THE U.S. ARMY IN A CIVIL-MILITARY SUPPORT ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA

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### The U.S. Army In A Civil-Military Support Role In Latin America

This paper examines U.S. security-related efforts in the Latin American region, with particular emphasis on the U.S. Army's role. It outlines those challenges the Latin American countries will be facing in the coming years where their militaries may have a role to play. The paper also provides an overview of specific security assistance programs and U.S. Army programs that provide opportunities for military-to-military contacts. Using these assessments, it then evaluates past and future civil-military support roles of the U.S. Army in Latin America, focusing particular attention on civic action and counter-drug activities, and the advantages and disadvantages of participating in these roles.

**Subject Terms:**
- U.S. Army
- Latin America
- civil-military relations
- role of militaries in Latin America
- democratization
- insurgencies
- counter-drug activities
- civic action
- disaster relief
- border disputes
- regional cooperation
- OAS
- IADB
- U.S. security assistance
- ESF
- IMET
- FMS
- MITT
- TAT
- HCA
- ERC
- SMEE
- DFT
- reserve forces
- interagency efforts.
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PREFACE

This paper has been prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Inter American Affairs) under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations & Policy, Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate. This work was performed under contract MDA 903 89C 0003, task order number T-K6-865, The U.S. Army in a Civil-Military Support Role in Latin America. The paper analyzes possible civil-military support roles that the U.S. Army might pursue in Latin America. In making this assessment, it also discusses pertinent challenges facing the Latin militaries in the region as well as the range of security assistance and military programs available to the U.S. Government.

Extensive interviews have been conducted during this study, and the author would like to thank all those who shared their valuable time and knowledge so willingly. In addition, the author wishes to thank especially the official reviewers for this paper, Dr. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College and Col. (Ret.) W. M. Christenson, an IDA consultant. In addition, LTC Blas Urquidez, Jr., LTC James A. McAtamney, and LTC John Fishel offered very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ........................................................................................... S-1

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. I-1
   A. Parameters of the Study................................................................. I-1
   B. Setting the Context ........................................................................ I-2
   C. Organization of the Paper.............................................................. I-5

II. CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE MILITARY ROLE ............................................................. II-1
   A. Challenges to the Region .............................................................. II-2
   B. The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Historical Perspective ............................................................ II-5
      1. General Trends ........................................................................ II-5
      2. Subregional Differences ............................................................. II-11
   C. Challenges Facing Latin American Militaries............................... II-15
      1. An Evolution of Civil-Military Relations...................................... II-17
      2. Civic Action Efforts ................................................................... II-22
      3. Counter-Drugs .......................................................................... II-24
      4. Counterinsurgency .................................................................... II-28
      5. Disaster Relief and Environmental Issues ................................. II-31
      6. Territorial Integrity of the State .................................................. II-31
   D. Regional Cooperation .................................................................... II-33
      1. Past Efforts and Future Prospects ................................................ II-33
      2. Research and Development ....................................................... II-37
      3. Peacekeeping and Multilateral Intervention .............................. II-39
E. Constraints on Latin American Militaries' Possible Future Functions .......... II-41

III. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO AND MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA.......................................................................................... III-1

A. Trends in the Major Security Assistance Programs................................. III-5
  1. Economic Support Fund ...................................................................... III-5
  2. Foreign Military Sales and Sections 517, 519, and 506(a) of Title 22 .... III-6
  3. International Military Education and Training .................................... III-15

B. Means to Execute Security Assistance Missions ..................................... III-20
  1. Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Teams ................ III-20
  2. Technical Assistance Field Teams and Extended Training Service
     Specialists ...................................................................................... III-22

C. U.S. Military Programs in Latin America .............................................. III-22
  1. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance .................................................. III-23
  2. Exercise Related Construction ....................................................... III-27
  3. Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund ................ III-28
  4. Developing Countries in Combined Exercises Program ..................... III-29
  5. Deployments for Training .............................................................. III-30
  6. Personnel Exchange Program ........................................................ III-31

D. Connections Among Programs ................................................................ III-33

E. Future Prospects for These Programs.................................................... III-35
  1. IMET ............................................................................................. III-35
  2. SMEEs ......................................................................................... III-37
  3. MTTs and Similar Efforts .................................................................. III-38

IV. FUTURE ROLES FOR THE U.S. ARMY................................................ IV-1

A. U.S. Army Peacetime Activities ............................................................ IV-5

B. Civic Action Activities ........................................................................ IV-5
  1. Current Efforts ............................................................................... IV-8

vi
2. Civic Action Objectives and Traditional Problems ................... IV-10
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of U.S. Army Participation in Civic
   Action Projects ............................................................. IV-13
   a. Advantages ................................................................ IV-13
   b. Disadvantages ......................................................... IV-15
4. Possible Changes to Civic Action Activities ............................... IV-16
C. The Counter-Drug Mission ....................................................... IV-18
   1. Historical Focus ....................................................... IV-18
   2. The U.S. Military's Role ............................................. IV-21
   3. Assessing the Counter-Drug Effort to Date ....................... IV-23
   4. Latin Perspectives on the U.S. Strategy ......................... IV-24
   5. Advantages and Disadvantages to U.S. Army Involvement in
      Counter-Drug Activities ............................................. IV-27
   6. The Future Environment and Possible Approaches ................ IV-29
D. Disaster Assistance and Environmental Issues .......................... IV-31
E. Enhancing Latin American Militaries' Support for Democracy .... IV-34
   1. Force Changes: Downsizing Active Forces; Establishing Reserve
      Forces ........................................................................ IV-34
   2. Multilateral Contacts: Existing Institutions and New Opportunities .. IV-39
   3. Expansion of IMET and Civil-Military Relations ................ IV-46
V. STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. V-1
A. U.S. Army Efforts ............................................................ V-1
B. Interagency Efforts ............................................................ V-6
Appendixes

Appendix A. Security Assistance Programs
Appendix B. Bibliography
Appendix C. Glossary

Tables

III-1 Economic Support Fund, Central and South America, Budget Authority .......... III-7
III-2 Foreign Military Sales and Construction Sales Agreement, Central and South America ............................................................. III-9
III-3 Military Assistance Program, Central and South America, Budget Authority/Obligations ............................................................ III-10
III-4 Excess Defense Articles Sold Under Foreign Military Sales, Central and South America ............................................................. III-12
III-5 International Military Education and Training Program, Budget Authority, Central and South America ........................................ III-17
III-6 Number of Latin American Students Participating in IMET, FY1988-FY1992 ................................................................. III-18

Figures

III-1 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, By Command ...................................... III-24
III-2 HCA Activities, By Type of Project ............................................................ III-25
III-3 Total Number of HCA Projects ................................................................. III-25
SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and traditional East-West military confrontation presents both challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in Central and South America. The region as a whole has not generally received a high priority among U.S. policy interests, and growing domestic pressures for reduced U.S. involvement overseas and reduced levels of assistance to foreign countries combine to present considerable impediments to U.S. policy in the region. Yet there are important reasons for the United States to focus on its neighbors to the South, including: geographical proximity, economic and trading opportunities, the growing significance of regional relations following the demise of the bipolar world, and potential security challenges.

This paper first examines how the role of the Latin American militaries is being redefined in today's changing environment, with a particular focus on the evolution of civil-military relations and the process of democratization in the region. It then identifies a range of U.S. security assistance programs and U.S. Army programs which can be used to promote and support U.S. policy objectives in Latin America. This paper then uses these assessments to project the kinds of civil-military support roles the U.S. Army can play in Latin America, especially civic action and counter-drug activities.

A. THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY

Within Latin America, the prospects for continued democratization are contingent on several developments; foremost among them is economic performance (dealing with problems such as inflation, foreign debt repayment, and rapid urbanization). Other challenges to democracy in the region include the fragility of the political systems and the continued important role of the military in political life; insurgent threats (above all in Peru, but also in Colombia and Guatemala); the spreading drug industry; and border disputes. All these issues affect the future prospects for democracy and the role that the militaries will play in these countries.

Traditional civil-military relationships in Latin America are becoming redefined as the militaries have withdrawn from a role of active governance. At the same time, legitimate roles for the militaries must be established and civilian capabilities in national
security affairs must be strengthened. It is important to develop a context in which the military and political elite view each other in a less adversarial manner.

In terms of military roles, considerable attention is being focused on civic action activities (such as developing a country's infrastructure and helping provide basic medical care). On the positive side, military involvement in such efforts could help foster a more positive image of the military, reduce its traditional isolation from society, and even improve military morale. Among the disadvantages to be considered are the potential threat to the institutionalization of civilian governments and democracy more generally, the possible increase—rather than decrease—in the military's influence, and the preclusion of civilians to obtain experience in these activities. Should reserve forces (similar to those in the United States) be established in many of these countries, as is currently being discussed, perhaps these forces could be better positioned to assume a civic action role.

One of the greatest challenges to democracy and stability in the region is the drug industry. While Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia face the greatest problems in this area, this industry is increasingly spreading throughout the region. Given the scope of the problem, it is clear that multilateral efforts are necessary; no country can handle this problem on its own. Within individual countries, the delineation of responsibility between police and military forces remains a contentious process.

Threats from insurgent groups, especially the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, remain a problem for several of the Latin American countries. In addition to dealing with this problem and the traditional concern of protecting the state's borders, the militaries may also find themselves tasked with disaster relief and environmental clean-up.

In the realm of regional cooperation, there have been several attempts at greater economic cooperation (including with U.S. involvement). In the security arena, the drug problem and peacekeeping operations may present opportunities—indeed, requirements—for cooperation. Institutions that can contribute to cooperation in general include the Inter-American Defense Board and the Organization of American States.

**B. U.S. PROGRAMS IN THE REGION**

The U.S. Government has several programs for providing security assistance in Central and South America. In light of the U.S. public's support for increasing isolationism and opposition to continuing current levels of foreign assistance, it will be necessary to meet future objectives with fewer resources. Within Latin America over the past decade, an overwhelming percentage of security assistance funds went to Central
America, above all El Salvador and Honduras. More recently, the focus on counter-drug efforts has brought considerable levels of assistance to the Andean countries. These trends highlight the continuing problem of U.S. assistance focusing on one problem in the area to the detriment of broader U.S. interests in the region.

Among the security assistance programs, the Economic Support Fund—which focuses on such things as infrastructure development, balance of payments, and budget support—accounts for the majority of these monies going to Latin America. For its part, the Foreign Military Sales component provides the authority for foreign governments to purchase defense equipment, defense services, and military training. The International Military Education and Training program is a low-cost effort that not only enhances the professional capabilities of foreign military officers, but also provides the opportunity for valuable military-to-military contacts. This program has now been expanded to include civilians as well. One of the problems that needs to be addressed, however, is a better system for evaluating the success of IMET. Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Teams are two of the vehicles that can be used to execute security assistance missions, and approximately 75 such teams have been used annually during the 1990s in Latin America.

Several U.S. military programs are operating in the region, providing a mechanism to enhance U.S.-Latin relations and provide U.S. forces with unique training opportunities. Among these are the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programs, Exercise Related Construction, Latin American Cooperation Fund, Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises, Deployments for Training, and the Personnel Exchange Program. Each of these is examined in some detail in Section C of Chapter III.

C. THE U.S. ARMY ROLE

The U.S. Army has an important and unique role to play in Latin America, particularly in light of the central position that the Latin armies have historically had in their countries. The U.S. Army has long-standing ties with its counterparts in the region, ties which can facilitate the pursuit of U.S. policy interests in general. In these activities, the Army is firmly committed to a role in support of the Ambassador and other civilian agencies. In view of the goal to reinforce civilian institutions and assuage the sensitivity that many countries in the region have about allowing a U.S. (military) presence, Army efforts are most beneficial when they are of small scale and low visibility.
The challenge today is not so much to identify possible new roles for the U.S. Army, but to set priorities among the activities that are already ongoing. What the Latin region needs most from the U.S. Army are individual trainers, engineers, and other specialists who can act as advisers on technical and planning issues. The Army should continue to structure its program in the region to meet such fundamental objectives as establishing and reinforcing support for democratization, improving the Latin militaries' professional expertise and support for civilian rule, and influencing their attitudes toward human rights.

Within U.S. Government civic action activities, there continue to be problems of interagency cooperation and coordination. Moreover, critics of such activities argue that they can undermine support for civilian governments, fail to take adequate account of local needs, and lack proper follow-up and evaluation. On the other hand, civic action can make good use of DoD assets already available, promote a positive image of the military, enhance troop morale, and utilize the civilian expertise of reserve force participants. One of the most important priorities should be on the assurance of cultural sensitivity training among the troops.

As the U.S. Government's counter-drug policy has evolved, the number of countries incorporated and the types of activities pursued have diversified. In the counter-drug effort, the U.S. military continues to play a strictly support role; its military trainers and intelligence-gathering capabilities have been particularly useful in these activities. Nevertheless, hopes that the military might be able to provide a "quick fix" to the drug threat have now faded. Moreover, there are concerns about how this policy might involve U.S. forces in counterinsurgency operations as the two become increasingly intertwined. In terms of overall policy, in light of growing isolationism and public frustration with the lack of notable progress, more emphasis should be placed on the domestic side of the equation--controlling demand and improving education and treatment programs. For the monies that continue to be spent abroad, it is necessary to improve the oversight of this aid. Within Latin America, the idea of regional cooperation should be encouraged.

The U.S. Army can also play a contributing role in disaster relief and environmental clean-up activities in the region. In such efforts, cooperation among agencies and various countries will be vital.

As the U.S. military implements reductions in its forces, some of the "lessons learned" from this experience might be useful for Latin militaries who are, themselves, facing force cuts. In addition, the U.S. Army has been very involved in helping Venezuela
create a reserve force modeled on the U.S. system; other countries have expressed interest in this idea as well. One issue that should be explored more fully in this connection is whether appropriate U.S. funds are being used in this effort. Aside from this possible concern, the reserve force experiment has several concrete benefits. It can help advance the idea of the citizen-soldier in this region, has attracted people with diverse civilian specialties, and is not a manpower-intensive effort for the United States.

There are several ways for the U.S. Army to maintain bilateral and multilateral contacts with Latin American counterparts, including the Conference of American Armies, Inter-American Defense Board, and School of the Americas. Each is examined in some detail in Section F.2 of Chapter IV.

Finally, IMET's expansion to include civilian participants offers an important opportunity to enhance civil-military relations and civilian capabilities in security affairs. The ability to study and learn together should contribute significantly to a better understanding between civilians and military personnel, whose mutual respect and cooperation are essential to truly effective civilian governance.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper contains a variety of conclusions and recommendations both for the U.S. Army and for interagency efforts as well. In abbreviated form, they include the following:

* Give high priority to cultural sensitivity training for all personnel going to the region.

* Focus U.S. Army activities in the region on small-scale, low-visibility programs such as Mobile Training Teams, Personnel Exchange Programs, Medical Readiness Training Exercises, and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges.

* Increase the use of simulation training facilities in the United States by Latin military officers.

* Ensure strong institutional support for the Foreign Area Officer program and the Personnel Exchange Program. Similarly, place emphasis during the downsizing of U.S. forces on retaining experts in the areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil-support operations.

* Seek to incorporate discussions of civil-military relations and human rights issues more consistently into programs.
- Undertake several efforts within the realm of civic action activities. First, better evaluation procedures should be established, including a review of "lessons learned." Second, consideration might be given to establishing a program for Latin America similar to one already in operation in Africa, whereby the Congress specifies funds for the Army Corps of Engineers to use on materials and oversight, while the host nation provides the labor force. Finally, in an effort to downplay possible negative consequences of military participation in civic action, a review could be conducted on the question of whether (and under what circumstances) the military might wear civilian clothes while performing these functions.

- Prioritize the Latin American region for receipt of excess engineering equipment from U.S. forces; this can strengthen indigenous capabilities in the important field of infrastructure development.

- Focus on a balance of interests in the region, not just the counter-drug mission, especially through the use of programs such as Subject Matter Expert Exchanges.

- Review the use of U.S. Army funds in the Venezuelan reserve force project to ensure that proper funding authority is being used.

- During IMET and Army-sponsored programs, emphasize as diverse an exposure for participants as possible, including not only government agencies, but analysis centers and academic institutions with an expertise in security affairs.

- Establish a coordinating link between the Conference of the American Armies and the Air Force and Navy counterpart organizations. Encourage the Latin American participants to do the same in order to make the best use of available resources.

- Consider consolidating the School of the Americas and other Spanish instruction efforts to create one such school for the Department of Defense.

- Share our "lessons learned" in connection with the downsizing of the U.S. military to help Latin counterparts undergoing similar reductions, placing emphasis on continued support for democratic institutions during this process.

- Address disaster relief and environmental issues in various forums, including the Conference of American Armies, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, and the Inter-American Defense Board (drawing on the latter's work already in creating a data base of disaster relief capabilities in the region).
• Encourage discussions of and moves toward greater regional cooperation, in areas such as counter-drugs, disaster relief, and environmental issues.

• Encourage national security and defense studies at universities and other such civilian-military interactions. More broadly, help through the IMET program to develop civilian expertise in national security affairs.

• Work to establish several interagency working groups. One group should work to ensure greater interagency cooperation and coordination, which is increasingly necessary as resources continue to decline. A key question is whether such cooperative efforts should continue on an ad hoc basis or whether greater institutionalization of the process would be more helpful. A separate interagency group might try to address the problem of security assistance being available only on a year-to-year basis and to identify possible solutions. Finally, an interagency group should be established for evaluating IMET, determining the criteria for evaluation and identifying the organization whose responsibility this should be.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

This paper examines past and present U.S. security-related efforts in the Latin American region, with particular emphasis on the U.S. Army's role. In this study, Latin America is taken to include the Central and South American countries, but not those of the Caribbean; in other words, the focus is on the U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. Using this experience as the foundation, this study offers assessments about possible civil-military support roles for the U.S. Army in the region, the advantages and disadvantages of participating in these roles, and constraints that may affect the U.S. Army's ability to execute them. It is meant to provide a non-governmental analysis of the factors affecting such U.S. Army activities in the region.

The study sought to address four main objectives: to examine the history of U.S. security assistance to Latin America over the past decade; to outline those challenges the Latin American countries will be facing in the coming years where their militaries may have a role to play; to assess the past and future civil-military support roles of the U.S. Army in this region in light of the previous two considerations; and to identify the resources the U.S. Army will likely need and the potential constraints it may face in performing the identified missions. This paper addresses the first three of these tasks; the last task is discussed in a separate IDA paper.¹ Both papers conclude with recommendations for future consideration.

Extensive interviews and literature surveys provided a starting point for the analysis contained in this paper. Among the literature examined were academic books and journal articles as well as many U.S. government documents.² The author interviewed representatives from numerous government agencies and analysis centers, as well as various scholars in the field. She made a conscious effort to talk with working-level analysts who are involved on a daily basis with the relevant programs, but also interviewed

² A bibliography of many of the published sources used is contained in Appendix B.
others who are more involved in the broader assessments of U.S. policy in this area. In all cases, in order to facilitate the quality of the discussion, the interviewees spoke off-the-record and therefore are not named specifically in this report.

The Latin American countries face serious challenges in the coming years, challenges that may well erode public support for the civilian governments now in power. Unless solutions to problems such as economic development and debt restructuring can be found, increasing instability and growing social unrest are likely to prevail. Given the central role their armies as institutions have played in these countries, a key question is whether the U.S. Army has a special role to play in helping to shape the evolution of civil-military relations in the Latin American countries and in identifying possible ways to address some of the more important challenges to these nations. By virtue of its contacts and special relationship with the armies in Latin America, the U.S. Army has, in fact, the opportunities and vehicles to play such a role. This paper suggests which of these vehicles are likely to be the most useful and accepted.

B. SETTING THE CONTEXT

The end of the Cold War and traditional East-West military confrontation presents both challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in Central and South America. The previous competition with the Soviet Union to influence the Latin region led to significant amounts of security assistance for some Central American countries. But the rest of the region did not receive high priority among U.S. policy interests. Moreover, even during the height of the Cold War and these efforts in Central America, the U.S. Government had a difficult time trying to convince the American public that Latin America was of great importance. Today, with the end of this confrontation, it may be even more difficult to convince the public of the region's importance, particularly in light of growing domestic pressures for reduced U.S. involvement overseas and reduced levels of security assistance to foreign countries.

Yet there are important reasons for U.S. policy to focus on the Latin American region. The demise of communism has brought with it the disappearance of the bipolar world; in its absence, the significance of regional problems and regional relations is increasing. Among the various regional groupings in the world, the importance of Latin America to U.S. strategy and interests is dictated not only by its geographical proximity, but also by the economic and trading prospects it offers. At the same time, such
opportunities are intermingled with potential security challenges such as insurgent threats, drug trafficking, and still tenuous civil-military relationships in many of the countries.

These factors all point to the conclusion that Latin America remains vital to U.S. national security interests, as the Commander of United States Southern Command, Gen. George Joulwan, and many others have argued. Increasingly, these security interests are understood to be not only military, but political and economic as well. Hence, today the emphasis on communist-supported military and ideological threats has been replaced by a focus on economic issues such as growing free enterprise and market economies in the region. In the political realm, Latin America should become more important in U.S. considerations in part because some of the larger countries could acquire a more visible role in addressing such international problems as terrorism, drug trafficking, the environment, and nuclear proliferation. In sum, Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson has articulated five basic U.S. objectives in the Western hemisphere: consolidating democracy and advancing human rights; encouraging economic reforms and development; promoting regional peace; eliminating the drug threat; and cooperating with other countries in the hemisphere to safeguard the environment and stop the proliferation of missile and nuclear weapons technology throughout the world.

The key question for the region--politically, militarily, and economically--lies in the overall prospects for stability. As Gen. Joulwan assesses the situation, "stability is growing, but remains uncertain." Drug trafficking is obviously a serious impediment to stability in the region; but even more fundamental is the continuing socio-economic gap (between those who are very privileged and those living in abject poverty). It is this gap that fuels insurgencies and other forms of violence, which perpetuate instability.

In light of these considerations, as well as the worldwide and regional changes, the question becomes: How is the role of the Latin American military now being defined and


4 This point is discussed in Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 55.

5 Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Statement before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, 18 April 1991.


I-3
what should be the role of the U.S. military and, in particular, the U.S. Army? In general, it is objectively difficult for U.S. citizens to comprehend the weight and importance of the armed forces' role in Latin American life given the much more limited role the U.S. military has played in our society. For the Latin militaries, the end of the Soviet threat in the region has signified a change in their raison d'être—from dealing with the communist threat to focusing above all on internal problems, including on nation building (or civic action) activities. This is not to say that these militaries have not previously had an internal role, rather that their focus in the last couple of decades has been more on the communist threat, certainly due in part to the U.S. focus on this threat (and its financial assistance to combat it). And while the threat of externally financed insurgencies has diminished significantly, the involvement of drug cartels in the arena of internal violence presents a new challenge. One of the questions it raises is: Who will be the source(s) of their weaponry? Ironically, while the crumbling of the Soviet empire has brought an end to traditional East-West confrontation, it has also opened up a variety of potential arms suppliers, which could ultimately mean a higher level of armaments in Latin America, not necessarily in the hands of government forces.

Within this context, how and why should the U.S. Army be involved? The U.S. military obviously has a variety of significant resources and capabilities at its disposal. For U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Joulwan has identified four primary foci: counter-drugs, counterinsurgency, nation assistance, and enhancement of democratic institutions and military support for these institutions in Latin America. These are specifically the issues that this paper addresses in looking at the U.S. Army in a civil-military support role in Latin America. In this examination, the study weighs the advantages and disadvantages to U.S. Army involvement in such efforts and what tools it can use to these ends. The question of why the U.S. Army should be involved can be answered in several ways. First, the types of activities in which the U.S. Army has been engaged in the region are frequently low cost initiatives that can provide a high rate of return. Second, the experience of the 1970s demonstrated that disengagement from Latin America can have serious negative consequences for the evolution of their democracies and more effective civil-military relations. Third, the current international environment dictates a growing need for and reliance on coalitions. The experience of Desert Storm underscored this point, and the

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7 Gen. Colin Powell has identified the major military strategic concepts worldwide for the 1990s as: deterrence, power projection, forward presence, collective security, sea and air superiority, security assistance, and arms control. For a discussion of how each of these might be implemented in Latin America, see Munger et al., U.S. Army South, pp. 22-24.
downsizing of U.S. military forces further reinforces this need. In Latin America, the
U.S. Army plays the key role in developing and maintaining contacts with those with
whom we may need or want to build such coalitions.

The militaries in Central and South America will remain viable and important
institutions in their countries in the future; the challenge for these militaries and their civilian
governments is to define legitimate and appropriate roles as they take a new place in
emerging democratic societies. The U.S. Army can play a useful role in this process
through many of the small-scale, low profile programs it already has in place. One of the
difficulties lies in ensuring continued support for these programs in an era of declining
financial and manpower resources. But if the Army is to remain an important contributor in
this region, these resources must be found.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

In examining the subject of U.S. Army civil-military support roles in Latin America
over the coming years, this paper begins with an assessment of the challenges within the
Latin American region as relates to military capabilities and interests. In addition to
discussing possible roles for these militaries as they redefine their missions, Chapter II
pays considerable attention to the history and future prospects for civil-military relations in
the region.

Chapter III next provides an overview of traditional security assistance programs
and examines numerous U.S. Army programs that provide opportunities for military-to-
military contacts. Such contacts help to allow the Army to play a unique and important role
in Latin America.

Using these analyses as the backdrop, Chapter IV then addresses considerations
about U.S. Army roles in Latin America. In addition to examining the issue of
involvement in the counter-drug effort, this chapter focuses particularly on civic action
activities and ways in which Latin military support for democratization can be strengthened.
On this latter score, the creation of reserve forces in some countries is of particular interest,
as is the expansion of the International Military Education and Training program to include
civilian participants.

This paper concludes with several recommendations about future Army-specific
efforts in the region. Chapter V offers several suggestions for interagency cooperation as
well.
II. CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE MILITARY ROLE

The process of military governments being replaced by civilian ones throughout Latin America over the last decade or so has been well-documented. But while trends toward greater democracy in the region are in evidence, there are still many challenges facing the countries, challenges that could well threaten the prospects for continued democratization. Above all, the challenge lies in economic performance and resulting stability. Moreover, the militaries in Central and South America will certainly remain viable and important institutions in the future. These militaries and their civilian governments must seek to define legitimate and appropriate roles as they take a new place in emerging democratic societies. Thus the following words, although written in 1959, could still hold a certain validity even today:

One would be sanguine to forecast the end of armed-forces influence in Latin America . . . Impartial, objective thinking based upon past experiences does not permit such optimism. Democracy has seemed to triumph over tyranny before. Militarism in the past often developed outside the field of popular realities and may be expected to do so on occasion in the future . . .

Even when the low prestige of the armed forces causes them to withdraw from active political competition, they will remain at once instruments of power and political factors. . . . And whether in public favor or not, the man in uniform in the foreseeable future will remain in the public eye and in a position of influence as the true technocrat in a continuing technological transformation.¹

This chapter identifies the primary challenges in the region and then turns to a discussion of evolving civil-military relations, followed by an examination of possible tasks for the Latin militaries. To the extent possible, differences among the various countries are noted since all these countries obviously do not share all problems equally.

A. CHALLENGES TO THE REGION

While support for democracy appears quite strong throughout Central and South America, serious threats still remain that could undermine this support. Foremost among these are economic issues.\textsuperscript{2} Widespread poverty, unemployment, rapid urbanization, and inflation have led to the adoption of strict market economy policies, all of which creates serious strains on popular support for the civilian governments in power. Perhaps the greatest economic challenge lies in grappling with the enormous foreign debt, which these countries see as a shared problem between the debtor and creditor nations. Yet the lending organizations and countries have not agreed with this perspective, making resolution of this matter highly problematic. In terms of the overall economic situation in Latin countries, there is obviously considerable divergence. Chile and Mexico are faring quite well.\textsuperscript{3} Venezuela has the natural resources for a healthy economy, but it is currently confronting economic austerity in light of the fall in its oil revenues. Among some of the smaller countries, Costa Rica and Belize appear to be functioning relatively well. At the other end of the spectrum are countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, and especially Peru that are all suffering through tremendous economic difficulties. Finally, Brazil's economic problems, while not as severe as those of Peru (which faces the combination of rampant poverty, insurgency, and drug trafficking), are certainly of serious concern given Brazil's vital role in the region as a whole.

From the military's perspective, these economic difficulties have negatively affected not only individuals serving in the military (as they see a decline in their quality of life, which therefore heightens the prospects for increased corruption within their ranks) but also the institution as a whole as every country has significantly reduced its defense budget, with the exception of Mexico.\textsuperscript{4} In short, modernization efforts are suspended, training levels fall, and morale suffers.

\textsuperscript{2} For a brief but useful overview of some of the general challenges facing Latin America, see Munger et al., \textit{U.S. Army South}, pp. 6-10.

\textsuperscript{3} Mexico's Free Trade Agreement with the United States is an important factor here. Chile would seem to be the next logical choice for a similar agreement with the United States. Cooperative efforts among the countries are discussed in Section D, Regional Cooperation, below.

\textsuperscript{4} This is discussed more fully in Omar Pacheco, "Latin American Countries' Debt and Its Influence on Their Armed Forces as They Attempt to Maintain the Stability and Security of the Region," paper prepared for the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 1990.
Perhaps the most striking illustration of how economic difficulties can affect both democracy and the military is seen in the aborted coup of February 1992 in Venezuela. Long regarded as a democratic stronghold in South America and a relatively rich country due to its resources (especially oil), the Venezuelan government of President Carlos Andres Perez has been forced to adopt stringent economic policies largely because of the fall in oil prices. The attempted coup by low- and mid-level officers symbolized the rank-and-file frustration (within the military and the population at large) with declining standards of living, continued evidence of government corruption, and a desire for change. Thus, even in this nation that could be considered a bastion of civilian democratic rule in the region, it was elements of the military institution rather than civilians through an electoral process that acted to try to change the situation. Such actions only underscore the fact that the roots of both authoritarian and democratic traditions continue to exist throughout the region among civilians and military personnel.

In addition to economic difficulties, the fragility of political systems presents another serious challenge to future stability in Latin America. Civilian institutions remain quite weak in many respects, especially in national security affairs, while the military has retained considerable power. The most vivid example of this trend is seen in Guatemala, although the general trend is mirrored throughout the region—even in countries where one would expect more progress along these lines, such as Brazil. Moreover, if the civilian governments prove incapable of meeting the demands and expectations of the people (and here so much will depend on economic performance), the ability of some of these governments to survive is even more questionable.

The fragility of political institutions is obviously affected by the existence of insurgent threats in some of these countries, mainly in Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala. With the signed agreement to end the conflict in El Salvador, there are some hopes that prospects for a settlement in Guatemala will be strengthened. No such hope is held for Peru, however, where the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) continues to terrorize the country and, if anything, the level of violence appears to be on the rise. The added complication in Peru is the reported connection between the Sendero Luminoso and the
drug industry, with the latter providing money (which can be used to by arms) in exchange for protection by the former.  

The spread of the drug industry presents one of the greatest challenges to civilian governments as well as the military and police forces. The pervasiveness of corruption and violence raises serious questions about anyone's ability to control this escalating problem. To the extent that the industry involves an increasing number of countries (including Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Brazil) as transshipment points, the need for regional cooperation in this realm appears that much stronger.

One challenge that may be fading somewhat is that of border disputes, or concerns about territorial integrity. Yet despite such agreements as the 1980 treaty between Honduras and El Salvador and the 1984 Beagle Channel treaty between Argentina and Chile, it should not be assumed that border disputes will not present some possibility of future conflict. For example, Venezuela and Colombia are currently disputing the territorial rights to a gulf on the Caribbean that they share. In addition, Brazilians in the northern section of the country are increasingly crossing into neighboring countries in search of gold and other resources; recently several such Brazilians were killed by Venezuelan forces. For the foreseeable future, countries will continue to be uneasy about what their neighbors are doing, as vividly illustrated by the persisting distrust between Argentina and Brazil.

Such are some of the main challenges to the region, although others can certainly be identified. What is important to underscore is that all these issues affect the future prospects for democracy and the role that the militaries will play in these countries. The military role in these problems will be addressed more fully, following a discussion of evolving civil-military relations in the region. The difficulty here lies in developing civilian oversight capabilities in national security affairs as the military simultaneously works to redefine the threats it must confront and tries to identify the forces it will need to do so. Moreover, there is the need to overcome the military's traditional isolation from the rest of society. As Gabriel Marcella has argued, a professional, self-confident, and politically

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responsible military will provide better protection for democracy than one that is poorly organized, insecure, and corrupt.\textsuperscript{7}

With today's regional trend toward civilian government, the nature of and prospects for civil-military relations in Latin America are changing. There is also now an opportunity to establish and institutionalize civilian political authority and military "professionalism" in the sense of consolidating democracy. Additionally, the waning of the Cold War and the receding external threat of communism provides an opportunity for Latin Americans, including their armed forces, to concentrate on issues of economic and political development.

