners generally were very responsive to the government's transportation requirements. They were high in demand and could negotiate at the high end of the price scale, because in the shipping industry, a fair price to a shipowner is whatever he can get.

Contractor (GE aircraft engines) worked directly with acquisition agency logistics and contracts personnel, assessed needs for parts (and which parts), by engine model, assessed manufacturing capacities, abilities of vendors to provide raw materials and components. Individuals at all levels could not have done more to support ODS efforts. They did not have to be asked, only to have explained what was required. Everyone extended themselves beyond limits that could have been expected.

Had 11 contractors (all prime) working to make one ship ready.

Generally excellent. Provided communication access, converted passenger planes to cargo planes.

We received tremendous support from industry. We negotiated contracts on the weekend; the companies had people working around the clock; extremely cooperative/patriotic reaction.

I expedited 20 or 25 contracts and everyone contacted were very willing to assist. I had contractors who were paying transportation to upgrade that at their own expense.

Expedited set up of logistics and maintenance facility in country. Expedited manufacture of spares and repairs. Quick start ups, working multiple shifts. On call assistance 7 days/week, 24 hours/day. Top management commitment.

Suppliers were very supportive in responding to requirements which were identified as ODS items.

a. Was there a difference in industry support during ODS as compared to before or after ODS? If so, explain.

Yes, there was an air of cooperation not available before or after ODS. Basically across the various industries that we interface with.

Yes, they were more interested in results.

Industry was more cooperative.

A little better but in general the same.

During ODS--more responsive--less concerned with profit.
Yes, generally more cooperative in expediting deliveries; however, they would not compromise their stands on risk avoidance contract provisions.

Yes, contractor willing to work without formal contract mod and frequently at no change in contract price.

Yes, contractors were more willing to work long hours, shorter material lead times, allow us to prioritize their production. Cooperation and attitude were very high.

Yes, not nearly as adversarial. At times downright enthusiastic without the focus on how much they had to make.

Only that due to the government's demand on the shipping industry with limited resources compatible with military utility, prices were somewhat higher. (Shipping industry has limited resources that are appropriate to support military requirements.)

Yes, Spirit of unity and cooperation was at such a high level previously unseen.

In past, contractor would claim delay and disruption. No claims submitted.

Yes, for the first time CRAF was activated so there were individual carrier problems which had to be worked. Definitely--more responsive, more cooperative, faster turn around times.

Probably. A need to support our troops.

Yes. Everyone wanted to help in any way they could.

Higher level of management support.

There was much more support during ODS.

Yes, response was fast and efficient. No requirements were challenged--just responded. Total team effort.

b. If there was a difference, what do you attribute it to?

Nationalism/patriotism/sense of urgency

Genuine patriotism and a desire for their company and equipment to "look good."

Prevailing national mood of support to our troops during ODS.

5-Patriotism

Increased business opportunity. Patriotism. Pride in wanting to support their system.

Involvement of reserve units throughout U.S. and media coverage made ODS "our war." All companies knew of people over there. Parades in U.S. reinforced patriotism.

Americans were behind ODS. It was popular, it was on TV in everyone's home. All felt they had a part, were involved, had a direct effect on the outcome.

A sense of national unity.

Industry wanted to do their part for the war effort.

Military necessity
Common goals and a sense of sacrifice and dedication to a bigger, important [cause]. Both industry and government personnel had friends and relatives in the theater. We all knew what was at stake--their lives.

See above
Patriotism and the desire to support our troops.
National pride

c. What recommendations would you make regarding relationships with industry?

Government must understand that there is a "two-way-street."
In order to get industry to cooperate it must cooperate with industry. Both sides have problems and both sides must be willing to cooperate with the other.
Remember that we're going to have to live with them after the emergency is over.
Be as open and up-front with industry as we can with respect to our requirements. At the same time maintain a business relationship.
Communicate honestly and frequently
I have only found one or two companies in 20 years that I could not establish a "working relationship" with. I think if you don't set this up in "good times" you cannot when the pressure is on. Things move too fast. The trust must already be there.
Maintain a professional approach to all concerned.
Our relationship with industry is mostly positive. I would try to encourage that by openness and good communication. Let them know what's going on, where we are headed, and as much as possible what we will need from them in the future.
Recognize professionalism of contractors; be open and "up-front." Let them know what the government expects and be ready to discuss problems on both sides; initiate corrective action within government.
Very important that the government and industry understand just how the contingency contracting procedures will work.
Try to develop continuing trusting patriotic relations with industry.
We need to understand the cost contractors incur assisting the government can cause their overhead to change.
Make more timely responses to contractors' questions, waivers, deviation, mods, and other responses required to keep contracts on schedule. The government needs to be more sensitive to contractor needs.
Keep good communications going with sources of supply. Establish and maintain good working relationships during peacetime to assure war time cooperation.
We need to foster more of a cooperative but arms-length relationship.
Military and industry need a partnership based on united need of ODS.
Relationships are good between industry and DECCO. Congress needs to trust acquisition and industry folks and focus on the few bad ones and jail them.

4-left blank

11. DEFENSE PRIORITIES ALLOCATION SYSTEM (DPAS): Under DPAS, contracts can be assigned a "DO" or "DX" rating so industry will give them higher priority than commercial work, particularly in situations like ODS. This can also help prime contractors expedite deliveries from vendors and subcontractors.

a. During ODS, was the DPAS system helpful?

6-No
Yes, we issued some DX contracts. Things moved too fast, not applicable.
4-Yes
We didn’t use it.
Not used
Not applicable, companies knew what was going on in ODS
Not known
Yes, we had a case where we used the ITA999 and a directive was issued.
No, everything was coded so it was as though no system existed.

b. If no, why not?

Didn’t use the system
Don’t believe it was used.
Munitions are "DO" rated orders. All "DO" rated orders have equal priority with each other (i.e., they are worked in order of receipt). Changing DO order priorities requires Department of Commerce directive.
In the past we have found we can achieve quicker, better results ourselves. It is helpful to know the system is there if we need it.
Most of our items are only "DO." I can’t recall the specifics but given the urgency of the situation in Dec-Jan-Feb the powers of intense persuasion were more effective. Our biggest problem was getting quotes. Once in production we could generally get the items.
Not applicable for transportation services
Didn’t have to use, contractors responded.
See above
Everything was coded.
N/A
9-left blank
c. Did you try to change the DPAS rating on existing contracts? If so, were you successful?

5-No
No. If the war had continued we would have had to--especially for subcontractors/vendors.
Yes, successful.
DO and DX ratings are program driven and can't be changed by DPAS. However, as in (a) above DPAS ITA999 can assist with the issuance of a directive.
Yes, some DO went to DX
No change on existing--used it once on a new contract.
N/A
8-left blank

d. What recommendations would you make concerning the DPAS system?

None, the system worked well.
Your relationship with the contractor is more important.
It became obvious that the government people do not really understand how the DPAS system relates to other priority systems like "Brick Bat" etc. Think we need some training.
1. Streamline process to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize similarly rated contracts.
2. Create new rating between "DX" and "DO" which could be used during wartime for war supplies.
None; however, President needs to declare "partial mobilization" to support rating changes.
Ironically most of the DX items are in plants that are primarily military. So giving it a higher priority than commercial is meaningless. Industry was generally well under capacity during ODS. So changing priorities wasn't necessary. Getting quotes, materials, and subcomponents in quickly was a problem. Wasn't there an issue with the DPAS? not extended?
I recommend all contractors review the DPAS booklet, sound and slide or VCR film on DPAS, which is available through all DCMAO offices.
We prioritized our war stoppers and then competed with other services against theirs. Need a DOD war stopper priority allocation during conflicts.

3-None
N/A
6-left blank
12. WAIVERS TO THE REGULATIONS: At any time during ODS would your organization have been able to work more effectively if a waiver or deviation to the FAR or DFARS had been granted?

6-No
6-Yes
N/A, did waiver when prudent
Absolutely
No, we presently have an expeditious system.

a. If yes, a waiver or deviation for what?

Small business review waiver. Increased J&A review threshold.

Several: Enable delegations of commander approval of UCA's above $5 million. Deviations to law restricting amount of expenditures which can be made under a UCA. SAF designations of urgent ODS requirements as Public Exigency requirements. SAF execution of a class unusual and compelling urgency J&A for certified ODS requirements. Modification of AFSC FAR supplement to allow CO approval of use of UCA when needed for a certified ODS requirement. AF and AFSC waiver of all reviews except CO and JAG for any contract document (priced or unpriced) implementing urgent ODS requirements. Waiver of 1279 reporting on initial award of ODS contracts or modification. Air Force waiver of acquisition plan format and delegation of AF approval to no higher than the product division level for ODS requirements. SAF approval to automatically continue performance of an ODS contract in the face of a protest at the GAO level. Delegation of HCA individual FAR deviation authority to the product division for urgent ODS contracts.

Increase dollar threshold of SPO 2-letter to approve UCA's. SPO 2-letter currently has $5 M authority.

Not a reg, a law. During a fight delegate J&A authority back to the PCO and waive CDB to one level above-the system is much too slow.

Just about anything not affecting wholesomeness
Allowing us to bypass the requirement to compete or to justify the use of sole source or directed source.

Waivers: During times such as ODS, there should be automatic release from the onerous papering of the files that slows down buying. When the President makes an announcement creating an area of operation, contracting officers should have the latitude to act quickly and insure lives aren't lost because of a stupid piece of paper. During the last crisis, a lot of pieces of paper were created (often explaining why another piece of paper wasn't there!). Yes, we did them. We wrote up something and our lawyers rewrote it
and our boards approved the buys. But is that really what the taxpayers want? Why are we papering contracting files—meaninglessly—and risking lives?

Commercial buys were the major problem areas—this time.

Try getting a subcontracting plan from a firm that rarely does business with us—and the vehicles were built 6 to 8 weeks earlier. It's a totally meaningless exercise. You're not going to change the way the item was built. (And if it's commercial, do you want to impose those requirements? Is it still the commercial item if it's changed in order to comply with subcontracting goals?)

Yes, I realize there is latitude in the laws/regs, but why are these types of requirements relevant. Why aren't they automatically lifted in times of an emergency?

We did a J&A for every file. We followed all the board rules, all the cost accounting rules, all the social program rules—or where latitude existed, we explained how we were exercising that latitude.

But if the outcome had been different, and we all ended up in front of a senate subcommittee explaining, can you imagine the disgust, if lives had been lost, because of delays due to the time associated with filling out that paperwork!

It was relatively easy to buy most military items—this time.

Contractors already had most of their subcontracting plans, accounting systems, FPRA's in place. There were open contracts we could just add to or modify easy.

But with the downsizing and cutbacks, many if not most of those contracts will not be in place, in just a year or two. And we won't have the production lines to steal the parts we need. The whole DOD defense production landscape will have changed and our ability to acquire the parts/equipment needed for the next emergency will be much more limited.

In other words, the difficulties associated with commercial buys during ODS may be the norm next time.

Source identification (are they still in business?), holding a contractors hand through the process of
filling out all our forms and certification, understanding the provisions, and with fewer buyers.

We need an active, ongoing program that continually asks the question: If an area of operations opens up tomorrow, what will we need, how will we buy it? Different areas--different answers.

Was a waiver requested?

In the early 1980's a buyer sent a suggestion to headquarters requested waivers and change delegations of authority to lower levels during operations such as ODS.

The acquisition headquarters response? We don't need to process this suggestion. When the time comes, the waivers will be granted!

There were no waivers! They didn't come--as promised.

Early on, headquarters refused to process the J&A for ODS and insisted each action have its own J&A.

During ODS we would get calls from headquarters and when we offered to return the call on a Saturday, their answer was typically, "No, it can wait until Monday." There was never any sense of urgency at headquarters. And they certainly weren't working Saturdays. Nor were they trying to make things easier!

With the total absences of any headquarters involvement, the message to the field was loud and clear: "You are on your own!"

Once we were working weekends and holiday, pressing to squeeze more and more actions out of a day, there wasn't time to think about waivers.

Late in the process (January or February) I can remember headquarters requesting suggested waivers, changes or regulatory relief--but insisting on documented support for each. It had a short suspense.

If we stopped to do their job, critical actions might have been delayed. We knew how critical the equipment was. It had to get there! Given the information we had, we knew there was little time left and there was no real point in investing time in requesting waivers.

There was no contracting leadership in Washington. Nothing we could see or feel that meant we would probably have to do all the work of writing a waiver,
and supporting it, without any likelihood they (headquarters, service department, and DOD contracting) would push it through. If you’re working as many hours as we were and talking directly to Saudi, the attention was on serving the folks in the area of operations, whose lives were at stake—not on being responsive to people who had already let us down.

Service Contract Act-wage determinations, synopsis publication and response time

Waiver of CICA for military necessity rather than having to justify all sole source actions.

Small business review, blanket waiver to synopsis/J&A, blanket waiver to cost/pricing data, waiver to review process for undefinitized contracting actions

Delegate UCA authority below the HCA

b. Was a waiver or deviation requested?

Yes, informally
5-Yes
No for SCA. There was a current waiver in place for synopsis publication and response times for certain types of procurements for the "spot market;" however, a blanket waiver for synopsis waiver for ODS was not requested.
Informally
3-No
No—didn’t have time—we just did it.
7-left blank

c. If requested, was the waiver or deviation granted?

No formal request made
Partially
2-No
2-Yes
None granted
N/A
11-left blank

d. If needed but not requested, why wasn’t it requested?

Was told it wouldn’t be approved
UCA expenditure limit is in law with no deviation or waiver possibility in the law; therefore, to change it requires a change in law.

Congress, to the best of my knowledge, did not give us a waiver of any procurement regulations. The work arounds that we initiated were done locally.

No time available to put together a comprehensive waiver request package. Also, based on previous synopsis waivers requested, approval time was too long.
NAVSUP guidance already established the ground rules. Didn’t have time. We awarded most contracts within hours. N/A
12-left blank

13. REQUIREMENTS: How did you learn of your ODS procurement requirements or potential requirements?

a. Who originated the requirements?

Using commands through the program office to my contracting division
Our program office
Program office and user
From the program manager, the cognizant program office
Program office—from OpNav and USAF staff.
We generated our own based upon classified troop strength
Our supply directorate and in some cases the program management organizations.
Spares—the item manager; vehicles—the users in Saudi
Normally, requirement came via MTMC from the Army, Navy, Marines
Agency logistics personnel
Squadron commander
Transcom submitted to the MAC crisis action team (CAT).
From CAT requirement went to Craf and then to contracting.
Engineers at our activity. The requirements were driven by program managers in NAVAIR and our representatives at weapon stations and aboard carriers.
Requirements people at the ALCs and at Army and Navy units.
Buying activities, item managers’ print outs, post awards, engineering
NICP
Normal channels
CENTCOM J-6
1-left blank

b. When?

At the initiation of Desert Shield
2-Daily
After the start of Operation Desert Shield
One month or so into (Fall after invasion)
D+1
As requisitions came in, as stock levels were inventoried, as studies were completed and demands anticipated.
About 1 week prior to needed delivery.
Just prior to ODS.
On 8/9.
As the requirement was validated—throughout the day.
Throughout the conflict and 30 days prior.
As deployment commenced.
c. Were the requirements clearly described? (e.g., Did you receive enough information about the requirements to proceed with the procurement actions in a timely fashion?)

3-Yes
2-Most of the time
For the most part the buying office went ahead with acquisition even though the SPO had not yet received funding or direction from the Pentagon.
The acquisition team worked together to flesh out the requirement.
No, asked what can be done to make the weapon better.
Program office and contractor knew options.
Yes, provided number and types of meals
As far as I know in most cases.
Generally, but spares for the commercial vehicles were extremely difficult to define
Sometimes and sometimes not. Requested delivery dates changed frequently which caused changes to RFPs. This was not easy because normal award time from issuance of RFP to award was 3 days.
No. Generally, contractor was asked "How many of "x" can you deliver per month?" or "Can you deliver 10,000 of "x" per month, we need them!"
Initial requirements clear; however, they were a moving target and kept changing.
Requirement clear. Problems arose with security issues, crews, clearances.
Not always, needed additional info from industry.
Normally, yes. You can not program abnormal wear out and breakage.
Requirements were clear. However, getting enough information about items (NSN, P.N. nomenclature, etc.) was hard to get in some cases because we didn't have contract.
1-left blank

d. Was funding available when the requirements were first identified?

4-No
3-Generally
2-Not always
1-Yes
7-Yes
Yes, funds were not limited.
For spare parts, yes; for vehicles, no
Not always. We used our own activity funding on occasion.
Our activity was NIF [Naval Industrial Funded] funded at that time and sometimes requirer's funds replaced the NIF funds after contracts were awarded.