The Latin American armed forces are facing new tasks and challenges presented by the transitions to democracy and the newly emerging international system. Militaries must adjust their doctrines, their institutional roles and their relationships with civilian governments in order to successfully prepare for these tasks and challenges. Specifically, both civilians and militaries in Latin America must define appropriate goals and strategies for defense and development and establish civil-military relations in such a way that clear lines of responsibility and authority are permanently established. In assessing how these changes might be made, it is first useful to examine how civil-military relations have evolved in the region.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE\textsuperscript{8}

1. General Trends

In previous years, Latin American military leaders who took control of governments did so principally because they felt the civilian leaderships were taking state and society along the road to disaster. They tended to see civilian political elites as corrupt, self-serving, and inept. In many cases, military coups d'etat were supported by a large


\textsuperscript{8} This section was coauthored with Audrey McInerney.
segment of the civilian population within the context of domestic social and political chaos.\(^9\)

Two factors usually merged to create the desire or rationale for taking power from the civilian politicians during recent decades. The first was the military's isolation from society. There has always been a gulf between the civilian elite and the military leadership in Latin America. Military officers, usually recruited from the middle class, are considered by these elites to be socially inferior. Political and business elites have tended to look down on the military and to leave them shunned and isolated in a rigid class structure. In turn, of course, Latin American military men have tended to look upon civilian elites with similar disdain. While officers have frequently been ostracized by the upper classes, they themselves are typically a privileged elite. This situation has been characterized in the following way: "Military families intermarry, have special housing, attend separate schools, use special social programs and benefits, and bury their dead in separate cemeteries. In Latin America, involvement by some in illicit activities, such as weapons and drug trafficking, increases the military's status as an ostracized caste."\(^10\)

The military, particularly in Central America, is also isolated from rural peasant society. Rural peasants are usually Indians, and military personnel posted in their areas often are ignorant of the local language, prejudiced against Indians, and moreover, fearful that the Indians may be insurgents (especially if they are posted in an area dominated by rebels). Guatemala, where rural Indians have been subjected to countless human rights abuses and forced into local "Civilian Defense Forces" to aid in counterinsurgency operations, is a case in point. Additionally, the military has conducted an intensive "propaganda and education" campaign to weaken Indian culture and promote national integration.\(^11\)


The second factor creating a rationale for military control is that the Latin American militaries have very similar myths about the founding of the state. Whether the military was actually involved in gaining independence and in early nation-building or not, it tends to see itself in that role and as guardian of the state, indeed, as the very essence of the state. In fact, concern for and involvement with internal affairs and the integrity of the state on the part of the Latin American armed forces dates back to the nineteenth century. Some argue that interest in internal security, economic development, and social services as well as belief in the ineptitude of civilian politicians and politics is part of an Hispanic "antipolitics" and the process of military professionalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this view, concern about domestic politics was only exacerbated by the Cold War context. The additional factor to be considered here is that the constitutions of many Latin American nations provide the militaries with specific tasks such as maintaining internal order and guaranteeing constitutional practices. Thus, legal relationships as well as the militaries' own institutional interests have shaped their role in Latin states.

In the post-war era an organic concept of the state came to dominate Latin American military doctrine. The state was seen as a living being that could be "infected" by external enemies or internal ones that were likened to cancers. The military's duty was to protect the organic state from "disease." The state came to be seen as a whole quite distinct from its parts (individual persons and institutions). According to the organic state doctrine, the state is to be preserved as a whole organism even to the detriment of the individuals and institutions that make it up. Some "parts" may have to be sacrificed for the common good.

By the 1950s, this organic view of the state came to be embodied in the National Security Doctrine. While security doctrines vary throughout Latin America, the National Security Doctrine concept became highly developed in the higher military schools in Brazil (Escola Superior da Guerra [ESG]) and Peru (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares [CAEM]) and is much the same throughout the region. The major difference in national security


doctrines appears in the area of policy making. The hardline tendency--common in the Southern Cone nations of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay--is focused on a strong and aggressive military to protect the state from incursions. The "projection of state power" is seen as the "way to increase the nation's own space and resources." This emphasis naturally increases the importance of the military in national life. As territorial acquisition became more difficult, the hardline National Security Doctrine's emphasis moved from conquest of territory to conquest of political space. Thus, the hardline policy is to develop an authoritarian state ever vigilant in the face of subversion and prepared to fight an internal war in order to prevent the "infection" of the state organism. Authoritarianism is necessary because "the state is under siege from a comprehensive subversive threat and does not have the luxury to wait for growth and redistributive measures to work their cure on the masses." 

The softline tendency, put into practice in Peru and Brazil, is to emphasize a policy of development for the common good and to protect the collective from tyranny. Greater technological and industrial capacity, a higher standard of living, and social equity should be the response to and prevention against revolutionary insurgency. The softline approach is based on the notion of "developmental geopolitics." The emphasis is not on hostile enemies, but rather on cooperative arrangements with neighboring states to enhance development. This aspect of the National Security Doctrine "has focused on the relationships among geography, resources, and national growth and has emphasized ways in which the distant areas of the nation could be effectively brought into the mainstream of the country's economic, cultural, and political life." The problems inherent in a seemingly peaceful, prodevelopment emphasis can be seen in Brazil today. The military, among other groups, supports development of the Amazon, and "developers" have come into often violent conflict with indigenous peoples, environmentalists, and small-scale laborers. The positive aspect of the softline National Security Doctrine is that it stresses integration and cooperative approaches to common problems in Latin America. Additionally, with the democratization of Latin America, countries like Argentina and Chile

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14 Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking," in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 144.
16 Child, in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 145.
are moving toward cooperative regional approaches, for example on border issues and in Antarctica.

The common strand in the National Security Doctrine, however, is important. It includes an emphasis on the organic state for which the military is responsible, the quest for national security, the threats from international communism to the state, and the authority of elites.17

Particularly during the 1970s, the notion became widely held by Latin American military officers that economic development is synonymous with national defense and national security and is thus a military mission. Military officers blamed civilian leaders who had imported institutions of liberal democracy for the lack of economic development and political stability in their countries. This attitude increasingly led to the belief that only military rule could promote development and fight communism (which would flourish where people are poor). Thus development became intertwined with national security.18 The Latin American armed forces questioned the ability to develop their states under capitalist free-market conditions. In the 1970s dependency theory, which suggests that Latin American economic development is dependent on the advanced industrial states and is hence somewhat impeded, became popular.19 At the same time, particularly in Central America and partly due to U.S. influence, the Latin American armed forces became militantly anti-communist. Military programs and doctrines came to reflect U.S. influence in this regard.20

The Latin American National Security Doctrine was affirmed in the context of the post-World War II East-West struggle. Marxism and Soviet-Chinese infiltration became the cancers that had to be fought. The military academies developed the doctrine of protecting the state and society not so much from a direct external military threat, but from a Marxist "fifth column" inspired or directed by the Soviet Union or China.

Since the militaries have "retreated to the barracks" and returned the institutions of government to civilian control, there have been uneasy civil-military relations in Central and

17 Pion-Berlin, Armed Forces and Society, pp. 421-422.
19 Rial in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 11.
South America. The main concern for civilian leaders has been that the military confine itself to its specific, professional duties. There are two ways the civilian governments can exercise "control" over the military. The first, known as "subjective control," is for the civilian leadership to try to weaken the military institution vis-a-vis civilian groups and thus render it powerless to interfere in governmental decisions. This strategy was adopted with little success by Raúl Alfonsin in Argentina because it served to alienate a military which was, in fact, more than willing to stay out of politics at the time.

It is difficult to differentiate between policies that weaken the military as a political threat and those that weaken the military's professionalism. Weakening military professionalism is counterproductive. The second method of asserting civilian authority, known as "objective control," is to develop "a distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps." Here the goal is to incorporate the military as a strong and necessary institution within the political system.

Of course, a problem facing civil-military relations in Latin America is defining military professionalism adequately and to everyone's satisfaction. Alfred Stepan has coined the phrases "old professionalism" and "new professionalism." The old professionalism, that of militaries in the advanced industrial states, means a military both politically subordinate and neutral. Military tasks are highly technical and specialized, requiring functional specialization of armed forces with limited resources. Thus, through old professionalism "the functions of the officer become distinct from those of the politician and policeman." The new professionalism, based on views developed by Latin American militaries in the 1950s and 1960s, is interventionist and politically concerned, rather than neutral. It is the organic state doctrine and the new professionalism that

22 As quoted in ibid., p. 154.
23 As Felipe Aguero argues, however, Venezuela appears to fit under both subjective and objective control. See Aguero, "The Military and Democracy in Venezuela," in Goodman et al., eds., *The Military and Democracy*, pp. 269-270.
defines the present Latin American military mission and which must be refined and adapted to new circumstances in Latin America and the international system.

2. Subregional Differences

Despite the generalizations that can be made about Latin American armed forces, there are differences in military doctrine and in military relations with civilian governments, especially between Central America and the Southern Cone. J. Samuel Fitch, citing Abraham Lowenthal's work, draws this distinction quite clearly.

The experience of the last decade confirms Lowenthal's hypothesis that a key determinant of the different patterns of civil-military relations in Latin America is the relative of institutionalization of civilian political versus military organizations. In the smaller, less professionalized military institutions of Central America, the corporate identity and solidarity of the officer corps are relatively weak. Personal cliques, factionalism, and individual gain play a larger role in military behavior. Reflecting the lower level of professional socialization, military thinking appears to be less technocratic and antipolitical than in the South American militaries, leading to greater willingness to enter into partisan political alliances with civilian factions as, for example, in Guatemala. Lower levels of professionalization also facilitate civilian political penetration of military and paramilitary forces, like the Salvadorean Treasury Police. Despite the weaker military institutions of these countries, the lower level of modernization in export-dependent, often mono-crop economies and the legacy of various episodes of direct U.S. intervention have inhibited the development of even moderately institutionalized civilian parties. In relative terms the military is still the most coherent national political institution. The result has been a history of personalist military regimes alternating with weak attempts at military populism and reform.27

This section examines some particular examples of civil-military relations drawn from both South and Central America.

Brazil and Peru are considered to have very professional armed forces in Latin America in the sense that their armed forces have been rationally or professionally organized; that is, they have "relatively universalistic procedures for recruitment and promotion of officers" based on merit and education.28 They also have well-developed and well-known higher military academies and doctrines. Additionally, there is some interaction with civilians in their institutions of higher military education, which is an


28 Stepan in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America, p. 135.
important factor as civilians try to develop better military oversight capabilities. According to conventional wisdom about military professionalism, however, the armed forces of Brazil and Peru should be and should have been apolitical in their activities, yet both militaries took over governments in 1964 and 1968, respectively. This anomaly has been attributed to the greater doctrinal focus on internal war rather than interstate conflict. Following Samuel Huntington's reasoning, armies become professionalized through preparation for conventional warfare against foreign armies. The functional specialization necessary means that the military is indifferent to values and political ideologies of civilian society. When the focus shifts from external to internal conflict, the military becomes involved in political ideologies and governance. Peru's military obviously faces a severe challenge now given its need to focus on the domestic challenges of insurgency (from the Sendero Luminoso) and drug trafficking. It is as yet not fully clear the implications of the military's backing of President Alberto Fujimori's coup in spring 1992, and the extent to which the military may play a political role in the country.

The military in countries like Venezuela and Colombia have been considered unique in Latin America because of their limited roles in running their governments. In Venezuela, "not a single military coup has broken the continuity of civilian control in a country that during the 1960s experienced violent political agitation." The aborted coup of February 1992 notwithstanding, the lack of military interference in Venezuela for more than three decades has been attributed to several factors, including coherent and strong political parties; strong individual leadership like that of Romulo Betancourt, president from 1958 to 1964 and a great influence until his death in 1981; and oil wealth which has kept the middle class relatively prosperous. The deteriorating economic situation in the country today, perhaps made worse by the fact that the people had known a better way of living, only emphasizes the important role economic well-being plays in politics and governmental stability.

Two important aspects of military professionalism contribute to civilian control in Venezuela. The first is that Venezuela's military has achieved a high level of technical organization, and the second is that the military is included in national decision making.

29 Ibid., p. 136.
particularly with regard to economic development. But in the wake of the failed 1992 coup, one cannot help but question the stability of civilian control in other countries in the region. Given that Venezuela's democracy is one of the more well-established in Latin America, the question becomes whether relatively sanguine U.S. appraisals of the future for civilian democracies are not, indeed, too optimistic. The problem is that even in the country that could be considered a model of civilian rule and democracy, the solution was an attempt by the military to change the situation, not an attempt to effect change through the civilian institutions and processes. The saving grace is that not all the military went along with this solution, including those among the top leadership.

At the other end of the spectrum is El Salvador, where graduates from the military academy (Escuela Militar) are structured by their tandas (graduating classes). The officers in the tandas form strong ties based on their common, often brutal, experience in military school. All graduates from the Escuela Militar consider themselves part of a closeknit family. They rise up through the ranks automatically; there is no merit system. The prevailing ethos is to look out for each other within each tanda and to consider all others, even within the armed forces, alien. The only exception to this closing of ranks is when an officer brings disgrace upon the army as an institution. Thus, it is nearly impossible to punish corruption or human rights abuses because the graduates of the military school all protect each other from any outside criticism or surveillance. Here, too, recent events raise certain questions. With the signing of the peace accord and the pledge to cut the Salvadoran military to half its current size, some hopes may be raised about reducing the extent of corruption within its ranks. It is obviously still too early to forecast, but the fact that the 2,200-man officer corps is unlikely to be seriously affected by these cuts does not bode well for any such hopes. More important should be the plans, also called for under the peace accord, to have the military academy's admission policy, curriculum, and facility overseen by a national peace commission that will include only one military officer. Another important aspect of the agreement is the provision that the National Police, Treasury Police, and National Guard were removed from the military's control and placed under the Ministry of Government. A new public police force will eventually replace the

31 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
32 Marcella, Journal of Interamerican Studies, p. 77, n. 6; Millett, in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America, pp. 208-211.
National Police, and will be trained at the national policy academy currently being
developed under international auspices.

Generally in Central America the concept of the military as "a special, privileged
class, exempt from the jurisdiction of the rest of society" endures.\textsuperscript{33} The military in
Central America tends to be the most modern institution, and the military has developed a
separate, professional identity, distinct from traditional political parties. Guatemala's
military, for example, has been "long considered the strongest and most professional
military force in Central America."\textsuperscript{34} Graduates of Guatemala's military academy (Escuela
Politécnica) are not bound by the kind of loyalties of El Salvador's tandas. The central
problem with Guatemala's military is in the area of human rights. Most noticeably in the
late 1970s a wave of government-supported, right-wing terrorism developed, particularly
in rural areas and against Indians. Counterinsurgency operations have been further
complicated partly because of internal corruption and international isolation. The United
States has urged that the insurgency be defeated without non-combants and moderate
politicians being murdered. However, as Richard Millett writes, "there are military
elements which share these goals, but no effective means has been found to support them
without strengthening the hardliners at the same time."\textsuperscript{35} Interviews and research
conducted for this project indicate that some U.S. analysts remain doubtful about the
expediency of the United States maintaining relations with the Guatemalan military. There
are, in fact, at least two ways of looking at this issue. On the one hand, opponents of such
relations argue that if the United States is serious about its commitment to human rights, we
should have no contacts with this military until such abuses are stopped, or at least sharply
curtailed. On the other hand, there is an argument to be made along the following lines:
While linking the observation of human rights to U.S. assistance is a legitimate enough
policy, there should be sufficient benefit to be derived in the event of appropriate behavior.
In other words, the "stick" (insistence on respect for human rights) can work effectively
only when the "carrot" is evident and seen to be worth the effort. Moreover, ceasing all
types of security assistance in the event of human rights violations can ultimately prove
detrimental to U.S. interests. It behooves the United States to maintain some links with

\textsuperscript{33} Millett, in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., \textit{Armies and Politics in Latin America}, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 212.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 215.
Guatemalan officers, such as through IMET. Without these contacts, there is little hope or opportunity to influence their behavior.

With respect to Honduras, two factors should be highlighted in looking at its armed forces. The first is that it plays a less visible role than the military in either El Salvador or Guatemala. The second is that Honduras faces real external military threats from its neighbors (i.e., El Salvador and, still to some extent, Nicaragua), and its mission receives some support from the population.

C. CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES

In looking at the place and roles of the militaries in Latin America today, it is naturally necessary to appreciate the enormous strength that these militaries (namely the armies) have had as an institution. Along with the church, the Army has frequently been the strongest, most enduring institution in the region. As a result, the importance of the Army can be seen to derive more from its impact on democratic institutions and less from its military capabilities per se.

Today the Armies are faced with having to reduce the size of their forces (largely due to economic constraints) and to determine what their new roles are to be. Such decisions are currently being addressed in the Southern Cone countries and El Salvador, for example. In fact, about the only possible exception is Mexico, where the traditions are distinctly different. The military has not held political power there since World War II, and it remains subservient to the civilian leadership; its missions will likely continue on the present course: protecting national sovereignty and focusing on internal order, public works, and counter-drugs.

For the region as a whole, the civilian governments and their militaries will need to work together to redefine their national security policy and hence their overall security requirements. As Aguilera has argued, such efforts should be undertaken without foreign

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36 There are, of course, differences among countries in terms of the military as an institution. For example, Richard Millett writes: "There is a real difference in the tradition of the military. In El Salvador the military was essentially an institutionalized actor; in Nicaragua it was an extension of the Somoza. It couldn't separate itself from them. The oligarchy in El Salvador will argue that far from running the army, in the last few years the army has run them, whereas no one could ever argue that the army ran the Somoza." Millett, "Nicaragua: The Sandinistas Prevail," in Hans Binnendijk, ed., Authoritarian Regimes in Transition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1987), p. 125.
interference, including by the United States.\textsuperscript{37} To accomplish this, the development of better civilian capabilities in national security affairs--including through education and ideally even independent research institutes--is necessary. At the same time, the militaries will also need to raise their own level of university education, largely because of the increasingly high-technology world in which they must operate. This could, in fact, provide opportunities for greater civilian-military interactions at universities, which could contribute to better working civil-military relations overall.\textsuperscript{38} The starting point for truly effective civil-military relations in a democracy may still be rather distant. Gen. (Ret.) Woerner notes that militaries in democracies "must be committed to high standards of military professionalism and ethics, supportive of democratic development, respectful of human rights, and subordinate to elected civilian authority."\textsuperscript{39} For their part, civilians must yet develop an adequate understanding of national security matters. In most Latin American countries, these requirements still have not been met.

In terms of specific roles for these militaries, all share the need to have a military as a symbol of national sovereignty. Other roles that are applicable to the region at large include: civic action (although this should be encouraged only if there are no civilians to perform the necessary functions), disaster assistance and environmental protection, and future efforts toward more regional cooperation (including intelligence sharing and peace-keeping operations). Virtually all countries in Central and South America also have some concerns about their borders with neighboring countries, or at a minimum, concern about what capabilities and intentions their neighbors might have. This is, in effect, the only external threat the militaries must face. More controversial is their involvement in counterinsurgency and, especially, counter-drug activities.

The insurgent threat remains a particularly vexing one for Peru and somewhat less so for Colombia and Guatemala. Other countries in the region have certainly experienced problems in this arena from time to time as well. Throughout Latin America, the insurgent threat has been largely precipitated by domestic (especially socio-economic) dissatisfaction, which the USSR and its proxies managed to exploit through financial and other support to

\begin{thebibliography}{10}

\item Gabriel Aguilera, "The Threat of New Missions: Latin American Militaries and the Drug War," in Goodman et al., eds., \textit{The Military and Democracy}, p. 36.
\item Discussed, for example, in Marcella, \textit{Journal of Interamerican Studies}, p. 72.
\end{thebibliography}
local insurgencies. With the end of the Cold War and the cessation of such Soviet activities, there is cause for hope that the role of insurgencies will diminish in Latin America. Nevertheless, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, which receives little foreign money but has been stepping up its activities, illustrates a different trend. Reports that this organization receives significant amounts of money from drug traffickers raises concerns that such resources, combined with continuing socio-economic problems, means that insurgencies could continue to present threats to democratic stability, especially in Peru.

Finally, the military's role in counter-drug activities has proven a contentious one. Interviews and readings show that some U.S. analysts question the utility of throwing copious amounts of money at this problem and of involving Latin American militaries beyond what could be considered support to law enforcement agencies. The official U.S. Government position is that the military should, at a minimum, provide support to police forces in the form of local security and other support measures so that police forces can then dedicate themselves fully to the enforcement role. Critics are concerned about what lays beyond this "minimal" role and charge that U.S. funding and support has actually encouraged the indigenous militaries to greater participation, including in missions that U.S. forces are expressly prohibited from performing under Posse Comitatus. Indeed, in cases such as Peru and Colombia where powerful insurgent groups are also apparently involved in the drug business, the military has certainly found its involvement extending beyond the parameters discussed above.

These roles for the Latin American militaries are now addressed in greater detail in the following sections.

1. An Evolution of Civil-Military Relations

As a country transitions to democracy in Latin America, it must find a new role for the military and establish a new footing for civil-military relations that ends the military's isolation from society, increases dialogue between political and military elites, increases civilian involvement in the understanding and formation of military and security doctrine,

40 For a more detailed examination of the roles that the USSR, Cuba, and Nicaragua have played in insurgency groups and activities, see Yonah Alexander and Richard Kucinski, "The International Terrorist Network," in Fauriol, ed., Latin American Insurgencies, pp. 44-55.

41 On the insurgent-trafficker connection, see for example, Trujillo, New York Times, 8 April 1992.
and increases "the participation of military professionals in national decision making."

Gabriel Marcella explains the civil-military relationship as follows:

There is always an element of tension between the civilian and military sectors of any society, but it reaches a particular, if not dangerous, intensity in Latin America. The lack of communication is particularly acute with respect to the mission of the military—national security—where few civilians engage in a pragmatic institutionalized dialogue with either military professionals or with the international network of strategic studies.\(^{42}\)

Thus, what must be overcome are a variety of long-standing obstacles such as the cultural distance between military and civilians and differences in their educational experiences.

Specifically, there needs to be civilian participation in the formation of defense policy and military participation in civilian institutions, especially institutions of higher education. National security and defense studies should be developed in Latin American universities and visiting research fellowships offered to military officers. University education required for advancement in the officer corps is especially important in preparation for role expansion or enhancement of the military's technological capabilities. In turn, civilians must master security policy to allow for governmental and legislative oversight of military activities and needs. One of the long-standing problems is that the military's traditional monopoly over security policy (both internal and external) facilitated its entrance into politics; this monopoly needs to be broken.

Some efforts have been made in the area of education, including merging civilians and military officers. Thus, as long ago as 1972, Venezuela established the Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defense (IAEDN), designed for senior officers and civilians to analyze security and defense issues.\(^{43}\) For its part, Mexico opened a new National Defense College in 1981 dedicated to advanced studies on security issues and geopolitics as well as traditional military subjects.\(^{44}\) In addition, the Argentine joint staff established a

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\(^{43}\) Aguero, in Goodman et al, eds., *The Military and Democracy*.

\(^{44}\) This appears to be, however, only for senior officers, although admittedly Mexico does not have the tradition of civil-military problems the rest of Central and South America does.
1-year strategy course for civilian and military personnel. It has already been noted that the Peruvian and Brazilian war colleges also include some civilian participants, as do schools in Argentina, Ecuador, and Uruguay. This kind of effort needs to be expanded throughout Latin America, and one way in which the United States can help is through the planned inclusion of civilians in the IMET program. It is crucial that, at least in some cases, these participants be grouped together to share the educational experience.

The other side of the educational equation recognizes the need to develop better expertise on military issues at civilian universities. As Alfred Stepan explains:

Latin American universities, to date, have failed to incorporate military sociology and military strategy into their curricula. This is a vital task because the newspapers, television, and weekly press should have military experts on their staffs. Equally important, the constant academic production of a cadre of citizens who are masters in their knowledge of the force structure, organizational style, budgetary issues, doctrinal questions, and the specific details of weapons systems are indispensable for the fulfillment of the military and intelligence oversight functions of political society, especially in the legislative branch.

In short, until such capabilities are developed, there can be little or no true civilian input into national security matters. Stepan also suggests that it is important to create civilian-led institutions that deal with security issues, similar to the Brookings Institution, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and its corresponding journals. The problem here is that the defense research institutes that do already exist (for example, in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay) tend to be partisan and are usually anti-military. Moreover, the money required to fund such efforts is another substantial impediment.

A great deal of what must be done in civil-military relations hinges on changes in the rigid political and class structures in Central and South America. As general attitudes toward class, democracy, and civic society change, so too will military attitudes. At the very least a context will be developed in which military and political elite opinions toward each other can change. A confrontational approach to the military creates the danger of "freezing the adversarial character of the relationship with the military."


47 Norden, Journal of Interamerican Studies, p. 163.
Current issues in civil-military relations include the size of the defense budget, the size and shape of the armed forces (which hinges on what missions are identified), and the tension between civilian and military authorities on who should perform certain tasks (such as civic action and counter-drugs). The civilian and military leaderships also battle over the share of expenditures that should go to defense, especially compared to social expenditures on health and education. In the current environment of economic restraint, traditional welfare-state benefits have generally been sharply curtailed, but defense budgets have suffered even more.

Chile and Argentina are two countries where civil-military relations seem to be on the right track, at least in terms of asserting appropriate civilian control over the military. Under Argentina's democratically elected president, Raúl Alfonsin, the government prosecuted scores of military officers, including generals who presided over the military regime, for violations of human rights. As a result Alfonsin faced three military uprisings and had to make several concessions to help resolve the conflicts, although the uprisings themselves were actually put down by the military. For his part, Argentina's current president, Carlos Menem, has released numerous military officers convicted of human rights violations, including an unrepentant Jorge Videla, considered the architect of Argentina's "dirty war." Menem's action came under severe internal and international criticism, and many have argued that the civilian leadership cannot permit the military to be above the law. Others, however, have criticized Alfonsin's approach to the military as being too confrontational. More generally, the Argentine military leadership has demonstrated a firm commitment--indeed, subservience--to the civilian leadership in recent years, despite considerable social and economic hardships.

In the case of civil-military relations in Chile, since that country's transition to democracy in 1989-90, the military has continued to believe it has fulfilled its role in returning order and democracy to the country. For example, the armed forces are proud of the 1980 constitution, designed under General Augusto Pinochet's notion of "protected democracy." While respecting the rights of the armed forces, the administration of President Patricio Aylwin has embarked on a cautious but decisive path of reform, likely taking advantage of certain lessons learned from the Argentine experience. The administration is currently designing a constitutional reform package. The first reform reintroduces direct elections for municipal councils and mayors by June 1992. President Aylwin intends to start negotiations with the opposition on other constitutional reforms in
March 1992 to eliminate the designated senators and Chile's nonproportional electoral system, and to restore the president's ability to dismiss the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Pinochet still holds sway in Chile as commander-in-chief of the army, but his role in Chilean politics has largely been reduced to protecting the military institution, particularly from retribution for human rights violations. Pinochet will not remain at the head of the army forever, and while the military will still be determined to protect its institutional interests, its political power will likely be eroded by time and by the civilian government's patient long-term reforms.

While the Chilean government has moved cautiously with regard to the military, President Aylwin has begun to implement several important changes. For example, structures have been put into place to centralize control over defense spending; as a result, budgets for the military services have effectively been opened up to civilian scrutiny. And while civilian leaders in the service departments have met with only limited success, they do represent an important and necessary first step in the further redefinition of civil-military relations in Chile.

Disagreements over defense budgets and size of forces have plagued South and Central American military relationships with civilian authorities. This is certainly no exception in Chile and Argentina. In these countries there have been implicit threats of a coup if military demands are not met. General Pinochet has commented on the defense budget in Chile and put the Chilean Armed Forces on alert in 1990, perhaps as a warning to the Chilean government. There have been four military uprisings in Argentina since 1987 by the *carapintadas* (painted faces), although they were all put down by the military leadership and did not present a real danger to democracy. Among the *carapintadas*' demands was amnesty from prosecution for human rights abuses. One of its leaders, Colonel Aldo Rico (now retired), made more explicitly political demands as well. He even went as far as to campaign for the governorship of Buenos Aires and to suggest an interest in the presidency of Argentina. However, Rico lost rank-and-file support as he moved away from specific military goals.

In Central America, militaries are known to make it clear in ways smaller than coup threats that they are a necessary institution and that, in turn, their needs and concerns should be addressed. For example, in Honduras the army has occasionally ignored cross-border incursions, and in Nicaragua the Sandinista-controlled army occasionally ignores Contra actions. If budget cuts are to be made, the armed forces indicate that they cannot do
their jobs properly, particularly in dangerous, that is, guerrilla-held areas. These warnings do not go unnoticed when it comes time for the civilian leadership to negotiate. Nevertheless, the overall trend is toward smaller budgets, especially in light of the fact that many of these countries stand to receive far less U.S. security assistance monies than they did during the previous decade.

In Central America, civilian leaders and parties still rely on military support to maintain political control. For example, Richard Millett suggests that in Honduras the armed forces commander "can be removed by a two-thirds vote of the Congress, but in reality, the armed forces commander is much more capable of removing the president than vice versa."48

2. Civic Action Efforts

The idea of involving military forces in the development of the country's infrastructure and in helping to educate the population is obviously not new in Latin America, nor is U.S. interest in focusing on such activities.49 As Charles Maechling, Jr., summarizes some of these past efforts, during the 1960s under U.S. General Maxwell Taylor's guidance, the U.S. military encouraged local armies to become involved in activities such as building roads, literacy instruction, and disease inoculation. Taylor believed "that Third World armies needed to play a constructive role in rural societies in order to build a sympathetic image of the military and thereby win the support of the civilian population."50 In Latin America, the United States sought to focus the attention of indigenous armies away from external defense missions toward internal security and counterinsurgency.51 However, as seen for instance in the cases of Bolivia and Brazil, whose militaries were quite involved in building roads and schools, etc., the result was that the military became more involved in politics. This highlighted a concern, which persists for many today, that if the military becomes particularly involved in such tasks, the risk is that much greater that they will try to seize political power. The counterargument by some

48 Millett, in Lowenthal and Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America, p. 218
49 In this discussion, "military" and "army" are used interchangeably since it would be overwhelmingly (if not entirely) the army that would be involved in these activities.
51 Ibid., p. 31.
Latin military personnel at the time, which echoed Taylor's reasoning, is that participation in nation building activities is "the proper road toward wiping out militarism and . . . the best means of giving the army a function and a social prestige that it now lacks."52

More recently, the Kissinger Commission report included among its recommendations a suggestion for civic action efforts in Central America to address the root causes of insurgency. Since then, it has been noted that Guatemala, for example, devotes considerable army manpower to what it calls civil affairs activities, emphasizing rural development.53

In short, the advantages and disadvantages of a Latin army participating in the development—including economic, educational, and medical aspects—of its country continue to be debated.54 In looking at both sides of the argument, one basic premise must be accepted: The military should be involved in civic action activities only if there is no civilian institution in place capable of handling these tasks.

Among the arguments used to support military involvement in these efforts is the idea that, by doing so, at least the military would be performing some useful function. It might even help reduce the traditional isolation of the military from the rest of society. The benefits military personnel might derive, namely improved morale by accomplishing worthwhile projects, also cannot be completely ignored. Moreover, the militaries generally support such activities since it helps justify their existence.

The primary disadvantage, indeed threat, associated with the military's performance of civic action projects lies in its potential effect on the civilian government and institutions. First of all, it deprives civilians of the experience, and perhaps more important, legitimacy in providing such public services. Moreover, as civilians try to reduce the military's influence in the region, these activities can be counterproductive to such an effort. In short, military participation (or certainly a leading military role) in civic action can be detrimental to the institutionalization of civilian government and democracy more generally. To the extent that the military does participate, for example in education, these efforts must be

54 The question of U.S. Army involvement in such activities in Latin America is addressed in Chapter IV, Section B.
implemented without trying to propagandize or pacify rural populations, especially those with distinct cultures, such as Indians. An additional problem in the case of military participation in education is the relative lack of education, particularly among the lower ranks, of military personnel themselves; this is only further complicated by the fact that many Latin American countries have numerous indigenous languages. In any event, the precise delineation of authority and responsibility must be carefully negotiated between military and civilian leaders in the country.

A possible compromise on this issue might be found in following a model established in the United States: the Army Corps of Engineers. Developing engineering skills to build dams, sewage facilities, road construction, and the like in an organization that could be seen as somewhat distinct from the traditional army organization could prove beneficial. Some countries, such as Brazil, already have considerable engineering expertise and, incidentally, have frequent contacts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Another possible solution lies in using reserve forces to accomplish these tasks. As noted below, the United States is already helping Venezuela create a reserve force, and at least eight other countries in the region have expressed an interest in establishing such forces themselves. Following the model used in Venezuela, an initial reserve force could be created within a couple of years. If this occurs, one of the reserve’s primary missions could be civic action activities. This should not entail the same kinds of concerns as involving active military forces since reserve personnel would be drawn from the civilian sector, would not present a threat to civilian rule, and could bring their existing civilian expertise to bear.