159
We received a multimillion PR which allowed us to expedite requirements once received.

2-left blank

e. If requirements were not clearly identified or if funding was not available in a timely fashion, how did you react?

We worked the requirements as if funds were available. In all but one instance funds arrived before we were ready to award the contract. One effort was delayed awaiting receipt of funds.

We worked with the program managers to figure out what was actually needed. We started on the contracts but did not issue them until the money was received.

Moved out anyway, even though we had no direction or funding--Contracting was not going to be the reason a contract award was late.

See c. above.

Worked with PM, Navy engineer, and contractor to come up with best option and did it.

Would make inquiries or get people together to clear up questions, uncertainties.

Generally you did as much as you possibly could--source identification, on-the-shelf availability, drafting contracts in advance--anything that could be done before the money got there.

Normally, verbal clarifications were made to ensure timely action.

Contractor and procuring activities were working so fast we tried to keep out of the way. However, we kept informed and made some administrative recommendations.

Used activity funding

Aggressively tried to respond to contractor to identify and correct problems ASAP.

Phone and fax coordination

2-N/A

5-left blank

f. Did relations with the ultimate user change as a result of the experiences with ODS?

3-No

2-Not significantly

Hard to say--Pilots were happy.

No, always enjoyed close relationship.

Yes, the user still wants requirements met as quickly as they were done during ODS.

Hard to assess. Believe field personnel were impressed by response from the whole country.

No change

No, our customers remain satisfied.

Yes, in the positive.
Definitely. Better relationship, greater understanding of user needs.
Yes and no. Buyers and post award personnel were not as aggressive as I thought they should be. Better communications links were established and have been maintained.

3-left blank

g. What recommendations would you make in regard to identification of requirements and availability of funding?

Users must be more aggressive in providing funds. To do this they must receive full cooperation from the HQ USAF.
Work even closer with the program managers and try to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.
Push authority to issue direction/funding down. During ODS funding/requirements approval was elevated to USAF/CV.
The program had money to do production anyway. We just accelerated and did in the field in the desert. Can't say on funding, but OSD/OPNAV should immediately make a pot available for legitimate requirements like acceleration.
Food should have pre-designed requirements in advance. When balloon goes up--just issue on pre-design.
The earlier the better. Also, take a few minutes to examine the requirement to be sure you are asking for what is needed. "Go slow to go fast."
If we spent time now planning how we would have to support various types of operations we could eliminate a lot of the confusion when the emergency happens.
In emergencies, routine matters must be able to be handled in a more direct fashion; i.e., fewer reviewers and "sign-offs."
In a crisis, it is difficult to determine these things in advance.
Better coordination between buying activity and DCMAO.
We have developed a package of pre-positional requirements that were the most common for the future.
The armed forces identified about 150 weapons systems for which spare parts usage was expected to accelerate. However, this took about two months. This process needs to be accelerated for future operations.

6-left blank

14. COMMUNICATIONS: During ODS did your organization have direct communications link-ups with individuals in the area of operations?

5-No
4-Yes
No communication
None. Utilized contractor comm sources.
No--dial up

a. What kinds of communications link-ups did you have (phones, fax)?

Yes, most contacts through program office (joint USN/USAF)
Phone, fax, e-mail, message (all secure and unsecure)
All, mostly phone
Phones, fax--the PM traveled over these
Phones, fax, ship-to-shore communication, messages
Yes, a temporary contract administrator was sent.
Phones, fax
Phones, faxed, messages and letters.
Direct contact, letters, print outs, phones, and fax.
Phone, fax, message
Telephone
We provided commercial service voice grade through wideband
service.
7-left blank

b. Did you have a dedicated point of contact in the area of
operation?

2-No
A number of them
Yes, at all levels
5-Yes
Yes, in all instances.
None now at DCMAO
I assigned personnel there.
6-left blank

If so, was the dedicated point of contact a
9-left blank
(i) Contracting specialist: 4
(ii) End item user: 4
(iii) Other: contract personnel
distribution type
military, logistics type
military officers
engineer
logistics specialist

162
d. What topics did you discuss with your point of contact?

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8-left blank

(i) What was needed: 8

Commercial spare parts to support commercial vehicles

(ii) When items were needed: 8

(iii) When items would be delivered: 7

or redelivered

(iv) Marking, containerization, transport of items: 4

(v) Other: Make next trys more efficient.
   When leased vehicles would be returned,
   what condition they were in, etc.
   Problems encountered with vessels
   Contract admin items
   Requirements definition
   How many ODS, NOR's and/or back orders,
   monthly usage, system down, was
   contractor working on other ODS orders.

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e. Did you and your dedicated point of contact ever discuss whether items would be bought in the CONUS or in the gulf area?

3-No
3-Yes
I don't know, but I'm sure it was discussed.
No, assumed CONUS purchase.
Pre-award function only
No, CONUS only
N/A
8-left blank

If so, what were the primary factors influencing the decision?

Quality and timeliness
   Time
   Cost effectiveness, speed
   Obtaining conforming supplies.
   Pre-award survey
   Ability to get items to where they were needed at the proper time.
2-N/A
11-left blank

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f. If these methods of direct communication had not been available, what impact would there have been on your ability to be responsive to the needs of the user in the area of operations?

Greatly reduced
Not as responsive—we reassigned items based upon user comments almost monthly.
We would have still received the information but not as quickly. Also, knowing the person (formerly our Deputy Division Chief) kept the motivation personal and high.
Much, much more difficult, far less responsive
Serious impact—could have resulted in mission failure
Negative impact on commercial airlift time sensitive information.
Severe impact due to delays in communications.
Slower
None
It would have been harder to control proper disposition of items.
Much slower
8-left blank

15. DELIVERY FOLLOW-UP: Did you track the delivery of the procured items to the area of operations?

5-No
No, program office did
We didn’t but program office did.
8-Yes
Yes, in some instances, at a minimum to the point where the military took control.
No, only tracked them to weapon station, or port of debarkation at Norfolk, VA.
Yes, through prime contractors.
1-left blank

a. If yes, describe your experiences regarding any of the following:

   (i) containerization and marking
   (ii) transportation
   (iii) supply and issue
   (iv) receiving dock
   (v) other logistical support

Much of our material hand carried by contractor or met at both ends by contractor or military (program office) personnel—success rate very high
Mission departure and arrivals tracked continuously.
Passenger and cargo processing and flow monitored.

164
All were trucked from vendor to POD. Ships were manifested and followed—but lost at tranship points in Spain. Receivers did not know whether they received or not. No ADP or stock control system in theater—real mess.

Transportation was one of our biggest problems, mainly because of the difficulty in getting material into New Cumberland. Truckers did not want their rigs tied up. Because of this contractors had a great deal of difficulty in finding a trucker to pick up their material. Workers in the contractor’s plant had worked extremely hard to manufacture parts at our request and became frustrated at seeing the material sit on the dock.

We hired a field service representative from Mack Truck and another who was very familiar with the commercial vehicles. They were there when the boats docked in the theater of operation. That proved to be critical in successfully mating up the equipment.

Vessels were tracked using all types of communication from time of delivery to the loadport, ocean transit arrival in dischargeport, until redelivery of vessel to ship owner.

Most problems incurred were buying activity failure to modify contract to change mode of transportation in order to expedite shipments, and duplication of efforts by activity and admin office.

(i) Enabled our local rep to find it if we knew where the pallet went. (ii) Problem getting prioritization and knowing when pallets were actually put on planes. (iii) Pallets hard to track when received. Needed local rep to find our equipment and make sure it was sent to right place.

DECCO provided commercial communications service. I was the exception to ship end items.

Unknown

9-left blank

b. What recommendations would you make in the above areas?

First line weapon system immediately establish dedicated point of contact both at staging area in U.S. and at arrival point in combat zone.

All are possible to correct

1-shipping stores based upon van number and content
2-external markings to facilitate customer
3-food ADP system

None, system worked well.

Do a better job of distributing the containerization if one depot cannot handle the work load. Have the commander willing to recognize there is an overall problem and he needs help. Be willing to waive some of the regulations regarding who/which company transports the material.
Tracking equipment: 1. There have to be more efficient ways with all the high tech bar coding and bar coding reading equipment available today. 2. We need on-the-shelf available bar coding equipment that would have been used to identify equipment as it was being loaded so that it would be easily assembled/mated when it arrived. Commercial equipment logistic support: Hiring a field service representative to assist in country was a life saver. Should have put him in country with a full-up maintenance van and set of high turnover parts (filters, etc.)

Augment the command workforce. Many buying activity personnel are not aware of DCMAO efforts and follow up right behind them also duplicating both DCMAO and contractor efforts. The buying activities need training or proper procedures for handling follow up. This is a much abused system by all activities. Better system of identifying where and when items were to be shipped. Centralize distribution at arrival point and assure items are identified and targeted for proper delivery point.

None, the industry was outstanding.

16. CONTRACT PAYMENT: Did your contractors encounter any payment problems with ODS contracts?

10-No
Yes, on UCA's
2-Yes
Very few complaints.
Yes, yes. Again it was the commercial contractors not familiar with the system that had the most problems.
No problems experienced
In early stages--only insignificant amount
None other than normal
None

a. If so, please explain the causes?

The UCA expenditure limit, see question 12d.
PCO and ACO made sure they didn't.
Receipts not verified for direct shipments to ODS users
Contract awarded and parts shipped before the distribution was made to the payment office.
In part the reorganization of the payments office, contractor's billing for the first time, and frankly, people who didn't give a damn in the payment offices.
Initially interest penalties paid due to volume of delivery orders issued and problems with invoices.
Payment office was overwhelmed with work, just like everyone else, and certain types of procurement require payment within 10 days versus 30 days.

b. What recommendations would you make to prevent payment problems?

A change to the UCA expenditure law which will permit some level within DOD to approve the expenditure of more than 75% of the NTE price prior to definitization of the UCA.

Pay based upon vendor shipping document instead of DD 250.

A computer system which is acceptable to all and relays award info immediately and is not dependent on hard copy transfer of contract data.

We need a system more compatible with commercial business—prompt and efficient with minor paperwork. We almost bankrupted certain contractors, especially the lease contractor who loaned us all their vehicles (and their livelihoods) and then wouldn't pay them. I spent hours and hours on the phone with payments office. Wrote justification after justification. Basically they wanted me to prove a guy would go bankrupt before they'd rush payment. Of course, the only way to prove it is to wait and see.

Other than hiring additional knowledgeable people, do not have any recommendations.

17. JUSTIFICATIONS AND APPROVALS (J&A’s): During ODS,

a. What was the dollar threshold for local approval of J&A’s?

$25 million
AFLC/PK $10 M
7-$10 million
$100
None
2-$1 million
$50 million
3-N/A
2-left blank

b. Did the majority of your procurements which required J&A’s fall under this dollar threshold?

3-No
5-Yes
Not sure
Did not require J&A's
In this case yes.
All but one was under $1 M
All
2-N/A
4-left blank
c. Did you request authority to use a blanket J&A?

5-No
No, we already had an annual J&A approval.
5-Yes
Yes, class J&A for each phase of the war--Phase I-Desert Shield, Phase II-Desert Storm, Phase III-Desert Sortie
Had blanket J&A authority before we started
No, NAVSUP prior guidance.
N/A
4-left blank
d. If so, was the use of a blanket J&A approved for ODS?

Not specifically for ODS. We have two class J&A's approved by Assistant Secretary of the Air Force each year and we were able to use them to support ODS.

2-No
2-Yes
No! No! No!
Yes for certain classes of items
5-N/A
7-left blank
e. If not requested or not approved, please explain.

Not needed
Guessed right on requirements and didn't need it.
Headquarters refused to forward to DA and sent back.
Advised by approval authority to satisfy requirements of CICA.
See above
DCMAO technical
2-N/A
10-left blank
f. What recommendations would you make regarding the use of J&A's?

Suggest that class J&A's be permitted for longer periods of time--with interim reports to approval authority--with provisions that J&A's could be amended while still open to change minor portions--such as increase in $ if circumstances remain the same.
Was to our benefit to have a blanket J&A.
During these emergencies there should be a delegation from headquarters to the product divisions. If requirements or groups of requirements can be accurately estimated, then class J&A's are the way to go. In the future, a war plan annex be developed which contains a class Public Exigency J&A which can be activated by message. DOD FAR supplement should authorize use of "unusual and compelling urgency" for wartime supplies/services to justify other than full and open competition. Set up some standard blanket (generic) to be used only under combat conditions. Need blanket approval, otherwise totally senseless waste of time doing each individually. Similar situations to ODS war power act should be enough justification. Provide for emergency methods to include blanket J&A's or other authorization for procuring agency to contract with established suppliers to acquire hard wave without normal administrative routine. Blanket approval/waiver of J&A's—delegate authority to local level. Give authority to HCAs regardless of dollar amount during war time.

5-left blank

18. CONTRACTING METHODS:

a. What contracting methods were used to meet ODS procurement needs:

(i) Accelerating delivery on existing contracts: 13
(ii) Exercising options on existing contracts: 12
(iii) Issuing delivery orders on existing indefinite delivery contracts: 10
(iv) Awarding new contracts: 14
(v) Awarding new purchase orders: 9
(vi) Awarding new orders under BOA's: 11
(vii) "Borrow - Payback" (i.e., Taking delivery of spare parts from weapon system production lines.): 5
(viii) Other: 2-letter contracts

Accelerating existing kit BOA orders, expanding existing orders, changing location of retrofit, etc.
Leases
Deceleration on parts not required to allow assets/machinery to manufacture parts required
Pre-award, post-award, progress payments, identify problems and make recommendations.

UCAs

b. What contract types were used for ODS procurements

1. Left blank
   (i) Firm Fixed Price: 17
   (ii) Fixed Price Incentive Firm: 2
   (iii) Fixed Price Award Fee: 0
   (iv) Cost or Cost Sharing: 2
   (v) Cost Plus Fixed Fee: 4
   (vi) Cost Plus Incentive Fee: 0
   (vii) Cost Plus Award Fee: 0
   (viii) Time and Material: 8
   (ix) Indefinite Delivery: 3
       (a) Definite Quantity: 0
       (b) Requirements: 3
       (c) Indefinite Quantity: 3

Parts and material purchased under competitive bidding concepts.

c. Were any of the following used:

5. Left blank
   No
   (i) Letter contracts: 9
   (ii) Change orders: 9
   (iii) Other undefinitized contractual actions: 9

BOA orders
Of sorts, existing LOE support was "burned" quickly and replaced later-i.e., sustaining engineering
With WOA

d. Did any of your contractors start work "at their own risk" (without a contract)?

10. Yes
    Probably
    V.s, verbals, paperwork caught up
    Not to my knowledge
    No
    Many started on verbal direction
    Verbal direction was given when hostilities broke out for carriers to expend costs to divert. Direction followed us in writing.
    We gave them written/oral intentions to place contracts.
    Yes, twice
    Not aware of any
e. What recommendations would you make regarding methods of contracting and types of contracts?

During times of crisis the establishment must understand the need for blanket letter contract approval. When "cutting corners" don't do anything stupid. A provision permitting the commander to delegate UCA approval authority to lower limits in wartime situations. UCAs are quickest way to get on contract. Be as flexible as possible. Careful use of ceiling prices/not to exceed/Scope and $ definitization later with actuals audited. Project rate pre-determined. Existing types provide necessary flexibility We need to have in place contractual instruments that are responsive to emergencies: BOA's, BPA, etc., for critical items for long lead time categories. Allow decision-making authority at the procuring activities. FFP and T&M worked well for repair situations. The IDIQ type contract allowed contracting to vary requirements. Waiver of UCA approvals. Present system works well. Keep flexibility in. Lower approval thresholds during wartime to HCA and below. None, our system worked fine. None N/A 2-left blank

19. WORKLOAD IMPACT: What was the impact of ODS on the workload of the individuals in your organization?

a. No real difference from normal, non-ODS workload: 1 False

b. More overtime required than for normal workload

Varied by organization
2-None
   (i) Extensive: 8
   (ii) Some: 8
   (iii) Very Little: 1

c. If overtime was required, was it

2-left blank
None
   (i) Constant: 7
   (ii) Frequent: 4
   (iii) Occasional: 5
d. Were extra employees used for the ODS workload?

1-left blank

(i) Reservists: 4
(ii) Temporary employees: 4
(iii) Retired civil service annuitants: 3
(iv) Borrowed from other organizations: 4
(v) No extra employees used: 10

e. Did employees in your organization have to work

Some
1-left blank
No

(i) week-ends: 15
But not much
(ii) holidays: 8

f. During ODS were employees in your organization on-call
(i.e., issued beepers or restricted to the geographic area
during off-duty hours)?

5-No
Some
Yes
Only one, myself; kept command advised where I could be reached
1-left blank

(i) Constantly: 4
(ii) Frequently: 3
(iii) Occasionally: 3

g. Other comments about workload

Routine buys were postponed. We weren’t able to do as much
planning and follow-up as we usually do--had to go into
more of a reactive instead of proactive mode.

$ for OT never came up
1. Productivity up 50% per hour per person
2. Great team effort--all contributed
3. Almost no sick leave

Based on volume of orders processed to support ODS,
contingency plan to augment workforce being developed.
Tremendous impact. We could have eliminated a lot of the
expense by waivers and delegations pushing the approval
authorities down. With downsizing it’s important we
retain through part-time, job sharing, or any other
desired alternative, trained, knowledgeable individuals
available for use in an emergency. It takes 3-5 years
to reasonably train a buyer. Hiring new employees in
an emergency will not provide the return on investment
converting a trained part-time employee to full time would.
We did not see large numbers of additional contracts (BOA orders); however, orders were larger quantity and dollars.
Other contracts not needed were not always reported in a timely manner.
None
11-left blank

20. SENSE OF URGENCY:

a. Which of the following groups demonstrated a sense of urgency in accomplishing the ODS support mission?

i. Contracting office personnel
   (a) Buyers and contracting officers: 18
   (b) Local review committee members: 12
   (c) Legal: 12
   (d) Price analysts: 10
   A, B, D are the same at NAVAIR

ii. Higher Headquarters
   (a) Policy staff: 7
   (b) Contract review staff: 6

iii. Contract Administration Office personnel (Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)): 7
   ACO was outstanding
   It varied
   We do our own admin

iv. Program management, engineering, & program control: 11
   Yes, around the clock
   Customer

v. Accounting and finance: 6
   Yes, worked Sundays and Saturdays with us

vi. Auditors (Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)): 2 Ok

vii. Clerical: 12
viii. Production Specialists: 5
ix. Supply: 6
x. Transportation: 6
Varied

xi. Contractors: 14
xii. Other groups:

- higher level approving authority
- internal contracting administration
- office personnel
- Wright-Patterson Contracting Center.

We are the last depot level CAS office in the AF. We administer DOD contracts, same as DCMC.

b. Comments or examples regarding demonstrated sense of urgency (or lack of a sense of urgency) by any of the above groups?

Staff offices, both local and headquarters treated the Desert Storm requirements as business as usual.

Upper level management was quite responsive. Middle and lower level individuals often times didn't see ODS as a "real" war and did not feel compelled to do anything out of the ordinary.

Under xii-the command level staff did not demonstrate any sense of urgency, the decision makers did.

From a contracting standpoint it did not appear there was any urgency by higher headquarters.

The acquisition team worked as a group of cohesive professionals to get the job done.

Front line people (all involved in day-to-day activities) all reacted well.

Those that were not responsive to my needs could be easily forced to be so by emphasizing their contribution or lack of same to the war.

In the beginning of ODS there were some personnel in the above areas who lacked the motivation or willingness to support ODS. By October the organization had established policies, new guidelines, and procedures and was an efficient, smoothly running team. I'm sure there were some individuals who never "got on board" or had a personal reason for not being a part of the team but they were overrun by others. In my organization (Production Management) I did not find one example of someone who refused to help. Some only gave 10% over their usual amount, some gave much more.

A DCMAO transportation on the west coast ordered a contractor not to ship--the vehicles missed the boats the PEO had managed to schedule specifically for these vehicles. We had to terminate the contract. It cost us $150K. (plus working all weekend to find other trucks on the east coast that could still meet the boat's departure date.) The attitude in particular among DCMAO transportation officers was frequently non-supportive.

Throughout the procurement "chain" to the individual sweeping the floor in the factory, everyone bent over backwards to do their job--asked what else can I do?
This entire command responded to the situation at hand with a sense of urgency to support our troops on the front line.

Accelerated contracting actions were required in all of the above areas. Insurance-indemnification under PL85804 required expedited review/coordination before forwarding to SAF for approval. Contract modifications expedited.


There was a great deal of urgency from post awards groups; however, we could never get them to expedite mods, waivers, and deviations.

Everyone pulled together as a team and worked towards supporting ODS.

It was our experience that there was a general sense of urgency.

Everyone performed above and beyond the call.

21. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE:

a. How was your organization structured before ODS?

   (i) Product centered (e.g., F-16 office): 0
   (ii) Functionally (e.g., Contracting, Engineering, Logistics, Finance): 16
   (iii) Matrix (e.g., Contracting people working for a program manager): 3

Assisting program manager as a team element

   (iv) Other: 0

b. Did the structure of your organization have to change in response to ODS? If so, how and why?

   16-No

   We set up matrix type teams

No. Within contracting office, however, contract specialists from Domestic Airlift office were utilized to assist international airlift buyers.

No. Although functionally structured, we have always worked as an integrated team by engine program. Thus, our technical and administrative experts were used to working together. We did designate principal points-of-contact for each engine program.
c. Was there a change in the decentralization of authority during ODS? If so, explain.

10- No
At the local level yes, manual approval authority was doubled, AP approval levels for non-SAF AP's was doubled, ASP's were waived for lower dollar value; i.e., below $100 million production.
PCOs have a lot of authority at NAVAIR
Strong individuals emerged to assume authority. The organization was smart enough to allow them to function.
I would guess there was much more decision making at lower levels. I couldn't possibly keep up with everything that was going on and neither could anyone else. The individual teams by weapon system met and made decisions to get the job done. People were much more willing to take that responsibility.
Yes, it just evolved into a more decentralized by virtue of people taking on the responsibility. And the leadership of the command encouraging this approach.
No, change was that there were face-to-face meetings to obtain approvals.
No, only expedited responses from upper level management.
Not from NAVSUP. We did issue temporary PCO warrants to select individuals.
1-left blank

22. CO-WORKERS EXPERIENCES: How do you think most of your co-workers feel about their experience in support of ODS?
Frustrated by the business as usual approach taken by staff offices.
In retrospect I'm sure they feel good about the contribution they made.
I believe they felt a sense of achievement in being able to support ODS requirements, most of which required work on an uncompensated overtime/weekend basis. Most people were willing to go ahead because they recognized the importance of the job being done.
Rewarding
Very positive experience
Much the same as I do.
Most positive experience of their professional lives
I believe they were as amazed as I how much was accomplished and the spirit in which it was done.
Great! I know we all did a tremendous job and I know everyone knows it. We know what our goals were. We knew our objectives and there was only one--support the soldier. Our commander was supportive, everyone helped. I wish we were as efficient all the time.
We felt proud; we made a difference; we were willing to do a little extra when asked.
Very good about what they accomplished. But their respect for the contracting leadership in Washington is probably at an all time low!
At the time, it was exhausting, but most people had fun because things could be done quickly and feedback on results was prompt. People were "high" on success.
Proud of their support.

Satisfied that we did our part.
The experience was very positive for the employees. A majority of employees were very willing to work excessive hours, weekends, holidays, and shifts to contract airlift to support our country. Workers were proud to be an active part of the DS effort.

Wanted to do anything they could to accomplish mission. Most were proud to ge a chance to assist ODS.
Proud. It’s a good feeling to know that when it counts, the organization works well.
Support of ODS was a positive experience which imparted a feeling of unity and a sense of purpose to what may normally be viewed as a routine job.
Proud!

23. DEDICATED TEAMS: Did your organization form any teams dedicated specifically to supporting ODS?

5-No
Only the Rapid Response Process team members
No, existing teams were used.
No, HARM team already in place, functioning.

5-Yes
No; however, existing groups did bond together more that before.

Did not have to; already had them.
Yes, one team

The entire airlift contracting office was drawn upon to assist in purchasing international airlift expansion services.

No, everyone supported ODS.
No, our normal organizational structure was adequate.

a. If yes, what functional areas (e.g., production, contracting, engineering, etc.) and other organizations were involved?

ASO/XR, comptroller, logistics, engineering, 4950th test wing, Wright laboratories
Quality, technical, supply, procurement, and military service

1. Production, contracting, engineering, supply, transportation, maintenance, product assurance, readiness

Production, contracting, engineering, quality, and the maintenance with top management review and support.
Production, contracts, engineering, quality
Team developed included ACO, price analyst, production controller, supervising surveyor and numerous trade people
All Contracting
N/A 10-left blank

b. Briefly describe the operation of the teams?

This team was set up as an ASO focal point for incoming combat mission needs statements (CMNS) from SAF and ultimately ODS users. The team was to analyze need, direct to a specified SPO to work if SAF did not know and also present an alternate fix if necessary. Team was to work to a 48 hour turn around form identified need to suggested fix and strategy to accomplish fix. Also to act as "consultants" to SPOs within their function for ODS requirement issues.

All potential problem areas were addressed by subject. All issues were discussed and decisions made; e.g., deviations acceptable, inspection criteria modified, acceptable substitutes.

1. On class IX items, the team met daily to discuss the hot items, potential hot items, and problems. The representative form each area was empowered to make decisions and recommendations. They briefed the commander daily.

2. Another team formed with the division chiefs form production, product assurance, and engineering to make technical/quality decisions which were preventing delivery of needed material.

Wasn't a member, but they attacked specific supply issues one by one

Were in existence; set up by engine line. Worked with logistics personnel from government procuring activity and contractor logistics personnel to address requirements and capabilities.

Daily routine was the same--we just streamlined the process

Team accomplished ACO functions on all contracts related to ODS.

Teams were project focused. Frequent/routine meetings, daily updates, daily security briefings on ODS with intelligence data.

N/A 10-left blank

c. How were team members selected?

By the 2-letter organizations, contracting representatives had authority to commit the 2-letter in team meetings.

Based solely on specialized knowledge
1. The best from my organization. From others by product or weapon system or expertise.

Already in place
By level of knowledge and those with can-do attitude
Experience, program knowledge, skills, compatibility
By the division chief
Don’t know
N/A
10-left blank

d. What did the team accomplish?

Established an organization, planned the process, identified members, were on call 24 hours per day. But never had to handle a CMNS
Able to meet 100% of all requirements
1. Shorten lead times, expedite awards, review problems and solutions, and made decisions
They coordinated with functional on the specifics and got problems solved.
Resolved problems, answered questions, established methods to facilitate movement/inspection.
Successfully completed contracts in support of ODS.
Accomplished their goals, strong teamwork
N/A
11-left blank

e. Were the teams continued after ODS?

3-No
1-Yes, as part of drawdown decisions
2. has been continued
3. Also another team at directorate level between supply, procurement, and others
Yes, normal methodology for us.
No, cannot keep all the best on one team.
Yes
N/A
10-left blank

f. What recommendations would you make for fostering good teamwork?

Work together in a team environment for all time.
The two most important factors when setting the team up are to make sure the team knows their responsibilities, and second to form teams of people who work well together.
Build the team quickly, and like it was done here, had a sense of purpose and dedication instilled in it, understood priority and need to act quickly.
Have solid, important objectives. Select members who are motivated and cooperative. Have them brief results to management. Praise the good work they do.
A. Strong enthusiastic program manager.
B. Enthusiastic, experienced team members.
C. Frequent communication with contractor.
D. Frequent team members.
Have the teams set up before you need them or they probably won't work.
Follow TQM consensus principles. No meeting over 2 hours.
Rotate meeting locations.
Assign your best personnel in each of the disciplines required. Give them carte blanch to make project work.
Strong communications, compatibility, clear focus on fleet needs.
It worked well before ODS--our training paid off in ODS.
N/A
8-left blank

24. CHALLENGES:

a. What were the 5 greatest challenges you and your organization faced during ODS (in order of priority). Please explain and give illustrations if possible.

Getting staff offices to expedite.
Getting funds on time.

1. Keeping up with the paperwork.

1. Getting commitment from individuals not directly involved with ODS--procurement committee.
2. Getting our buyers to understand what was hot and what really wasn't: e.g., a program manager asking to expedite his work.
3. Getting the contractors to remember that it wasn't "anything goes" because of the war.

1. SPO's attempting to use ODS priority for non-ODS requirements
2. Attempting to understand/sort out DOD priority system
3. Trying to convince the contracting staff at command level that they should be making attempts to develop streamlined procedures for ODS certified requirements. The requirements system was streamlined; given any lengthy time period contacting would have been buried
4. Balancing ODS priority vs normal program priorities and making sure both get done.

1. Obtaining direction and funding from Pentagon. UCA's were not awarded when ready for several weeks awaiting direction and funding
2. Supporting ODS contracting requirements with undermanned office
3. Lack of preplanned wartime streamlined acquisition process, we had to work within existing process

1. Walking the fine line of getting the latest and best to the field without getting ahead of spares/training/etc., which would do more bad than good.
2. Sadly—the constant personal fight against inertia from knowing that one slip or wrong guess and the all too numerous second guessers and bean counters would end your career when this was all over.

Getting user requirements: Theater never submitted a requisition
Transportation: Enormous volume of overseas requirement taxed transportation system
Getting industry to produce at levels 3 to 10 times past levels
Obtaining approval and properly obtaining commercial substitutes
Overcoming bureaucratic blocks to expedite actions

1. Early shipment of needed material.
2. Selection of best contractor for award—who would offer the overall best value in terms of delivery and quality as well as price.
3. Finding sources for procurement of needed material
4. Coordinating transportation problems and getting material to its final destination
5. Coordination and teamwork between and among other organizations. Keeping everyone working on the same sheet of music and motivating our priorities and urgency.

1. Overcoming the lack of leadership. Actually it was worse than no leadership. It was the negative leadership coming from Washington. When headquarters rejected the ODS J&A, the message they sent us was "It's not that important—not important enough for them to stick their neck out." It was difficult to motivate others when you weren't confident. Obviously headquarters didn't think it was important. Why should anyone else? The general changed that here with his emotional and impassioned personal appeal to the section and branch chiefs.
2. Overcoming the RIF reorganization. In August a RIF was announced and although we avoided layoffs (through the creation of ODS positions) we went through the reorganization in October. Key personnel were transferred. The most knowledgeable and ambitious commercial truck buyer was moved to another area, just at the time we needed him most.
3. Anticipating contracting needs and requirements. We tend to be reactive. We are trained to wait on others to determine the requirements, sent it to us and then we do something. It's always good to be proactive, but in a crisis, we found it essential to have solutions before the requirement gets to you. If you need to buy X, Y, or Z, how will you do? My first line supervisors and I spend time brainstorming. It paid off. We had answers when folks ran in with the requirement.

4. Dealing with other organizations. We spent hundreds of hours with other organizations we rarely ever deal with—transportation organization at the state level, bankers, and DLA transportation officers, and payment offices.

5. Most of all, dealing with a peace time procurement system. The procurement system which evolved with CICA and the micromanagement of the 1980's assumed peace. It also assumed having all the time in the world to be fair and responsive to everyone. Our buyers have been indoctrinated in this culture to the point they are afraid to ask questions. We hadn't wargamed the procurement process. We were doing almost everything for the first time. We had no plan. We were improvising as we went and without Washington leadership or support, you drew on similar exercises such as safety-related urgent procurements or rushed actions to avoid a break in production, or "red teams" drafted to solve difficult technical issues. Why weren't we prepared? After all, war is our business. Over the years, procurement problems have been solved with bandaids (another review). So problems have never been solved; we just get more people to look at each action, without ownership or responsibility, and more documentation. Those reviews have never added value, only aggravation, and can be deadly in a crisis. We have non-responsive, outdated support systems (especially an obsolete computer system that generates our solicitation and contracts). Add a bureaucratic mentality in general, and you've got a recipe for disaster. Ironically, as our weapons have become faster and more technically brilliant, the procurement system has become more cumbersome and dull. Fortunately we have a lot of energetic and dedicated people who aren't dull--yet. Don't count on it next time! Between downsizing, the shift of most of the spare parts procurement to DLA and the changes in the industrial base, we may not be able to do it again!

Obtaining accurate delivery dates from the user in order to meet the user's schedule for departure.

Developing streamlined internal office procedures for managing fast-paced procurements with large
numbers of offerors on each solicitation (average # of offers received was 20 vessels).
Complete contract file documentation.

1. To act as intermediary between different agencies (Navy-AF-Army) who wanted to exercise their priority (DPAS) against the other service in order to get their product. Our position was to work with the contractor, determine what could be manufactured based upon raw materials, production capacities, etc., in order to satisfy all users. I believe that we were able to do this. At such times there must be someone to play this role, otherwise services would be at each other’s throats and we all would lose.