3. Counter-Drugs

The Latin American region finds itself faced with one of the greatest challenges to stability and democracy in recent memory: the growing, processing, and trafficking of illegal drugs. To date this problem has been most rampant in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Yet although these three countries are frequently grouped...
together, the specific difficulties they face are not identical. Peru is the major producer of coca, accounting for some 60 percent of the U.S. supply, while Bolivia produces 30 percent, and Colombia only 10 percent. In Peru the drug activity has been concentrated in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV); in Bolivia coca is grown primarily in the Chapare (a rain forest in the center of the country) and some in Yungas (a mountainous region in the west). In contrast, because Colombia's activities are focused more on processing and shipping cocaine, the industry is much more diffused throughout the country.

These countries do find coincidence in the following problems. None of them has a strong economic base; in fact, both Peru and Bolivia are suffering through tremendous economic difficulties. This weak economic position makes reliance on growing and processing coca all the more difficult to break. For example, it has been estimated that as much as 30 percent of Bolivia's economy may come from the drug trade, and more than 350,000 of its citizens (15 percent of its employable population) are directly employed in it. In Colombia, some 100,000 peasants are directly employed in drug production, with another 400,000 indirectly employed. Gen. Joulwan has noted that all told, there are between 750,000 and one million campesinos employed in growing coca. In addition to sharing economic woes, all three countries also find the drug industry presenting a serious threat to civil-military relations and democratization.

One of the problems facing these countries' governments as they try to grapple with this challenge is determining what forces should be employed. The Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy notes that the drug problem in Latin America is increasingly one of reduced governmental authority and rising violent crime. Fragile judicial systems are being overwhelmed by drug cartels, and civilian governments are literally losing sovereign control over portions of their territories. Some have argued that police functions such as riot control, fighting drug trafficking, and national intelligence gathering

59 O'Connor, "Strategic Analysis of the War on Drugs," p. 16; Department of State, Report of Audit, p. 10.
60 O'Connor, "Strategic Analysis," p. 16.

II-25
should be provided by police under civilian control. Because counter-drug efforts necessitate the expansion of intelligence gathering, a delineation of boundaries for military and national defense and intelligence gathering is advisable. The commission advises that those who do engage in counter-drug work in Latin America should "concentrate on international law-enforcement efforts, on the disruption of criminal processing and trafficking networks throughout the Americas, rather than on seizures of drug shipments." It also advises better international cooperation in counter-drugs but does not address whether it is advisable for militaries to be involved. Gen. Joulwan has noted the progress made by the Andean countries between 1989 and the present. They "have significantly increased numbers of police forces specially trained in counternarcotics" and have developed aviation units to support these police forces. Nevertheless, military involvement has increased as well.

Throughout Latin America there has been a history of tension and distrust between police and military forces. The involvement of military forces in what most consider to be a law enforcement responsibility has come as the result of several factors and has raised additional problems. The reasons for the military's involvement can be traced to the fact that law enforcement personnel simply do not have the manpower or the resources to cope with this challenge. This is exacerbated by the fact that drug traffickers have increasingly formed alliances with insurgent groups, particularly in Peru and Colombia. For example, according to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) employee Kenneth O'Connor, "The Sendero Luminoso provide protection for coca farmers, and also serve as brokers to insure the Peruvian farmers receive a fair price for the coca leaves from Colombian processors. It has been estimated that the Sendero Luminoso raise approximately $30 million annually in this manner." A final factor influencing Latin military participation in the drug war has been the pressure applied by the United States on this score.

63 Andersen, Foreign Policy; Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy.
64 Seizing Opportunities: Report of the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy, p. 10.
65 Joulwan statement, 20 February 1992, p. 11.
66 The insurgency threat is addressed more fully in the following section.
The militaries in these countries, in fact, were quite reluctant to become involved in counter-drug efforts, but promises of more U.S. security assistance provided considerable incentive to both them and their civilian governments. In addition to the argument that the military has the personnel and equipment resources needed to fight the drug traffickers, it has also been suggested that the military could play a useful role in agricultural infrastructure development and in crop substitution efforts, which have become part of the counter-drug program.\textsuperscript{68} Such roles do, however, raise the traditional concerns associated with encouraging these militaries to perform civic action activities, as discussed above.

One of the more troubling phenomena associated with the military's participation in this role is the reported concomitant spread (and threat of the spread) of corruption, tolerance of drug trafficker violence, and human rights abuses by the military and police forces alike.\textsuperscript{69} For its part, in 1987, the Colombia government established a Directorate of Anti-Narcotics within the national police forces, to which it has assigned approximately 2,200 people for no more than 2 years in order to try to minimize corruption.\textsuperscript{70} Nevertheless, the extent of corruption appears to be spreading. This approach (of establishing a special force) has been adopted as well in the Mexican army, seemingly with greater success in the latter case, although corruption is certainly still a problem.\textsuperscript{71}

Mexico has, in fact, been dedicating some 25 percent of its armed forces to combating drugs since 1972. And in contrast to some of the other Latin American militaries (such as Guatemala) which support this role primarily because they know it is a

\textsuperscript{68} See, for example, Seizing Opportunities: Report of the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy, p. 14.


\textsuperscript{70} U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia, September 1991, p. 15

\textsuperscript{71} Mexico's special task force within the military was established in 1976. Its units are relieved every six months. See, Priani, "Drugs in the Americas," p. 19.
way of obtaining U.S. aid, the Mexican military does seem to believe that it is in its own best interest to be involved in counter-drug efforts.

The final point to be underscored in this discussion is that the drug industry is spreading throughout the region, thereby bringing threats of instability to numerous countries and their governments. Thus, in addition to the nations already mentioned, Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala number among those that are seeing increased transshipment activities. Uruguay and Panama are also faced with problems of money laundering. These trends only underline the growing need for more regional cooperation, which is beginning to show some signs of developing. Defeating the drug industry is far beyond the capabilities of any one nation, including the United States. Recent analysis drawing a connection (direct or indirect) between the money Latin countries have available through drug trafficking and their ability to pay off their foreign debt only further complicates any international efforts.

4. Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurrection and counterterrorism remain, to varying degrees, a concern for the governments and militaries in the Andes and Central America. Latin American armed forces must be ready to defend their constitutional governments and thus must be prepared for defense in the form of counterinsurgency. However, doctrine, perspectives, and practice need to be adjusted so that the militaries see themselves as guardians of democracy and pluralism. Again, civil-military cooperation is required to discuss appropriate forms of civil defense for a democracy. There must be a joint civil-military effort to create doctrine, to mobilize people and resources in the fight, and to establish clear lines of authority. If there is no such cooperation, as insurgency grows, so too will the political power of the military as the only arm of government equipped in any way to cope. That temptation for a political role for the military undermines democracy. Marcella and Woerner have articulated an appropriate approach to counterinsurgency:

The counterinsurgency must be conducted under civilian leadership. The military must indeed apply its operational capabilities to destroy the will of

72 The militaries also recognize that fighting the drug war gives them a reason for their existence, as well as a negotiating tool for modernizing and acquiring new equipment.
73 See, for example, Andreas and Sharpe, Current History, February 1992.
74 Marcella, Journal of Interamerican Studies, p. 54.
the insurgents to fight. But a military effort alone is not sufficient. Unless civilian leadership expands its own capabilities to involve the various ministries of government in the tasks of reform and nation-building, the risk to cooperative civil-military relations and the subordination of the military to civilian authority is intensified. What is even more dangerous is the likelihood that without effective civilian leadership, the military may win the tactical victories but the government may lose the battle for democracy in the long term.\textsuperscript{75}

In terms of specific countries, Peru unquestionably faces the most severe insurgent threat. It has been estimated that since the \textit{Sendero Luminoso} began its activities in 1980, more than 20,000 have died in Peru.\textsuperscript{76} The complicating factor, as Marcial Rubio Correa explains, is that the military, political, and social groups cannot agree on how to deal with the \textit{Sendero}—whether it is a terrorist group to be eliminated or a political party that takes military actions.\textsuperscript{77} The result of this lack of consensus and inability to develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy means that the \textit{Sendero} has divided the civilian government and the military and has managed to weaken the two institutions through this internal confrontation.\textsuperscript{78}

One of the most important factors to be considered if one is to more fully understand the insurgent threat in Peru is the effects of the economic crisis in the country. In the wake of President Garcia's rule (1986-90), Peru found its economy virtually bankrupt. Since that time, under President Fujimori, a certain amount of progress has been made in dealing with the foreign debt, expanding support from the World Bank, and easing U.S. restrictions (although the latter has seen numerous fluctuations). The dilemma, as Fujimori tirelessly points out, is that the insurgent threat cannot be effectively addressed without additional economic aid. The country's inability to pay for weapons and equipment for its police and military forces clearly impedes its ability to fight the insurgents. Moreover, insurgent attacks against the economic infrastructure only further weaken the government's capabilities.


\textsuperscript{77} Marcial Rubio Correa, "The Perception of the Subversive Threat in Peru," in Goodman et al., eds., \textit{The Military and Democracy}, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., pp. 118-119.
More generally speaking, the militaries that must deal with an insurgent threat (mainly Peru, Colombia, and Guatemala)\textsuperscript{79} must carry out this mission using an appropriate level of force while maintaining respect for human rights. Without such an approach these countries can expect to experience difficulties in receiving U.S. security assistance, as has especially been the case with Peru. In fact, section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act states that "no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, all orders authorizing the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Latin America (for counter-drug or other purposes) require the incorporation of human rights training in their activities.\textsuperscript{81} A more fundamental question is whether U.S. Government policy should advocate the use of U.S. military forces in a country with an insurgent threat such as Peru. The danger of U.S. personnel being injured or killed in what the American public would see as a civil war would likely cause a tremendous backlash; the reaction would only be worse if forces that the U.S. Government were supporting were clearly involved in human rights abuses.

In short, a plethora of roles for the Latin militaries can afford them too much political power (such as counterinsurgency and counter-drugs) and undermine civilian authority in these areas by blurring "the line between appropriate and inappropriate domains for military professional activities."\textsuperscript{82} This same argument has been used with regard to the role of the armed forces in development projects. The model which some countries such as Mexico and the Andean countries have tried is the creation of a separate entity to deal with these challenges. For example, in Mexico the counter-drug force rotates personnel in and out on a regular basis in order to eliminate (or at least reduce) the risks of corruption.

\textsuperscript{79} A list of primary insurgent groups in the region is contained in Marcella, \textit{Journal of Interamerican Studies}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{80} Section 502B (a) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 USC 2304 (a) (2).
\textsuperscript{81} After-action reports which deployed units must complete must include information about the type and scope of human rights training conducting during the deployments.
5. Disaster Relief and Environmental Issues

A less controversial mission for the Latin militaries than civic action, counter-drugs, and counterinsurgency is that of disaster relief. Because such actions are taken on an emergency basis, the civilian government would not likely face a threat of its legitimacy being undermined. Nor would the military necessarily gain a political role from such efforts.

While there are questions about some of the Latin militaries' ability to respond to a disaster situation, it is doubtful that any other governmental agency would have a greater capability. This point does raise, however, the prospect of regional cooperation. Given the considerable cost that a disaster relief mission can entail, and in light of declining defense budgets throughout the region, discussions on establishing some kind of regional force for this mission—or some other form(s) of cooperative arrangements—should be encouraged. In this vein, the Inter-American Defense Board has prepared a disaster relief preparedness manual and is planning to develop a database of disaster relief capabilities for the entire hemisphere. This could be an excellent starting point for such regional efforts.

Some elements of this force might be used on a regular basis for environmental clean-up/protection as well since these problems affect more than one country. This is not, of course, viewed by the militaries as a traditional mission for their forces, and while it is certainly not high on their list of priorities, worldwide attention is increasingly focusing on environmental problems, most notably highlighted by the United Nations Earth Summit in Brazil in June 1992. For their part, the militaries face the additional problem of the pollution and other environmental damage they themselves have created.\textsuperscript{83} Many of the militaries have their own professional engineers who could be used in environmental tasks.

6. Territorial Integrity of the State

Traditionally, threats from border disputes have been one of the main external tasks for Latin militaries; such threats have also proven useful in justifying defense budgets. And while concerns about border issues have diminished, especially since the settlement in 1984 between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Island Channel, there are still many

\textsuperscript{83} For example the Science for Peace Institute at the University of Toronto has reported that "10 to 30 percent of all global environmental degradation can be attributed to military activities." As cited in "Toxic Military," \textit{The Nation}, 8 June 1992, p. 773.
unresolved issues concerning borders in Latin America. Hence the militaries will continue to be able to point to some border concerns, if only concerns about what their neighbors are doing that could be perceived as threatening. For example, Chile’s neighbors, Bolivia and Peru, have not formally accepted the territorial gains made by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1873-1879), and their dissatisfaction on this score is voiced occasionally. Peru and Brazil’s common border in the Amazon is indistinct, and while Guatemala recently recognized Belize’s right to self-determination, it has said that it is not satisfied with the present border demarcation between the two countries. Finally, Peru and Ecuador have an ongoing border dispute, although they have demonstrated some willingness to put this dispute aside in the interests of cooperation in counter-drug efforts. In short, the Latin American armed forces still maintain some concern about border disputes, and there are occasional minor border incidents. Clearly, maintaining the territorial integrity of the state remains a priority.

The Latin American armed forces also must guard national air space and waterways, perhaps less against territorial incursions by other states and more against narcotics traffickers as they find new avenues (for example, in Chile, Brazil, and Venezuela) when old ones are closed by effective counter-drug actions. From the Latin American perspective, another important role for their armed forces is the guarding of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) against encroachments; the scope of each country’s right in this realm as established under the Law of the Sea remains, however, politically controversial. Several countries in Latin America (Peru, for example) rely heavily on fishing for export and are vulnerable to large and modern fishing trawlers from other countries depleting their stocks of fish. Also, the countries are interested in having their armed forces be capable of protecting rights to off-shore drilling in the EEZ as well as the actual sites.

Thus border conflicts do remain a problem for some countries in the region, although the number and intensity of these problems seem to be on the decline. They also provide the military with a legitimate external role. Nevertheless, the existence of these problems can be seen to "threaten the peace and stability of Latin America and thwart

84 In fact, the ability to resolve this dispute appears to be attributable at least in part to the work done by these countries’ representatives at the Inter-American Defense Board. These are the kinds of useful experiences that need to be better highlighted in face of opposition for continuing such military-to-military contacts.
attempts to initiate multinational economic, political and security projects which would benefit the inhabitants of the region" as a whole.\textsuperscript{85} It is the subject of prospects for increased regional cooperation that is addressed next.

D. REGIONAL COOPERATION

In today's increasingly interdependent world, the importance of forming coalitions to accomplish mutually beneficial objectives has been repeatedly underscored. The question for Central and South America is whether traditional animosities can be overcome sufficiently to enable greater coordination and cooperation.

1. Past Efforts and Future Prospects

There are, of course, existing multilateral fora and agreements in Latin America such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Treaty. Moreover, in the economic arena there have been several previous attempts to establish an institution similar to the European Community (EC). For example, in 1960, the Central American Common Market (CACM) was created "to provide Central American nations with free or preferential trade" within this region. CACM still exists, although its inter-regional trade has declined significantly since 1980, and it no longer acts as a political forum in the region.\textsuperscript{86} In 1980 the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)--including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela--was created, but without much success. The Andean Pact was established in 1969 by Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile, although Chile withdrew in 1977.\textsuperscript{87} And while the Pact has suffered as its members have more frequently sought bilateral arrangements, recently it is showing some new signs of life.

New arrangements in the economic sphere continue to take shape. Thus, a regional trade bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru is to establish a common market, called Mercosur, by 1994. Analysts agree that Mercosur's prospects will be

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 44.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 45. Venezuela also joined this group, but not until Chile ceased to participate after 1973.
largely dependent on the viability of Brazil's economy, which is at present highly questionable.

The United States is obviously playing a role here as well, particularly in the form of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico.\(^{88}\) In the case of the EAI, reaction both here and throughout Latin America has been generally positive. At a minimum, as Marcella and Woerner have pointed out, it shifts the focus of U.S.-Latin relations from confrontation to cooperation.\(^{89}\) One of the problems with the Initiative, however, as Carol Graham contends, is that it will ultimately exclude the very poor countries in the region. Those most likely to benefit would be Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. Countries that have not advanced as far in economic reforms—such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru—might not be able to benefit.\(^{90}\) In terms of the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, there is little question about the political capital the Mexican government invested in this effort. The broader implications of the agreement for the region may be found in Chile's interest to be next on the list to negotiate a similar arrangement with the United States. Given the considerably stronger position of Chile's economy compared with that of its neighbors, Chile has demonstrated little interest in regional arrangements such as Mercosur. Indeed, if a U.S.-Chile agreement were negotiated, it has been argued, it could demonstrate to other Latin American countries what is possible given the implementation of appropriate economic reforms. It would also refute the belief that Mexico was able to obtain such an agreement because of its geographical proximity to the United States.\(^{91}\)

Given these various economic efforts, the question becomes whether there could be spillover effects into the political and security arenas, much as has occurred with the EC's evolution in Europe. Some would argue that without a unifying threat such as the previous Soviet threat to Western Europe, greater security cooperation in Latin America is unlikely. There are admittedly many obstacles that would need to be surmounted, not the least of which is continuing distrust among neighbors. At the same time, however, the pervasiveness of the drug trafficking problem and its threat to political, economic, and

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\(^{88}\) The EAI contains three basic objectives: to create a free trade zone in the Americas; to stimulate foreign investment in the region; and to reduce or cancel some $12 billion in U.S. government loans.


\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 25.
social stability throughout the region could offer a unifying focus, even if on an ad hoc basis. This has, in fact, begun to happen, not only among the Andean nations, but elsewhere within the region as well. According to Gen. Joulwan in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Regional cooperation is on the upswing, historic differences are being put aside for the common good. More countries are bringing more resources to the fight."92 This was evident, for example, during Support Justice operations. And while he notes that a "consensus on a cooperative regional approach to the narcotrafficker threat is now developing in the Andean ridge,"93 Joulwan also underscores the commitment by other nations in Central and South American in combating this spreading threat.

Not only in the Andean ridge, but in Central America and the "spillover" countries of the Southern Cone, there is also developing national will in the counter-drug fight. Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica have demonstrated increased awareness and will at the national level to step up counternarcotics programs. Within the Southern Cone, there is a growing awareness that action must be taken now before the narcotraffickers become entrenched in their countries.94

What are some of the existing and emerging institutions that deal with security matters and some of the emerging regional leaders? Security arrangements in the region date back to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Treaty), signed in 1947. This was considered the world's first regional defense alliance because it contained the provision that "an attack on one is an attack on all." It did not, however, establish either a combined military command (as NATO did) or a military planning body.95

Other long-standing institutional arrangements include the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC). Both groups are funded through the OAS. Founded in 1962, the IADC is designed for senior military officers and civilian functionaries, where they focus on political, military, economic, and social issues.96 The IADB, as Dennis Caffrey characterizes it, serves "a political-military symbol of hemispheric unity while enhancing communications among the multinational military

93 Ibid., p. 7.
94 Ibid., p. 21.
96 For a more detailed discussion of the IADB and IADC, see Chapter IV, Section E, below.
However, Caffrey notes that the IADB's role and effectiveness have been quite limited. For example, IADB initiatives on interoperability studies, decisionmaking exercises, and the development of inter-American military doctrine have not met with support from OAS members. The effectiveness of both organizations could obviously be enhanced by improved cooperation. And while the OAS has recently played a leading and important role in regional problems, there still persists a feeling among some analysts that more effective (and probably smaller) regional groups need to take shape to contend with today's challenges.

On a different plane, some Latin American nations have demonstrated a willingness and ability to work together on an ad hoc basis, in connection with a particular regional problem. One such attempt during the 1980s was known as the Contadora Group (consisting of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela), dedicated to addressing the problem of conflict in Central America, specifically in Nicaragua. In 1985, the Group received the support of Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil as it publicly opposed U.S. aid to the Contras, asked that the Reagan Administration shift away from its militaristic approach, and advocated that bilateral U.S.-Nicaraguan talks be resumed.

Since that time, of course, significant progress has been made toward creating a more stable environment in Central America. One of the leading figures that has emerged in these efforts is the Mexican government, especially President Salinas de Gortari. Mexico has been the host for both the Salvadoran and Guatemalan peace processes. Another key player in regional efforts has been Venezuela, whose oil resources and strong economy made it an important regional power as early as the 1970s. President Perez has sought an international role for himself, although these efforts have recently been much criticized by his people as they see him neglecting domestic (especially economic) problems. In short, Mexico and Venezuela appear to be taking the most active role in the politico-security arena. The trends within Central America are moving more slowly. For his part, Guatemala's President Serrano aspires to be a regional leader, but the situation in his own country will likely occupy his attention for the foreseeable future.

98 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
Difficulties notwithstanding, the development of greater cooperation across a range of issues makes considerable sense for Latin America. It is more likely that arrangements will occur on an ad hoc rather than institutionalized basis and that more attempts will be made to work bilaterally rather than multilaterally. However they develop, such efforts can be an important contribution to regional stability. Augusto Varas summarizes the problems and prospects quite well, as well as the U.S. role in these efforts:

The diversity of conflict formation structures in the region accounts for the difficulties of integrating them all in a single security system and helps us understand the individualistic, specific position of each Latin American country in the global military field. However, within the issue of regional defense systems . . . [there are] issues around which new hemispheric military cooperation forms could be developed. Such regional defense systems should protect the hemispheric collective defense interests through a revision of military relations with the United States and a new design for hemispheric defense that is separated from global confrontation. Because world peace depends on regional defense systems, the need for a U.S. presence in them must be recognized. Moreover, U.S. participation can be turned into an asset and, therefore, into a contribution to global peace.100

Having examined these broader trends and issues, this section now turns to a brief analysis of two particular areas for possible military cooperation: research and development and peacekeeping operations.

2. Research and Development

There is some potential for cooperation on research and development for military industries, although there are admittedly obstacles as well. Developing joint ventures in military production for domestic use and export could benefit Latin American economies and contribute to more modern and efficient armed forces. It has been observed that "in countries producing their own arms, increased military expenditures affect overall economic growth positively. In countries constrained by limitations on foreign exchange and lacking domestic arms production, bigger military expenditures lessen growth."101 Thus, domestic production of arms and equipment can contribute to economic growth and, by extension, ease one of the trade-offs--between defense spending and spending on social services--that plague relations between civilians and militaries. Moreover, "if armaments

100 Augusto Varas, "Civil-Military Relations in a Democratic Framework," in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 213.
can be sold abroad, military spending is effectively exchanged for consumables." An additional consideration is that efforts to create indigenous arms industries are driven by political motivations as well, as Andrew Pierre has argued.

Space technology and space exploration could offer other fields for cooperation in terms of research and development and joint ventures. There could also be cooperation in developing nuclear energy technology which would serve development needs in Latin America. Such efforts should be facilitated by the accord between the Brazilian and Argentine militaries to halt their nuclear programs and to use their nuclear capabilities only for peaceful purposes. Indeed, the field of energy resources is one that could benefit enormously from regional cooperation since some countries control energy resources that others need to be able to tap in order to develop more fully. This could include river system projects and hydroelectric projects. Such regional efforts, it can be argued, can strengthen the overall economic base and diminish the likelihood of interstate conflict, thereby even strengthening the process of democratization in Latin America.

Yet, while cooperation on military industry and space and nuclear technology issues is useful in overcoming the problems of the limited resources of individual countries, the classic (and continuing) problems of trust and cooperation in international relations must be recognized. Argentina and Brazil (and increasingly Chile) have well-developed arms industries and are obviously less needy of cooperation in these fields. Argentina and Brazil need incentives to act as "hegemons" in terms of sharing information and perhaps losing their competitive edges. Moreover, the remaining border and territorial disputes fuel mistrust concerning cooperation on improving military effectiveness. Thus, it is likely that Argentina and Brazil will prefer to remain competitors in arms developments. This does not exclude, however, the potential for expanded cooperation of other countries with either Brazil or Argentina, as is already occurring. As is the case with U.S. equipment, one question will be whether Brazil and Argentina will manufacture the kinds of equipment Latin American countries need, as the former aim for inclusion in the high-tech world (especially their aviation industries).

102 Ibid., p. 165.
104 Child, in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, pp. 146, 160.
Finally, it should be noted that cooperation in arms and technology development mean a greater potential for interoperability, a problem that has plagued many nations in this region. In fact, decisions to buy arms and military equipment from various sources over the years has meant not only serious difficulties in repairing and maintaining this equipment, but also concrete problems in interoperability within a given service or in the country's joint activities. Needless to say, the prospects for interoperability in the context of combined exercises have been quite limited. NATO's problems in this area pale by comparison to Latin America's. Greater collaborative efforts would obviously ease these difficulties over the long term. However, this cooperation also implies a distinct vulnerability in case of conflict when an opponent might seize and make ready use of the other nation's weapons and spare parts.

3. Peacekeeping and Multilateral Intervention

Regional peacekeeping is also a future possibility for Latin American militaries. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all sent personnel to participate in the United Nations' monitoring force deployed in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. The OAS is increasingly involving itself in election monitoring and human rights issues in various Latin American countries. There is an opportunity for Latin American governments to monitor the Central American peace process through the OAS, and the IADB has some ideas for making a contribution in this area as well. Some believe a regional military group formed under the auspices of the OAS could be readied to intervene in cases of extraconstitutional actions. The recent coup in Haiti prompted some Latin American governments led by Venezuela to propose the possibility of intervention on behalf of the constitutionally elected president, Aristide. In fact, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela submitted a document to the United Nations in 1980 which asserted that intervention is acceptable in cases of violations of human, political, economic, and social rights and that "their defence is an international obligation to which States are committed, and that therefore joint action in defence of those rights does not violate the principle of

105 In addition, the Partnership for Democracy and Development in Central America includes six Central American nations, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela as well as the OECD nations and various international institutions. According to Bernard Aronson, the objective of the group is to establish a common effort to support democracy, peace, and economic development in Central America.
non-intervention." The OAS, however, is in the process of adjusting its role in the post-Cold War period to adapt to and encourage new relationships in the Western Hemisphere. The OAS could have a more important role in hemispheric relations similar to the more important role envisaged for the United Nations in the "new international system." As a political forum, the OAS may become an important component in the consolidation of democracy. To intervene militarily on behalf of democracy, however, is a very complicated matter and beyond the current capacity of the OAS. Nonetheless, the context for multilateral action and the need for such action exists in Latin America. Military participation can be included in both humanitarian assistance and potential intervention.

Multilateral missions could be extended to out-of-area conflicts as well. This could be a useful new area for military developments in Latin America in which the armed forces could hone their skills and also learn from cooperation with other militaries. Trends in this direction have, in fact, already occurred. For example, both Chile and Argentina were involved in peacekeeping operations in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Moreover, Argentina sent a contingent to participate in the multinational coalition formed to counter Iraq's aggression in 1991.

Multilateral military intervention on humanitarian grounds can take the form of defense of another state's territorial integrity, defense against extraconstitutional takeovers, or disaster relief. This type of intervention is receiving increasing attention. Military humanitarianism has been defined as "the use of outside armed forces to alleviate suffering caused by both man-made and natural disasters." The argument for military humanitarianism can be made for Latin American military operations both inside and outside of Latin America. The justification for the use of the military in humanitarian efforts is that "armed forces can respond rapidly and massively to a wide range of crises; they have disciplined and well-trained organizations; and they have access to crucial resources such as food, medicine and fuel. They also have transportation capabilities (land, sea, air), communications equipment, building supplies, tools and temporary shelters." This statement is not entirely true of many Latin American countries, but if

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106 Carta de Conducta de Riobamba [Charter of Conduct] presented to the United Nations General Assembly by the Permanent Representatives of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (September 18, 1980), paragraph 3.


108 Ibid., p. 452.
the necessary training and resources were dedicated to this area, the capability could be
developed.

There are several potential problems in Latin American involvement in
multilateralism. The first is that both regional and out-of-area cooperation as well as
peacekeeping operations are expensive. These activities require resources and logistical
capabilities that Latin American militaries do not have. They require additional training and
money. Out-of-area cooperation may meet with resistance, not only from a military that
may not accept far-flung international matters as its concern, but also from a civilian
government seeking to spend money on domestic problems.

Intervention against governments can be problematic in that it requires a definition
of what constitutes aggression and a willingness to pay the costs to do something about it.
It is frequently difficult to determine just who is the aggressor. An ally or regional partner
may be labeled an aggressor (e.g., Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War). And while
some government changes may be clearly extraconstitutional (Haiti, for example), others
are not so clear cut. Some changes of government may violate a constitution on paper but
may, for humanitarian or political reasons, be seen as good for the country. (Latin
Americans supported Castro’s revolution against Batista. He was the constitutionally
elected president of Cuba, even if those elections were marred by fraud.) Do Latin
American countries want to intervene in elections that are questionable? It seems highly
unlikely, for instance, that any Latin American government would want to send its armed
forces to intervene in Mexico if the PRI were accused of electoral irregularities. Or what
would happen if a constitution were seen as unjust? Who should decide the definition of
democracy and an appropriate constitution? Before the armed forces of Latin America start
training for these tasks, these political questions will need to be answered.

E. CONSTRAINTS ON LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES’ POSSIBLE
FUTURE FUNCTIONS

This chapter has identified a range of tasks and challenges for the Latin American
countries and their militaries. A final question to be addressed is: what kinds of factors may
affect these militaries’ abilities to carry out the functions that have been discussed? Most of
these factors have already been mentioned in the context of these earlier discussions, but
they merit at least a brief highlighting here.
The most significant constraint is the overall economic situation and its effect on the defense budgets. Throughout the region, defense monies have declined—many precipitously—in the last several years. The implications of such declines are obvious: reduced abilities to modernize existing equipment or to purchase new, negative effects on officer morale, and declining training and readiness levels.

A second major factor could be classified as "political will." This term would apply to possible opposition by the public at large and/or by civilian politicians to suggested military roles. For instance, memories of the militaries' involvement in civic action projects several decades ago and the militaries' subsequent greater involvement in politics linger in the minds of many civilian politicians. In addition, continuing human rights abuses by those involved in counter-drugs and counterinsurgency activities could result in greater public outcry and a closer examination of the military role in such internal functions.

Finally, in the realm of regional cooperative efforts, economic constraints will be compounded by continuing distrust and animosity among potential participants. Multilateral organizations and activities that bring these countries together can be used to aim ultimately toward eventual better working relationships among them.

In summary, there are several new challenges facing Latin American armed forces in the post-Cold War era. Among them are institutional integration into the newly emerging democracies and development of strategy and tactics designed to defend constitutional democracy. This includes reassessing and redefining the role militaries play in Latin American governments, reformulating national security doctrine to address new threats and challenges, and professionalization in the sense of technical expertise in specifically delineated areas and support for democratic processes. All of the above require cooperation between civilian and military leaders. A new structural relationship for civilians and military will be extremely difficult given the decades of animosity, but traditional civil-military relations and isolation must be overcome if the Latin American armed forces are to be part of the transitions to democracy and to a new international system.

The U.S. role, and especially that of the U.S. Army, can be quite important in many of these considerations. This paper will now address this U.S. factor, first in terms of the resources and programs the U.S. Government and the Army have at their disposal and then the actual role the Army can play in these challenges facing Latin America.
III. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO AND MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

Security assistance is a fundamental component of U.S. defense and foreign policy. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, security assistance supports independent political development; promotes stability; encourages economic development and reform; contributes to base and facility access needed to bolster our own force projection capabilities; and promotes the interoperability of U.S. and allied forces to strengthen our collective security framework. Security assistance is also our principal instrument for combating low-intensity conflict (LIC). In summary, security assistance plays a significant role in preserving our own security through collective efforts.¹

Both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), and the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (AECA), address security assistance in a statutory sense.

There are three primary security assistance programs under Title 22 of the United States Code that are used in Latin America which can help meet those objectives: the Economic Support Fund (ESF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Security assistance monies must be used when providing goods (such as military equipment) and services (such as maintaining and repairing this equipment). Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) are an example of a vehicle through which security assistance training is conducted under the authority of Title 22. When U.S. military activities focus on training our forces or enhancing military-to-military relations, however, there are other sources of funding that are to be used. For example, under Title 10 of the United States Code there are programs such as Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Latin America Cooperation funds. While distinctly different from U.S. security assistance programs in terms of objectives, these programs do provide another means for accomplishing the aim of establishing and maintaining relations with Latin

American counterparts. Thus, these programs will also be examined in this section because the main interest here is in determining not only what the United States has done previously in the way of security assistance per se—including the strengths and weaknesses of these efforts—but also how it can make the most effective use of various funds it will have available in the future.

One thing in today's dynamic environment seems certain: Given the dramatic changes throughout the world over the last several years highlighted by the official end of the Cold War, U.S. public support for virtually all types of foreign assistance, particularly security assistance, will continue to erode. It will clearly require a significant improvement in the U.S. domestic economic situation before the current move toward isolationism can possibly be reversed. However, even a revived economy is no guarantee that funding for security assistance programs will be broadly supported. Overwhelmingly, the U.S. public sentiment believes that the end of the Cold War means there is little need to continue security assistance at its historical levels. The additional problems for Latin American countries hoping for such assistance is that this region (with the obvious exceptions of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and now the Andean drug countries) has been and remains a low-level priority for U.S. policy makers and for the U.S. Congress. Unless the Congress is presented with a strong case arguing the need for security assistance to Latin America—preferably based on a coherent, overall program for the entire region—there is good reason to believe that funding will be severely limited. Moreover, with so much funding for security assistance already earmarked by Congress for other countries, there will undoubtedly be less to spend in Latin America than heretofore as overall funds decline.