1. Had to accomplish a significant amount of work on two government ships in a limited industrial base.
2. Coordination of the effort required to deploy ships.
3. Keeping a lid on what was necessary to support ODS. Ships commanding officers and chief engineers will try to throw everything they would like to have done into what needs to be done.

1. There were insufficient number of trained contract specialists available.
2. Up to 30% of requirements changed after received and lead time was generally less than 5 days.
3. Procuring airlift and handling problems in an area contracting was unfamiliar with while abiding by contract terms was difficult.
4. Ability to procure additional airlift services from contractors not already on contract were limited.
5. Lack of structured contingency plan which had been practiced and which was integrated within offices.

1. Need to follow contracting procedures for synopsis, J&A, UCA's, etc.
2. Urgency—things had to be done in matter of minutes vs days.
3. Rearrange personal schedules.
4. Obtaining clearly defined requirements.
5. Availability of funding.

Getting contract technicians to the Middle East.
Obtaining theater clearances to deploy.
Assisting customers in writing their Statements of Work (SOW).

The only real challenge was the all-out effort to provide timely support in the procurement of spare parts.

Customer coordination.
1. Processing ITA999, Priority Assistance Request, needed to sort priorities
2. Expediting new order--government placed many late P.O. and contracts that caused expeditious handling prior to receiving order.
3. Getting contracts corrected, waivers, deviations
4. Contractors with multiple orders from different sources using same equipment and facility--lining up priorities
5. Contractors not passing on priorities to subcontractors
6. Short turn around pre-awards

1. Getting local approval authority for FAR/DFARS deviations.
2. Getting a contracting officer in country to be focal point for contracting actions.
3. Establishing urgency monitoring system to prioritize workload
4. Protecting independence of contracting officer decision making from requirements people dictates.
5. Developing process expediting procedures and educating workforce on the change.

b. What were the 5 greatest challenges you and your organization faced in the aftermath of ODS (in order of priority). Please explain and give illustrations, if possible.

Definitizing letter contracts (L/C).
Explaining reason for delinquent L/C's.
Explaining to the program office why we could not use UCA's/LCs as business as usual.

1. To a large degree our support to ODS has had to be maintained even though most people think "it's over."

1. Definitizing ODS UCA's.

Getting support for post-Desert Storm efforts.
Fortunately, all went well--the guesses were all right--luck.

Identifying excess levels in theater
Modifying or canceling contracts without destroying base; punished companies after their support
Physically getting rid of excess sticks prior to expiration date
Readjusting stockage levels to pre-ODS data
Employees returning to pre-ODS habits

Inability to answer questions regarding terminations.
Economic instability.
1. Review of all awarded contracts to see which needed to be canceled, stretched out.
2. Make lists and justify recognition of contractors whose outstanding support was obvious.
3. Do the same for employees.
4. Get the organization back on a peace time operations, retaining as much as possible the comraderie of ODS.
5. Get ready for the downsizing and changes that followed ODS.

Finding the energy for terminations.
Morale besides the normal letdown from the intensity of the crisis, the employees were naturally worried about a RIF.
Capturing the streamlining ideas and permanently improving the procurement process.

Completing contract file documentation (obtaining signed documents from foreign shipowners-most of whom had never done business with the U.S. government.)
Validating war risk bonus invoices and approving payment.

Close out of contracts and coordinating funds for work that was accomplished by the contractors and not a part of the contract.

1. Processing equitable adjustments in a timely manner.
2. Reconciliation of contract payment.
3. Contract modification due to extraordinary items required to support ODS.
4. Accomplishing follow-up actions with unaugmented workforce.
5. Fuel adjustments for commercial missions.

1. Going back to business-as-usual.
2. Getting equipment returned to CONUS.

1. Stop work orders--work in progress
2. Cost estimates for work completed at point of stop work
3. Revising delivery schedules for new inventory requirements

1. Getting out of the urgent contracting mode.
2. Determining cost effectiveness of T for Cs.

The challenge now being faced is to continue to provide support with reduced resources because of budget cuts.

Billing
2-left blank
25. INSPECTIONS: Has your organization been audited or inspected since ODS? If so, what was the outcome in regard to ODS procurements?

8-No
Yes, do not know of any specific criticism of an ODS procurement. We were inspected by and AF IG team looking at our planning and execution of ODS requirements. Do not know the results of that inspection.
To the best of my knowledge no adverse findings resulted from after ODS audits--at least not on the HARM.
Yes, 4 GAO, 3 Army Audit Agency, 2 specials. All procurements were found to be proper, etc.
Only superficially. The only audit I’m aware of had to do with canceling ODS kits and stretching out delivery schedules. We had already done a thorough review ourselves and I have not heard of any audit findings that were negative.
My branch, only once: no findings
Yes, no specific evaluation relative to ODS.
GAO audit during ODS--essentially agreed best prices were paid based on the circumstances.
No audits or inspections.
Yes. The DOD IG report on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet indicated the contracting staff had not been augmented to cope with the increased work load. As a result documentation processing was delayed or incomplete, particularly during the early weeks when assistance within the contracting office was not utilized.
Air Force Audit Agency, DOD IG. No problems or discrepancies noted.
Yes, audit showed procurements were done IAW regs and statutes.

26. LEAD TIME: Did the fact that Desert Shield lasted four months before Desert Storm began allow you to procure items that you would not have had time to procure if hostilities had broken out suddenly? If so, explain.

It gave us a four month lead-time we would not of otherwise had.
Yes, in fact, as stated above, we started doing aircraft mods in June 90 to support the increased demands for intelligence information.
Yes
The systems that were bought would not (because of their production lead time) have made it to Desert Storm.
No
Absolutely--we were on a cut back for 2-3 years before ODS. The shelves were bare.
Absolutely--we were not adequately prepared, and next time we may not have the luxury of 4-6 months to get ready.
Yes, we were working on the logistics pipeline prior to ODS.
Four months is not enough time to do something substantial to a front line weapon unless you are accelerating an existing planned upgrade or correction which is what was done. What was done was accomplished in much less than four months. I know of nothing else we would have done in 6 or 7 months.

No, food was consumed at wartime rates from Day 1.

Not really. Lead times for aircraft engines and parts are significantly longer than four months—logistics personnel were working long before. Any sudden hostility could result in little instant impact upon this industry. It takes time to evaluate sources/resources and to gain momentum.

Those items that were long lead and required MIL STD commercial items were used.

No, since contracting procures airlift services. Services were needed from the onset to move troops and cargo into the AOR.

Yes. It gave us an idea of what parts would be required. We never experienced what fine sand could do to end items.

Some, while we are not a procurement agency, because of long lead items and the amount of increase in usage of equipment needed was unpredicted and may orders were placed late. We handled many expedites which involved major equipment and/or defense systems being down.

Yes, enabled production lines to get started on equipment that didn’t currently have a hot line.

Yes, there is a minimum lead time in the manufacture and delivery of items, so the four-month interval allowed for procurement of items that a one-week or one-month time would not.

Yes, we were able to pre-position communication services.

1-left blank

27. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: What changes do you feel need to be made to the legal aspects of contracting or to contracting policies in order to assist contracting professional in a future military contingency? Please be specific.

In times of war, delegation to the lowest level must occur. Higher headquarters must be willing to depend upon the people in the field to do the right thing.

Need planned authorized wartime streamlined acquisition process that is documented in FAR and FAR supplements. I believe there should be a "war" book of streamlined regs authorized in war, such as ceiling priced authority, Make it easier to issue directives to contractor. The DPAS (ITA999) can be a very complex system.

In time of national emergency or in support of military actions War Powers Act should take precedence over policy and most regulations.
J&A authority (same) and some authority to waive CBD announcements. Also certain critical weapon systems should always have BOAs in place for instant use as required.

I feel an increased set of thresholds need to be established (e.g., double what they are now) so they could be authorized by the Sec AF in times of emergency. After the emergency, the secretary would direct that they go back to peacetime levels. Major commands and lower organizations would not have the authority to restrict these. Examples: J&A review, committee review, UCA approvals, business clearance, contract clearance.

The UCA expenditure limits presently in law needs to have a national emergency waiver procedure in it, or be repealed altogether. DOD and/or USAF needs to develop and have in place a set of "contingency waivers/deviations/class J&A's" which could be implemented in a national emergency situation. See paragraph 12 for specifics. The requirements process was streamlined, in a continued conflict it was obvious that contracting would have become a bottleneck.

Congress has us so tied up with rules and regulation that very little of what we do makes common sense (in my opinion). We need to look at the commercial world and try to do what's smart. Socioeconomic programs are fine but they should be recognized as such and not as the best business decision.

We need to recognize that most all of our policy, regs, public laws are "peace-time" approaches when we have the luxury of time. Most of the urgency methods have all sorts of impediments (approvals and reviews) so they won't be abused. These impediments (understandable when there are only a few actions during peace-time) could become life threatening during an ODS. We need "war-time" or "theater support" policy and procedures.

In a military contingency (possible expand definition to include military exercises) permit Head of Contracting Activity to invoke exceptions or waivers in the following areas directly related to or in support of the contingency:

- acquisition plan
- synopsis publication and response times
- wage determinations when a major part of the performance will be outside the U.S.
- award synopses
- business clearance memorandums

Establish authority at HPA (Head of Procuring Activity) for using streamlined acquisition reviews. Should not have to have normal number of sign-offs, boards of review, etc., particularly when buying parts from the same source as had been the source or original manufacturer.

Need to issue blanket waivers as previously mentioned.
A specific listing or document identifying what contracting thresholds and limitations can be relieved in a contingency to include identification of the authority with the power to authorize relief.

Contingency implications should be considered in the development of any contracting policy.

Be responsive. When procedures interfere with mission support, look to amending procedures.

I'm unable to answer as I lack legal perspective.

Bring all approval levels down to local activity for deviations and approvals during time of military contingency.

No recommendations for changes

2-None

28. ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on your experiences what would you recommend an organization do to make contracting for a contingency situation in the future faster, more cost effective, or more responsive to the customer.

Delegate authority for use of sole source contracting and the use of undefinitized contractual documents to contracting directorates. Also, must waive all reviews other than JAG above the 3-letter contracting directors.

Write up "lessons learned" to help document what worked and what didn't so that it could be used as a baseline 10 to 15 years from now (or sooner) when we have another emergency.

Based on prior experience a team should be developed that can be put together on short notice to handle emergency situations.

A. Work closely with customer.
B. Work closely with contractors.
C. Work closely with Pentagon to obtain funding and direction.

Organization responded well (NAVAIR)

No changes required here. Biggest impact is at user level.

Waive the regulations. Trust the civilian workforce to police itself. Recognize that we are not crooks or dummies and that we know what we are doing and are tax payers too. The closer the procurement organization is to the customer the more effective it will be.

Have operational plan in place.

Same as above. Need a good cadre of very experienced/skilled people.

We need to plan the procurement process for war. We need up-to-date letter contracts in our computers with fill-in-the-blanks. We need to constantly monitor war essential parts and make sure we have ordering agreements or contractual instruments in place, even if we don't have current requirements. We need to ask
ourselves what kind of equipment or parts and equipment might be needed in a tropics environment, the mountains, the arctic, and what is commercially available.

Consider using multi-functional teams as a normal method of working together. Ensure that there is someone close to the arctic who has the authority to resolve problems between the services—preferably a civilian.

I don't know of anything other than para 27 above. Management must (1) always be ready to reassign people, even on a temporary basis, to meet unusual fluctuations in the workload; (2) be willing to institute rapid approval methods (face-to-face as necessary); and very important (3) acknowledge those people putting out the extra effort and find ways to reward them for that effort.

Train for contingency operations. Know how and where to obtain relief from contracting restrictions you know you will need by the nature of your business. Have a plan for augmenting your staff. Know what physical limitations you will have and have a plan for supplementing them. Structure contracts to accommodate contingencies where reasonable.

Issue uniform list of ODS requirements to DCMAO handling contracts. Every activity had their own system.


No change—current organizational structure is adequate to handle workload increases.

None
2-left blank

29. TRAINING:

a. Did you have any special training for responding rapidly to contracting needs for a military contingency?

12-No
No, just on the job training when safety issues or other critical events happened requiring rapid action.

(i) If so, briefly describe the training.

OJT during Viet Nam, Grenada and Panama
16 years experience
18 years of expediting contracts, judging contractor capabilities
All mandatory training requirements. None specific for military contingency.

The only training given was inter-office. Training was given on international expansion airlift buying to all contract specialists in contracting.
Yes. Many years of working with organizations in the field.
2-N/A
11-left blank

(ii) When was the training given?

Mid 70's, early 80's, and 1990
On the job, government classes
Nov 90 and ongoing for the next several months
3-N/A
13-left blank

(iii) Who gave the training

My contracting officers.
AFIT, TACOM, Ft Lee
Experienced expansion airlift buyers
3-N/A
13-left blank

(iv) Did the training adequately prepare you for supporting ODS?

It definitely helped.
2-Yes
Training should have been more structured and ideally given at the beginning of the DS contingency.
3-N/A
12-left blank

b. If you were developing a training package on this subject, what topics would you consider to be essential? Give illustrations, if possible.

No additional training is required. There must be an understanding by all parties at all management levels that they are part of a unique situation and the utmost cooperation must be afforded their customers.

1. Know the difference between statute/EO and regs.
   2. Accountability—especially after the fact.
   3. Attitude and commitment.

The DOD, AF, AFSC priority system. The requirements certification system. Assuming contingency contracting authority is given, what authorities have been delegated where.

1. Use of UCA's
   2. How to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize rated orders

Developing relationships/understandings with contractors and my government personnel, from ACOs and QARs to field engineers to key command personnel. Learn to clear the way with face to face discussions (agreements in principle) before you start writing memos.

191
Cutting red tape
Practice.

Form the teams. Do exercises.
Give team memb-er training on working in a group.
Find out where shortcomings are and solve them.
Take lessons learned from your sources and solve the problems.
Decide whether it is best to anticipate or wait for events.
Make sure the war is popular.

Each organization should have rapid contracting model or strategy.
1. Case studies with all the contractual instruments, support, justifications, and work arounds addressed
2. You need to look at letter contracts especially, and all the applicable guidance.
3. Contracting for commercial items or commercial equivalent items
4. Sources of surplus for older equipment where it won't be economical to grant new production
5. Instruments that can be in place before the money is received like BOA's and BPA's.

Military reservists who were sent to theater as contracting officers need tools to do their jobs--copies of regulations and forms, sufficient warranted authority, computer (laptop or better), and phone numbers of persons in the U.S. to call if they need any help at any time--day or night.

Regulatory relief. Changes in processing points.
Communications with requiring activities.
While business would not be "as usual," apply the usual concepts in a smarter more logical manner. Do the job smarter.

The contracting office is revising a contingency contracting operating instruction which includes manpower requirements, communication and equipment needs and detailed instructions for buying expansion commercial airlift under a contingency.

1. DPAS ITA999 Form
2. DCMAO services. It seemed like everyone wanted to talk to contractor which caused confusion, conflicts, and most of duplication of efforts.
3. Look at alternate sources for delivery when low bidder can't meet schedule.

Existing training was adequate.
N/A
4-left blank
30. **SUMMARY OF ODS CONTRACTING ACTIONS:**

**IN SUPPORT OF ODS ONLY**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Actions</th>
<th>Total Dollars</th>
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<td><strong>a. SUMMARY DATA:</strong></td>
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<td>$222.7 M</td>
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<td>983</td>
<td>$90 M</td>
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included options that were awarded

| iii. Options Exercised--17-left blank | 2       | $4,596 K     |
|                                       | 10%                              | $200 M        |

| iv. Orders - Existing Contracts--12-left blank | 2       | $500-700 K   |
|                                               | 20%                              | $300 M        |
|                                               | 4                                | $900 K        |
|                                               | 5400                             | $1.4 B        |
|                                               | 15                               |               |
|                                               | 1*                               | $.1 M         |
|                                               | 2724                             | $12 M         |

| v. Calls Against BOA's--17-left blank | 2       | $3-4 M       |
|                                       | 3*                               | $.2 M         |

| vi. UCA's--14-left blank | 3       | $3,368 K     |
|                         | 20%                              | $400 M        |
|                         | 1                                | $150 K        |
|                         | 65                               | $157.1 M      |
### SUMMARY DATA (cont):

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<td>Actions</td>
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<td>vii. Competition--14-left blank</td>
<td>80% $1.2 B</td>
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<td>viii. Small Business--14-left blank</td>
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<td>128</td>
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<td>ix. Small Disadvantaged--15-left blank</td>
<td>3% $30 M</td>
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During and after
Data not kept--were involved in iv., v., and vi.
*Only reflects statistics from Jan 91 thru Mar 92.

b. Procurement Acquisition Lead Time (PALT)

45 days average
12 days average for small purchases
14 days average for options exercised
3 days average for UCA's
10-90 days
Varies significantly
3 days average
3-5 days
2-3 days
100 days
119 days
35 days
2-3 days in most cases
7-left blank

c. Other significant data regarding performance during ODS?