There are several problems in the security assistance system as a whole and as it applies to Latin America specifically. One perennial problem is the process by which the U.S. Congress manages to earmark an overwhelming percentage of all security assistance funds. In fact, more than 85 percent of security assistance is allocated to only five countries: Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, and Pakistan. The remaining funds—15 percent—must then be allocated among all the remaining countries of the world. As a

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2 U.S. government counterdrug efforts have provided additional monies to certain Latin American countries under the International Narcotics Matter (INM) program. Administered by the State Department, the INM provides some funding to DoD. Since FY1989 (through the first quarter of FY1992), total INM funds received by DoD come to $3.2 million. All told, Congress appropriated $450 million to DoD in FY1990 for its counterdrug responsibilities and about $1.1 billion for FY1991.
result, the entire Latin American region since the mid-1980s has, on average, received less than nine percent of all security assistance monies; all the countries of this region combined do not receive as much security assistance as any one of the five above-mentioned countries individually. The consensus, nevertheless, is that earmarking will continue to be a Congressional mandate, despite an almost universal opinion that this is not an effective or just way of distributing foreign aid. Indeed, some members of Congress have recognized the need to change this system and have broached the subject during Congressional discussions in recent years about reforming the overall foreign aid process. Comprehensive studies have also been conducted on this matter, resulting in legislative initiatives such as (most recently) H.R. 2508, "The International Cooperation Act of 1991," which seeks a fundamental revision of the Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Control Acts. To date, however, there has been no agreement on eliminating (or even reducing) earmarking.

Within Latin America, the flow of assistance has been overwhelmingly to Central America; in the second half of the 1980s, the Central American countries received at least seven times more security assistance funding than the South American countries. Moreover, this money has tended to be allocated to only a very few of the countries, with the others receiving virtually nothing. Since the mid-1980s, for example, El Salvador and Honduras have received some 65 percent of all Latin American security assistance. More recently, following President Bush’s counter-drug policy statement in August 1989 and the subsequent meeting in Cartegena, Colombia in 1990 to address the growing threat from drug production and trafficking, the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia began to receive increasing attention. Indeed, because of the Andean Narcotics Initiative, the security assistance money planned to be spent in FY1991 and 1992 is to be disbursed almost evenly between Central and South America. Nevertheless, the problem remains that the focus continues to be on one challenge--first El Salvador and the Contras, now the drug war--to the detriment of broader U.S. interests in the region. The number of countries receiving substantial U.S. security assistance still remains quite limited: the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru), El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (proposed for FY1992). Appendix A illustrates these trends in greater detail

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3 See tables contained in Appendix A.
4 The estimates for FY1991 and FY1992 show a marked decrease, mainly for Honduras, making the figure for these 2 years less than 30 percent.
with tables that summarize the annual funding levels of the various security assistance programs for each country in this region.

In this connection, one element of the ongoing debate about security assistance focuses on which countries should be highest on the list of U.S. priorities. Some argue that we should put our emphasis on the most needy and underdeveloped countries (such as Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia). Others believe that focusing our efforts on the more developed countries (such as Brazil, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico) can help strengthen their governments with the result that they may subsequently serve as models for the weaker countries. Indeed, this latter approach could help foster greater regional cooperation and thereby allow the United States to take a less visible role. For if there is anything to be learned from previous U.S. involvement in the Latin American region, it is that the Latin countries resent what they perceive to be unilateral U.S. actions, as epitomized by the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and by U.S. actions in Nicaragua and Operation Just Cause in Panama more recently. While these actions certainly were not taken under the auspices of security assistance per se, any type of U.S. involvement in the region must be very sensitive to such perceptions.

Another concern with U.S. security assistance policies in Latin America--voiced by military and civilian analysts alike--is that too much emphasis has been placed on providing combat equipment. This focus can heighten regional tensions as one country wants to ensure that it is as well-armed as its neighbors. Additionally, in many cases U.S. equipment is simply too advanced technologically, both in terms of the country's actual needs and in terms of its ability to maintain the equipment after receiving it. Finally, as Andrew Pierre points out, a common criticism of arms sales in general is that they divert scarce resources from economic and social programs in the recipient country, which is where the emphasis should be placed.5 In short, most support the idea that--especially in Central and South America--less emphasis should be placed on providing equipment through security assistance, and more on training and providing general services.

A final problem that should be noted concerning security assistance in general is the need to develop longer term programs and the funding process to meet these programs. According to the current system, funding can be secured only on a year-to-year basis. Thus, although we try to work with the countries to develop long-term programs, we are

never able to guarantee that the funding for subsequent years will, in fact, materialize. Indeed, when programs fail to be funded beyond the initial year, the U.S. Government, and particularly its representatives in-country, risk losing a great deal of their credibility. This is clearly not a problem for DoD to handle alone, and there is much skepticism that this process can ever be changed, just as there is great skepticism that Congressional earmarking of assistance funds will ever be eliminated. It is a problem to be kept in mind, however, and one that should at least be addressed at an interagency level within the U.S. Government. As LTC Joseph Luckett argues, "Consistent multi-year programs with adequate funding will encourage and strengthen the economies of these democracies. This type of comprehensive program will enhance regional democratization in the long term."6

In addition to the problem of trying to fund projects over more than 1 year, the restrictions that Congress places on security assistance funds can present even more fundamental challenges to the continuity of various assistance programs. To cite but two of these restrictions, the Kennedy Amendment links a country's performance in the area of human rights to its ability to receive U.S. security assistance. For example, reports of human rights violations by the Guatemalan military have long caused staunch Congressional opposition to U.S. military aid for this nation. A second restriction, known as the Brooke-Alexander sanction, can impede or stop security assistance in the event a country defaults on its foreign debt payments. Here Peru serves as an example, where even its IMET funding was intermittently suspended when it fell behind on debt repayment, resulting in a virtual inability to program IMET students (since there would be no guarantee that the funds would be available throughout the given IMET program).

A. TRENDS IN THE MAJOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

1. Economic Support Fund

Turning to the three primary security assistance programs, it is the Economic Support Fund (ESF) that represents the majority of security assistance monies going to Latin America. Indeed, since the mid-1980s, the ESF portion of total security assistance to these nations has averaged 70 percent annually, almost all of which has gone to Central

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America. During this time, El Salvador and Honduras have received a significant portion of ESF monies. Costa Rica's share has been declining in recent years, while that of Guatemala has been increasing. In addition, for FY1992 a considerable sum was requested for Nicaragua as it seeks to recover from its devastating civil war and the crippled economy that resulted. Table III-1 details ESF funding for each of the Latin American countries since 1979.

The ESF program is administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under policy direction from the Department of State. ESF monies are used for such economic undertakings as infrastructure development, balance of payments, commodity import financing, and budget support. ESF monies cannot be used to purchase defense articles, defense services, or military training (other than instruction aids). Since fiscal year 1989, all ESF funds have been in the form of grants, and since 1987 Congress has earmarked more than 90 percent of all ESF funds. Of all ESF funds worldwide, Latin America's share has varied quite widely over the past decade or so, but for fiscal years 1985-92, it has received an average of 17 percent of these funds.

2. Foreign Military Sales and Sections 517, 519, and 506(a) of Title 22

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) component of U.S. security assistance provides the authority (but not the money) for foreign governments to purchase defense equipment, defense services, and military training; it represents the largest portion of total U.S. security assistance worldwide. Such sales can be made only to countries that the President determines to be eligible. FMS can also include training of foreign military personnel, usually on a specific type of equipment that their country has purchased from the United States. In addition, the sales of design and construction services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations is made possible through Foreign Military Construction Sales. The recipient must pay the United States for the full costs, and the sales agreement and procedures generally parallel those of FMS. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for Foreign Military Construction Sales within the U.S. Army.

One of the persistent problems of FMS is that prices for U.S. equipment are expensive compared to what other countries offer (although the U.S. tends to offer more in its packages, including maintenance and spare parts). According to the Arms Export

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7 Based on percentages taken from year-by-year summary charts for all security assistance, contained in Appendix A.
# Table III-1. Economic Support Fund
## Central and South America, Budget Authority
### (Current Dollars, in Thousands)

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1. Provisional allocation of $175 million as follows: Bolivia $65 million, Colombia $50 million, Peru $60 million. Final allocations will depend on each country's performance in meeting drug program objectives.

2. Provisional allocation of $250 million as follows: Bolivia $100 million, Colombia $50 million, Peru $100 million. Final allocations will depend on each country's performance meeting drug program objectives.

3. Includes $250,000 for fact-finding.
Control Act, the U.S. government must be paid "for all costs associated with the manufacture, storage, development, administration, packaging, and transportation of any defense article sale." Long delays in actual delivery of defense goods only reduces U.S. competitiveness in these sales. Furthermore, particularly since the 1970s, many Latin American countries have sought to remain somewhat independent of U.S. influence. The result has been a considerable diversity of suppliers to the region, including the former USSR, France, Italy, and Great Britain, as well as Brazil. The main recipients of U.S. Foreign Military Sales in Latin America have been El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, and Brazil (since FY1987). Table III-2 illustrates trends in this program since FY1979 for each of the Central and South American countries. As indicated in this table, the Latin American region has never received more than 5 percent of the worldwide U.S. funds for any given year.

FMS purchases are made using either the foreign government's own money or U.S. grants and loans under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. MAP represents grant funds available to allies "in order to strengthen their defense capabilities without diverting domestic resources from internal development to military equipment/training purchases" from the U.S. government. The Latin American countries have not received MAP financing since FY1989; their allocation reached its peak in FY1984 when it accounted for some $296 million of the $712 million available in MAP funds worldwide. Virtually all of this money (throughout the 1980s) went to El Salvador and Honduras. These trends are shown in greater detail in Table III-3. It should also be noted that, following the pattern of other assistance programs, more than 90 percent of all FMS and MAP funds are earmarked by Congress.

Increasingly, FMF comes in the form of grants, which allies may use to purchase articles, services, and training from the United States. The Administration has, in fact, requested that Congress make the entire program grants. Congress is also responsible for

9 Prior to FY1989, the Foreign Military Financing Program was referred to as the Foreign Military Sales Credit (FMSCR) Program and the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program (FMSFP). For additional information, see Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, p. 39.
Table III-2. Foreign Military Sales and Construction Sales Agreements, Central and South America

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Regional Total as percentage of Worldwide Total

|                      | 0.2%           | 0.1%           | 3%             | 3%             | 0.0%          | 2%             | 2%             | 4%             | 5%             | 3%             | 3%             | 1%              | 2%             | 3%             |

### Table III-3. Military Assistance Program, Central and South America Budget Authority/Obligations

(Current Dollars, In Thousands)

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**NOTE:**

*a* Less than $500.

*b* Wind-up costs under Section 515(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, including supply operations.

*a* A Military Assistance Program under Section 508(a) drawdown authority was implemented for El Salvador in FY1981 in the amount of $25.0 million; $35.0 million in FY1982.
approving the overall funding level for FMF and for determining whether a given country is eligible for such funding. The funds are then allocated by the Defense Security Assistance Agency on a case-by-case basis.\(^\text{12}\)

Also falling under Title 22 security assistance and relevant to the Foreign Military Sales component is the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. The individual U.S. Services determine what articles in their inventories are to be considered "excess," and there is an annual worldwide limit of $250 million for all EDA. EDA goods can either be sold under FMS or transferred under Sections 516-519 of Title 22.\(^\text{13}\) EDA goods sold are priced on the basis of their condition, ranging from 50 percent of their original acquisition value for new equipment to 5 percent of this value for equipment in need of repairs.\(^\text{14}\) However, according to the FY1992 Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, prepared by the Department of State and the Defense Security Assistance Agency, because items transferred under Sections 516-519 are grants, there are usually charges only for the costs of packing, crating, handling, and transportation; the current value of the material and the original acquisition value are still provided to Congress, but simply as part of the Congressional notification procedure.\(^\text{15}\) Table III-4 identifies those Central and South American countries that have received excess defense articles under FMS (but not those under Sections 516-519), as well as their acquisition and sales value.

The transfer of EDA under Section 517, which was first authorized in FY1990, is currently available to the following nations: Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Belize, Jamaica, and Brazil.\(^\text{16}\) The primary emphasis is on those articles that would

\(^{12}\) As is the case for most security assistance funds, Israel and Egypt account for an overwhelming amount of this assistance. For example, in FY1990, these two countries received $3.1 billion of the $4.7 billion available. Data on FMF to Latin American countries are contained in the annual summary charts in Appendix A.

\(^{13}\) For the purposes of this study, only two of these sections are relevant: Section 517, Modernization of Military Capabilities of Certain Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries, and Section 519, Additional Authorities Relating to Modernization of Military Capabilities. (Section 516 applies to countries of NATO's Southern flank and Section 518 applies to EDA for natural resources and wildlife management.)

\(^{14}\) Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency (hereafter DoS/DSAA), Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1992, p. 53.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) For a more detailed discussion of this program and others in this section, see the extremely useful document by United States Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation: A Primer, Preliminary Draft, July 1991, pp. 4-21 and 4-23. It should be noted that, while Peru is on the eligible list, it did not sign the necessary agreement to actually receive equipment.
Table III-4. Excess Defense Articles Sold Under
Foreign Military Sales,
Central and South America

(Current Dollars, in Thousands)

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<td>COLOMBIA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSTA RICA</td>
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<td>6,975</td>
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<tr>
<td>VENEZUELA</td>
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<td>WORLDWIDE TOTAL</td>
<td>12,222</td>
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</table>

facilitate greater cooperation and collaboration between the recipient country's military and law enforcement agencies in combating drugs. Requests for this assistance are generally to be initiated by the foreign country; the U.S. embassy will forward the requests to the Departments of State and Defense, along with the country team's evaluation and recommendation. The goods cannot be transferred for at least 30 days after Congress is notified by the Defense Security Assistance Agency of such an intention. It is further stipulated that the aggregate value of EDA transferred to a given country cannot exceed $10 million in any fiscal year, although this restriction was waived for Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in FY1991. It should be noted that goods sometimes are not shipped even after Congress is notified. For instance, Congress was notified of potential shipments of wheeled vehicles to Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru during FY1990, but the transfers did not actually occur. In FY1991 under Section 517, Colombia was the only Latin American recipient. The equipment transferred consisted of OV-10 aircraft and landing craft, with a total acquisition value of some $913,000 and a sales value of $228,000.

EDA transferred under Section 519 pertains to nonlethal excess defense articles to help countries modernize their defense capabilities, as determined by the U.S. President. This was first authorized in FY1991, spurred in part by the recognition that scale-downs in U.S. military forces would make available more excess defense property. According to the enabling legislation, "The Congress urges the President to make maximum use of available excess defense articles as a cost-effective supplement to funded security assistance programs to meet the legitimate defense requirements of eligible allies and friends." The request process is similar to that used for Section 517, although only 15 days' Congressional notification is required.

Latin American recipients of EDA under Section 519 during FY1991 were Chile and Colombia. Chile's equipment consisted of C-130B aircraft with an acquisition value of $3.3 million and sales value of almost $2.1 million. Colombia also received C-130B aircraft as well as T-37 engines and jeep spare parts. The total acquisition value of these EDA goods sent to Colombia was roughly $4.2 million; the sales value was almost $3.2 million.

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17 As quoted in ibid., p. 4-26.
In general, EDA goods being sent to Latin America, or those under consideration, are most frequently trucks, wheeled vehicles, and aircraft. In FY1992 it is expected that many vehicles will be sent to the region.

Finally, another component of Title 22 security assistance is known as Section 506(a). According to regulations, it is the President who has the responsibility for determining that such assistance is to be transferred, and he must notify the Congress of his intention to utilize this program. While authority for this program was enacted in 1961, it has only been since 1981 that any Latin American countries have received assistance from this fund. Section 506(a) allows the emergency drawdown of defense articles from DoD stocks, defense services, and military education and training if this immediate need cannot be met under any other program. The aggregate value cannot exceed $75 million in any fiscal year. Section 506(a) comes in the form of grants and also covers TDY expenses associated with providing services or training. However DoD provides these defense articles and services without a guarantee of reimbursement for their costs; funds must be specifically appropriated by the Congress to reimburse DoD. Regulations stipulate that the goods must be delivered or the services initiated within 120 days of the President notifying Congress of his intention to use this drawdown authority.18

During the 1980s, the following Latin American countries received Section 506(a) assistance: El Salvador received a total of $80 million during 1981-82; Honduras received $20 million in 1986; and Colombia received $65 million in 1989. Beginning in FY1990, up to an additional $75 million per year can be allocated for the purpose of combating the drug war in Latin America or for international disaster relief. This is known as Section 506(a)2. It follows the same notification procedures as the original Section 506(a) and is funded through Congressional appropriations; thus, here too, only if Congress specifically appropriates funds to reimburse DoD will the latter's costs for providing such assistance be recovered. For FY1990, the total amount allocated for Section 506(a)2 was $53.3 million. This was divided among the following countries as indicated: Belize ($0.5 million), Bolivia ($7.8 million), Colombia ($20 million), Ecuador ($3 million), Jamaica ($5 million), and Mexico ($17 million).

18 For more detailed information, see Ibid., pp. 4-17-18.
3. International Military Education and Training

The third major component of U.S. security assistance is the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. This program has provided education and training to military personnel from various foreign countries, primarily here in the United States, although occasionally these funds may be used abroad. Some of the principal aims of IMET have been to develop among the participants the ability to operate and maintain equipment purchased from the United States, to develop their own training capability, to improve their abilities to manage their own defense establishments, and to enhance our military-to-military relations with these countries. One obvious benefit is that these contacts can then provide the United States with greater access to foreign militaries and their governments more broadly. IMET is also a means for promoting democratization, improving professionalism within foreign militaries, and developing a better understanding of U.S. doctrine and technology as well as U.S. society in general. It can also be argued that as these students become familiar with U.S. equipment, the prospects for selling weapons systems to these countries (thereby providing U.S. defense industries with more orders) are enhanced.

Throughout its history, IMET has accounted for only a minute fraction of the total money spent on security assistance; at its peak in the mid-1980s, it amounted to about $55 million per annum. Proponents argue that it produces the greatest return on investment of all the security assistance programs. On the other hand, its critics charge that there is no mechanism in place to assess IMET’s actual results. For example, according to a study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in June 1990, neither the Department of Defense nor Department of State has developed a system for evaluating the IMET program’s success. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) evaluates the program by reporting the number of IMET graduates who have since attained prominent positions and by documenting inspections conducted by the Unified Commands, which are supposed to ensure that IMET graduates are placed in positions where they can use what they have learned.

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19 The preference is for IMET funds to be used in the United States since one of the aims of the program is to expose the students to U.S. society, our democratic process and principles, etc.

20 IMET funding is generally about $47 million per year, which is used to train some 5,000 people from approximately 100 countries. This has represented only about 1 percent of all security assistance funds.
learned. Such data by no means indicate how much the student has assimilated, how he has been influenced by what he has seen, and how (or whether) what he has learned is actually disseminated upon his return to his own country. Until such time as more effective evaluating criteria are established, some level of opposition to the program--particularly within the Congress--will certainly continue. Moreover, if DoD wishes to maintain support for IMET, more concerted and methodical efforts must be made to draw attention to the successes of this program; all too frequently it is the negative actions of those who have participated in IMET that receive the publicity. As discussed in Chapter IV of this report, actions are currently underway to expand the IMET program to include civilians; such actions only heighten the need for an effective review process. This section examines the program as it has functioned for military participants to date, while some suggestions for a review process are offered below.

Since IMET's peak in 1985, the number of students in this program has declined 20 percent worldwide. One thing that has remained constant for more than a decade, however, is that the Latin American countries have received approximately 20 percent of worldwide IMET funding each year. This and other trends are illustrated in Table III-5. The major recipient nations during this time have been El Salvador, Honduras, and Colombia. In addition, Table III-6, below, identifies the actual number of Central and South American students participating in IMET since FY1988. As this table makes clear, with the increased emphasis in counter-drug efforts, the numbers of students from Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador has been sizable. An exception to this trend is seen in the case of Peru, namely because of continuing problems surrounding assistance to Peru (both from the perspective of the Peruvian government and the U.S. Congress). Overall, the number of students from Latin America average more than 1,700 annually, with the estimate of significant increases in FY1991 and FY1992, both in terms of actual numbers of students and as a percentage of all students worldwide.

22 See Section El.
23 For example, as noted earlier, the failure of the Peruvian government to consistently repay its debt has caused the Brooke-Alexander sanction to be imposed, whereby IMET funding has been periodically suspended. From Peru's perspective, there has been resentment about the U.S. emphasis on military problems without (as it sees it) adequate attention being focused on the country's underlying economic problems. Peru argues that the latter must be addressed first and foremost, only then can the prospects for dealing with the former be improved.
### Table III-5. International Military Education and Training Program

**Budget Authority, Central and South America**

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</table>

**Regional Total as Percentage of Worldwide Total**

- 23% 24% 24% 24% 22% 21% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 21% 22% 21%


^aIncludes $7,000 to Nicaragua; 1979 was the last year it received IMET monies.
Table III-6. Number of Latin American Students Participating in IMET, FY1988-FY1992

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<td>79</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>56</td>
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<td>REGIONAL TOTAL</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>1,685</td>
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<td>2,729</td>
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<tr>
<td>WORLDWIDE TOTAL</td>
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<td>4,768</td>
<td>6,025</td>
<td>6,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLDWIDE TOTAL</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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The Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMS) program, which has encompassed the U.S. military schools located in Panama, has also received some IMET support to cover the operating expenses of these schools. However, since the Army's School of the Americas has been moved to Fort Benning and the Inter-American Air Force Academy has been moved to Homestead AFB, Florida, only the U.S. Navy's Small Craft Instruction and Training Team (SCIATT) remains in Panama, at the Rodman Naval Station. Once the Army and Air Force schools moved to CONUS, Congress mandated that their operating expenses were to be a line in their respective service budgets. Students attending these schools still use IMET funds to pay for tuition and other associated expenses, but these monies are reflected in the budgets for the individual countries, not under the funds allocated to PACAMS.

That part of the IMET program for which the U.S. Army is responsible is administered by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). It was stipulated in FY1989 that only those countries with a GNP per capita of less than $2,349 can receive...
grant-funded military education; countries exceeding this amount (such as Argentina and Venezuela) must pay for the transportation and living expenses of its students, which can certainly affect the countries' ability to participate in this program. At the same time, countries that do not exceed the per capita limit have the flexibility to decide whether to use IMET funds to cover their students' transportation and living expenses. For example, Colombia has opted to cover these expenses outside IMET funding, which therefore means more Colombian students are able to attend IMET programs. Honduras tried to do the same, although the government subsequently found that these expenses were simply too great to be absorbed by its defense monies.

The range of experiences that IMET can offer is quite diverse, seeking to target different populations for different purposes. Among the courses the IMET offers are: professional military training at U.S. War Colleges (such as the International Fellows Program), management training, technical and maintenance training, and flight training. One way for the U.S. military to foster a better understanding of civil-military relations among its Latin colleagues is to put even greater emphasis on the education (rather than training) aspects of this program. In other words, while equipment maintenance and troop training remain important subjects, issues such as resource management, legal and ethical aspects of command, and civilian oversight of national security affairs will require even more attention. The IMET experience also offers an important opportunity for participating military officers to discuss national security affairs, engaging both civilian and military personnel in these discussions. In so doing, they acquire the experience of participating in such discussions in a professional way, without seeing differing perspectives pilloried.

Finally, it should be noted that the Defense Security Assistance Agency must approve the use of IMET funds for certain types of training, for example in the case of training primarily for the purposes of civic action. This restriction reflects the concern of some people that military involvement in civic action activities (such as construction of public works and other efforts to develop a country's infrastructure) can undermine civilian authority, give the military legitimacy in performing tasks that should be executed by the civilian authorities. The other types of training which DSAA must approve on a case-by-case basis is laid out in U.S. Department of Defense, Security Assistance Management Manual, DOD5105.38-M, section 100102.
civilian government, and even provide the military with public relations benefits to the
detriment of public support for the civilian government.25

In a broader sense, while the technical knowledge taught in IMET courses is
important, there is an even more essential issue. Put simply, can the IMET programs
succeed in influencing the participants' values such that their future behavior will reflect
concern for the same basic priorities as the United States has (such as observation of
human rights)? Moreover, can IMET manage to influence the participants' attitudes in such
a way that they will be receptive to the U.S. point of view during the remainder of their
careers? The answers to these questions may largely determine the perceived success of
this program.

B. MEANS TO EXECUTE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

Having outlined the major security assistance programs in the previous section,
this section discusses several vehicles which the U.S. Government has available for
implementing these programs. In other words, using the funding available through FMS,
IMET, and other programs, the following teams are what are actually deployed to execute
some of these missions: Mobile Training Teams, Technical Assistance Teams, Technical
Assistance Field Teams, and Extended Training Service Specialists. These are each briefly
examined below.

1. Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Teams

Mobile Training Teams, or MTTs, are one of the more valuable resources available
to the U.S. Army for activities in the Latin American region. MTTs send DoD personnel
(military and civilian) on temporary duty for a maximum of 6 months in order to train
foreign personnel. Usually this training focuses on equipment that the host nation has
received from the United States, but more broadly speaking, MTTs can provide "medical
maintenance or technical assistance which meets specific training objectives in connection
with the development of a host country's capability, and which contributes to the host
nation's military professionalism and infrastructure."26 It is also possible to train foreign

25 These issues are addressed more fully below, in Chapter II, Section C2 and Chapter IV, Section B. A
discussion of possible problems in military involvement in civic action and the use of IMET funds is
also contained in General Accounting Office, Security Assistance: Observations on the International

26 U.S. Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation, p. 4-31.
personnel in the United States under MTTs if the training equipment used is owned or soon will be owned by the foreign country.27

Following a request from in-country, MTTs are handled by the Commanders in Chief (CINC)s, in conjunction with the various Services. Funding for MTTs comes from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, International Narcotics Matters (INM), or sometimes IMET. As a rule, teams funded through FMS have tended to comprise Special Forces, teachers, and instructors. Since the late 1980s, INM has provided funding for teams which, in many cases, have comprised Special Forces personnel. According to Klare and Kornbluth writing in 1988, 25 to 35 percent of all MTTs, especially those involved in counterinsurgency efforts, have comprised Special Forces;28 this trend has been replicated in those teams dedicated to counter-drug initiatives. If IMET funds are used, the approval of the Defense Security Assistance Agency is required. IMET is the most infrequently used funding source for MTTs since most are conducted outside CONUS and one of the objectives of IMET is to expose foreign citizens to U.S. values and society.

Some specific examples of MTTs follow: In connection with U.S. counter-drug efforts, Section 506(a) funds were used by DoD to have U.S. military personnel train Colombian military personnel. In this case, 12 MTTs, lasting approximately 4 months, were used to train Colombian military units in logistics, tactics, aircraft maintenance, weapons, and military operations. Another eight MTTs provided training in operations and maintenance of aircraft and logistics.29 In terms of overall efforts in Latin America, in the early 1980s almost all MTTs were conducted in Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Since then, El Salvador has remained a large recipient, but MTTs have also begun to focus on Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. The latter countries are, of course, where mainly INM-funded MTTs would be sent.

A program quite similar to MTTs is the Technical Assistance Team (TAT) effort. The procedures for requesting TATs, their funding sources, and their duration (i.e., not more than 6 months) are the same as for MTTs. MTTs and TATs differ, however, in that TATs focus more on equipment and tend to focus on a particular problem. Hence,

27 Ibid.
28 Klare and Kornbluth, *Low-Intensity Warfare*, p. 84.
according to the DoD Security Assistance Management Manual, the purpose of TATs is "to place into operation, maintain, and repair equipment provided under FMS or GA programs."\textsuperscript{30}

All told, the majority of such efforts in Latin America are handled by MTTs. Thus, in 1990 and 1991 roughly three-quarters of the 70 to 75 teams sent to the SOUTHCOM region were MTTs. The remainder were TATs, TAFTs, and ETSSs. These latter two programs are discussed in the next section.

2. Technical Assistance Field Teams and Extended Training Service Specialists

The major difference between MTTs/TATs and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) and Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs) is that the latter two programs are designed to exceed 6 months in duration, and thus require a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) for the participating personnel. TAFTs and ETSSs are effectively the same thing; ETSSs were originally established only for use in El Salvador.

El Salvador remains, in fact, the recipient of many such teams. They have focused on issues such as training and infrastructure development. Colombia is now the other major participating country, with a particular emphasis on training personnel in the maintenance of helicopters.

C. U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

In addition to the major security assistance programs and the vehicles used to conduct them as discussed above, there are other funding sources which, although subject to their own limitations on use, can also help to maintain and enhance relations with military counterparts and civilians, frequently in the host country. Such programs include Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programs, Exercise Related Construction, Latin American Cooperation Fund, Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises, Deployment for Training, and the Personnel Exchange Program. Each of these programs is described below.

1. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

Activities conducted under Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), which is authorized under Title 10 of U.S. Code, have been particularly prevalent in the Latin American region, although the overall scope of the program remains quite limited. An official program and an office within OSD/International Security Affairs (ISA), called the Office for Humanitarian Assistance, were established for HCA in the mid-1980s. HCA activities fit into two general categories: medical and engineering projects. These projects include providing medical, dental, and veterinary clinics as well as building and repairing schools, health clinics, wells, bridges, and roads. It is a statutory limitation that HCA projects be carried out in conjunction with authorized U.S. military operations and that they promote the security interests of both the United States and the host nation as well as the operational readiness skills of the participants. In addition, HCA cannot be given directly or indirectly to any individual or group involved in military or paramilitary activities.

The Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization Act stipulated that the total monies spent on HCA for FY1987 through FY1991 could not exceed $16.4 million; this small sum of money again illustrates the limited nature and scope of the program. Since its inception in FY1987, SOUTHCOM has consistently received more than 50 percent of all HCA monies available, as illustrated in Figure III-1. Thus, for example, of the total HCA funding of $4.24 million for FY1990, SOUTHCOM received $2.32 million. During this same year, more than 18,000 active, reserve, and national guard personnel from all Services participated in HCA activities worldwide.

Within Latin America, the main recipient country has been Honduras, although its share has decreased over time as the military situation in Nicaragua has eased. During FY1988, the first full year of funding, Honduras received 85 percent of all HCA funds appropriated to SOUTHCOM. In the following two years, this percentage declined to 54 and then 33 percent, respectively. As Honduras' share has declined, Bolivia and Panama have received more of this funding, so that in FY1990, Bolivia's share had reached 21 percent and Panama's (following Operation Just Cause) came to 20 percent. In terms of the types of HCA activities performed, both the amount of money ($1 million annually) and the number of projects (about 30) performed related to medical activities has remained fairly

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31 Civic action activities (especially by the host nation militaries) were popular in the 1960s and have seen a certain resurgence since the mid-1980s.
constant. Engineering projects, in contrast, have been on the increase, particularly in Honduras and Panama during FY1990 and 1991. Thus, whereas engineering projects accounted for less than $400,000 of SOUTHCOM’s HCA funds in FY1988, they exceeded $1.7 million in FY1991. Similarly, the number of projects has increased from approximately 40 per year to over 200.\textsuperscript{32} These trends for the medical and engineering projects are depicted in Figures III-2 and III-3.

It is SOUTHCOM’s policy that every unit in its theater will have some HCA experience. But there are certain requirements to be met in order to achieve this objective. One of the statutory limitations of HCA funds is that they cannot be spent unless the U.S.

\textsuperscript{32} Information derived from Action Memorandum, FY1988 and FY1989 Annual Report to Congress on Title 10 Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (HCA), and Memorandum for OSD-ISA from U.S. Southern Command on FY1990 After Action report for Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.
troops are in the given country in some other capacity. Thus, HCA monies are spent strictly on the materials used for the HCA projects; they do not cover troop costs such as transportation, salaries, or TDY expenses. These restrictions mean that HCA is linked up with other sources of funding. One example is the link with Exercise Related Construction
(ERC) projects, particularly in the case of engineering HCA activities. Thus, U.S. personnel sent to the region under the overall Joint Staff exercise budget would undertake, in addition to their ERC project, an HCA project such as building a well or helping to construct a bridge for the host nation. There are similar linkages between HCA and single-Service Deployment for Training (DFT) and Overseas Deployment for Training (ODT). Since the inception of this program in FY1987, there have been HCA projects conducted in conjunction with annual exercises such as *Fuertes Caminos, Fuerzas Unidas*, and *Ahuas Tara*.

Falling under the category of humanitarian assistance are two other programs that pertain to the Latin American region: DoD Excess Property and Denton Space Available Transportation. Daily execution and management of the Excess Property program is handled by the Office of Humanitarian Assistance. The purpose of the program is to allow non-lethal DoD excess property to be sent to foreign countries for humanitarian purposes. Typical items include clothing, food, medical equipment and supplies, and trucks. Generally, foreign countries originate requests, which are processed through the U.S. embassy in-country, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA and one of his subordinates, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Affairs, consider all requests and approve what property will be sent to which countries. The Secretary of State is then responsible for the distribution of the supplies. Over 40 nations worldwide have received assistance through this program.

Transportation of humanitarian assistance can be provided under the Denton Space Available Transportation program. This program supplies the means for delivering humanitarian goods (such as clothing, medical supplies, educational materials, and vehicles) from non-governmental sources to non-military groups within foreign countries at no cost to the donor. The major problem with the program is that it can be a time-intensive process. Once the donor applies to USAID and provides the information about the humanitarian goods available, USAID then obtains the approval of all parties involved (the recipient government, the U.S. embassy in-country, the State Department, etc.); this process alone can take a year or more. Once it has obtained the necessary approval, USAID then contacts the U.S. Air Force, instructing it to move the cargo when space

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33 See the next section for a discussion of Exercise Related Construction.
34 These programs are discussed in Section C5, below.
becomes available. Particularly if the cargo is not located near a busy military transportation area, the shipping process can consume considerable additional time.

The Denton program was first enacted in FY1985; at that time, it pertained only to Central America. The following year, however, it was broadened to encompass the entire world. During the first 3 years of operation, more than 2 million pounds of cargo, of which more than 80 percent was clothing and medical and pharmaceutical supplies, were lifted; most went to Central America.

2. Exercise Related Construction

Exercise Related Construction (ERC) funds are used for minor military construction projects; they can be used only in connection with Joint Staff exercises and each project must cost less than $1 million. In addition, equipment and supplies cannot be left behind after the completion of the project, and in cases where a structure was built, there must be a use agreement between the host nation and the United States.

ERC funds are frequently used for projects that cannot be planned far in advance. However, sometimes the project may actually be determined first, and the exercise is then developed around the project. According to the Joint Staff/J-4, which manages ERC, the primary objective of ERC is to support exercises (by enabling them to occur, reducing their cost, or enhancing their safety). Additional objectives that ERC frequently meets (but which are not required per se) are the training of troops (generally engineer troops) and the fostering of relations between the United States and other countries. It should be underscored that ERC funds are not foreign assistance monies, but construction monies. The purpose is to bring benefit to U.S. troops and their training capability. Some have expressed concern, however, that the decline in U.S. security assistance funds has sparked a greater interest in the use of ERC funds for helping to develop other countries’ infrastructures; those responsible for the program stress that the objective must remain the training benefit to U.S. troops.

ERC funding averages approximately $7 million per year, with roughly $4 million of that amount going to Latin America. Within this region, the key recipients have been

35 There are two kinds of Joint Staff exercises: JCS-coordinated, which are minor exercises involving forces from more than one CINC or agency, and JCS-directed, which are major exercises. Funding comes from J7 and the military departments. See also U.S. Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation, p. 4-34.
Honduras and Panama, although there is a recognized need to shift away from these countries as the nature of the threat in the region has changed. As noted above, ERC projects frequently are conducted in conjunction with HCA activities, an arrangement which allows more benefits to the host nation for little additional cost. This is precisely one of the ways to make the best use of limited resources.

3. Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund

The Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund (SALACF) program focuses on enhancing army-to-army relations through exchanges, familiarization visits to U.S. Army installations, and activities by army personnel from Latin American countries. The funds can be used to cover travel and per diem expenses as well as representational functions (such as hosting dinners for foreign visitors). The Air Force and Navy also have their own funds for similar programs. The SALACF program is run by the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (DAMO-SS) as Executive Agent for the Secretary of the Army; it has an average annual budget of $1 million.

The majority of SALACF program funds are dedicated to conducting Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) between U.S. Army and Latin American Army representatives in specific doctrinal areas. Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) International Army Programs Directorate manages the majority of SMEEs, directing execution by appropriate Army activities at the Department of Army level. The Judge Advocate General (DAJA) and The Surgeon General (DASG) have similar, albeit smaller, SMEE programs which have grown in popularity in recent years as human rights and military justice themes as well as medical/health issues have come to the forefront. At its peak, SMEE funding reached $800,000, but more recently it has averaged about $350,000 annually, with an average of 25 to 30 SMEEs directed by TRADOC annually. According to current projections, available resources (both funding and manpower) will make it possible to perform roughly 20 SMEEs annually. TRADOC-executed SMEEs ideally alternate between the United States and the various participating Latin American countries, which to date have largely focused on Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, and Guatemala.36 They must be held on a bilateral basis and must offer an exchange of information. The topics discussed can range from doctrine to training to organizational issues to equipment; in

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36 There is some concern about what countries will be able to be involved in future SMEEs. See Section E2, below.
short, the subject matter can address virtually anything relevant to the Army.\textsuperscript{37} The overwhelming majority of the time, SMEEs consist of three or four people (generally between the ranks of major and colonel) and last for 5 working days. In short, SMEEs have provided a valuable opportunity for working-level contacts with Latin American countries. SMEEs have been especially valuable in those instances when the countries receive either little or no U.S. security assistance as a way of maintaining contacts.

Also under Title 10, in addition to the Latin America Cooperation program, there are Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs managed by the individual Services. These funds, paid by the Secretary of Defense, can be used to cover the travel, subsistence, and other such expenses of defense personnel from developing countries so that they may attend bilateral or regional conferences and seminars, such as the Conference of the Chiefs of the American Armed Forces or the Honor Graduate Tour. The Secretary of Defense reports to Congress annually which countries have participated in these programs and how much the United States has spent in each.\textsuperscript{38}

4. Developing Countries in Combined Exercises Program

Another component of Title 10 funding is known as Developing Countries in Combined Exercises Program, or DCCEP. Under this program, a developing country's "incremental expenses," incurred as the direct result of participation in a bilateral or multilateral military exercise, are paid. The following criteria must be met, however: The exercise must primarily aim to enhance U.S. security interests, and the Secretary of Defense must determine that the country's participation is necessary in order to achieve the exercise's fundamental objectives and that these objectives cannot be achieved unless the United States pays for these expenses. Incremental expenses include such items as food, fuel, ammunition, and transportation, but exclude any pay, allowances, and other normal costs of the country's military personnel.\textsuperscript{39} Payments for DCCEP are made by the Secretary of Defense, following consultation with the Secretary of State. DCCEP funds may be used in connection with Joint Staff and Deployment for Training exercises.

\textsuperscript{37} SMEEs expressly exclude individual training as well as equipment and literature transfers. This, as well as the fact that there must be an exchange of information, distinguishes the program from security assistance.

\textsuperscript{38} For more detail, including restrictions on the use of these funds, see U.S. Southern Command, \textit{Inter-American Cooperation}, p. 4-54-55.

\textsuperscript{39} This is taken from ibid., p. 4-39.
5. Deployments for Training

Deployments for Training (DFTs) are, according to Field Manual 100-20, "an exercise conducted outside of CONUS due to the unique training value accrued to the exercising unit, usually resulting in collateral benefits to the host nation." Those on active duty participate in DFTs, while the program for the reserve component is called Overseas Deployments for Training (ODTs). All DFTs have the primary purpose of training U.S. forces (raising their combat readiness, training in a realistic environment, improving their ability to conduct unilateral or combined operations in the theater, etc.); any benefits to the host nation must be "strictly ancillary." DFTs also afford the United States access to countries which (for political and other reasons) could not support a larger, more enduring U.S. presence, thereby strengthening military-to-military ties which otherwise might not have been possible. DFTs largely differ from JCS-directed exercises in their duration (the latter generally last 5 to 6 months).

The specifics of a given DFT are obviously worked out with consideration to the particular country’s interests and needs. Thus, a request for a DFT goes through SOUTHCOM's J3 Exercise Division, which (along with J5) considers the political situation in the country and determines whether the request is consonant with the country team's objectives and with the legal requirements for deploying personnel. Ideally, DFTs have a long lead planning time in order to ensure maximum training benefit; the entire process takes roughly 2 years, with active coordination beginning at least 5 months before the deployment, although it is possible to shorten this process.

In terms of their structure, engineer DFTs, for example, have a 2-12 week duration and comprise some 20-150 personnel. On average, 10-12 DFTs and ODTs each are conducted annually, although in the last couple of years their budget has been reduced considerably. Thus, for fiscal year 1992, there are 5 engineer DFTs and 13 engineer ODTs.

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41 For simplicity's sake, this discussion will use the term DFTs, but is meant to refer to both DFTs and ODTs.
42 U.S. Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation, p. 4-29. See this document for additional discussion about these exercises.
43 U.S. Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation, pp. 4-29-30.
scheduled in the region.\textsuperscript{45} The majority are being conducted in Panama, but there are also ones scheduled in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Belize, Bolivia, and Peru. In addition, there are likely to be "increased tempo" DFTs, which are small in scale and have only about 60 days from the time of notification to get the personnel in place; it is anticipated that they will be largely conducted in conjunction with counter-drug efforts, primarily as a means of providing mitigating civic action.

In addition to engineering efforts, medical activities--known as Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (DENTRETEs)-- are also undertaken in Latin America.\textsuperscript{46} ODTs are an important personnel source for MEDRETEs; MEDRETEs are frequently performed in conjunction with exercises such as \textit{Fuerzas Unidas} and \textit{Fuertes Caminos}, and can be executed by either active or reserve components. On average, MEDRETEs last two weeks. As an illustration of where these exercises have been conducted recently, in FY1991, several ODT MEDRETEs were held in Guatemala, Bolivia, and Costa Rica. Army National Guard MEDRETEs for FY1992 include Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Argentina, and Belize, while the U.S. Army Reserve has scheduled MEDRETEs in Bolivia, Paraguay, Guyana, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. Not surprisingly, Panama also is a site for many MEDRETEs (since U.S. personnel and infrastructure support are already in place), held in connection with \textit{Fuertes Caminos} exercises, for example. One problem for MEDRETEs a the new requirement (as of February 1992) that all CONUS-based elements must now provide their own communication equipment, which will cause some short-term problems and will require long-term solutions.

6. Personnel Exchange Program

The Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) offers another way for enhancing military-to-military ties in Latin America. This is a U.S. Army Chief of Staff program, administered by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and run with the purpose of exposing foreign military officers to military operations in the United States, and U.S. officers to military operations in foreign countries. PEPs allow a sharing of

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. Of the DFTs, only 3 are from CONUS; most ODTs, except those in Panama, are tied in with DFTs.

\textsuperscript{46} For simplicity's sake, this discussion will use the term MEDRETEs but is meant to refer to DENTRETEs as well.
knowledge and experience, and can help to improve interoperability. PEP tours are 1 to 2 years in duration. Such programs offer one-for-one exchanges of military personnel, either officers (generally no higher than lieutenant colonel) or NCOs, to fill specific positions in the respective countries. The first Personnel Exchange Program was established with Mexico back in 1947. Since that time, the program has expanded to encompass more than 20 countries with approximately 130 positions worldwide (meaning there are slots for some 130 U.S. military personnel and the same number for foreign personnel).

To date, the PEP program has emphasized English-speaking countries, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (accounting for over half of all the positions). Current plans, however, call for the program's future orientation to focus more on non-English speaking countries. In light of this shift, a greater emphasis on the Latin American region will be a natural outgrowth, although it may still be expected that difficulties in English language capability will continue for many countries. The Latin American countries that currently have approved exchange programs and the number of positions available in each are as follows: Venezuela (5), Brazil (4), Colombia (3), Guatemala (1), Honduras (1), Mexico (1), Paraguay (1), and Peru (5). However, the Peru program is suspended at the present time due to security concerns related to the Sendero Luminoso unrest in Peru.

In establishing a PEP program, the Army Chief of Staff takes into account the advice of the State Department and the Country Team. A memorandum of agreement is worked out addressing the types of activities that the two countries want to enact, with many focusing on teaching at various military schools. Because this is an exchange program, there is little actual money involved (for example, the person's salary and benefits are still paid by his own country), and a country generally pays for extra costs if it requests additional services. In this regard, for some of the poorer Latin American countries a certain amount of flexibility is sometimes necessary to help cover such costs. For example, the host country may want the U.S. participant to travel elsewhere within the country to meet with other military personnel to share his knowledge, but it may not be able to afford the additional travel costs. If the U.S. Army determines the request to be worthwhile, the security assistance programs and the Secretary of the Army have some funds available to cover such expenses.

47 In other words, the person cannot have a supernumerary role.
Like the MTTs and other programs, PEPs provide a low-visibility, small-scale opportunity to broaden and deepen contacts between the U.S. and Latin armies and, through these working-level contacts, can help to strengthen the development of militaries in Latin America that will support democratic processes. They also provide a valuable means for developing cultural awareness and sensitivities, an increasingly important benefit in today's environment. Yet while the PEP program certainly does not appear in jeopardy of disappearing, the State Department's push to reduce slots in embassies abroad for financial reasons tends to put PEP (and Foreign Area Officer) positions at greater risk. Because these personnel are more frequently out among the people (serving as an instructor at an academy for instance) and are therefore not so visible at the country team table, there is a concern that they will likely be more vulnerable to such embassy cuts. Yet these are exactly the personnel who can provide great benefits--both to the host country in imparting knowledge as well as to the U.S. government in developing a deeper understanding of the country, its society, and the overall atmosphere. Indeed, this is the type of Army activity that should be stressed more rather than less. Finally, it should be noted that PEP positions for instructors provide another valuable opportunity for U.S. Army officers to include some discussions about democratic values, civil-military relations, human rights, etc. To ensure that this is done, they should receive training in these areas and, in fact, be required to incorporate such discussions into their instruction.

D. CONNECTIONS AMONG PROGRAMS

In the preceding sections, this chapter has examined a variety of U.S. programs operating in the Latin American region. Recognizing the diversity of these efforts, it is worth trying to identify where some of the programs might be able to work together and where resources can (or should) be coordinated. Such efforts are obviously all the more important today with probable declines in all types of funding.

The programs most frequently linked with other efforts, and ones that must do so by current definition of these programs, are HCA activities and the Developing Countries in Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) funding authority. As noted earlier, legislative restrictions require that HCA projects be conducted in conjunction with an authorized

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48 As noted previously, DCCEP is a funding authority under Title 10 that allows the Secretary of Defense to pay the incremental expenses of a developing country incurred as a direct result of participation in a bilateral or multilateral exercise.
military operation; thus, they are joined up with exercises in the region. Concomitantly, there is frequently a link with ERC funds used during Joint Staff exercises as well as with single-Service Deployments for Training (DFT) and the reserve equivalent, Overseas Deployments for Training (ODT). Similarly, the DCCEP funding authority is naturally combined with ERC, DFT, and ODT programs.

Other program linkages that have also been noted are connections in the sense that certain programs do not have their own funding source as such. Rather, they must rely on funding from other programs. For example, MTTs are implemented through the use of FMS programs, INM or, occasionally, IMET monies. Similarly, the way in which Excess Defense Articles can be distributed to foreign countries is either through sales under the Foreign Military Sales program or through transfers under Sections 516-519 of Title 22.

Aside from these connections, many of the other programs outlined above preclude greater cooperation among themselves, largely because of the way they have been structured. Thus, for example, DoD Excess Property cannot be transported under the Denton Space Available program because the latter stipulates that the goods must be from a non-government source.

Some useful ad hoc arrangements have emerged among programs run by different U.S. Government agencies. For example, IMET programs have worked together with programs sponsored by the United States Information Agency (USIA), particularly in the area of counter-drug initiatives. Nevertheless, it should be noted that such cooperation continues to be on an ad hoc rather than formalized basis. But given the reality of declining resources, more such cooperation—whether ad hoc or formalized—is to be encouraged.

Finally, a slightly different way of examining this issue is to identify what funding sources are available for a particular effort. Because of the priority it currently receives and the diversity of funds available, it is useful to look at this question as it relates to the counter-drug effort. There are, of course, a diversity of funds available through the Department of Justice (including the Drug Enforcement Administration), Department of Transportation, USAID (including the Andean Narcotics Initiative, which comes from the Economic Support Fund), and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) for international counter-drug programs. In terms of DoD programs, the 1991 National Drug Control Strategy indicates that for interdiction and other activities as well as international efforts via the 506(a) and Excess Defense Articles programs, DoD's
counter-drug monies totaled almost $800 million for 1990 and projected more than $1.1 billion for 1991 and 1992 each.\textsuperscript{49} This still does not identify all possible sources of DoD funding, however. For example, there are also security assistance programs for individual countries, a part of the State Department's INM funds, MTTs, PEPs, etc. In short, the possible sources for counter-drug efforts are numerous and varied.

E. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THESE PROGRAMS

This overview of U.S. security-related programs in Latin America would not be complete without a brief discussion of the future prospects for some of these programs. This discussion is not necessarily comprehensive, but it does identify the main trends and some of the more significant changes and challenges in three of these programs: International Military Education and Training, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, and Mobile Training Teams.

1. IMET

The IMET program seeks to provide the environment and opportunity for participants from other nations to be exposed to democratic values and ideas here in the United States. In this connection, it also aims to develop a better appreciation for effective civil-military relations (particularly for participants from both the Latin American and East European regions). The challenge, of course, lies in trying to determine how to ensure that the program best meets its objective of having these values assimilated. We certainly do not want to indoctrinate participants or use heavy-handed approaches, but neither can we assume that the students will simply assimilate these ideas automatically. Both faculty and U.S. students in these programs should be made expressly aware of their own responsibility in showing how the U.S. system works. As for the IMET participants themselves, efforts are already underway to place greater emphasis on more junior-level officers, the reasoning being that they would tend to be more receptive to new ways of thinking. Even so, most would agree that changing attitudes on such complex matters will take even more than one generation to accomplish.\textsuperscript{50}


\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, Richard Millet questions whether even this is likely. He argues: "There remains, of course, the possibility that intensive training of junior officers may, over time, alter institutional attitudes. In theory, this is possible, but in practice, it is problematical." Millet, "The Limits of Influence: The
Despite certain recognized inadequacies of the IMET system as it currently operates, the fact remains that it offers an expedient, low-cost, and low-visibility means for meeting U.S. security objectives in the region. Indeed, as Gabriel Marcella and Gen. (Ret.) Fred Woerner have argued, IMET should be made the central component of U.S. strategy in this region; furthermore, care must be taken not to allow counter-drug efforts to overtake and overshadow IMET efforts.51

The final point that should be made in examining IMET's future prospects (in addition to its expansion to include civilians, as discussed below in Chapter IV) is the need for better evaluation procedures. The inclusion of civilians in the IMET program is a positive step and one that can prove quite useful as many Latin American countries redefine the civil-military relationship. It appears that from Congress' perspective, the key gauge of IMET's success in the immediate term will lie in how many civilians participate in the program. But in light of this expansion, the creation of a more effective and--perhaps more important--mutually acceptable evaluation procedure for IMET becomes all the more vital. Critics have long contended that little is done to ensure that IMET participants actually use the training and experience they receive through the program. This argument is countered by the fact that U.S. insistence on tracking former IMET personnel would be seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of the participating nations. Because this program has considerable potential in its ability to advance military and civilian thinking on security affairs, an active effort should be made to address these concerns.

This study therefore suggests that an interagency group--including representatives from Congressional staffs--be established to first identify the appropriate criteria for evaluating the IMET program. How should its "success" or "failure" be measured? How can the utility of the training and education received be assessed? How can the overall impact of IMET be appraised? Is this impact meeting U.S. objectives? Is the type of instruction provided appropriate to the needs of the participants? These issues, among others, would need to be addressed. Following agreement on the criteria to be used, the group would also have to determine how this evaluation would be carried out, and


particularly, determine who would be responsible. Tasking the individual embassies with this responsibility would seem to put too much additional pressure on resources already being strained and cut, although their inputs would obviously be necessary. Should it be the Department of Defense, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, or the Government Accounting Office that assumes responsibility? Would the necessary levels of cooperation be provided by the other appropriate agencies? Should a nongovernmental agency be entrusted with the responsibility? An argument could be made that a nongovernmental agency could offer independent and objective assessments, although cooperation from all government agencies would have to be ensured. Such a solution would also reduce the demand on already strained personnel resources in U.S. Government agencies.

These are all issues that the interagency group would need to address. While these will undoubtedly be difficult matters on which to reach agreement, such efforts are increasingly necessary in order to maintain broad-based support for continuing, or even further expanding, the IMET program. If new evaluation criteria could be established and enforced, this information could then be used as part of overall U.S. criteria for determining the extent to which a country would be allowed to participate in IMET programs. This could help ensure that U.S. monies are spent most effectively.

2. SMEEs

As noted earlier in this paper, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, or SMEEs, have been a valuable tool for the U.S. Army in its relations with certain South and Central American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Venezuela. Exchanges with them offer opportunities for acquiring valuable insights into their thinking and for discussing U.S. and Latin approaches to common problems. In all cases, SMEEs have offered a unique means for bilateral military-to-military contacts with those countries with whom the U.S. Army probably would not otherwise have such opportunities.

Within the Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund (SALACF), the DAMO-SS is responsible for providing funds as well as for establishing SMEE policy guidelines. It is the responsibility of TRADOC, DAJA, and DASG to develop and execute their programs. They use the Army International Activities Plan as a guideline for determining what countries and what activities to emphasize.
As it presently stands, SMEEs are no longer earmarked to particular countries (as they had been to Argentina, Chile, etc.). Instead, SMEEs are now open to all countries in the region. During the selection process, it is the responsibility of those requesting a SMEE to explain how it would contribute to the country team/SOUTHCOM goals and objectives; indeed, a SMEE's linkage to these goals and objectives is an increasingly important criteria when decisions are being made about which SMEEs will be conducted.

Once the recipient countries and the types of SMEE programs have been selected, if additional requests for SMEEs are received, TRADOC asks SOUTHCOM/U.S. Army South and Department of the Army for guidance on priorities. If the latter decide to approve the additional request(s), they also must determine which of the previously approved requests will no longer be executed.

In prioritizing the recipient list, it is important to consider longer range U.S. objectives in the area, ones that go beyond the counter-drug mission. In other words, it can be argued that the marginal benefit a SMEE can offer is much greater for Argentina and Chile than for Colombia and Peru. Related to this point is the idea that the U.S. Army should do its utmost to diversify contacts in the Latin American region (recognizing of course that SMEEs and other activities can be conducted only in countries which wish to have such contacts). Every effort should be made to give priority to those countries with whom the Army has few, if any, other bilateral contacts. In short, the Latin American Cooperation fund (and its major component, SMEEs) have provided an important balance to the counter-drug role, a balance that should continue in the future.

3. MTTs and Similar Efforts

In assessing the future prospects of MTTs (and similar programs--TATs, TAFTs, and ETSSs), one issue that has been raised relates to their actual implementation. As was the case during the 1960s, despite their utility and benefits, MTTs sometimes place more emphasis on completing the project than on ensuring that it has the best possible effects on the local population. This problem can be exacerbated by the continuing U.S. intra-governmental lack of cooperation.

In addition, while there is a consensus that MTTs offer a cost-effective way of helping to instruct Latin American militaries in useful areas, those MTTs performed by

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52 This lack of cooperation is discussed more fully in Clark and Christenson, Resources and Constraints.
instructors will be more difficult to conduct as the Army's manpower and overall budget are reduced. It is anticipated that training installations--where these instructors are permanently stationed--will certainly see their resources cut significantly. Thus, if an instructor is sent abroad on an MTT, the question becomes who will be available to teach the courses for which he is responsible. In light of these constraints, it may become increasingly necessary to bring one or two students from the given country to CONUS to attend the course here. The disadvantages and difficulties involved in such a solution are several. First, it would likely require more security assistance monies (funds which are almost assuredly going to be reduced from existing levels) since the costs would be higher, especially if more than one student were sent. Second, the number of students exposed to the course would necessarily be much fewer. And finally, language capability would likely be a greater factor because the U.S. instructor would not be able to tailor the course to the given country's interests and the student's particular capabilities. However, in light of shrinking resources, this solution would at least continue to provide some useful training and educational benefits.

The prospects for other types of MTTs, primarily performed by Special Operations Forces (SOF), are brighter. In today's environment, it is such forces that should be high on the priority list to maintain. Their availability to fulfill such missions should therefore be fairly well safeguarded; moreover, as of 1992 all SOF (Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP) have a mission to train host nation forces. The availability of funding will be largely dependent on the extent of Congressional interest in having the military continue in counter-drug efforts (since many of the MTTs conducted by SOFs are focused on this mission).
IV. FUTURE ROLES FOR THE U.S. ARMY

The U.S. Army has an important and unique role to play in Latin America, particularly in light of the central position that the Latin armies have historically had in their countries. The U.S. Army has long-standing ties with its counterparts in the region, which can provide a very useful tool for U.S. policy interests in general. For example, these military-to-military ties have helped to broaden overall bilateral diplomatic relations, sometimes even by providing an initial communication channel between the respective governments. Obviously these relations were especially important during military rule in these countries, but they continue to provide a vital link today as well.

In the current environment, the central issue lies not in trying to identify new roles for the U.S. Army to play; ample consideration has already been given to this matter. Rather, the focus must be on prioritizing among the various possible roles and taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each activity. The two most important points to underscore here are, first, that while the Army should certainly pursue activities in Latin America, it should not and does not want to play the lead role. That responsibility lies with the Ambassador and other civilian agencies because it is vital that U.S. behavior demonstrate our military's commitment to democratization and civilian authority. This point of view is firmly supported by both civilian and military analysts and is underscored in current Army policy. Second, U.S. Army activities should focus on low-visibility, small-scale efforts. The importance of maintaining a low profile clearly coincides with the desire to reinforce civilian institutions and the democratic process; it also recognizes the sensitivity that many countries in the region have about allowing a visible U.S. presence, especially from a military standpoint. Programs such as MTTs, PEPs, and SMEEs are some of the tools for carrying out these efforts.

1 For example, Bolivia and Venezuela have been quite sensitive about a U.S. presence, although these concerns now seem to be subsiding somewhat. In contrast, Peru remains highly sensitive to U.S. forces.
Related to this last point is the widely accepted idea that what the Latin region needs most from the U.S. Army are individual trainers, engineers, and other specialists who can act as advisers on technical and planning matters, while actual implementation is to be left to the host nation. Such efforts are not confined to purely "military" issues, however. For example, U.S. Army medical experts can provide useful expertise in the area of medical care, as can judge advocates who are currently working to help some countries (such as Peru) implement a comprehensive human rights program. In short, the focus should be on the institutional relationship, which can be of assistance as the Latin militaries define their new roles, downsize their active forces, adjust to budgetary cuts, etc.

Within this framework the U.S. Army should continue to structure its program in Latin America to meet such fundamental objectives as establishing and reinforcing overall support for democratization, improving the Latin militaries' support for democracy and civilian rule, and influencing their attitudes toward human rights. These kinds of objectives can be best accomplished through an emphasis on personal contacts and assistance, not through an emphasis on high-technology equipment sales and transfers. In this connection, a former head of SOUTHCOM, Gen. (Ret.) Fred Woerner, identifies what he calls the "triad of professionalism" for the Latin American militaries: legitimacy in the cultural context, technical capability, and level of resources. He argues that the U.S. focus should be on the legitimacy aspect, but traditionally the emphasis has been on the latter two aspects. In working toward such legitimacy, he argues, IMET should become the major security assistance program with a focus more on education than training, while arms sales and grants should be de-emphasized and used only selectively. This reasoning is largely in line with analysis done by TRADOC on using U.S. resources in a low-intensity conflict environment. It notes that excessive aid can actually encourage instability, overwhelm the economy, and even weaken the government's ties with the people.

There is no doubt that certain U.S. actions in the region have been detrimental to broader U.S. interests and have heightened certain regional concerns. The long-standing image of the United States as an interventionist force and Latin sensitivities about this capability, which were only reinforced by Operation Just Cause in Panama, persist in the

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minds of many. The lesson to be learned from Just Cause and previous military interventions in the region is that force and coercive diplomacy "are not the way to build policy consensus between the United States and Latin America."4 Another concern about the traditional U.S. approach to Latin America is the tendency to focus on only one issue and/or country. In the 1980s, the focus was on Nicaragua and El Salvador; today the focus is on the drug war. By narrowing the focus so much, U.S. interests ultimately suffer. For the Army's part, while it clearly must follow general U.S. policy guidelines, it should make serious efforts to ensure that its Army-specific programs concentrate on a range of countries and activities. For example, SMEEs and PEPs can be particularly helpful in countries that have little other contact with the U.S. Army. The value added by these small programs can be so much greater in such countries than in countries where extensive U.S. programs are already operating.

Opposition to many of the roles the U.S. Army has undertaken (or has been told to undertake) in Latin America also needs to be mentioned. The main controversy stems from the U.S. focus on internal security issues. For example, Augusto Varas believes:

The United States should abandon the idea of using military means to solve problems such as narcotics trafficking or terrorism. Similarly, the use of techniques for low-intensity conflicts or covert operations should be replaced by economic and social policies aimed at the roots of the social problems from which regional armed tensions, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism stem. The effects of these problems should be controlled by police actions, rather than by military actions, which tend to reproduce the phenomena on a larger scale, rather than by checking them. This type of confusion erodes inter-American military relations. . . . The military linkages should be democratized through renouncement of the use of force as a means for solving internal conflicts.5

While all may not share this perspective, it does represent a significant body of thinking on these issues, and the U.S. government, as well as the Army, must be prepared for these arguments.6 The rebuttal to this line of thinking is that when an insurgent threat is sufficient to be able to destroy a given country's government, the threat has then exceeded police capabilities.

5 Varas in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 213.
6 This is addressed more fully in Section C, below, on counter-drug activities.

IV-3
In short, the U.S. Army does have a role to play in the Latin American region, but reservations such as those Varas raises as well as ideas about keeping the presence to a minimum must be kept in mind during the planning process. Another vital decision to be made as plans are implemented is where to focus Army efforts. As already noted, every effort should be made to avoid overemphasizing only countries involved in counter-drug activities. A broader question is whether to focus primarily on the least developed countries (such as Peru and Bolivia) or on the stronger countries (such as Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela), reasoning that contacts with the latter will eventually affect the former as well. Indeed, this approach could actually help to foster greater regional cooperation, which would ultimately allow the United States to take a more secondary role in shaping regional dynamics.

Finally, it must also be noted that in today's environment of declining personnel and budgetary resources, the Army's ability to market its ideas and explain the reasons why its programs are vital must be finely honed, particularly when the arguments must be made on Capitol Hill. Without the Cold War justification, greater emphasis must be placed on the Army's unique ability to assist on a low level as the Latin militaries continue to make their transitions under civilian rule. It is also important to be able to cite concrete results from previous Army projects (results that another organization could not have accomplished), rather than to rely on the argument that they provided very useful training opportunities, for example. The more information that the Army leadership has at its fingertips about the positive effects it has in the region, the more likely support will be forthcoming from other segments of the U.S. Government. In addition, SOUTHCOM has traditionally depended on both part-time active duty and reserve forces to meet many of its requirements, and even greater attention is being focused today on the latter component. The reserves are particularly strong in areas applicable to SOUTHCOM activities such as medical capabilities, civil affairs, transportation and intelligence support; indeed, 98 percent of the civil affairs units are in the reserve component. The use of U.S. reserve components in Latin America has a real positive value in terms of demonstrating the

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7 According to one estimate, reserve annual deployments to the region double the in-theater strength. See LTC Joseph L. Luckett, "Reserve Component Overseas Deployment Training," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2 April 1990, p. 11.

concept of the citizen-soldier and the ability to bring their civilian skills into play as well. This will be perceived positively both within the U.S. Congress and in the host nations.

A. U.S. ARMY PEACETIME ACTIVITIES

There are a number of peacetime activities in which the U.S. Army can engage in the Latin American region, ones that can seek to address some of the underlying and fundamental problems confronting these countries. In turn, these efforts may help to promote greater political stability in the region. This paper will examine several such activities, namely: civic action activities, counter-drug missions, disaster relief and environmental issues, and civil-military relations.

Within the overall context of these efforts, DoD efforts are clearly subsumed under the State Department’s general programs so that DoD capabilities are offered in support of these programs. It is reasoned that the U.S. military—and here the U.S. Army has played the primary role—has unique planning, organizational, and technological capabilities at its disposal that can be of considerable benefit in such activities. A continuing problem is that the State Department has sometimes proved unwilling (or uninterested) in tapping the potential that DoD has to offer in this arena.

Within the Latin American region, the U.S. Army obviously has a unique relationship with its counterparts which can be brought to bear in performing these actions. Among other things, the U.S. Army has ability to help educate host country institutions, train host country personnel, provide equipment, and help develop the given country’s infrastructure plans. Nevertheless, the idea of encouraging Latin militaries to assume certain roles—such as civic action and counter-drug missions—raises additional concerns, which are addressed below as well as in the section on Latin American militaries’ possible roles.9

B. CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES

The idea of civic action activities by the U.S. military is not new, nor is the controversy surrounding it.10 This idea derived from the Government’s desire to have a

9 See Chapter III, Section C2, and Section B2 of the present chapter.
network of bases in foreign countries; civic action was seen as a way of fostering good will, which would then allow this objective to be accomplished. The kinds of negative experiences associated with these efforts, particularly during the Vietnam War, continue to affect the debate about the military's involvement today. In Latin America, a region where low intensity conflict is seen to be the primary threat, civic action is seen as an important means to counter insurgency movements and hence to help develop the infrastructure for democracies to be able to survive. It has been written both in the 1960s and 1990s that "while counterinsurgency cannot succeed through civic action alone, neither can it be lastingly successful without it." The challenge today lies in ensuring that these efforts are all coordinated among the various U.S. government components (USAID, military agencies, State Department, etc.) in-country and in Washington as well as among the various host nation agencies (their civilian government, the military, local community members, etc.). Many of the participants in this process recognize this challenge and are actively striving to meet it. If such a coordinated approach can be implemented consistently, the level of opposition to U.S. military involvement could decrease.