A lot of manipulation during the process; i.e., verbal
direction for contractor/government team to take PCs
and parts to Saudi Arabia directly and perform certain
acts. Numerous trips were made including malfunction
on sight investigation, etc. Doesn't show up in
documentation specifically.

We used letter contracts for larger dollar efforts.

17-left blank
31. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA: During ODS

a. To which military service or agency were you assigned:

1-left blank
(i) Navy: 4
(ii) Marines: 0
(iii) Army: 3
(iv) Air Force: 6
(v) DOD agency: 5

b. Rank or grade

[NOTE: This information has been excluded to assure anonymity.]

c. Level

1-left blank
(i) Non-supervisory: 2
(ii) First line supervisor: 3
(iii) Middle Management: 7
(iv) Senior Leadership: 6

d. Job title

[NOTE: This information has been excluded to assure anonymity.]

32. ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?

My personal assessment is we made it through ODS because it was relatively short and our people were willing to make personal sacrifices to make sure what needed to get done got done. I was disappointed in the short-sightedness of the command staff to support planning for a long-term conflict situation. If it had gone longer, i.e., a "Viet Nam" type situation, we may not have been able to handle it as well as was done. You can't count on people giving 6 and 7 days a week for a long period of time.

If you are going to hold 1st and 2nd line people responsible for their actions after the fact, make damn sure you train them well for these conditions and make it very clear what is allowed and what is not.

Continuous improvement (GE name for TQM) has proven itself during ODS. The people responded to make the whole effort a success by doing their jobs smarter and more efficiently.

Excellent topic for a study.
Appendix C: Round Two Questionnaire

DIRECTIONS

DON'T PANIC! Please don't panic at the size of this package. The information on the white paper is presented for your information only. The colored paper contains a limited number of questions that we ask you to answer. Circle the word or words that best describe your feelings about the immediately preceding recommendation. Below is an example:

The rain in Spain should fall mainly on the plain.

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COMMENTS. If you want to make any comments about the answer, you may do so in the space provided. These extra comments are strictly voluntary. All we ask you to do is to circle the proper word.

TIME REQUIRED. You will probably complete the package within 20 minutes.

CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES. The first round responses have been compiled in a manner which will allow you to express your agreement with each of the recommendations. As promised no answers have been attributed to individuals. We think you will enjoy discovering how other people answered the same questions you did.

PARTICIPATION. We want to thank you sincerely for participating in this research. Your continued support in this effort is essential. Even if you did not participate in the first round, we would like you to answer this round.

SUSPENSE DATE. Please return the survey (colored paper) to us, using the enclosed envelope, by 24 June 1992. You may keep the white package.

Again, thank you for participating.
6. SOURCE DEVELOPMENT:

c. What recommendations do you have concerning source development?

Try to make dual awards during development in order to build in more than one source.

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All classes of supply need to give listings of commercially available substitutes to use if required.

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We have in the Production Mgt Div a variety of sources both human and reference type to call upon when needed. Sources developed when there is no need may not be there when you need them. For fairly simple items we had little difficulty. Luckily our OEM’s [Original Equipment Manufacturers] were still in production on vehicles so complex items could be borrowed from the line or constructed from them or their sources.

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197
The survey of commercial equivalent should be conducted annually with major truck trailer manufacturers. Various operational environments should be considered and the recommended modifications to each identified. We, contracting, production, and technical personnel, need to maintain contact with the commercial firms and understand what the industry is producing that might meet our needs in an emergency.

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Have pre-arranged agreements with sources which can be used in contingencies like ODS.

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Start out finding out the end item manufacturer. If item is part of subassembly contact that sub for sources. Contact buying activity find out if other sources bid and if any other sources ever supplied similar or identical items. Check with QAR [Quality Assurance Representative] at subcontractor to see if they sold to another source and check with them if they ever bought from other sources. Check with buying activities to see if anyone else bid or supplied in past.

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198
On a fast start war basis--none. Parts wear out faster due to climate and usage. Only recommendation is—be responsive. Red tape and archaic procedures that slow up contract/vendor support are not acceptable.

If the development of new sources is an integral function of normal operations, the same procedure serves during emergencies such as ODS.

Continue to use the CBD (Commerce Business Daily], public forums, etc.
7. USE OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS:

h. What recommendations do you have concerning the use of commercial items?

They are fine to use as long as they meet requirements.

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Should be a mix—if the laptops failed—they are cheap—but should not be the only reprogramming source.

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For specific limited application they can fill the void and the more versatile military vehicles can then be freed up to fill the more demanding assignments. But they are a logistics nightmare!

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All mobilization plans should be based upon commercially available items.

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* Comments:

DOD should expand the use of COTS.

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Make sure they are as good as or better than required items by letting the buying activity make final decision requirements.

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* Comments:

Good way to go, especially when required on short notice. Provides instant capability. However, not ruggedized and can lock you into sole source for replacement or logistics support.

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* Comments:
I believe we should be doing this up front in our design of new systems. Too often we use a part that is unique to military when a commercial item would serve the same purpose and be easier to buy. Not just during ODS but always.

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8. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS:

e. What recommendations do you have concerning unsolicited proposals?

Be certain the using organization has a bonafide need for the items.

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Need DOD central screening point so as not to waste valuable time at ICP [Inventory Control Point] level to screen.

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They are a valuable source of info. Sometimes we don't know what's out there.

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Only valuable if we have, as we did in ODS, exhausted all sources.

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Good way to find out about technologies and products that are available and may not have been considered.

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We always accept unsolicited proposals for spare parts and submit them to the directorate of technical operations for review.

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203
9. ACCELERATED DELIVERY:

d. What recommendations do you have concerning accelerating delivery?

Insure that increased costs are justified by genuine need.

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Once a production lot has been accelerated, future production lots must be accelerated also or there will be a gap in production.

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Contractors have excess capacity so deliveries can be accelerated

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Get a rough order of magnitude (ROM) MIPR money to ACO, give verbal turn on and audit actuals, only works if you have developed working relationship and trust with contractor and ACO--not friendship-trust and fairness basis.

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Keep normal contracts in effect with no acceleration. Issue new contracts on a affordability basis to augment normal requirements.

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Always have as popular a war as ODS. Contractors were almost 100% cooperative. Also have a short war. Over an extended period people get tired/burned out. Hopefully we would have caught up with the cycle eventually and not been required to expedite as much or as often.

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Almost all these cases had a unique set of circumstances. Each was worked case-by-case. I can’t think of any universal recommendations.

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If demands for airlift are greater than that which can be satisfied on a voluntary basis, CRAF will have to be activated.

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Give major contractors description of needs, request their expert input; get out of the way.

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206
Pay premium funds or trade off delq. contracts. Most government employees who do this type work are in need of training.

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Most contractors were supportive and accelerated at minimal costs when they could.

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Our standard policy regarding acceleration of deliveries was followed and worked well.

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None, our system works well,

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207
10. RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY:

c. What recommendations would you make regarding relationships with industry?

Government must understand that there is a "two-way-street." In order to get industry to cooperate it must cooperate with industry. Both sides have problems and both sides must be willing to cooperate with the other.

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Remember that we're going to have to live with them after the emergency is over.

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Be as open and up-front with industry as we can with respect to our requirements. At the same time maintain a business relationship.

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Communicate honestly and frequently

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I have only found one or two companies in 20 years that I could not establish a "working relationship" with. I think if you don't set this up in "good times" you cannot when the pressure is on. Things move too fast. The trust must already be there.

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Military and industry need a partnership based on united need of ODS.

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Maintain a professional approach to all concerned.

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209
Our relationship with industry is mostly positive. I would try to encourage that by openness and good communication. Let them know what's going on, where we are headed, and as much as possible what we will need from them in the future.

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Recognize professionalism of contractors; be open and "up-front." Let them know what the government expects and be ready to discuss problems on both sides; initiate corrective action within government.

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Very important that the government and industry understand just how the contingency contracting procedures will work.

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Try to develop continuing trusting patriotic relations with industry.

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We need to understand the cost contractors incur assisting the government can cause their overhead to change. Make more timely responses to contractors' questions, waivers, deviation, mods, and other responses required to keep contracts on schedule. The government needs to be more sensitive to contractor needs.

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Keep good communications going with sources of supply. Establish and maintain good working relationships during peacetime to assure war time cooperation.

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211
We need to foster more of a cooperative but arms-length relationship.

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**Comments:**

Relationships are good between industry and DECCO. Congress needs to trust acquisition and industry folks and focus on the few bad ones and jail them.

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**Comments:**

11. DEFENSE PRIORITIES ALLOCATION SYSTEM (DPAS):

d. What recommendations would you make concerning the DPAS system?

1. Streamline process to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize similarly rated contracts.
2. Create new rating between "DX" and "DO" which could be used during wartime for war supplies.

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**Comments:**
None, the system worked well.

Your relationship with the contractor is more important.

It became obvious that the government people do not really understand how the DPAS system relates to other priority systems like "Brick Bat" etc. Think we need some training.

None; however, President needs to declare "partial mobilization" to support rating changes.
Ironically, most of the DX items are in plants that are primarily military. So giving it a higher priority than commercial is meaningless. Industry was generally well under capacity during ODS. So changing priorities wasn’t necessary. Getting quotes, materials, and subcomponents in quickly was a problem. Wasn’t there an issue with the DPAS? not extended?

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I recommend all contractors review the DPAS booklet, sound and slide or VCR film on DPAS, which is available through all DCMAO offices.

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We prioritized our war stoppers and then competed with other services against theirs. Need a DOD war stopper priority allocation during conflicts.

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13. **REQUIREMENTS:**

g. What recommendations would you make in regard to identification of requirements and availability of funding?

Users must be more aggressive in providing funds. To do this they must receive full cooperation from the HQ USAF.

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The program had money to do production anyway. We just accelerated and did in the field in the desert. Can’t say on funding, but OSD/OPNAV should immediately make a pot available for legitimate requirements like acceleration.

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The armed forces identified about 150 weapons systems for which spare parts usage was expected to accelerate. However, this took about two months. This process needs to be accelerated for future operations.

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Push authority to issue direction/funding down. During ODS funding/requirements approval was elevated to USAF/CV.

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Food should have pre-designed requirements in advance. When balloon goes up--just issue on pre-design.

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* Comments:

Better coordination between buying activity and DCMAO.

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In emergencies, routine matters must be able to be handled in a more direct fashion; i.e., fewer reviewers and "sign-offs."

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* Comments:
The earlier the better. Also, take a few minutes to examine the requirement to be sure you are asking for what is needed. "Go slow to go fast."

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In a crisis, it is difficult to determine these things in advance.

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Work even closer with the program managers and try to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.

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We have developed a package of pre-positional requirements that were the most common for the future.

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217
If we spent time now planning how we would have to support various types of operations we could eliminate a lot of the confusion when the emergency happens.

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15. DELIVERY FOLLOW-UP:

b. What recommendations would you make in the above areas?

Tracking equipment: 1. There have to be more efficient ways with all the high tech bar coding and bar coding reading equipment available today. 2. We need on-the-shelf available bar coding equipment that would have been used to identify equipment as it was being loaded so that it would be easily assembled/mated when it arrived. Commercial equipment logistic support: Hiring a field service representative to assist in country was a life saver. Should have put him in country with a full-up maintenance van and set of high turnover parts (filters, etc.)

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First line weapon system immediately establish dedicated point of contact both at staging area in U.S. and at arrival point in combat zone.

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218
All are possible to correct
1-shipping stores based upon van number and content
2-external markings to facilitate customer
3-food ADP system

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None, system worked well.

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Augment the command workforce.

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* Comments:

Better system of identifying where and when items were to be shipped. Centralize distribution at arrival point and assure items are identified and targeted for proper delivery point.

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* Comments:
Do a better job of distributing the containerization if one depot cannot handle the work load. Have the commander willing to recognize there is an overall problem and he needs help. Be willing to waive some of the regulations regarding who/which company transports the material.

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Many buying activity personnel are not aware of DCMAO efforts and follow up right behind them also duplicating both DCMAO and contractor efforts. The buying activities need training or proper procedures for handling follow up. This is a much abused system by all activities.

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None, the industry was outstanding.

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16. CONTRACT PAYMENT:

b. What recommendations would you make to prevent payment problems?

A change to the UCA expenditure law which will permit some level within DOD to approve the expenditure of more than 75% of the NTE price prior to definitization of the UCA.

Pay based upon vendor shipping document instead of DD 250.

A computer system which is acceptable to all and relays award info immediately and is not dependent on hard copy transfer of contract data.
We need a system more compatible with commercial business—prompt and efficient with minor paper work. We almost bankrupted certain contractors, especially the lease contractor who loaned us all their vehicles (and their livelihoods) and then wouldn't pay them. I spent hours and hours on the phone with payments office. Wrote justification after justification. Basically they wanted me to prove a guy would go bankrupt before they'd rush payment. Of course, the only way to prove it is to wait and see.

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Other than hiring additional knowledgeable people, do not have any recommendations.

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17. JUSTIFICATIONS AND APPROVALS (J&A'S):

f. What recommendations would you make regarding the use of J&A's?

Suggest that class J&A's be permitted for longer periods of time—with interim reports to approval authority—with provisions that J&A's could be amended while still open to change minor portions—such as increase in $ if circumstances remain the same.

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222
During these emergencies there should be a delegation from headquarters to the product divisions.

If requirements or groups of requirements can be accurately estimated, then class J&A’s are the way to go.

In the future, a war plan annex be developed which contains a class Public Exigency J&A which can be activated by message.

Was to our benefit to have a blanket J&A.
DOD FAR supplement should authorize use of "unusual and compelling urgency" for wartime supplies/services to justify other than full and open competition.

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Set up some standard blanket (generic) to be used only under combat conditions.

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Need blanket approval, otherwise totally senseless waste of time doing each individually.

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Similar situations to ODS war power act should be enough justification.

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Blanket approval/waiver of J&A's—delegate authority to local level.

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*Comments:*

Give authority to HCAs regardless of dollar amount during war time.

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*Comments:*

Provide for emergency methods to include blanket J&A's or other authorization for procuring agency to contract with established suppliers to acquire hard ware without normal administrative routine.

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18. CONTRACTING METHODS:

e. What recommendations would you make regarding methods of contracting and types of contracts?

When "cutting corners" don't do anything stupid.

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Existing types provide necessary flexibility

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UCAs are quickest way to get on contract.

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Be as flexible as possible.

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A provision permitting the commander to delegate UCA approval authority to lower limits in wartime situations.

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During times of crisis the establishment must understand the need for blanket letter contract approval.

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Careful use of ceiling prices/not to exceed/scope and $ definitization later with actuals audited. Project rate pre-determined.

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Allow decision-making authority at the procuring activities.

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We need to have in place contractual instruments that are responsive to emergencies: BOA's, BPA, etc., for critical items for long lead time categories.

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FFP and T&M worked well for repair situations

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The IDIQ type contract allowed contracting to vary requirements.

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Keep flexibility in. Lower approval thresholds during war time to HCA and below.

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Waiver of UCA approvals.

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Present system works well.

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None, our system worked fine.

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23. DEDICATED TEAMS:

f. What recommendations would you make for fostering good teamwork?

Work together in a team environment for all time.

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The two most important factors when setting the team up are to make sure the team knows their responsibilities, and second to form teams of people who work well together.

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Build the team quickly, and like it was done here, had a sense of purpose and dedication instilled in it, understood priority and need to act quickly.

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A. Strong enthusiastic program manager.
B. Enthusiastic, experienced team members.
C. Frequent communication with contractor.
D. Frequent team members.

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Have the teams set up before you need them or they probably won't work.

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Follow TQM consensus principles. No meeting over 2 hours. Rotate meeting locations.

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Have solid, important objectives. Select members who are motivated and cooperative. Have them brief results to management. Praise the good work they do.

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Assign your best personnel in each of the disciplines required. Give them carte blanch to make project work.

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Strong communications, compatibility, clear focus on fleet needs.

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It worked well before ODS--our training paid off in ODS.