It should be noted that two types of civic action can be distinguished: mitigating civic action which offsets the negative consequences of other U.S. activities in the area and developmental civic action. Mitigating civic action would occur in cases such as when U.S. training operations might damage an area's roads, bridges, or other infrastructure components, as in Panama as a result of Operation Just Cause. Also falling under this category would be assistance efforts undertaken in an attempt to offset the negative consequences of other military actions, for example counter-drug operations. Developmental civic action encompasses the other medical and engineering activities undertaken to help improve the infrastructure and general well-being of the population in the host country. Thus, ideally mitigating civic action would have a developmental

12 Some programs, of course, require such coordination. For example, HCA activities cannot be conducted unless the Secretary of State specifically approves the provision of such assistance.
13 There remains, however, a reluctance—particularly by USAID—to coordinate fully with U.S. military personnel in these efforts, although it is required under Title 10. The degree of cooperation is also dependent on individual staffs within the given U.S. embassies.
component, while developmental civic action should always seek to mitigate the negative effects of other activities.

The U.S. Army is able to undertake civic action efforts in conjunction with exercises and training activities. For example, under the Exercise Related Construction program, engineers can construct and repair roads, bridges, public facilities and the like during JCS exercises, as long as these efforts are done for the express purpose of allowing U.S. forces to be able to execute their mission. The same kinds of activities can be done during DFT and ODT exercises as well.\(^\text{15}\)

In addition, the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program, established in the mid-1980s, provides another important tool for carrying out civic action efforts; it has also been one means of helping to alleviate the decline in foreign and security assistance funds. According to current legislative statutes, HCA must be conducted in conjunction with an authorized military operation; thus, it is frequently combined with ERC or DFT/ODT efforts. It is also required that HCA projects promote the security interests of both the United States and the host nation as well as the operational readiness skills of the participants.\(^\text{16}\) HCA activities include: medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities (such as schools, health clinics, and gyms).

Historically, medical civic action has proven less controversial than engineering activities, mainly for the obvious reason that constructed roads and facilities could ultimately be used for some other purpose, while inoculations and medical exams would not be motivated by some hidden agenda. Generally speaking, the question of military involvement in civic action activities has proven quite divisive.\(^\text{17}\) DoD has long recognized concerns about an expanded military role in this area, as well as concerns within other

\(^{15}\) Construction costing less than $300,000 for exercises not directed by JCS (such as single-Service exercises) can be taken from the O&M account. This provision can apply to JCS exercises only if they subsequently tear down what was built.

\(^{16}\) Other restrictions on HCA activities are outlined in the Second Annual Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Conference, February 1988, Command briefing and legislative authorities.

\(^{17}\) Regina Gaillard has offered another suggestion with regard to civic action activities. She argues that a Development Corps comprised of U.S. civilians could be created for such tasks. They could then be put under contract to various Third World governments. Part of these countries' international debt could then be exchanged by allowing the Corps to carry out its training in the given country.
government agencies (namely State and AID) about military involvement in what the latter consider to be their purview. In this connection, one component of civic action—the HCA program—has had statutory limitations placed on the total amount of money that can be spent on its activities worldwide ($16.4 million over 5 years) and on the ways in which the funds can be used. Moreover, this program requires cooperation and coordination of the various agencies. Nevertheless, interviews conducted for this project indicate that there are quite a few military officers as well as U.S. civilian analysts and officials who voice concerns about the military's involvement in many of these efforts, primarily because they question the long-term utility of much of what is done.

In order to explore these concerns more fully, this section will first examine the types of civic action projects that have been implemented in Latin America in recent years. It will then identify some of the primary aims of these activities as well as some of the problems that have traditionally been associated with them. The section concludes with a discussion of the specific advantages and disadvantages of U.S. military participation in civic action efforts and, based on these factors, offers suggestions about possible changes in the approach to civic action.

1. Current Efforts

Honduras was the primary recipient of HCA at the outset of this DoD program, and it still is a major participant. Bolivia and Panama have since also become key participants, while Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Guyana have participated to a lesser degree. Of course, since HCA must be combined with military operations, there are certain constraints on the countries and areas in which it will be conducted. In addition, some of the Latin countries—such as Venezuela and Brazil—already have well developed capabilities in civic action activities and are not in need of U.S. efforts along these lines. The trend away from the focus on Honduras (following the resolution of the military conflict in Nicaragua) is a positive one. Once the mitigating civic action projects in Panama are completed, a more equitable distribution of projects among participating countries could be envisioned.

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18 For example, as explained earlier, HCA funds cannot be spent unless the U.S. troops are in the particular country in some other capacity.

19 At times the following countries have also had some HCA projects: Paraguay, Peru, Belize, Colombia, Uruguay, and Chile. All told in the SOUTHCOM region, there have been about 70 annual

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IV-8
Sensitivity to the desires and priorities of the host nations are obviously a consideration in performing these missions. There have been cases where U.S. personnel have faced considerable negative publicity prior to civic action activities. One case in point is Bolivia, some of whose politicians (notably those of the Left) were particularly suspicious of these activities, but by keeping a low profile and performing the promised projects, the U.S. Army was able to overcome this negative attitude. In the case of medical training exercises conducted in Guatemala, the Army coordinated closely with the host nation military as well as with the civilian government so that all parties were in agreement about the frequency of the activities, the number of personnel involved, etc. Participants judged that such coordination provided an all-around positive experience. But despite these and similar successes, concerns have been voiced that the needs of the local population have certainly not always been sufficiently considered. There are countless anecdotes about roads being overgrown by the jungle within months and of local people being unable to maintain the facilities that are constructed, etc. While a memorandum of agreement is always signed by the United States and the host nation outlining the requisite responsibilities, in some cases the host government proves unwilling or unable to perform the required maintenance and repairs. The United States has often found it difficult to influence these efforts, especially when there has been a change in administration. Moreover, on many occasions the problem may lie first and foremost with an inadequate degree of coordination between the host nation’s central government and that of the local population. As long as these problems persist, there will continue to be criticism of these U.S. Army activities, even though it may have done everything in its power to ensure a successful completion and follow-through on a given project.

A final point to be made relates to the kinds of resources used to perform civic action tasks. It is fair to say that virtually all components of the Army take part, but the primary participants are from the reserve component (both U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard), especially those with medical, engineering, and civil affairs expertise. In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) has been interested in these activities.20

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20 The head of the Army Corps of Engineers established a special cell within the Corps about 2 years ago to deal with the Army staff on nation assistance activities, including civic action projects.

HCA projects for FY 1988-1990; in FY 1991, the number rose appreciably to almost 270. For more detail on the numbers and types of projects, see Chapter III, Section C1.
Traditionally, the Corps has been very constrained overseas because it does not operate independently and, because its expenses must be fully reimbursable (including salaries), its services tend to be quite expensive. These costs would either have to be paid by the host nation (unlikely in the case of Latin American countries) or through U.S. government funding (such as FMS or JCS exercises). But ACE has now developed a three-phased approach to its role, the first of which entails only a modest cost. This first phase involves sending in a team of three to five people to assess a problem that the Ambassador or SOUTHCOM has identified. The assessment, in the form of a small report, suggests what would need to be done to solve the problem (such as flooding or water resource management). This phase is not terribly expensive and represents an excellent way of using the most capable resources available without obligating the use of the Corps for implementation of the project. The second phase entails making the decision about whether to proceed and, if so, who will be tasked. The third phase is the actual execution of the mission.

2. Civic Action Objectives and Traditional Problems

Civic action has the basic objectives of supporting a host nation's development and promoting regional stability. In doing so, it is necessary to render support to the civilian governments in light of U.S. interests in encouraging the strengthening of democratization and an evolution of more effective civil-military relations. Coordination and communication must therefore be central to the implementation of civic action plans. Indeed, it has been recognized by the U.S. Secretary of the Army as well as by many others that civic action projects must be well-coordinated, supported locally, and examined for potential environmental impact. Another U.S. objective should ultimately be to develop self-sufficiency within the host nation; that is, to help the nation develop internal engineering and medical capabilities so that it can handle future requirements. The question is: Are these objectives being met and are we ultimately seeking to establish self-sufficiency?

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21 Although there is no set rule, the members of these teams have generally been all civilians.

22 It should also be noted that all assessment teams sent to the region receive cross-cultural sensitivity training, briefings by the Foreign Service Institute, etc., and that the Corps now has a database on its personnel's language capabilities, a factor that will be taken into account when team members are selected.
The need for infrastructural development in many of the Latin countries is quite clear, but traditional problems associated with U.S. assistance in these efforts persist. One of the greatest problems lies in the need for better cooperation both among U.S. agencies and within the host nation. On the U.S. Government side, the largest obstacle lies in continuing tensions between civilian agencies (namely, USAID) and the military. From the former's perspective, while the military certainly has the necessary tools for civic action, this is not the message that should be sent; the United States wants to promote civilian capabilities and build up civilian institutions in Latin America. Having the U.S. military involved means having the host nation military involved, which then works against the image of the civilian government representing the position of authority. In addition, USAID interprets its charter to rule out close collaboration with U.S. military forces on such projects. Moreover, USAID has raised concerns that the military does not sufficiently consider the long-term implications of what it is doing, a factor which is only exacerbated by the fact that military personnel are rotated in and out so frequently that there is little continuity. The absence of specific evaluations of civic action performed by the military is another impediment to improved DoD-USAID relations. For its part, the military has found USAID as an institution uncooperative, although there are certainly cases in individual embassies where the representatives from these agencies work quite well and closely together. There is also a definite problem in the way the two organizations approach a problem: In simplified terms, USAID tends to focus more attention on studying the problem and less on action, while the military is more result-oriented, getting the job done but without necessarily always thinking through all the longer term implications of their actions. In short, the current situation relies on ad hoc cooperation between these agencies' representatives in the embassies. Success (and failure) is very much personality-driven.

Within the host nation there can be problems of coordination and cooperation as well. For example, if USAID and the Milgroup representatives do not work well together, the prospects for coordination between the host nation civilian government and its military are impeded. In addition, even assuming such cooperation does occur, there is no

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23 Generally the only type of assessments made are statements such as "it provided an excellent training opportunity" or it "enhanced bilateral relations."
guarantee that the local community is sufficiently consulted as to its specific needs. This is not to say that this lack of communication occurs on every project and in every country. It is, in fact, largely dependent on the individual personnel within the embassy. The more fundamental question is whether U.S. policy and interests are best met through such ad hoc arrangements or whether some level of greater cooperation should be institutionalized in Washington. At a minimum, the establishment of a permanent working group consisting of various agencies (including USAID, DoD, State Department, etc.) to address these continuing problems would provide a useful vehicle for discussions.

Another difference of opinion that can arise between U.S. government agencies lies in determining what should qualify as civic action and what should be considered security assistance. Civic action activities must have as one of their goals the training of participating U.S. forces, but determining when their activities exceed their training requirements and become assistance can be a fine distinction. It is therefore necessary for planners to ensure that HCA activities do not exceed the legislative authority and extend into security assistance.

The determination to conduct most civic action in rural areas has also been criticized to the extent that the number of people affected by these efforts are much fewer than if they were conducted in urban areas. Moreover, roads may be built in a given rural area, but the people living there may still lack the means of transportation to fully utilize the new roads. The question is whether this road really provides them any benefit. The problem, of course, in emphasizing urban activities is that it would be more difficult politically to have dozens of U.S. military personnel operating in the center of a city. A possible solution would be to have just one or two U.S. personnel assigned to the urban area to act as advisers in road construction, sewers installation, or medical exams, as the case may be. However to do this it would be necessary to amend existing legislation.

The final problem to be considered when looking at the U.S. Army role in civic action projects is whether the proper emphasis is given between providing services and training indigenous personnel to provide for themselves. LTC John Everson reasons that although these "programs may improve U.S.-host nation relations and provide short-term

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24 It should be further noted that, even with such consultation, there have been cases where facilities have been willfully misused by the local population after being built, although such cases seem to be the exception rather than the rule.
or local material benefits, they contribute nothing to the process of national development and often risk damaging the credibility and stature of host nation agencies." The level of host nation participation certainly varies by country. For example, medical exercises conducted in Guatemala have had roughly as many Guatemalans participating as U.S. personnel, while in Bolivia some activities had considerably more U.S. participants. In part this discrepancy can be attributed to the availability of appropriate personnel in a given country. In addition, the U.S. obviously must rely on what the host nation identifies, not only in terms of its specific needs, but also in terms of the personnel it has. To the extent that the Milgroup representatives and others involved in the planning process for civic action activities have an input into host nation participation, they should underscore the importance that the United States attaches to their eventual ability to conduct these activities on their own. This is certainly our ultimate long-term objective.

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of U.S. Army Participation in Civic Action Projects

a. Advantages

Among civilians and military personnel alike, there is agreement that the U.S. Army and other military forces should play strictly a support role in U.S. peacetime activities, including in civic action projects (which are military activities designed to support civilian national development). And while all agree in principle that improving the infrastructures and other capabilities (such as medical treatment) is a good idea, the desirability of involving the armed forces in these efforts generates very mixed opinions and often heated arguments. This section first examines the advantages to U.S. Army involvement in these activities and then the arguments against such involvement.

From the point of view of direct benefits to U.S. troops, there are two very important considerations. First, many military personnel have noted, especially in operations in Latin America, that civic action activities were one of the greatest experiences they had ever had in the Army because they could see real results and could interact directly


26 The U.S. Army will be used here without referring to the other Services, mainly because the Army has been the most active Service in civic action efforts. The advantages and disadvantages can largely be applied to the other Services as well, however.
with those they were trying to help. Thus, these experiences can provide a real morale boost to U.S. troops, thereby keeping them well motivated and well trained. Second, the fact that these activities are conducted (in conjunction with military operations) in difficult conditions—in austere environments and far from any logistics support, etc.—offers U.S. troops training in an atmosphere that cannot be replicated in CONUS.

As previously noted, many of the personnel that take part in civic action activities come from the U.S. reserves. The advantage here is that these forces not only gain useful experience, but also bring with them the benefits of their civilian experience and expertise. This can be especially helpful as some of the Latin American countries consider creating their own reserve forces and see what such forces might accomplish.

It is also generally accepted that no other agencies have the resources that DoD possesses and that, indeed, these assets would probably be wasted otherwise. Moreover, from a financial standpoint, it is cheaper to carry out these efforts in Latin American than in other theaters such as Asia and Europe. This can be expected to become an increasingly important consideration as the defense budget is further reduced. Despite high-level commitment to ensure that training is kept at an appropriate level, cuts are inevitable here as well. Thus, to the extent that foreign operations continue, the Latin region may not fare as badly as other regions where it is more expensive to operate.27

In terms of broader U.S. interests in a given country or the region, civic action activities can also help to foster good will between the United States and the local population, thereby helping to erase some of the lingering sentiments about the strong-armed neighbor to the north. At the same time, we are able to help some of the most needy people. Establishing contacts at this level can often provide a counterweight to the "good deeds" that drug traffickers and insurgents sometimes do to win local support (or at least to ensure their passivity).

Finally, civic action activities provide an important vehicle for projecting a positive image of what the military can do. In this vein, these efforts seek to improve the overall well-being of local populations. They also provide a useful means of demonstrating to the host nation militaries the U.S. principle of the Army's subordination to civilian authority.

27 This is all assuming, of course, a status quo environment. Should another Persian Gulf crisis erupt, Latin American activities will certainly be affected, as seen in the 1991 Gulf crisis and the cancellation
Any opportunities to make this point—directly or indirectly—should be exploited to the fullest extent possible. As LTC Joseph Luckett has written, the benefits of civic action are that it "enhances civil military relations, deprives local insurgencies of support by reducing popular dissatisfaction, and improves the image of the host country and U.S. armed forces."28

b. Disadvantages

Those who are opposed to U.S. Army participation in civic action projects offer their own viable list of concerns about the possible negative consequences of such involvement. The most important objection is that U.S. military involvement means host nation military involvement, which can undermine the authority of and support for the civilian government.29 There have certainly been instances where the civilians have been barely visible in these projects; active efforts must be enforced to ensure that such actions (or lack thereof) are not repeated. Those who believe that the U.S. Army should not be involved argue that the resources should be given to civilian agencies.

There are other disadvantages to the way in which civic action projects are currently carried out, some of which may have solutions. As noted earlier, there are concerns that insufficient consideration is given to local needs and capabilities when these activities are planned. For instance, new roads may quickly become overgrown by jungle or may lead to a nearby city and consequently exacerbate urbanization problems. Similarly, engineers have previously constructed woodframe school and other community buildings, but the climatic conditions made it difficult for the local population to maintain these facilities. More emphasis is now being placed on using local capabilities and techniques such as cinder block construction. Facilities requiring the lowest levels of maintenance would obviously be preferable in such environments.

29 By the same token, depending on the approach taken, military involvement could also strengthen support for the civilian government; the challenge lies in finding such an approach. It should also be noted that even some who object to U.S. military participation believe that at current levels of effort such an undermining of the civilian governments is unlikely to occur.
The final criticism of the U.S. Army approach to civic action is that it does not focus on follow-up or evaluation of what has been accomplished. Until more detailed assessments are demanded from those responsible for each civic action effort (such as HCA programs), this concern will justifiably persist. There should, indeed, be more attention paid to evaluations, be they by the personnel involved or by objective outside observers. An assessment of "lessons learned" from these activities would clearly benefit future leaders of such efforts as well as the SOUTHCOM and Army staffs. They would also provide concrete evidence of the utility of what is being performed by military personnel, which could be used to respond to its critics.

4. Possible Changes to Civic Action Activities

Many of the deficiencies cited by critics of the U.S. Army's participation in civic action efforts could be ameliorated through adjustments in the way some things are done. As just noted, a better system for evaluating these activities needs to be instituted. Part of this evaluation could include an assessment of the environmental and cultural impacts, although these issues certainly must be considered before the exercise is ever conducted.

Concerted efforts must also be made to ensure cultural sensitivity among the participants, preferably including some language training. While it is inarguable that priority must be placed on the actual objectives to be accomplished, it is at the same time detrimental to have much of the goodwill that these activities can foster negated because of U.S. personnel insensitivities or lack of cultural awareness. Certainly not every soldier sent to the region can be expected to speak Spanish, but a high priority should at least be placed on cultural awareness briefings prior to the unit's arrival in the host nation.

To counter criticism about civic action activities, consideration should also be given to actively encouraging press coverage of what is accomplished. This can be done both in the United States (especially in the areas of the participating units) and in the host nation, as determined by the local and national governments. Care should naturally be taken, however, to underscore the fact that these activities are fully supportive of the military's subordination to civilian authority. Otherwise, concerns about undermining civilian governments could be heightened.

Some Latin American specialists have also suggested that U.S. Army personnel not wear their uniforms when conducting civic action activities. Eliminating the requirement to
wear uniforms would reduce the image of the military as the source of good deeds to the detriment of civilian authority. However, there are several arguments against this approach. First, there is the belief that if the host nation wants U.S. assistance, they must be willing to accept it at face value, and since these are military personnel, they should be in uniform. In addition, because civic action activities are designed to bring positive results, it is to the military's advantage to be in uniform, thereby demonstrating that the military can perform beneficial activities. Furthermore, because it is part of U.S. military training, it is only appropriate that uniforms be worn. Finally, there are legal implications on the basis of the Geneva convention that would need to be addressed should soldiers who are not in uniform become involved in a conflict in a foreign country. A related issue is whether the participating personnel should have weapons with them. Except in cases where there is an actual danger to U.S. personnel, weapons should be left at base camps or, if necessary, within reach (rather than on their person). These issues have important ramifications and a closer examination of their pros and cons would be merited. One factor that would need to be explored is the question of who would have the authority to make such a decision—the Unified Commander or the Army.

The point has already been made that it is necessary to have closer interagency cooperation. While the lack of cooperation is certainly by no means strictly the Army's fault, all parties involved must accept personal responsibility to work better together. Appropriate policies and procedures are already in place. For example, to better determine the types of civic action activities to be performed, the United States first creates a survey team composed of military and civilian personnel from the host nation as well as the corresponding U.S. personnel. This team then works with the local political leadership to determine their interests and needs. In this context, the military's subordination to civilian authority is to be consistently underscored. The thing to be avoided at all costs is for U.S. Army personnel to be seen as representatives of the host nation's military. More generally, it should again be underscored that medical activities will be much more acceptable to critics than engineering efforts. Yet while this approach and these considerations seem fairly straightforward, implementation often proves more difficult than it appears.

One way of trying to expand indigenous capabilities in developing medical and engineering expertise would be to train foreign personnel in CONUS at civilian or military facilities. These efforts could be conducted under such programs as IMET or PEP.
Finally, a program that has been put into operation in Africa might also be considered for Latin America. The U.S. Congress has specifically allocated funds for a civic action program in Africa where the Army Corps of Engineers provides the material and some oversight personnel, and the host nation provides the military labor. To the extent that the U.S. Army wants to remain active in these activities in SOUTHCOM's arena, an effort could be made to devise a similar program for this region.

C. THE COUNTER-DRUG MISSION

1. Historical Focus

Trying to find ways to address the spread of drugs, and the threat they create to the well-being and future of U.S. society, has become a top U.S. government priority in recent years. The White House now issues an annual National Drug Control Strategy, which addresses both domestic and international approaches to the challenges drugs are posing. This section of this paper outlines the policies adopted to date and the U.S. military's role; an analysis of the expediency and appropriateness of these policies is presented below, in the discussion on future policies and approaches (Section C6). Because the emphasis of this paper is on U.S. Army roles in Latin America, the focus here will necessarily be on the international aspects of the Drug Control Strategy.30

As outlined in the White House document, the international section of the 1991 Strategy aims first to strengthen the political commitment of drug producer and transit countries to strengthen their laws, legal institutions, and programs to prosecute, punish, and where appropriate, extradite drug traffickers and drug money launderers. The Strategy also provides for increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement and security activities of drug source and transit countries to enable them to take effective action against the drug trafficking organizations. . . . [It] also contains economic assistance programs for the Andean nations that are conditioned on counter-drug performance, adherence to sound economic policies, and respect for human rights.31

30 Interestingly, in terms of format, the 1992 version of the White House document does not emphasize the international aspects as strongly as earlier versions. It should also be noted that many now (in 1992) feel the level of commitment by the executive branch is diminishing.

This strategy represents an evolution of thinking and policy on the "drug war" since it was launched in the late 1980s. For example, the initial U.S. Government focus was on the three main Andean countries--Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru--and the types of efforts centered on what have been called "repressive, military tactics." Since that time, while the Andean nations admittedly remain at the core of the strategy, the amount of money being spent, the number of countries included in counter-drug initiatives, and the types of activities have all been expanded and diversified.

This expansion illustrates not only a continued commitment to efforts to address the drug challenge, it also unfortunately illustrates the pervasiveness of the problem. Thus, while Peru and Bolivia remain the main coca-producing countries of the world and Colombia leads in the processing and distribution of cocaine (and increasingly heroin), there are few other countries in Latin America that remain untouched by the drug industry. For example, Uruguay and Panama have become involved in money laundering, while numerous countries including Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela all find their territories being used as transshipment points. Furthermore, according to the National Drug Control Strategy, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela have the potential for "large-scale, profitable cultivation of coca leaf."33

Just as the number of countries incorporated into the U.S. Government's drug strategy have grown, so too have the types of activities being pursued. While original efforts focused on eradicating crops and targeting the labs that process the coca, more recent actions have also been aimed at economic development. In many respects, the counter-drug program has been adjusted over the last several years, based on trial and error. For example, it became evident that crop eradication focused on the lowest link in the chain--the farmer--who was generally engaged in the activity simply as a way of surviving the harsh economic realities of the Andean countries. Consequently, this policy brought with it considerable public opposition within the countries, thereby undermining any local support for actions carried out by their government (frequently with U.S. assistance). As LTC John Fishel explains the problem, crop eradication has proven counterproductive in that "First, it merely alienates the peasant farmer and turns him into a


potential insurgent. Second, it is a wasted effort because for every hectare of coca that is eradicated, two to three more are produced.\textsuperscript{34} Fishel further notes that targeting the labs has yielded more positive results in that such actions have "had the salutary effect of producing steps in voluntarily abandoning coca growing in favor of alternate crops. . . . Peasants who could not make money from growing coca sought alternative crops."\textsuperscript{35}

An "alternative crop" program (also referred to as "alternative development") has since become part of the U.S. drug strategy. The obstacles impeding the success of such a program are many. First, it has proved very difficult—if not impossible—to find a crop that can grow in some of these regions (such as Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, or UHV) which can offer the farmer the same monetary benefits. Moreover, the coca marketing system makes it necessary to establish a whole corresponding infrastructure in order to be able to compete. As Fishel explains, the drug industry buys the leaf directly from the peasant and provides the transport. Thus, "all the primary producer does is prepare his product for shipment and collect his money. For any agricultural alternative to succeed, the marketing and distribution process of the coca industry at the grower's level must be replicated accordingly."\textsuperscript{36} Another idea under alternative development would provide opportunities for generating employment in regions away from where the coca is grown. While this, too, presents considerable challenges in implementation, it seems likely to yield more positive long-term results. Abraham Lowenthal has put this into even broader perspective:

Alternative crops alone are not an adequate answer. . . . In the long run, sustained economic development in Latin America is needed to provide the environment for weaning drug-producing regions from that activity. The link back to the debt crisis is obvious; sustained development in Latin America cannot occur as long as massive debt service obligations deprive the region of the capital it needs for investment, social services, and growth.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus, an important way in which the U.S. drug strategy has begun to expand its efforts lies in the establishment of programs aimed at helping the drug-producing countries address their underlying economic problems. From the beginning, the Andean countries have taken the position that their economic difficulties are of paramount concern and must

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 69.
\textsuperscript{37} Lowenthal, \textit{Partners In Conflict}, p. 192.
be dealt with before serious anti-drug efforts could be undertaken. In an attempt to address these concerns, the 1991 U.S. Strategy included a request for "development" funds, which aim "to strengthen and diversify the legitimate economies of the Andean nations.... This involves providing balance of payments assistance; supporting income-earning alternatives in coca growing and surrounding areas [i.e., alternative development, discussed above]; and supporting trade and investment programs that generate jobs, income, and foreign exchange throughout the economy." With respect to this latter effort, two specific programs have been unveiled. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), launched in June 1990, seeks "to improve economic growth, increase trade, and promote investment in Latin America." It would make available grants and loans to countries "that adopt comprehensive investment reforms and improve the climate for private investment." Second, the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI) offers expanded trade and investment between the United States and Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. As part of this initiative, the Andean Trade Preferences Act, which provides duty-free access for exports from these four countries, became law in December 1991. Thus, some attempt is being made to address the underlying economic and social problems.

2. The U.S. Military's Role

In terms of U.S. Government counter-drug activities, there are obviously a host of agencies involved. For the purposes of this study, it should be briefly noted that it falls under the State Department's purview to coordinate the Government's international drug control policy overseas and to administer aid to law enforcement agencies. The Department of Defense administers aid for the local military and assists their police through the State Department. What is especially important to underscore is the U.S. military's position in playing a support role in the counter-drug effort.

39 "National Drug Control Strategy," February 1991, pp. 81-82. As Bagley explains, the EAI was established in response to Andean demands to "help defray the costs of their anti-drug efforts and to promote economic recovery in the region." Bagley in Proceedings of the Latin America Strategy Development Workshop, p. 101.
In fact, at the outset the U.S. military was largely reluctant to become involved in the "drug war," legitimately fearing the extent to which it would get wrapped into this role and recognizing the uncertainty of how "victory" would ever be determined in such a war. As both civilian and military participants at a National Defense University conference agreed, "civilian decision makers imposed a larger role on the military in the drug war. In part the decision was based upon the assumption that military technology might serve as a quick fix. . . . Use of the military for intelligence collection and monitoring had consensus. The military seemed more clear than the civilians in the executive and legislative branches on the counterproductive impacts of militarizing the drug war." The National Command Authorities have, of course, determined that the U.S. military will play a strictly support role in counter-drug activities. Even in this context, it must be recognized that there are limits to what military forces can--and should--do (in a support role). What has become quite clear is that, despite the appreciable technological and personnel capabilities, any hope for a "military quick fix" has proven illusory.

There are, of course, certain restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in international counter-drug activities. Most important, all such forces are prohibited from participating in any operational counter-drug missions. The guidelines regulating U.S. military participation in drug enforcement operations abroad stipulated that "U.S. forces had to be invited by the host government; they were to be directed and coordinated by U.S. civilian agencies; and their role was to be limited to support functions." In addition to supplying equipment, the main military missions for U.S. forces in counter-drug activities have been in monitoring and interdiction and in providing support (such as in the form of training in the areas of intelligence, helicopter maintenance, and logistics using MTTs). In addition, such training activities have included human rights training for the host nation forces as a means of addressing U.S. concerns that these latter forces do not adhere to the kind of human rights policies that we expect (and require in connection with rendering assistance). In terms of intelligence efforts, considerable progress is being made through the use of both equipment and personnel. For example, in all the key countries, the U.S. military has established Tactical Analysis Teams in the embassies, usually consisting of

43 Bagley in ibid., p. 92.
44 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the provision of U.S. security assistance funds to countries with a pattern of human rights abuses.
two to four Service personnel, to carry out analytical work on possible targets in support of U.S. DEA counter-drug efforts within that country.\textsuperscript{45}

One additional problem faced the U.S. military in its preliminary efforts in the Andean Initiative: Prior to this initiative, the U.S. military had had limited contact with the militaries in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru for more than a decade; hence, military-to-military ties were not very well developed, and some time was required to establish useful working contacts. More generally, of course, it also took some time to overcome host nation reluctance to become involved in counter-drug activities. Finally, Gen. Joulwan has argued the need for applying U.S. counter-drug efforts on a theater-wide basis, given that the traffickers have no regard for national boundaries.\textsuperscript{46} While this raises the need for regional cooperation in an area not known for such efforts, current indications are that progress is being made on this front as well.

3. Assessing the Counter-Drug Effort to Date

Most independent assessments of the progress being made in combating drugs have concluded that, although useful changes have been to the U.S. Government's strategy, there is still much to be accomplished before it could ever be called a success. The Andean countries have demonstrated an increasing level of commitment to counter-drug efforts, but this has come at a price. While special police forces have been created for the counter-drug mission, the extent of host nation military involvement has also deepened considerably. With this involvement has come not only continuing tensions with law enforcement personnel, but also reported increases in human rights abuses committed by military and police forces in connection with both counterinsurgency and counter-drug efforts.\textsuperscript{47}

The arguments in favor of involving both law enforcement and military forces in counter-drug efforts focus on the inability of the former to handle this mission on their own. Police forces simply do not have the personnel or the equipment necessary to counter the drug producers and traffickers.\textsuperscript{48} It has also been argued that combining efforts would

\textsuperscript{45} As described in Joulwan statement, 20 February 1992, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{47} For references to this problem, see citations listed in footnote 68, Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{48} While some critics accept that the military may need to fill this void in police capabilities for the immediate term, many believe that the ultimate aim should be to establish these capabilities within the law enforcement agencies.
reduce "duplication of logistics, maintenance, and other key support elements essential for effective counternarcotics operations." Finally, particularly in the case of Peru and Colombia, the increasing collaboration between drug traffickers and insurgents has made it difficult to distinguish between police and military missions.

Among the three key countries to date, Peru has proven the most troublesome. As an October 1991 GAO report outlined, Peru must resolve some serious problems before the program can ever work. These problems include: the need for government control over military and police forces, the lack of cooperation and coordination between the military and the police, political instability caused by the Sendero Luminoso insurgent threat, corruption, human rights abuses, and the economy's dependence on coca production.

More generally, many of these problems are reflected throughout the Andean region, as Peter Andreas and Kenneth Sharpe argue:

Peru and Bolivia . . . are ultimately unwilling and unable to attack the drug economy seriously. Meanwhile both the drug trade and the drug war are weakening civilian institutions and deepening existing problems of violence, human rights abuses, and military corruption. . . . Like the government of its Andean neighbors, Colombia has declared war on drugs yet turns a blind eye to the influx of drug dollars that help boost the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves.

And, indeed, even during the drug summit held among the heads of state in Texas in February 1992, "the failures of the drug war were as prominently on display as its successes."