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27. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: What changes do you feel need to be made to the legal aspects of contracting or to contracting policies in order to assist contracting professional in a future military contingency? Please be specific.

In times of war, delegation to the lowest level must occur. Higher headquarters must be willing to depend upon the people in the field to do the right thing.

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I feel an increased set of thresholds need to be established (e.g., double what they are now) so they could be authorized by the Sec AF in times of emergency. After the emergency, the secretary would direct that they go back to peacetime levels. Major commands and lower organizations would not have the authority to restrict these. Examples: J&A review, committee review, UCA approvals, business clearance, contract clearance.

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The UCA expenditure limits presently in law needs to have a national emergency waiver procedure in it, or be repealed altogether. DOD and/or USAF needs to develop and have in place a set of "contingency waivers/deviations/class J&A's" which could be implemented in a national emergency situation. See paragraph 12 for specifics. The requirements process was streamlined, in a continued conflict it was obvious that contracting would have become a bottleneck.

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Need planned authorized wartime streamlined acquisition process that is documented in FAR and FAR supplements.

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I believe there should be a "war" book of streamlined regs authorized in war, such as ceiling priced authority, J&A authority(same) and some authority to waive CBD announcements. Also certain critical weapon systems should always have BOAs in place for instant use as required.

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Make it easier to issue directives to contractor. The DPAS (ITA999) can be a very complex system.

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Congress has us so tied up with rules and regulation that very little of what we do makes common sense (in my opinion). We need to look at the commercial world and try to do what's smart. Socioeconomic programs are fine but they should be recognized as such and not as the best business decision.

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We need to recognize that most all of our policy, regs, public laws are "peace-time" approaches when we have the luxury of time. Most of the urgency methods have all sorts of impediments (approvals and reviews) so they won't be abused. These impediments (understandable when there are only a few actions during peace-time) could become life threatening during an ODS. We need "war-time" or "theater support" policy and procedures.

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In a military contingency (possible expand definition to include military exercises) permit Head of Contracting Activity to invoke exceptions or waivers in the following areas directly related to or in support of the contingency:
- acquisition plan
- synopsis publication and response times
- wage determinations when a major part of the performance will be outside the U.S.
- award synopses
- business clearance memorandums

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In time of national emergency or in support of military actions War Powers Act should take precedence over policy and most regulations.

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235
Establish authority at HPA (Head of Procuring Activity) for using streamlined acquisition reviews. Should not have to have normal number of sign-offs, boards of review, etc., particularly when buying parts from the same source as had been the source or original manufacturer.

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A specific listing or document identifying what contracting thresholds and limitations can be relieved in a contingency to include identification of the authority with the power to authorize relief. Contingency implications should be considered in the development of any contracting policy.

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Need to issue blanket waivers as previously mentioned.

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236
Be responsive. When procedures interfere with mission support, look to amending procedures.

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I'm unable to answer as I lack legal perspective.

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Bring all approval levels down to local activity for deviations and approvals during time of military contingency.

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28. **ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS**: Based on your experiences what would you recommend an organization do to make contracting for a contingency situation in the future faster, more cost effective, or more responsive to the customer.

Delegate authority for use of sole source contracting and the use of undefinitized contractual documents to contracting directorates. Also, must waive all reviews other than JAG above the 3-letter contracting directors.

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Write up "lessons learned" to help document what worked and what didn’t so that it could be used as a baseline 10 to 15 years from now (or sooner) when we have another emergency.

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A. Work closely with customer.
B. Work closely with contractors.
C. Work closely with Pentagon to obtain funding and direction.

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238
Organization responded well (NAVAIR)

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No changes required here. Biggest impact is at user level.

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Have operational plan in place.

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Waive the regulations. Trust the civilian work force to police itself. Recognize that we are not crooks or dummies and that we know what we are doing and are tax payers too. The closer the procurement organization is to the customer the more effective it will be.

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Based on prior experience a team should be developed that can be put together on short notice to handle emergency situations.

**STRONGLY AGREE**  **AGREE**  **NEUTRAL**  **DISAGREE**  **STRONGLY DISAGREE**

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We need to plan the procurement process for war. We need up-to-date letter contracts in our computers with fill-in-the-blanks. We need to constantly monitor war essential parts and make sure we have ordering agreements or contractual instruments in place, even if we don’t have current requirements. We need to ask ourselves what kind of equipment or parts and equipment might be needed in a tropics environment, the mountains, the arctic, and what is commercially available.

**STRONGLY AGREE**  **AGREE**  **NEUTRAL**  **DISAGREE**  **STRONGLY DISAGREE**

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Consider using multi-functional teams as a normal method of working together. Ensure that there is someone close to the action who has the authority to resolve problems between the services--preferably a civilian.

**STRONGLY AGREE**  **AGREE**  **NEUTRAL**  **DISAGREE**  **STRONGLY DISAGREE**

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I don’t know of anything other than para 27 above. Management must (1) always be ready to reassign people, even on a temporary basis, to meet unusual fluctuations in the workload; (2) be willing to institute rapid approval methods (face-to-face as necessary); and very important (3) acknowledge those people putting out the extra effort and find ways to reward them for that effort.

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Train for contingency operations. Know how and where to obtain relief from contracting restrictions you know you will need by the nature of your business. Have a plan for augmenting your staff. Know what physical limitations you will have and have a plan for supplementing them. Structure contracts to accommodate contingencies where reasonable.

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Same as above. Need a good cadre of very experienced/skilled people.

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241
Issue uniform list of ODS requirements to DCMAO handling contracts. Every activity had their own system.

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No change--current organizational structure is adequate to handle workload increases.

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242
29. TRAINING:

b. If you were developing a training package on this subject, what topics would you consider to be essential? Give illustrations, if possible.

No additional training is required. There must be an understanding by all parties at all management levels that they are part of a unique situation and the utmost cooperation must be afforded their customers.

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1. Know the difference between statute/EO and regs.
2. Accountability—especially after the fact.
3. Attitude and commitment.

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Practice.
Form the teams. Do exercises.
Give team members training on working in a group.
Find out where shortcomings are and solve them.
Take lessons learned from your sources and solve the problems.
Decide whether it is best to anticipate or wait for events.
Make sure the war is popular.

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243
The DOD, AF, AFSC priority system. The requirements certification system. Assuming contingency contracting authority is given, what authorities have been delegated where.

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Military reservists who were sent to theater as contracting officers need tools to do their jobs—copies of regulations and forms, sufficient warranted authority, computer (laptop or better), and phone numbers of persons in the U.S. to call if they need any help at any time—day or night.

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Developing relationships/understandings with contractors and my government personnel, from ACOs and QARs to field engineers to key command personnel. Learn to clear the way with face to face discussions (agreements in principle) before you start writing memos.

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1. Use of UCA's
2. How to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize rated orders

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While business would not be "as usual," apply the usual concepts in a smarter more logical manner. Do the job smarter.

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Cutting red tape

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Regulatory relief. Changes in processing points. Communications with requiring activities.

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Each organization should have rapid contracting model or strategy:

1. Case studies with all the contractual instruments, support, justifications, and work arounds addressed
2. You need to look at letter contracts especially, and all the applicable guidance.
3. Contracting for commercial items or commercial equivalent items
4. Sources of surplus for older equipment where it won't be economical to grant new production
5. Instruments that can be in place before the money is received like BOA's and BPA's.

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The contracting office is revising a contingency contracting operating instruction which includes manpower requirements, communication and equipment needs and detailed instructions for buying expansion commercial airlift under a contingency.

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Existing training was adequate.

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* Comments:
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1. DPAS ITA999 Form
2. DCMAO services. It seemed like everyone wanted to talk to contractor which caused confusion, conflicts, and most of duplication of efforts.
3. Look at alternate sources for delivery when low bidder can't meet schedule.

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32. ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?

My personal assessment is we made it through ODS because it was relatively short and our people were willing to make personal sacrifices to make sure what needed to get done got done. I was disappointed in the short-sightedness of the command staff to support planning for a long-term conflict situation. If it had gone longer, i.e., a "Viet Nam" type situation, we may not have been able to handle it as well as was done. You can't count on people giving 6 and 7 days a week for a long period of time.

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If you are going to hold 1st and 2nd line people responsible for their actions after the fact, make damn sure you train them well for these conditions and make it very clear what is allowed and what is not.

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Continuous improvement (GE name for TQM) has proven itself during O&O. The people responded to make the whole effort a success by doing their jobs smarter and more efficiently.

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Excellent topic for a study.

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248
Appendix D: Round Two Questionnaire Answers

NOTE: The number that appears under each agreement category is the number of respondents who chose that category. The responses were not numbered in the questionnaire, but are presented with numbers here for easier reference for the statistics in Appendix E.

6. SOURCE DEVELOPMENT:
   c. What recommendations do you have concerning source development?

1-Try to make dual awards during development in order to build in more than one source.

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Comments:
-This becomes very expensive on the "front end."
-Budget and out year quantities must support the additional expenditure.
-Will be extremely difficult to do in a declining budget situation.
-Will be extremely difficult to do in a declining budget situation.

2-All classes of supply need to give listings of commercially available substitutes to use if required.

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Comments:
-Why not just use the commercial in the first place (if possible)?
-If DOD expects to remain a competitive customer, DOD needs to purchase commercial items to maintain competition among suppliers. Suppliers can also keep focused on products that are most profitable to them based on general public needs and reduce their time and resources that can only be dedicated to DOD requirements.

3-We have in the Production Mgt Div a variety of sources both human and reference type to call upon when needed. Sources developed when there is no need may not be there when you need them. For fairly simple items we had little
difficulty. Luckily our OEM's [Original Equipment Manufacturers] were still in production on vehicles so complex items could be borrowed from the line or constructed from them or their sources.

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4-The survey of commercial equivalent should be conducted annually with major truck trailer manufacturers. Various operational environments should be considered and the recommended modifications to each identified. We, contracting, production, and technical personnel, need to maintain contact with the commercial firms and understand what the industry is producing that might meet our needs in an emergency.

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5-Have pre-arranged agreements with sources which can be used in contingencies like ODS.

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Comments:
- Wouldn't this require something in the public law?
- Pre-arranged agreements might be made with contractors who provide basics--such as MRE's. However, who knows were the next contingency might be or what would be needed--in the frozen tundra, in a tropical rain forest, or an arid desert.
- Define agreement. What advantage to contractor?
- If not active producer, you may think source is there and find out it's not viable when you really need it.

6-Start out finding out the end item manufacturer. If item is part of subassembly contact that sub for sources. Contact buying activity find out if other sources bid and if any other sources ever supplied similar or identical items. Check with QAR [Quality Assurance Representative] at subcontractor to see if they sold to another source and check with them if they ever bought from other sources.
Check with buying activities to see if anyone else bid or supplied in past.

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7-On a fast start war basis--none. Parts wear out faster due to climate and usage. Only recommendation is--be responsive. Red tape and archaic procedures that slow up contract/vendor support are not acceptable.

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Comments:
- Don't understand the question.

8-If the development of new sources is an integral function of normal operations, the same procedure serves during emergencies such as ODS.

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9-Continue to use the CBD [Commerce Business Daily], public forums, etc.

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Comments:
- Not enough time.
- Public notification in some manner is necessary in most cases to obtain competition; however, the time restrictions allowing the public to respond should be reduced to the minimum time required to obtain sufficient proposal information.

251
7. USE OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS:

h. What recommendations do you have concerning the use of commercial items?

1- They are fine to use as long as they meet requirements.

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Comments:
- Most commercial items do not meet MIL STD due to lack of supporting documentation.
- Requirements include logistics support agreements for emergency by ops. Must also include appropriate RAM-D parameters.

2- Should be a mix—if the laptops failed—they are cheap—but should not be the only reprogramming source.

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Comments:
- Commercial items do not necessarily have to be obtained from the lowest priced offerer.

3- For specific limited application they can fill the void and the more versatile military vehicles can then be freed up to fill the more demanding assignments. But they are a logistics nightmare!

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Comments:
- Commercial items are no more of a logistics nightmare than militarized equipment supported by many sole source 2nd and 3rd tier subcontractors who may bottleneck spares in an emergency operation.

4- All mobilization plans should be based upon commercially available items.

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Comments:
- Not possible. The commercial world doesn’t use tanks, missiles, Bradleys, howitzers, etc.
- I’m not sure this is possible
- Mobilization plan should be based on MIL STD. Back up should be commercial.
- This is simply impracticable. But mix should include the max number of commercial available items.

5-DOD should expand the use of COTS.

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Comments:
- What is COTS?

6-Make sure they are as good as or better than required items by letting the buying activity make final decision requirements.

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Comments:
- The buying activity does not always understand the requirer needs.
- Will not know if equal until tested.

7-Good way to go, especially when required on short notice. Provides instant capability. However, not ruggedized and can lock you into sole source for replacement or logistics support.

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Comments:
- Agree with first two sentences. Neutral on last sentence. It would depend on item procured.
8-I believe we should be doing this up front in our design of new systems. Too often we use a part that is unique to military when a commercial item would serve the same purpose and be easier to buy. Not just during ODS but always.

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8. UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS:
e. What recommendations do you have concerning unsolicited proposals?

1-Be certain the using organization has a bonafide need for the items.

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Comments:
-If a requirement exists, UP’s are inappropriate.

2-Need DOD central screening point so as not to waste valuable time at ICP [Inventory Control Point] level to screen.

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Comments:
-Time?
-UP should be reviewed by the activity most knowledgeable or with ability to determine viability of the UP. A central DOD screening point would probably have to staff a UP to another activity; thereby increasing evaluating and processing time and delays response to soliciting company.

3-They are a valuable source of info. Sometimes we don’t know what’s out there.

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4-Only valuable if we have, as we did in ODS, exhausted all sources.

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Comments:
- Old equipment requires procurement of commercial items because no longer manufactured or out of business.

5-Good way to find out about technologies and products that are available and may not have been considered.

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6-We always accept unsolicited proposals for spare parts and submit them to the directorate of technical operations for review.

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9. ACCELERATED DELIVERY:

d. What recommendations do you have concerning accelerating delivery?

1- Insure that increased costs are justified by genuine need.

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Comments:
- Do not give carte blanche on accelerating make. Manufacturer justify.

2-Once a production lot has been accelerated, future production lots must be accelerated also or there will be a gap in production.

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Comments:
- Adjust rates.
- For major end items. On spares manufacturers usually processes in lots.
- Not necessarily. Level out--stretch out can be done.
- Not always the case. More likely we will interrupt a production for a government requirement.

3-Contractors have excess capacity so deliveries can be accelerated

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Comments:
- Not always.
- May not be reality in the future, shrinking defense base.
- Could be true or false. Each situation stands alone.
- During ODS it was generally true—but we can’t count on it next time.
- Not in this economy.
- Not always the case. Other things also need to be considered, such as cost of overtime, availability of materials, etc.

4-Get a rough order of magnitude (ROM) MIPR money to ACO, give verbal turn on and audit actuals, only works if you have developed working relationship and trust with contractor and ACO—not friendship-trust and fairness basis.

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Comments:
- May be used, but not legal.
- I don’t believe this is legal. Gives a contractor a blank check—takes too much effort to audit/follow/control.
- Also need ceiling price. Not very good leverage on FFP. "Good will" doesn’t pay bonuses and dividends.
5-Keep normal contracts in effect with no acceleration. Issue new contracts on an affordability basis to augment normal requirements.

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Comments:
- Wouldn't have worked in ODS. Long lead materials couldn't be obtained quickly enough for new contracts.
- In certain cases maybe.
- This makes sense as long as the contractor could meet the new contract and (assumed) expedited delivery terms.
- Do whatever is more cost effective to support the mission.
- This may put more in logistics pipeline, but eventually, not immediately.
- A lot of extra work for no gain.

6-Always have as popular a war as ODS. Contractors were almost 100% cooperative. Also have a short war. Over an extended period people get tired/burned out. Hopefully we would have caught up with the cycle eventually and not been required to expedite as much or as often.

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Comments:
- Can't always expect an optimal war scenario.
- Depends on course of operation, and mix of commercially available/military designed. Subcontractor base is shaky in many industries.

7-Almost all these cases had a unique set of circumstances. Each was worked case-by-case. I can't think of any universal recommendations.

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Comments:
- Lots of time on the phone and effort by both government and contractor personnel.
8-If demands for airlift are greater than that which can be satisfied on a voluntary basis, CRAF will have to be activated.

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9-Give major contractors description of needs, request their expert input; get out of the way.

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Comments:
- Bring your checkbook too!
- Sometimes
- Assuming the requirement is suitable for this tactic.
- Depends on the contractor and relationship with the ACO or PM.