4. Latin Perspectives on the U.S. Strategy

From the perspective of the Andean countries, the U.S. strategy has had several shortcomings, some of which have begun to be addressed. As already noted, one difference of opinion with the United States lies in the former's determination that

49 As reported in Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 39.
economic and social instability in their countries, which foster drug trafficking, must be dealt with first before trying to eradicate the drugs themselves. For example, in September 1990 both Bolivian President Paz Zamora and Peruvian President Fujimori were openly critical of the U.S. Andean drug strategy "owing to its excessive emphasis on military strategies and tactics and the absence of funds for socio-economic development."53 The ideas of alternative development as well as EAI and ATI seek to meet such concerns, although the solutions remain quite distant. Until the local populations see concrete improvements, opposition to U.S. policies--at least at the public level--should be expected to continue. Put more bluntly, the farmers and other low-level workers will clearly be more concerned with being able to feed themselves and otherwise survive than with worrying about any ethical dilemma of producing narcotics.54

In addition to the economic linkage, there is also the problem that drug trafficking has increasingly become linked with insurgencies, particularly in Peru, although Colombia has also experienced problems in this area. The added complication of fighting an insurgent threat coupled with combating drugs obviously makes the task all the more complex. While the U.S. Government continues to restrict its involvement in counterinsurgency efforts, it has come to recognize the fact that the two threats can be virtually impossible to separate. The prioritization of these threats can continue, however, to have a detrimental effect on collaborative efforts, especially between the United States and Peru. As Carol Graham explains, Peru, in addition to differing on the priority to be given to economic development, "also puts a higher priority on curbing the growth of Shining Path [Sendero Luminoso] than on fighting the drug trade. Peru fears that using its military, and possibly U.S. personnel, to eradicate coca runs the risk of turning hundreds of thousands of displaced farmers into supporters of Shining Path."55

Another area of disagreement centers on a perceived U.S. attitude that the drug problem is somehow the Andean countries' "fault." Carlos Garcia Priani, a colonel in the Mexican Army, has argued that one of the reasons for tensions in U.S.-Latin American relations has been the tendency of the United States to divide countries into "victims and

executioners.” He reasons that all countries are victims in the drug problem, but does not believe that U.S. policy has adopted this perspective fully.\textsuperscript{56}

Another prevailing sentiment among Latin countries is that U.S. policy should actually devote more attention to its own domestic situation. In other words, it should focus on reducing the demand for these drugs rather than on emphasizing control over the supply side of the equation. Related to this concern is the fact that public figures such as former D.C. Mayor Marion Barry receive minimal, if any, punishment for their own involvement in illicit drugs. Until stronger actions are taken in U.S. courts against such criminals, it is hard to expect Latin judges to risk their own lives in prosecuting drug traffickers, although some certainly are trying to do so.

In terms of the U.S. presence, particularly at the outset of the counter-drug efforts, local reaction was quite negative. Host countries raised concerns about how extensive the U.S. presence would become as well as arguments that their countries were being controlled—or at least unduly influenced—by the United States. In short, some perceived that their sovereignty was being called into question. For example, during Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 “the presence of U.S. military forces conducting operations on Bolivian soil brought forth nationalistic concerns about sovereignty”\textsuperscript{57} among political forces on the Left. It has been argued that if some mitigating civic action had been undertaken in conjunction with these actions, the public reaction might not have been so negative.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, in addition to concerns about the U.S. presence, local populations have indicated concerns about the involvement of their own militaries in counter-drug activities—a roll which is largely seen to have been encouraged (if not forced) by the United States. Indeed, the militaries themselves were reluctant to take on this mission since it was outside their traditional national security mission and they feared becoming more subject to corruption. Nevertheless, they also realized that counter-drug efforts provided an opportunity for justifying their existence and that such efforts would have priority for U.S. funding. Many of these fears have proved justified as corruption and human rights abuses have become more manifest among military forces.\textsuperscript{59} The involvement of Latin American

\textsuperscript{56} Priani, “Drugs in the Americas,” p. 22.
\textsuperscript{58} Fishel and Cowan in DePauw and Luz, Winning the Peace.
\textsuperscript{59} In response to this problem, both Colombia and Peru announced the creation of agencies to deal with human rights abuses and control over police and military involved in counter-drugs. However,
militaries in the drug war has also raised fundamental concerns about threats to democratic stability, a greater insurgent threat, and even fears of an army coup. Lastly, an apparently growing phenomenon is the toleration and even support of drug trafficker violence by security forces in Colombia and elsewhere, which is obviously linked to the corruption problem.60

Louis Goodman and Johanna Mendelson have summed up the many difficulties associated with military involvement in this effort in the following way:

Within the rubric of military subordination to civilian authority, the dangers of the drug war as a military mission are obvious. As with military counterinsurgency activities of the 1960s, direct Latin American military involvement in the drug war would involve military in police tasks that are technically within the civilian domain; it would also require mastery of a complex combination of political and military skills, likely necessitating the expansion of military intelligence operations; it would blur the line between appropriate and inappropriate domains for military professional actions; it would expand the managerial roles played by the military in society; and it would increase the role military men play in national politics and political decision making.

Involving Latin American armed forces in the drug war threatens traditional concepts of military professionalism in the region. It pushes military men to involve themselves in activities that advocates of democracy would prefer to reserve for civilians.

The preferred solution, of course, would be to treat narcotics traffickers as a police problem; to train special gendarmerie to control it; and to restrict military missions to external security matters.61

5. Advantages and Disadvantages to U.S. Army Involvement in Counter-Drug Activities

The U.S. Government has indicated that all forces must be brought to bear in the fight against drugs. Military forces and technology, it has been argued, provide unique capabilities that can be used in this fight. However, initial hopes that the military might be able to offer a "quick fix" to this complicated problem have long since faded. There are

according to GAO, in the 6 months since this decision was announced Peru had not allocated any money or personnel to this agency. See Conahan statement "The Drug War," p. 3.
61 Goodman and Mendelson in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 191.
areas in which the military's expertise can be used to good purpose, but in the overall assessment there are more negative consequences to consider than positive. On the positive side, the utility of military trainers and intelligence gathering capabilities is generally accepted, although the desirability of keeping the numbers fairly limited and visibility low is underscored by many who accept this role. Similarly, there is overwhelming endorsement for keeping U.S. military activities in a strictly support role.

As for the negative effects of U.S. involvement in the drug war, the unintended consequences of military counter-drug strategies must be considered. As pointed out at a National Defense University conference, such consequences could include the "enhancement of the Andean militaries at the expense of civilian elected officials; potential conflict between anti-drug efforts and economic stabilization priorities; and danger of a major escalation of military force." The underlying threat to democratic gains is, indeed, one of the major concerns in involving military forces in the drug war. The U.S. Government must recognize that encouraging Latin military forces to become involved in counter-drug efforts could ultimately strengthen the military at the expense of the civilian governments, thereby upsetting the delicate balance in evolving civil-military relations. Gabriel Marcella and Fred Woerner have summarized the dilemma by asking whether the United States is "nudging the recipient Latin American militaries to go beyond roles and missions envisioned in their laws and civil-military relations, roles and missions that are prohibited to the armed forces of the United States?" They suggest that the solution to the drug problem, as well as other problems in the region, lies only partially in military solutions; it is necessary to "find the appropriate balance between the military and non-military components of national security." Indeed, in today's world it is the non-military components--such as economic and political factors--that are of increasing importance and utility.

The other point which Marcella and Woerner raise has been of concern to many other analysts as well, and that is: does the United States have the right to push Latin American militaries into performing missions that we expressly forbid our own military to execute? The argument for local military involvement is based largely on the fact that the

63 Marcella and Woerner, "Strategic Vision and Opportunity," p. 34.
64 Ibid., p. 43.
law enforcement agencies do not have the personnel or technical capabilities to counter such a widespread problem. The responding argument is that, to the extent the U.S. Government is involved, it should spend its time and provide its equipment to police or other forces specially created to deal with the drug threat. There is clearly no easy solution, particularly since the general sentiment is that very little progress has been made overall and negative consequences such as increased corruption and human rights abuses have occurred. In fact, the counter-drug effort can be likened to putting a finger in a dyke; one leak is stopped, but several new holes are then created.

Many are not sanguine about the prospects for continuing the drug war with the current emphasis on military solutions, even as some economic dimensions are added to the program. As James Malloy has suggested, there may well be several counterproductive results: "a new cycle of direct military rule [in Latin governments], or at least military control will emerge; direct U.S. military involvement could lead to a dangerous quagmire; and the revolutionary could be revitalized during a time of basic decline." While all would hope and expect that the U.S. military will remain strictly in a support role with low visibility, experts inside and outside the Government have raised the troubling prospect of the United States being inadvertently drawn into a counterinsurgency campaign, particularly in Peru. This concern is made all the more viable following the deaths of three U.S. civilians who were under contract to fly and maintain helicopters being used in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV).

6. The Future Environment and Possible Approaches

Given the complexities of trying to deal with the drug challenge and the difficulties encountered in current counter-drug efforts, what changes in the operating environment should be considered and how might future policies be adjusted? In terms of setting policy, one of the most important considerations must be shifts in public opinion. It can certainly be argued that since its inception, the Drug Control Strategy has had its opponents

66 Based on numerous interviews. See also Amb. Ambler Moss, "U.S. Strategic Interests in Latin America: Democracy, Drugs, Development, Debt and Trade," in ibid., p. 19
within the Congress as well as the public at large. This opposition is not diminishing today, and it will only be reinforced by increasing frustration with the inability to make notable progress in the "drug war." In this same vein, the mood of the nation, reflected as well in the Congress, is one of growing isolationism. Thus, support for counter-drug activities abroad, already controversial, is likely to erode further. And the trend toward isolationism would only intensify should there be any significant loss of life by U.S. personnel.

In response to isolationist pressures as well as to continuing differences with Latin leaders about where to put the emphasis in the drug war, the U.S. Government should focus much more of its attention on the domestic side of the equation. In other words, we should be more concerned with controlling and stopping the demand than with affecting supply. The difficulties of addressing the supply side are more than evident, particularly in Colombia, where despite some inroads in undermining the Medellin cartel, seizing cocaine, and disrupting shipments, the Cali cartel has now become stronger, heroin is an increasing problem, and shipment lines are being diversified. Thus, funds would be better spent within the United States on measures such as interdiction, education, and drug treatment programs. A counter-drug program will be effective and successful only if demand is appreciably reduced; continuing to push the effort primarily in the Andean countries will only create more opposition and foster resentment of the United States. Another way of reducing this tension is to enlist greater international cooperation, namely by European nations and Japan; this was one of the ideas discussed during the San Antonio drug summit.

Some U.S. Government funds will certainly continue to go to Andean and other Latin countries, even if greater emphasis is placed on U.S. consumption, and the U.S. Government needs to improve oversight of the aid supplied. As an October 1991 GAO report indicated, "The executive branch has not established the management oversight needed to execute large counternarcotics aid programs... and no end-use monitoring system has been established to ensure that the military aid will be used as intended." The report recommends that U.S. oversight be increased in both Colombia and Peru, a demand likely to be echoed by many in Congress. Embassy personnel stationed in these countries, particularly military personnel, will need to be prepared to deal with these demands. It

68 Conahan statement, "The Drug War," summary page.
would be in the DoD's interest to identify possible ways to address oversight requirements that would minimize the drain on defense personnel resources and still satisfy Congressional demands. In other words, an active rather than reactive position would be of greater benefit to DoD.

Congress appears to be increasingly shifting from its previous tendency to see the military as the solution for counter-drug efforts. In contrast to 2 years ago, the mood is now more cautious and it is likely to continue this way in discussions about what the military role should be in the drug arena. One factor which has certainly precipitated this shift is a recognition of the extreme difficulties of operating in a corrupt environment. Thus, the U.S. military should aim to maintain as low a profile as possible, continuing to underscore its support role, and draw attention itself to the limits of using the military in this capacity. Having the technology and resources does not mean that the military can provide the solutions or even that it is the most effective way of addressing the problem. Moreover, Congressional sentiment appears to be moving in this direction in any event.

Within Latin America itself, the counter-drug effort could be strengthened by more serious efforts at bilateral or regional cooperation, such as in the sharing of intelligence. A more ambitious, albeit difficult idea would be to create a multinational drug "strike force," which the Mexican government has reportedly endorsed, despite "almost unanimous rejection by Latin American leaders."69 To the extent that the United States might apply behind-the-scenes pressure on others to endorse this idea, it would also help draw attention away from the U.S. presence and put the problem into a broader regional context. Moreover, it should be noted that the OAS is seeking to develop regional cooperation in this area through "preventive education and the mobilization of the private sector, especially the media."70

D. DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

A mission which fits under the rubric of nation assistance and in which the U.S. military has excelled especially over the last year is that of disaster assistance. While such assistance has been rendered in many locales over the years, 1991 presented particular challenges in the scope and breadth of initiatives taken. During 1991 alone, U.S. military

forces undertook major relief efforts in Kurdistan to help refugees from northern Iraq, in Bangladesh in the wake of a cyclone and damaging floods, and at Guantanamo Bay with the infusion of Haitian refugees. In 1992, military transport is being used to bring supplies to the former republics of the Soviet Union. All these operations have underscored the military's ability to react quickly in an emergency and to bring the necessary forces to bear in an efficient manner.

This capability comes with a price, however, as some senior military leaders "worry that quick infusions of emergency relief can drag into lengthy and costly commitments."71 Indeed, as the director of operations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated "We don't seek the mission. But relief operations can be expected to be something we'd be involved with from time to time as situations warrant."72 While the disaster relief mission is not necessarily what the military would choose for itself as a top priority, the political support—including within the Congress—for the military maintaining this kind of capability definitely exists, largely because it is widely acknowledged that no other agency has the resources and organization that the military can bring to bear. Thomas Weiss and Kurt Campbell point out the implications this has for the U.S. and other militaries:

While Western ministers of defence will not and should not transform themselves into relief agencies, many situations will inevitably require their assistance. Therefore, these establishments . . . should retain and promote officers whose expertise includes peace-keeping, humanitarian administration and civilian support operations, an area which is not a career "fast track" in most military organizations.73

Clearly, the pressure to reduce such forces will be all the greater as forces are downsized, and that pressure must be countered. In addition, Weiss and Campbell note the need for new mechanisms for better cooperation with civilian relief agencies.

Should a disaster occur in one of the Latin American countries, the U.S. Army would certainly play an important role in any relief efforts, not only because of its available resources but also because of its long history of relations with counterparts in this region. As the various experiences of 1991 have shown, however, it is increasingly important to establish coalitions in these efforts (as well as in conflict situations). International

72 Lt. Gen. Martin L. Bradtner (USMC), as quoted in ibid.
73 Weiss and Campbell, Survival, p. 457.
coalitions can ease any sensitivities about a single country's involvement (which could certainly be a concern in Latin America if the United States were to operate alone), and they can share in the costs of the effort. Therefore, attention should be paid to encouraging the Latin militaries to enhance their own disaster relief capabilities, particularly in terms of establishing the necessary organizational structure. These are issues that can be discussed in bilateral and multilateral fora, such as Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, the Conference of American Armies, the Inter-American Defense Board, and the Organization of American States.

The use of military resources to help address environmental concerns involves many of the same considerations as the disaster relief role. Here in the United States, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) has been very active in environmental clean-up efforts both at military bases and in its work for the Environmental Protection Agency in the Superfund project. In Latin America, the environmental issue which has received the greatest attention is, of course, the Amazon Forest, largely because its future affects not only that region but the world in general. For several decades, national governments in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have promoted Amazonian development. Increasing international attention to the long-term implications of the destruction of this forest have led to a policy of what the Brazilian government calls "rational development" of the Amazonian forest. It has been suggested that "henceforth, national governments will need to match their valid desire for regional land development with increased awareness of the regional environment." Other environmental concerns throughout Latin America include sea pollution, contamination and erosion of land, and industrial pollution. This is not to say that the Latin militaries are necessarily interested in or prepared to deal with these and other environmental problems, but as they define their new roles and missions, some consideration might be given to such ideas.

Here there may be at least two ways in which the U.S. Army can play a role. First, the Army and especially the ACE can share its lessons learned as well as its expertise with Latin counterparts. This can be done during IMET-sponsored study here in the United States or in various bilateral and multilateral fora. In fact, the Inter-American Defense College or the Conference of American Armies might want to consider addressing disaster

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relief/environmental issues in special colloquia. Through such multilateral organizations, the U.S. Army could suggest exploring the prospects for regional cooperation in areas where environmental issues affect more than one country. Second, the U.S. Army could help train Latin military personnel in technical fields related to the environment, and ideally such training could then be carried over into civilian life as well. This is not to say that the Army should take the leading role; rather it might serve more as a facilitator given its historically strong ties with their respective militaries. Indeed, many of the Latin militaries (particularly Brazil) are quite sensitive about any U.S. involvement in this area; thus, overt U.S. involvement would be best kept to a minimum.

E. ENHANCING LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES' SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

1. Force Changes: Downsizing Active Forces; Establishing Reserve Forces

Virtually all countries in Central and South America have been grappling with serious economic difficulties, which have clearly affected the size of their respective defense budgets. And while there is some optimism for economic growth and curbing inflation in the region, pressures for social programs, more firmly established civilian governments, and the absence of serious military threats for many nations will mean continuing austerity for defense budgets. Such trends are clearly evident in Argentina, Honduras, and Uruguay, to name but a few. In fact, Mexico appears to be the only country in the region committed to maintaining—and even increasing—its level of defense expenditures.

These domestic economic considerations, coupled with decreasing levels of U.S. security assistance, mean that most of these countries will probably be unable to support their militaries in their current size and shape. The idea of downsizing forces is further aided, of course, by the signing of the peace accord in El Salvador, which calls for that country to cut its military to one-half its current size over the next 2 years. For its part, Argentina has already begun to implement cuts in its active forces. This pattern is likely to be repeated elsewhere in the region, with the possible exception of Guatemala where the Army can point to enough of an internal threat to justify its requirements, and it remains in such a strong position of power. Other exceptions might be the Andean countries since the
militaries are increasingly involved in counter-drug activities and are receiving significant levels of U.S. security assistance.

These emerging trends provide the U.S. Government, and especially the U.S. Army, with at least two important opportunities. First, the U.S. Army—like all U.S. military Services—is obviously facing its own challenges in having to downsize significantly. As it goes through this difficult process, it can serve as a model to other American armies, showing its ability to work within the democratic system to try to affect some of these changes and cuts. Examples can include efforts to further reduce U.S. reserve forces before accepting even deeper active force cuts, lobbying for new equipment purchases, etc. The important point to be underscored to Latin counterparts is the willingness—indeed, determination—of the U.S. Army to work within the system and to continue to support the democratic process. While this may seem an obvious point to many in the United States, it is not necessarily obvious to those who have had little experience with civilian control over security affairs, or civilian governments in general. Such efforts clearly should not be made in a heavy-handed way (as if the United States were trying to instruct others), but ideally in the form of "lessons learned." Thus, the experiences and problems the U.S. Army encounters as it downsizes could be shared with Latin counterparts in the form of an interactive dialogue; both difficulties and successes could be identified. Such discussions could be held on either a bilateral or regional basis. Furthermore, they could become part of a broader effort to establish a regional framework for discussing military force reductions.

The second, more explicit opportunity for the U.S. Army in this environment lies in the possible establishment of reserve forces in various Central and South American countries. Such an effort is in full swing in Venezuela, and during the November 1991 meeting of the Conference of American Armies, the following countries expressed interest in learning more about this idea: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay. Venezuela is, in fact, the first country in the world to establish a reserve force modeled on the U.S. system.75

To briefly summarize the project as it unfolded in Venezuela, following exploratory conversations between Venezuelan officials and the U.S. embassy as well as civil affairs

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75 Similar programs are currently underway in Egypt, Taiwan, and Barbados as well.
personnel and a delegation headed by a U.S. General officer, Venezuela requested through the U.S. embassy that U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers be sent to their country. In October 1989, one U.S. officer was sent to Venezuela for one year to help them begin to create a reserve force. The overall program is seen as a 5-year project. The first year-long slot was succeeded by another 1-year position, and the Ambassador has requested one person for a 3-year assignment. After this time, it is expected that U.S. personnel would only be sent there on a rotational basis for the purpose of their own training.

Since its inception, the project has also involved sending various reserve specialists (aviation technicians, drill sergeants, etc.) to Venezuela to meet particular technical needs. Care has been taken to ensure that these personnel have not only the technical expertise, but also the language capability and cultural awareness. Being sent to Venezuela to perform these duties is counted as the reservist's yearly active duty requirement.

Although proper emphasis has been placed on using personnel with adequate cultural expertise, there have been some concerns raised about the sources of funding used for these personnel. As noted earlier, the distinction between security assistance activities (providing goods and services) and training activities often becomes a fine line, one which the U.S. Congress and other government agencies scrutinize carefully. The personnel who have been sent to Venezuela in connection with the reserve project have not used security assistance monies, but rather the Reserve Paid Allowance (for their salaries) and the Operational and Maintenance (O&M) Army Reserve. What some question is whether these efforts are not focused more on providing services than on training for the reservist. Efforts are currently underway to try to provide greater flexibility in the use of these funds. However, until and unless these efforts succeed, the funding issue will continue to be a very sensitive subject and a more detailed evaluation of the use of funds to date should be undertaken. Thus, in Venezuela and any countries where reserve forces are started, careful attention must be paid to this distinction in monies and it should be anticipated that GAO and other U.S. Government agencies will keep a close watch on these expenditures.

Aside from this potential problem, however, U.S. assistance in the creation of reserve forces contains many benefits for both countries. In the case of Venezuela, the reserve force now comprises eight battalions, with close to 5,000 people. There has been

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76 The officer on year-long duty also receives his basic pay from the Reserve Paid Allowance and his TDY from SOUTHCOM.
great interest in participating in this new force, and a wide variety of personnel—including doctors and other professionals—have responded to the opportunity to serve their country and at the same time bring their civilian expertise to military service. In short, the reserve force is helping to establish the idea of the citizen-soldier, which may well help bridge the traditional gap between the Latin armed forces and the rest of society. In addition, while there are certainly initial investment costs to establish a new force, in the long run, reserves are cheaper to maintain than active forces. Moreover, the creation of reserve forces provides a way of easing some of the difficulties involved in the inevitable active force reductions. Indeed, even in Venezuela, whose economy has been quite strong due to its oil resources but recently has been experiencing difficulties, the active force is being drawn down. Thus, political as well as economic reasons will give momentum to such planned cuts. In short, virtually all Latin American countries have a military force larger than they can sustain economically. Finally, as the active force is reduced, available equipment can be turned over for reserve use (as Venezuela has done), much as it is expected to happen in the U.S. military. As a side note to this last point, expectations that equipment drawdowns in the U.S. military will find their way to the Latin American countries are generally too optimistic. Naturally, U.S. reserve and national guard forces would be first on the list to receive such equipment and, as with all U.S. security assistance efforts, there are numerous other countries that will be much higher on the list. Indeed, there are also many who argue that the last thing Central and South American countries need is to have excess combat equipment "dumped" in the region, only to exacerbate regional and domestic tensions. On the other hand, engineer equipment would certainly be welcomed, and could frequently obviate the need for a significant U.S. presence during civic action programs such as Fuertes Caminos exercises. The question here remains whether Latin American countries will be placed high enough on the priority list to receive such equipment.

Turning to the benefits that the U.S. Army derives from helping to establish reserve forces, perhaps the most important point is how these efforts are being conducted. It is certainly not manpower-intensive: only one officer is stationed in-country (for a year), with other reserve personnel called in as required to meet technical and other specialty needs. For example, in addition to technicians such as aviation and avionics specialists

77 In fact, for the initial 600 positions available, 10 times that number applied.
78 The one exception might be the Andean countries, given the strong emphasis being placed on the drug war.
who have been called in, drill sergeants were also requested to help during the battalion's first training period. Thus, the overall U.S. presence and visibility is kept very low, which is exactly the approach the U.S. Government should adopt. A related benefit is the positive experience enjoyed by U.S. reservists. As with HCA activities, there is a sense of doing something useful, being appreciated, and seeing real results. This clearly boosts morale and enhances the ability to retain quality personnel in our own reserves. Furthermore, a conscious effort has been made to ensure that all participants have at least some Spanish-language ability; the importance of cultural sensitivity cannot be overemphasized. Finally, while a complete evaluation of the U.S. Army's role in helping establish a Venezuelan reserve force cannot yet be made, it does appear to illustrate ways in which our military can expand into new areas and work with countries on which U.S. policy has not tended to focus.

On a broader scale, the reserve effort has also helped deepen relations between the two militaries and the governments in general. Some who have been involved in this reserve project believe that it has helped ease Venezuelan concerns about a U.S. military presence in their country. They reason that this may open up opportunities to send even relatively large numbers of U.S. troops to Venezuela for training exercises. While it is not clear that this would be necessary, or even desirable, it is worth noting that sensitivities have at least been somewhat eased.

As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the Venezuelan experience has prompted some interest among other South and Central American countries in a reserve program. A reservist has been designated within the Conference of American Armies to work this issue within that organization. In addition, a three-man team has recently begun visits to all eight of the countries that have expressed interest in order to conduct initial discussions. This round of visits will probably last about 2 months.

Of these countries, Argentina has some of the strongest reasons for moving quite quickly on the reserve idea. Morale within the Argentine military continues to suffer seriously as a result of major cuts in the defense budget and the continuing effects of the military's loss in the Falklands war. In addition, traditional concerns about and rivalry with Brazil (as well as Chile) provide added impetus to the desire to have a reserve force that could be called upon if a threat arose, but would not represent as large a long-term economic drain. The importance of being able to use a reserve force to bridge the gap between civilians and military is also significant.
Other leading countries would logically be Brazil and Colombia, which have the infrastructure and economic support for such an effort. Among the other countries, there are perhaps greater questions. For El Salvador, there may be political constraints given the recent signing of the peace accord, which calls for cutting the military to half its current size. On the other hand, if political accommodation can be reached, a reserve force might provide a new opportunity for Salvadorans to cooperate and try to reassemble their war-ravaged country. In the case of Bolivia and Paraguay, there are questions about their infrastructure support and their ability to find the necessary economic resources. This then raises the prospect of whether U.S. security assistance might be used in these cases to help them finance the necessary expenditures (not as it relates to the participation of U.S. personnel). As for Honduras, the main point of contention may well be the military's own attitude. In short, there are certainly constraints and difficulties within each of the countries, each of which will require different handling. Still, overall economic realities of not being able to support their current active forces means these countries (and others in the region) may find a reserve force one of the more palatable as well as realistic options.

2. Multilateral Contacts: Existing Institutions and New Opportunities

The U.S. Army participates in several multilateral organizations which can be used to support its objective of maintaining contacts with Latin American counterparts. These organizations also offer opportunities for discussing a host of issues, ranging from regional cooperation to civic action to technical topics. This section examines three such organizations: the Conference of American Armies, the Inter-American Defense College and Inter-American Defense Board, and the School of the Americas. It also offers suggestions about possible new opportunities to explore.

The Conference of American Armies (CAA) was established during the 1960s, with the host country rotating among the members every 2 years. Most recently, Guatemala was the host in 1988-89, and in 1990-91 the United States served in that capacity. The most visible of its activities is a biannual conference at the level of the chiefs of staff held in the

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79 As noted earlier, there is also concern about the distinction between using training funds and security assistance funds. Another consideration here is that certain countries—such as Argentina and Brazil—would be strongly opposed to any perception that this was "security assistance."

80 While the School of the Americas is not actually a multilateral organization, but rather a U.S. Army program, it is an important source for multilateral contacts and is examined here in that context.
host country and dedicated to a common theme. The November 1991 conference addressed the theme of the role of the American Armies in the preservation of democracy in the continent, considering the new ideological views of the communist world and the political, social, and economic situation in the American countries. In addition to these high-level meetings, there are also numerous operations-level sessions, generally hosted by the United States, covering topics such as intelligence, training, or automation.

A notable benefit of the CAA program is that it provides an important opportunity not only for U.S. contacts with Latin counterparts, but for the development of such contacts among the various South and Central American participants.81 Given traditional distrust between many of the countries in this region (which obviously impedes greater regional cooperative efforts), these personal contacts can occasionally facilitate interaction between countries, overcoming bureaucratic red tape between them. Moreover, personal contacts can also lead to an expansion of more formal bilateral ties.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy have comparable programs with their counterparts in Latin America as well, known as the Conference of the Chiefs of the American Air Forces and the Inter-American Naval Conference, respectively. Yet all three of these efforts are conducted in virtual isolation from one another; there is no official channel for coordinating or exchanging information. Similarly, in many countries there is apparently no exchange of information among each of the Service's points of contact for these three programs.82 In the interests of making the best use of resources, official channels of communication should be established within the U.S. services, and South and Central American participants should be encouraged to follow this example.

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) are both funded through the Organization of American States.83 The IADB, founded in 1942, has historically focused on planning for the collective self-defense of the

81 An opposing view should be noted as well, however. Some people interviewed were concerned that a forum such as CAA, which puts all members on an equal footing, was not appropriate. They argued that the U.S. Army Chief of Staff was "in a different league" from most of the other participants and that it sent the wrong message for him to interact with them as colleagues.


83 The IADB and IADC operate independently of the OAS. There is some consideration being given, however, to making the IADB an arm of the OAS, partly owing to financial considerations and partly because some IADB members (though not all) see IADB membership in the OAS as an important demonstration of the military's commitment to subordination to a political organization.
Americas. However, particularly in light of worldwide changes in the last several years, this mission has been redefined and refocused. Thus, in addition to hemisphere security, the IADB is looking increasingly at such specific issues as air space control, maritime traffic control, protection of the environment, disaster relief, and combating drug trafficking. Among other efforts, it also aims to establish exchanges of information through databanks, for example on each country's disaster relief capabilities. Until recently, membership in the IADB was limited to signatories of the Inter-American Defense Treaty. This requirement has now been eliminated, however, so that membership is now open to all nations who are members of the OAS.

The IADB consists of the Council of Delegates, under which falls the Staff, Secretariat, and Inter-American Defense College. The Council of Delegates is composed of the heads of the delegations from each member nation. It sets the policies and governs the activities of the other three groups. For its part, the Staff provides studies and reports in three general areas: intelligence, plans, and logistics. For example, two recent efforts have been manuals on peacekeeping and disaster relief preparedness.

The IADC, founded in 1962, focuses its curriculum on studying the political, economic, social, and military centers of power in the world and in the hemisphere. Each class consists of approximately 60 students generally at the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel. Over the last decade, the member countries with the greatest amount of participation (in terms of the numbers of students sent) have been: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. In addition, to military officers, the IADC is open to civilians as well, although a country cannot send a civilian delegate without sending a military one. Brazil and Chile (as well as the United States) have consistently taken advantage of this opportunity.

For the future, the IADB and its components have the potential to play a beneficial role in areas such as regional cooperation and enhancing support for democratization. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to be overcome is the stigma that has historically been attached

84 Thus, in the event of a disaster, the affected country could quickly determine the closest source for the resources it needs most.
85 It is hoped that opening the membership will alleviate some of the funding difficulties since members of the OAS who are not IADB members have tended to oppose funding the latter.
86 In the early 1980s, Argentina did as well. In addition, over the past decade, Peru and Venezuela have sent civilian participants on more than one occasion.
to many of its participants, who frequently have been seen as persona non grata in their own country or as self-aggrandizers who reward themselves with a comfortable position in the United States for 2 years. Yet there is proof that many of these participants do go on to hold important positions in their countries and that participation in the IADB can be a useful experience on which to draw. Moreover, the contacts they establish here with their colleagues can prove particularly helpful.\textsuperscript{87}

In terms of coordination, the IADB maintains contact with other multilateral institutions such as the CAA, although some thought might even be given to collaborative projects such as joint conferences. One organization with which it could expand contacts is the OAS; here the differences between politicians and military personnel tend to impede a closer working relationship. Yet this would appear an important area on which to focus greater attention and effort, particularly if the OAS becomes a more viable international actor.

The School of the Americas (SOA) is the third organization to be examined in this section; although it is a U.S. Army school, its purpose is to train students from a host of Latin American countries and is therefore an important venue for multilateral contacts. Previously based in Panama, it is now located at Fort Benning, Georgia. The main distinguishing feature of the SOA is that all courses are taught in Spanish. More specifically, the SOA has as its mission the following: to develop and conduct military education and training, using U.S. doctrine, in Spanish; to promote a higher level of military professionalism and to improve the effectiveness of military education and training in Latin America; to foster greater cooperation among the Armed Forces of the Americas; and to enhance the knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions.\textsuperscript{88} As for subject matter, the SOA focuses on instruction of NCOs, officers, and some civilians in the areas of joint and combined operations, special operations, officer/NCO professional development, resource management, civil-military operations, and aviation; included in these efforts as well is an emphasis on human rights training. Programs include a Command and General Staff school, cadet training, some technical courses such as in the

\textsuperscript{87} For example, the work of the Peruvian and Ecuadoran representatives to the IADB helped diffuse the simmering border conflict between their two nations.

area of counter-drugs, and helicopter flight training (helicopter maintenance is to be added to the curriculum as of November 1992).

In terms of students, the SOA is focused on more junior-level officers (there are some lieutenant colonels, but most are below this rank), and there have been graduates from every country of the region. Most come from South America; especially recently, namely from the Andean ridge as well as Venezuela and Argentina. Overall, there are 16 different nations that currently participate in the SOA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. There is no set limit on how many students may attend from a given country; that is dependent on the amount of IMET and FMS monies the country receives. All told, over 1,500 students attend the SOA annually, and approximately 300 personnel work at the facility to provide the infrastructure and teaching support. In addition to U.S. instructors, the SOA also has guest instructors from each of the participating Latin American countries.