10-Pay premium funds or trade off delq. contracts. Most government employees who do this type work are in need of training.

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Comments:
- The first sentence is one of the decisions a contracting officer would have to make if it pertained to his situation. The second sentence is probably true in some offices and not in others.

11-Most contractors were supportive and accelerated at minimal costs when they could.

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Comments:
- I believe this depended on the supply and demand of the supplies/services being procured.
- My experience was mixed. Some wanted steep acceleration (e.g., hand-held LORANs), some charged minimal acceleration charges.
12-Our standard policy regarding acceleration of deliveries was followed and worked well.

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Comments:
- Don’t know--this is activity specific.
- It was not worked well because employees that do this type of work do it by telecon and are not trained or qualified to do this type work.

13-None, our system works well,

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Comments:
- I don’t believe this.
- This also is activity specific. Most activities can be improved.

10. RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY:
   c. What recommendations would you make regarding relationships with industry?

1-Government must understand that there is a "two-way-street." In order to get industry to cooperate it must cooperate with industry. Both sides have problems and both sides must be willing to cooperate with the other

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Comments:
- The government personnel fight their contractors rather than work with them. We do some real dumb things that cost us more money.

2-Remember that we’re going to have to live with them after the emergency is over.

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Comments:
-Government employees made commitments to contractors but when ODS ended never followed up and refused to do what they promised.

3-Be as open and up-front with industry as we can with respect to our requirements. At the same time maintain a business relationship.

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Comments:
-Too much non-committal

4-Communicate honestly and frequently

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Comments:
-Too much non-committal

5-I have only found one or two companies in 20 years that I could not establish a "working relationship" with. I think if you don’t set this up in "good times" you cannot when the pressure is on. Things move too fast. The trust must already be there.

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6-Military and industry need a partnership based on united need of ODS.

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Comments:
-Must avoid public perception of going back to "military-industrial complex."
-Too many people without a professional aptitude or experience managing and/or working in program control, production, and other industrial areas of government. Very costly.
7-Maintain a professional approach to all concerned.

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Comments:
- This statement means different things to different people.
- It's hard to do when lots of our employees, although probably over-trained, don't have the knowledge or experience to meet job requirements to do a professional job.

8-Our relationship with industry is mostly positive. I would try to encourage that by openness and good communication. Let them know what's going on, where we are headed, and as much as possible what we will need from them in the future.

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Comments:
- Relationship with industry is not mostly positive. Strongly agree with other portion of paragraph.

9-Recognize professionalism of contractors; be open and "up-front." Let them know what the government expects and be ready to discuss problems on both sides; initiate corrective action within government.

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Comments:
- It's not happening.

10-Very important that the government and industry understand just how the contingency contracting procedures will work.

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Comments:
- A lot of problems with that at times--depends on the contractor.
11-Try to develop continuing trusting patriotic relations with industry.

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Comments:
- However, patriotism must be supplemented with reasonable economic incentives. Businessmen are not altruistic.
- It's going to take a lot of work on the government's side.

12-We need to understand the cost contractors incur assisting the government can cause their overhead to change. Make more timely responses to contractors' questions, waivers, deviation, mods, and other responses required to keep contracts on schedule. The government needs to be more sensitive to contractor needs.

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Comments:
- Unfortunately at times our regulations get in the way of being fair and expediting the end product.
- Help

13-Keep good communications going with sources of supply. Establish and maintain good working relationships during peacetime to assure war time cooperation.

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Comments:
- Help

14-We need to foster more of a cooperative but arms-length relationship.

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Comments:
- What's "arms-length"?
- Help
15. Relationships are good between industry and DECCO. Congress needs to trust acquisition and industry folks and focus on the few bad ones and jail them.

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Comments:
-Amen!

11. DEFENSE PRIORITIES ALLOCATION SYSTEM (DPAS):

d. What recommendations would you make concerning the DPAS system?

1-1. Streamline process to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize similarly rated contracts. 2. Create new rating between "DX" and "DO" which could be used during wartime for war supplies.

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Comments:
-Suggestion 1. is OK. Suggestion 2. would further complicate a poorly understood system.
-Strongly agree with #1. Neutral on #2.
-Not sure what this system really gets us. In theory it sounds good, in practice it isn't much of a stick.

2-None, the system worked well.

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Comments:
-Activity specific

3-Your relationship with the contractor is more important.

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Comments:
-Most of the time

263
4-It became obvious that the government people do not really understand how the DPAS system relates to other priority systems like "Brick Bat" etc. Think we need some training.

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Comments:
- During ODS everyone was trying to develop their own system of priorities internally which also confused the system.

5-None; however, President needs to declare "partial mobilization" to support rating changes.

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Comments:
- Presidential participation would probably help the system change faster.
- Don't understand how this would work.

6-Ironically, most of the DX items are in plants that are primarily military. So giving it a higher priority than commercial is meaningless. Industry was generally well under capacity during ODS. So changing priorities wasn't necessary. Getting quotes, materials, and subcomponents in quickly was a problem. Wasn't there an issue with the DPAS? not extended?

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Comments:
- Yes, there was.
- DX is program related so we might need an equal rating for non-program related contracts.
Issuance of a directive is too much work.

7-I recommend all contractors review the DPAS booklet, sound and slide or VCR film on DPAS, which is available through all DCMAO offices.

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Comments:
- Me too.
- Probably wouldn’t be a bad idea to refresh contractors and government on DPAS.
- We need more education on DPAS to industry and government. Buying activities have got to let DCMAO handle more of these situations.

8-We prioritized our war stoppers and then competed with other services against theirs. Need a DOD war stopper priority allocation during conflicts.

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Comments:
- DPC Directive—too much paperwork.

13. REQUIREMENTS:

g. What recommendations would you make in regard to identification of requirements and availability of funding?

1-Users must be more aggressive in providing funds. To do this they must receive full cooperation from the HQ USAF.

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Comments:
- No involvement with USAF. Had no funding problems.
- I am not in the USAF—therefore cannot comment.

2-The program had money to do production anyway. We just accelerated and did in the field in the desert. Can’t say on funding, but OSD/OPNAV should immediately make a pot available for legitimate requirements like acceleration.

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3-The armed forces identified about 150 weapons systems for which spare parts usage was expected to accelerate. However, this took about two months. This process needs to be accelerated for future operations.

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4-Push authority to issue direction/funding down. During ODS funding/requirements approval was elevated to USAF/CV.

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Comments: 
-No involvement

5-Food should have pre-designed requirements in advance. When balloon goes up--just issue on pre-design.

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Comments: 
-No involvement

6-Better coordination between buying activity and DCMAO.

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Comments: 
-We are all fighting one another. Nobody wants to work in system. Too much duplication in efforts.

7-In emergencies, routine matters must be able to be handled in a more direct fashion; i.e., fewer reviewers and "sign-offs."

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8-The earlier the better. Also, take a few minutes to examine the requirement to be sure you are asking for what is needed. "Go slow to go fast."

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9-In a crisis, it is difficult to determine these things in advance.

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Comments:
-Agree with statement; however, because of crisis determinations must be made looking at big picture.

10-Work even closer with the program managers and try to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.

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Comments:
-It is a "two-way street"!

11-We have developed a package of pre-positional requirements that were the most common for the future.

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Comments:
-Good
-Good idea

12-If we spent time now planning how we would have to support various types of operations we could eliminate a lot of the confusion when the emergency happens.

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Comments:
- Not sure how many scenarios would have to be planned. Could be more expensive than it's worth.
- Lessons learned/set up contingency plans

15. DELIVERY FOLLOW-UP:

b. What recommendations would you make in the above areas?

1-Tracking equipment: 1. There have to be more efficient ways with all the high tech bar coding and bar coding reading equipment available today. 2. We need on-the-shelf available bar coding equipment that would have been used to identify equipment as it was being loaded so that it would be easily assembled/mated when it arrived. Commercial equipment logistic support: Hiring a field service representative to assist in country was a life saver. Should have put him in country with a full-up maintenance van and set of high turnover parts (filters, etc.)

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2-First line weapon system immediately establish dedicated point of contact both at staging area in U.S. and at arrival point in combat zone.

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3-All are possible to correct
1-shipping stores based upon van number and content
2-external markings to facilitate customer
3-food ADP system

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4-None, system worked well.

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Comments:
- Activity specific
5-Augment the command workforce.

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Comments:
- Plenty of people on-board, they must work hard and productively.
- Reservists enhanced productivity in many organizations.
- Redesignate the workforce

6-Better system of identifying where and when items were to be shipped. Centralize distribution at arrival point and assure items are identified and targeted for proper delivery point.

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7-Do a better job of distributing the containerization if one depot cannot handle the work load. Have the commander willing to recognize there is an overall problem and he needs help. Be willing to waive some of the regulations regarding who/which company transports the material.

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8-Many buying activity personnel are not aware of DCMAO efforts and follow up right behind them also duplicating both DCMAO and contractor efforts. The buying activities need training or proper procedures for handling follow up. This is a much abused system by all activities.

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Comments:
- Don't know
- Agree for most part with regard to need for training
- Probably more abused than you think. Even do plant visits on DCMAO administered contractors.
9-None, the industry was outstanding.

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16. CONTRACT PAYMENT:
   b. What recommendations would you make to prevent payment problems?

1-A change to the UCA expenditure law which will permit some level within DOD to approve the expenditure of more than 75% of the NTE price prior to definitization of the UCA.

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Comments:
- I think this would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Not knowing the specifics, I'm not sure how much the contractor suffered, if any at all. Also, the government has to have some leverage to induce reaching a final agreement.
- Exercise war powers act would have some effect

2-Pay based upon vendor shipping document instead of DD 250.

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Comments:
- Possible, adding caveat that if there are any discrepancies between shipping documents and DD 250, government is entitled to refund if determined necessary.
- Do not see extensive time savings.
- Fast pay system didn't work. Parts were paid for and not received.

3-A computer system which is acceptable to all and relays award info immediately and is not dependent on hard copy transfer of contract data.

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Comments:
- Network of such magnitude would not be cost effective.

4-We need a system more compatible with commercial business—prompt and efficient with minor paper work. We almost bankrupted certain contractors, especially the lease contractor who loaned us all their vehicles (and their livelihoods) and then wouldn't pay them. I spent hours and hours on the phone with payments office. Wrote justification after justification. Basically they wanted me to prove a guy would go bankrupt before they’d rush payment. Of course, the only way to prove it is to wait and see.

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5-Other than hiring additional knowledgeable people, do not have any recommendations.

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Comments:
- On a DOD-wide basis, streamlining processes appears to be possible consideration.
- Better resource allocation
- Get rid of government personnel not doing [their] jobs.

17. JUSTIFICATIONS AND APPROVALS (J&A’S):
f. What recommendations would you make regarding the use of J&A’s?

1-Suggest that class J&A’s be permitted for longer periods of time—with interim reports to approval authority—with provisions that J&A’s could be amended while still open to change minor portions—such as increase in $ if circumstances remain the same.

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2-During these emergencies there should be a delegation from headquarters to the product divisions.

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Comments:
- During emergencies/contingencies approval levels should be delegated to the lowest possible level.
- To what benefit?

3-If requirements or groups of requirements can be accurately estimated, then class J&A's are the way to go.

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4-In the future, a war plan annex be developed which contains a class Public Exigency J&A which can be activated by message.

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5-Was to our benefit to have a blanket J&A.

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6-DOD FAR supplement should authorize use of "unusual and compelling urgency" for wartime supplies/services to justify other than full and open competition.

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Comments:
- This would only state another exception. Would need accompanying language to reduce paperwork requirements to reduce resource involvement.
- War powers act does
- However, must be handled so that not blanket exception. We still need development of stronger industrial support base to keep prices reasonable, lead times manageable.
7-Set up some standard blanket (generic) to be used only under combat conditions.

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Comments:
- Relates to above

8-Need blanket approval, otherwise totally senseless waste of time doing each individually.

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9-Similar situations to ODS war power act should be enough justification.

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Comments:
- Don't know
- See comment on recommendation above. Need criteria to separate emergency needs from less critical or where cycle is not way off.

10-Blanket approval/waiver of J&A's--delegate authority to local level.

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11-Give authority to HCAs regardless of dollar amount during war time.

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Comments:
- Lower.
- Give authority to lower levels.
- HCA's or CINCs.
- All the time, HCA's should have authority.
12. Provide for emergency methods to include blanket J&A's or other authorization for procuring agency to contract with established suppliers to acquire hard wave without normal administrative routine.

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18. CONTRACTING METHODS:

e. What recommendations would you make regarding methods of contracting and types of contracts?

1-When "cutting corners" don't do anything stupid.

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2-Existing types provide necessary flexibility

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3-UCAs are quickest way to get on contract.

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Comments:
- Not always. But agree that this is the case the biggest percentage of the time.
- Not always.
- Depends on type of product.

4-Be as flexible as possible.

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5-A provision permitting the commander to delegate UCA approval authority to lower limits in wartime situations.

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6-During times of crisis the establishment must understand the need for blanket letter contract approval.

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Comments:
- Most will be F-P; lose a great deal of leverage and cost consciousness on both sides in rapid scenario.

7-Careful use of ceiling prices/not to exceed/scope and $ definitization later with actuals audited. Project rate pre-determined.

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Comments:
- Depends on contractor

8-Allow decision-making authority at the procuring activities.

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9-We need to have in place contractual instruments that are responsive to emergencies: BOA's, BPA, etc., for critical items for long lead time categories.

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Comments:
- When is the next war? We can't award contracts that won't be used.

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- Long lead materials are not covered under either BOA or BPA, OEM must be offered incentive to keep long lead items in stock (tax exempt).
- If doable

10-FFP and T&M worked well for repair situations

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Comments:
- FFP is too inflexible

11-The IDIQ type contract allowed contracting to vary requirements.

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12-Keep flexibility in. Lower approval thresholds during war time to HCA and below.

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13-Waiver of UCA approvals.

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Comments:
- Need approval, but at a lower level.
- In an age of fax machines, E-mail, and (soon) electronic signatures, may not be necessary, prudent.
- Need to control these at some level.

14-Present system works well.

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Comments:
- It worked--not well enough.
-Approval levels need to be lowered during contingencies.

15-None, our system worked fine.

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Comments:
-Comment was probably made by someone at too high a level to understand.
-Activity specific
-What system

23. DEDICATED TEAMS:
f. What recommendations would you make for fostering good teamwork?

1-Work together in a team environment for all time.

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Comments:
-In the total team concept, functionals lose their independence and are pressured to do stupid things. Functionals must be autonomous. 
-We all do this.
-Develop teams best suited to handle emergency situations
-Need to maintain independence of contracting officers. Co-location makes it difficult to avoid unwarranted influence.

2-The two most important factors when setting the team up are to make sure the team knows their responsibilities, and second to form teams of people who work well together.

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Comments:
-Should add "know who has what authority." There is only one PCO and that is the person with the warrant.

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3-Build the team quickly, and like it was done here, had a sense of purpose and dedication instilled in it, understood priority and need to act quickly.

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4-A. Strong enthusiastic program manager.
B. Enthusiastic, experienced team members.
C. Frequent communication with contractor.
D. Frequent team members.

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Comments:
- Augment team as required

5-Have the teams set up before you need them or they probably won't work.

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Comments:
- If the team is set up 5-10 years in advance it won't work either.
- This depends on each activity and individual personalities.
- Management should be aware of what teams will or will not work. Set up contingency plan for emergencies.

6-Follow TQM consensus principles. No meeting over 2 hours. Rotate meeting locations.

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Comments:
- Do not have meetings for the sake of having a meeting. Limit personnel attending.
- In war scenario, the consensus meetings won't always work.
7-Have solid, important objectives. Select members who are motivated and cooperative. Have them brief results to management. Praise the good work they do.

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Comments:
-Solid objectives are the key to success.

8-Assign your best personnel in each of the disciplines required. Give them carte blanch to make project work.

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9-Strong communications, compatibility, clear focus on fleet needs.

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10-It worked well before ODS--our training paid off in ODS.

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Comments:
-Teaming has not worked well!

27. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: What changes do you feel need to be made to the legal aspects of contracting or to contracting policies in order to assist contracting professional in a future military contingency? Please be specific.

1-In times of war, delegation to the lowest level must occur. Higher headquarters must be willing to depend upon the people in the field to do the right thing.

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Comments:
- Not sure how you properly maintain CI, so HQ must be "in loop" and have power to redirect.

2-I feel an increased set of thresholds need to be established (e.g., double what they are now) so they could be authorized by the Sec AF in times of emergency. After the emergency, the secretary would direct that they go back to peacetime levels. Major commands and lower organizations would not have the authority to restrict these. Examples: J&A review, committee review, UCA approvals, business clearance, contract clearance.