The SOA's move to Fort Benning appears to have been beneficial in several respects. In addition to removing it from the less secure environment of Panama, the new location also offers fewer distractions for the students. Moreover, the Army has been able to make the training facilities at Fort Benning available to the students when needed, which adding another important element to their education and overall experience. In fact, the SOA anticipates a growing dependence on other Fort Benning units for resource support to conduct training.\textsuperscript{89} The new location also provides opportunities for visits by the students to other U.S. facilities as a way of expanding their educational experience. Finally, its relocation means that more U.S. funds (IMET and FMS) are being spent within the United States, which helps the domestic economic situation.

There has been some criticism of the School of the Americas, however, which is representative of some of the concerns about IMET in general. As a specific example, Richard Millett has pointed out that, although more Nicaraguans had been trained at the School of the Americas and other U.S. schools than any other Latin American nation, the United States still was unable to influence Nicaragua's National Guard during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Millett, "The inability of the United States to influence the National Guard in Nicaragua reflected both an astonishing degree of ignorance in

\textsuperscript{89} As discussed in ibid., p. 10.
Washington concerning the nature and leadership of that body and the Guard's own total identification with the Somozas. At the same time, it is possible to point to several notable successes at the SOA, including very positive results in the training of Colombian, Bolivian, and Peruvian police.

In terms of the program in general, one concern about the School of the Americas relates to the fact that, although IMET funds are used at this school, IMET objectives are not necessarily being fully met. Specifically, critics charge that there is not sufficient emphasis on assimilating U.S. values; that--like all other U.S. schools--this is to be done simply through osmosis. Some also believe that because the courses taught at this school are largely taught in other CONUS institutions as well, the entire program wastes increasingly limited resources. On the other hand, it can be argued equally convincingly that for many of these countries, there are simply no military personnel capable of meeting the English-language requirements of other IMET programs. And while recognizing the constraints of the school and the fact that it may not meet all of IMET's objectives fully, it does nevertheless provide a certain amount of exposure for many personnel who would otherwise never have such an opportunity and at the same time does not require funds for English-language training. Thus, even if it cannot provide everything, at least it provides contacts and exposure to U.S. society and values. It is also useful to consider that having such a Spanish-speaking program is a way of showing Latin American countries that the U.S. focus is not purely on Europe, as they generally perceive. Finally, the SOA does provide a vehicle for developing contacts among the participating countries as well, which would not happen to the same extent if the students were placed in other English-speaking IMET programs.

These arguments--pro and con--raise questions of how the School of Americas should be focused for the future, given that it anticipates having more responsibility but fewer resources. An assessment of the program's overall objectives and accomplishments would be appropriate, with consideration given to whether the future emphasis should be

90 Millett in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 131.
91 When the school was based in Panama, IMET funds were also appropriated for some of the operational costs associated with running it. Since it has been moved to CONUS, these funds have been made a line item in the Army's budget.
92 Moreover, even some of those who do meet the language requirement find that their language capability is still not strong enough to allow them to get the most out of their classes.
more on developing the English-language capability so that eventually students can attend the courses offered in other schools in CONUS. Consideration should also be given to trying to consolidate some programs, such as small-unit training, conducted by the School of the Americas and its Air Force and Navy counterpart schools. In lieu of these separate schools for each Service, one school for all the Department of Defense could be established. Other future developments could include greater reliance on correspondence courses; while perhaps not a perfect solution, the SOA itself suggests that these courses would still allow the countries to receive training but at reduced cost for both them and the SOA. Correspondence courses would be supplemented with MTT exercises in-country so that the students could then apply what they had learned. In addition, the SOA is focusing on expanding the number of civilian personnel coming from both defense and non-defense establishments to attend certain courses that would expand their knowledge of the military infrastructure.

Finally, a couple of points about multilateral efforts and future prospects should be underscored. Given the trends in declining defense monies throughout the region as well as the increasing recognition that coalition-building will continue to be a priority in security affairs, the need for regional cooperation will only increase. Existing multilateral contacts help to facilitate such cooperation and should be exploited to the fullest extent possible to this end.

There are also other opportunities for bilateral and multilateral contacts that have not yet been utilized as much as possible. Particularly during IMET programs, but also in connection with SMEEs, PEPs, and CAA efforts, more emphasis could be placed on diversifying contacts. For example, with the interest in developing civilian expertise in defense issues and in defining new military roles, contacts with nongovernmental institutions in the United States could be included and expanded in these programs. These institutions could include federally funded research and development centers, other defense think tanks (such as the Brookings Institution), and academic institutions that deal with

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93 This is discussed in Wallace H. Nutting, "Coalition Building in United States Security Policy," in Fauriol, Security in the Americas, p. 365.

94 The need to work with other institutions that train Latin American personnel is, in fact, specifically addressed in the School of the America's document, SOA 2000: A Vision of the Future, pp. 1-2.

95 As discussed in ibid., p. 10. The basic costs would be for printing, translating, and shipping course materials.
national security issues (such as American University, Georgetown University, and Harvard University). Even though countries in Central and South America will not necessarily have the funds to develop similar institutions in their own countries, the kinds of analysis done in think tanks as well as the presence of military personnel in civilian institutions can at least serve as a useful framework for expanding their thinking.

3. Expansion of IMET and Civil-Military Relations

Beginning in 1990, the U.S. Congress authorized the inclusion of civilians in the IMET program for the first time and suggested renaming it Democratic Military Education and Training, or DMET. The aim is to help develop a stronger defense oversight capability and a better general grasp of security issues among responsible civilian officials. As Senator Cranston outlined this plan, the initial provision was for the inclusion of civilians belonging to defense ministries and other relevant executive branch agencies. It was stipulated that $1 million of IMET-designated funds were to be dedicated to civilian participation. Since then the amount earmarked for such use has been increased to as much as $2.5 million, although overall IMET funding has not increased commensurately. In addition, Senators Cranston and Kennedy introduced a bill to expand civilian participation to include members of national legislatures and their staffs as well. As summarized by the Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency, this new addition to the IMET program is "to train civilian and military officials in managing and administering military establishments [and budgets]. As countries evolve toward democratic forms of government, we need to support civilian control over the military, responsible resource management and respect for human rights." These subjects will become a permanent part of the IMET program. At least two reasons for this expansion are the changes in Eastern Europe (with the demise of the communist regimes) and in Latin America (as the countries have replaced military with civilian leaders). In addition to the focus on civil-military relations, civilian participants in particular will also focus on "military justice systems, code of conduct and the protection of human rights."

96 For a fuller discussion, see for example the Congressional Record, vol. 136, no. 145 (22 October 1990) and vol. 137, no. 77 (21 May 1991).
98 U.S. Southern Command, Inter-American Cooperation, pp. 4-5.
In terms of implementation of the expanded IMET program, the Defense Resource Management Education Center in Monterey, CA, has redesigned its course on international management to include civilians; its aim is to teach management principles to senior military and civilian leaders. It will be the first program under IMET to incorporate civilians. In addition, the Naval Post Graduate school in Monterey offers a Masters degree in resources management, which will be open to both civilians and military personnel (although civilians will receive priority).

A particularly useful program that is already ongoing is known as Mobile Education Teams. These teams conduct a 2-week program in defense resources management, focusing on such issues as working with constrained budgets, managing money with competing resources, and--most important--linking budgetary issues with considerations about threat assessments and military strategy. Such programs have been conducted twice already in Honduras and Argentina, and one is scheduled for Chile during 1992. Approximately 40 students participate in each class, and of that number roughly 25 percent are civilians. In effect, this is the same type of program that will be conducted in Monterey, although the latter will be for a longer duration.

As for the expected level of civilian participation from Latin American countries, the decisions have not yet been made. There is an annual process for each of the Unified Commands to work with Security Assistance Training officers, but this has not yet been conducted with SOUTHCOM in 1992.

While there are some who find that the IMET program has not proven that exposure to the program yields a more democratically attuned military officer, there is widespread support for the expansion of IMET to include civilians. At the same time, it is admitted that it is still too early to determine whether this expansion will be successful; in fact, it will probably be 3 to 5 years before realistic appraisals of its successes and failures can be made. Until that time, the primary Congressional criteria for measuring success will likely be the actual number of civilian personnel involved in the program. The incorporation of civilians means that greater emphasis should be placed on instruction in such areas as resource management, national security affairs, and threat assessment. In addition, the more that civilians and military officers can be integrated in some of these programs, the more likely that the great divide between the military institution and the rest of society in Latin America can be reduced. Indeed, the lack of contacts between civilian and military
leaders both professionally and socially has been a long-standing impediment to the evolution of more effective civil-military relations in Latin America.  

Along these lines, a colloquia held at National Defense University in 1990 offered four specific proposals to help expand civilian capabilities. The group’s recommendations were to:

(1) immediately modify the Inter-American Defense College to make it half civilian and half military; (2) expand the training of civilians in the oversight and control of military matters; (3) expand the education of militaries in the support of civilian democracies by dramatically expanding IMET to emphasize education rather than training; and (4) specific orders be issued to assure that U.S. military activities are conducted in a way that they serve to enhance the control civilian authorities exercise over the military.

One of the greatest challenges will be identifying civilian personnel capable of assuming a more effective role in oversight of military issues. For many Latin American countries, civilian personnel in these positions have been little more than a rubber stamp for approving what the military wants. The expanded IMET program will need to focus on promising young officials who can move beyond that mentality; identifying these people will in itself present a challenge. One note of caution to be added in this connection is the fact that there is likely to be considerable divergence of opinion among Latin American countries about whether to be involved in this expanded effort; some countries may believe that their current system works perfectly well. Although current and past Argentine presidents have gone on record with the U.S. Congress about their support for this endeavor, it should not be expected that all other countries in the region will necessarily follow suit.

One possible constraint in expanding the IMET program may well test Congressional support. As the U.S. military draws down, there will be fewer spaces and fewer courses available at the same time that the number of those eligible and interested in participating will be increasing. Shrinking defense resources also makes it more likely that the per capita cost of these courses will increase, something that the services will be ill-prepared to absorb. If the Congress is truly interested in supporting greater efforts in this

99 This problem has been discussed in depth by a variety of U.S. specialists on Latin America, including Alfred Stepan. See, for example, his Rethinking Military Politics.

100 Proceedings of the Latin America Strategy Development Workshop, p. 84.

101 Statements by Menem and Alfonsin are contained in Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 77 (21 May 1991).
area, more funds should be made available through IMET (or some other fund) to cover some of the operating expenses of the schools and to otherwise help defray the costs to the military services since IMET is supposed to make use of DoD facilities and programs. Another option, of course, is that the Congress will decide to place greater emphasis on civilian schools (which in many cases would be cheaper), which would further erode the capability of U.S. military training schools and further de-emphasize the military training aspects of IMET programs. There is also the possibility that some participants could be offered sabbaticals on Capitol Hill. If such an effort proved successful, consideration might be given to establishing a kind of Presidential Management Internship for a limited number of participants each year.

There is, in fact, good reason to diversify the types of schools IMET students would attend. For example, senior-level civilian officials might join some of the senior-level military officers attending programs at U.S. War Colleges. In turn, a select number of the junior officers could benefit greatly from attending civilian universities where they could study not only security affairs (with civilian students), but also more general political science and government courses. The selection of such schools should be fairly limited, but there are certainly some programs which would be quite relevant and useful, such as at Johns Hopkins University and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. There are, admittedly, at least two impediments to this idea. First, it would be necessary to overcome the requirement that only DoD facilities be used in IMET programs. Second, and more fundamental, the number of Latin American officers that could likely benefit from such a program is probably quite small since many do not have the equivalent of an undergraduate education.\textsuperscript{102}

As efforts are made to identify some of the potential "rising stars"--both military and civilian--in the various countries who could most benefit from such experience as IMET can provide, suggestions should be obtained from as wide a variety of people as possible. U.S. embassy personnel in-country naturally can offer valuable inputs. In addition, personnel participating in PEPs, MTTs, SMEEs, etc., should all be methodically asked for any inputs they might have to offer. By the same token, efforts could be made to contact some of the academic as well as other government specialists in Latin American

\textsuperscript{102} This idea would, nevertheless, be well worth exploring in the overall context of IMET, as it applies to countries throughout the world.
affairs who have frequent contacts with Latin Americans in the national security arena. Thus, while those in charge of IMET obviously cannot dictate who will participate from any given country, some subtle, behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts could be used to emphasize the importance the United States attaches to ensuring the participation of high-quality personnel and the program's overall success.

In short, the inclusion of civilians in the IMET program is a positive step and one that can prove quite useful as many Latin American countries redefine the civil-military relationship. The broader issue of civil-military relations has already been addressed at length in Chapter II of this paper, but several points regarding U.S. involvement in the evolution of such relations in Latin America are worth noting here. First, the U.S. Government must ensure that its actions are in line with its stated objectives. In this case, we affirm that our objective is to support democratization in Latin America, a process in which local militaries certainly have a role to play. However, if we focus attention only or primarily on their militaries, we risk sending the wrong signal and undermining our objectives. Hence, the expansion of IMET to include civilians is particularly useful in helping us establish a range of contacts.

Another question relates to the very definition of civil-military relations and U.S. perceptions. Arturo Valenzuela cautions that U.S.-type standards should not necessarily be applied: "The dichotomy 'civil military relations' is an idealized projection of relationships of countries such as Great Britain and the United States. It is not very useful for the states of the Third World. There, the armed forces and the political system are highly interconnected, and the subordination of the armed forces is a problem under constant discussion." Sam Sarkesian suggests that civil-military relations "is the resulting balance between the military and society that emerges from the patterns of behavior and the interaction between military professionals and important political actors, and the power exercised by the military institution as a political actor."

IMET and other U.S. Government programs must seek to address the difficulties of increased civilian capabilities in security affairs while at the same time recognizing the continued importance of military input in these decisions. For example, Alfred Stepan has

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103 As discussed by Rial in Goodman et al., eds., *The Military and Democracy*, p. 277.
noted that, when questioned, congressional representatives in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay did not have professional staff dedicated to military matters, not believing "they had any right to call the military to public hearings. They felt the military would consider it historically illegitimate." In contrast, Stepan describes the Brazilian military's involvement in congressional hearings: "The military have constructed what is possibly the largest and best organized 'lobby' in the Brazilian Congress. On the other hand, the Brazilian Congress has not yet taken any steps to empower itself to be an informed and authoritative actor concerning military affairs." There have, nevertheless, been some attempts to create a more effective working relationship between civilians and military personnel in some Latin American countries. For example, in the war colleges of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia joint study of national security issues has been institutionalized. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Argentina set up a 1-year program on strategy with civilian and military participation. These are exactly the kinds of efforts that need to be encouraged and experiences from them shared among the Latin countries.

A final point bears remembering as the IMET program is expanded; that is, civil-military relations must not only address the military's role in politics but also help define what the military should do in the new environment. According to Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, "public opinion tends to regard this problem [of civil-military relations] only in the light of past perceptions--that is, how to diminish the political role of the military, rather than how to award a valid role to the military instrument in the state today." This can be accomplished, she suggests, only through the development of better communication links between the two groups, an area where IMET and other U.S. programs can make a valuable contribution.

107 Marcella, Journal of Interamerican Studies, p. 49.
108 Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse qualified the results of the first year of this effort as "excellent," but noted the difficulties in institutionalizing this type of effort. Gamba-Stonehouse, in Goodman et al., eds., The Military and Democracy, p. 173.
109 Ibid., p. 171.
V. STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are a number of areas in which U.S. security policy and security assistance could benefit from change as pertains to the Latin American region. Some of the most serious problem areas are, however, ones where there is little hope that effective change can be made. A paramount example is Congressional earmarking of 85 percent of security assistance funds to only five countries. While there is virtually universal frustration with the system as it exists today, it is also widely recognized that there is little hope of changing this system. Indeed, there have been attempts over the past several years within Congress itself to reform foreign aid, and eliminating earmarking was to be one of these reforms, but success has been distinctly lacking. The fundamental problem in this connection, particularly during election years, is the strength of the lobbies that these main recipient nations have on Capitol Hill and the power they are able to wield among members of Congress. Until such time as this overall political system can be revamped, it is difficult to imagine a significant shift in the procedures for security assistance funding.

While such realities create certain constraints for the U.S. Army and for U.S. policy in general, there are nevertheless areas in which changes can be effected. And such changes may help the U.S. Army play a more effective role in the Latin American region (and elsewhere). The following sections detail these recommendations, broken down loosely into two categories: areas in which the U.S. Army can act on its own and areas in which interagency cooperation is most useful.

A. U.S. ARMY EFFORTS

In light of the important role played by Latin American militaries in their countries, the U.S. Army can provide unique opportunities and contacts for overall U.S. policy in the region. It is therefore in the interests of the U.S. Army and U.S. Government as a whole for military-to-military relations to be maintained and developed. The utility of these relations has already been demonstrated by their ability to positively affect and broaden bilateral relations overall. The U.S. Army should continue to have a presence in the individual countries, recognizing on a case-by-case basis the possible sensitivities associated with a U.S. presence.
A variety of considerations dictate that the most useful kind of U.S. Army presence in Central and South America will focus on small-scale and low-visibility efforts. First, there are continuing Latin concerns that the United States is a country still too inclined toward intervention, particularly in what it has regarded as its "backyard." This makes many of the countries reluctant to accept a very large presence, even on a limited basis (such as for training activities). Second, the nature of the world environment is changing, with military solutions and capabilities taking a back seat to political and economic considerations. Putting too great an emphasis on a military presence--including in efforts such as engineer-type civic action--can send the wrong signal, especially as one of the main goals of U.S. policy is to reinforce democratization and military support for civilian authority. The types of Army activities that should receive the greatest priority are TATs, MTTs, PEPs, SMEEs, MEDRETEs, and DENTRETEs--programs that involve only a few people, people who are culturally aware and sensitive and who generally keep a low visibility.

In addition, small unit exchanges (SUEs) offer an opportunity for training large groups of soldiers. To conduct a SUE, it is necessary for the two countries to develop a Memorandum of Understanding, which would lay out reciprocal support for the exchange. The problem with this type of effort, however, is that most Latin American countries are constrained financially in their ability to participate in U.S.-hosted SUEs. The main difficulty for them is that most are legally obligated (by their governments) to pay their troops a fixed per diem, regardless of whether the United States reimburses the troops' expenses (for transportation, cost of living, etc.) or not.

Overall, programs such as these are extremely valuable and well-received by the host nations. They can provide the necessary assistance and expertise without the problems historically associated with a sizable U.S. presence in the countries, and they are a cost-effective way of doing so. Such programs are also a way of avoiding negative reaction by the U.S. public, particularly with current sentiments running strongly toward a withdrawal from external involvements. The level of involvement in a given country should obviously depend on specific assessments of the political situation, governmental will, and likely public reaction.

At the same time that a certain level of U.S. Army activity is maintained in host nation countries, the Army should also increase its emphasis on training provided to contingents of foreign nationals in CONUS. There are several ways in which this goal can be accomplished, but the key here is to offer training time for commanders and their
assigned staffs at facilities which offer capabilities not generally available in most Latin American countries. As an example, use can be made of training facilities where simulations are available to support wargaming exercises, particularly those that are not always used to capacity. These would not need to be purely Army facilities; the Joint Warfare Center type of activity could also be utilized. One approach would be to allow a group consisting of several echelons of commanders and staffs to run their own wargame. U.S. personnel would be available to help with simulations, gaming, and support, but the costs of the operation would be borne by the participating nation.\textsuperscript{1} Other examples might include simulation of U.S.-Foreign Nation combined operations. This approach not only encourages the exchange of ideas, but it facilitates for all participants the opportunity for cultural and institutional insight not necessarily available in other undertakings. If a given country could not afford this level of effort, another possibility would be the participation of some of its representatives as observers (or, indeed, players) in a reduced scenario. Most important, these efforts could be implemented using mechanisms and facilities that are already in place.

Also related to the subject of CONUS training is the expansion of IMET to include civilian participants. Greater emphasis is going to be placed on education rather than training, and certain adjustments in programs will need to be made given this shift in emphasis. The broadening of programs to include civilians should be embraced and seen as an important opportunity to help develop more effective civil-military relations. Until civilians develop greater capabilities in security matters, the problem of inadequate civilian control and legislative oversight of the military will persist. Broadening IMET training to include such topics as resources management, political attitudes toward democracy, and the role of the military will be beneficial to both military and civilian participants. These shifts in IMET might also open the door for foreign military personnel to attend civilian schools, as well as for senior civilian leaders to attend our national war colleges. This kind of civil-military integration, as well as civilians and military personnel from a given country studying within the same program, is a necessary and beneficial tool in today's world.

In addition, during IMET and Army-sponsored programs, an emphasis could be placed on expanding Latin exposure to various non-governmental U.S. agencies. When citizens from Latin American countries--civilian and military--visit the United States, efforts

\textsuperscript{1} It might opt to use some IMET funds for this purpose if expenses would prove difficult to cover. This overall idea of use of CONUS facilities is discussed more fully in Clark and Christenson, Resources and Constraints.
should be made to include on their itineraries visits to think tanks, academia, and other institutions involved in security studies, but not directly linked to the Government. Such meetings could be either informational or substantive.

As for the Army's specific missions in Latin America, care should be taken to emphasize more than the counter-drug role. While the Army must naturally follow general U.S. policy, it should actively seek a well-balanced list of priorities for its various activities in the Latin American region. For example, SMEEs provide an extremely valuable and unique opportunity to the U.S. Army to maintain bilateral contacts with Latin countries that do not have significant amounts of other contacts with the United States—countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It is vitally important to maintain contacts with such nations, not only for the sake of regional relations but also in the broader perspective of global relations. Efforts should therefore be made to give these and other countries higher priority than those already receiving substantial U.S. assistance (for instance through counter-drug programs).

To the extent that the Army is involved in the counter-drug effort, it should naturally continue to emphasize its strictly support role. It should also realize, however, that many remain skeptical about this stated position and sincerely fear that U.S. military involvement is likely to escalate. Efforts could also be made to put as much as possible into a multilateral context, thereby diffusing opposition both by the U.S. public and by host nation publics. While the counter-drug effort is an area (to date) where the Congress is willing to put money for the Services, the long-term strategy for the U.S. Army should ultimately be to minimize its role in the counter-drug mission, if not divest itself from it.

A stronger emphasis on civic action activities should also be avoided given widespread concerns about possibly undermining civilian authority and about supporting projects that have questionable utility for the local population. This is not to say that all such efforts should be abandoned, but rather that greater interagency cooperation be observed, that care be taken to show military subordination to civilian authority, and that more consideration be given to local population needs. To the extent that civic action does continue, the current emphasis on using reserves should be encouraged. In addition, certain low-visibility methods can also be adopted. For instance, under a PEP program, one U.S. engineer could be sent to the host nation to use his skills there while an engineer from that nation could work in a district engineer office here, gaining experience that could then be used in his own country. This could improve the expertise in such activities without involving large numbers of U.S. military personnel.
Another important role for the U.S. Army is its ability to serve as a "model" for encouraging a downsizing of Latin American armies. As U.S. forces themselves are downsized, discussions can be held with Latin counterparts about how some of the reduction decisions are made, and these discussions can also serve to underscore the U.S. military's continued commitment to the process of civilian oversight. This effort can be combined with possible projects to help establish reserve forces in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. As noted earlier, such an effort has already been instituted in Venezuela with considerable success. It is also another way in which small-level U.S. Army efforts have been and can be utilized effectively. From the perspective of the various Latin American countries that might establish such forces, they recognize that despite the initial investment, reserves are cheaper to maintain than active forces, and establishing reserves could ultimately ease some of the difficulties of downsizing the active force, although disputes over priorities for active and reserve components would likely be as vigorous as those here in the United States.

In all of its activities in the Latin American region, the U.S. Army should continue to place great emphasis on human rights training through the range of its programs in the region. This will be an increasingly important consideration, especially among members of Congress, particularly since the need to combat communist aggression can no longer be used by the Government as an excuse to overlook human rights abuses. By taking an active approach to focusing on such training, the military can gain the upper hand, showing Congress how serious it is about addressing these problems (rather than reacting to Congressional mandates). Related to the issue of interactions with Congress is the need to develop better Army capabilities in selling the importance of its programs to Congress. As budgets decline, such capabilities become increasingly vital.

U.S. Army activities in the Latin American region are best served by ensuring that as many of its representatives as possible have some language capability and an awareness of cultural sensitivities. In those cases where Ambassadorial positions may be filled with political appointments rather than regional experts, this factor becomes all the more important. It is also an increasingly necessary consideration in today's environment where more emphasis is placed on coalition-building in every sense (military, political, and economic). In this context, the Army's Foreign Area Officer program is quite important for providing knowledgeable, skilled military personnel. The FAO program is an excellent idea that has suffered from institutional bias within the Army (since there is a perception that these skills are less significant than the officer's branch specialty skills). Current
efforts to reduce FAO training (language training, master degree, and utilization tour in-country) to a 36-month period could ease some of the long-standing problems of FAOs being taken out of their branch speciality for too long; it is still too early to assess whether this shortening of the program will negatively affect the capabilities of the personnel being trained.\textsuperscript{2} An advantage that the active Army is exploiting during the downsizing of its force is encouraging those FAOs with appropriate skills who are departing to enter the reserves. The availability of their skills would be of particular utility in the event of a crisis situation.

B. INTERAGENCY EFFORTS

There are several areas where the U.S. Army has a role to play within the broader context of interagency activities. For example, there is long-standing recognition that the levels of interagency cooperation are insufficient. While it is clearly the responsibility of all government agencies to work together, the Army and DoD as a whole must ensure that it encourages such interaction and takes active steps to do so. Related to this is the need to make more effective use of security assistance funds which may be reduced in the face of declining budgets. If there were better coordination among government agencies, some efforts could be combined.

One particular area where such cooperation should occur is that of civic action. Particularly in this area, where arguments are strong that it should be civilian expertise that is being developed, the need for the Army to work with USAID is quite important. Admittedly, there have been reluctance and obstacles on both sides to a good working relationship. As it currently stands, such coordination is largely dependent on personal relations between the representative within an individual embassy. There are clearly many obstacles that remain, such as differing approaches and solutions to problems, but a more concerted effort is required of all parties involved. The reality is that the agencies will no longer to be able to afford to work without each other.

Within the U.S. embassies in each country, greater efforts should be made to underscore the importance of the military's contribution to the overall Country Team objectives. Particularly in light of cutbacks in the numbers of embassy personnel due to financial constraints, it is that much more important to provide a coherent and regularized input about the variety of activities military representatives have been able to perform. For example, there is some concern that because personnel participating in PEPs are outside the

\textsuperscript{2} This is discussed more fully in Clark and Christenson, \textit{Resources and Constraints}.
embassy compound, their value is not sufficiently appreciated. Regular briefings of their activities will help to demonstrate the very valuable benefits such programs can provide. Indeed, these kinds of activities can be extremely useful in getting a sense of the local problems and priorities that those working inside the embassy compound every day will not necessarily see.

Finally, it is recommended that an interagency group--including Congressional staff--be established to elaborate a mutually acceptable evaluation procedure for IMET. The inclusion of civilians in the IMET program is a positive step and one that can prove quite useful as many Latin American countries redefine the civil-military relationship. But in light of this expansion, the creation of a more effective evaluation procedure for IMET becomes all the more important. Critics have long contended that little is done to ensure that IMET participants actually use the training and experience they received through the program. This reasoning is countered by the argument that U.S. insistence on tracking former IMET personnel would be seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of the participating nations. Moreover, it can be extremely difficult to assess some of the benefits that IMET offers (such as improved quality of life for the students during the participation in the program). Yet because this program has considerable potential in its ability to advance military and civilian thinking on security affairs, an active effort should be made to address these concerns.

The first aim of this interagency group would be to identify possible appropriate criteria for evaluating the IMET program. How should its "success" or "failure" be measured? How can the utility of the training and education received be assessed? How can the overall impact of IMET be appraised? Is this impact meeting U.S. objectives? Is the type of instruction provided appropriate to the needs of the participants? These would be some of the issues that would need to be addressed. Following agreement on the criteria to be used, the group would also have to determine how this evaluation would be carried out and who would be responsible. Tasking the individual embassies with this responsibility would seem to put additional pressure on resources already being strained and cut, although their inputs would obviously be necessary. Should it be the Defense Security Assistance Agency or the Government Accounting Office that assumes responsibility? Would the necessary levels of cooperation be provided from DoD, State, and other U.S. Government agencies, and would this cooperation be more likely under the supervision of the Executive branch's DSAA or the Legislative branch's GAO? As an alternative, should a non-government agency be entrusted with the responsibility? These,
again, would be issues that the interagency group would need to address. While these will undoubtedly be difficult matters on which to reach agreement, such efforts are increasingly necessary in order to maintain broad-based support for continuing, or even expanding, the IMET program.

There are obviously other areas in which the U.S. Army can undertake initiatives in its Latin American policy, either independently or in conjunction with other U.S. agencies. The above recommendations do, however, provide a starting point as the Army considers what its civil-military support role can and should be in Central and South America in today's environment which is no longer ruled by East-West confrontation.
Appendix A

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Appendix A

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

This appendix contains tables for Fiscal Years 1979 through 1992, outlining the major security assistance programs—Economic Support Fund, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training—for South and Central American countries. Each table also indicates the total level of funding received by the region and the total level of U.S. security assistance funding worldwide.

In addition to the relevant countries, these tables contain certain Latin American-specific programs that are funded through Title 22 security assistance. Both the Central America Regional and the Latin America and Caribbean Regional programs are funded through the Economic Support Fund (ESF). These programs are designed to address issues that can be dealt with most effectively on a regional basis. They seek to improve human rights, the justice system, education and training, and living conditions generally. Some projects include assisting in elections, helping develop legislative management, and supporting freedom of the press. An additional benefit of these programs is that they can provide assistance to countries where there is no USAID mission, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia.

PACAMS stands for the various U.S. military schools that have been located in Panama such as the Army's School of the Americas, the Air Force's Inter-American Air Force Academy, and the Navy's Small Craft Instruction and Training Team. Historically, PACAMS has received funding from the International Military Education and Training budget. However, now that both the Army and Air Force's schools have been relocated to CONUS (Fort Benning and Holmstead Air Force Base, respectively), this item is being phased out.

The Regional Military Training Center was an effort undertaken in the mid-1980s to establish a training center in Central America itself (in Honduras), funded through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The purpose was to be able to train Central American military personnel more efficiently and cheaply. The program also offered a way of allowing more U.S. trainers into the region, given the Congressional restriction that a maximum of 55 U.S. trainers could be stationed in El Salvador. However, historic animosities between El Salvador and
Honduras, coupled with the Honduran government conclusion that the benefits it was deriving from this arrangement were not as great as expected, resulted in the program being halted. The ultimate result was the construction of an Army National Training Center designed to be able to train between 800 and 1200 men every 3 months, which now allows the Hondurans to train all their personnel in one area, thereby providing a more efficient system.

The Andean Narcotics Initiative has evolved as a result of the U.S. administration's commitment to assist in fighting the drug war, especially in the Andean countries. The Initiative is funded through ESF and is being allocated to Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru--in addition to the other security assistance funding these countries already receive. As noted in the text, there are also other monies set aside for DoD efforts in combatting the drug problem, under the program known as International Narcotics Matter, or INM. Since FY1989 (through the first quarter of FY1992), the total amount of funds received by DoD under INM was $3.2 million. All told, Congress appropriated $450 million to DoD for counter-drug activities in FY1990 and about $1.1 billion in FY1991.
Table A-1. Security Assistance Programs
Budget Authority
Central and South America
(Current Dollars, in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Support Fund</th>
<th>FMS Financing</th>
<th>MAP (Grant)</th>
<th>IMET (Grant)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Belize</td>
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<td>826</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>96</td>
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*FMS financing split evenly between Treasury Rate and Concessionary Rate for these countries; all other countries received Concessionary Rate.
Table A-2. Security Assistance Programs

Budget Authority
Central and South America
(Current Dollars, in Thousands)

<table>
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<th>FY1986 (Actual)</th>
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<td>Suriname</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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### Table A-4. Security Assistance Programs

**Budget Authority**

*Central and South America*

*(Current Dollars, in Thousands)*

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<th>Economic Support Fund</th>
<th>MAP (Grant)</th>
<th>IMET (Grant)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>682</td>
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<td><strong>Venezuela</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Regional Total:</strong></td>
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*Source: Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency, Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1990.*
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic Support Fund</th>
<th>MAP (Grant)</th>
<th>IMET (Grant)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>600</td>
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Table A-6. Security Assistance Programs
Budget Authority
Central and South America
(Current Dollars, In Thousands)

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### Table A-8. Security Assistance Programs

**Budget Authority**

**Central and South America**

(Current Dollars, in Thousands)

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/a Provisional allocation as follows: Bolivia $100 million, Colombia $50 million, Peru $100 million. Final allocations will depend on each country's performance in meeting drug program objectives.
Appendix B

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Appendix B

BIBLIOGRAPHY


1 This bibliography was compiled by Theophilos Gemelas.


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B-5


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Appendix C

GLOSSARY
## Appendix C

### GLOSSARY

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<tr>
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<td>Conference of American Armies</td>
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<td>Central American Common Market</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>Continental United States</td>
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