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Comments:
- At lowest possible level

3-The UCA expenditure limits presently in law needs to have a national emergency waiver procedure in it, or be repealed altogether. DOD and/or USAF needs to develop and have in place a set of "contingency waivers/deviations/class J&A's" which could be implemented in a national emergency situation. See paragraph 12 for specifics. The requirements process was streamlined, in a continued conflict it was obvious that contracting would have become a bottleneck.

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Comments:
- Not just USAF--all DOD.

4-Need planned authorized wartime streamlined acquisition process that is documented in FAR and FAR supplements.

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5-I believe there should be a "war" book of streamlined regs authorized in war, such as ceiling priced authority, J&A authority(same) and some authority to waive CBD
announcements. Also certain critical weapon systems should always have BOAs in place for instant use as required.

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6-Make it easier to issue directives to contractor. The DPAS (ITA999) can be a very complex system.

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Comments:
- Don't know "DPAS"
- Help

7-Congress has us so tied up with rules and regulation that very little of what we do makes common sense (in my opinion). We need to look at the commercial world and try to do what's smart. Socioeconomic programs are fine but they should be recognized as such and not as the best business decision.

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Comments:
- There are numerous commercial companies that would easily fit into requirements for socioeconomic programs. Agree that congress has us tied up with rules and regs they make but don't follow.

8-We need to recognize that most all of our policy, regs, public laws are "peace-time" approaches when we have the luxury of time. Most of the urgency methods have all sorts of impediments (approvals and reviews) so they won't be abused. These impediments (understandable when there are only a few actions during peace-time) could become life threatening during an ODS. We need "war-time" or "theater support" policy and procedures.

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Comments:
- Controls against abuse must be minimized to most effective, some risk taken. But can't throw them out entirely.

9-In a military contingency (possible expand definition to include military exercises) permit Head of Contracting Activity to invoke exceptions or waivers in the following areas directly related to or in support of the contingency:
- acquisition plan
- synopsis publication and response times
- wage determinations when a major part of the performance will be outside the U.S.
- award synopses
- business clearance memorandums

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Comments:
- At lowest level possible

10-In time of national emergency or in support of military actions War Powers Act should take precedence over policy and most regulations.

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11-Establish authority at HPA (Head of Procuring Activity) for using streamlined acquisition reviews. Should not have to have normal number of sign-offs, boards of review, etc., particularly when buying parts from the same source as had been the source or original manufacturer.

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Comments:
- Approval at lowest level possible.
- Local problem. Most boards, etc., are locally imposed and could be waived locally.

12-A specific listing or document identifying what contracting thresholds and limitations can be relieved in a contingency to include identification of the authority with
the power to authorize relief. Contingency implications should be considered in the development of any contracting policy.

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13-Need to issue blanket waivers as previously mentioned.

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Comments:
-See above comments.

14-Be responsive. When procedures interfere with mission support, look to amending procedures.

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15-I'm unable to answer as I lack legal perspective.

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16-Bring all approval levels down to local activity for deviations and approvals during time of military contingency.

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28. ORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on your experiences what would you recommend an organization do to make contracting for a contingency situation in the future faster, more cost effective, or more responsive to the customer.

1-Delegate authority for use of sole source contracting and the use of undefinitized contractual documents to
contracting directorates. Also, must waive all reviews other than JAG above the 3-letter contracting directors.

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Comments:
- Also, need streamlined documentation and to keep higher headquarters informed, submit status reports on certain approvals after-the-fact.

2-Write up "lessons learned" to help document what worked and what didn't so that it could be used as a baseline 10 to 15 years from now (or sooner) when we have another emergency.

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Comments:
- Writing "lessons learned" is only valuable if someone with authority to make the changes is agreeable to processing changes to laws and regs.  
- After time has elapsed, things change. Most lessons learned are either not continuously read or are not a good match to new scenarios.

3-A. Work closely with customer.  
B. Work closely with contractors.  
C. Work closely with Pentagon to obtain funding and direction.

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Comments:
- A and B OK. C is too bureaucratic in wartime.

4-Organization responded well (NAVAIR)

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5-No changes required here. Biggest impact is at user level.

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6-Have operational plan in place.

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7-Waive the regulations. Trust the civilian work force to police itself. Recognize that we are not crooks or dummies and that we know what we are doing and are tax payers too. The closer the procurement organization is to the customer the more effective it will be.

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Comments:
- Waive the regulations if possible, but delegate everything to lowest level possible to ensure integrity remains in the procurement system.
- Modify, not blanket waivers. War profiteering not dead, can suck out vital economic resources. Also, need oversight.
- Need some guidelines to protect the public trust.

8-Based on prior experience a team should be developed that can be put together on short notice to handle emergency situations.

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9-We need to plan the procurement process for war. We need up-to-date letter contracts in our computers with fill-in-the-blanks. We need to constantly monitor war essential parts and make sure we have ordering agreements or contractual instruments in place, even if we don't have current requirements. We need to ask ourselves what kind of equipment or parts and equipment might be needed in a
tropics environment, the mountains, the arctic, and what is commercially available.

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Comments:
-To some extent, this might make sense. However, to have contingency contracts in place for all scenarios as well as having contractors agree to keep them in effect with no activity seems too hard.
-Too many variables

10-Consider using multi-functional teams as a normal method of working together. Ensure that there is someone close to the action who has the authority to resolve problems between the services—preferably a civilian.

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Comments:
-Agree with all except stipulating a civilian—during a contingency the military may have the best communication channels about what is really happening. I think this liaison would depend on individual personalities of the team players.
-Keep contracting officer independent.

11-I don't know of anything other than para 27 above. Management must (1) always be ready to reassign people, even on a temporary basis, to meet unusual fluctuations in the workload; (2) be willing to institute rapid approval mechanisms as necessary; and very important (3) acknowledge those people putting out the extra effort and find ways to reward them for that effort.

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12-Train for contingency operations. Know how and where to obtain relief from contracting restrictions you know you will need by the nature of your business. Have a plan for augmenting your staff. Know what physical limitations you
will have and have a plan for supplementing them. Structure contracts to accommodate contingencies where reasonable.

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13-Same as above. Need a good cadre of very experienced/skilled people.

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14-Issue uniform list of ODS requirements to DCMAO handling contracts. Every activity had their own system.

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Comments:
- Help


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Comments:
- Don’t think we should suspend uniform contract format.
- Don’t suspend requirements for competition—in many supplies/services procured, competition is what kept many suppliers from being able to demand premium prices.
- But keep track of UCAs/letter contracts for future definitization.
- [Agree with first sentence. Disagree with second.] Need letter contracts accounted for and maintained.
No change--current organizational structure is adequate to handle workload increases.

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Comments:
- Activity specific

29. TRAINING:
b. If you were developing a training package on this subject, what topics would you consider to be essential? Give illustrations, if possible.

1- No additional training is required. There must be an understanding by all parties at all management levels that they are part of a unique situation and the utmost cooperation must be afforded their customers.

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Comments:
- Information needs to be put out to advise people of the limitations of authority in extraordinary situations.
- Need to educate the other functional areas--cross training.

2-1. Know the difference between statute/EO and regs.
2. Accountability--especially after the fact.
3. Attitude and commitment.

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3- Practice.
Form the teams. Do exercises.
Give team members training on working in a group.
Find out where shortcomings are and solve them.
Take lessons learned from your sources and solve the problems.
Decide whether it is best to anticipate or wait for events.
Make sure the war is popular.

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Comments:
- Nice if you have the staff and time to do such things. Personnel resources are limited here.

4-The DOD, AF, AFSC priority system. The requirements certification system. Assuming contingency contracting authority is given, what authorities have been delegated where.

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5-Military reservists who were sent to theater as contracting officers need tools to do their jobs--copies of regulations and forms, sufficient warranted authority, computer (laptop or better), and phone numbers of persons in the U.S. to call if they need any help at any time--day or night.

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Comments:
- This is not really a training recommendation. Military reservists in contracting field need same courses as DOD civilians.
- Better to send contracting officers

6-Developing relationships/understandings with contractors and my government personnel, from ACOs and QARs to field engineers to key command personnel. Learn to clear the way with face to face discussions (agreements in principle) before you start writing memos.

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Comments:
- This is OJT, not instructional training.

7-1. Use of UCA's
2. How to obtain Department of Commerce directive to reprioritize rated orders

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289
8-While business would not be "as usual," apply the usual concepts in a smarter more logical manner. Do the job smarter.

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Comments:
-This requires intensive exposure to contracting concepts, statutes, regs. Need contracting "SWAT teams" intensively trained to provide needed creativity, flexibility.

9-Cutting red tape

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Comments:
-Creativity in "bending" the rules without breaking them or abrogating their spirit.

10-Regulatory relief. Changes in processing points. Communications with requiring activities.

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11-Each organization should have rapid contracting model or strategy.

1. Case studies with all the contractual instruments, support, justifications, and work arounds addressed
2. You need to look at letter contracts especially, and all the applicable guidance.
3. Contracting for commercial items or commercial equivalent items
4. Sources of surplus for older equipment where it won't be economical to grant new production

290
5. Instruments that can be in place before the money is received like BOA's and BPA's.

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12-The contracting office is revising a contingency contracting operating instruction which includes manpower requirements, communication and equipment needs and detailed instructions for buying expansion commercial airlift under a contingency.

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Comments:
-Could we get a copy?

13-Existing training was adequate.

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Comments:
-Activity specific

14-1. DPAS ITA999 Form
2. DCMAO services. It seemed like everyone wanted to talk to contractor which caused confusion, conflicts, and most of duplication of efforts.
3. Look at alternate sources for delivery when low bidder can't meet schedule.

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32. ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?

1-My personal assessment is we made it through ODS because it was relatively short and our people were willing to make personal sacrifices to make sure what needed to get done got done. I was disappointed in the short-sightedness of the command staff to support planning for a long-term conflict situation. If it had gone longer, i.e., a "Viet Nam" type
situation, we may not have been able to handle it as well as was done. You can’t count on people giving 6 and 7 days a week for a long period of time.

2-If you are going to hold 1st and 2nd line people responsible for their actions after the fact, make damn sure you train them well for these conditions and make it very clear what is allowed and what is not.

3-Continuous improvement (GE name for TQM) has proven itself during ODS. The people responded to make the whole effort a success by doing their jobs smarter and more efficiently.

4-Excellent topic for a study.
Appendix E: Statistical Analysis of Round Two Answers

TABLE 7

POINT VALUES FOR AGREEMENT CATEGORIES

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<th>Degree of Agreement/Disagreement</th>
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TABLE 8

RANGES OF AGREEMENT

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<tr>
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NOTE: Standard deviations of less than 1.00 indicate consensus of opinion.

TABLE 9

STATISTICS OF ROUND TWO ANSWERS

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Appendix F: Cover Letters

April 6, 1992

Dear

With the recent changes in the world political situation, the U.S. military can expect to engage in small conventional conflicts that arise quickly in various locations rather than the European-based nuclear scenario that was prepared for previously. In order to support such a conflict, the contracting organizations located within the U.S. must be prepared to acquire equipment and supplies very rapidly, just as they did recently for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Two Air Force Institute of Technology masters candidates, Captains Kathleen Killen and Gavin Wilson, are researching the contracting actions that took place during the Gulf War in order to capture the contracting methods which were successful in supporting troops that are deployed overseas. The results of this research will be used to indicate the best contracting practices to use during military contingencies, as well as to train contracting professionals.

Captains Killen and Wilson wish to administer a questionnaire sponsored by the National Contract Management Association to representative agencies within each branch of the military, as well as the Defense Logistics Agency. Your input is important, and I would like to thank you in advance for giving them your assistance.

Questions regarding this study should be addressed to Capt Killen at (513) 237-7510 or their thesis advisor, Dr Rita Wells at (513) 255-8546.

WILLIAM C. PURSCH, Ph.D.
Functional Director for Research and Grants
National Contract Management Association
FROM: Captains Kathleen Killen and Gavin Wilson

SUBJECT: Final Thesis Questionnaire

TO:

You are one of a small select group who have been chosen because you were involved in making contracting decisions to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Your personal input is essential to our study.

Your answers will not be attributed to you. However, all the answers will be sent to all respondents for review and further comment. For this reason, we ask that you return the questionnaire, using the enclosed envelope, by 01 May 1992.

Your time and personal input are an important investment in improving the process of supporting military contingencies.

Please call Captain Killen at (513) 237-7510 if you have any questions.

Thank you so much for your assistance.

KATHLEEN E. KILLEN, CAPT, USAF
Master of Science Candidate
AF Institute of Technology

GAVIN P. WILSON, CAPT, USAF
Master of Science Candidate
AF Institute of Technology
Appendix G: Acronym Definitions

ACO -- Administrative Contracting Officer
ADPE -- Automatic Data Processing Equipment
AFB -- Air Force Base
AFIT -- Air Force Institute of Technology
AFSC -- Air Force Systems Command
ALC -- Air Logistic Center
AOR -- Area of Responsibility
BCM -- Business Clearance Memorandum
BOA -- Basic Ordering Agreement
BPA -- Basic Purchasing Agreement
CAP -- Civil Air Patrol
CAT -- Crisis Action Team
CEO -- Chief Executive Officer
CICA -- Competition in Contracting Act
CMNS -- Combat Mission Need Statement
CO -- Contracting Officer
CONUS -- Continental United States
COR -- Contracting Officer Representative
COTS -- Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CRAF -- Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CV -- Vice Commander
DCAA -- Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCMAO -- Defense Contract Management Administration Office
DMC -- Defense Contract Management Command
DFARS -- Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DLA -- Defense Logistics Agency
DOD -- Department of Defense
DPAS -- Defense Priorities Allocation System
FAR -- Federal Acquisition Regulation
GAO -- General Accounting Office
GOSC -- General Officer Steering Committee
GPS -- Global Positioning System
HCA -- Head of Contracting Agency
HPA -- Head of Procuring Activity
HQ -- Headquarters
J&A -- Justification and Approval
JAG -- Judge Advocate General
JIT -- Just-In-Time
L/C -- Letter Contract
LOE -- Level of Effort
MAC -- Military Airlift Command
MIL STD -- Military Standard
MRE -- Meals, Ready to Eat
NSN -- National Stock Number
NTE -- Not-To-Exceed
ODS -- Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm
OEM -- Original Equipment Manufacturer

300
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>On-the-Job Training</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OT</td>
<td>Overtime</td>
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<td>PALT</td>
<td>Procurement Acquisition Lead Time</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Procurement/Program Contracting Officer</td>
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<td>PEO</td>
<td>Program Executive Officer</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
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<td>PMD</td>
<td>Program Management Directive</td>
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<td>RIF</td>
<td>Reduction in Force</td>
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<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposals</td>
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<td>ROM</td>
<td>Rough Order of Magnitude</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Rapid Response Process</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Secretary of the Air Force</td>
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<td>SAT</td>
<td>Special Action Team</td>
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<td>SPO</td>
<td>System Program Office</td>
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<td>TACOM</td>
<td>Tank and Automotive Command</td>
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<td>TDM</td>
<td>Total Design Method</td>
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<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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<td>TQM</td>
<td>Total Quality Management</td>
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<td>UCA</td>
<td>Undefinitized Contractual Action</td>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Bibliography


303


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Vitae

Capt Kathleen E. Killen enlisted in the Navy in 1974 as an Ocean Systems Technician. In 1979 she separated from the Navy as a Petty Officer Second Class to attend Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, LA. After graduating with a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering, she entered the Air Force via Officers Training School. She attended the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) from 1983 to 1985 while earning a Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering. She served at Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, in the Maverick Missile System Program Office and at Space Systems Division, Los Angeles AFB, CA, in the Global Positioning System Joint Program Office before returning to AFIT for this graduate work in Systems Management. She has an assignment to Human Systems Division, Brooks AFB, TX, upon the completion of her degree.

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306
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AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTING ACTIONS BY UNITED STATES BASED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

Kathleen E. Killen, Captain, USAF
Gavin P. Wilson, Captain, USAF

Air Force Institute of Technology, WPAFB OH 45433-6583

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

This study assembled the experiences of the contracting professionals who supported Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm from their continental United States based Department of Defense offices. The results of the study show that these professionals actively supported the conflict just as much as the contingency contracting officers who were deployed to the Middle East. No major differences in contracting methods appeared among the different agencies studied. However, the study does suggest that certain regulations should be considered for changes or waivers that go into effect during military contingencies. Also, there are specific training requirements that contracting professionals should receive in order to support a military contingency properly.
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